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Senate v Ermita gr 169777 (2006)

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the
President has abused power by issuing E.O. 464 Ensuring
Observance of the Principles of Separation of Powers, Adherence to
the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public
Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation
Under the Constitution, and for Other Purposes. Petitioners pray
for its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional.
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the
Philippines, through its various Senate Committees, conducts
inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter
alia, the attendance of officials and employees of the executive
department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in
Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).
The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials
of the Executive Department for them to appear as resource
speakers in a public hearing on the railway project, others on the
issues of massive election fraud in the Philippine elections, wire
tapping, and the role of military in the so-called Gloriagate
Scandal.
Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from
the President as provided by E.O. 464, Section 3 which requires all
the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the
consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of
Congress.
ISSUE:
Is sec 3 of E.O. 464 (2005) constitutional?
RULING:
The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part. To determine the
validity of the provisions of EO 464, the SC sought to distinguish
Section 21 from Section 22 of Art 6 of the 1987 Constitution. The
Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of
Article VI of the Constitution. Although there is no provision in the
Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with
power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that
it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively,
such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be
implied. In other words, the power of inquiry with process to
enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the
legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or
effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions
which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the
legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information
which is not infrequently true recourse must be had to others who
do possess it.
Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question Hour. The
Question Hour is closely related with the legislative power, and it is
precisely as a complement to or a supplement of the Legislative
Inquiry. The appearance of the members of Cabinet would be very,
very essential not only in the application of check and balance but
also, in effect, in aid of legislation. Section 22 refers only to
Question Hour, whereas, Section 21 would refer specifically to
inquiries in aid of legislation, under which anybody for that matter,
may be summoned and if he refuses, he can be held in contempt of
the House. A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of
legislation and the question hour. While attendance was meant to
be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in
inquiries in aid of legislation. Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while
closely related and complementary to each other, should not be
considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One
specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may be
used for legislation, while the other pertains to the power to
conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain
information in pursuit of Congress oversight function. Ultimately,
the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive
officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find
their basis in the principle of separation of powers.
While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature,
it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to
comply with its demands for information. When Congress exercises
its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt
themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not
exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one
executive official may be exempted from this power the
President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the
reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is
based on her being the highest official of the executive branch, and
the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government

which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom. The requirement

then to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is
only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For
under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of
department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their
part. Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of
department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not
bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department
head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is
subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the
Executive Secretary.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department
heads are implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right
to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to
whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a
report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances,
Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that
Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when
the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is in aid of
legislation under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the
same reasons stated in Arnault.

Bengzon v Senate Blue Ribbon Committee

Digest
G.R. No. 89914 November 20, 1991
Padilla, J.:
Facts:
1. Petitioner was one of the defendants in a civil case filed by the
government with the Sandiganbayan for the alleged anomalous
sale of Kokoy Romoaldez of several government corporations to the
group of Lopa, a brother-in-law of Pres. Aquino.
2. By virtue of a privilege speech made by Sen. Enrile urging the
Senate to look into the transactions, an investigation was
conducted by the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. Petitioners and
Ricardo Lopa were subpoenaed by the Committee to appear before
it and testify on "what they know" regarding the "sale of thirty-six
(36) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez."
3. At the hearing, Lopa declined to testify on the ground that his
testimony may "unduly prejudice" the defendants in civil case
before the Sandiganbayan.
4. Petitioner filed for a TRO and/or injunctive relief claiming that
the inquiry was beyond the jurisdiction of the Senate. He
contended that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee acted in excess
of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose. One of the defendants in
the case before the Sandiganbayan, Sandejas, filed with the Court
of motion for intervention. The Court granted it and required the
respondent Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to comment on the
petition in intervention.
ISSUE: Whether the Blue Ribbon inquiry was in aid of legislation
NO.
1. There appears to be no intended legislation involved. The
purpose of the inquiry to be conducted is not related to a purpose
within the jurisdiction of Congress, it was conducted to find out
whether or not the relatives of President Aquino, particularly Mr.
Lopa had violated RA 3019 in connection with the alleged sale of
the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy"
Romualdez to the Lopa Group.
2. The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid
of legislation is not absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is
circumscribed by the Constitution. As provided therein, the
investigation must be "in aid of legislation in accordance with its
duly published rules of procedure" and that "the rights of persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected." It
follows then that the rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must
be respected, including the right to due process and the right not
to be compelled to testify against one's self.
3. The civil case was already filed in the Sandiganbayan and for the
Committee to probe and inquire into the same justiciable
controversy would be an encroachment into the exclusive domain
of judicial jurisdiction that had already earlier set in. The issue
sought to be investigated has already been pre-empted by the
Sandiganbayan. To allow the inquiry to continue would not only
pose the possibility of conflicting judgments between the
legislative committee and a judicial tribunal.
4. Finally, a congressional committees right to inquire is subject to
all relevant limitations placed by the Constitution on governmental
action including the relevant limitations of the Bill of Rights. One of
these rights is the right of an individual to against selfincrimination. The right to remain silent is extended to respondents
in administrative investigations but only if it partakes of the nature
of a criminal proceeding or analogous to a criminal proceeding.
Hence, the petitioners may not be compelled by respondent
Committee to appear, testify and produce evidence before it only

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because the inquiry is not in aid of legislation and if pursued would
be violative of the principle of separation of powers between the
legislative and the judicial departments of the government as
ordained by the Constitution.

ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, petitioner, vs. THE

SECRETARY OF FINANCE and THE COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents. G.R. No. 115455
August 25, 1994
FACTS: Herein various petitioners seek to declare RA 7166 as
unconstitutional as it seeks to widen the tax base of the existing
VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the
National Internal Revenue Code. The value-added tax (VAT) is
levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as
well as on the sale or exchange of services. It is equivalent to 10%
of the gross selling price or gross value in money of goods or
properties sold, bartered or exchanged or of the gross receipts
from the sale or exchange of services.
CREBA asserts that R.A. No. 7716 (1) impairs the obligations of
contracts, (2) classifies transactions as covered or exempt without
reasonable basis and (3) violates the rule that taxes should be
uniform and equitable and that Congress shall "evolve a
progressive system of taxation."
With respect to the first contention, it is claimed that the
application of the tax to existing contracts of the sale of real
property by installment or on deferred payment basis would result
in substantial increases in the monthly amortizations to be paid
because of the 10% VAT. The additional amount, it is pointed out, is
something that the buyer did not anticipate at the time he entered
into the contract.
It is next pointed out that while Section 4 of R.A. No. 7716 exempts
such transactions as the sale of agricultural products, food items,
petroleum, and medical and veterinary services, it grants no
exemption on the sale of real property which is equally essential.
The sale of real property for socialized and low-cost housing is
exempted from the tax, but CREBA claims that real estate
transactions of "the less poor," i.e., the middle class, who are
equally homeless, should likewise be exempted.
Finally, it is contended, for the reasons already noted, that R.A. No.
7716 also violates Art. VI, Section 28(1) which provides that "The
rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall
evolve a progressive system of taxation."
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7166 violates the principle of
progressive system of taxation.

HELD: No, there is no justification for passing upon the claims that
the law also violates the rule that taxation must be progressive and
that it denies petitioners' right to due process and that equal
protection of the laws. The reason for this different treatment has
been cogently stated by an eminent authority on constitutional law
thus: "When freedom of the mind is imperiled by law, it is freedom
that commands a momentum of respect; when property is
imperiled it is the lawmakers' judgment that commands respect.
This dual standard may not precisely reverse the presumption of
constitutionality in civil liberties cases, but obviously it does set up
a hierarchy of values within the due process clause."
Petitioners contend that as a result of the uniform 10% VAT, the tax
on consumption goods of those who are in the higher-income
bracket, which before were taxed at a rate higher than 10%, has
been reduced, while basic commodities, which before were taxed
at rates ranging from 3% to 5%, are now taxed at a higher rate.
Just as vigorously as it is asserted that the law is regressive, the
opposite claim is pressed by respondents that in fact it distributes
the tax burden to as many goods and services as possible
particularly to those which are within the reach of higher-income
groups, even as the law exempts basic goods and services. It is
thus equitable. The goods and properties subject to the VAT are
those used or consumed by higher-income groups. These include
real properties held primarily for sale to customers or held for lease
in the ordinary course of business, the right or privilege to use

industrial, commercial or scientific equipment, hotels, restaurants

and similar places, tourist buses, and the like. On the other hand,
small business establishments, with annual gross sales of less than
P500,000, are exempted. This, according to respondents, removes
from the coverage of the law some 30,000 business
establishments. On the other hand, an occasional paper of the
Center for Research and Communication cities a NEDA study that
the VAT has minimal impact on inflation and income distribution
and that while additional expenditure for the lowest income class is
only P301 or 1.49% a year, that for a family earning P500,000 a
year or more is P8,340 or 2.2%.
Lacking empirical data on which to base any conclusion regarding
these arguments, any discussion whether the VAT is regressive in
the sense that it will hit the "poor" and middle-income group in
society harder than it will the "rich," is largely an academic
exercise. On the other hand, the CUP's contention that Congress'
withdrawal of exemption of producers cooperatives, marketing
cooperatives, and service cooperatives, while maintaining that
granted to electric cooperatives, not only goes against the
constitutional policy to promote cooperatives as instruments of
social justice (Art. XII, 15) but also denies such cooperatives the
equal protection of the law is actually a policy argument. The
legislature is not required to adhere to a policy of "all or none" in
choosing the subject of taxation. 44
Nor is the contention of the Chamber of Real Estate and Builders
Association (CREBA), petitioner in G.R. 115754, that the VAT will
reduce the mark up of its members by as much as 85% to 90% any
more concrete. It is a mere allegation. On the other hand, the claim
of the Philippine Press Institute, petitioner in G.R. No. 115544, that
the VAT will drive some of its members out of circulation because
their profits from advertisements will not be enough to pay for their
tax liability, while purporting to be based on the financial
statements of the newspapers in question, still falls short of the
establishment of facts by evidence so necessary for adjudicating
the question whether the tax is oppressive and confiscatory.
Indeed, regressivity is not a negative standard for courts to
enforce. What Congress is required by the Constitution to do is to
"evolve a progressive system of taxation." This is a directive to
Congress, just like the directive to it to give priority to the
enactment of laws for the enhancement of human dignity and the
reduction of social, economic and political inequalities (Art. XIII,
1), or for the promotion of the right to "quality education" (Art. XIV,
1). These provisions are put in the Constitution as moral
incentives to legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights.

