FORCE MAJEURE CASES

G.R. No. L-87584 June 16, 1992GOTESCO

INVESTMENT CORPORATION,
petitioner,vs. GLORIA E. CHATTO and LINA DELZA CHATTO, respondents.
FACTS:
1.Respondents went to see the movie Mother Dear at Superama Theater owned by petitioner.
2.Hardly ten minutes after entering the theater, the ceiling of the balcony collapsed. The theater
was plunged into the darkness. Shocked and hurt, respondents managed to crawl under the
fallen ceiling. As soon as they were able to get out,they walked to the nearby FEU hospital for
treatment.
3. The next day they transferred to UST hospital. Due to the continuing pain, respondent Gloria
went to the US for further treatment.
4. Respondents filed a case for damages.
5. Trial court ruled in favor of respondents.
a. The ceiling collapsed because of some structural construction or architectural defect.
b. Petitioner is grossly negligent in failing to cause proper and adequate inspection and upkeep
of the building.
6. CA affirmed the decision.
7.Petitioners defense:
a. The ceiling of the balcony collapsed due to force majeure
ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner is liable. HELD: YES
Petitioner presented Mr. Ong as its witness. Mr. Ong admitted that he could not give any reason
why the ceiling collapsed. The real reason why Mr. Ong could not explain the cause or reason is
that he did not actually conduct the investigation. It was not shown that any causes
denominated as force majeure obtained immediately before or at the time of the collapse of the
ceiling. Such defects could have easily been discovered if only petitioner exercised due diligence
and care in keeping and maintaining the premises. But as disclosed by Mr. Ong, there was no
adequate inspection nor the nature and extent of the same. It is settled that: The owner or
proprietor of a place of public amusement impliedly warrants that the premises, appliances and
amusement devices are safe for the purpose for which they are designed, the doctrine being
subject to no other exception or qualification than that he does not contract against unknown
defects not discoverable by ordinary or reasonable means.
14 This implied warranty has given rise to the rule that: Where a patron of a theater or other
place of public amusement is injured, and the thing that caused the injury is wholly and
exclusively under the control and management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in
the ordinary course of events would not have happened if proper care had been exercised, its
occurrence raises a presumption or permits of an inference of negligence on the part of the
defendant.
15 That presumption or inference was not overcome by the petitioner. Besides, even assuming
for the sake of argument that, as petitioner vigorously insists, the cause of the collapse was due

