I.

OVERVIEW
A. DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTS
1. JUDICIAL POWER
Extraordinary Jurisdiction
The courts justices are recognized not only to settle actual controversies but to determine WON there has
been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Judicial power- the right to determine actual controversies. According to Conception, it is the
product of experience during Martial Law. 1987 Constitution- reactionary charter.
Is the Political Question Doctrine Already Obsolete?
By no means. However in proper case, the Supreme Court is not hindered by the doctrine where abuse of
discretion is grave.
Is this extraordinary jurisdiction vested in the Supreme Court alone or in other courts as well?
Yes, in other courts also in a proper case.
Lis mota- the cause of the suit or action.
What is a proper case?
There must be an actual case or controversy.
The question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party.
The constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible time.
The determination of the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.
Who is the Proper Party?
The person directly affected.
The Power to Declare Unconstitutional
Involving rights that are legally demandable and enforceable referred to as judicial supremacy.
Equity Jurisdiction
Equity- Justice according to natural law and right or justice outside law being ethical rather than jural and
belonging more to the sphere of morals than of law. It signifies to the power of the high court to waive technical
rules in order to be able to rule on important substantive issues.
SC has the power to suspend its own rules when the ends of justice would be served thereby.
Supreme Court Circular No. 2-89
Court en banc is not an appellate court. It is enumerated in the SC Circular No 2-89 dated Feb. 7,
1989 as amended by SC Resolution dated November 18, 1993.
The High Court is Not a Trier of Facts
Only questions of law for certiorari in the SC.
The following are the cases:
(1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures [Joaquin v.
Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 (1953)];
(2) . when the inference made is manifestly absurd, mistaken or impossible (Luna v. Linatoc, 74 Phil. 15 (1942)];
(3) when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts (Buyco v. People, 95 Phil. 253 (1954)];
(4) when the judgment is premised on a misapprehension of facts [De la Cruz v. Sosing, 94 Phil. 26 (1953);
Castillo v. Court of Appeals. G.R. No. L-48290, September 29,1983,124 SCRA 808];
(5) when the findings of fact are conflicting [Casica v. Villaseca, 101 Phil. 1205 (1957)];
(6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee [Evangelista v. Alto Surety & Ins. Co., Inc., 103 Phil.
401 (1958)];
(7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court;
(8) when such findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
(9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by
the respondents ; and
(10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is
contradicted by the evidence on record.
Writ of Amparo
From the Spanish word amparar meaning to protect

It is a special constitutional writ to protect or enforce a constitutional right other than physical liberty which
is already covered by the writ of habeas corpus. It is used to protect constitutional rights.
Two Standards of Judicial Review
Panganiban- Strict scrutiny and deferential interpretation are standards of judicial review
Grave abuse of discretion:
(1) Those that clearly violate the Constitution, the laws or settled jurisprudence
(2) Those that have been issued with patent arbitrariness, whim, bias or personal hostility.
A. MEANING OF JUDICIAL POWER; JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY

Justiciable controversy
a litigated question; adversary proceeding in a court of law; a civil action or suit, either at law or in
equity; a justiciable dispute.

Political Law; Constitutional Law; Judicial Department; Concepts;

Judicial Review; Moot Questions
A moot case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so
that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. Generally, Courts decline jurisdiction
over such case or dismiss it on ground of mootness. However, Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot
and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of
the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised
requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar and the public; fourth, the case
is capable of repetition yet evading review. [Mattel, Inc. v. Francisco, G.R. No. 166886, July 30, 2008]
G.R. No. 208566
November 19, 2013
GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L. GONZALEZ REUBEN M. ABANTE
and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN DIEGO, Petitioners, vs. HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N.
OCHOA JR. SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT FLORENCIO B. ABAD, NATIONAL TREASURER
ROSALIA V. DE LEON SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON m his
capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES represented by FELICIANO S.
BELMONTE, JR. in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 208493
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) PRESIDENT SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, Petitioner, vs. HONORABLE
FRANKLIN M. DRILON in his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and HONORABLE FELICIANO S.
BELMONTE, JR., in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 209251
PEDRITO M. NEPOMUCENO, Former Mayor-Boac, Marinduque Former Provincial Board Member
-Province of Marinduque, Petitioner, vs. PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III* and
SECRETARY FLORENCIO BUTCH ABAD, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
"Experience is the oracle of truth."1
-James Madison
Before the Court are consolidated petitions2 taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, all of which assail the
constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System. Due to the complexity of the subject matter, the Court shall
heretofore discuss the systems conceptual underpinnings before detailing the particulars of the constitutional
challenge.
The Facts
I. Pork Barrel: General Concept.
"Pork Barrel" is political parlance of American -English origin.3 Historically, its usage may be traced to the
degrading ritual of rolling out a barrel stuffed with pork to a multitude of black slaves who would cast their
famished bodies into the porcine feast to assuage their hunger with morsels coming from the generosity of their
well-fed master.4 This practice was later compared to the actions of American legislators in trying to direct
federal budgets in favor of their districts.5 While the advent of refrigeration has made the actual pork barrel
obsolete, it persists in reference to political bills that "bring home the bacon" to a legislators district and
constituents.6 In a more technical sense, "Pork Barrel" refers to an appropriation of government spending meant
for localized projects and secured solely or primarily to bring money to a representative's district.7 Some
scholars on the subject further use it to refer to legislative control of local appropriations.8

In the Philippines, "Pork Barrel" has been commonly referred to as lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members of
the Legislature,9 although, as will be later discussed, its usage would evolve in reference to certain funds of the
Executive.
II. History of Congressional Pork Barrel in the Philippines.
A. Pre-Martial Law Era (1922-1972).
Act 3044,10 or the Public Works Act of 1922, is considered11 as the earliest form of "Congressional Pork
Barrel" in the Philippines since the utilization of the funds appropriated therein were subjected to postenactment legislator approval. Particularly, in the area of fund release, Section 312 provides that the sums
appropriated for certain public works projects13 "shall be distributed x x x subject to the approval of a joint
committee elected by the Senate and the House of Representatives. "The committee from each House may also
authorize one of its members to approve the distribution made by the Secretary of Commerce and
Communications."14 Also, in the area of fund realignment, the same section provides that the said secretary,
"with the approval of said joint committee, or of the authorized members thereof, may, for the purposes of said
distribution, transfer unexpended portions of any item of appropriation under this Act to any other item
hereunder."
In 1950, it has been documented15 that post-enactment legislator participation broadened from the areas of
fund release and realignment to the area of project identification. During that year, the mechanics of the public
works act was modified to the extent that the discretion of choosing projects was transferred from the Secretary
of Commerce and Communications to legislators. "For the first time, the law carried a list of projects selected by
Members of Congress, they being the representatives of the people, either on their own account or by
consultation with local officials or civil leaders."16 During this period, the pork barrel process commenced with
local government councils, civil groups, and individuals appealing to Congressmen or Senators for projects.
Petitions that were accommodated formed part of a legislators allocation, and the amount each legislator would
eventually get is determined in a caucus convened by the majority. The amount was then integrated into the
administration bill prepared by the Department of Public Works and Communications. Thereafter, the Senate
and the House of Representatives added their own provisions to the bill until it was signed into law by the
President the Public Works Act.17 In the 1960s, however, pork barrel legislation reportedly ceased in view of
the stalemate between the House of Representatives and the Senate.18
B. Martial Law Era (1972-1986).
While the previous" Congressional Pork Barrel" was apparently discontinued in 1972 after Martial Law was
declared, an era when "one man controlled the legislature,"19 the reprieve was only temporary. By 1982, the
Batasang Pambansa had already introduced a new item in the General Appropriations Act (GAA) called the"
Support for Local Development Projects" (SLDP) under the article on "National Aid to Local Government Units".
Based on reports,20 it was under the SLDP that the practice of giving lump-sum allocations to individual
legislators began, with each assemblyman receiving P500,000.00. Thereafter, assemblymen would
communicate their project preferences to the Ministry of Budget and Management for approval. Then, the said
ministry would release the allocation papers to the Ministry of Local Governments, which would, in turn, issue
the checks to the city or municipal treasurers in the assemblymans locality. It has been further reported that
"Congressional Pork Barrel" projects under the SLDP also began to cover not only public works projects, or socalled "hard projects", but also "soft projects",21 or non-public works projects such as those which would fall
under the categories of, among others, education, health and livelihood.22
C. Post-Martial Law Era:
Corazon Cojuangco Aquino Administration (1986-1992).
After the EDSA People Power Revolution in 1986 and the restoration of Philippine democracy, "Congressional
Pork Barrel" was revived in the form of the "Mindanao Development Fund" and the "Visayas Development Fund"
which were created with lump-sum appropriations of P480 Million and P240 Million, respectively, for the funding
of development projects in the Mindanao and Visayas areas in 1989. It has been documented23 that the clamor
raised by the Senators and the Luzon legislators for a similar funding, prompted the creation of the
"Countrywide Development Fund" (CDF) which was integrated into the 1990 GAA24 with an initial funding of
P2.3 Billion to cover "small local infrastructure and other priority community projects."
Under the GAAs for the years 1991 and 1992,25 CDF funds were, with the approval of the President, to be
released directly to the implementing agencies but "subject to the submission of the required list of projects and
activities."Although the GAAs from 1990 to 1992 were silent as to the amounts of allocations of the individual
legislators, as well as their participation in the identification of projects, it has been reported26 that by 1992,
Representatives were receiving P12.5 Million each in CDF funds, while Senators were receiving P18 Million each,
without any limitation or qualification, and that they could identify any kind of project, from hard or
infrastructure projects such as roads, bridges, and buildings to "soft projects" such as textbooks, medicines, and
scholarships.27
D. Fidel Valdez Ramos (Ramos) Administration (1992-1998).
The following year, or in 1993,28 the GAA explicitly stated that the release of CDF funds was to be made upon
the submission of the list of projects and activities identified by, among others, individual legislators. For the
first time, the 1993 CDF Article included an allocation for the Vice-President.29 As such, Representatives were
allocated P12.5 Million each in CDF funds, Senators, P18 Million each, and the Vice-President, P20 Million.

In 1994,30 1995,31 and 1996,32 the GAAs contained the same provisions on project identification and fund
release as found in the 1993 CDF Article. In addition, however, the Department of Budget and Management
(DBM) was directed to submit reports to the Senate Committee on Finance and the House Committee on
Appropriations on the releases made from the funds.33
Under the 199734 CDF Article, Members of Congress and the Vice-President, in consultation with the
implementing agency concerned, were directed to submit to the DBM the list of 50% of projects to be funded
from their respective CDF allocations which shall be duly endorsed by (a) the Senate President and the
Chairman of the Committee on Finance, in the case of the Senate, and (b) the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the Chairman of the Committee on Appropriations, in the case of the House of
Representatives; while the list for the remaining 50% was to be submitted within six (6) months thereafter. The
same article also stated that the project list, which would be published by the DBM,35 "shall be the basis for the
release of funds" and that "no funds appropriated herein shall be disbursed for projects not included in the list
herein required."
The following year, or in 1998,36 the foregoing provisions regarding the required lists and endorsements were
reproduced, except that the publication of the project list was no longer required as the list itself sufficed for the
release of CDF Funds.
The CDF was not, however, the lone form of "Congressional Pork Barrel" at that time. Other forms of
"Congressional Pork Barrel" were reportedly fashioned and inserted into the GAA (called "Congressional
Insertions" or "CIs") in order to perpetuate the ad ministrations political agenda.37 It has been articulated that
since CIs "formed part and parcel of the budgets of executive departments, they were not easily identifiable and
were thus harder to monitor." Nonetheless, the lawmakers themselves as well as the finance and budget
officials of the implementing agencies, as well as the DBM, purportedly knew about the insertions.38 Examples
of these CIs are the Department of Education (DepEd) School Building Fund, the Congressional Initiative
Allocations, the Public Works Fund, the El Nio Fund, and the Poverty Alleviation Fund.39 The allocations for the
School Building Fund, particularly, shall be made upon prior consultation with the representative of the
legislative district concerned.40 Similarly, the legislators had the power to direct how, where and when these
appropriations were to be spent.41
E. Joseph Ejercito Estrada (Estrada) Administration (1998-2001).
In 1999,42 the CDF was removed in the GAA and replaced by three (3) separate forms of CIs, namely, the
"Food Security Program Fund,"43 the "Lingap Para Sa Mahihirap Program Fund,"44 and the "Rural/Urban
Development Infrastructure Program Fund,"45 all of which contained a special provision requiring "prior
consultation" with the Member s of Congress for the release of the funds.
It was in the year 200046 that the "Priority Development Assistance Fund" (PDAF) appeared in the GAA. The
requirement of "prior consultation with the respective Representative of the District" before PDAF funds were
directly released to the implementing agency concerned was explicitly stated in the 2000 PDAF Article.
Moreover, realignment of funds to any expense category was expressly allowed, with the sole condition that no
amount shall be used to fund personal services and other personnel benefits.47 The succeeding PDAF provisions
remained the same in view of the re-enactment48 of the 2000 GAA for the year 2001.
F. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (Arroyo) Administration (2001-2010).
The 200249 PDAF Article was brief and straightforward as it merely contained a single special provision
ordering the release of the funds directly to the implementing agency or local government unit concerned,
without further qualifications. The following year, 2003,50 the same single provision was present, with simply an
expansion of purpose and express authority to realign. Nevertheless, the provisions in the 2003 budgets of the
Department of Public Works and Highways51 (DPWH) and the DepEd52 required prior consultation with
Members of Congress on the aspects of implementation delegation and project list submission, respectively. In
2004, the 2003 GAA was re-enacted.53
In 2005,54 the PDAF Article provided that the PDAF shall be used "to fund priority programs and projects
under the ten point agenda of the national government and shall be released directly to the implementing
agencies." It also introduced the program menu concept,55 which is essentially a list of general programs and
implementing agencies from which a particular PDAF project may be subsequently chosen by the identifying
authority. The 2005 GAA was re-enacted56 in 2006 and hence, operated on the same bases. In similar regard,
the program menu concept was consistently integrated into the 2007,57 2008,58 2009,59 and 201060 GAAs.
Textually, the PDAF Articles from 2002 to 2010 were silent with respect to the specific amounts allocated for
the individual legislators, as well as their participation in the proposal and identification of PDAF projects to be
funded. In contrast to the PDAF Articles, however, the provisions under the DepEd School Building Program and
the DPWH budget, similar to its predecessors, explicitly required prior consultation with the concerned Member
of Congress61 anent certain aspects of project implementation.
Significantly, it was during this era that provisions which allowed formal participation of non-governmental
organizations (NGO) in the implementation of government projects were introduced. In the Supplemental
Budget for 2006, with respect to the appropriation for school buildings, NGOs were, by law, encouraged to
participate. For such purpose, the law stated that "the amount of at least P250 Million of the P500 Million
allotted for the construction and completion of school buildings shall be made available to NGOs including the
Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce and Industry, Inc. for its "Operation Barrio School"
program, with capability and proven track records in the construction of public school buildings x x x."62 The

same allocation was made available to NGOs in the 2007 and 2009 GAAs under the DepEd Budget.63 Also, it
was in 2007 that the Government Procurement Policy Board64 (GPPB) issued Resolution No. 12-2007 dated June
29, 2007 (GPPB Resolution 12-2007), amending the implementing rules and regulations65 of RA 9184,66 the
Government Procurement Reform Act, to include, as a form of negotiated procurement,67 the procedure
whereby the Procuring Entity68 (the implementing agency) may enter into a memorandum of agreement with
an NGO, provided that "an appropriation law or ordinance earmarks an amount to be specifically contracted out
to NGOs."69
G. Present Administration (2010-Present).
Differing from previous PDAF Articles but similar to the CDF Articles, the 201170 PDAF Article included an
express statement on lump-sum amounts allocated for individual legislators and the Vice-President:
Representatives were given P70 Million each, broken down into P40 Million for "hard projects" and P30 Million for
"soft projects"; while P200 Million was given to each Senator as well as the Vice-President, with a P100 Million
allocation each for "hard" and "soft projects." Likewise, a provision on realignment of funds was included, but
with the qualification that it may be allowed only once. The same provision also allowed the Secretaries of
Education, Health, Social Welfare and Development, Interior and Local Government, Environment and Natural
Resources, Energy, and Public Works and Highways to realign PDAF Funds, with the further conditions that: (a)
realignment is within the same implementing unit and same project category as the original project, for
infrastructure projects; (b) allotment released has not yet been obligated for the original scope of work, and (c)
the request for realignment is with the concurrence of the legislator concerned.71
In the 201272 and 201373 PDAF Articles, it is stated that the "identification of projects and/or designation of
beneficiaries shall conform to the priority list, standard or design prepared by each implementing agency
(priority list requirement) x x x." However, as practiced, it would still be the individual legislator who would
choose and identify the project from the said priority list.74
Provisions on legislator allocations75 as well as fund realignment76 were included in the 2012 and 2013 PDAF
Articles; but the allocation for the Vice-President, which was pegged at P200 Million in the 2011 GAA, had been
deleted. In addition, the 2013 PDAF Article now allowed LGUs to be identified as implementing agencies if they
have the technical capability to implement the projects.77 Legislators were also allowed to identify
programs/projects, except for assistance to indigent patients and scholarships, outside of his legislative district
provided that he secures the written concurrence of the legislator of the intended outside-district, endorsed by
the Speaker of the House.78 Finally, any realignment of PDAF funds, modification and revision of project
identification, as well as requests for release of funds, were all required to be favorably endorsed by the House
Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance, as the case may be.79
Belgica v. Executive Secretary Ochoa (2013)
Subject: Justiciable Controversy, Ripeness for Adjudication, Political Question, Locus Standi, Res Judicata,
Stare Decisis, Pork Barrel, Congressional Pork Barrel, Presidential Pork Barrel, Mandamus, Right to Information,
SARO, Operative Fact Doctrine
Facts: Before the Court are consolidated petitions, taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, all of which assail
the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System.
Pork Barrell refers to an appropriation of government spending meant for localized projects and secured solely
or primarily to bring money to a representative's district.In the Philippines, the pork barrel has been
commonly referred to as lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members of the Legislature, although, its usage
would evolve in reference to certain funds of the President such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential
Social Fund.
The Malampaya Funds was a special fund created under PD 910 issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos
for the development of indigenous energy resources vital to economic growth.
The Presidential Social Fund is sourced from the share of the government in the aggregate gross earnings of
PAGCORthrough which the President provides direct assistance to priority programs and projects not funded
under the regular budget.
In 1996, an anonymous source later identified as Former Marikina City Romeo Candazo revealed that huge
sums of government money went into the pockets of legislators as kickbacks.
in 2004, several concerned citizens sought the nullification of the PDAF for being unconstitutional.
Unfortunately, for lack of any pertinent evidentiary support that illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks
has become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress, the petition was dismissed.

In July 2013, NBI began its probe into allegations that the government has been defrauded of some P10 Billion
over the past 10 years by a syndicate using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and various government
agencies for scores of ghost projects. The investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six whistle-blowers
who declared that JLN Corporation (stands for Janet Lim Napoles) had facilitated the swindling of billions of
pesos from the public coffers for ghost projects using no fewer than 20 dummy non-government organizations
for an entire decade.
In August 2013, the Commission on Audit released report revealing substantial irregularities in the
disbursement and utilization of PDAF by the Congressmen during the Arroyo administration.
As for the 'Presidential Pork Barrel', whistle-blowers alleged that "at least P900 Million from royalties in the
operation of the Malampaya gas project off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has
gone into a dummy NGO.
Spurred in large part by the findings contained in the CoA Report and the Napoles controversy, several petitions
were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the Pork Barrel System be declared unconstitutional
Held:
I. Procedural issues
Justiciable Controversy
1. By virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, judicial power operates only when there is an
actual case or controversy.
2. Jurisprudence provides that an actual case or controversy is one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an
assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or
abstract difference or dispute.
3. The Court finds that there exists an actual and justiciable controversy in these cases. The requirement of
contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the parties on the constitutionality
of the Pork Barrel System. Also, the challenged funds and the provisions allowing for their utilization such as
the 2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD 910 for the Malampaya Funds and PD 1869 for the Presidential Social Fund
are currently existing and operational; hence, there exists an immediate or threatened injury to petitioners as a
result of the unconstitutional use of these public funds.
Ripeness for Adjudication
4. Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness, meaning that the
questions raised for constitutional scrutiny are already ripe for adjudication. A question is ripe for adjudication
when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. It is a
prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may
come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to
itself as a result of the challenged action
5. The cases at present have not become moot. A case becomes moot when there is no more actual
controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits.
6. The Court observes that respondents proposed line-item budgeting scheme would not terminate the
controversy since said reform is geared towards the 2014 budget, and not the 2013 PDAF Article which, being a
distinct subject matter, remains legally effective and existing.
7. Neither will the Presidents declaration that he had already abolished the PDAF render the issues on PDAF
moot precisely because the Executive branch of government has no constitutional authority to nullify or annul
its legal existence. By constitutional design, the annulment or nullification of a law may be done either by
Congress, through the passage of a repealing law, or by the Court, through a declaration of unconstitutionality

8. Moreover, the Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if: (a) there is a grave violation of the Constitution;
(b) the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; (c) when the
constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the
public; (d) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. All the four exceptions are applicable in this
case.
Political Question
9. The issues raised before the Court do not present political but legal questions which are within its province to
resolve. A political question refers to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
Legislature or executive branch of the Government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom,
not legality, of a particular measure.
10. The intrinsic constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System is not an issue dependent upon the wisdom of the
political branches of government but rather a legal one which the Constitution itself has commanded the Court
to act upon. More importantly, the present Constitution has not only vested the Judiciary the right to exercise
judicial power but essentially makes it a duty to proceed therewith under the expanded concept of judicial
power under Section1, Article 8 of the 1987 Constitution
Locus Standi
11. Unless a person is injuriously affected in any of his constitutional rights by the operation of statute or
ordinance, he has no standing.
12. Petitioners, as taxpayers, possess the requisite standing to question the validity of the existing Pork Barrel
System under which the taxes they pay have been and continue to be utilized. They are bound to suffer from
the unconstitutional usage of public funds.
13. Moreover, as citizens, petitiones have equally fulfilled the standing requirement given that the issues they
have raised may be classified as matters of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society,
or of paramount public interest
Res Judicata (does not apply)
14. Res judicata means a matter adjudged. The focal point of res judicata is the judgment.The res judicata
principle states that a judgment on the merits in a previous case rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction
would bind a subsequent case if, between the first and second actions, there exists an identity of parties, of
subject matter, and of causes of action.
15. The res judicata principle cannot apply in this case. The required identity is not present since Philconsa and
LAMP, respectively, involved constitutional challenges against the 1994 CDF Article and 2004 PDAF Article,
whereas the cases at bar call for a broader constitutional scrutiny of the entire Pork Barrel System. Also, the
ruling in LAMP is essentially a dismissal based on a procedural technicality and, thus, hardly a judgment on
the merits .
Stare Decisis (does not apply)
16. Stare decisis non quieta et movere (or simply, stare decisis) means follow past precedents and do not
disturb what has been settled. The focal point of stare decisis is the doctrine created. The stare decisis
principle, entrenched under Article 8 of the Civil Code, evokes the general rule that, for the sake of certainty, a
conclusion reached in one case should be doctrinally applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially
the same, even though the parties may be different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent
any powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike.
17. The Philconsa resolution was a limited response to a separation of powers problem, specifically on the
propriety of conferring post-enactment identification authority to Members of Congress. On the contrary, the
present cases call for a more holistic examination of the entire Pork Barrel System. The complexity of the issues
and the broader legal analyses herein warranted may be, therefore, considered as a powerful countervailing
reason against a wholesale application of the stare decisis principle.

18. In addition, the Court observes that the Philconsa ruling was actually riddled with inherent constitutional
inconsistencies which similarly countervail against a full resort to stare decisis.
19. As for LAMP, suffice it to restate that the said case was dismissed on a procedural technicality and, hence,
has not set any controlling doctrine susceptible of current application to the substantive issues in these cases.
II. Substantive issues
Pork Barrel System
20. The Court defines the Pork Barrel System as the collective body of rules and practices that govern the
manner by which lump-sum, discretionary funds, primarily intended for local projects, are utilized through the
respective participations of the Legislative and Executive branches of government, including its members.
21. The Pork Barrel System involves two (2) kinds of lump-sum discretionary funds:
(a) Congressional Pork Barrel-- a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund wherein legislators, either
individually or collectively organized into committees, are able to effectively control certain aspects of the funds
utilization through various post-enactment measures and/or practices.
(b) Presidential Pork Barrel-- a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund which allows the President to determine
the manner of its utilization.
Constitutionality of the Congressional Pork Barrel
22. The Supreme Court declared that the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) and its predecessor, the
Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) are unconstitutional.
23. The Supreme Court declared the Pork Barrel System as unconstitutional on the following grounds:
(a) Separation of Powers. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, legislators have been authorized to participate in the
various operational aspects of budgeting, including the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual
activities and the regulation and release of funds, in violation of the separation of powers principle. From the
moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play
any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is
thus unconstitutional.
(b) Non-delegability of legislative power. The power to appropriate is lodged in Congress and must be exercised
only through legislation, pursuant to Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Insofar as the 2013
PDAF Article has conferred unto legislators the power of appropriation by giving them personal, discretionary
funds from which they are able to fund specific projects which they themselves determine, it has violated the
principle of non-delegability of legislative power;
(c) Checks and balances. Even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013 PDAF
Article would remain constitutionally flawed since the lump-sum amount of P24.79 Billion would be treated as a
mere funding source allotted for multiple purposes of spending. This setup connotes that the appropriation law
leaves the actual amounts and purposes of the appropriation for further determination and, therefore, does not
readily indicate a discernible item which may be subject to the Presidents power of item veto.
Insofar as it has created a system of budgeting wherein items are not textualized into the appropriations bill, it
has flouted the prescribed procedure of presentment and, in the process, denied the President the power to
veto items
(d) Public Accountability. To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators, who
are vested with post-enactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities in which they themselves
participate. Also, this very same concept of post-enactment authorization runs afoul of Section 14, Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution. Allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of project implementation renders
them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office.
(e) Political dynasty. Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution is considered as not self-executing due to

the qualifying phrase as may be defined by law. In this respect, said provision does not, by and of itself,
provide a judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive
action.
(f) Local autonomy. The gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office, without
taking into account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the legislator represents. As a result, a
district representative of a highly-urbanized metropolis gets the same amount of funding as a district
representative of a far-flung rural province which would be relatively underdeveloped compared to the former.
This concept of legislator control underlying the CDF and PDAF conflicts with the functions of the various Local
Development Councils (LDCs).
Insofar as it has authorized legislators, who are national officers, to intervene in affairs of purely local nature,
despite the existence of capable local institutions, it has likewise subverted genuine local autonomy.
Constitutionality of the Presidential Pork Barrel
24. While the designation of a determinate or determinable amount for a particular public purpose is sufficient
for a legal appropriation to exist, the appropriation law must contain adequate legislative guidelines if the same
law delegates rule-making authority to the Executive either for the purpose of (a) filling up the details of the
law for its enforcement, known as supplementary rule-making, or (b) ascertaining facts to bring the law into
actual operation, referred to as contingent rule-making.
25. The phrase and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President under Section 8 of
PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient
standard to adequately determine the limits of the Presidents authority with respect to the purpose for which
the Malampaya Funds may be used. As it reads, the said phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the
Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate
public funds beyond the purview of the law.
26. Hence, insofar as it has conferred to the President the power to appropriate funds intended by law for
energy-related purposes only to other purposes he may deem fit as well as other public funds under the broad
classification of priority infrastructure development projects, it has transgressed the principle of nondelegability.
Previous Rulings on PDAF/CDF
27. In Philconsa v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 113105, August 19, 1994, the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the then known Countrywide Development Fund (CDF). The petitioners in the said case
claimed that the power given to the members of Congress to propose and identify the projects and activites to
be funded by the CDF is an encroachment by the legislature on executive power. They argued that the proposal
and identification of the projects do not involve the making of laws or the repeal and amendment thereof which
is the only function given to the Congress by the Constitution.
The Supreme Court held that the power of appropriation carries with it the power to specify the project or
activity to be funded under the appropriation law. It can be as detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be.
The CDF is explicit that it shall be used "for infrastructure, purchase of ambulances and computers and other
priority projects and activities and other credit facilities to qualified beneficiaries..." It was Congress itself that
determined the purposes for the appropriation. On the other hand, the Executive was responsive for the
implementation of the priority projects specified in the law. The Supreme Court emphasized that the authority
given to the members of Congress is only to propose and identify projects to be implemented by the President.
Under the GAA of 1994, the President must examine whether the proposals submitted by the members of
Congress fall within the specific items of expenditures for which the CDF was set up, and if qualified, the
President next determines whether they are in line with other projects planned for the locality. Thereafter, if the
proposed projects qualify for funding, it is the President who shall implement them. The proposals and
identifications made by the members of Congress are merely recommendatory.
In addition, the Supreme Court stated that the CDF is a recognition that individual members of Congress, far
more than the President and their congressional colleagues are likely o be knowledgeable about the needs of
their respective constituents and the priority to be given to each project.
28. In Sarmiento v. Treasurer, G.R. Nos. 125680 & 126313, September 4, 2001, the petitioners

questioned the constitutionality of the CDF under the GAA of 1996. Seeking the reversal of Philconsa v.
Enriquez, the petitioners alleged that the proposal and identification of projects by members of Congress were
not merely recommendatory considering that requests for releases of funds under the CDF are automically
released. The Solicitor General argued that since the questioned provision is basically the same provision found
in the 1994 GAA held as constitutional by the Supreme Court in Philconsa v. Enriquez, the instant case should
be resolved in the same manner, following the principle of stare decisis.
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the CDF under the 1996 GAA.
29. In League Against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP) v. Secretary of Budget and Management, G.R.
164987, April 21, 2012, petitioners assailed the constitutionality and legality of the implementation of the
Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) as provided for in the GAA of 2004. According to the petitioners,
the provision in the GAA as regards the PDAF is silent and therefore prohibits an automatic allocation of lump
sums to individual senators and congressmen for funding of projects. It does not give the individual members of
Congress the mandate to propose, select and identify programs and projects to be funded out of PDAF. The
petitioners submitted that such a situation violates the principle of separation of powers because in receiving
and thereafter spending funds for their chosen projects, the members of Congress in effect intruded into an
executive function. Further, the authority to propose and select projects does not pertain to legislation. It is, in
fact, a non-legislative function devoid of constitutional sanction and therefore impermissible and must be
considered nothing less than malfeasance.
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the PDAF. The Court stated that no convincing proof was
presented showing that, indeed there were direct releases of funds to members of Congresss, who actually
spent them according to their sole discretion. Not even a documentation of the disbursement of funds by the
DBM in favor of the members of Congres was presented by the petitioner to convince the Court to probe into
the truth of their claims. The Court further stated that the authority granted to members of Congress to
propose and select projects was already upheld in Philconsa v. Enriquez, and there is no need to review or
reverse the pronouncements made in said case so long as there is no showing of a direct participation of
legislators in the actual spending of the budget.
Mandamus
30. Petitioners prayed that the Executive Secretary and/or the Department of Budget and Management be
ordered to provide the public and the Commission on Audit complete lists/schedules or detailed reports related
to the availments and utilization of the PDAF and Malampaya funds.
31. Petitioners prayer was grounded on Section 28, Article II (policy of full public disclosure) and Section 7,
Article III (right of the people to information on matters of public concern) of the 1987 Constitution.
32. The court denied the prayer of petitioner on procedural grounds. The proper remedy to invoke the right to
information is to file a petition for mandamus. Citing Legaspi vs CSC: the duty to disclose the information of
public concern, and to afford access to public records cannot be discretionary on the part of said agencies. Xxx
The constitutional duty, not being discretionary, its performance may be compelled by a writ of mandamus in a
proper case
33. Moreover, in the case of Valmonte v. Belmonte Jr., it has been clarified that the right to information does
not include the right to compel the preparation of lists, abstracts, summaries and the like. In the same case, it
was stressed that it is essential that the applicant has a well defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing
demanded and that it is the imperative duty of defendant to perform the act required. Hence, without the
foregoing substantiations, the Court cannot grant a particular request for information.
34. In these cases, aside from the fact that none of the petitions are in the nature of mandamus actions, the
Court finds that petitioners have failed to establish a "a well-defined, clear and certain legal right" to be
furnished by the Executive Secretary and/or the DBM of their requested PDAF Use Schedule/List and
Presidential Pork Use Report. Neither did petitioners assert any law or administrative issuance which would form
the bases of the latters duty to furnish them with the documents requested
35. Nevertheless, petitioners are not denied access to official documents which are already existing and of
public record.
Inclusion of Funds in Budgetary Deliberations