Lung Center of the Philippines vs Quezon City

Facts: The Lung Center of the Philippines is a non-stock and non
profit entity created by PD 1823. The ground floor of the hospital
was leased for private enterprises such as the canteens, small
stores and clinics for medical practitioners who charge their
patients for medical professional services. It is also mentioned that
a portion was also leased to a private enterprise for commercial
purposes which is known as the Elliptical Orchids and Garden
Center. The petitioners accept paying and non-paying patients
while they are still subsidized by the government. The respondents
charged real property tax to the petitioners. However, the
petitioners invoked that they are exempted from that real property
tax due to the fact that they are a charitable institution as
mandated by the sec. 28(3), article VI of 1987 Constitution. The
Local Board of City Appeals of Quezon City dismissed their petition
and hold that they are liable for real property taxes. The City Board
of Assessment Appeals of Quezon City and the Court of Appeals,
affirmed that decision. Consequently, the petitioner filed its
petition in the Supreme Court on the ground that lower court erred
in their in declaring that they are not entitiled with the real tax
exemption and even though they are not declared as real tax
exempt under its charter, PD 1823, said exemption may
nevertheless be extended upon proper application.
Issue: whether or not the petitioner is a chariable institution
Whether the real properties of the petitioner are exempt from real
property tax
Ruling:
The Lung Center of the Philippines is a charitable institution due to
it is constituted by the statute creating the enterprise, its corporate
purposes, its constitution and by-laws, the methods of
administration, the nature of actual work performed, the character
of service rendered, the indefiniteness of the beneficiaries, and the
use and occupation of the properties. As long as it exists to carry
out a purpose reorganized in law as charitable and not maintained
for gain or private advantage.

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Under the 1972, 1987 Constitution and Local government code, in
order to be entitled to the exemption, it must be a charitable
institution and its real properties are actually, directly and
exclusively used for charitable purposes. Exclusive is meant as
possessed and enjoyed to the exclusion of others. If a real property
is used for one more commercial purposes, it is not exclusively
used for the exempted purposes but is subject to taxation. What is
meant by actual, direct and exclusive use of the property for
charitable purposes is the direct and intermediate and actual
application of the property itself to the purposes for which the
charitable institution is organized. Thus, the portion leased to
private entities as well as those parts of the hospital leased to
private individuals are subjected to real property tax while the
hospital and its clinic whether for paying or non-paying patients are
exempt from real property tax liability.

can therefore legally and fairly serve as basis for determining the
existence of a prima facie case of forfeiture of the Swiss funds. The
Republic did not fail to establish a prima facie case for the
forfeiture of the Swiss deposits. The Swiss deposits which were
transferred to and are deposited in escrow at the Philippine
National Bank in the estimated aggregate amount of
US$658,175,373.60 as of 31 January 2002, plus interest, were
forfeited in favor of the Republic.

G.R. No. 152154 July 15, 2003

Republic (petitioner), through the Presidential Commission on Good

Government (PCGG), represented by the Office of the

Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan

GR. No. 152154, July 15, 2003, Corona, J.
FACTS:

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (SPECIAL FIRST
DIVISION),Ferdinand E. Marcos (representedby his
estate/heirs: Imelda R.Marcos, Maria Imelda
[Imee]Marcos-Manotoc, Ferdinand R.Marcos, Jr. and
Irene Marcos-Araneta) and Imelda RomualdezMarcos
FACTS:
Petitioner Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good
Government(PCGG), represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), filed a petition for forfeiture before the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioner sought the declaration of the aggregate
amount of US$356 million (now estimated to be more than US$658
million inclusive of interest) deposited in escrow in the PNB, as illgotten wealth. The funds were previously held by the following five
account groups, using various foreign foundations in certain Swiss
banks. In addition, the petition sought the forfeiture of US$25
million and US$5 million in treasury notes which exceeded the
Marcos couples salaries, other lawful income as wellas income
from legitimately acquired property. The treasury notes are frozen
at the Central Bank of the Philippines by virtue of the freeze order
issued by the PCGG. Before the case was set for pre-trial, a General
Agreement and the Supplemental Agreement dated December 28,
1993 were executed by the Marcos children and then PCGG
Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo for a global settlement of the
assets of the Marcos family to identify, collate, cause the inventory
of and distribute all assets presumed to be owned by the Marcos
family under the conditions contained therein.
ISSUE: WON the Swiss funds can be forfeited in favor of the
Republic, on the basis of the Marcoses lawful income.
HELD:
NO.RA 1379 raises the prima facie presumption that a property is
unlawfully acquired, hence subject to forfeiture, if its amount or
value is manifestly disproportionate to the official salary and other
lawful income of the public officer who owns it. The following facts
must be established in order that forfeiture or seizure of the Swiss
deposits maybe effected: (1) ownership by the public officer of
money or property acquired during his incumbency, whether it be
in his name or otherwise, and (2) the extent to which the amount
of that money or property exceeds, i.e., is grossly disproportionate
to, the legitimate income of the public officer. Herein, the spouses
Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos were public officials during the time
material to the present case was never in dispute. The spouses
accumulated salary of $304,372.43 should be held as the only
known lawful income of the Marcoses since they did not file any
Statement of Assets and Liabilities(SAL), as required by law, from
which their networth could be determined. Besides, under the1935
Constitution, Ferdinand E. Marcos as President could not receive
"any other emolument from the Government or any of its
subdivisions and instrumentalities". Likewise, under the 1973
Constitution, Ferdinand E .Marcos as President could "not receive
during his tenure any other emolument from the Government or
any other source."Their only known lawful income of $304,372.43