to force majeure, petitioner would still be liable because it was guilty of negligence, which the
trial court denominated as gross. As gleaned from Bouvier's definition of and Cockburn's
elucidation on force majeure for one to be exempt from any liability because of it, he must have
exercised care, i.e. , he should not have been guilty of negligence.
NAPOCOR vs CA
GR 103442-45 May 21, 1993
FACTS:
This is a consolidated case comprising of four separate complaints., filed against NPC and a
particular Chavez. Plaintiffs filed a complaint against respondent for the lost of lives and
destruction of properties due to the negligence of the latter in releasing water from Angat dam
during the typhoon Kading Benjamin Chavez, being the supervisor at that time of a multipurpose hydroelectric plant in the Angat River at Hilltop, Norzagaray, Bulacan, failed to exercise
due diligence in monitoring the water level at the dam. NPCs allegations were as follows:
1) the NPC exercised due care, diligence and prudence in the operation and maintenance of the
hydroelectric plant;
2) the NPC exercised the diligence of a good father in the selection of its employees; 3) written
notices were sent to the different municipalities of Bulacan warning the residents therein about
the impending release of a large volume of water with the onset of typhoon "Kading" and advise
them to take the necessary precautions;
4) the water released during the typhoon was needed to prevent the collapse of the dam and
avoid greater damage to people and property;
5) in spite of the precautions undertaken and the diligence exercised, they could still not contain
or control the flood that resulted and;
6) the damages incurred by the private respondents were caused by a fortuitous event or force
majeure and are in the nature and character of damnum absque injuria. By way of special
affirmative defense, the defendants averred that the NPC cannot be sued because it performs a
purely governmental function.
The trial court dismissed the complaints as against the NPC on the ground that the provision of
its charter allowing it to sue and be sued does not contemplate actions based on tort. Its decision
on 30 April 1990 dismissing the complaints "for lack of sufficient and credible evidence."
Court of Appeals reversed the appealed decision and awarded damages in favor of the private
respondents. Based on the findings that From the mass of evidence extant in the record, We are
convinced, and so hold that the flash flood on October 27, 1978, was caused not by rain waters
(sic), but by stored waters (sic) suddenly and simultaneously released from the Angat Dam by
defendants-appellees, particularly from midnight of October 26, 1978 up to the morning hours of
October 27, 1978.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is negligent?
Whether or not the notices of warning were insufficient?
Whether or not The damages suffered was not DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA?
HELD:
We declared therein that the proximate cause of the loss and damage sustained by the plaintiffs
therein who were similarly situated as the private respondents herein was the negligence of
the petitioners, and that the 24 October 1978 "early warning notice" supposedly sent to the
affected municipalities, the same notice involved in the case at bar, was insufficient.
The petitioners were guilty of "patent gross and evident lack of foresight, imprudence and
negligence in the management and operation of Angat Dam," and that "the extent of the
opening of the spillways, and the magnitude of the water released, are all but products of
defendants-appellees' headlessness, slovenliness, and carelessness."
To exempt the obligor from liability under Article 1174 of the Civil Code, for a breach of an
obligation due to an "act of God," the following must concur: (a) the cause of the breach of the
obligation must be independent of the will of the debtor; (b) the event must be either
unforseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor

to fulfill his obligation in a moral manner; and (d) the debtor must be free from any participation
in, or aggravation of the injury to the creditor. (Vasquez v. Court of Appeals, 138 SCRA 553;
Estrada v. Consolacion, 71 SCRA 423; Austria v. Court of Appeals, 39 SCRA 527; Republic of the
Phil. v. Luzon Stevedoring Corp., 21 SCRA 279; Lasam v. Smith, 45 Phil. 657).
Accordingly, petitioners cannot be heard to invoke the act of God or force majeure to escape
liability for the loss or damage sustained by private respondents since they, the petitioners, were
guilty of negligence. The event then was not occasioned exclusively by an act of God or force
majeure; a human factor negligence or imprudence had intervened. The effect then of the
force majeure in question may be deemed to have, even if only partly, resulted from the
participation of man. Thus, the whole occurrence was thereby humanized, as it were, and
removed from the laws applicable to acts of God.
ELIAS S. CIPRIANO and/or E.S. CIPRIANO ENTERPRISES, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF
APPEALS and MACLIN ELECTRONICS, INC.,respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
FACTS:
E.S. Cipriano Enterprises, owned by petitioner Cipriano, is engaged in the rustproofing of
vehicles, under the style Motobilkote. On April 30, 1991, private respondent Maclin Electronics,
Inc., through an employee, brought a 1990 model Kia Pride Peoples car to petitioners shop for
rustproofing. The job order showed the date it was received for rustproofing as well its condition
at the time. Neither the time of acceptance nor the hour of release, however, was
specified. According to the petitioner, the car was brought to his shop at 10 oclock in the
morning of April 30, 1991 and was ready for release later that afternoon, as it took only six hours
to complete the process of rustproofing In the afternoon of May 1, 1991, fire broke out at the
Lambat restaurant, which petitioner also owned, adjoining his Mobilkote rustproofing shop. The
fire destroyed both the shop and the restaurant, including private respondents car.
On May 8 1991, MACLIN sent a letter to petitioner, demanding reimbursement for the value of
the Kia Pride. In reply, petitioner denied liability on the ground that the fire was a fortuitous
event (Art. 1174 and 1262, NCC), prompting private respondent to bring this suit for the value of
its vehicle and for damages. Private respondent argued that petitioner was liable for the loss of
the car even if it was caused by a fortuitous event. It contended that the nature of petitioners
business required him to assume the risk because under P.D. No. 1572, petitioner was required to
insure his property as well as those of his customers.
RTC ruled in favor of MACLIN stating that the failure of defendant to comply with P.D. No. 1572 is
in effect a manifest act of negligence which renders defendant [petitioner herein] liable for the
loss of the car even if the same was caused by fire, and that rustproffing is definitely covered
by P.D. No. 1572. Since petitioner did not register his business and insure it, he must bear the
cost of loss of his customers. CA affirmed the RTCs decision.
ISSUE: Whether petitioners failure to abide by PD 1572 constitutes negligence
HELD:
We have already held that violation of a statutory duty is negligence per se. We stated that
where the very injury which was intended to be prevented by the ordinance has happened, noncompliance with the ordinance was not only an act negligence but also the proximate cause.
Indeed, the existence of a contract between petitioner and private respondent does not bar a
finding of negligence under the principles of quasi-delict. Petitioners negligence is the source of
his obligation. He is not being held liable for breach of his contractual obligation due to
negligence but for his negligence in not complying with a duty imposed on him by law. It is
therefore immaterial that the loss occasioned to private respondent was due to a fortuitous
event, since it was petitioners negligence in not insuring against the risk which was the
proximate cause of the loss.
There is thus a statutory duty imposed on petitioner and it is for his failure to comply with this
duty that he was guilty of negligence rendering him liable for damages to private
respondent. While the fire in this case may be considered a fortuitous event,this circumstance
cannot exempt petitioner from liability for loss.
WHEREFORE, the decision, dated November 18, 1992, of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with
the modification that the award of attorneys fees is DELETED.