36. The Court also denied petitioners' prayer to order the inclusion of the subject funds in the budgetary
deliberations of Congress as the same is a matter left to the prerogative of the political branches of
government.
TRO Enjoining Release of Remaining PDAF
37. In response to the Courts September 10, 2013 TRO that enjoined the release of the remaining PDAF
allocated for the year 2013, the DBM issued Circular 2013-8 which authorized the continued implementation
and disbursement of PDAF funds as long as they are: (a) covered by a Special Allotment Release Order (SARO);
and (b) that said SARO had been obligated by the implementing agency concerned prior to the issuance of the
Courts September 10, 2013 TRO.
38. As to the issue of lifting the TRO, the present decision has rendered it moot and academic. The
unconstitutionality of the 2013 PDAF Article as declared herein has the consequential effect of converting the
temporary injunction into a permanent one. Hence, from the promulgation of this Decision, the release of the
remaining PDAF funds for 2013, among others, is now permanently enjoined.
39. As to the coverage and application of the TRO, the Court agreed with the petitioners position that "the
issuance of the SARO does not yet involve the release of funds under the PDAF, as release is only triggered by
the issuance of a Notice of Cash Allocation (NCA). As such, PDAF disbursements, even if covered by an
obligated SARO, should remain enjoined.
A SARO only evinces the existence of an obligation and not the directive to pay. Practically speaking, the SARO
does not have the direct and immediate effect of placing public funds beyond the control of the disbursing
authority. In fact, a SARO may even be withdrawn under certain circumstances which will prevent the actual
release of funds
40. Thus, unless an NCA has been issued, public funds should not be treated as funds which have been
"released." In this respect, therefore, the disbursement of 2013 PDAF funds which are only covered by
obligated SAROs, and without any corresponding NCAs issued, must, at the time of this Decisions
promulgation, be enjoined and consequently reverted to the unappropriated surplus of the general fund
Operative Fact Doctrine
41. the Courts pronouncement anent the unconstitutionality of (a) the 2013 PDAF Article and its Special
Provisions, (b) all other Congressional Pork Barrel provisions similar thereto, and (c) the phrases (1) "and for
such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD 910, and (2) "to
finance the priority infrastructure development projects" under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993,
must only be treated as prospective in effect in view of the operative fact doctrine.
42. The operative fact doctrine exhorts the recognition that until the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares
the invalidity of a certain legislative or executive act, such act is presumed constitutional and thus, entitled to
obedience and respect and should be properly enforced and complied with.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 160261
November 10, 2003
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner, NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA
MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC., ITS OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention, WORLD
WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention, vs. THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE,
REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C.
TEODORO, JR. AND REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, respondents. JAIME N.
SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention, SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-inintervention.
etc.
Francisco vs. House of Representatives (2003)
G.R. No. 160261 | 2003-11-10
Subject: Statutory Construction (of the Constitution); Reliance on Foreign Jurisprudence to Interpret the
Constitution; Judicial Review and Separation of Powers; Requisites for Exercise of Judicial Review; Locus Standi;
Class Suits; Impeachment, meaning of 'to Initiate'; Impeachment case vs Impeachment Proceeding

Facts: On June 2, 2003, an impeachment complaint (1st impeachment complaint) was filed by former President
Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. and 7 Associate Justices for culpable violation of the
Constitution, betrayal of public trust and other high crimes.
On October 22, 2003, the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss the complaint for being insufficient in
substance, although it was sufficient in form.
On October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss the complaint or 4 months
and 3 weeks since the filing thereof, a 2nd impeachment complaint was filed with the Houses Secretary General
by Representatives Teodoro, Jr. and Funtabella against Chief Justice Hilario Davide, founded on the alleged
results of the legislative inquiry "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of
disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund
(JDF).
The 2nd impeachment complaint was accompanied by a Resolution of Endorsement/ Impeachment signed by
at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of Representatives.
Due to the events that took place, several instant petitions were filed against the House of Representatives,
mostly contending that the filing of the 2nd impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates Article XI
Section 5 of the Constitution that no impeachment proceedings shall be INITIATED against the same official
more than once within a period of one year; and that sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in
Impeachment Proceedings of the 12th Congress are unconstitutional as well.
The House of Representatives argues that sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules do not
violate Section 3 (5) of Article XI of the present Constitution, contending that the term "initiate" does not mean
"to file", and concludes that the one year bar prohibiting the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the
same officials could not have been violated as the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide and the
7 Associate Justices had not been initiated as the House of Representatives, acting as the collective body, has
yet to act on it.
The resolution of this issue thus hinges on the interpretation of the term "initiate".
Section 3 (2), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution
3 ways to file an impeachment complaint:
1) by a verified complaint for impeachment by any member of the House of Representatives; or
2) by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any member (of the House of Representatives); or
3) by at least 1/3 of all the members of the House of Representatives
Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules (of the 12th Congress)
Impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated:
1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is
sufficient in substance; or
2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint
and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance; or
3) by the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified
complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House
Held: Statutory Construction (of the Constitution)
1. First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed. We look to the language of the document itself in our
search for its meaning. We do not of course stop there, but that is where we begin.
2. Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution should be interpreted
in accordance with the intent of its framers. The object is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of
the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order
to construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose.
3. Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. It is a well-established
rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the
others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought
into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a

particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the
Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two
can be made to stand together. In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in
favor of a construction which will render every word operative, rather than one which may make the words idle
and nugatory.
Reliance on Foreign Jurisprudence to Interpret the Constitution
4. In this case, the House argues that the impeachment proceedings are outside the scope of judicial review in
relation to Art XI Section 3(6) of the constitution which says that the Senate has the sole power to try and
decide impeachment cases. The House also relies on American jurisprudence to support their claim.
5. As held in the case of Garcia vs. COMELEC, "[i]n resolving constitutional disputes, [this Court] should not be
beguiled by foreign jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicable because they have been dictated by
different constitutional settings and needs." Indeed, although the Philippine Constitution can trace its origins to
that of the United States, their paths of development have long since diverged.
6. There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with respect
to the power of the House of Representatives over impeachment proceedings.
-the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of Representatives without limitation
-the Philippine Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate
impeachment cases, provides for several limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2),
(3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and
the one year bar on the impeachment of one and the same official.
Judicial Review and Separation of Powers
7. The Courts power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government in Article VIII
section 1 of the 1987 Constitution.
8. Judicial review is an integral component of the delicate system of checks and balances which, together with
the corollary principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock of our republican form of government and
insures that its vast powers are utilized only for the benefit of the people for which it serves.
9. When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the
other departments; rather, it only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to
check the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive
and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.
10. The power of judicial review includes the power of review over justiciable issues in impeachment
proceedings.
Requisites for exercise of Judicial Review
11. The courts' power of judicial review is subject to several limitations. In order for the courts to exercise its
judicial review power, the following requisites must be established:
(1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
(2) the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement;
(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and
(4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
Locus Standi
12. Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that
the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged.
Citizen standing
13. When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be
direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also
that he sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and
not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining has been
or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be
subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.

14. When the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the
requirement of personal interest.
Taxpayer standing
15. In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally
disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is a wastage of public
funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. Before he can invoke the power of judicial
review, however, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure
of money raised by taxation and that he would sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the
questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members
of the public. At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be
entertained.
16. In this case, the Court opts to grant standing to most of the petitioners, given their allegation that any
impending transmittal to the Senate of the Articles of Impeachment and the ensuing trial of the Chief Justice will
necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds.
Legislator standing
17. As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which he claims infringes
his prerogatives as a legislator. Indeed, a member of the House of Representatives has standing to maintain
inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his office.
Associations standing
18. While an association has legal personality to represent its members, especially when it is composed of
substantial taxpayers and the outcome will affect their vital interests, the mere invocation by the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines or any member of the legal profession of the duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing
more, although undoubtedly true, does not suffice to clothe it with standing. Its interest is too general. It is
shared by other groups and the whole citizenry.
19. However, a reading of the petitions shows that it has advanced constitutional issues which deserve the
attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. It, therefore, behooves
this Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issues presented by it.
Class suits
20. When dealing with class suits filed in behalf of all citizens, persons intervening must be sufficiently
numerous to fully protect the interests of all concerned to enable the court to deal properly with all interests
involved in the suit, for a judgment in a class suit, whether favorable or unfavorable to the class, is, under the
res judicata principle, binding on all members of the class whether or not they were before the court.
21. Where it clearly appears that not all interests can be sufficiently represented as shown by the divergent
issues raised in the numerous petitions before this Court, G.R. No. 160365 as a class suit ought to fail.
22. However, since petitioners additionally allege standing as citizens and taxpayers, their petition will stand.
Impeachment, meaning of to Initiate (Impeachment case vs Impeachment Proceeding)
23. The word "initiate" as it twice appears in Article XI (3) and (5) of the Constitution means to file the complaint
and take initial action on it."Initiate" of course is understood by ordinary men to mean, as dictionaries do: to
begin, to commence, or set going.
24. According to Father Bernas, an amicus curiae, an impeachment proceeding is not a single act. It is a
complexus of acts consisting of a beginning, a middle and an end.
(a) The beginning or the initiation is the filing of the complaint and its referral to the Committee on Justice.
(b) The middle consists of those deliberative moments leading to the formulation of the articles of
impeachment.
(c) The end is the transmittal of the articles of impeachment to the Senate.
25. An impeachment case is the legal controversy that must be decided by the Senate. The Constitution
provides that the House, by a vote of one-third of all its members, can bring a case to the Senate. It is in that
sense that the House has "exclusive power" to initiate all cases of impeachment. No other body can do it.
However, before a decision is made to initiate a case in the Senate, a "proceeding" must be followed to arrive at
a conclusion. A proceeding must be "initiated."

26. An impeachment proceeding takes place not in the Senate but in the House and consists of several steps:

(1) the filing of a verified complaint either by a Member of the House of Representatives or by a private citizen
endorsed by a Member of the House of the Representatives;
(2) the processing of this complaint by the proper Committee which may either reject the complaint or uphold
it;
(3) whether the resolution of the Committee rejects or upholds the complaint, the resolution must be forwarded
to the House for further processing; and
(4) the processing of the same complaint by the House of Representatives which either affirms a favorable
resolution of the Committee or overrides a contrary resolution by a vote of one-third of all the members.
(5) If at least one third of all the Members upholds the complaint, Articles of Impeachment are prepared and
transmitted to the Senate. It is at this point that the House "initiates an impeachment case." It is at this point
that an impeachable public official is successfully impeached. That is, he or she is successfully charged with an
impeachment "case" before the Senate as impeachment court.
27. Father Bernas further explains: The "impeachment proceeding" is not initiated when the complaint is
transmitted to the Senate for trial because that is the end of the House proceeding and the beginning of another
proceeding, namely the trial. Neither is the "impeachment proceeding" initiated when the House deliberates on
the resolution passed on to it by the Committee, because something prior to that has already been done. The
action of the House is already a further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning. Rather, the
impeachment proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee
on Justice for action. This is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that follow. He concludes that
when Section 3 (5) says, "No impeachment proceeding shall be initiated against the same official more than
once within a period of one year," it means that no second verified complaint may be accepted and referred to
the Committee on Justice for action.
28. Therefore, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against
Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr., along with 7 Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, on June 2, 2003 and
referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by
Representatives Teodoro, Jr. and Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the
constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable
officer within a one-year period.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-45081
July 15, 1936
JOSE A. ANGARA, petitioner, vs. THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, PEDRO YNSUA, MIGUEL CASTILLO,
and DIONISIO C. MAYOR, respondents.
Political Law; Constitutional Law; General Considerations; Separation of Powers
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express
provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive
cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from
the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be
absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system
of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government.
[Angara v. Electoral v. Commission, G.R. No. L-45081, July 15, 1936]
Our Constitution contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It
enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, and autonomy but reciprocity. [Neri vs. Senate
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations G.R. No. 180643, September 4, 2008]
Separation of powers is founded on the belief that, by establishing equilibrium among the three power holders,
harmony will result, power will not be concentrated and thus tyranny will be avoided. [Bernas, The 1987
Philippine Constitution: A Comprehensive Reviewer (2011)]
Political Law; Constitutional Law; Judicial Department; Concepts; Judicial Review
Judicial review is the power of the Courts to test the validity of executive and legislative acts in light of their
conformity with the Constitution. The power is inherent in the Judicial Department, by virtue of the doctrine of

separation of powers. [Nachura, Outline Reviewer in Political law (2009)] This is not an assertion of superiority
by the Courts over the other departments, but merely an expression of the supremacy of the Constitution.
[Angara v. Electoral Commission, G.R. No. L-45081, July 15, 1936].
All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or agreement, or law, which shall be heard by
the Supreme Court en banc, and all other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en
banc, including those involving the constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees,
proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of
a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted
thereon. [Sec. 4 (2), Article VIII, 1987 Constitution]
Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide,
final judgments and orders of lower courts. [Sec. 5 (2), Article VIII, 1987 Constitution] Such implies that lower
courts can also exercise such power. In one case, the Supreme Court said that the lower courts should not shy
away from the task of deciding constitutional questions when properly raised before them. [Ynot v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74457, March 20, 1987] This was later on affirmed in another case, where the Court
held that, the Constitution vests the power of judicial review not only in the Supreme Court but also in Regional
Trial Courts. Furthermore, B.P. 129 grants RTCs the authority to rule on the conformity of laws and treaties with
the Constitution. [Mirasol v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128448, February 1, 2001]
Requisites of Judicial Review
Actual case or controversy
Locus Standi
Question is raised at the earliest opportunity
Lis Mota of the case
Actual case or controversy means a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims which can be
resolved on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. [Guingona v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125532, July 10,
1998]. The controversy must be definite and concrete, bearing upon the legal relations of the parties who are
pitted against each other due to their adverse legal interest. [John Hay Peoples Alternative Coalition v. Lim, G.R.
No. 119775, October 24, 2003] The issues raised in the case must not be moot and academic, or because of
subsequent developments, have become moot and academic. A moot and academic case is one that ceases to
present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events. [Province of Batangas v. Romulo, G.R. No.
152774, May 27, 2004]
Locus standi is defined as the right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question. [Blacks Law
Dictionary, 6th ed., 1991] In private suits, real party in interest rule governs. [Sec. 2, Rule 3, 1997 Rules of
Court] A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefitted or injured by the judgment in the suit or
the party entitled to the avails of the suit. [Salonga v. Warner Barnes, G.R. No. L-2246, January 31, 1951]. The
difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits where the plaintiff asserts a public right in assailing
the validity of an official act, and he does so as a representative of the general public. To establish legal
standing, he has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and securing relief as a
citizen or taxpayer. [David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006]
A person has standing to challenge the validity of governmental act only if he has a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement.
[People v. Vera, G.R. No. L-45685, November 16, 1937] To put it differently, a citizen can raise a constitutional
question only if he can show the following: (1) that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury
as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged
action; (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. [Telecommunications and Broadcast
Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 132922, April 21, 1998] Note, however,
that when the subject in issue is of transcendental interest to the public, the Court entertains the suit even if
those suing do not have personal and direct interest such that they stand to suffer harm. [Kilosbayan v.
Guingona, G.R. No. 113375, May 5, 1994] The following maybe parties (a) Taxpayers, when public funds are
involved [Tolentino v. Comelec, G.R. No. 148334, January 21, 2004]; (b) Government of the Philippines, when
questioning the validity of its own laws [People v. Vera, supra]; (c) Legislators, when the powers of Congress are
being impaired [PHILCONSA v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 113105, August 19, 1994]; (d) Citizens, when the enforcement
of a public right is involved [Taada v. Tuvera, G.R. No. L-63915, April 24, 1985]. Thus, when a citizen questions
the circulars issued by the Commission on Audit lifting the pre-audit of government transactions of the national
government agencies, government-owned and controlled corporations, and local governments, he has standing
to file the case since he would be adversely affected by the illegal use of public money. [De la Llana v.
Commission on Audit, G. R. No. 180989, 7 February 2012]

The earliest opportunity to raise a constitutional issue is to raise it in the pleadings before a competent court
that can resolve the same, such that, if not raised in the pleadings, it cannot be considered at the trial and, if
not considered in the trial, it cannot be considered on appeal. [Matibag v. Benipayo, G.R. No. 149036, April 2,
2002] However, in criminal cases, the question can be raised at any time at the discretion of the court; in civil
cases, the question can be raised at any stage of the proceedings if necessary for the determination of the case
itself; and in every case, except when there is estoppel, it can be raised at any stage if it involves the
jurisdiction of the court. [Zandueta v. De la Costa, G.R. No. L-46267, November 28, 1938]
The doctrine of separation of powers demand that proper respect be accorded to the other departments, courts
are loathe to decide constitutional questions as long as there is some other basis that can be used for a
decision. The constitutional issue must be the lis mota of the case. [De la Llana v. Alba, G.R. No. L-57883, March
12, 1982] As an example, in a case where Fertiphil Corporation sought the refund of the capital recovery
component it had paid to the Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority levied under LOI No. 1465 by challenging the
validity of the LOI, the Supreme Court held that the issue of constitutionality of the LOI was adequately pleaded
in the complaint; it is the lis mota of the case because the trial court cannot determine the claim without
resolving the issue of constitutionality.[Planters Products v. Fertiphil Corporation, G.R. No. 166006, March 14,
2008] Note, however, that the Court will not pass upon the question of constitutionality, although properly
presented, if the case can be disposed of on some other ground, such as the application of the statute or
general law. [Ty v. Trampe, G.R. No. 117577, December 1, 1995] Every law has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution,
and not that is doubtful, speculative or argumentative. [Arceta v. Mangrobang, G.R. No. 152895, June 15, 2004]
Facts:
In the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and the respondents, Pedro
Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates voted for the position of member of the National
Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas.
On October 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as member-elect of the
National Assembly for the said district, for having received the most number of votes.
On December 8, 1935, the herein respondent Pedro Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a Motion of
Protest against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, being the only protest filed after the
passage of Resolutions No. 8 aforequoted, and praying, among other-things, that said respondent be declared
elected member of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas, or that the election of said position be
nullified.
Issue:
Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the
controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative?
Held:
Yes. The Electoral Commission, as we shall have occasion to refer hereafter, is a constitutional organ,
created for a specific purpose, namely to determine all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. Although the Electoral Commission may not be
interfered with, when and while acting within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the
reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not subject to constitutional
restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the government, and even if it were,
conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law between department powers and agencies of the
government are necessarily determined by the judiciary in justifiable and appropriate cases. The Supreme Court
has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose
of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly.
Issue:
Has the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to the
cognizance of the protest filed the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of
such election by resolution of the National Assembly?
Held:

Section 4 of Article VI of the 1935 Constitution which provides:

SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justice of the Supreme Court designated by
the Chief Justice, and of six Members chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom shall be nominated by
the party having the largest number of votes, and three by the party having the second largest number of votes
therein. The senior Justice in the Commission shall be its Chairman. The Electoral Commission shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly.
The Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly. Under the organic law prevailing before the present
Constitution went into effect, each house of the legislature was respectively the sole judge of the elections,
returns, and qualifications of their elective members.
The 1935 Constitution has transferred all the powers previously exercised by the legislature with respect to
contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of its members, to the Electoral Commission. Such
transfer of power from the legislature to the Electoral Commission was full, clear and complete, and carried with
it ex necesitate rei the implied power inter alia to prescribe the rules and regulations as to the time and manner
of filing protests.
The avowed purpose in creating the Electoral Commission was to have an independent constitutional organ pass
upon all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly,
devoid of partisan influence or consideration, which object would be frustrated if the National Assembly were to
retain the power to prescribe rules and regulations regarding the manner of conducting said contests.
Section 4 of article VI of the Constitution repealed not only section 18 of the Jones Law making each house of
the Philippine Legislature respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its elective
members, but also section 478 of Act No. 3387 empowering each house to prescribe by resolution the time and
manner of filing contests against the election of its members, the time and manner of notifying the adverse
party, and bond or bonds, to be required, if any, and to fix the costs and expenses of contest.
Confirmation by the National Assembly of the election is contested or not, is not essential before such memberelect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National Assembly. Confirmation by
the National Assembly of the election of any member against whom no protest had been filed prior to said
confirmation, does not and cannot deprive the Electoral Commission of its incidental power to prescribe the time
within which protests against the election of any member of the National Assembly should be filed.
Based on the foregoing, the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its
constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua
against the election of the herein petitioner Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of the National Assembly of
December 3, 1935 can not in any manner toll the time for filing protests against the elections, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the
rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-34150 October 16, 1971
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and THE CHIEF ACCOUNTANT,
THE AUDITOR, and THE DISBURSING OFFICER OF THE 1971 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION,
respondents, RAUL S. MANGLAPUS, JESUS G. BARRERA, PABLO S. TRILLANA III, VICTOR DE LA
SERNA, MARCELO B. FERNAN, JOSE Y. FERIA, LEONARDO SIGUION REYNA, VICTOR F. ORTEGA, and
JUAN V. BORRA, Intervenors.
TOLENTINO VS. COMELEC
G.R. No. L-34150, October 16 1971, 41 SCRA 702
Constituent power means the power to formulate a Constitution or to propose amendments to or revisions of the
Constitution and to ratify such proposal. It is exercised by Congress (by special constitutional conferment), by a
Constitutional Convention or Commission, by the people through Initiative and Referendum, and ultimately, by
the sovereign electorate. It does not need the approval of the Chief Executive. Legislative power means the
power to pass, repeal or amend ordinary laws or statutes. It is an ordinary power of Congress and of the people,
also through Initiative and Referendum. [Bernas, The 1987 Constitution: A Commentary (2009)]
Steps in the amendatory process:
a.) Proposal of the amendments or revision, which may be done by:

i. Constituent Assembly - Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly, by a 3/4 vote of all its members.
ii. Constitutional Convention - Congress may call a ConCon by a 2/3 vote of all its members or by a majority vote
of all its members, Congress may submit to the electorate the question of whether to call a ConCon or not.
[Section 3, Art. XVII, 1987 Constitution].
iii. Peoples Initiative A petition of at least 12% of the total number of registered voters of which every
legislative district must be represented by atlease 3% of the registered voters therein. No amendment in this
manner shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this constitution nor more than once
every five years.
An initiative is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and enact
legislation through an election called for the purpose. There are three systems of initiatives: (1) Initiative on the
Constitution, which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution; (2) Initiative on statutes,
which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation; and (3) Initiative on local legislation, which
refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city, municipal or barangay law, resolution or
ordinance. [R.A. 6735, An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum].
b.) Ratification, the proposed amendment shall be submitted to the people and shall be deemed ratified by the
majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite, held not earlier than 60 days nor later than 90 days [Section 4, Art.
XVII, 1987 Constitution]:
(i) After approval of the proposal by Congress or Constitutional Convention;
(ii) After certification by the COMELEC of sufficiency of petition of the people.
The doctrine of Proper Submission means, because the Constitution itself prescribes the time frame within which
the plebiscite is to he held, there can no longer be a question on whether the time given to the people to
determine the merits and demerits of the proposed amendment. A plebiscite may be held on the same day as a
regular election [Gonzales v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-28196. November 9, 1967]. The entire Constitution must be
submitted for ratification at one plebiscite only. The people must have a proper frame of reference. [Tolentino
v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-34150, October 16 1971].
FACTS:
The 1971 Constitutional Convention came into being by virtue of two resolutions of the Congress approved in its
capacity as a constituent assembly convened for the purpose of calling a convention to propose amendments to
the Constitution. After election of delegates held on November 10, 1970, the Convention held its inaugural
session on June 1, 1971. In the morning of September 28, 1970, the Convention approved Organic Resolution
No. 1 which is entitled as, "A RESOLUTION AMENDING SECTION 1 OF ARTICLE V OF THE CONSTITUTION SO AS TO
LOWER THE VOTING AGE TO 18." On September 30, 1971, the COMELEC "resolved" to follow the mandate of the
Convention, that it will hold the said plebiscite together with the senatorial elections on November 8, 1971 .
Petitioner, Arturo Tolentino, filed a petition for prohibition, its main thrust being that Organic Resolution No. 1
and the necessary implementing resolutions subsequently approved have no force and effect as laws in so far
as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite co-incident with the senatorial elections, on the ground that the
calling and holding of such a plebiscite is, by the Constitution, a power lodged exclusively in Congress as a
legislative body and may not be exercised by the Convention, and that, under Article XV Section 1 of the 1935
Constitution, the proposed amendment in question cannot be presented to the people for ratification separately
from each and all other amendments to be drafted and proposed by the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Organic Resolution No. 1 of the 1971 Constitutional Convention violative to the Constitution.
HELD:
NO. All the amendments to be proposed by the same Convention must be submitted to the people in a single
"election" or plebiscite. In order that a plebiscite for the ratification of a Constitutional amendment may be
validly held, it must provide the voter not only sufficient time but ample basis for an intelligent appraisal of the
nature of the amendment per se but as well as its relation to the other parts of the Constitution with which it
has to form a harmonious whole. In the present context, where the Convention has hardly started considering
the merits, if not thousands, of proposals to amend the existing Constitution, to present to the people any single
proposal or a few of them cannot comply with this requirement
Javellana vs Executive Secretary (1973)
G.R. No. L-36142 / No. L-36164 / No. L-36165 / No. L-36236 / No. -6283 | 1973-03-31