Solicitor General (OSG), filed a petition for forfeiture before the

Sandiganbayan pursuant to RA 1379, An Act Declaring Forfeiture
In Favor of the State Any Property To Have Been Unlawfully
Acquired By Any Public Officer or Employee and Providing For the
Procedure Therefor.
In the said case, petitioner sought the declaration of the aggregate
amount of US$ 356M deposited in escrow in the PNB, as ill-gotten
wealth. The funds were previously held by 5 account groups, using
various foreign foundations in certain Swiss banks. In addition, the
Republic sought the forfeiture of US$25 million and US$5 million in
treasury notes, which exceeded the Marcos couple's salaries, other
lawful income as well as income from legitimately acquired
property. The treasury notes were frozen at the Central Bank of the
Philippines, now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, by virtue of the freeze
order issued by the PCGG. Before the case was set for pre-trial, a
General Agreement and the Supplemental Agreement dated
December 28, 1993 were executed by the Marcos children and
then PCGG Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo for a global
settlement of the assets of the Marcos family. The General
Agreement/Supplemental Agreements sought to identify, collate,
cause the inventory of and distribute all assets presumed to be
owned by the Marcos family under the conditions contained
therein. The General Agreement specified in one of its "whereas
clauses" the fact that petitioner obtained a judgment from the
Swiss Federal Tribunal on December 21, 1990, that the US$356
million belongs deposited in the name of the aforementioned 5
account groups were of illegal provenance. The funds were
thereafter. remitted to the Philippines in escrow. Subsequently,
respondent Marcos children moved that the funds be placed
incustodia legis because the deposit in escrow in the PNB was
allegedly in danger of dissipation by petitioner. The
Sandiganbayan, in its resolution dated September 8, 1998, granted
the motion. Hearings were conducted by the Sandiganbayan on the
motion for summary judgment filed by petitioner. Sandiganbayan
ruled in favor of the Petitioner, approving the
General/Supplemental Agreements. However, in a resolution dated
31 January 2002, the
Sandiganbayan reversed itself and denied said motion for
summary judgment. It ruled that the evidence offered for
summaryjudgment of the case did not prove that the money in the
Swiss Banks belonged to the Marcos spouses because no legal
proof exists in the record as to the ownership by the Marcoses of
the funds in escrow from the Swiss Banks. The basis for the
forfeiture in favor of the government cannot be deemed to have
been established.
The Republic filed the petition for certiorari.
ISSUE
: Whether petitioner Republic was able to prove its case for
forfeiture in accordance with the requisites of Sections 2 and 3 of
RA 1379. Note: Section 2. Filing of petition.
Whenever any public officer or employee has acquired during his
incumbency an amount or property which is manifestly out of
proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to
his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired

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property, said property shall be presumed prima facie to have
been unlawfully acquired.
RULING:
YES. The Republic was able to establish a prima facie case for the
forfeiture of the Swiss funds pursuant to RA 1379. RA 1379 raises
the prima faciepresumption that a property is unlawfully acquired,
hence subject to forfeiture, if its amount or value is manifestly
disproportionate to the official salary and other lawful income of
the public officer who owns it. The following facts must be
established in order that forfeiture or seizure of the Swiss deposits
may be effected: a. ownership by the public officer of money or
property acquired during his incumbency, whether it be in his
name or otherwise, and b. the extent to which the amount of that
money or property exceeds, i. e., is grossly disproportionate to, the
legitimate income of the public officer. c. that the said amount is
manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or
employee and to his other lawful income and the income from
legitimately acquired property.
That spouses Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos were public officials
during the time material to the instant case was never in dispute.
The combined accumulated salaries of the Marcos couple were
reflected in the Certification dated May 27, 1986 issued by then
Minister of Budget and Management Alberto Romulo. The
Certification showed that, from 1966 to 1985, Ferdinand E. Marcos
and Imelda R. Marcos had accumulated salaries in the amount of
P1,570,000 andP718,750, respectively, or a total of P2,288,750. In
addition to their accumulated salaries from 1966 to 1985 are the
Marcos couples combined salaries from January to February 1986
in the amount of P30,833.33. Hence, their total accumulated
salaries amounted to P2,319,583.33.