Exercise of diligence article 2180 of the civil code

MISTAKE AND WAVER
REYNALDA GATCHALIAN vs. ARSENIO DELIM and the HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
G.R. No. L-56487 October 21, 1991
FACTS:
Reynalda Gatchalian boarded paying passenger bus own by Arsenio Delim. Said bus is
bound to Baung La Union. During the course of the trip, the passengers already noticed a
snapping sound which the driver ignored. Somewehre along the highway of Bo. Payocpoc, the
vehicle bumped a cement flower po on the side of the road causing the vehicle to go off the road,
turn turtle and fall of the ditch.
Consequently, several passengers including Gatchalian were injured. They were promptly
taken to Bethany Hospital at San Fernando, La Union for medical treatment.
On 14 July 1973, while injured passengers were confined in the hospital, Mrs. Adela Delim,
wife of respondent, visited them and later paid for their hospitalization and medical expenses.
However, before Mrs. Delim left, she had the injured passengers, including petitioner, sign a
prepared affidavit of quit claim
Notwithstanding this document, Gathalian still filed with the then Court of First Instance of La
Union an action extra contractu to recover compensatory and moral damages.
In defense, respondent averred that the vehicular mishap was due to force majeure, and
that petitioner had already been paid and moreover had waived any right to institute any action
against him by virtue of the signed affidavit.
ISSUE:
Is Gatchalian still entitled for damages despite execution of affidavit of quit claim?
HELD:
Yes, Gatchalian is still entitled for damages.
The Supreme Court held that since what is involved is the liability of a common carrier for
injuries sustained by passengers in respect of whose safety a common carrier must exercise
extraordinary diligence. Thus, the waiver cannot be used as an escape for liability.
Delim failed to rebut the statutory presumption of negligence as prescribed in Artibles
1733 and 1755 of the NCC. To overcome this presumption, the common carrier must slow to the
court that it had exercised extraordinary diligence to prevent the injuries.
The act of the driver of ignoring the snapping sound and continued on driver despite it
being noticed by most passengers is a clear proof of utter negligence. This could also mean that
the bus had not been checked physically or mechanically to determine what was causing the
"snapping sound" which had occurred so frequently that the driver had gotten accustomed to it.

A common carrier is bound to carry its passengers safely" as far as human care and
foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of a very cautious person, with due regard to all
the circumstances".