Subjects Ratification of Proposed Amendments to the Constitution

Facts:
The Plebiscite Case
On March 16, 1967, Congress of the Philippines passed Resolution No. 2, as amended by Resolution No. 4,
calling for a Constitutional Convention to propose amendments to the Philippine Constitution. Said Resolution
was implemented by Republic Act No. 6132, for the election of delegates of the said Convention. Hence, the
1971 Constitutional Convention began to perform its functions on June 1, 1971. While the Convention was in
session on September 21, 1972, the President issued Proclamation No. 1081 placing the entire Philippines under
Martial Law.
On November 29, 1972, the Convention approved its Proposed Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines.
The next day, November 30, 1972, the President of the Philippines issued Presidential Decree No. 73, which is an
order for setting and appropriating of funds for a plebiscite for the ratification or rejection of the proposed
Constitution as drafted by the 1971 Constitutional Convention.
On December 7, 1972, Charito Planas filed a case against the Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of the
Philippines and the Auditor General, to enjoin said respondents or their agents from implementing Presidential
Decree No. 73, on the grounds that the President does not have the legislative authority to call a plebiscite and
the appropriation of public funds for the purpose are lodged exclusively by the Constitution in Congress and
there is no proper submission to the people of said Proposed Constitution set for January 15, 1973, there being
no freedom of speech, press and assembly, and there being no sufficient time to inform the people of the
contents thereof.
On December 23, 1972, the President announced the postponement of the plebiscite for the ratification or
rejection of the Proposed Constitution. The Court deemed it fit to refrain, for the time being, from deciding the
aforementioned case.
In the afternoon of January 12, 1973, the petitioners in Case G.R. No. L-35948 filed an "urgent motion," praying
that said case be decided "as soon as possible, preferably not later than January 15, 1973." The next day,
January 13, 1973, the Court issued a resolution requiring the respondents to comment and file an answer to the
said "urgent motion" not later than Tuesday noon, January 16, 1973." When the case was being heard, the
Secretary of Justice called on and said that, upon instructions of the President, he is delivering a copy of
Proclamation No. 1102, which had just been signed by the President earlier that morning.
Proclamation No. 1102, declares that Citizen Assemblies referendum was conducted, and that the result shows
that more than 95% of the members of the Citizens Assemblies are in favor of the new Constitution and majority
also answered that there was no need for a plebiscite and that the vote of the Citizens Assemblies should be
considered as a vote in a plebiscite. The then President of the Philippines, Marcos, hereby certify and proclaim
that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention has been ratified by an overwhelming
majority of all of the votes cast by the members of the Citizens Assemblies throughout the Philippines, and has
thereby come into effect.
The Ratification Case
On January 20, 1973, Josue Javellana filed case against the Executive Secretary and the Secretaries of National
Defense, Justice and Finance, to restrain said respondents "and their subordinates or agents from implementing
any of the provisions of the propose Constitution not found in the present Constitution" referring to that of 1935.
Javellana alleged that the President had announced "the immediate implementation of the New Constitution,
thru his Cabinet, respondents including," and that the latter "are acting without, or in excess of jurisdiction in
implementing the said proposed Constitution" upon the ground: "that the President, as Commander-in-Chief of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, is without authority to create the Citizens Assemblies"; that the same "are
without power to approve the proposed Constitution ..."; "that the President is without power to proclaim the
ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed Constitution"; and "that the election held to ratify the
proposed Constitution was not a free election, hence null and void."
Issue:
1. Whether or not the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 involves a justiciable or political question.
2. Whether or not the proposed new or revised Constitution been ratified to said Art. XV of the 1935
Constitution.
3. Whether or not the proposed Constitution aforementioned been approved by a majority of the people in
Citizens' Assemblies allegedly held throughout the Philippines.
4. Whether or not the people acquiesced in the proposed Constitution.
5. Whether or not the parties are entitled to any relief.
Ruling:
The court was severely divided on the following issues raised in the petition: but when the crucial question of
whether the petitioners are entitled to relief, six members of the court (Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo,
Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra) voted to dismiss the petition. Concepcion, together Justices Zaldivar, Fernando
and Teehankee, voted to grant the relief being sought, thus upholding the 1973 Constitution.
First Issue

On the first issue involving the political-question doctrine Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando,
Teehankee and myself, or six (6) members of the Court, hold that the issue of the validity of Proclamation No.
1102 presents a justiciable and non-political question. Justices Makalintal and Castro did not vote squarely on
this question, but, only inferentially, in their discussion of the second question. Justice Barredo qualified his vote,
stating that "inasmuch as it is claimed there has been approval by the people, the Court may inquire into the
question of whether or not there has actually been such an approval, and, in the affirmative, the Court should
keep hands-off out of respect to the people's will, but, in negative, the Court may determine from both factual
and legal angles whether or not Article XV of the 1935 Constitution been complied with." Justices Makasiar,
Antonio, Esguerra, or three (3) members of the Court hold that the issue is political and "beyond the ambit of
judicial inquiry."
Second Issue
On the second question of validity of the ratification, Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee
and myself, or six (6) members of the Court also hold that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention was not validly ratified in accordance with Article XV, section 1 of the 1935 Constitution, which
provides only one way for ratification, i.e., "in an election or plebiscite held in accordance with law and
participated in only by qualified and duly registered voters.
Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that "(A)s to whether or not the 1973 Constitution has been validly
ratified pursuant to Article XV, I still maintain that in the light of traditional concepts regarding the meaning and
intent of said Article, the referendum in the Citizens' Assemblies, specially in the manner the votes therein were
cast, reported and canvassed, falls short of the requirements thereof. In view, however, of the fact that I have no
means of refusing to recognize as a judge that factually there was voting and that the majority of the votes were
for considering as approved the 1973 Constitution without the necessity of the usual form of plebiscite followed
in past ratifications, I am constrained to hold that, in the political sense, if not in the orthodox legal sense, the
people may be deemed to have cast their favorable votes in the belief that in doing so they did the part
required of them by Article XV, hence, it may be said that in its political aspect, which is what counts most, after
all, said Article has been substantially complied with, and, in effect, the 1973 Constitution has been
constitutionally ratified."
Justices Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, or three (3) members of the Court hold that under their view there has
been in effect substantial compliance with the constitutional requirements for valid ratification.
Third Issue
On the third question of acquiescence by the Filipino people in the aforementioned proposed Constitution, no
majority vote has been reached by the Court.
Four (4) of its members, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that "the people have
already accepted the 1973 Constitution."
Two (2) members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself hold that there can be no free expression,
and there has even been no expression, by the people qualified to vote all over the Philippines, of their
acceptance or repudiation of the proposed Constitution under Martial Law.
Justice Fernando states that "(I)f it is conceded that the doctrine stated in some American decisions to the effect
that independently of the validity of the ratification, a new Constitution once accepted acquiesced in by the
people must be accorded recognition by the Court, I am not at this stage prepared to state that such doctrine
calls for application in view of the shortness of time that has elapsed and the difficulty of ascertaining what is
the mind of the people in the absence of the freedom of debate that is a concomitant feature of martial law."
Three (3) members of the Court express their lack of knowledge and/or competence to rule on the question.
Justices Makalintal and Castro are joined by Justice Teehankee in their statement that "Under a regime of martial
law, with the free expression of opinions through the usual media vehicle restricted, (they) have no means of
knowing, to the point of judicial certainty, whether the people have accepted the Constitution."
Fourth Issue
On the fourth question of relief, six (6) members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo,
Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra voted to DISMISS the petition. Justice Makalintal and Castro so voted on the
strength of their view that "(T)he effectivity of the said Constitution, in the final analysis, is the basic and
ultimate question posed by these cases to resolve which considerations other than judicial, and therefore
beyond the competence of this Court, are relevant and unavoidable."
Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee and myself voted to deny
respondents' motion to dismiss and to give due course to the petitions.
Fifth Issue
Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that it is in force
by virtue of the people's acceptance thereof;
Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando and Teehankee cast no vote
thereon on the premise stated in their votes on the third question that they could not state with judicial
certainty whether the people have accepted or not accepted the Constitution; and

Two (2) members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself voted that the Constitution proposed by the
1971 Constitutional Convention is not in force; with the result that there are not enough votes to declare that
the new Constitution is not in force.
ACCORDINGLY, by virtue of the majority of six (6) votes of Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio
and Esguerra with the four (4) dissenting votes of the Chief Justice and Justices Zaldivar, Fernando and
Teehankee, all the aforementioned cases are hereby dismissed. This being the vote of the majority, there is no
further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect. It is so ordered.
FROM MYLEGALWHIZ:
Facts: Previously, Congress passed a resolution calling a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution.
The 1971 Constitutional Convention came up with a Proposed Constitution, which by virtue of Presidential
Decree No. 73, was submitted to the Filipino people for ratification or rejection. This spawned a a sequel of cases
(hereafter Plebiscite cases) questioning the validity of PD 73 and the antecedent acts.
However, pending the hearing of the Plebiscite Cases, the President signed Proclamation No. 1102 which
proclaimed that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention has been ratified by an
overwhelming majority of all of the votes cast by the members of all the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies)
throughout the Philippines, and has thereby come into effect.
Javellana filed this suit against the respondents to restrain them from implementing the Proposed Constitution.
Javellana filed the petition as a Filipino citizen and a qualified and registered voter and as a class suit, for himself
and in behalf of all citizens and voters similarly situated. Petitioners prayed for the nullification of Proclamation
No. 1102.
After deliberating on the cases, the members of the Court agreed that each would write his own opinion and
serve a copy thereof on his colleagues, and this they did. Subsequently, the Court discussed said opinions and
votes were cast thereon.
Held: Required Vote to Nullify Executive Proclamation
One of the petitions theorized that the case was an academic futility since it was improbable that the necessary
8 votes under the 1935 Constitution, and much less the ten 10 votes required by the 1973 Constitution, can be
obtained to declare invalid the contested Proclamation No. 1102.
Section 10 of Article VIII of the 1935 Constitution, the concurrence of two thirds of all the Members of the
Supreme Court is required only to declare a "treaty or law" unconstitutional, but not to nullify a rule or
regulation or an executive order issued by the President.
The distinction is not without reasonable foundation. The two thirds vote (8 votes) requirement was made to
apply only to treaty and law, because, in these cases, the participation of the two other departments of the
government - the Executive and the Legislative - is present, which circumstance is absent in the case of rules,
regulations and executive orders. Indeed, a law(statute) passed by Congress is subject to the approval or veto of
the President, whose disapproval cannot be overridden except by the vote of two-thirds of all members of each
House of Congress. A treaty is entered into by the President with the concurrence of the Senate, which is not
required in the case of rules, regulations or executive orders which are exclusive acts of the President. Hence, to
nullify the same, a lesser number of votes is necessary in the Supreme Court than that required to invalidate a
law or treaty.
Although the foregoing refers to rules, regulations and executive orders issued by the President, the dictum
applies with equal force to executive proclamations, like said Proclamation No. 1102.
In fact, while executive orders embody administrative acts or commands of the President, executive
proclamations are mainly informative and declaratory in character. As consequence, an executive proclamation
has no more than "the force of an executive order," so that, for the Supreme Court to declare such proclamation
unconstitutional, under the 1935 Constitution, the same number of votes needed to invalidate an executive
order, rule of regulation namely, six votes would suffice.
Political Question
Political questions refer to 'those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in
their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature
or executive branch of the government.' It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of
a particular measure.
Accordingly, when the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the issue on whether or
not the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met, or the limitations respected, it justiciable or nonpolitical, the crux of the problem being one of legality or validity of the contested act, not its wisdom
Considering that Art. XV of the1935 Constitution prescribes the method or procedure for its amendment, the
question of whether or not the Proposed Constitution drafted by the 1971 Constitutional Convention has been
ratified in accordance with said Art. XV is a justiciable and not a political question.
Ratification of Constitutional Amendments
It is well settled that the matter of ratification of an amendment to the Constitution should be settled by
applying the provisions of the Constitution in force at the time of the alleged ratification, or the old Constitution.
Hence, The determination of whether or not the new constitution is now in force depends upon whether or not

the said new Constitution has been ratified in accordance with the requirements of the 1935 Constitution, upon
the authority of which said Constitutional Convention was called and approved the proposed Constitution.
The plebiscite in the Citizens Assemblies , claimed to have ratified the revised Constitution, is null and void
based on the following reasons:
(a) Unqualified voters allowed to vote
Under the 1935 Constitution, persons below 21 years of age could not exercise the right of suffrage. Hence,
when persons above 15 years but less than 21 years of age were allowed to vote in the plebiscite, it rendered
the proceedings void. And, since there is no means by which the invalid votes of those less than 21 years of age
can be separated or segregated from those of the qualified voters, the proceedings in the Citizens Assemblies
must be considered null and void.
(b) Casting of votes not done by ballot
The 1935 Constitution requires "a majority of the votes cast" for a proposed amendment to be valid.
The term "votes cast" has been held to mean ballots cast , and the word cast means to deposit (the ballot)
formally or officially. In short, Article XV of the 1935 Constitution intended the term "votes cast" to mean votes
made in writing or choices made on ballots not orally or by raising hands by the persons taking part in
plebiscites.
Hence, the viva voce voting in the Citizens' Assemblies is null and void ab initio
(c) Conducted without Comelec supervision
The plebiscite on the constitution not having been conducted under the supervision of COMELEC is void. The
Barrio Assemblies took place without the intervention of the COMELEC and without complying with the
provisions of the Election Code of 1971 or of PD 73. The procedure followed is such that there is no reasonable
means of checking the accuracy of the returns filed by the officers who conducted said plebiscites. This is
another patent violation of the fundamental scheme set forth in the 1935 Constitution to insure the "free,
orderly, and honest" expression of the people's will.
Evidence of Ratification
Proclamation No. 1102 is not an evidence, prima facie or otherwise, of the alleged ratification of the proposed
Constitution. Article X of the 1935 Constitution places COMELEC as the "exclusive" charge to the "the
enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections" independently of the Executive.
But there is not even a certification by the COMELEC in support of the alleged results of the citizens assemblies
relied upon in Proclamation No. 1102. Also, the respective local governments had not certified to the President
the alleged result of the citizens' assemblies all over the Philippines. In effect, the citizens assemblies did not
adopt the proposed constitution.
Acquiescence of the People to the Proposed Amendments
A department of the Government cannot recognize its own acts. Recognition normally connotes the
acknowledgment by a party of the acts of another. Individual acts of recognition by members of Congress do not
constitute congressional recognition, unless the members have performed said acts in session duly assembled.
This is a well-established principle of Administrative Law and of the Law of Public Officers.
Taking into consideration Proclamation No. 1081 which placed the entire Philippines under Martial Law, the
compliance by the people with the orders of martial law government does not constitute acquiescence to the
proposed Constitution. Neither is the Court prepared to declare that the people's inaction as regards
Proclamation No. 1102, and their compliance with a number of Presidential orders, decrees and/or instructions
amounts to a ratification, adoption or approval of said Proclamation No. 1102. The intimidation is there, and
inaction or obedience of the people, under these conditions, is not necessarily an act of conformity or
acquiescence.
Enrolled Bill
It is claimed that Proclamation No. 1102 is "conclusive" upon the Court, or is, at least, entitled to full faith and
credence, as an enrolled bill.
The "enrolled bill" refers to a document certified to the President or his action under the Constitution by the
Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and attested to by the respective Secretaries
of both Houses, concerning legislative measures approved by said Houses. I
The conclusiveness bestowed to an enrolled bill cannot be applied to Proclamation No. 1102. A certification
issued by an officer without legal authority is as good as non-existent. The act of the President declaring the
results of a plebiscite on the proposed Constitution was made without authority.
1973 Constitution is in Force
Four members of the Court hold that it is in force by virtue of the people's acceptance thereof; Four members
cast no vote thereon on the premise that they could not state with judicial certainty whether the people have
accepted or not accepted the Constitution; and Two members of the Court voted that the Constitution proposed
by the 1971 Constitutional Convention is not in force; with the result, there are not enough votes to declare that
the new Constitution is not in force.
EN BANC
February 15, 1910; G.R. No. 3983
SALVADORA OCAMPO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. TOMAS CABAGIS, defendant-appellant.
ELLIOTT, J.:
On the 26th of December, 1908, a judgment was entered in this case in the following words:

Without prejudice to the filing of an extended opinion later, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and
the defendant is absolved from the complaint without special finding as to costs, and twenty days hereafter let
judgment be entered in conformity herewith, and ten days later let the record be returned to the court wherein
it originated, for appropriate action. So ordered.
No further decision was ever filed.
Two of the four justices who signed the decision are no longer members of this court. The appellees now seek
the cancellation and annulment of the entry of judgment and the recall of the remittiturand the record of the
case to this court. The motion is made upon the theory that no final judgment has ever been entered, and that
by reason of the changes in the personnel of the court the more extensive opinion which was contemplated can
not now be filed.
Section 15 of Act No. 136 provides that "in the determination of causes all decisions of the Supreme Court shall
be given in writing, signed by the judges concurring in the decision, and the grounds of the decision shall be
stated as briefly as may be consistent with clearness."
The decision of December 26, 1908, was in writing, and was signed by the four justice who concurred therein,
but no grounds are stated for the decision.
This statute recognizes the system of rendering written decision in which are developed the reasoning by which
the conclusion are reached. The customs of stating the grounds of a decision in writing is of comparatively
recent origin. Under the early English practice, if any reasons were given, they were stated orally by the judges,
and taken down by the reporters. It was thought by some of the early judges that reason are sometimes
dangerous things, and that for the credit of the decisions it might be better that each reader be left at liberty to
supply reasons satisfactory to his own mind. Thus, Lord Coke says that in the Court of King's Bench "the reasons
or causes of the judgment are not expressed; for wise and learned men do, before they judge, labor to reach to
the depth of all reason of the case in question, but in their judgments express not any; and in truth, if judges
should set down the reasons and causes of their judgment within every record, that immense labor would
withdraw them from the necessary service of the Commonwealth, and their records should prove to be like
elephantini libri, of infinite length, and in mine opinion lose somewhat of their present authority and reverence,
and that is worthy for learned and grave men to imitate." (Coke, pref. 5, p. 3.)
To relieve the court from that immense labor, which "would withdraw them from the necessary service" of the
public, this Act of the Commission directs that decisions shall be of reasonable instead of infinite length.
It is certainly desirable in the interest of clearness and certainly that appellate courts should state the reasons
upon which their decision rests. The custom which gradually grew up produced that great body of reports from
which is derived the common law of England and America, and the great value of which has been universally
recognized by jurists and statesmen. Edmund Burke said that English law had "not any other sure foundation,
nor consequently the lives and property of the subject any sure hold, but in the maxims, rules, principles, and
judicial traditionally line of decisions contained in the notes taken, and from time to time published, called
reports," and that "to give judgment privately is to put an end to the reports, and to put an end to the reports is
to put an end to the laws of England."
There is of course a golden medium between judgments rendered privately or orally and the opinions of infinite
length with which the courts have almost overwhelmed the legal profession. The correct general theory is found
in this statute. The opinions should be in writing, and the grounds of the decision should be stated as briefly as
may be consistent with clearness. But the exact form and manner in which decisions shall be rendered are
questions of judicials rather than of legislative determination. No legislature has ever, so far as we have been
able to learn, attempted to make the validity of a decision dependent upon the exact form in which it is
expressed. Presumably no legislature intends to impose upon courts conditions and restrictions which will render
them incapable of performing their functions properly and efficiently. The result which would follow strict
compliance with a statute of this nature may properly be taken into consideration in order to determine whether
or not the Legislature intended the statute to be mandatory or merely directory. It should not be assumed in the
absence of specific language to the contrary that a legislature intended that the rights of parties should be
seriously affected by the failure of a court or some officer to comply strickly with the statutory requirements as
to the manner of official action. Legislatures often enact statutes for the purpose of providing an orderly
procedure for the conduct of public business, but procedure is secondary in importance to substantive rights,
and the nonobservance of such procedure should never be permitted to affect substantive rights, unless the
intention of the legislature is clearly expressed. It is desirable that courts should state the grounds upon which
their decisions rest, but it possible to conceive of conditions under which strict compliance with a statute
requiring this would be impracticable or even impossible. Instead of protecting the interest of litigants by
securing a prompt and orderly administration of the law, it would then result in obstructing or stopping the
wheels of the judicial machinery, to the prejudice of all parties. There can be but one decision by any court, and
it must be the result of the concurrent judgment of a majority of the justices constituting that court. The
legislature can not compel the minds of men. The law has no mandamus to the logical faculty. It is not unusual
for the majority of the members of a court to agree to a common conclusion, while being unable to agree upon
the grounds or reasons leading to that conclusion. Individuals have different methods of reasoning, but the
conclusion of the majority of a court is the decision of the court, regardless of the views of the members as to
the reasons which induce that conclusion.

A strict and literal compliance with this statute would often render it impossible for the court to decide a case.
The Act declares the manner in which the Supreme Court shall perform the strictly judicial act of giving final
expression to its decision, but it does not say that the failure to comply therewith shall render the decision
ineffective. The direction is as to a matter which is not of the essence of the thing to be done, and there is
nothing to suggest that the Legislature intended that strict compliance therewith should be essential to the
validity of a decision duly and formally rendered in some other regular manner. It seems to be universal held
that statutes of this nature are merely directory, and that compliance therewith is not necessary to the validity
of the proceedings. A somewhat similar questions required the supreme court to "decided every point fairly
arising upon the record, and give its reasons therefor in writing." This provision was held not to affect the
common law doctrine of res judicata.
Notwithstanding that clause in the constitution [said the curt] if the points are involved in the issue, they are res
judicata, although not mentioned in the opinion of the court or noticed by counsel on either side. That clause of
the constitution is merely directory to the court, and it ought to be followed; but it does in no wise change the
common law rule as to the doctrine of res judicata. The contrary doctrine would lead to endless litigation; and
no suitor could know when his controversy was terminated. There would be anything but response in such a
construction of the constitution as that. (Henry vs. Davis, 13 W Va., 230.)
Section 15 of Act No. 136 expresses a proper rule which should be observed by the court unless there is some
substantial reason for departing therefrom, but if such reason exists, the judicial action can not be controlled by
legislative directions. In holding that this statute is directory, we assume of the court against its judicial
judgment.
There is, however, a broader ground upon which the decision may be placed. The doctrine is well established in
the various States of the Union that the legislatures have no power to establish rules which operates to deprive
the courts of their constitutional authority to exercise the judicial functions. A constitutional court when
exercising its proper judicial functions can no more be unreasonably controlled by the legislature than can the
legislature when properly exercising legislative power be subjected to the control of the courts. Each acts
independently within its exclusive field.
But counsel asserts that the courts of the Philippine Islands are not constitutional courts, and "that Act No. 136,
the Acts of Congress and the Commission are the Constitution as far as this Supreme Court is concerned." We
are unable to accept this as a correct statement of the law. In a certain sense these courts are not constitutional
courts. In a broader sense, and for the purposes of construing and testing the validity of the Acts of the
Philippine Legislature, they are constitutional courts, because they, like the Legislature, exist by virtue of a
written Organic Law enacted by the supreme legislative body. The validity of all legislative Acts must be
determined by their compliance with this Organic Law, and the determination of the legal question of
compliance or noncompliance therewith is a judicial question, which must in the last analysis be determined by
the judiciary. This principle is inherent in every government organized under the American system which
distributes the powers of government among executive, legislative and judicial departments. In the absence of a
restrictive provision in the Organic Law, a grant of the legislative power means a grant of all the legislative
power; and a grant of the judicial power means a grant of all the judicial power which may be exercised under
the government. With the peculiar restrictions upon the power of the Philippine Government, which lie back of
the general statement already made, we have no concern at the present time. Within the relation created by the
Acts of Congress the general principles of American constitutional law apply whenever they can be made
applicable. The motion is therefore denied.
B. POLITICAL QUESTION
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-33964 December 11, 1971
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF TEODOSIO LANSANG RODOLFO DEL
ROSARIO, and BAYANI ALCALA, petitioners, vs. BRIGADIER-GENERAL EDUARDO M. GARCIA, Chief,
Philippine Constabulary, respondent.
etc.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
In the evening of August 21, 1971, at about 9 p.m., while the Liberal Party of the Philippines was holding a
public meeting at Plaza Miranda, Manila, for the presentation of its candidates in the general elections
scheduled for November 8, 1971, two (2) hand grenades were thrown, one after the other, at the platform where
said candidates and other persons were. As a consequence, eight (8) persons were killed and many more
injured, including practically all of the aforementioned candidates, some of whom sustained extensive, as well
as serious, injuries which could have been fatal had it not been for the timely medical assistance given to them.
On August 23, soon after noontime, the President of the Philippines announced the issuance of Proclamation No.
889, dated August 21, 1971, reading as follows:
Subject: Suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus (constitutional limitations); Judicial branchs
power to review factual basis of suspension by Executive branch

Facts: In the evening of August 21, 1971, while the Liberal Party was holding a public meeting at Plaza Miranda,
two hand grenades were thrown at the platform where the candidates and other persons were, killing and
injuring several persons.
Two days later, President Marcos announced the issuance of Proclamation No. 889, declaring that lawless
elements have created a state of lawlessness and disorder affecting public safety and the security of the State;
and thereby the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended, for persons detained for the crimes of
insurrection or rebellion. Presently, petitions for writs of habeas corpus were filed by herein petitioners who
have been arrested without a warrant and then detained. They likewise assail Proclamation No. 889 as
unconstitutional.
The respondent argues that petitioners had been detained on reasonable belief that they had participated in
the crime of insurrection or rebellion and that their continued detention is justified due to the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus pursuant to Proclamation No. 889.
It is likewise alleged that the issuance of the proclamation partakes of the nature of political question which
cannot be the subject of judicial inquiry and that in making said declaration.
Held:
Constitutional limitations on the power to suspend the privilege of the writ
1. In case of invasion, insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof, the President has, under the
Constitution, three courses of action open to him, namely: (a) to call out the armed forces; (b) to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and (c) to place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.
2. The grant of power to suspend the privilege is neither absolute nor unqualified. The authority conferred by
the Constitution, both under the Bill of Rights and under the Executive Department, is limited and conditional.
3. Two conditions must concur for the valid exercise of the authority to suspend the privilege to the writ, to wit:
(a) there must be invasion, insurrection, or rebellion or- under Art VII, there is imminent danger thereof and
(b) public safety must require the suspension of the privilege.
4. Compliance with these constitutional limitations may be inquired into by the courts.
Finality and conclusiveness upon the courts
5. The Presidential Proclamation under consideration declares that there is actually a state of rebellion and that
public safety requires it.
6. These findings are not conclusive upon the court. Judicial courts have authority to and should inquire into the
existence of the factual bases required by the Constitution for the suspension of the privilege of the writ.
7. This overturns the precedent laid out in Barcelon v. Baker and Montenegro v. Castaneda which ruled the
authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen requiring suspension of the privilege or the writ belongs to
the President and his decision is final and conclusive upon the courts.
Political question -Scope of Judicial Inquiry
8. In testing the validity of acts of Congress and of the Executive be, the proper standard is not correctness, but
arbitrariness. This means that judicial inquiry into the basis of the questioned proclamation can go no further
than to satisfy the Court not that the President's decision is correct but that in suspending the writ, the President
did not act arbitrarily.
9. Under the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances, the function of the Court
is merely to check, not to supplant the Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond the
constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in the President or to determine the
wisdom of his act.
10. The President did not act arbitrarily in issuing Proclamation No. 889. Accordingly, the same is not
unconstitutional. The President acted on relevant facts gathered thru various intelligence agents of our
government.
Facts: In the evening of August 21, 1971, at about 9 p.m., while the Liberal Party of the Philippines was holding a
public meeting at Plaza Miranda, Manila, for the presentation of its candidates in the general elections
scheduled for November 8, 1971, two hand grenades were thrown at the platform where said candidates and
other persons were. Eight persons were killed and many more injured. Proclamation 889 was issued by the