G.R. No. 152154 July 15, 2003 REPUBLIC OF THE

PHILIPPINES vs.HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN(SPECIAL FIRST
DIVISION),Ferdinand E. Marcos (representedby his
estate/heirs: Imelda R.Marcos, Maria Imelda
[Imee]Marcos-Manotoc, Ferdinand R.Marcos, Jr. and
Irene Marcos-Araneta) andImelda RomualdezMarcos
FACTS:
Petitioner Republic, through thePresidential Commission on Good
Government(PCGG), represented by the Office of theSolicitor
General (OSG), filed a petition forforfeiture before the
Sandiganbayan. Petitionersought the declaration of the
aggregateamount of US$356 million (now estimated tobe more
than US$658 million inclusive of interest) deposited in escrow in
the PNB, as ill-gotten wealth. The funds were previously heldby the
following five account groups, usingvarious foreign foundations in
certain Swissbanks. In addition, the petition sought theforfeiture of
US$25 million and US$5 million intreasury notes which exceeded
the Marcoscouples salaries, other lawful income as wellas income
from legitimately acquiredproperty.The treasury notes are frozen at
theCentral Bank of the Philippines by virtue of thefreeze order
issued by the PCGG. Before thecase was set for pre-trial, a General
Agreementand the Supplemental Agreement datedDecember 28,
1993 were executed by theMarcos children and then PCGG
ChairmanMagtanggol Gunigundo for a global settlementof the
assets of the Marcos family to identify,collate, cause the inventory
of and distributeall assets presumed to be owned by the
Marcosfamily under the conditions contained therein.
ISSUE: WON the Swiss funds can be forfeited in favor of the
Republic, on the basis of theMarcoses lawful income.
HELD: NO.RA 1379 raises the prima faciepresumption that a
property isunlawfullyacquired, hence subject to forfeiture, if
itsamount or value is manifestly disproportionateto the official
salary and other lawful income of the public officer who owns it.
The followingfacts must be established in order thatforfeiture or
seizure of the Swiss deposits maybe effected: (1) ownership by the
public officerof money or property acquired during hisincumbency,
whether it be in his name orotherwise, and (2) the extent to which
theamount of that money or property exceeds, i.e., is

grosslydisproportionate to, thelegitimate income of the public

officer. Herein,the spouses Ferdinand and Imelda Marcoswere
public officials during the time material tothe present case was
never in dispute.The spouses accumulated salary of $304,372.43
should be held as the only knownlawful income of the Marcoses
since they didnot file any Statement of Assets and Liabilities(SAL),
as required by law, from which their networth could be determined.
Besides, under the1935
Constitution, Ferdinand E. Marcos asPresident could not receive
"any otheremolument from the Government or any of
itssubdivisions and instrumentalities". Likewise,under the 1973
Constitution, Ferdinand E.Marcos as President could "not receive
duringhis tenure any other emolument from theGovernment or any
other source."Their only known lawful income of $304,372.43 can
therefore legally and fairlyserve as basis for determining the
existence of a prima facie case of forfeiture of the Swissfunds. The
Republic did not fail to establish aprima facie case for the forfeiture
of the Swissdeposits.The Swiss deposits which weretransferred to
and are deposited in escrow atthe Philippine National Bank in the
estimatedaggregate amount of US$658,175,373.60 as of 31
January 2002, plus interest, were forfeitedin favor of the Republic

G.R. No. 146738

March 2, 2001

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner,

vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, respondent.
Facts
On the line in the cases at bar is the office of the President.
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada alleges that he is the President on
leave while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo claims she is the
President.
In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada
was elected President while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
was elected Vice-President.
From the beginning of his term, estrada was plagued by a plethora
of problems that slowly eroded his popularity. on October 4, 2000.
Ilocos Sur Governor, Luis "Chavit" Singson, friend estrada, went on
air and accused the him, his family and friends of receiving millions
of pesos from jueteng lords.
October 5, 2000, Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr., delivered a fiery
privilege speech entitled "I Accuse." He accused the petitioner of
receiving some P220 million in jueteng money from Governor
Singson from November 1998 to August 2000. He also charged
that the petitioner took from Governor Singson P70 million on
excise tax on cigarettes intended for Ilocos Sur.
The privilege speech was referred by then Senate President
Franklin Drilon, to the Blue Ribbon Committee (then headed by
Senator Aquilino Pimentel) and the Committee on Justice (then
headed by Senator Renato Cayetano) for joint investigation
The House Committee on Public Order and Security, then headed
by Representative Roilo Golez, decided to investigate the expos of
Governor Singson.
Representatives Heherson Alvarez, Ernesto Herrera and Michael
Defensor spearheaded the move to impeach the estrada.
On October 11, Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin issued a pastoral
statement in behalf of the Presbyteral Council of the Archdiocese of
Manila, asking petitioner to step down from the presidency as he
had lost the moral authority to govern.
October 17, former President Corazon C. Aquino also demanded
that the petitioner take the "supreme self-sacrifice" of resignation.
Arroyo resigned as Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare
and Services6 and later asked for petitioner's
resignation.7 However, petitioner strenuously held on to his office
and refused to resign.
On November 20, the Senate formally opened the impeachment
trial of the petitioner. Twenty-one (21) senators took their oath as
judges with Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.,
presiding.
On December 7, the impeachment trial started.