III. VICARIOUS LIABILITY

Article 2180 to 2194 of the Civil Code
SABINA EXCONDE vs. DELFIN CAPUNO, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-10134
June 29, 1957
Facts:
Dante Capuno was a member of the Boy Scouts organization and a student of Balintawak
Elementary school. On March 31, they were instructed by the schools supervisor to attend a
parade in honor of Dr. Jose Rizal. From school, Dante and other students boarded the jeep that
was going to take them to the parade. Dante then drove the jeep, while the driver sat by his side.
They have not gone too far when the jeep turned turtle resulting to the death of two of its
passengers, Amado Ticzon and Isidore Caperi.
Issue:
Whether or not Delfin capuno may be held jointly and severally liable with his son Dante
Capuno, for the civil liability of his tortuous act?
Held:
Although at the time of the accident the father was not present, plaintiff contends that at
the time of the accident Dante was a minor who was living with his parents. The court thus found
that Delfin Capuno should be held solidarily liable for the tortuous act of his son Dante, for his
failure to exercise proper parental authority.

Salen vs. Balce

SEVERINO SALEN and ELENA SALBANERA vs. JOSE BALCE
G.R. No. L-14414. 27 April 1960.
Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of Camarines Norte.
Bautista Angelo, J.:
Facts: Plaintiffs are the legitimate parents of Carlos Salen who died from wounds caused by
Gumersindo Balce, a legitimate son of defendant who was then single, 18 yrs old and was living
with defendant. As a result of C. Salen's death, G. Balce was accused and convicted of homicide
and was sentenced to imprisonment and to pay the amount of P2,000.00. Plaintiffs brought this
action against defendant before CFI to recover the sum of P2,000.00, with legal interest.
Defendant, in his answer, set up the defense that the law upon which plaintiffs predicate their
right to recover does not here apply for the reason that law refers to quasi-delicts and not to
criminal cases. CFI sustained the theory of defendant.
Issue: WON appellee can be held subsidiary liable to pay the indemnity in accordance with Art.
2180 of the CC.
Ruling: Judgment reversed.
Art 2180 CC applies in the case at bar. To hold otherwise would result in the absurdity that while
for an act where mere negligence intervenes the father or mother may stand subsidiarily liable
for the damage caused by his or her son, no liability would attach if the damage is caused with
criminal intent. Verily, the void that apparently exists in the RPC (art.101) is subserved by this
particular provision of our CC, as may be gleaned from some recent decisions of the SC which
cover equal or identical cases.
G.R. No. L-16929