President suspending privilege of writ of habeas corpus stating that there is a conspiracy of rebellion and
insurrection in order to forcibly seize political power. Petitions for writ of habeas corpus were filed by persons
(13) who have been arrested without a warrant.
It was stated that one of the safeguards of the proclamation was that it is to be applied to persons caught in
flagrante delicto. Incidentally, Proc. 889-A was issued as an amendment, inserting the word actually staging.
Proc. 889-B was also issued lifting the suspension of privilege in 27 provinces, 3 sub-provinces and 26 cities.
Proc. 889-C was issued restoring the suspension in 13 provinces and cities(mostly in Mindanao). Proc. 889-D
further lifted the suspension in 7 provinces and 4 cities. Only 18 provinces and sub-provinces and 2 cities whose
privilege was suspended. Petitioners maintained that Proclamation No. 889 did not declare the existence of
actual "invasion insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof, however it became moot and academic
since it was amended. Petitioners further contend that public safety did not require the issuance of
proclamations stating: (a) that there is no rebellion; (b) that, prior to and at the time of the suspension of the
privilege, the Government was functioning normally, as were the courts; (c) that no untoward incident,
confirmatory of an alleged July-August Plan, has actually taken place after August 21, 1971; (d) that the
President's alleged apprehension, because of said plan, is non-existent and unjustified; and (e) that the
Communist forces in the Philippines are too small and weak to jeopardize public safety to such extent as to
require the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
A resolution was issued by majority of the Court having tentatively arrived at a consensus that it may inquire in
order to satisfy itself of the existence of the factual bases for the proclamations. Now the Court resolves after
conclusive decision reached by majority.
Issues: (1) Whether or Not the authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen requiring suspension (of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus) belongs to the President and his decision is final and conclusive upon the
courts and upon all other persons.
(2) Whether or Not public safety require the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus decreed in
Proclamation No. 889-A.
Held: The President has authority however it is subject to judicial review. Two conditions must concur for the
valid exercise of the authority to suspend the privilege to the writ (a) there must be "invasion, insurrection, or
rebellion" or "imminent danger thereof," and (b) "public safety" must require the suspension of the privilege.
President has three (3) courses of action: (a) to call out the armed forces; (b) to suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus; and (c) to place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. He had, already, called
out the armed forces, proved inadequate. Of the two other alternatives, the suspension of the privilege is the
least harsh.
Petitioners contention that CPP-NPA has no ability, is negatived by the killing of 5 mayors, 20 barrio captains and
3 chiefs of police; that there were fourteen (14) meaningful bombing incidents in the Greater Manila Area in
1970. CPP has managed to infiltrate or establish and control nine major labor organizations; has exploited the
(11) major student or youth organizations; about thirty (30) mass organizations actively advancing the CPP.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 162230
April 28, 2010
ISABELITA C. VINUYA, et al., Petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G.
ROMULO, THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS DELIA DOMINGO-ALBERT, THE
HONORABLE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ, and THE HONORABLE SOLICITOR
GENERAL ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
The Treaty of Peace with Japan, insofar as it barred future claims such as those asserted by plaintiffs in these
actions, exchanged full compensation of plaintiffs for a future peace. History has vindicated the wisdom of that
bargain. And while full compensation for plaintiffs' hardships, in the purely economic sense, has been denied
these former prisoners and countless other survivors of the war, the immeasurable bounty of life for themselves
and their posterity in a free society and in a more peaceful world services the debt.1
There is a broad range of vitally important areas that must be regularly decided by the Executive Department
without either challenge or interference by the Judiciary. One such area involves the delicate arena of foreign
relations. It would be strange indeed if the courts and the executive spoke with different voices in the realm of
foreign policy. Precisely because of the nature of the questions presented, and the lapse of more than 60 years
since the conduct complained of, we make no attempt to lay down general guidelines covering other situations

not involved here, and confine the opinion only to the very questions necessary to reach a decision on this
matter.
FACTS:
This is an original Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with an application for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the Office of the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of the
DFA, the Secretary of the DOJ, and the OSG.
Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit organization registered with the SEC,
established for the purpose of providing aid to the victims of rape by Japanese military forces in the Philippines
during the Second World War.
Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department through the DOJ, DFA, and
OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the
establishment of the comfort women stations in the Philippines. But officials of the Executive Department
declined to assist the petitioners, and took the position that the individual claims of the comfort women for
compensation had already been fully satisfied by Japans compliance with the Peace Treaty between the
Philippines and Japan.
Hence, this petition where petitioners pray for this court to (a) declare that respondents committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of discretion in refusing to espouse their claims for the crimes against
humanity and war crimes committed against them; and (b) compel the respondents to espouse their claims for
official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and
other international tribunals.
Respondents maintain that all claims of the Philippines and its nationals relative to the war were dealt with in
the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 and the bilateral Reparations Agreement of 1956.
On January 15, 1997, the Asian Womens Fund and the Philippine government signed a Memorandum of
Understanding for medical and welfare support programs for former comfort women. Over the next five years,
these were implemented by the Department of Social Welfare and Development.
ISSUE:
WON the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in not espousing petitioners claims for
official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan.
RULING:
Petition lacks merit. From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department has the exclusive prerogative
to determine whether to espouse petitioners claims against Japan.
Political questions refer to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in
their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative
or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a
particular measure.
One type of case of political questions involves questions of foreign relations. It is well-established that the
conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and
legislativethe politicaldepartments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise
of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision. are delicate, complex, and involve large
elements of prophecy. They are and should be undertaken only by those directly responsible to the people
whose welfare they advance or imperil.
But not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions, and courts certainly possess the
authority to construe or invalidate treaties and executive agreements. However, the question whether the
Philippine government should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign government is a foreign relations
matter, the authority for which is demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the
political branches. In this case, the Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best interest of
the country to waive all claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The
wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to question.

The President, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which prevail in foreign
countries, and especially is this true in time of war. He has his confidential sources of information. He has his
agents in the form of diplomatic, consular and other officials.
The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners cause would be inimical to our countrys
foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations with Japan, thereby creating serious implications for
stability in this region. For the to overturn the Executive Departments determination would mean an
assessment of the foreign policy judgments by a coordinate political branch to which authority to make that
judgment has been constitutionally committed.
From a municipal law perspective, certiorari will not lie. As a general principle, where such an extraordinary
length of time has lapsed between the treatys conclusion and our consideration the Executive must be given
ample discretion to assess the foreign policy considerations of espousing a claim against Japan, from the
standpoint of both the interests of the petitioners and those of the Republic, and decide on that basis if
apologies are sufficient, and whether further steps are appropriate or necessary.
In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means available for individuals to bring a claim within the
international legal system has been when the individual is able to persuade a government to bring a claim on
the individuals behalf. By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or
international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own right to ensure, in the
person of its subjects, respect for the rules of international law.
Within the limits prescribed by international law, a State may exercise diplomatic protection by whatever means
and to whatever extent it thinks fit, for it is its own right that the State is asserting. Should the natural or legal
person on whose behalf it is acting consider that their rights are not adequately protected, they have no remedy
in international law. All they can do is resort to national law, if means are available, with a view to furthering
their cause or obtaining redress. All these questions remain within the province of municipal law and do not
affect the position internationally.
Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations will not alter this analysis. Petitioners have
not shown that the crimes committed by the Japanese army violated jus cogens prohibitions at the time the
Treaty of Peace was signed, or that the duty to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes is an erga omnes
obligation or has attained the status of jus cogens.
The term erga omnes (Latin: in relation to everyone) in international law has been used as a legal term
describing obligations owed by States towards the community of states as a whole. Essential distinction should
be drawn between the obligations of a State towards the international community as a whole, and those arising
vis--vis another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature, the former are the concern of
all States. In view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their
protection; they are obligations erga omnes.
The term jus cogens (literally, compelling law) refers to norms that command peremptory authority,
superseding conflicting treaties and custom. Jus cogens norms are considered peremptory in the sense that they
are mandatory, do not admit derogation, and can be modified only by general international norms of equivalent
authority
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 165109; December 14, 2009
MANUEL N. MAMBA, RAYMUND P. GUZMAN and LEONIDES N. FAUSTO, Petitioners, vs. EDGAR R.
LARA,
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Taxpayer suit; legal standing of taxpayer to sue.
See - REMULLA VS. MALIKSI, GR NO. 171633, SEPT. 11, 2013.
With respect to the first, jurisprudence dictates that a taxpayer may be allowed to sue where there is a claim
that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that
public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law or ordinance. 34 In this
case, public funds of the Province of Cavite stand to be expended to enforce the compromise judgment. As such,
Remulla being a resident-taxpayer of the Province of Cavite has the legal standing to file the petition for
annulment of judgment and, therefore, the same should not have been dismissed on said ground. Notably, the

fact that there lies no proof that public funds have already been disbursed should not preclude Remulla from
assailing the validity of the compromise judgment. Lest it be misunderstood, the concept of legal standing is
ultimately a procedural technicality which may be relaxed by the Court if the circumstances so warrant. As
observed in Mamba v. Lara,35 the Court did not hesitate to give standing to taxpayers in cases36
where serious legal issues were raised or where public expenditures of millions of pesos were
involved. Likewise, it has also been ruled that a taxpayer need not be a party to the contract in
order to challenge its validity, 37 or to seek the annulment of the same on the ground of extrinsic
fraud.38 Indeed, for as long as taxes are involved, the people have a right to question contracts
entered into by the government,39 as in this case.
_________________________
The decision to entertain a taxpayers suit is discretionary upon the Court. It can choose to strictly apply
the rule or take a liberal stance depending on the controversy involved. Advocates for a strict application of the
rule believe that leniency would open floodgates to numerous suits, which could hamper the government from
performing its job. Such possibility, however, is not only remote but also negligible compared to what is at stake
- the lifeblood of the State. For this reason, when the issue hinges on the illegal disbursement of public funds,
a liberal approach should be preferred as it is more in keeping with truth and justice.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari with prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary
Injunction, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeks to set aside the April 27, 2004 Order[1] of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 5, Tuguegarao City, dismissing the Petition for Annulment of Contracts and Injunction
with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction,[2] docketed as Civil
Case No. 6283. Likewise assailed in this Petition is the August 20, 2004 Resolution[3] of RTC, Branch 1,
Tuguegarao City denying the Motion for Reconsideration of the dismissal.
Factual Antecedents
MANUEL MAMBA V. EDGAR LARA
G.R. No. 165109
Facts:
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cagayan passed several resolutions authorizing Gov. Edgar Lara to
negotiate, sign and execute contracts or agreements for the issuance and flotation of bonds to fun the priority
projects of the governor and for the construction and development of a New Cagayan Town Center subject to
the approval and ratification of by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Subsequently, the planning, design,
construction and site development of the project was awarded to Asset Builders Corporation.
Petitioners Manuel Mamba, Raymund Guzman and Leonidaz Fausto, a Representative of Cagayan and
members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, respectively, filed a petition for Annulment of Contracts entered into
by Gov. Lara in connection with the New Cagayan Town Center project.
The Court dismissed the petition for lack of course of action, stating among others, that petitioners did not
have the locus standi to file the present case as they are not parties to the questioned contract.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners have locus standi to file the petition.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that petitioners have legal standing to sue as taxpayers. A taxpayer is allowed to
sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that the public money is being deflected to
any improper purpose or that there is wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law. However, for a taxpayers suit to prosper, two requisites must be met: (1) public funds
derived from taxation are disbursed by a political subdivision or instrumentality and in doing so, a law is violated
or some irregularity is committed and (2) the petitioner is directly affected by the alleged act. A taxpayer need
not be a party to the contract to challenge its validity. As long as taxes are involved, people have a right to
question the contracts entered into by the government.
In this case, although the construction of the town center would be primarily sourced from the proceeds of
the bonds, a government support would still be spent for paying the interest of the bonds. As to the second
requisite, the court has relaxed the stringent direct injury test wherein ordinary citizens and taxpayers were
allowed to sue even if they failed to show direct injury by invoking transcendental importance, paramount
public interest or far-reaching implications.
G.R. No. 190293
PHILIP SIGFRID A. FORTUN and ALBERT LEE G. ANGELES, Petitioners, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGALARROYO, as Commander-in-Chief and President of the Republic of the Philippines, EDUARDO
ERMITA, Executive Secretary, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (AFP), or any of their units,
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP), or any of their units, JOHN DOES and JANE DOES acting under

their direction and control, Respondents.

etc.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
These cases concern the constitutionality of a presidential proclamation of martial law and suspension of
the privilege of habeas corpus in 2009 in a province in Mindanao which were withdrawn after just eight days.
The Facts and the Case
The essential background facts are not in dispute. On November 23, 2009 heavily armed men, believed
led by the ruling Ampatuan family, gunned down and buried under shoveled dirt 57 innocent civilians on a
highway in Maguindanao. In response to this carnage, on November 24 President Arroyo issued Presidential
Proclamation 1946, declaring a state of emergency in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City to
prevent and suppress similar lawless violence in Central Mindanao.
Believing that she needed greater authority to put order in Maguindanao and secure it from large groups of
persons that have taken up arms against the constituted authorities in the province, on December 4, 2009
President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 1959 declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus in that province except for identified areas of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.
Two days later or on December 6, 2009 President Arroyo submitted her report to Congress in accordance with
Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which required her, within 48 hours from the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, to submit to that body a report in
person or in writing of her action.
In her report, President Arroyo said that she acted based on her finding that lawless men have taken up arms in
Maguindanao and risen against the government. The President described the scope of the uprising, the nature,
quantity, and quality of the rebels weaponry, the movement of their heavily armed units in strategic positions,
the closure of the Maguindanao Provincial Capitol, Ampatuan Municipal Hall, Datu Unsay Municipal Hall, and 14
other municipal halls, and the use of armored vehicles, tanks, and patrol cars with unauthorized PNP/Police
markings.
On December 9, 2009 Congress, in joint session, convened pursuant to Section 18, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution to review the validity of the Presidents action. But, two days later or on December 12 before
Congress could act, the President issued Presidential Proclamation 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao.
Petitioners Philip Sigfrid A. Fortun and the other petitioners in G.R. 190293, 190294, 190301,190302,
190307, 190356, and 190380 brought the present actions to challenge the constitutionality of President
Arroyos Proclamation 1959 affecting Maguindanao. But, given the prompt lifting of that proclamation before
Congress could review it and before any serious question affecting the rights and liberties of Maguindanaos
inhabitants could arise, the Court deems any review of its constitutionality the equivalent of beating a dead
horse.
Prudence and respect for the co-equal departments of the government dictate that the Court should be
cautious in entertaining actions that assail the constitutionality of the acts of the Executive or the Legislative
department. The issue of constitutionality, said the Court in Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010,[1]
must be the very issue of the case, that the resolution of such issue is unavoidable.
The issue of the constitutionality of Proclamation 1959 is not unavoidable for two reasons:
One. President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus before the joint houses of Congress could fulfill their automatic duty to review and
validate or invalidate the same. The pertinent provisions of Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
state:
Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and
whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not
exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part
thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress.
The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may
revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the
initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a
period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or
suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without any need of a call.
xxxx
Although the above vests in the President the power to proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus, he shares such power with the Congress. Thus:
1.
The Presidents proclamation or suspension is temporary, good for only 60 days;
2.
He must, within 48 hours of the proclamation or suspension, report his action in person or in writing
to Congress;

3.
Both houses of Congress, if not in session must jointly convene within 24 hours of the proclamation
or suspension for the purpose of reviewing its validity; and
4.
The Congress, voting jointly, may revoke or affirm the Presidents proclamation or suspension, allow
their limited effectivity to lapse, or extend the same if Congress deems warranted.
It is evident that under the 1987 Constitution the President and the Congress act in tandem in exercising
the power to proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. They exercise the
power, not only sequentially, but in a sense jointly since, after the President has initiated the proclamation or
the suspension, only the Congress can maintain the same based on its own evaluation of the situation on the
ground, a power that the President does not have.
Consequently, although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court the power to review the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that the Court
must allow Congress to exercise its own review powers, which is automatic rather than initiated. Only when
Congress defaults in its express duty to defend the Constitution through such review should the Supreme Court
step in as its final rampart. The constitutional validity of the Presidents proclamation of martial law or
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is first a political question in the hands of Congress before it becomes a
justiciable one in the hands of the Court.
Here, President Arroyo withdrew Proclamation 1959 before the joint houses of Congress, which had in fact
convened, could act on the same. Consequently, the petitions in these cases have become moot and the Court
has nothing to review. The lifting of martial law and restoration of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
Maguindanao was a supervening event that obliterated any justiciable controversy.[2]
Two. Since President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus in just eight days, they have not been meaningfully implemented. The military did not
take over the operation and control of local government units in Maguindanao. The President did not issue any
law or decree affecting Maguindanao that should ordinarily be enacted by Congress. No indiscriminate mass
arrest had been reported. Those who were arrested during the period were either released or promptly charged
in court. Indeed, no petition for habeas corpus had been filed with the Court respecting arrests made in those
eight days. The point is that the President intended by her action to address an uprising in a relatively small
and sparsely populated province. In her judgment, the rebellion was localized and swiftly disintegrated in the
face of a determined and amply armed government presence.
In Lansang v. Garcia,[3] the Court received evidence in executive session to determine if President
Marcos suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in 1971 had sufficient factual basis. In Aquino,
Jr. v. Enrile,[4] while the Court took judicial notice of the factual bases for President Marcos proclamation of
martial law in 1972, it still held hearings on the petitions for habeas corpus to determine the constitutionality of
the arrest and detention of the petitioners. Here, however, the Court has not bothered to examine the evidence
upon which President Arroyo acted in issuing Proclamation 1959, precisely because it felt no need to, the
proclamation having been withdrawn within a few days of its issuance.
Justice Antonio T. Carpio points out in his dissenting opinion the finding of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City that no probable cause exist that the accused before it committed rebellion in Maguindanao since
the prosecution failed to establish the elements of the crime. But the Court cannot use such finding as basis for
striking down the Presidents proclamation and suspension. For, firstly, the Court did not delegate and could not
delegate to the RTC of Quezon City its power to determine the factual basis for the presidential proclamation
and suspension. Secondly, there is no showing that the RTC of Quezon City passed upon the same evidence
that the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, had in her possession when she issued the
proclamation and suspension.
The Court does not resolve purely academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually
challenging these are.[5] This is especially true, said the Court in Philippine Association of Colleges and
Universities v. Secretary of Education,[6] where the issues reach constitutional dimensions, for then there
comes into play regard for the courts duty to avoid decision of constitutional issues unless avoidance becomes
evasion. The Courts duty is to steer clear of declaring unconstitutional the acts of the Executive or the
Legislative department, given the assumption that it carefully studied those acts and found them consistent
with the fundamental law before taking them. To doubt is to sustain.[7]
Notably, under Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the Court has only 30 days from the filing of an
appropriate proceeding to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Thus The Supreme Court may review, in an
appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law
or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its
decision thereon within thirty days from its filing. (Emphasis supplied)
More than two years have passed since petitioners filed the present actions to annul Proclamation 1959. When
the Court did not decide it then, it actually opted for a default as was its duty, the question having become moot
and academic.
Justice Carpio of course points out that should the Court regard the powers of the President and Congress
respecting the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus as
sequential or joint, it would be impossible for the Court to exercise its power of review within the 30 days given
it.

But those 30 days, fixed by the Constitution, should be enough for the Court to fulfill its duty without preempting congressional action. Section 18, Article VII, requires the President to report his actions to Congress, in
person or in writing, within 48 hours of such proclamation or suspension. In turn, the Congress is required to
convene without need of a call within 24 hours following the Presidents proclamation or suspension. Clearly,
the Constitution calls for quick action on the part of the Congress. Whatever form that action takes, therefore,
should give the Court sufficient time to fulfill its own mandate to review the factual basis of the proclamation or
suspension within 30 days of its issuance.
If the Congress procrastinates or altogether fails to fulfill its duty respecting the proclamation or suspension
within the short time expected of it, then the Court can step in, hear the petitions challenging the Presidents
action, and ascertain if it has a factual basis. If the Court finds none, then it can annul the proclamation or the
suspension. But what if the 30 days given it by the Constitution proves inadequate? Justice Carpio himself
offers the answer in his dissent: that 30-day period does not operate to divest this Court of its jurisdiction over
the case. The settled rule is that jurisdiction once acquired is not lost until the case has been terminated.
The problem in this case is that the President aborted the proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao in just eight days. In a real sense, the proclamation and
the suspension never took off. The Congress itself adjourned without touching the matter, it having become
moot and academic.
Of course, the Court has in exceptional cases passed upon issues that ordinarily would have been regarded as
moot. But the present cases do not present sufficient basis for the exercise of the power of judicial review. The
proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in this case, unlike
similar Presidential acts in the late 60s and early 70s, appear more like saber-rattling than an actual deployment
and arbitrary use of political power.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the consolidated petitions on the ground that the same have become moot
and academic.
SO ORDERED.

2. COURTS AND JUDGES: DEFINITIONS

a. Court of law and court of equity distinguished
FELIX TING HO, JR., MERLA TING HO BRADEN, JUANA TING HO & LYDIA TING HO BELENZO,
Petitioners,
vs.
VICENTE TENG GUI, Respondent.
FACTS: This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 42993 which reversed and set aside the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Olongapo City,
Branch 74, in Civil Case No. 558-0-88.
In their complaint before the RTC, petitioners alleged that their father Felix Ting Ho died intestate on June 26,
1970, and left upon his death an estate which consisrs of lot and properties.

The said lot and properties were titled and tax declared under trust in the name of respondent Vicente Teng Gui
for the benefit of the deceased Felix Ting Ho who, being a Chinese citizen, was then disqualified to own public
lands in the Philippines; and that upon the death of Felix Ting Ho, the respondent took possession of the same
for his own exclusive use and benefit to their exclusion and prejudice.
Felix Ting Ho sold the commercial and residential buildings to his sister-in-law, Victoria Cabasal, and the bakery
to his brother-in-law, Gregorio Fontela. He alleged that he acquired said properties from the respective buyers
on October 28, 1961 and has since then been in possession of subject properties in the concept of an owner;
and that on January 24, 1978, Original Certificate of Title No. P-1064 covering the subject lot was issued to him
pursuant to a miscellaneous sales patent granted to him on January 3, 1978.6
In light of these factual findings, the RTC found that Felix Ting Ho, being a Chinese citizen and the father of the
petitioners and respondent, resorted to a series of simulated transactions in order to preserve the right to the
lot and the properties thereon in the hands of the family. As stated by the trial court:
After a serious consideration of the testimonies given by both one of the plaintiffs and the defendant as well as
the documentary exhibits presented in the case, the Court is inclined to believe that Felix Ting Ho, the father of
the plaintiffs and the defendant, and the husband of Leonila Cabasal thought of preserving the properties in
question by transferring the said properties to his eldest son as he thought that he cannot acquire the properties
as he was a Chinese citizen. To transfer the improvements on the land to his eldest son the defendant Vicente
Teng Gui, he first executed simulated Deeds of Sales in favor of the sister and brother-in-law of his wife in 1958
and after three (3) years it was made to appear that these vendees had sold the improvements to the defendant
Vicente Teng Gui who was then 18 years old. The Court finds that these transaction (sic) were simulated and
that no consideration was ever paid by the vendees.
xxx

xxx

xxx

With regards (sic) to the transfer and relinquishment of Felix Ting Hos right to the land in question in favor of
the defendant, the Court believes, that although from the face of the document it is stated in absolute terms
that without any consideration Felix Ting Ho was transferring and renouncing his right in favor of his son, the
defendant Vicente Teng Gui, still the Court believes that the transaction was one of implied trust executed by
Felix Ting Ho for the benefit of his family8
Notwithstanding such findings, the RTC considered the Affidavit of Transfer, Relinquishment and Renouncement
of Rights and Interests over the land as a donation which was accepted by the donee, the herein respondent.
With respect to the properties in the lot, the trial court held that although the sales were simulated, pursuant to
Article 1471 of the New Civil Code9 it can be assumed that the intention of Felix Ting Ho in such transaction was
to give and donate such properties to the respondent. As a result, it awarded the entire conjugal share of Felix
Ting Ho in the subject lot and properties to the respondent and divided only the conjugal share of his wife
among the siblings. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision decreed:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant as the Court
orders the partition and the adjudication of the subject properties, Lot 418, Ts-308, specifically described in
original Certificate of Title No. P-1064 and the residential and commercial houses standing on the lot specifically
described in Tax Decs. Nos. 9179 and 9180 in the name of Vicente Teng Gui in the following manner, to wit: To
the defendant Vicente Teng Gui is adjudicated an undivided six-tenth (6/10) of the aforementioned properties
and to each of the plaintiffs Felix Ting Ho, Jr., Merla Ting-Ho Braden, Juana Ting and Lydia Ting Ho-Belenzo each
an undivided one-tenth (1/10) of the properties10
From this decision, both parties interposed their respective appeals. The petitioners claimed that the RTC erred
in awarding respondent the entire conjugal share of their deceased father in the lot and properties in question
contrary to its own finding that an implied trust existed between the parties. The respondent, on the other hand,
asserted that the RTC erred in not ruling that the lot and properties do not form part of the estate of Felix Ting
Ho and are owned entirely by him.
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC. The appellate court held that the deceased
Felix Ting Ho was never the owner and never claimed ownership of the subject lot since he is disqualified under
Philippine laws from owning public lands, and that respondent Vicente Teng Gui was the rightful owner over said
lot by virtue of Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. 7457 issued in his favor, viz:
The deceased Felix Ting Ho, plaintiffs and defendants late father, was never the owner of the subject lot, now
identified as Lot No. 418, Ts-308 covered by OCT No. P-1064 (Exh. A; Record, p. 104). As stated by Felix Ting Ho
no less in the "Affidavit of Transfer, Relinquishment and Renouncement of Rights and Interest" etc. (Exh. B:
Record, p. 107), executed on October 25, 1966 he, the late Felix Ting Ho, was merely a possessor or occupant of

the subject lot "by virtue of a permission granted by the then U.S. Naval Reservation Office, Olongapo,
Zambales". The late Felix Ting Ho was never the owner and never claimed ownership of the land. (Emphasis
supplied)1avvphi1
The affidavit, Exhibit B, was subscribed and sworn to before a Land Investigator of the Bureau of Lands and in
the said affidavit, the late Felix Ting Ho expressly acknowledged that because he is a Chinese citizen he is not
qualified to purchase public lands under Philippine laws for which reason he thereby transfers, relinquishes and
renounces all his rights and interests in the subject land, including all the improvements thereon to his son, the
defendant Vicente Teng Gui, who is of legal age, single, Filipino citizen and qualified under the public land law to
acquire lands.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Defendant Vicente Teng Gui acquired the subject land by sales patent or purchase from the government and not
from his father, the late Felix Ting Ho. It cannot be said that he acquired or bought the land in trust for his father
because on December 5, 1977 when the subject land was sold to him by the government and on January 3,
1978 when Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. 7457 was issued, the late Felix Ting Ho was already dead, having
died on June 6, 1970 (TSN, January 10, 1990, p. 4).11
Regarding the properties erected over the said lot, the CA held that the finding that the sales of the two-storey
commercial and residential buildings and sari-sari store to Victoria Cabasal and Gregorio Fontela and
subsequently to respondent were without consideration and simulated is supported by evidence, which clearly
establishes that these properties should form part of the estate of the late spouses Felix Ting Ho and Leonila
Cabasal.
Thus, while the appellate court dismissed the complaint for partition with respect to the lot in question, it
awarded the petitioners a four-fifths (4/5) share of the subject properties erected on the said lot. The dispositive
portion of the CA ruling reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and NEW
JUDGMENT rendered:
1. DISMISSING plaintiff-appellants complaint with respect to the subject parcel of land, identified as Lot No. 418,
Ts-308, covered by OCT No. P-1064, in the name of plaintiff-appellants [should be defendant-appellant];
2. DECLARING that the two-storey commercial building, the two-storey residential building and sari-sari store
(formerly a bakery), all erected on the subject lot No. 418, Ts-308, form part of the estate of the deceased
spouses Felix Ting Ho and Leonila Cabasal, and that plaintiff-appellants are entitled to four-fifths (4/5) thereof,
the remaining one-fifth (1/5) being the share of the defendant-appellant;
3. DIRECTING the court a quo to partition the said two-storey commercial building, two-storey residential
building and sari-sari store (formerly a bakery) in accordance with Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court and
pertinent provisions of the Civil Code;
4. Let the records of this case be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings;
5. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Office of the Solicitor General; and
6. There is no pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.12
Both petitioners and respondent filed their respective motions for reconsideration from this ruling, which were
summarily denied by the CA in its Resolution13 dated August 5, 1997. Hence, this petition.
According to the petitioners, the CA erred in declaring that Lot No. 418, Ts-308 does not form part of the estate
of the deceased Felix Ting Ho and is owned alone by respondent. Respondent, on the other hand, contends that
he should be declared the sole owner not only of Lot No. 418, Ts-308 but also of the properties erected thereon
and that the CA erred in not dismissing the complaint for partition with respect to the said properties.
The primary issue for consideration is whether both Lot No. 418, Ts-308 and the properties erected thereon
should be included in the estate of the deceased Felix Ting Ho.