5
"(1) to inform the parties that the Court did not issue a
resolution on January 20, 2001 declaring the office of the
President vacant and that neither did the Chief Justice
issue a press statement justifying the alleged resolution;

December hearings was the testimony of Clarissa Ocampo, senior

vice president of Equitable-PCI Bank. She testified that she was one
foot away from petitioner Estrada when he affixed the signature
"Jose Velarde" on documents involving a P500 million investment
agreement with their bank on February 4, 2000.
On January 11, Atty. Edgardo Espiritu who served as petitioner's
Secretary of Finance took the witness stand. He alleged that the
petitioner jointly owned BW Resources Corporation with Mr. Dante
Tan who was facing charges of insider trading.

(2) to order the parties and especially their counsel who

are officers of the Court under pain of being cited for
contempt to refrain from making any comment or
discussing in public the merits of the cases at bar while
they are still pending decision by the Court, and

January 16, when by a vote of 11-1017 the senator-judges ruled

against the opening of the second envelope which allegedly
contained evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a
secret bank account under the name "Jose Velarde." The public and
private prosecutors walked out in protest of the ruling.
January 18 saw the high velocity intensification of the call for
petitioner's resignation. A 10-kilometer line of people holding
lighted candles formed a human chain from the Ninoy Aquino
Monument on Ayala Avenue in Makati City to the EDSA Shrine to
symbolize the people's solidarity in demanding petitioner's
resignation. Students and teachers walked out of their classes in
Metro Manila to show their concordance. Speakers in the
continuing rallies at the EDSA Shrine, all masters of the physics of
persuasion, attracted more and more people.
On January 19, the fall from power of the petitioner appeared
inevitable. At 1:20 p.m., the petitioner informed Executive
Secretary Edgardo Angara that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, had defected. At 2:30 p.m.,
petitioner agreed to the holding of a snap election for President
where he would not be a candidate.
General Reyes declared that "on behalf of Your Armed Forces, the
130,000 strong members of the Armed Forces, we wish to
announce that we are withdrawing our support to this
government."
To stem the tide of rage, petitioner announced he was ordering his
lawyers to agree to the opening of the highly controversial second
envelope.26There was no turning back the tide. The tide had
become a tsunami.
January 20 turned to be the day of surrender. At 12:20 a.m., the
first round of negotiations for the peaceful and orderly transfer of
power started at Malacaang'' Mabini Hall, Office of the Executive
Secretary.
At about 12:00 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to
respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines.28 At 2:30 p.m.,
petitioner and his family hurriedly left Malacaang Palace.
On January 22, the Monday after taking her oath, respondent
Arroyo immediately discharged the powers the duties of the
Presidency. On the same day, this Court issued the following
Resolution in Administrative Matter No. 01-1-05-SC, to wit:
On February 6, respondent Arroyo nominated Senator Teofisto
Guingona, Jr., as her Vice President
On February 7, the Senate passed Resolution No. 83 declaring that
the impeachment court is functus officio and has been
terminated.47 Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago stated "for the
record" that she voted against the closure of the impeachment
court on the grounds that the Senate had failed to decide on the
impeachment case and that the resolution left open the question of
whether Estrada was still qualified to run for another elective post.
After his fall from the pedestal of power, the petitioner's legal
problems appeared in clusters. Several cases previously filed
against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion.
on February 6, filed GR No. 146738 for Quo Warranto. He prayed
for judgment "confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent
President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to
discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have
taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President,
only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution."
In a resolution dated February 20, acting on the urgent motion for
copies of resolution and press statement for "Gag Order" on
respondent Ombudsman filed by counsel for petitioner in G.R. No.
146738, the Court resolved:

(3) to issue a 30-day status quo order effective

immediately enjoining the respondent Ombudsman from
resolving or deciding the criminal cases pending
investigation in his office against petitioner, Joseph E.
Estrada and subject of the cases at bar, it appearing from
news reports that the respondent Ombudsman may
immediately resolve the cases against petitioner Joseph E.
Estrada seven (7) days after the hearing held on February
15, 2001, which action will make the cases at bar moot
and academic."53
ISSUES
Whether the petitions present a justiciable controversy.
Assuming that the petitions present a justiciable
controversy, whether petitioner Estrada is a President on
leave while respondent Arroyo is an Acting President.
Whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a
condition precedent for the criminal prosecution of
petitioner Estrada. In the negative and on the assumption
that petitioner is still President, whether he is immune
from criminal prosecution.
Whether the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be
enjoined on the ground of prejudicial publicity.
Whether the petitions present a justiciable controversy.
Whether or not the cases At bar involve a political question
The cases at bar pose a political question, and hence, are beyond
the jurisdiction of this Court to decide. They contend that shorn of
its embroideries, the cases at bar assail the "legitimacy of the
Arroyo administration." They stress that respondent Arroyo
ascended the presidency through people power; that she has
already taken her oath as the 14th President of the Republic; that
she has exercised the powers of the presidency and that she has
been recognized by foreign governments. They submit that these
realities on ground constitute the political thicket, which the Court
cannot enter.
We reject private respondents' submission
It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom,
not legality of a particular measure." To a great degree, the 1987
Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political question
doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial review of this court
not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable but also to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of government.
Needless to state, the cases at bar pose legal and not political
questions. The principal issues for resolution require the proper
interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution,
notably section 1 of Article II,74 and section 875 of Article VII, and
the allocation of governmental powers under section 1176 of Article
VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential
immunity from suit. They also involve the correct calibration of the
right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity. As early as the 1803
case of Marbury v. Madison,77 the doctrine has been laid down
that "it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is . . ." Thus, respondent's in
vocation of the doctrine of political question is but a foray in the
dark.
Whether or not the petitioner
Resigned as President
Petitioner denies he resigned as President or that he suffers from a
permanent disability. Hence, he submits that the office of the