July 31, 1961

ESTANISLAWA CANLAS, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
CHAN LIN PO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Bienvenido V. Zapa for plaintiff-appellant.
Gelasio L. Dimaano and Romeo D. Laig for defendants-appellees.
BARRERA, J.:
In Criminal Case No. 19353 filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila, Juanito Chan was
charged with homicide through reckless imprudence, in that on June 11, 1951, being then the
driver of a motor vehicle with plate T-5713-1951, Manila, he drove and operated said vehicle
along Rizal Avenue Extension, Manila, in a reckless and imprudent manner, thereby causing it to
hit Nicolas Paras, aged 65, and run over his head, crushing it flat, resulting in the latter's
instantaneous death.
At the initial stage of the trial of said criminal case, reservation was made by the private
prosecutor representing the widow of the deceased, for the filing of a separate civil action, which
was in fact subsequently filed.
Notwithstanding his aforementioned reservation, the private prosecutor continue handling the
prosecution of the criminal case until trial thereof was terminated. In due time, decision was
rendered the dispositive part of which reads:
Wherefore, finding the accused Juanito Chan y Diala guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
as charged in the case at bar, the court hereby sentences said accused Juanito Chan y Diala to
one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional, to indemnify the heirs of the victim,
Nicolas Paras, in the amount of P5,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
and to pay the costs.
Upon appeal by the accused Juanito Chan, the Court of Appeals, despite the fact that its
attention was called to the reservation to file a separate civil action, rendered judgment thus:
Wherefore, we hereby sentence appellant to undergo an indeterminate penalty of not less than
one (1) year and not more than four (4) years of prision correccional. With this only modification,
the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs.
In the civil action filed pursuant to the reservation it is alleged, inter alia, that defendants Chan
Lim Po, Remedios Diala, and Lim Koo, were the operators and owners of truck No. T-5713-1951,
registered in the name of defendant Juanito Chan y Diala; that the death of the victim, Nicolas
Paras, left destitute his widow, plaintiff Estanislawa Canlas, and their five legitimate children; that
defendants operators of the truck in question had committed the unpardoanble fault and the
imprudence of employing their co-defendant Juanito Chan y Diala to drive said vehicle, knowing
as they do that the latter not then have the necessary license to drive motor vehicles, his license
having been confiscated by the authorities for various traffic violations, and knowing,
furthermore, that he was insolvent and that he was employed only because he was the son of
defendants Chan Lim Po and Remedios Diala.
Defendants, in their answer dated January 2, 1953, alleged that prior to July 4, 1952, the sole
owner and operator of the truck in question was defendant Lim Koo; that on July 4, 1952, said
truck was bought by defendant Remedios Diala that defendant Chan Lim Po, was never co-owner
or operator of said vehicle; that defendant Juanito Chan y Diala was not employed as driver of
said truck on June 11, 1951 when the mishap occurred or at any time before or after said date;
and that oil the alleged date of the accident, the truck referred to was out of order and as not
used, and was not involved in any accident.
On January 18, 1954 and on April 12, 1957, the case as ordered dismissed and the records sent
to the archives, for failure of plaintiff Canlas to prosecute. However, upon plaintiff's motion, on
the ground that the reason why she had not asked for the setting of the trial of the civil case was
because she was waiting for the outcome of the trial the criminal case (No. 19353), the present
case was ordered reinstated on July 3, 1957.
Finally, on April 7, 1958, this case was heard. Plaintiff presented as her only witness her
daughter, Isabel Paras Vda. de Morales, who identified Exhibit A (copy of the decision in Criminal
Case No. 19353, CFI Manila) and exhibit B (copy of the decision of the Court of Appeals in the
same criminal case appealed to it CA-G.R. No. 63-R). In addition, she testified regarding the