We affirm the CA ruling.

With regard to Lot No. 418, Ts-308, Article XIII, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution states:
Section 1. All agricultural timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and
other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the
State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines
or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens,
subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government
established under this Constitution (Emphasis supplied)
Our fundamental law cannot be any clearer. The right to acquire lands of the public domain is reserved for
Filipino citizens or corporations at least sixty percent of the capital of which is owned by Filipinos. Thus, in
Krivenko v. Register of Deeds,14 the Court enunciated that:
Perhaps the effect of our construction is to preclude aliens, admitted freely into the Philippines from owning
sites where they may build their homes. But if this is the solemn mandate of the Constitution, we will not
attempt to compromise it even in the name of amity or equity. We are satisfied, however, that aliens are not
completely excluded by the Constitution from the use of lands for residential purposes. Since their residence in
the Philippines is temporary, they may be granted temporary rights such as a lease contract which is not
forbidden by the Constitution. Should they desire to remain here forever and share our fortunes and
misfortunes, Filipino citizenship is not impossible to acquire.15
In the present case, the father of petitioners and respondent was a Chinese citizen; therefore, he was
disqualified from acquiring and owning real property in the Philippines. In fact, he was only occupying the
subject lot by virtue of the permission granted him by the then U.S. Naval Reservation Office of Olongapo,
Zambales. As correctly found by the CA, the deceased Felix Ting Ho was never the owner of the subject lot in
light of the constitutional proscription and the respondent did not at any instance act as the dummy of his
father.
On the other hand, the respondent became the owner of Lot No. 418, Ts-308 when he was granted
Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. 7457 on January 3, 1978, by the Secretary of Natural Resources "By Authority of
the President of the Philippines," and when Original Certificate of Title No. P-1064 was correspondingly issued in
his name. The grant of the miscellaneous sales patent by the Secretary of Natural Resources, and the
corresponding issuance of the original certificate of title in his name, show that the respondent possesses all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications to acquire alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.
These issuances bear the presumption of regularity in their performance in the absence of evidence to the
contrary.
Registration of grants and patents involving public lands is governed by Section 122 of Act No. 496, which was
subsequently amended by Section 103 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, viz:
Sec. 103. Certificate of title pursuant to patents.Whenever public land is by the Government alienated,
granted or conveyed to any person, the same shall be brought forthwith under the operation of this Decree. It
shall be the duty of the official issuing the instrument of alienation, grant, patent or conveyance in behalf of the
Government to cause such instrument to be filed with the Register of Deeds of the province or city where the
land lies, and to be there registered like other deeds and conveyance, whereupon a certificate of title shall be
entered as in other cases of registered land, and an owners duplicate issued to the grantee. The deeds, grant,
patent or instrument of conveyance from the Government to the grantee shall not take effect as a conveyance
or bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract between the Government and the grantee and as evidence
of authority to the Register of Deeds to make registration. It is the act of registration that shall be the operative
act to affect and convey the land, and in all cases under this Decree registration shall be made in the office of
the Register of Deeds of the province or city where the land lies. The fees for registration shall be paid by the
grantee. After due registration and issuance of the certificate of title, such land shall be deemed to be registered
land to all intents and purposes under this Decree.16 (Emphasis supplied)
Under the law, a certificate of title issued pursuant to any grant or patent involving public land is as conclusive
and indefeasible as any other certificate of title issued to private lands in the ordinary or cadastral registration
proceeding. The effect of the registration of a patent and the issuance of a certificate of title to the patentee is
to vest in him an incontestable title to the land, in the same manner as if ownership had been determined by
final decree of the court, and the title so issued is absolutely conclusive and indisputable, and is not subject to
collateral attack.17

Nonetheless, petitioners invoke equity considerations and claim that the ruling of the RTC that an implied trust
was created between respondent and their father with respect to the subject lot should be upheld.
This contention must fail because the prohibition against an alien from owning lands of the public domain is
absolute and not even an implied trust can be permitted to arise on equity considerations.
In the case of Muller v. Muller,18 wherein the respondent, a German national, was seeking reimbursement of
funds claimed by him to be given in trust to his petitioner wife, a Philippine citizen, for the purchase of a
property in Antipolo, the Court, in rejecting the claim, ruled that:
Respondent was aware of the constitutional prohibition and expressly admitted his knowledge thereof to this
Court. He declared that he had the Antipolo property titled in the name of the petitioner because of the said
prohibition. His attempt at subsequently asserting or claiming a right on the said property cannot be sustained.
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that an implied trust was created and resulted by operation of law in view
of petitioner's marriage to respondent. Save for the exception provided in cases of hereditary succession,
respondent's disqualification from owning lands in the Philippines is absolute. Not even an ownership in trust is
allowed. Besides, where the purchase is made in violation of an existing statute and in evasion of its express
provision, no trust can result in favor of the party who is guilty of the fraud. To hold otherwise would allow
circumvention of the constitutional prohibition.
Invoking the principle that a court is not only a court of law but also a court of equity, is likewise misplaced. It
has been held that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be done indirectly which,
because of public policy, cannot be done directly...19
Coming now to the issue of ownership of the properties erected on the subject lot, the Court agrees with the
finding of the trial court, as affirmed by the appellate court, that the series of transactions resorted to by the
deceased were simulated in order to preserve the properties in the hands of the family. The records show that
during all the time that the properties were allegedly sold to the spouses Victoria Cabasal and Gregorio Fontela
in 1958 and the subsequent sale of the same to respondent in 1961, the petitioners and respondent, along with
their parents, remained in possession and continued to live in said properties.
However, the trial court concluded that:
In fairness to the defendant, although the Deeds of Sale executed by Felix Ting Ho regarding the improvements
in favor of Victoria Cabasal and Gregorio Fontela and the subsequent transfer of the same by Gregorio Fontela
and Victoria Cabasal to the defendant are all simulated, yet, pursuant to Article 1471 of the New Civil Code it
can be assumed that the intention of Felix Ting Ho in such transaction was to give and donate the improvements
to his eldest son the defendant Vicente Teng Gui 20
Its finding was based on Article 1471 of the Civil Code, which provides that:
Art. 1471. If the price is simulated, the sale is void, but the act may be shown to have been in reality a donation,
or some other act or contract.211avvph!1
The Court holds that the reliance of the trial court on the provisions of Article 1471 of the Civil Code to conclude
that the simulated sales were a valid donation to the respondent is misplaced because its finding was based on
a mere assumption when the law requires positive proof.
The respondent was unable to show, and the records are bereft of any evidence, that the simulated sales of the
properties were intended by the deceased to be a donation to him. Thus, the Court holds that the two-storey
residential house, two-storey residential building and sari-sari store form part of the estate of the late spouses
Felix Ting Ho and Leonila Cabasal, entitling the petitioners to a four-fifths (4/5) share thereof.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated December 27, 1996 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 42993 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
IN RE: PETITION FOR SEPARATION OF PROPERTY ELENA BUENAVENTURA MULLER, Petitioner, versus
HELMUT MULLER, Respondent.
G.R. No. 149615 | 2006-08-29
FIRST DIVISION

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari[1] assails the February 26, 2001 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 59321 affirming with modification the August 12, 1996 Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 86 in Civil Case No. Q-94-21862, which terminated the regime of absolute community of
property between petitioner and respondent, as well as the Resolution[4] dated August 13, 2001 denying the
motion for reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller were married in Hamburg, Germany on
September 22, 1989. The couple resided in Germany at a house owned by respondent's parents but decided to
move and reside permanently in the Philippines in 1992. By this time, respondent had inherited the house in
Germany from his parents which he sold and used the proceeds for the purchase of a parcel of land in Antipolo,
Rizal at the cost of P528,000.00 and the construction of a house amounting to P2,300,000.00. The Antipolo
property was registered in the name of petitioner under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 219438[5] of the
Register of Deeds of Marikina, Metro Manila.
Due to incompatibilities and respondent's alleged womanizing, drinking, and maltreatment, the spouses
eventually separated. On September 26, 1994, respondent filed a petition[6] for separation of properties before
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
On August 12, 1996, the trial court rendered a decision which terminated the regime of absolute community of
property between the petitioner and respondent. It also decreed the separation of properties between them and
ordered the equal partition of personal properties located within the country, excluding those acquired by
gratuitous title during the marriage. With regard to the Antipolo property, the court held that it was acquired
using paraphernal funds of the respondent. However, it ruled that respondent cannot recover his funds because
the property was purchased in violation of Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution. Thus However, pursuant to Article 92 of the Family Code, properties acquired by gratuitous title by either spouse
during the marriage shall be excluded from the community property. The real property, therefore, inherited by
petitioner in Germany is excluded from the absolute community of property of the herein spouses. Necessarily,
the proceeds of the sale of said real property as well as the personal properties purchased thereby, belong
exclusively to the petitioner. However, the part of that inheritance used by the petitioner for acquiring the house
and lot in this country cannot be recovered by the petitioner, its acquisition being a violation of Section 7, Article
XII of the Constitution which provides that "save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be
transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of
the public domain." The law will leave the parties in the situation where they are in without prejudice to a
voluntary partition by the parties of the said real property. x x x
xxxx
As regards the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 219438 of the Registry of Deeds of Marikina,
Metro Manila, situated in Antipolo, Rizal and the improvements thereon, the Court shall not make any
pronouncement on constitutional grounds.[7]
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered the assailed decision modifying the trial court's
Decision. It held that respondent merely prayed for reimbursement for the purchase of the Antipolo property,
and not acquisition or transfer of ownership to him. It also considered petitioner's ownership over the property
in trust for the respondent. As regards the house, the Court of Appeals ruled that there is nothing in the
Constitution which prohibits respondent from acquiring the same. The dispositive portion of the assailed
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the lower court dated August 12, 1996 is hereby
MODIFIED. Respondent Elena Buenaventura Muller is hereby ordered to REIMBURSE the petitioner the amount of
P528,000.00 for the acquisition of the land and the amount of P2,300,000.00 for the construction of the house
situated in Atnipolo, Rizal, deducting therefrom the amount respondent spent for the preservation, maintenance
and development of the aforesaid real property including the depreciation cost of the house or in the alternative
to SELL the house and lot in the event respondent does not have the means to reimburse the petitioner out of
her own money and from the proceeds thereof, reimburse the petitioner of the cost of the land and the house
deducting the expenses for its maintenance and preservation spent by the respondent. Should there be profit,

the same shall be divided in proportion to the equity each has over the property. The case is REMANDED to the
lower court for reception of evidence as to the amount claimed by the respondents for the preservation and
maintenance of the property.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Hence, the instant petition for review raising the following issues:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RESPONDENT HEREIN IS ENTITLED
TO REIMBURSEMENT OF THE AMOUNT USED TO PURCHASE THE LAND AS WELL AS THE COSTS FOR THE
CONSTRUCTION OF THE HOUSE, FOR IN SO RULING, IT INDIRECTLY ALLOWED AN ACT DONE WHICH OTHERWISE
COULD NOT BE DIRECTLY x x x DONE, WITHOUT DOING VIOLENCE TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROSCRIPTION
THAT AN ALIEN IS PROHIBITED FROM ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP OF REAL PROPERTIES LOCATED IN THE
PHILIPPINES.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN SUSTAINING RESPONDENT'S CAUSE OF ACTION WHICH IS ACTUALLY
A DESPERATE ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN OWNERSHIP OVER THE LOT IN QUESTION, CLOTHED UNDER THE GUISE OF
CLAIMING REIMBURSEMENT.
Petitioner contends that respondent, being an alien, is disqualified to own private lands in the Philippines; that
respondent was aware of the constitutional prohibition but circumvented the same; and that respondent's
purpose for filing an action for separation of property is to obtain exclusive possession, control and disposition of
the Antipolo property.
Respondent claims that he is not praying for transfer of ownership of the Antipolo property but merely
reimbursement; that the funds paid by him for the said property were in consideration of his marriage to
petitioner; that the funds were given to petitioner in trust; and that equity demands that respondent should be
reimbursed of his personal funds.
The issue for resolution is whether respondent is entitled to reimbursement of the funds used for the acquisition
of the Antipolo property.
The petition has merit.
Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states:
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, are disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain. Hence,
they are also disqualified from acquiring private lands.[9] The primary purpose of the constitutional provision is
the conservation of the national patrimony. In the case of Krivenko v. Register of Deeds,[10] the Court held:
Under section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution, "natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural
land, shall not be alienated," and with respect to public agricultural lands, their alienation is limited to Filipino
citizens. But this constitutional purpose conserving agricultural resources in the hands of Filipino citizens may
easily be defeated by the Filipino citizens themselves who may alienate their agricultural lands in favor of aliens.
It is partly to prevent this result that section 5 is included in Article XIII, and it reads as follows:
"Sec. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land will be transferred or assigned
except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the
Philippines."
This constitutional provision closes the only remaining avenue through which agricultural resources may leak
into aliens' hands. It would certainly be futile to prohibit the alienation of public agricultural lands to aliens if,
after all, they may be freely so alienated upon their becoming private agricultural lands in the hands of Filipino
citizens. x x x
xxxx

If the term "private agricultural lands" is to be construed as not including residential lots or lands not strictly
agricultural, the result would be that "aliens may freely acquire and possess not only residential lots and houses
for themselves but entire subdivisions, and whole towns and cities," and that "they may validly buy and hold in
their names lands of any area for building homes, factories, industrial plants, fisheries, hatcheries, schools,
health and vacation resorts, markets, golf courses, playgrounds, airfields, and a host of other uses and purposes
that are not, in appellant's words, strictly agricultural." (Solicitor General's Brief, p. 6.) That this is obnoxious to
the conservative spirit of the Constitution is beyond question.
Respondent was aware of the constitutional prohibition and expressly admitted his knowledge thereof to this
Court.[11] He declared that he had the Antipolo property titled in the name of petitioner because of the said
prohibition.[12] His attempt at subsequently asserting or claiming a right on the said property cannot be
sustained.
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that an implied trust was created and resulted by operation of law in view
of petitioner's marriage to respondent. Save for the exception provided in cases of hereditary succession,
respondent's disqualification from owning lands in the Philippines is absolute. Not even an ownership in trust is
allowed. Besides, where the purchase is made in violation of an existing statute and in evasion of its express
provision, no trust can result in favor of the party who is guilty of the fraud.[13] To hold otherwise would allow
circumvention of the constitutional prohibition.
Invoking the principle that a court is not only a court of law but also a court of equity, is likewise misplaced. It
has been held that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be done indirectly which,
because of public policy, cannot be done directly.[14] He who seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes
into equity must come with clean hands. The latter is a frequently stated maxim which is also expressed in the
principle that he who has done inequity shall not have equity. It signifies that a litigant may be denied relief by a
court of equity on the ground that his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or
deceitful as to the controversy in issue.[15]
Thus, in the instant case, respondent cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear that
he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the constitutional prohibition.
Further, the distinction made between transfer of ownership as opposed to recovery of funds is a futile exercise
on respondent's part. To allow reimbursement would in effect permit respondent to enjoy the fruits of a property
which he is not allowed to own. Thus, it is likewise proscribed by law. As expressly held in Cheesman v.
Intermediate Appellate Court:[16]
Finally, the fundamental law prohibits the sale to aliens of residential land. Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973
Constitution ordains that, "Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private land shall be transferred or
conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain." Petitioner Thomas Cheesman was, of course, charged with knowledge of this prohibition. Thus,
assuming that it was his intention that the lot in question be purchased by him and his wife, he acquired no right
whatever over the property by virtue of that purchase; and in attempting to acquire a right or interest in land,
vicariously and clandestinely, he knowingly violated the Constitution; the sale as to him was null and void. In
any event, he had and has no capacity or personality to question the subsequent sale of the same property by
his wife on the theory that in so doing he is merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of
conjugal property. To sustain such a theory would permit indirect controversion of the constitutional prohibition.
If the property were to be declared conjugal, this would accord to the alien husband a not insubstantial interest
and right over land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that
the Constitution does not permit him to have.
As already observed, the finding that his wife had used her own money to purchase the property cannot, and
will not, at this stage of the proceedings be reviewed and overturned. But even if it were a fact that said
wife had used conjugal funds to make the acquisition, the considerations just set out to militate, on
high constitutional grounds, against his recovering and holding the property so acquired, or any
part thereof. And whether in such an event, he may recover from his wife any share of the money
used for the purchase or charge her with unauthorized disposition or expenditure of conjugal funds
is not now inquired into; that would be, in the premises, a purely academic exercise. (Emphasis
added)
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated February 26, 2001
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59321 ordering petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller to reimburse
respondent Helmut Muller the amount of P528,000 for the acquisition of the land and the amount of P2,300,000
for the construction of the house in Antipolo City, and the Resolution dated August 13, 2001 denying
reconsideration thereof, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The August 12, 1996 Decision of the Regional Trial

Court of Quezon City, Branch 86 in Civil Case No. Q-94-21862 terminating the regime of absolute community
between the petitioner and respondent, decreeing a separation of property between them and ordering the
partition of the personal properties located in the Philippines equally, is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
PHILIPPINE CARPET MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, PACIFIC CARPET MANUFACTURING
CORPORATION, MR. PATRICIO
LIM and MR. DAVID LIM, Petitioners,
vs.
IGNACIO B. TAGYAMON, PABLITO L. LUNA, FE B. BADA YOS, GRACE B. MARCOS, ROGELIO C. NEMIS,
ROBERTO
B. ILAO, ANICIA D. DELA CRUZ and CYNTHIA L. COMANDAO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 191475 | 2013-12-11
THIRD DIVISION
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Court of Appeals (CA)
Decision1 dated July 7, 2009 and Resolution2 dated February 26, 2010 in CA-G.R. SP No. 105236. The assailed
decision granted the petition for certiorari filed by respondents Ignacio B. Tagyamon (Tagyamon), Pablito I. Luna
(Luna), Fe B. Badayos (Badayos), Grace B. Marcos (Marcos), Rogelio C. Nemis (Nemis), Roberto B. Ilao (Ilao),
Anicia D. Dela Cruz (Dela Cruz), and Cynthia L. Comandao (Comandao), the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The private respondent is hereby ordered to reinstate the petitioners
with full backwages less the amounts they received as separation pays. In case reinstatement would no longer
be feasible because the positions previously held no longer exist, the private respondent shall pay them
backwages plus, in lieu of reinstatement, separation pays equal to one (1) month pay, or one-half (1/2) month
pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. In addition, the private respondent is hereby ordered to pay
the petitioners moral damages in the amount of P20,000.00 each.
SO ORDERED.3
The Facts
Petitioner Philippine Carpet Manufacturing Corporation (PCMC) is a corporation registered in the Philippines
engaged in the business of manufacturing wool and yarn carpets and rugs.4 Respondents were its regular and
permanent employees, but were affected by petitioners retrenchment and voluntary retirement programs.
On March 15, 2004, Tagyamon,5 Luna,6 Badayos,7 Dela Cruz,8 and Comandao9 received a uniformly worded
Memorandum of dismissal, to wit:
This is to inform you that in view of a slump in the market demand for our products due to the uncompetitiveness of our price, the company is constrained to reduce the number of its workforce. The longterm effects of September 11 and the war in the Middle East have greatly affected the viability of our business
and we are left with no recourse but to reorganize and downsize our organizational structure.
We wish to inform you that we are implementing a retrenchment program in accordance with Article 283 of the
Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended, and its implementing rules and regulations.
In this connection, we regret to advise you that you are one of those affected by the said exercise, and your
employment shall be terminated effective at the close of working hours on April 15, 2004.
Accordingly, you shall be paid your separation pay as mandated by law. You will no longer be required to report
for work during the 30-day notice period in order to give you more time to look for alternative employment.
However, you will be paid the salary corresponding to the said period. We shall process your clearance and
other documents and you may claim the payables due you on March 31, 2004.
Thank you for your services and good luck to your future endeavors.10

As to Marcos, Ilao, and Nemis, they claimed that they were dismissed effective March 31, 2004, together with
fifteen (15) other employees on the ground of lack of market/slump in demand.11 PCMC, however, claimed
that they availed of the companys voluntary retirement program and, in fact, voluntarily executed their
respective Deeds of Release, Waiver, and Quitclaim.12
Claiming that they were aggrieved by PCMCs decision to terminate their employment, respondents filed
separate complaints for illegal dismissal against PCMC, Pacific Carpet Manufacturing Corporation, Mr. Patricio
Lim and Mr. David Lim. These cases were later consolidated. Respondents primarily relied on the Supreme
Courts decision in Philippine Carpet Employees Association (PHILCEA) v. Hon. Sto. Tomas (Philcea case),13 as to
the validity of the companys retrenchment program. They further explained that PCMC did not, in fact, suffer
losses shown by its acts prior to and subsequent to their termination.14 They also insisted that their acceptance
of separation pay and signing of quitclaim is not a bar to the pursuit of illegal dismissal case.15
PCMC, for its part, defended its decision to terminate the services of respondents being a necessary
management prerogative. It pointed out that as an employer, it had no obligation to keep in its employ more
workers than are necessary for the operation of his business. Thus, there was an authorized cause for dismissal.
Petitioners also stressed that respondents belatedly filed their complaint as they allowed almost three years to
pass making the principle of laches applicable. Considering that respondents accepted their separation pay and
voluntarily executed deeds of release, waiver and quitclaim, PCMC invoked the principle of estoppel on the part
of respondents to question their separation from the service. Finally, as to Marcos, Ilao and Nemis, PCMC
emphasized that they were not dismissed from employment, but in fact they voluntarily retired from
employment to take advantage of the companys program.16
On August 23, 2007, Labor Arbiter (LA) Donato G. Quinto, Jr. rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint for
lack of merit.17 The LA found no flaw in respondents termination as they voluntarily opted to retire and were
subsequently re-employed on a contractual basis then regularized, terminated from employment and were paid
separation benefits.18 In view of respondents belated filing of the complaint, the LA concluded that such action
is a mere afterthought designed primarily for respondents to collect more money, taking advantage of the 2006
Supreme Court decision.19
On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) sustained the LA decision.20 In addition to the LA
ratiocination, the NLRC emphasized the application of the principle of laches for respondents inaction for an
unreasonable period.
Still undaunted, respondents elevated the matter to the CA in a petition for certiorari. In reversing the earlier
decisions of the LA and the NLRC, the CA refused to apply the principle of laches, because the case
was instituted prior to the expiration of the prescriptive period set by law which is four years. It stressed that
said principle cannot be invoked earlier than the expiration of the prescriptive period.21 Citing the Courts
decision in the Philcea case, the CA applied the doctrine of stare decisis, in view of the similar factual
circumstances of the cases. As to Ilao, Nemis and Marcos, while acknowledging their voluntary resignation, the
CA found the same not a bar to the illegal dismissal case because they did so on the mistaken belief that PCMC
was losing money.22 With the foregoing findings, the CA ordered that respondents be reinstated with full
backwages less the amounts they received as separation pay. In case of impossibility of reinstatement, the CA
ordered PCMC to pay respondents backwages and in lieu of reinstatement, separation pay equal to one month
pay or month pay for every year of service whichever is higher, plus moral damages.23
The Issues
Aggrieved, petitioners come before the Court in this petition for review on certiorari based on this ground, to
wit:
IN RENDERING ITS DISPUTED DECISION AND RESOLUTION, THE COURT A QUO HAS DECIDED A QUESTION OF
SUBSTANCE NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND/OR ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE.
a) Res Judicata should not be followed if to follow it is to perpetuate error (Philippine Trust Co., and Smith Bell &
Co. vs. Mitchell, 59 Phil. 30, 36 (1933). The (Supreme) Court is not precluded from rectifying errors of judgment
if blind and stubborn adherence to the doctrine of immutability of final judgments would involve the sacrifice of
justice for technicality (Heirs of Maura So vs. Obliosca, G.R. No. 147082, January 28, 2008, 542 SCRA 406)
b) Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. Waivers that represent a voluntary and
reasonable settlement of the laborers claims are legitimate and should be respected by the Court as the law
between the parties (Gamogamo vs. PNOC Shipping and Transport Corp., G.R. No. 141707, May 2, 2002;
Alcasero vs. NLRC, 288 SCRA 129) Where the persons making the waiver has done so voluntarily, with a full

understanding thereof, and the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction must
be recognized as valid and binding undertaking (Periquet vs. NLRC, 186 SCRA 724 [1990]; Magsalin vs. Coca
Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc. vs. National Organization of Working Men (N.O.W.M.], G.R. No. 148492, May 2, 2003).24
Petitioners contend that the Philcea case decided by this Court and relied upon by the CA in the assailed
decision was based on erroneous factual findings, inapplicable financial statement, as well as erroneous analysis
of such financial statements.25 They, thus, implore the Court to revisit the cited case in order to dispense with
substantial justice.26 They explain that the Court made conclusions based on erroneous information. Petitioners
also insist that the doctrines of res judicata and law of the case are not applicable, considering that this case
does not involve the same parties as the Philcea case.27 They likewise point out that not all respondents were
involuntarily separated on the ground of redundancy as some of them voluntarily availed of the companys
Voluntary Separation Program.28 They further contend that respondents are guilty not only of laches but also
of estoppel in view of their inaction for an unreasonable length of time to assail the alleged illegal dismissal and
in voluntarily executing a release, quitclaim and waiver.29
The Courts Ruling
Laches
Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that
which by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, thus, giving rise to a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it.30 It has been
repeatedly31 held by the Court that:
x x x Laches is a doctrine in equity while prescription is based on law. Our courts are basically courts of law not
courts of equity. Thus, laches cannot be invoked to resist the enforcement of an existing legal right. x x x
Courts exercising equity jurisdiction are bound by rules of law and have no arbitrary discretion to disregard
them. In Zabat Jr. v. Court of Appeals x x x, this Court was more emphatic in upholding the rules of procedure.
We said therein:
As for equity which has been aptly described as a justice outside legality, this is applied only in the
absence of, and never against, statutory law or, as in this case, judicial rules of procedure. Aequetas nunguam
contravenit legis. The pertinent positive rules being present here, they should preempt and prevail over all
abstract arguments based only on equity.
Thus, where the claim was filed within the [four-year] statutory period, recovery therefore cannot be barred by
laches. Courts should never apply the doctrine of laches earlier than the expiration of time limited for the
commencement of actions at law.32
An action for reinstatement by reason of illegal dismissal is one based on an injury to the complainants rights
which should be brought within four years from the time of their dismissal pursuant to Article 114633 of the
Civil Code. Respondents complaint filed almost 3 years after their alleged illegal dismissal was still well within
the prescriptive period. Laches cannot, therefore, be invoked yet.34 To be sure, laches may be applied only
upon the most convincing evidence of deliberate inaction, for the rights of laborers are protected under the
social justice provisions of the Constitution and under the Civil Code.35
Stare Decisis
The main issue sought to be determined in this case is the validity of respondents dismissal from employment.
Petitioners contend that they either voluntarily retired from the service or terminated from employment based
on an authorized cause. The LA and the NLRC are one in saying that the dismissal was legal. The CA, however,
no longer discussed the validity of the ground of termination. Rather, it applied the Courts decision in
the Philcea case where the same ground was thoroughly discussed. In other words, the appellate court applied
the doctrine of stare decisis and reached the same conclusion as the earlier case.
Under the doctrine of stare decisis, when a court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state
of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases in which the facts are substantially the
same, even though the parties may be different.36 Where the facts are essentially different, however, stare
decisis does not apply, for a perfectly sound principle as applied to one set of facts might be entirely
inappropriate when a factual variant is introduced.37
The question, therefore, is whether the factual circumstances of this present case are substantially the same as
the Philcea case.

We answer in the affirmative.