6
President was not vacant when respondent Arroyo took her oath as
President.

1.

"Sec. 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office

or resignation of the President, the Vice President shall become the
President to serve the unexpired term. In case of death, permanent
disability, removal from office, or resignation of both the President
and Vice President, the President of the Senate or, in case of his
inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall then
act as President until the President or Vice President shall have
been elected and qualified.

2.

The issue then is whether the petitioner resigned as President or

should be considered resigned as of January 20, 2001 when
respondent took her oath as the 14th President of the Public.
Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual
question and its elements are beyond quibble: there must be an
intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of
relinquishment.78 The validity of a resignation is not government
by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be
written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the
resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect.
In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any
formal letter of resignation before he evacuated Malacaang Palace
in the afternoon of January 20, 2001 after the oath-taking of
respondent Arroyo. Consequently, whether or not petitioner
resigned has to be determined from his act and omissions before,
during and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior,
contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial
evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue.
Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as
President.
In sum, we hold that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be
doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving Malacaang. In the press
release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the
oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit
with reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was
leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of
peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He
did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind inability and
that he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the
disability disappears: (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people
for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring
to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President
(4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that
may come ahead in the same service of our country. Petitioner's
reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the
president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his
supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national
spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give
up the presidency. The press release was petitioner's valedictory,
his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the part tense.
Whether or not the petitioner Is only temporarily unable to
Act as President.
The petitioner that he is merely temporarily unable to perform the
powers and duties of the presidency, and hence is a President on
leave. As aforestated, the inability claim is contained in the January
20, 2001 letter of petitioner sent on the same day to Senate
President Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella.
Petitioner postulates that respondent Arroyo as Vice President has
no power to adjudge the inability of the petitioner to discharge the
powers and duties of the presidency. His significant submittal is
that "Congress has the ultimate authority under the Constitution to
determine whether the President is incapable of performing his
functions in the manner provided for in section 11 of article
VII."95 This contention is the centerpiece of petitioner's
stance that he is a President on leave and respondent Arroyo is
only an Acting President.
An examination of section 11, Article VII is in order.
That is the law. Now, the operative facts:

3.

Petitioner, on January 20, 2001, sent the above

letter claiming inability to the Senate President
and Speaker of the House;
Unaware of the letter, respondent Arroyo took
her oath of office as President on January 20,
2001 at about 12:30 p.m.;
Despite receipt of the letter, the House of
Representatives passed on January 24, 2001
House Resolution No. 175;

On the same date, the House of the Representatives

passed House Resolution No. 176
"RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES TO THE ASSUMPTION INTO OFFICE BY VICE
PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO AS PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, EXTENDING ITS CONGRATULATIONS
AND EXPRESSING ITS SUPPORT FOR HER ADMINISTRATION AS A
PARTNER IN THE ATTAINMENT OF THE NATION'S GOALS UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION
On February 7, 2001, the House of the Representatives
passed House Resolution No. 178
"RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGALARROYO'S NOMINATION OF SENATOR TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR.
AS VICE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
On February 7, the Senate also passed Senate Resolution No.
82
"RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL
ARROYO'S NOMINATION OF SEM. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS
VICE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
On the same date, February 7, the Senate likewise passed Senate
Resolution No. 83 "RESOLUTION RECOGNIZING THAT THE
IMPEACHMENT COURT IS FUNCTUS OFFICIO
On February 8, the Senate also passed Resolution No.
84 "certifying to the existence of vacancy in the Senate and calling
on the COMELEC to fill up such vacancy through election to be held
simultaneously with the regular election on May 14, 2001 and the
Senatorial candidate garnering the thirteenth (13th) highest number
of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of Senator Teofisto
T. Guingona, Jr.'
What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is that
both houses of Congress have recognized respondent
Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition
is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada. Is no
longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected
petitioner's claim of inability
In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not
resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a
President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable
to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by
Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de
jure, president made by a co-equal branch of government
cannot be reviewed by this Court.
Whether or not the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit.
Assuming he enjoys immunity, the extent of the immunity
Petitioner Estrada makes two submissions: first, the cases filed
against him before the respondent Ombudsman should be
prohibited because he has not been convicted in the impeachment
proceedings against him; and second, he
enjoys immunity from all kinds of suit, whether criminal or civil.
Our 1935 Constitution took effect but it did not contain any specific
provision on executive immunity. Then came the tumult of the
martial law years under the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos and
the 1973 Constitution was born. In 1981, it was amended and one
of the amendments involved executive immunity. Section 17,
Article VII stated:
"The President shall be immune from suit during his
tenure. Thereafter, no suit whatsoever shall lie for official
acts done by him or by others pursuant to his specific
orders during his tenure.

