Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Institute, authors argue that federal government usually neither has the incentive nor the
information needed to effectively coordinate relief management.
The authors have identified three problems in the delivery of disaster relief when conducted by a
central government organisation: the problem of bureaucracy, the problem of coordination and
the problem of adverse incentives.
As Sobel and Leeson demonstrate, result of the multiple layers of bureaucracy inherent to
centralised decision-making is usually slow and delayed action. We do not have many accounts
from Indian experience that critiques or lauds bureaucratic efficiency in times of emergency.
However, it is quite likely that the bureaucratic processes that have been practiced for decades
are not abandoned over-night. In such a scenario, it is again logical that more often than not
decisions and orders flow from the top (minister or the top bureaucrat) to the bottom (those on
the ground implementing those decisions made for them). This brings us to the next problem, the
problem of coordination.
Drawing insights from the 1945 article The Use of Knowledge in Society by Nobel prize
winning economist Frederich Hayek, the specific knowledge of circumstances which must be
made use of (more so in times of emergency) never exists in concentrated or integrated form to
be used by anyone in its totality. In fact, the dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently
contradictory knowledge is possessed separately by different individuals. In his attempt to solve
this problem, Hayek suggests that this problem must be solved by some form of decentralisation.
Individuals with local knowledge and the ability to act on it must have a greater say in the
decisions of rescue, relief and rehabilitation.
The knowledge of what relief supplies are needed, who needs them and who has the best means
to meet those needs is necessarily dispersed. The issue then becomes, how best to utilise such
dispersed knowledge. A case can be made that only the government has the resources to swiftly
address a situation like the one being faced by Uttarakhand today. In such a scenario, maybe
more authority and power to demand and deploy specific resources should be left to people on
the ground implementing rescue and relief activities rather than directed from above.
(We are leaving the problem of adverse incentives and the role of market (private profit-making
organisations)and non-profit making charitable and community based solutions to be addressed
in a separate post.)
India has a central organisation in National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA). It is not
quite clear what role NDMA is performing in ongoing rescue and relief work in Uttarakhand.
While the armed forces have come to take the lead in rescue and relief work, there are
independent stories of people voluntarily providing the support to those in need (as documented
here, here and here).
Who should provide the rescue and relief work? How should it be done? Can such an activity be
incentivised? Is it immoral to charge disaster victims (exorbitant or not) for rescue and relief? Is
government the only one equipped to tackle such a situation? These are not easy questions to
answer. However, Hayekian insights of knowledge problem, as developed and applied by Sobel
and Leeson suggests that decentralisation of disaster relief and management is the preferred
option. Also, the least the government can do is not get in the way of private voluntary efforts for
relief, rescue and rehabilitation.