This case and the Philcea case involve the same period which is March to April 2004; the issuance of
Memorandum to employees informing them of the implementation of the cost reduction program;
the implementation of the voluntary retirement program and retrenchment program, except that this case
involves different employees; the execution of deeds of release, waiver, and quitclaim, and the acceptance of
separation pay by the affected employees.
The illegality of the basis of the implementation of both voluntary retirement and retrenchment programs of
petitioners had been thoroughly ruled upon by the Court in the Philcea case. It discussed the requisites of both
retrenchment and redundancy as authorized causes of termination and that petitioners failed to substantiate
them. In ascertaining the bases of the termination of employees, it took into consideration petitioners claim
of business losses; the purchase of machinery and equipment after the termination, the declaration of cash
dividends to stockholders, the hiring of 100 new employees after the retrenchment, and the authorization of full
blast overtime work for six hours daily. These, said the Court, are inconsistent with petitioners claim that there
was a slump in the demand for its products which compelled them to implement the termination programs. In
arriving at its conclusions, the Court took note of petitioners net sales, gross and net profits, as well as net
income. The Court, thus, reached the conclusion that the retrenchment effected by PCMC is invalid due to a
substantive defect. We quote hereunder the Courts pronouncement in the Philcea case, to wit:
Respondents failed to adduce clear and convincing evidence to prove the confluence of the essential requisites
for a valid retrenchment of its employees. We believe that respondents acted in bad faith in terminating the
employment of the members of petitioner Union.
Contrary to the claim of respondents that the Corporation was experiencing business losses, respondent
Corporation, in fact, amassed substantial earnings from 1999 to 2003. It found no need to appropriate
its retained earnings except on March 23, 2001, when it appropriated P60,000,000.00 to increase production
capacity. x x x
xxxx
The evidence on record belies the P22,820,151.00 net income loss in 2004 as projected by the SOLE. On March
29, 2004, the Board of Directors approved the appropriation of P20,000,000.00 to purchase machinery to
improve its facilities, and declared cash dividends to stockholders at P30.00 per share. x x x
xxxx
It bears stressing that the appropriation of P20,000,000.00 by the respondent Corporation on September 16,
2004 was made barely five months after the 77 Union members were dismissed on the ground that respondent
Corporation was suffering from "chronic depression." Cash dividends were likewise declared on March 29, 2004,
barely two weeks after it implemented its "retrenchment program." If respondent Corporation were to be
believed that it had to retrench employees due to the debilitating slump in demand for its products resulting in
severe losses, how could it justify the purchase of P20,000,000.00 worth of machinery and equipment? There is
likewise no justification for the hiring of more than 100 new employees, more than the number of those who
were retrenched, as well as the order authorizing full blast overtime work for six hours daily. All these are
inconsistent with the intransigent claim that respondent Corporation was impelled to retrench its employees
precisely because of low demand for its products and other external causes.
xxxx
That respondents acted in bad faith in retrenching the 77 members of petitioner is buttressed by the fact that
Diaz issued his Memorandum announcing the cost-reduction program on March 9, 2004, after receipt of the
February 10, 2004 letter of the Union president which included the proposal for additional benefits and wage
increases to be incorporated in the CBA for the ensuing year. Petitioner and its members had no inkling, before
February 10, 2004, that respondent Corporation would terminate their employment. Moreover, respondent
Corporation failed to exhaust all other means to avoid further losses without retrenching its employees, such as
utilizing the latter's respective forced vacation leaves.
Respondents also failed to use fair and reasonable criteria in implementing the retrenchment program, and
instead chose to retrench 77 of the members of petitioner out of the dismissed 88 employees.
Worse, respondent Corporation hired new employees and even rehired the others who had been "retrenched."
As shown by the SGV & Co. Audit Report, as of year end December 31, 2003, respondent Corporation increased
its net sales by more than P8,000,000.00. Respondents failed to prove that there was a drastic or severe
decrease in the product sales or that it suffered severe business losses within an interval of three (3) months

from January 2004 to March 9, 2004 when Diaz issued said Memorandum. Such claim of a depressed market as
of March 9, 2004 was only a pretext to retaliate against petitioner Union and thereby frustrate its demands for
more monetary benefits and, at the same time, justify the dismissal of the 77 Union members.
xxxx
In contrast, in this case, the retrenchment effected by respondent Corporation is invalid due to a substantive
defect, non-compliance with the substantial requirements to effect a valid retrenchment; it necessarily follows
that the termination of the employment of petitioner Union's members on such ground is, likewise, illegal. As
such, they (petitioner Union's members) are entitled to reinstatement with full backwages.38
We find no reason to depart from the above conclusions which are based on the Courts examination of the
evidence presented by the parties therein. As the respondents here were similarly situated as the
union members in the Philcea case, and considering that the questioned dismissal from the service was based
on the same grounds under the same circumstances, there is no need to relitigate the issues presented herein.
In short, we adopt the Courts earlier findings that there was no valid ground to terminate the employees.
A closer look at petitioners arguments would show that they want the Court to re-examine our decision in the
Philcea case allegedly on the ground that the conclusions therein were based on erroneous interpretation of
the evidence presented.
Indeed, in Abaria v. National Labor Relations Commission,39 although the Court was confronted with the same
issue of the legality of a strike that has already been determined in a previous case, the Court refused to apply
the doctrine of stare decisis insofar as the award of backwages was concerned because of the clear erroneous
application of the law. We held therein that the Court abandons or overrules precedents whenever it
realizes that it erred in the prior decision.40 The Courts pronouncement in that case is instructive:
The doctrine though is not cast in stone for upon a showing that circumstances attendant in a particular case
override the great benefits derived by our judicial system from the doctrine of stare decisis, the Court is justified
in setting it aside. For the Court, as the highest court of the land, may be guided but is not controlled by
precedent. Thus, the Court, especially with a new membership, is not obliged to follow blindly a particular
decision that it determines, after re-examination, to call for a rectification.41
The Abaria case, however, is not applicable in this case. There is no reason to abandon the Courts ruling in the
Philcea case.
Do we apply the aforesaid decision to all the respondents herein? Again, we answer in the affirmative.
Just like the union members in the Philcea case, respondents Tagyamon, Luna, Badayos, Dela Cruz, and
Comandao received similarly worded memorandum of dismissal effective April 15, 2004 based on the same
ground of slump in the market demand for the companys products. As such, they are similarly situated in all
aspects as the union members. With respect to respondents Marcos, Nemis and Ilao, although they applied
for voluntary retirement, the same was not accepted by petitioner. Instead, it issued notice of termination dated
March 6, 2004 to these same employees.42 And while it is true that petitioner paid them separation pay, the
payment was in the nature of separation and not retirement pay. In other words, payment was made because of
the implementation of the retrenchment program and not because of retirement.43 As their application for
availing of the companys voluntary retirement program was based on the wrong premise, the intent to retire
was not clearly established, or rather that the retirement is involuntary. Thus, they shall be considered
discharged from employment.44 Consequently, they shall be treated as if they are in the same footing as the
other respondents herein and the union members in the Philcea case.
Waivers, Releases and Quitclaims
As a rule, deeds of release and quitclaim cannot bar employees from demanding benefits to which they are
legally entitled or from contesting the legality of their dismissal. The acceptance of those benefits would
not amount to estoppel.45 To excuse respondents from complying with the terms of their waivers, they must
locate their case within any of three narrow grounds: (1) the employer used fraud or deceit in obtaining the
waivers; (2) the consideration the employer paid is incredible and unreasonable; or (3) the terms of the waiver
are contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs or prejudicial to a third person with a
right recognized by law.46 The instant case falls under the first situation.
As the ground for termination of employment was illegal, the quitclaims are deemed illegal as the employees
consent had been vitiated by mistake or fraud. The law looks with disfavor upon quitclaims and releases by
employees pressured into signing by unscrupulous employers minded to evade legal responsibilities.47 The

circumstances show that petitioners misrepresentation led its employees, specifically respondents herein,
to believe that the company was suffering losses which necessitated the implementation of the voluntary
retirement and retrenchment programs, and eventually the execution of the deeds of release, waiver and
quitclaim.48
It can safely be concluded that economic necessity constrained respondents to accept petitioners monetary
offer and sign the deeds of release, waiver and quitclaim. That respondents are supervisors and not rank-andfile employees does not make them less susceptible to financial offers, faced as they were with the prospect of
unemployment. The Court has allowed supervisory employees to seek payment of benefits and a manager to
sue for illegal dismissal even though, for a consideration, they executed deeds of quitclaims releasing their
employers from liability.49
x x x There is no nexus between intelligence, or even the position which the employee held in the company
when it concerns the pressure which the employer may exert upon the free will of the employee who is asked
to sign a release and quitclaim. A lowly employee or a sales manager, as in the present case, who is confronted
with the same dilemma of whether [to sign] a release and quitclaim and accept what the company offers them,
or [to refuse] to sign and walk out without receiving anything, may do succumb to the same pressure, being
very well aware that it is going to
take quite a while before he can recover whatever he is entitled to, because it is only after a protracted legal
battle starting from the labor arbiter level, all the way to this Court, can he receive anything at all. The
Court understands that such a risk of not receiving anything whatsoever, coupled with the probability of not
immediately getting any gainful employment or means of livelihood in the meantime, constitutes enough
pressure upon anyone who is asked to sign a release and quitclaim in exchange of some amount of money
which may be way below what he may be entitled to based on company practice and policy or by law.50\
The amounts already received by respondents as consideration for signing the releases and quitclaims should
be deducted from their respective monetary awards.51
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated July 7,
2009 and Resolution dated February 26, 2010 in CA-G.R. SP No. 105236 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
B. COURT OF JUSTICE AND QUASI-JUDICIAL BODIES DISTINGUISHED
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, as Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 104 of Quezon City, and ALEXANDER DIONISIO Y MANIO,
respondents. HON. CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, Ombudsman, intervenor-respondent.
G.R. No. 108208 | 1994-03-11
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Section 46 of Republic Act No. 6975 1 provides that "criminal cases involving PNP members shall be within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the regular courts." The principal issue in this case is whether the term "regular courts"
includes the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner maintains that it does not while the respondent Judge and the
intervenor-respondent hold otherwise.
Section 46 reads as follows:
"SEC. 46. Jurisdiction in Criminal Cases. ---- Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, criminal cases
involving PNP members shall be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regular courts: Provided, That the courtsmartial appointed pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1850 shall continue to try PC-INP members who have
already been arraigned, to include appropriate actions thereon by the reviewing authorities pursuant to
Commonwealth Act No. 408, otherwise known as the Articles of War, as amended, and Executive Order No. 178,
otherwise known as the Manual for Courts-Martial: Provided, further, That criminal cases against PC-INP
members who may have not yet been arraigned upon the effectivity of this Act shall be transferred to the proper
city or provincial prosecutor or municipal trial court judge."
The factual and procedural antecedents in this case are as follows:
On 31 July 1991, private respondent Alexander Dionisio y Manio, a member of the Philippine National Police

(PNP) assigned to the Central Police District Command Station 2 in Novaliches, Quezon City, was dispatched by
his Commanding Officer to Dumalay Street in Novaliches to respond to a complaint that a person was creating
trouble there. Dionisio proceeded to that place, where he subsequently shot to death T/Sgt. Romeo Sadang.
On 7 August 1991, pursuant to Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, the Office of the City Prosecutor filed
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City an Information 2 charging Dionisio with the crime of homicide
committed as follows:
"That on or about the 31st day of July, 1991, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, and without any justifiable motive, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of one
T/SGT. ROMEO SADANG Y MACABEO, by then and there shooting the latter with the use of a gun, .45 caliber
pistol, thereby inflicting upon the latter gunshot wounds on his neck and on his thorax, which where the direct
and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said T/SGT. ROMEO SADANG Y
MACABEO in such amount as may be awarded to them under the provisions of the Civil Code.
Contrary to law."
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-91-23224 and was raffled off to Branch 104 of the RTC,
prescribed over by the respondent Judge.
On 4 September 1992, while trial was already in progress, the respondent Judge issued, motu proprio, an order 3
requiring the prosecution and the defense to comment on whether the Court should still proceed with the trial of
the case:
"[i]n view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Deloso vs.
Domingo (Vol. 191 SCRA, 545), quoted as follows:
....
'The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over offenses committed by public officials when penalty prescribed by law
for the offense is higher than prision correccional (Sec. 4, subpar. (c), P.D. 1606). The murder charge against the
petitioner carries the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period of death (Art. 248, Revised Penal
Code), hence, it is cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction to
investigate it.'"
In his Order of 24 September 1992, 4 the respondent Judge dismissed Criminal Case No. Q-91-23224 "for refiling with the Sandiganbayan" on the ground that the Sandiganbayan, and not the Regional Trial Court, has
jurisdiction over the case. The body of the order reads:
"Which Court has jurisdiction over police officers who are charged with the crime of homicide or murder?
Accused Quezon City Patrolman Alexander Dionisio y Manio is being tried for homicide for killing T/Sgt. Romeo
Sadang y MACABEO on July 31, 1991 in Quezon City. Several witnesses were already presented by the
prosecution. Nobody raised the issue of jurisdiction. On September 4, 1992, the Court issued an order requiring
the prosecution and the defense to comment on whether the Court has jurisdiction over the matter in view of
the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Deloso vs. Domingo, 191 SCRA 945 [sic] which rules as follows:
'The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over offenses committed by public officials when the penalty prescribed by
law for the offense is higher than prision correccional (Sec. 4, subpar. (c), P.D. 1606). The murder charge against
the petitioner carries the penalty of reclusion temporal in maximum period to death (Art. 248, Revised Penal
Code), hence, it is cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction to
investigate it.'
As a matter of fact, even if the act or crime is not related to or connected with or arising from the performance
of official duty, it must be investigated by the Ombudsman or any of its duly deputized representative:
'The clause "any (illegal) act or omission of any public official" is broad enough to embrace any crime committed
by a public official. The law does not qualify the nature of the illegal act or omission of the public official or
employee that the Ombudsman may investigate. It does not require that the act or omission be related to or be
connected with or arise from, the performance of official duty. Since the law does not distinguish, neither should
we.'
The Sandiganbayan, although trying only certain special classes of crimes, still can be classified as a regular
court functioning within the framework of the judicial department of the government. It is a 'trial court and

bound by the rules governing trial courts. It is one of the "inferior courts" in Article X of the Constitution whose
jurisdiction may be questioned before the Supreme Court and whose judgments are subject to its review,
revision, affirmance or setting aside. The independence of the judiciary enshrined in the Constitution calls for
the unitary judicial system with the Supreme Court at the top of the hierarchical set-up' (Rules of Criminal
Procedures by Dr. Fortunato Gupit, Jr., 1986 Edition, p. 26).
Conformably therefore to the foregoing consideration, the regular court referred to in Section 46 of Republic Act
6975 (An Act establishing the Philippine National Police) is the Sandiganbayan. Since the penalty for homicide,
the charge against the accused, carries the penalty of reclusion temporal, said case is cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and the Ombudsman has the primary jurisdiction to investigate it. (Art. 249, RPC).
WHEREFORE, the above-entitled case is hereby dismissed for refiling with the Sandiganbayan."
On 6 October 1992, the private prosecutor moved for a reconsideration 5 of the dismissal, citing the opinion of
the Secretary of Justice of 31 July 1991 6 that "crimes committed by PNP members are not cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan" because "[t]hey fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regular courts" as provided in
Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 and "[t]he Sandiganbayan is not a regular court but a special court."
The respondent Judge denied the motion in the Order of 7 October 1992: 7
"The opinion of the Secretary of Justice dated July 31, 1992 [sic] . . . is not binding to this Court.
This Court still holds that the regular Courts referred to in Sec. 46 of RA 6975 (An Act Establishing the Philippine
National Police) includes the Sandiganbayan which has exclusive original jurisdiction to try offenses on felonies
committed by public officers in relation to their office, whether simple or complex with other crimes where the
penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional (Sec. 4, par. c, PD 1606)
What is contemplated in the law is the regular civil court to the exclusion of non-regular courts such as military
courts which had previous jurisdiction over police officers. The police force being civilian in character should be
under the jurisdiction of the civil court. What is meant by 'regular courts' mentioned in Sec. 46, RA 6975 are the
'inferior courts' in Article X of the constitution which calls for a unitary judicial system with the Supreme Court at
the top of the hierarchical set-up (Rules in Crim. Procedure by Dr. Fortunato Gupit, page 26, 1986 edition)."
On 6 January 1993, petitioner filed the instant petition. We required the respondents to comment thereon.
On 5 February 1993, the office of the Ombudsman filed a motion for leave to intervene and to file comment 8
alleging that its constitutional duty to investigate criminal cases against public officers, including PNP members,
and to prosecute cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan are affected by the issue raised; and that the office of
the Ombudsman and the Department of Justice (DOJ) had issued a joint circular on 14 October 1991 9 wherein
(a) both agencies agreed that, subject to the final determination by competent authorities, the term "regular
courts" in Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 refers to "civilian courts" as distinguished from military courts, and (b)
certain guidelines were adopted to govern the investigation and prosecution of PNP members. Attached to the
motion is the Ombudsman's Comment 10 on the petition. We granted this motion to intervene, admitted the
Comment, and required petitioner to reply thereto. 11
In their separate Comments, 12 the respondent Judge reiterates the reasons stated in the assailed orders, and
the private respondent concurs with the position and amplifies the arguments of the Ombudsman.
Petitioner filed its Reply 13 to the Comments of the respondents and the intervenor.
On 6 July 1993, we resolved to consider the separate comments of the respondents as answers, to give due
course to the petition, and to require the parties to file simultaneously their respective memoranda within
twenty days from notice, which they did, with the petitioner submitting its memorandum only on 29 December
1993 after obtaining several extensions of time to do so.
In the main, petitioner insists that the dismissal of the criminal case below "for refiling with the Sandiganbayan"
was erroneous because Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 vests the exclusive jurisdiction in criminal cases involving
PNP members only in the "regular courts" which excludes the Sandiganbayan since it is, constitutionally and
statutorily, a "special court" and not a regular court. To bolster this claim, petitioner points to Section 5, Article
XIII of the 1973 Constitution which described the Sandiganbayan as "a special court" and Section 4, Article XI of
the 1987 Constitution which provides that "[t]he present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall
continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law."
It further asserts that (a) if it were the intention of R.A. No. 6975 to grant to the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction over

PNP members, then Section 46 should have explicitly stated or used the term "civil courts" considering that
members of the Integrated National Police (INP) were then integrated with and under the operational control
and administrative set-up of the Philippine Constabulary (PC) and, under P.D. No. 1850, were subject to courtmartial proceedings for all crimes cognizable by the civil courts; (b) if it were the intention of R.A. No. 6975 to
include the Sandiganbayan in the term "regular courts" in Section 46, then it should not have provided therein
that "criminal cases against PC-INP members who may have not yet been arraigned upon the effectivity of this
Act shall be transferred to the proper city or provincial prosecutor or municipal trial court judge"; instead, it
should have directed such transfer to "the Ombudsman or the Special Prosecutor since the Ombudsman or the
Special Prosecutor is mandated by law to entertain cases cognizable only by the Sandiganbayan" under Section
15 of R.A. No. 6770; and (c) there is an irreconcilable conflict between Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 and Section 4
of P.D. No. 1606 (revising P.D. No. 1486 which created the Sandiganbayan), as amended, which vests in the
Sandiganbayan exclusive original jurisdiction over "[o]ther offenses or felonies committed by public officers and
employees in relation to their office . . . where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision
correccional . . . or a fine of P6,000.00"; the latter then should be deemed impliedly repealed by the former,
which is a later law.
Petitioner finally contends that P.D. No. 1606, as amended, is a general law for it applies to all public officers,
while R.A. No. 6975 is a special law for it sets out a special rule of jurisdiction for PNP members. The latter
should thus prevail.
Petitioner then prays that the assailed orders of respondent Judge of 24 September 1992 and 7 October 1992 be
reversed and set aside and that the respondent Judge be directed to reinstate and continue the trial of Criminal
Case No. Q-91-23224.
On the other hand, the Ombudsman maintains the view that it is the Sandiganbayan and not the Regional Trial
Court which has jurisdiction over the subject criminal case in view of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 and the Joint
Circular of 14 October 1991. It asserts that the term "regular courts" in Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 includes the
Sandiganbayan and that R.A. No. 6975 has not repealed Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606.
Amplifying its view, it opines that: (a) while the Sandiganbayan is a special court, it is a regular court within the
context of Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 because it is a "court normally functioning with continuity within the
jurisdiction vested in it," and that the term "regular courts" is used in Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 to distinguish
the said courts from the courts-martial for it seeks to divest the latter of such jurisdiction and mandates its
transfer to the former pursuant to the policy of the law to establish a police force national in scope and civilian
in character; and (b) since the creation of the Sandiganbayan is mandated by the Constitution 14 to take
cognizance of crimes committed by public officers in relation to their office and P.D. No. 1606 created it pursuant
to such mandate, then the repeal of the latter, as suggested by petitioner, would diminish and dilute the
constitutional jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and would operate to amend the Constitution, which no statute
can do. Moreover, there is no irreconcilable inconsistency between the two laws to warrant an implied repeal.
Finally, the Ombudsman asserts that the proviso in Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 that "criminal cases against PCINP members who may have not yet been arraigned upon the effectivity of this Act shall be transferred to the
proper city or provincial prosecutor or municipal trial court judge" only means a referral to the proper city or
provincial prosecutor or municipal trial court judge for appropriate preliminary investigation and not the filing of
the criminal information with the proper court it being a fact that all city and provincial prosecutors have been
deputized by the Ombudsman to conduct preliminary investigation of cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.
As to which law is the special law, the Ombudsman maintains that it is P.D. No. 1606 because it deals
specifically with the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan while Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 does not specifically
mention any particular court.
The resolution of the principal issue hinges on the interpretation of the term regular courts in Section 46 of R.A.
No. 6975 which, in turn, requires an inquiry into the legislative intent and purpose of the law.
There can be no doubt that the provisions of R.A. No. 6975 on the PNP are intended to implement Section 6,
Article XVI (General Provisions) of the 1987 Constitution which reads:
"SEC. 6. The State shall established and maintain one police force, which shall be national in scope and civilian
in character, to be administered and controlled by a national police commission. The authority of local
executives over the police units in their jurisdiction shall be provided by law."
The sponsors of House Bill No. 23614, 15 which together with Senate Bill No. 463 16 eventually became R.A. No.
6975 were unequivocal on this. Representative Antonio Cerilles, after referring to the aforementioned mandate,
declared:

"Today is a date with history, Mr. Speaker, when this august chamber will try its best to pursue what is
mandated by the Constitution. Today, we shall insist, though legislative fiat, that the State should establish and
maintain one police force. Its civilian character on a national scope shall be paramount. Today, we should insist
that no office in any element or unit of the police force can be occupied or run by military personnel and officer.
We should also insist that the only way to professionalize our police force is to separate them from the Armed
Forces of the Philippines." 17
In this sponsorship speech, Representative Nereo Joaquin stated:
"First and foremost among all these is, as already mentioned earlier, the fact that the bill is undoubtedly in
harmony and in conformity not only with the latter but more importantly with the spirit of the new Constitution
particularly Section 6 of Article XVI, the General Provisions. . . ." 18
Police forces have traditionally been under civilian authority. However, the dictatorial regime of then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, consistent with his own agenda to strengthen the machinery of martial law rule, exploited
to his advantage the provision of the 1973 Constitution which mandated the establishment and maintenance of
"an integrated national police force whose organization, administration, and operation shall be provided by law."
19 First, he issued a series of decrees consolidating and integrating various local police forces and placing them
under the operational control, direction, and supervision of the Philippine Constabulary (PC); 20 then on 8
August 1975, he promulgated P.D. No. 765 which "established and constituted the Integrated National Police
which shall be composed of the Philippine Constabulary as the nucleus, and the integrated police forces as
established by Presidential Decrees Nos. 421, 482, 531, 585 and 641, as components, under the Department of
National Defense." By this decree, Mr. Marcos succeeded in militarizing the police forces by making them mere
components of the PC which was then one of the four major commands of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP). He did not stop there. For, even after the farcical lifting of Martial Law in 1981 through Proclamation No.
2045, and pursuant to the infamous Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution, 21 he promulgated on 4
October 1982 P.D. 1850 which provided for court-martial jurisdiction over police officers, policemen, firemen,
and jail guards. Section 1 thereof reads:
"SECTION 1. Court-Martial Jurisdiction over Integrated National Police and Members of the Armed Forces. ---- Any
provision of the law to the contrary notwithstanding ---- (a) uniformed members of the Integrated National Police
who commit any crime or offense cognizable by the civil courts shall henceforth be exclusively tried by courtsmartial pursuant to and in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended, otherwise known as the
Articles of War; (b) all persons subject to military law under Article 2 of the aforecited Articles of War who
commit any crime or offense shall be exclusively tried by courts-martial or their case disposed of under the said
Articles of War; Provided, that, in either of the aforementioned situations, the case shall be disposed of or tried
by the proper civil or judicial authorities when court-martial jurisdiction over the offense has prescribed under
Article 38 of Commonwealth Act Numbered 408, as amended, or court martial jurisdiction over the person of the
accused military or Integrated National Police personnel can no longer be exercised by virtue of their separation
from the active service without jurisdiction having duly attached beforehand unless otherwise provided by law.
As used herein, the term uniformed members of the Integrated National Police shall refer to police officers,
policemen, firemen and jail guards."
In a manner of speaking, this decree completed the militarization of the INP and consummated the aberration in
the police organization. Two years later, or on 5 September 1984, he issued P.D. No. 1952 which amended P.D.
No. 1850 by inserting a proviso to the first paragraph of Section 1 granting himself the authority "in the interest
of justice, [to] order or direct, at any time before arraignment, that a particular case be tried by the appropriate
civil court."
Before P.D. No. 1850, or specifically on 16 January 1981, Mr. Marcos, through P.D. No. 1822, placed under courtmartial jurisdiction, pursuant to the Articles of War, all officers, soldiers, and personnel in the active service of
the AFP or of the PC, charged with any crime or offense related to the performance of their duties.
Needless to state, the overwhelming sentiment of the framers of the 1987 Constitution against the martial law
regime 22 and the militarization of the police forces prompted them to explicitly direct the establishment and
maintenance of one police force, which shall be national in scope and civilian in character. This civilian character
is unqualified and unconditional and is, therefore, all-embracing. The Declaration of Policy (Section 2) of R.A. No.
6975 faithfully carried out this mandate when it declared therein that:
"The police force shall be organized, trained and equipped primarily for the performance of police functions. Its
national scope and civilian character shall be paramount. No element of the police force shall be military nor
shall any position thereof be occupied by active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines."

That civilian character refers to its orientation and structure. Thus, during a bicameral conference committee
meeting on House Bill No. 23614 and Senate Bill No. 463, Senator Edgardo Angara remarked:
"SENATOR ANGARA:
That's what we're trying to interpret nga eh. Civilian in character meaning, we're separating the police both in
orientation and structure from the military discipline and structure, I think that's essentially the mandate we're
trying to implement."
Civilian character necessarily includes, according to him:
"SENATOR ANGARA:
Civilian system of justice na." 23
It is thus evident that the mandate of Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 is to divest courts-martial of any jurisdiction
over criminal cases involving PNP members and to return or transfer that jurisdiction to the civil courts. This
return or transfer of jurisdiction to the civil courts was explicitly provided for in the original Section 68 of House
Bill No. 23614 which reads as follows:
"SEC. 68. Jurisdiction in criminal cases. ---- Any provision of the law to the contrary notwithstanding, criminal
cases involving PNP members shall, immediately upon effectivity of this Act, be exclusively tried by the Civil
Courts: Provided, however, That in cases where a member of the PNP is unable to post bail, he may be placed
upon order by the court under the custody of his supervisor upon petition of the latter." 24
Upon motion of Representative Rodolfo Albano, accepted by the Committee and approved in plenary session,
this section was amended to read as follows:
"ANY PROVISION OF LAW TO THE CONTRARY NOTWITHSTANDING, CRIMINAL CASES INVOLVING PNP MEMBERS
SHALL BE WITHIN THE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF THE CIVIL COURTS." 25
In the course of the interpellation on his amendment, Mr. Albano had the occasion to emphasize the purpose of
the law and the transfer of jurisdiction to civil courts of criminal cases involving members of the PNP:
"MR. ALBANO:
Considering that we are creating here a purely civilian police force, he [the PNP member] should, therefore, also
fall under our civil force, and there should be no iota of military syndrome [referring to the proviso in Sec. 68] so
to speak." 26
During the deliberation by the Bicameral Conference Committee on National Defense on House Bill No. 23614
and Senate Bill No. 463, more specifically on Section 68 of the former, its Chairman, Senator Ernesto Maceda,
used the term "regular courts" in lieu of civil courts. Thus:
"THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA):
Okay, Rey at saka iyong House, you work on the flow chart.
So other than that in that particular section, ano ba itong 'Jurisdiction in criminal cases?' What is this all about?
REP. ZAMORA:
In case they are charged with crimes.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA):
Ah, the previous one is administrative, 'no. Now, if it is charged with a crime, regular courts." 27
The term regular courts was finally carried into the reconciled bill, 28 entitled "An Act Establishing the Philippine
National Police Under a Reorganized Department of the Interior and Local Government, and for Other Purposes,"
and incorporated in the Conference Committee Report received by the Office of the Secretary of the Senate on
19 November 1990. Section 46 of the proposed reconciled bill is Section 68 of House Bill No. 23614, with further
modifications and amendments. The reconciled bill was approved by both Houses of Congress and became R.A.