7
The immunities herein provided shall apply to the
incumbent President referred to in Article XVII of this
Constitution.
We reject his argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the
reason that he must first be convicted in the impeachment
proceedings. The impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was
aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors and by the events that
led to his loss of the presidency. Indeed, on February 7, 2001, the
Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83 "Recognizing that the
Impeachment Court is Functus Officio." 109 Since, the Impeachment
Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to demand
that he should first be impeached and then convicted before he
can be prosecuted. The plea if granted, would put a perpetual bar
against his prosecution. Such a submission has nothing to
commend itself for it will place him in a better situation than a nonsitting President who has not been subjected to impeachment
proceedings and yet can be the object of a criminal prosecution. To
be sure, the debates in the Constitutional Commission make it
clear that when impeachment proceedings have become moot due
to the resignation of the President, the proper criminal and civil
cases may already be filed against him,

This is in accord with our ruling In Re: Saturnino Bermudez 111 that
'incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought
to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure" but not
beyond. Considering the peculiar circumstance that the
impeachment process against the petitioner has been aborted and
thereafter he lost the presidency, petitioner Estrada cannot
demand as a condition sine qua non to his criminal prosecution
before the Ombudsman that he be convicted in the impeachment
proceedings. His reliance on the case of Lecaroz vs.
Sandiganbayan112 and related cases113 are inapropos for they have
a different factual milieu.
We now come to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by
petitioner as a non-sitting President. The cases filed against
petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder,
bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination
can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death
penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a nonsitting president. Petitioner cannot cite any decision of this Court
licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him
with post-tenure immunity from liability. It will be anomalous to
hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability for unlawful acts
and conditions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are
not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting
as such but stands in the same footing as any trespasser. 114
There are more reasons not to be sympathetic to appeals to stretch
the scope of executive immunity in our jurisdiction. One of the
great themes of the 1987 Constitution is that a public office is a
public trust.118 It declared as a state policy that "the State shall
maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take
positive and effective measures against graft and corruptio." 119 it
ordained that "public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, and efficiency act with patriotism and justice, and
lead modest lives."120 It set the rule that 'the right of the State to
recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or
employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees, shall
not be barred by prescription, latches or estoppel." 121 It maintained
the Sandiganbayan as an anti-graft court.122 It created the office of
the Ombudsman and endowed it with enormous powers, among
which is to "investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person,
any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or
agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust
improper or inefficient."123 The Office of the Ombudsman was also
given fiscal autonomy.124 These constitutional policies will be
devalued if we sustain petitioner's claim that a non-sitting
president enjoys immunity from suit for criminal acts committed
during his incumbency.
Whether or not the prosecution of petitioner
Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity
Petitioner also contends that the respondent Ombudsman should
be stopped from conducting the investigation of the cases filed
against him due to the barrage of prejudicial publicity on his guilt.
He submits that the respondent Ombudsman has developed bias
and is all set file the criminal cases violation of his right to due
process.

there is not enough evidence to warrant this Court to

enjoin the preliminary investigation of the petitioner by the
respondent Ombudsman. Petitioner needs to offer more than
hostile headlines to discharge his burden of proof. 131 He needs to
show more weighty social science evidence to successfully prove
the impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision. Well
to note, the cases against the petitioner are still
undergoing preliminary investigation by a special panel of
prosecutors in the office of the respondent Ombudsman. No
allegation whatsoever has been made by the petitioner that the
minds of the members of this special panel have already been
infected by bias because of the pervasive prejudicial publicity
against him. Indeed, the special panel has yet to come out with its
findings and the Court cannot second guess whether its
recommendation will be unfavorable to the petitioner.
Again, we hold that the evidence proffered by the petitioner
is insubstantial. The accuracy of the news reports referred to by
the petitioner cannot be the subject of judicial notice by this Court
especially in light of the denials of the respondent Ombudsman as
to his alleged prejudice and the presumption of good faith and
regularity in the performance of official duty to which he is
entitled. Nor can we adopt the theory of derivative prejudice
of petitioner, i.e., that the prejudice of respondent
Ombudsman flows to his subordinates. In truth, our Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, give investigation prosecutors the
independence to make their own findings and recommendations
albeit they are reviewable by their superiors. 134 They can be
reversed but they can not be compelled cases which they believe
deserve dismissal. In other words, investigating prosecutors should
not be treated like unthinking slot machines. Moreover, if the
respondent Ombudsman resolves to file the cases against the
petitioner and the latter believes that the findings of probable
cause against him is the result of bias, he still has the remedy of
assailing it before the proper court.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions of Joseph Ejercito Estrada
challenging the respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as the de
jure 14th President of the Republic are DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.