earning capacity of her deceased father as carpenter, and the effect of his death upon her, her
plaintiff mother, and the other fibers of the family. Exhibit D was, likewise, offered to that plaintiff
tried to execute the judgment of Court of Appeals as to the indemnity of P5,000.00, and
defendant Juanito Chan y Diala served the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, on account of
his inability to pay the indemnity.
Counsel for defendants did not cross-examine plaintiff's sole witness, but limited himself to
offering, as evidence for defendants, Exhibits 1 and 2, the briefs filed in the Court of Appeals in
the criminal action, inviting attention to Exhibits 1-A and 2-A, which apprised the Court of
Appeals of the reservation made by counsel for herein plaintiff to file a separate civil action.
In its decision dated April 29, 1958 (the one now on appeal) absolving defendants from the
complaint, and dismissing their (defendants') counterclaim, the lower court stated:
It is the contention of defendants that when the trial court sentenced the accused, Juanito Chan y
Diala, in the criminal action, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Nicolas Paras in the amount
of P5,000.00, which sentence was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, despite the aforesaid
reservation to file a separate civil action, this constitutes res judicata, and is a bar to the present
civil action. Defendants claim that while it is true that the reservation was made, nevertheless
the same was disregarded by the Court, and abandoned by plaintiff, when judgment was
rendered as already stated, without said plaintiff either asking that the indemnity be stricken out,
or appealing from that portion of the decision. On the other hand, it appears that plaintiff had
tried to execute the judgment for indemnity. The contention referred to is meritorious; and no
evidence having been presented against the co-defendants of Juanito Chan y Diala not even with
respect to the relationship of said Juanito Chan y Diala, with his co-defendants, it is not seen how
this action can prosper.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, absolving defendants from the complaint, and
dismissing defendants' counterclaim, without pronouncement a to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Her motion for reconsideration of said decision having been denied, plaintiff interposed the
present appeal, claiming that the trial court erred
1. In holding that Criminal Case No. 19353 of the Court of First Instance of Manila is res
judicata to the instant case.
2. In holding that plaintiff-appellant had not presented evidence against other defendantsappellees.
At the outset, let it be said that there seems to be a confusion in the mind of counsel for plaintiffappellant as to the basis of the complaint, whether it is for the purpose of enforcing the primary
civil liability of defendants Chan Lin Po, Remedios Diala and Lim Koo (the first two, as parents of
defendant Juanito Chan y Diala, and the last, as the latter's employer) under Article 2180 of the
New Civil Code, or their subsidiary liability under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. (See
paragraph 11 of the amended complaint, page 34 of the Record on Appeal, which speaks of
the primary liability of defendants, and appellant's argument invoking Article 103 of the Revised
Penal Code and the cases cited in pages 4 and 5 of appellant's brief, all referring
to subsidiary liability.) Be this as it may, the judgment in the criminal case, except as to the fact
of commission by the accused of the act charged therein, can not be considered as res
judicata constituting a bar to the present action, whether it be to enforce the subsidiary or
primary liability of defendants who were not parties to the criminal case. The two cases are
different in nature and purpose, and they affect different parties. Hence, to the extent that the
decision appealed from holds that the present action barred by the adjudication of indemnity in
the criminal case, the same is reversed.
With respect to the second assignment of error, the appeal has no merit. There is absence of
proof that the accused Juanito Chan y Diala was an employee (as driver) of defendant Lim Koo at
the time of the mishap on June 11, 1951, or that the latter, as his employer was at the time
engaged in a business or industry. Exhibit A (decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila in
Crim. Case No. 19358) and Exhibit B (decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 14463-R)
presented in evidence by appellant, do not categorically state that said accused was, at the time
of the mishap, an employee of said defendant. And, as observed by the trial court in the present
case, "no evidence having been presented against the co-defendants of Juanito Chan y Diala, not
even with respect to the relationship of said Juanito Chan y Diala with his co-defendants, it is not

seen how this action can prosper." Hence, defendant Lim Koo can not be held subsidiarily liable
to appellant under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code.1 Neither could he be held primarily
responsible to appellant under paragraph 5, Article 2180 of the New Civil Code.2 As already
stated, there is no evidence as to the accused's relationship to said defendant. Furthermore, it
was not shown that the accused, even as employee of Lim Koo acted within the scope of his
assigned task at the time of the mishap. Likewise, defendants Chan Lin Po and Remedios Diala,
(father and mother of accused) can not be held answerable under paragraph 2, Article 2180 of
said Code,3 there being no proof that said accused was, at the time of the mishap, a minor living
in the company of his parents. In fact, there is the finding in the decision of the Court of Appeals
(Exhibit B) that he (accused) was at the time of the mishap a married man. In the circumstances,
the dismissal of the present action by trial court was proper.
The case of Buyayao, et al. v. Itogon Mining Co., Inc. (G.R. No. L-8277, prom. April 28, 1956) cited
as authority by appellant, is inapplicable. In said case, we affirmed the decision of the trial court
holding Itogon Mining Co., Inc. subsidiarily liable (as employer of Alejandro Bentres, convicted of
homicide for the killing of one Dalasdas) in the sum of P4,000.00 under Article 103 of the Revised
Penal Code, not only due to the finding in the judgment of the Court of Appeals that its employee
Bentres, "undoubtedly acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or
office" (because he as policeman of the company shot the deceased when trying to stop and
arrest the latter whom he caught stealing ores from the mines of said company), but also
because said fact "appear in the Stipulation of Facts", which circumstance does not obtain in the
case at bar.
WHEREFORE, with the modification above indicated, the judgment of the trial court appealed
from is hereby affirmed without costs. So ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon and Natividad, JJ., concur.
Bautista Angelo, J., is on leave.
Labrador and De Leon, JJ., took no part.