No. 6975.
The foregoing considered, we have no doubt that the terms civil courts and regular courts were used
interchangeably or were considered as synonymous by the Bicameral Conference Committee and then by the
Senate and the House of Representatives. Accordingly, the term regular courts in Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975
means civil courts. There could have been no other meaning intended since the primary purpose of the law is to
remove from courts-martial the jurisdiction over criminal cases involving members of the PNP and to vest it in
the courts within our judicial system, i.e., the civil courts which, as contradistinguished from courts-martial, are
the regular courts. Courts-martial are not courts within the Philippine judicial system; they pertain to the
executive department of the government and are simply instrumentalities of the executive power. 29 Otherwise
stated, courts-martial are not regular courts.
Parenthetically, in Quiloa vs. The General Court Martial, 30 this Court found correct and impliedly adopted as
its own a statement of the Office of the Solicitor General in its Comment that Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975
mandates the transfer of criminal cases against members of the PNP to the civilian courts. Thus:
"Moreover, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General in his comment ---...
The civilian character with which the PNP is expressly invested is declared by RA 6975 as paramount, and, in
line therewith, the law mandates the transfer of criminal cases against its members to civilian courts." 31
Having thus ruled that the term "regular courts" in Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 refers to the civil courts, we must
now determine if the Sandiganbayan is included in that term.
Regular courts are those within the judicial department of the government, namely, the Supreme Court and
such lower courts as may be established by law. 32 Per Section 16, Chapter 4, Book II of the Administrative Code
of 1987, 33 such lower courts "include the Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, Court of Tax Appeals, Regional Trial
Courts, Shari'a District Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, and
Shari'a Circuit Courts."
The Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486 34 pursuant to the mandate of Section 5, Article XIII of the
1973 Constitution. 35 This was revised by P.D. No. 1606. 36 The latter was amended by P.D. No. 1860 37 and
lastly by P.D. No. 1861. 38 Under the amendments introduced by P.D. No. 1861, the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over the following cases:
"SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. ---- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:
(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code;
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office, including
those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed with other
crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years,
or a fine of P6,000.00: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that offenses or felonies mentioned in this paragraph where the
penalty prescribed by law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years or a fine of
P6,000.00 shall be tried by the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court and
Municipal Circuit Trial Court.
(b) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction:
(1) On appeal, from the final judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in cases originally
decided by them in their respective territorial jurisdiction.
(2) By petition for review, from the final judgments, resolution or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in the
exercise of their appellate jurisdiction over cases originally decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, in their respective jurisdiction. . . ."
Undoubtedly then, the Sandiganbayan is a regular court and is thus included in the term regular courts in
Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975.
Petitioner's insistence that it is not because, by the Constitution and by the statutes, the Sandiganbayan is a

special court and, therefore, not a regular court is untenable. In the first place, a comparison between the words
regular and special is inappropriate since the opposite of the latter is not the former and vice versa. Special
means "designed for a particular purpose; confined to a particular purpose, object, person, or class," 39 and is,
therefore, the antonym of general. 40 On the other hand, regular means "steady or uniform in course, practice,
or occurrence," as opposed to casual or occasional. 41 In other words, special and general are categories in the
distributive order. 42 With reference then to the courts, they principally relate to jurisdiction. Thus, there are
courts of general jurisdiction and courts of special jurisdiction. It is, of course, incorrect to say that only courts of
general jurisdiction are regular courts. Courts of special jurisdiction, which are permanent in character, are also
regular courts. The Sandiganbayan is a court with special jurisdiction because its creation as a permanent antigraft court is constitutionally mandated and its jurisdiction is limited to certain classes of offenses.
That the Sandiganbayan is among the regular courts is further strongly indicated by Section 1 of P.D. No. 1606
which vests upon it "all the inherent powers of a court of justice" and places it on "the same level as the Court of
Appeals," and by Section 4 thereof, as amended by P.D. No. 1861, which grants it appellate jurisdiction over
certain cases decided by the Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
There is, as well, no merit in the theory of petitioner that Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 impliedly repealed Section
4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by P.D. No. 1861, as regards the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over
members of the PNP. First, the argument is based on the faulty assumption that the Sandiganbayan, being a
special court, is not a regular court within the contemplation of Section 46. Second, both provisions are not
irreconcilable and the presumption against an implied repeal has not been overcome. Implied repeal may be
indulged in only if the two laws are inconsistent, or the former law must be repugnant as to be irreconcilable
with the latter law. Necessarily then, an attempt must be made to harmonize the two laws. In Valera vs. Tuason,
43 this Court stated:
"One of the well-established rules of statutory construction enjoins that endeavor should be made to harmonize
the provisions of a law or of two laws so that each shall be effective. In order that one law may operate to repeal
another law, the two laws must actually be inconsistent. The former must be so repugnant as to be
irreconciliable [sic] with the latter act. (U.S. vs. Palacios, 33 Phil., 208). Merely because a later enactment may
relate to the same subject matter as that of an earlier statute is not of itself sufficient to cause an implied repeal
of the latter, since the new law may be cumulative or a continuation of the old one. (Statutory Construction,
Crawford, p. 634)."
In Gordon vs. Veridiano, 44 this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, emphasized the task of
courts to reconcile and harmonize laws:
"Courts of justice, when confronted with apparently conflicting statutes, should endeavor to reconcile the same
instead of declaring outright the invalidity of one as against the other. Such alacrity should be avoided. The wise
policy is for the judge to harmonize them if this is possible, bearing in mind that they are equally the handiwork
of the same legislature, and so give effect to both while at the same time also according due respect to a
coordinate department of the government."
Indeed, it has been approximately said:
"The presumption against implied repeals is classically founded upon the doctrine that the legislature is
presumed to envision the whole body of the law when it enacts new legislation, and, therefore, if a repeal of the
prior law is intended, expressly to designate the offending provisions rather than to leave the repeal to arise by
necessary implication from the later enactment. Still more basic, however, is the assumption that existing
statutory and common law, as well as ancient law, is representative of popular will. As traditional and customary
rules, the presumption is against their alteration of repeal. The presumption has been said to have special
application to important public statutes of long standing." 45
It can thus be reasonably presumed that in the enactment of R.A. No. 6975, Congress had the whole body of the
law in mind and, for consistency, coherence, and harmony, took into account the provisions of the Constitution
regarding the Sandiganbayan, the law creating it, and the amendments thereto relative to its jurisdiction. Since
under the law, the Sandiganbayan is a special anti-graft court with exclusive original jurisdiction over (a)
violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code; and (b)
other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees (including those in government-owned or
controlled corporations) in relation to their office where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision
correccional or imprisonment for six years, or a fine of P6,000.00, and since members of the PNP are public
officers or employees, 46 Congress can be logically presumed to have read into Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 the
constitutional and statutory provisions regarding the Sandiganbayan. The alleged inconsistency seen by
petitioner is non-existent for, on the contrary, the two provisions can well go together with full and unhampered

effect to both and without doing violence to either, thereby giving spirit to the maxim, interpretare et
concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi or every statute must be so construed and harmonized with other
statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. 47 As harmonized, the conclusion is inevitable that
members of the PNP, as public officers and employees, are subject to the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan with
respect to (a) violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII
of the Revised Penal Code, and (b) other offenses or felonies committed by them in relation to their office where
the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment of six years, or a fine of
P6,000.00. All other offenses committed by them are cognizable by the appropriate courts within the judicial
system such as the Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts.
That the public officers or employees committed the crime in relation to their office must, however, be alleged
in the information for the Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction over a case under Section 4(a) (2). 48 This
allegation is necessary because of the unbending rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations of the
information. 49
In the instant case, the trial court dismissed Criminal Case No. Q-91-23224 on the ground that since the penalty
prescribed for the crime charged ---- which is homicide ---- is higher than prision correccional, 50 then pursuant
to Deloso vs. Domingo, 51 it is the Sandiganbayan which has jurisdiction over the case. In order to avoid a
misapprehension of the ruling in Deloso, which was based on P.D. No. 1606 alone, it must be stressed that we
had unequivocally ruled in Aguinaldo vs. Domagas 52 that for the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive original
jurisdiction over offenses or felonies committed by public officers or employees, under Section 4(a) (2) of P.D.
No. 1606, as amended by P.D. No. 1861, it is not enough that the penalty prescribed therefor is higher than
prision correccional or imprisonment for six years, or a fine of P6,000.00; it is also necessary that such offenses
or felonies were committed in relation to their office. We then concluded:
"Even before considering the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged, it is thus essential to determine
whether that offense was committed or alleged to have been committed by the public officers and employees in
relation to their offices."
In the recent case of Sanchez vs. Demetriou, 53 we reiterated our ruling on the requirement that the offenses or
felonies covered by Section 4(a) (2) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by P.D. No. 1861, have to be committed by
public officers and employees in relation to their office and likewise elucidated on the meaning of offenses
committed in relation to their office by reiterating the principle in Montilla vs. Hilario 54 that an offense may be
considered as committed in relation to the office if "the offense cannot exist without the office," or that "the
office must be a constituent element of the crimes as . . . defined and punished in Chapter Two to Six, Title
Seven, of the Revised Penal Code," and the principle in People vs. Montejo 55 that the offense must be
intimately connected with the office of the offender and perpetuated while he was in the performance, though
improper or irregular, of his official functions. Further, we intimated that the fact that the offense was committed
in relation to the office must be alleged in the information.
Just recently, in Natividad vs. Felix, 56 we explicitly declared that we had re-examined the Deloso case in
Aguinaldo and in Sanchez and reiterated the requisites for an offense under Section 4(a) (2) of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended by P.D. No. 1861, to fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
In the light then of the foregoing, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City would be without jurisdiction over
Criminal Case No. Q-91-23224 if the information therein would show that the offense of homicide charged was
committed by the accused (private respondent) in relation to his office. The information has failed to do so. The
pleadings of the parties are of little help. We can only speculate therefrom that the crime charged might have
been committed while the private respondent was in the pursuit of his mission. Under the sub-heading in the
petition entitled "Relevant Antecedents," the petitioner merely states:
"1. On July 31, 1991, private respondent . . . then a member of the PNP-NCR assigned to the Central Police
District Command Station 2, based in Novaliches, Quezon City, was dispatched by his Commanding Officer to
Dumalay Street in Novaliches to check on a complaint regarding a person creating trouble in the place. While in
Novaliches, private respondent shot Romeo Sadang to death."
There is no indication at all that the trouble-maker was the victim and that he was shot by the private
respondent in the course of the latter's mission. On the other hand, the private respondent asserts in his
Comment that he "shot Romeo Sadang in the performance of a lawful duty and in lawful defense of his life." 57
Petitioner ignored this claim in its Reply to the Comment. This claim is an anticipatory defense yet to be proved
and its assertion in the Comment does not cure the deficiency, pointed out earlier, of the information. It would
appear to us that with respect to the issue of jurisdiction, the parties only took into account the prescribed
penalty, relying upon Deloso vs. Domingo, for which reason they did not consider important and relevant the

issue of whether the offense charged was committed by the private respondent in relation to his office. But as
stated earlier, Deloso vs. Domingo was modified by Aguinaldo vs. Domagas.
The dismissal then of Criminal Case No. Q-91-23224 solely on the basis of Deloso vs. Domingo was erroneous. In
the light of Aguinaldo and Sanchez, and considering the absence of any allegation in the information that the
offense was committed by private respondent in relation to his office, it would even appear that the RTC has
exclusive jurisdiction over the case. However, it may yet be true that the crime of homicide charged therein was
committed by the private respondent in relation to his office, which fact, however, was not alleged in the
information probably because Deloso vs. Domingo did not require such an allegation. In view of this eventuality
and the special circumstances of this case, and to avoid further delay, if not confusion, we shall direct the court
a quo to conduct a preliminary hearing in this case to determine whether the crime charged in Criminal Case No.
Q-91-23224 was committed by the private respondent in relation to his office. If it be determined in the
affirmative, then it shall order the transfer of the case to the Sandiganbayan which shall forthwith docket and
proceed with the case as if the same were originally filed with it. Otherwise, the court a quo shall set aside the
challenged orders, proceed with the trial of the case, and render judgment thereon.
Henceforth, any officer authorized to conduct a preliminary investigation 58 who is investigating an offense or
felony committed by a public officer or employee (including a member of the PNP) where the penalty prescribed
by law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six years, or a fine of P6,000.00, must determine if
the crime was committed by the respondent in relation to his office. If it was, the investigating officer shall
forthwith inform the Office of the Ombudsman which may either (a) take over the investigation of the case
pursuant to Section 15(1) of R.A. No. 6770, 59 or (b) deputize a prosecutor to act as special investigator or
prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of the case pursuant to Section 31 thereof. 60 If the
investigating officer determines that the crime was not committed by the respondent in relation to his office, he
shall then file the information with the proper court.
In the light of the foregoing, further discussion on the other collateral issues raised has become unnecessary.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ORDERING the respondent Judge to conduct, within fifteen (15) days
from receipt of a copy of this Decision, a preliminary hearing in Criminal Case No. Q-91-23224 to determine
whether the crime charged was committed by the private respondent in relation to his office, and
(1) If he determines that the crime charged was committed by the private respondent in relation to his office,
DIRECTING the respondent Judge to forthwith transmit the records of the case to the Sandiganbayan which shall
docket and proceed with the case as if the same were originally filed with it; or
(2) If he determines otherwise, DIRECTING him to set aside the challenged Orders of 24 September 1992 and 7
October 1992, to proceed with the hearing of Criminal Case No. Q-91-23224, and to render judgment thereon.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
PROSPERO A. PICHAY, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS INVESTIGATIVE AND
ADJUDICATORY DIVISION, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary, and
HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, and as an ex-officio member of
the Monetary Board, Respondents.
G.R. No. 196425 | 2012-07-24

A discussion citing this case is available.

Political Law; Constitutional Law; Bill of Rights; Due Process - right to life, liberty and property; Procedural and
substantive due process
EN BANC
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

The Case
This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order, seeking to declare as unconstitutional Executive Order No. 13, entitled, "Abolishing the Presidential AntiGraft Commission and Transferring Its Investigative, Adjudicatory and Recommendatory Functions to the Office
Of The Deputy Executive Secretary For Legal Affairs, Office of the President",1 and to permanently prohibit
respondents from administratively proceeding against petitioner on the strength of the assailed executive order.
The Facts
On April 16, 2001, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 12 (E.O. 12)
creating the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) and vesting it with the power to investigate or hear
administrative cases or complaints for possible graft and corruption, among others, against presidential
appointees and to submit its report and recommendations to the President. Pertinent portions of E.O. 12
provide:

Section 4. Jurisdiction, Powers and Functions. (a) x x x

xxx

xxx

(b) The Commission, acting as a collegial body, shall have the authority to investigate or hear administrative
cases or complaints against all presidential appointees in the government and any of its agencies or
instrumentalities xxx
xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx
xxx

Section 8. Submission of Report and Recommendations. - After completing its investigation or hearing, the
Commission en banc shall submit its report and recommendations to the President. The report and
recommendations shall state, among others, the factual findings and legal conclusions, as well as the penalty
recommend (sic) to be imposed or such other action that may be taken."
On November 15, 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III issued Executive Order No. 13 (E.O. 13),
abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functions to the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal
Affairs (ODESLA), more particularly to its newly-established Investigative and Adjudicatory Division (IAD). The
full text of the assailed executive order reads:
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 13

ABOLISHING THE PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-GRAFT COMMISSION AND TRANSFERRING ITS INVESTIGATIVE,

ADJUDICATORY AND RECOMMENDATORY FUNCTIONS TO THE OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
WHEREAS, this administration has a continuing mandate and advocacy to fight and eradicate corruption in the
different departments, bureaus, offices and other government agencies and instrumentalities;
WHEREAS, the government adopted a policy of streamlining the government bureaucracy to promote economy
and efficiency in government;
WHEREAS, Section VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides that the President shall have control of all the
executive departments, bureaus and offices;
WHEREAS, Section 31 Chapter 10, Title III, Book III of Executive Order 292 (Administrative Code of 1987)

provides for the continuing authority of the President to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of
the President;
WHEREAS, Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1416 (Granting Continuing Authority to the President of the Philippines
to Reorganize the National Government), as amended by PD 1722, provides that the President of the Philippines
shall have continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the National Government and may,
at his discretion, create, abolish, group, consolidate, merge or integrate entities, agencies, instrumentalities and
units of the National Government, as well as, expand, amend, change or otherwise modify their powers,
functions and authorities;
WHEREAS, Section 78 of the General Provisions of Republic Act No. 9970 (General Appropriations Act of 2010)
authorizes the President of the Philippines to direct changes in the organizational units or key positions in any
department or agency;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, BENIGNO S. AQUINO III, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me
by law, do hereby order the following:
SECTION 1. Declaration of Policy. It is the policy of the government to fight and eradicate graft and corruption in
the different departments, bureaus, offices and other government agencies and instrumentalities.

The government adopted a policy of streamlining the government bureaucracy to promote economy and
efficiency in the government.

SECTION 2. Abolition of Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC). To enable the Office of the President (OP) to
directly investigate graft and corrupt cases of Presidential appointees in the Executive Department including
heads of government-owned and controlled corporations, the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) is
hereby abolished and their vital functions and other powers and functions inherent or incidental thereto,
transferred to the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (ODESLA), OP in accordance with
the provisions of this Executive Order.

SECTION 3. Restructuring of the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs, OP. In addition to the
Legal and Legislative Divisions of the ODESLA, the Investigative and Adjudicatory Division shall be created.

The newly created Investigative and Adjudicatory Division shall perform powers, functions and duties
mentioned in Section 2 hereof, of PAGC.

The Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (DESLA) will be the recommending authority to the
President, thru the Executive Secretary, for approval, adoption or modification of the report and
recommendations of the Investigative and Adjudicatory Division of ODESLA.

SECTION 4. Personnel Who May Be Affected By the Abolition of PAGC. The personnel who may be affected by the
abolition of the PAGC shall be allowed to avail of the benefits provided under existing laws if applicable. The
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) is hereby ordered to release the necessary funds for the benefits
of the employees.

SECTION 5. Winding Up of the Operation and Disposition of the Functions, Positions, Personnel, Assets and
Liabilities of PAGC. The winding up of the operations of PAGC including the final disposition or transfer of their
functions, positions, personnel, assets and liabilities as may be necessary, shall be in accordance with the
applicable provision(s) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing EO 72 (Rationalizing the Agencies Under or
Attached to the Office of the President) dated March 15, 2002. The winding up shall be implemented not later
than 31 December 2010.

The Office of the Executive Secretary, with the assistance of the Department of Budget and Management,
shall ensure the smooth and efficient implementation of the dispositive actions and winding-up of the activities
of PAGC.

SECTION 6. Repealing Clause. All executive orders, rules, regulations and other issuances or parts thereof, which
are inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive Order, are hereby revoked or modified accordingly.
SECTION 7. Effectivity. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately after its publication in a newspaper of
general circulation.
On April 6, 2011, respondent Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima filed before the IAD-ODESLA a complaint
affidavit2 for grave misconduct against petitioner Prospero A. Pichay, Jr., Chairman of the Board of Trustees of
the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), as well as the incumbent members of the LWUA Board of
Trustees, namely, Renato Velasco, Susana Dumlao Vargas, Bonifacio Mario M. Pena, Sr. and Daniel Landingin,
which arose from the purchase by the LWUA of Four Hundred Forty-Five Thousand Three Hundred Seventy Seven
(445,377) shares of stock of Express Savings Bank, Inc.
On April 14, 2011, petitioner received an Order3 signed by Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr.
requiring him and his co-respondents to submit their respective written explanations under oath. In compliance
therewith, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam manifesting that a case involving the
same transaction and charge of grave misconduct entitled, "Rustico B. Tutol, et al. v. Prospero Pichay, et al.",
and docketed as OMB-C-A-10-0426-I, is already pending before the Office of the Ombudsman.
Now alleging that no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy is available to him in the ordinary course
of law, petitioner has resorted to the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition upon the following grounds:

I. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR USURPING THE POWER OF THE LEGISLATURE TO CREATE A PUBLIC OFFICE.
II. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR USURPING THE POWER OF THE LEGISLATURE TO APPROPRIATE FUNDS.
III. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR USURPING THE POWER OF CONGRESS TO DELEGATE QUASI-JUDICIAL
POWERS TO ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES.
IV. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR ENCROACHING UPON THE POWERS OF THE OMBUDSMAN.
V. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR VIOLATING THE GUARANTEE OF DUE PROCESS.
VI. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR VIOLATING THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.
Our Ruling
In assailing the constitutionality of E.O. 13, petitioner asseverates that the President is not authorized
under any existing law to create the Investigative and Adjudicatory Division, Office of the Deputy Executive
Secretary for Legal Affairs (IAD-ODESLA) and that by creating a new, additional and distinct office tasked with
quasi-judicial functions, the President has not only usurped the powers of congress to create a public office,
appropriate funds and delegate quasi-judicial functions to administrative agencies but has also encroached upon
the powers of the Ombudsman.
Petitioner avers that the unconstitutionality of E.O. 13 is also evident when weighed against the due
process requirement and equal protection clause under the 1987 Constitution.
The contentions are unavailing.

The President has Continuing Authority to Reorganize the Executive Department under E.O. 292.
Section 31 of Executive Order No. 292 (E.O. 292), otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987,
vests in the President the continuing authority to reorganize the offices under him in order to achieve simplicity,
economy and efficiency. E.O. 292 sanctions the following actions undertaken for such purpose:
(1)Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper, including the immediate
Offices, the Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers System and the Common Staff Support System, by
abolishing, consolidating, or merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to
another;
(2)Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other Department or Agency as well
as transfer functions to the Office of the President from other Departments and Agencies; and
(3)Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other Department or Agency as well
as transfer agencies to the Office of the President from other departments or agencies.4
In the case of Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora5 the Court affirmed that the President's authority to
carry out a reorganization in any branch or agency of the executive department is an express grant by the
legislature by virtue of E.O. 292, thus:
But of course, the list of legal basis authorizing the President to reorganize any department or agency in
the executive branch does not have to end here. We must not lose sight of the very source of the power - that
which constitutes an express grant of power. Under Section 31, Book III of Executive Order No. 292
(otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987), "the President, subject to the policy of the Executive
Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have the continuing authority to
reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President." For this purpose, he may
transfer the functions of other Departments or Agencies to the Office of the President. (Emphasis supplied)
And in Domingo v. Zamora,6 the Court gave the rationale behind the President's continuing authority in
this wise:
The law grants the President this power in recognition of the recurring need of every President to
reorganize his office "to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency." The Office of the President is the nerve
center of the Executive Branch. To remain effective and efficient, the Office of the President must be
capable of being shaped and reshaped by the President in the manner he deems fit to carry out his
directives and policies. After all, the Office of the President is the command post of the President. (Emphasis
supplied)
Clearly, the abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its functions to a division specially created within the
ODESLA is properly within the prerogative of the President under his continuing "delegated legislative authority
to reorganize" his own office pursuant to E.O. 292.
Generally, this authority to implement organizational changes is limited to transferring either an office or
a function from the Office of the President to another Department or Agency, and the other way around.7 Only
Section 31(1) gives the President a virtual freehand in dealing with the internal structure of the Office of the
President Proper by allowing him to take actions as extreme as abolition, consolidation or merger of units, apart
from the less drastic move of transferring functions and offices from one unit to another. Again, in Domingo v.
Zamora8 the Court noted:
However, the President's power to reorganize the Office of the President under Section 31 (2) and (3) of
EO 292 should be distinguished from his power to reorganize the Office of the President Proper. Under Section
31 (1) of EO 292, the President can reorganize the Office of the President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or
merging units, or by transferring functions from one unit to another. In contrast, under Section 31 (2) and (3) of
EO 292, the President's power to reorganize offices outside the Office of the President Proper but still within the
Office of the President is limited to merely transferring functions or agencies from the Office of the President to
Departments or Agencies, and vice versa.
The distinction between the allowable organizational actions under Section 31(1) on the one hand and
Section 31 (2) and (3) on the other is crucial not only as it affects employees' tenurial security but also insofar
as it touches upon the validity of the reorganization, that is, whether the executive actions undertaken fall
within the limitations prescribed under E.O. 292. When the PAGC was created under E.O. 12, it was composed of

a Chairman and two (2) Commissioners who held the ranks of Presidential Assistant II and I, respectively,9 and
was placed directly "under the Office of the President."10 On the other hand, the ODESLA, to which the
functions of the PAGC have now been transferred, is an office within the Office of the President Proper.11 Since
both of these offices belong to the Office of the President Proper, the reorganization by way of abolishing the
PAGC and transferring its functions to the ODESLA is allowable under Section 31 (1) of E.O. 292.
Petitioner, however, goes on to assert that the President went beyond the authority granted by E.O. 292
for him to reorganize the executive department since his issuance of E.O. 13 did not merely involve the abolition
of an office but the creation of one as well. He argues that nowhere in the legal definition laid down by the Court
in several cases does a reorganization include the act of creating an office.
The contention is misplaced.
The Reorganization Did not Entail the Creation of a New, Separate and Distinct Office.
The abolition of the PAGC did not require the creation of a new, additional and distinct office as the duties
and functions that pertained to the defunct anti-graft body were simply transferred to the ODESLA, which is an
existing office within the Office of the President Proper. The reorganization required no more than a mere
alteration of the administrative structure of the ODESLA through the establishment of a third division - the
Investigative and Adjudicatory Division - through which ODESLA could take on the additional functions it has
been tasked to discharge under E.O. 13. In Canonizado v. Aguirre,12 We ruled that Reorganization takes place when there is an alteration of the existing structure of government offices or
units therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility between them. It involves a reduction of
personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions.
The Reorganization was Pursued in Good Faith.
A valid reorganization must not only be exercised through legitimate authority but must also be pursued
in good faith. A reorganization is said to be carried out in good faith if it is done for purposes of economy and
efficiency.13 It appears in this case that the streamlining of functions within the Office of the President Proper
was pursued with such purposes in mind.
In its Whereas clauses, E.O. 13 cites as bases for the reorganization the policy dictates of eradicating corruption
in the government and promoting economy and efficiency in the bureaucracy. Indeed, the economical effects of
the reorganization is shown by the fact that while Congress had initially appropriated P22 Million for the PAGC's
operation in the 2010 annual budget,14 no separate or added funding of such a considerable amount was ever
required after the transfer of the PAGC functions to the IAD-ODESLA.
Apparently, the budgetary requirements that the IAD-ODESLA needed to discharge its functions and
maintain its personnel would be sourced from the following year's appropriation for the President's Offices under
the General Appropriations Act of 2011.15 Petitioner asseverates, however, that since Congress did not indicate
the manner by which the appropriation for the Office of the President was to be distributed, taking therefrom the
operational funds of the IAD-ODESLA would amount to an illegal appropriation by the President. The contention
is without legal basis.
There is no usurpation of the legislative power to appropriate public funds.
In the chief executive dwell the powers to run government. Placed upon him is the power to recommend
the budget necessary for the operation of the Government,16 which implies that he has the necessary authority
to evaluate and determine the structure that each government agency in the executive department would need
to operate in the most economical and efficient manner.17 Hence, the express recognition under Section 78 of
R.A. 9970 or the General Appropriations Act of 2010 of the President's authority to "direct changes in the
organizational units or key positions in any department or agency." The aforecited provision, often and
consistently included in the general appropriations laws, recognizes the extent of the President's power to
reorganize the executive offices and agencies under him, which is, "even to the extent of modifying and
realigning appropriations for that purpose."18
And to further enable the President to run the affairs of the executive department, he is likewise given
constitutional authority to augment any item in the General Appropriations Law using the savings in other items
of the appropriation for his office.19 In fact, he is explicitly allowed by law to transfer any fund appropriated for
the different departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department which is included in the

General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau or office included in
the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment.20
Thus, while there may be no specific amount earmarked for the IAD-ODESLA from the total amount
appropriated by Congress in the annual budget for the Office of the President, the necessary funds for the IADODESLA may be properly sourced from the President's own office budget without committing any illegal
appropriation. After all, there is no usurpation of the legislature's power to appropriate funds when the President
simply allocates the existing funds previously appropriated by Congress for his office.
The IAD-ODESLA is a fact-finding and recommendatory body not vested with quasi-judicial powers.
Petitioner next avers that the IAD-ODESLA was illegally vested with judicial power which is reserved to the
Judicial Department and, by way of exception through an express grant by the legislature, to administrative
agencies. He points out that the name Investigative and Adjudicatory Division is proof itself that the IADODESLA wields quasi-judicial power.
The argument is tenuous. As the OSG aptly explained in its Comment,21 while the term "adjudicatory"
appears part of its appellation, the IAD-ODESLA cannot try and resolve cases, its authority being limited to the
conduct of investigations, preparation of reports and submission of recommendations. E.O. 13 explicitly states
that the IAD-ODESLA shall "perform powers, functions and duties xxx, of PAGC."22
Under E.O. 12, the PAGC was given the authority to "investigate or hear administrative cases or
complaints against all presidential appointees in the government"23 and to "submit its report and
recommendations to the President."24 The IAD-ODESLA is a fact-finding and recommendatory body to the
President, not having the power to settle controversies and adjudicate cases. As the Court ruled in Cario v.
Commission on Human Rights,25 and later reiterated in Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission:26
Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or
even a quasi-judicial agency or office. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of
a controversy is not a judicial function. To be considered as such, the act of receiving evidence and arriving at
factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to the factual
conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and
definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law.
The President's authority to issue E.O. 13 and constitute the IAD-ODESLA as his fact-finding investigator
cannot be doubted. After all, as Chief Executive, he is granted full control over the Executive Department to
ensure the enforcement of the laws. Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution provides:
Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
The obligation to see to it that laws are faithfully executed necessitates the corresponding power in the
President to conduct investigations into the conduct of officials and employees in the executive department.27
The IAD-ODESLA does not encroach upon the powers and duties of the Ombudsman.
Contrary to petitioner's contention, the IAD-ODESLA did not encroach upon the Ombudsman's primary
jurisdiction when it took cognizance of the complaint affidavit filed against him notwithstanding the earlier filing
of criminal and administrative cases involving the same charges and allegations before the Office of the
Ombudsman. The primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute cases refers to criminal
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and not to administrative cases. It is only in the exercise of its primary
jurisdiction that the Ombudsman may, at any time, take over the investigation being conducted by another
investigatory agency. Section 15 (1) of R.A. No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989, empowers the
Ombudsman to (1)Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer
or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It
has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of its primary
jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of government, the
investigation of such cases. (Emphasis supplied)
Since the case filed before the IAD-ODESLA is an administrative disciplinary case for grave misconduct,
petitioner may not invoke the primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to prevent the IAD-ODESLA from

proceeding with its investigation. In any event, the Ombudsman's authority to investigate both elective and
appointive officials in the government, extensive as it may be, is by no means exclusive. It is shared with other
similarly authorized government agencies.28
While the Ombudsman's function goes into the determination of the existence of probable cause and the
adjudication of the merits of a criminal accusation, the investigative authority of the IAD- ODESLA is limited to
that of a fact-finding investigator whose determinations and recommendations remain so until acted upon by
the President. As such, it commits no usurpation of the Ombudsman's constitutional duties.
Executive Order No. 13 Does Not Violate Petitioner's Right to Due Process and the Equal Protection
of the Laws.
Petitioner goes on to assail E.O. 13 as violative of the equal protection clause pointing to the arbitrariness
of limiting the IAD-ODESLA's investigation only to presidential appointees occupying upper-level positions in the
government. The equal protection of the laws is a guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility
from the government.29 It is embraced under the due process concept and simply requires that, in the
application of the law, "all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed."30 The equal protection clause, however, is not absolute but subject to
reasonable classification so that aggrupations bearing substantial distinctions may be treated differently from
each other. This we ruled in Farinas v. Executive Secretary,31 wherein we further stated that The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile
discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited either in
the object to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute
equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and
conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not
infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it
applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction
between those who fall within such class and those who do not. (Emphasis supplied)
Presidential appointees come under the direct disciplining authority of the President. This proceeds from
the well settled principle that, in the absence of a contrary law, the power to remove or to discipline is lodged in
the same authority on which the power to appoint is vested.32 Having the power to remove and/or discipline
presidential appointees, the President has the corollary authority to investigate such public officials and look
into their conduct in office.33 Petitioner is a presidential appointee occupying the high-level position of
Chairman of the LWUA. Necessarily, he comes under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the President, who is well
within his right to order an investigation into matters that require his informed decision.
There are substantial distinctions that set apart presidential appointees occupying upper-level positions in
government from non-presidential appointees and those that occupy the lower positions in government. In
Salumbides v. Office of the Ombudsman,34 we had ruled extensively on the substantial distinctions that exist
between elective and appointive public officials, thus:
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former
occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term
and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold
their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials
hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure
of the appointing authority.
x

An election is the embodiment of the popular will, perhaps the purest expression of the sovereign power
of the people. It involves the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote. Considering that
elected officials are put in office by their constituents for a definite term, x x x complete deference is accorded
to the will of the electorate that they be served by such officials until the end of the term for which they were
elected. In contrast, there is no such expectation insofar as appointed officials are
concerned. (Emphasis supplied)
Also, contrary to petitioner's assertions, his right to due process was not violated when the IAD-ODESLA
took cognizance of the administrative complaint against him since he was given sufficient opportunity to oppose
the formal complaint filed by Secretary Purisima. In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving
reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the
minimum requirements of due process,35 which simply means having the opportunity to explain one's side.36

Hence, as long as petitioner was given the opportunity to explain his side and present evidence, the
requirements of due process are satisfactorily complied with because what the law abhors is an absolute lack of
opportunity to be heard.37 The records show that petitioner was issued an Order requiring him to submit his
written explanation under oath with respect to the charge of grave misconduct filed against him. His own failure
to submit his explanation despite notice defeats his subsequent claim of denial of due process.
Finally, petitioner doubts that the IAD-ODESLA can lawfully perform its duties as an impartial tribunal,
contending that both the IAD-ODESLA and respondent Secretary Purisima are connected to the President. The
mere suspicion of partiality will not suffice to invalidate the actions of the IAD-ODESLA. Mere allegation is not
equivalent to proof. Bias and partiality cannot be presumed.38 Petitioner must present substantial proof to show
that the lAD-ODES LA had unjustifiably sided against him in the conduct of the investigation. No such evidence
has been presented as to defeat the presumption of regularity m the performance of the fact-finding
investigator's duties. The assertion, therefore, deserves scant consideration.
Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must be
a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative one.39 Petitioner has
failed to discharge the burden of proving the illegality of E.O. 13, which IS indubitably a valid exercise of the
President's continuing authority to reorganize the Office of the President.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition IS hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO, Petitioner, vs. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010,
Respondent.
REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, JR., REP. SIMEON A. DATUMANONG, and REP.
ORLANDO B. FUA, SR., Petitioners, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. and
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Respondents.
G.R. No. 192935 and G.R. No. 193036 | 2010-12-07
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority
over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but
only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine
conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual
controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them.
--- Justice Jose P. Laurel1
The role of the Constitution cannot be overlooked. It is through the Constitution that the
fundamental powers of government are established, limited and defined, and by which these
powers are distributed among the several departments.2 The Constitution is the basic and
paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to which all persons, including the highest
officials of the land, must defer.3 Constitutional doctrines must remain steadfast no matter what
may be the tides of time. It cannot be simply made to sway and accommodate the call of situations
and much more tailor itself to the whims and caprices of government and the people who run it.4
For consideration before the Court are two consolidated cases5 both of which essentially assail the
validity and constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1, dated July 30, 2010, entitled "Creating the
Philippine Truth Commission of 2010."
The first case is G.R. No. 192935, a special civil action for prohibition instituted by petitioner Louis
Biraogo (Biraogo) in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer. Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 1 for
being violative of the legislative power of Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution6
as it usurps the constitutional authority of the legislature to create a public office and to appropriate
funds therefor.7
The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition filed by
petitioners Edcel C. Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua, Sr.
(petitioners-legislators) as incumbent members of the House of Representatives.

The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to the events prior to the historic May 2010
elections, when then Senator Benigno Simeon Aquino III declared his staunch condemnation of graft
and corruption with his slogan, "Kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap." The Filipino people,
convinced of his sincerity and of his ability to carry out this noble objective, catapulted the good
senator to the presidency.
To transform his campaign slogan into reality, President Aquino found a need for a special body to
investigate reported cases of graft and corruption allegedly committed during the previous
administration.
Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President on July 30, 2010, signed Executive Order No.
1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission). Pertinent provisions of
said executive order read:
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 1
CREATING THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010
WHEREAS, Article XI, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines solemnly enshrines the
principle that a public office is a public trust and mandates that public officers and employees, who
are servants of the people, must at all times be accountable to the latter, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest
lives;
WHEREAS, corruption is among the most despicable acts of defiance of this principle and notorious
violation of this mandate;
WHEREAS, corruption is an evil and scourge which seriously affects the political, economic, and
social life of a nation; in a very special way it inflicts untold misfortune and misery on the poor, the
marginalized and underprivileged sector of society;
WHEREAS, corruption in the Philippines has reached very alarming levels, and undermined the
people's trust and confidence in the Government and its institutions;
WHEREAS, there is an urgent call for the determination of the truth regarding certain reports of
large scale graft and corruption in the government and to put a closure to them by the filing of the
appropriate cases against those involved, if warranted, and to deter others from committing the
evil, restore the people's faith and confidence in the Government and in their public servants;
WHEREAS, the President's battlecry during his campaign for the Presidency in the last elections
"kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap" expresses a solemn pledge that if elected, he would end
corruption and the evil it breeds;
WHEREAS, there is a need for a separate body dedicated solely to investigating and finding out the
truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration, and
which will recommend the prosecution of the offenders and secure justice for all;
WHEREAS, Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the
Revised Administrative Code of the Philippines, gives the President the continuing authority to
reorganize the Office of the President.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, BENIGNO SIMEON AQUINO III, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by
virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby order:
SECTION 1. Creation of a Commission. " There is hereby created the PHILIPPINE TRUTH
COMMISSION, hereinafter referred to as the "COMMISSION," which shall primarily seek and find the
truth on, and toward this end, investigate reports of graft and corruption of such scale and
magnitude that shock and offend the moral and ethical sensibilities of the people, committed by
public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the private
sector, if any, during the previous administration; and thereafter recommend the appropriate action
or measure to be taken thereon to ensure that the full measure of justice shall be served without
fear or favor.
The Commission shall be composed of a Chairman and four (4) members who will act as an
independent collegial body.

SECTION 2. Powers and Functions. " The Commission, which shall have all the powers of an
investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, is
primarily tasked to conduct a thorough fact-finding investigation of reported cases of graft and
corruption referred to in Section 1, involving third level public officers and higher, their coprincipals, accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous
administration and thereafter submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress
and the Ombudsman.
In particular, it shall:
a) Identify and determine the reported cases of such graft and corruption which it will investigate;
b) Collect, receive, review and evaluate evidence related to or regarding the cases of large scale
corruption which it has chosen to investigate, and to this end require any agency, official or
employee of the Executive Branch, including government-owned or controlled corporations, to
produce documents, books, records and other papers;
c) Upon proper request or representation, obtain information and documents from the Senate and
the House of Representatives records of investigations conducted by committees thereof relating to
matters or subjects being investigated by the Commission;
d) Upon proper request and representation, obtain information from the courts, including the
Sandiganbayan and the Office of the Court Administrator, information or documents in respect to
corruption cases filed with the Sandiganbayan or the regular courts, as the case may be;
e) Invite or subpoena witnesses and take their testimonies and for that purpose, administer oaths
or affirmations as the case may be;
f) Recommend, in cases where there is a need to utilize any person as a state witness to ensure
that the ends of justice be fully served, that such person who qualifies as a state witness under the
Revised Rules of Court of the Philippines be admitted for that purpose;
g) Turn over from time to time, for expeditious prosecution, to the appropriate prosecutorial
authorities, by means of a special or interim report and recommendation, all evidence on corruption
of public officers and employees and their private sector co-principals, accomplices or accessories,
if any, when in the course of its investigation the Commission finds that there is reasonable ground
to believe that they are liable for graft and corruption under pertinent applicable laws;
h) Call upon any government investigative or prosecutorial agency such as the Department of
Justice or any of the agencies under it, and the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission, for such
assistance and cooperation as it may require in the discharge of its functions and duties;
i) Engage or contract the services of resource persons, professionals and other personnel
determined by it as necessary to carry out its mandate;
j) Promulgate its rules and regulations or rules of procedure it deems necessary to effectively and
efficiently carry out the objectives of this Executive Order and to ensure the orderly conduct of its
investigations, proceedings and hearings, including the presentation of evidence;
k) Exercise such other acts incident to or are appropriate and necessary in connection with the
objectives and purposes of this Order.
SECTION 3. Staffing Requirements. " x x x.
SECTION 4. Detail of Employees. " x x x.
SECTION 5. Engagement of Experts. " x x x
SECTION 6. Conduct of Proceedings. " x x x.
SECTION 7. Right to Counsel of Witnesses/Resource Persons. " x x x.
SECTION 8. Protection of Witnesses/Resource Persons. " x x x.

SECTION 9. Refusal to Obey Subpoena, Take Oath or Give Testimony. " Any government official
or personnel who, without lawful excuse, fails to appear upon subpoena issued by the Commission
or who, appearing before the Commission refuses to take oath or affirmation, give testimony or
produce documents for inspection, when required, shall be subject to administrative disciplinary
action. Any private person who does the same may be dealt with in accordance with law.
SECTION 10. Duty to Extend Assistance to the Commission. " x x x.
SECTION 11. Budget for the Commission. " The Office of the President shall provide the
necessary funds for the Commission to ensure that it can exercise its powers, execute its functions,
and perform its duties and responsibilities as effectively, efficiently, and expeditiously as possible.
SECTION 12. Office. " x x x.
SECTION 13. Furniture/Equipment. " x x x.
SECTION 14. Term of the Commission. " The Commission shall accomplish its mission on or
before December 31, 2012.
SECTION 15. Publication of Final Report. " x x x.
SECTION 16. Transfer of Records and Facilities of the Commission. " x x x.
SECTION 17. Special Provision Concerning Mandate. If and when in the judgment of the President
there is a need to expand the mandate of the Commission as defined in Section 1 hereof to include
the investigation of cases and instances of graft and corruption during the prior administrations,
such mandate may be so extended accordingly by way of a supplemental Executive Order.
SECTION 18. Separability Clause. If any provision of this Order is declared unconstitutional, the
same shall not affect the validity and effectivity of the other provisions hereof.
SECTION 19. Effectivity. " This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.
DONE in the City of Manila, Philippines, this 30th day of July 2010.
(SGD.) BENIGNO S. AQUINO III
By the President:
(SGD.) PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.
Executive Secretary
Nature of the Truth Commission
As can be gleaned from the above-quoted provisions, the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is a
mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate
reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their coprincipals, accomplices and accessories during the previous administration, and thereafter to
submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. Though it
has been described as an "independent collegial body," it is essentially an entity within the Office of
the President Proper and subject to his control. Doubtless, it constitutes a public office, as an ad hoc
body is one.8
To accomplish its task, the PTC shall have all the powers of an investigative body under Section 37,
Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987. It is not, however, a quasi-judicial body as it
cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes between contending
parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make
recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt,
much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts
if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law. Needless to
state, it cannot impose criminal, civil or administrative penalties or sanctions.
The PTC is different from the truth commissions in other countries which have been created as
official, transitory and non-judicial fact-finding bodies "to establish the facts and context of serious

violations of human rights or of international humanitarian law in a country's past."9 They are
usually established by states emerging from periods of internal unrest, civil strife or
authoritarianism to serve as mechanisms for transitional justice.
Truth commissions have been described as bodies that share the following characteristics: (1) they
examine only past events; (2) they investigate patterns of abuse committed over a period of time,
as opposed to a particular event; (3) they are temporary bodies that finish their work with the
submission of a report containing conclusions and recommendations; and (4) they are officially
sanctioned, authorized or empowered by the State.10 "Commission's members are usually
empowered to conduct research, support victims, and propose policy recommendations to prevent
recurrence of crimes. Through their investigations, the commissions may aim to discover and learn
more about past abuses, or formally acknowledge them. They may aim to prepare the way for
prosecutions and recommend institutional reforms."11
Thus, their main goals range from retribution to reconciliation. The Nuremburg and Tokyo war crime
tribunals are examples of a retributory or vindicatory body set up to try and punish those
responsible for crimes against humanity. A form of a reconciliatory tribunal is the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, the principal function of which was to heal the wounds of
past violence and to prevent future conflict by providing a cathartic experience for victims.
The PTC is a far cry from South Africa's model. The latter placed more emphasis on reconciliation
than on judicial retribution, while the marching order of the PTC is the identification and punishment
of perpetrators. As one writer12 puts it:
The order ruled out reconciliation. It translated the Draconian code spelled out by Aquino in his
inaugural speech: "To those who talk about reconciliation, if they mean that they would like us to
simply forget about the wrongs that they have committed in the past, we have this to say: There
can be no reconciliation without justice. When we allow crimes to go unpunished, we give consent
to their occurring over and over again."
The Thrusts of the Petitions
Barely a month after the issuance of Executive Order No. 1, the petitioners asked the Court to
declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its functions. A perusal of the
arguments of the petitioners in both cases shows that they are essentially the same. The
petitioners-legislators summarized them in the following manner:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates the separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create
a public office and appropriate funds for its operation.
(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot
legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the
Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to
create an entirely new public office which was hitherto inexistent like the "Truth Commission."
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and pertinent statutes when it vested the "Truth
Commission" with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of the
Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution and the Department of Justice created under the
Administrative Code of 1987.
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and
prosecution officials and personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar
species even as it excludes those of the other administrations, past and present, who may be
indictable.
(e) The creation of the "Philippine Truth Commission of 2010" violates the consistent and general
international practice of four decades wherein States constitute truth commissions to exclusively
investigate human rights violations, which customary practice forms part of the generally accepted
principles of international law which the Philippines is mandated to adhere to pursuant to the
Declaration of Principles enshrined in the Constitution.
(f) The creation of the "Truth Commission" is an exercise in futility, an adventure in partisan
hostility, a launching pad for trial/conviction by publicity and a mere populist propaganda to
mistakenly impress the people that widespread poverty will altogether vanish if corruption is

eliminated without even addressing the other major causes of poverty.

(g) The mere fact that previous commissions were not constitutionally challenged is of no moment
because neither laches nor estoppel can bar an eventual question on the constitutionality and
validity of an executive issuance or even a statute."13
In their Consolidated Comment,14 the respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), essentially questioned the legal standing of petitioners and defended the assailed executive
order with the following arguments:
1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress to create a public office because the
President's executive power and power of control necessarily include the inherent power to conduct
investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed and that, in any event, the Constitution,
Revised Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. No. 292), 15 Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 141616 (as
amended by P.D. No. 1772), R.A. No. 9970,17 and settled jurisprudence that authorize the President
to create or form such bodies.
2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is no
appropriation but a mere allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress.
3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the Office of the
Ombudsman (Ombudsman) and the Department of Justice (DOJ), because it is a fact-finding body
and not a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or erode the latter's
jurisdiction.
4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was validly created
for laudable purposes.
The OSG then points to the continued existence and validity of other executive orders and
presidential issuances creating similar bodies to justify the creation of the PTC such as Presidential
Complaint and Action Commission (PCAC) by President Ramon B. Magsaysay, Presidential
Committee on Administrative Performance Efficiency (PCAPE) by President Carlos P. Garcia and
Presidential Agency on Reform and Government Operations (PARGO) by President Ferdinand E.
Marcos.18
From the petitions, pleadings, transcripts, and memoranda, the following are the principal issues to
be resolved:
1. Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing to file their respective petitions and
question Executive Order No. 1;
2. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping
the powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and
commissions;
3. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal protection clause; and
5. Whether or not petitioners are entitled to injunctive relief.
Essential requisites for judicial review
Before proceeding to resolve the issue of the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1, the Court
needs to ascertain whether the requisites for a valid exercise of its power of judicial review are
present.
Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the power of judicial review is subject to
limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial
power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the
subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the
question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.19

Among all these limitations, only the legal standing of the petitioners has been put at issue.
Legal Standing of the Petitioners
The OSG attacks the legal personality of the petitioners-legislators to file their petition for failure to
demonstrate their personal stake in the outcome of the case. It argues that the petitioners have not
shown that they have sustained or are in danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to
the creation of the PTC. Not claiming to be the subject of the commission's investigations,
petitioners will not sustain injury in its creation or as a result of its proceedings.20
The Court disagrees with the OSG in questioning the legal standing of the petitioners-legislators to
assail Executive Order No. 1. Evidently, their petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of
the Congress as a body to which they belong as members. This certainly justifies their resolve to
take the cudgels for Congress as an institution and present the complaints on the usurpation of
their power and rights as members of the legislature before the Court. As held in Philippine
Constitution Association v. Enriquez,21
To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since
his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.
An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but
nonetheless substantial injury, which can be questioned by a member of Congress. In such a case,
any member of Congress can have a resort to the courts.
Indeed, legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges
vested by the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the
validity of any official action which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.22
With regard to Biraogo, the OSG argues that, as a taxpayer, he has no standing to question the
creation of the PTC and the budget for its operations.23 It emphasizes that the funds to be used for
the creation and operation of the commission are to be taken from those funds already
appropriated by Congress. Thus, the allocation and disbursement of funds for the commission will
not entail congressional action but will simply be an exercise of the President's power over
contingent funds.
As correctly pointed out by the OSG, Biraogo has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of
sustaining, any personal and direct injury attributable to the implementation of Executive Order No.
1. Nowhere in his petition is an assertion of a clear right that may justify his clamor for the Court to
exercise judicial power and to wield the axe over presidential issuances in defense of the
Constitution. The case of David v. Arroyo24 explained the deep-seated rules on locus standi. Thus:
Locus standi is defined as "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question." In
private suits, standing is governed by the "real-parties-in interest" rule as contained in Section 2,
Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It provides that "every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest." Accordingly, the "real-party-in
interest" is "the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit." Succinctly put, the plaintiff's standing is based on his own right to
the relief sought.
The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a
"public right" in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the
general public. He may be a person who is affected no differently from any other person. He could
be suing as a "stranger," or in the category of a "citizen," or 'taxpayer." In either case, he has to
adequately show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. In other words, he has to make out a
sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a "citizen" or
"taxpayer.
Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both "citizen" and "taxpayer" standing in public actions.
The distinction was first laid down in Beauchamp v. Silk, where it was held that the plaintiff in a
taxpayer's suit is in a different category from the plaintiff in a citizen's suit. In the former, the
plaintiff is affected by the expenditure of public funds, while in the latter, he is but the mere
instrument of the public concern. As held by the New York Supreme Court in People ex rel Case v.
Collins: "In matter of mere public right, however...the people are the real parties...It is at least the

right, if not the duty, of every citizen to interfere and see that a public offence be properly pursued
and punished, and that a public grievance be remedied." With respect to taxpayer's suits, Terr v.
Jordan held that "the right of a citizen and a taxpayer to maintain an action in courts to restrain the
unlawful use of public funds to his injury cannot be denied."
However, to prevent just about any person from seeking judicial interference in any official policy or
act with which he disagreed with, and thus hinders the activities of governmental agencies engaged
in public service, the United State Supreme Court laid down the more stringent "direct injury" test in
Ex Parte Levitt, later reaffirmed in Tileston v. Ullman. The same Court ruled that for a private
individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of an executive or legislative action,
he must show that he has sustained a direct injury as a result of that action, and it is not sufficient
that he has a general interest common to all members of the public.
This Court adopted the "direct injury" test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held that the
person who impugns the validity of a statute must have "a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result." The Vera doctrine was
upheld in a litany of cases, such as, Custodio v. President of the Senate, Manila Race Horse Trainers'
Association v. De la Fuente, Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works and Anti-Chinese League of the
Philippines v. Felix. [Emphases included. Citations omitted]
Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a matter of
procedure, hence, can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and
legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental
importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest."25
Thus, in Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres,26 the Court held that in cases of paramount
importance where serious constitutional questions are involved, the standing requirements may be
relaxed and a suit may be allowed to prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party
claiming the right of judicial review. In the first Emergency Powers Cases,27 ordinary citizens and
taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive orders although they
had only an indirect and general interest shared in common with the public.
The OSG claims that the determinants of transcendental importance28 laid down in CREBA v. ERC
and Meralco29 are non-existent in this case. The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogo's assertion
that the petition covers matters of transcendental importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction
by the Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the attention of this
Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Where the issues are of
transcendental and paramount importance not only to the public but also to the Bench and the Bar,
they should be resolved for the guidance of all.30 Undoubtedly, the Filipino people are more than
interested to know the status of the President's first effort to bring about a promised change to the
country. The Court takes cognizance of the petition not due to overwhelming political undertones
that clothe the issue in the eyes of the public, but because the Court stands firm in its oath to
perform its constitutional duty to settle legal controversies with overreaching significance to
society.
Power of the President to Create the Truth Commission
In his memorandum in G.R. No. 192935, Biraogo asserts that the Truth Commission is a public office
and not merely an adjunct body of the Office of the President.31 Thus, in order that the President
may create a public office he must be empowered by the Constitution, a statute or an authorization
vested in him by law. According to petitioner, such power cannot be presumed32 since there is no
provision in the Constitution or any specific law that authorizes the President to create a truth
commission.33 He adds that Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987, granting the President
the continuing authority to reorganize his office, cannot serve as basis for the creation of a truth
commission considering the aforesaid provision merely uses verbs such as "reorganize," "transfer,"
"consolidate," "merge," and "abolish."34 Insofar as it vests in the President the plenary power to
reorganize the Office of the President to the extent of creating a public office, Section 31 is
inconsistent with the principle of separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution and must be
deemed repealed upon the effectivity thereof.35
Similarly, in G.R. No. 193036, petitioners-legislators argue that the creation of a public office lies
within the province of Congress and not with the executive branch of government. They maintain
that the delegated authority of the President to reorganize under Section 31 of the Revised
Administrative Code: 1) does not permit the President to create a public office, much less a truth

commission; 2) is limited to the reorganization of the administrative structure of the Office of the
President; 3) is limited to the restructuring of the internal organs of the Office of the President
Proper, transfer of functions and transfer of agencies; and 4) only to achieve simplicity, economy
and efficiency.36 Such continuing authority of the President to reorganize his office is limited, and
by issuing Executive Order No. 1, the President overstepped the limits of this delegated authority.
The OSG counters that there is nothing exclusively legislative about the creation by the President of
a fact-finding body such as a truth commission. Pointing to numerous offices created by past
presidents, it argues that the authority of the President to create public offices within the Office of
the President Proper has long been recognized.37 According to the OSG, the Executive, just like the
other two branches of government, possesses the inherent authority to create fact-finding
committees to assist it in the performance of its constitutionally mandated functions and in the
exercise of its administrative functions.38 This power, as the OSG explains it, is but an adjunct of
the plenary powers wielded by the President under Section 1 and his power of control under Section
17, both of Article VII of the Constitution.39
It contends that the President is necessarily vested with the power to conduct fact-finding
investigations, pursuant to his duty to ensure that all laws are enforced by public officials and
employees of his department and in the exercise of his authority to assume directly the functions of
the executive department, bureau and office, or interfere with the discretion of his officials.40 The
power of the President to investigate is not limited to the exercise of his power of control over his
subordinates in the executive branch, but extends further in the exercise of his other powers, such
as his power to discipline subordinates,41 his power for rule making, adjudication and licensing
purposes42 and in order to be informed on matters which he is entitled to know.43
The OSG also cites the recent case of Banda v. Ermita,44 where it was held that the President has
the power to reorganize the offices and agencies in the executive department in line with his
constitutionally granted power of control and by virtue of a valid delegation of the legislative power
to reorganize executive offices under existing statutes.
Thus, the OSG concludes that the power of control necessarily includes the power to create offices.
For the OSG, the President may create the PTC in order to, among others, put a closure to the
reported large scale graft and corruption in the government.45
The question, therefore, before the Court is this: Does the creation of the PTC fall within the ambit
of the power to reorganize as expressed in Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code? Section
31 contemplates "reorganization" as limited by the following functional and structural lines: (1)
restructuring the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper by abolishing,
consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another; (2)
transferring any function under the Office of the President to any other Department/Agency or vice
versa; or (3) transferring any agency under the Office of the President to any other
Department/Agency or vice versa. Clearly, the provision refers to reduction of personnel,
consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions.
These point to situations where a body or an office is already existent but a modification or
alteration thereof has to be effected. The creation of an office is nowhere mentioned, much less
envisioned in said provision. Accordingly, the answer to the question is in the negative.
To say that the PTC is borne out of a restructuring of the Office of the President under Section 31 is
a misplaced supposition, even in the plainest meaning attributable to the term "restructure""
an "alteration of an existing structure." Evidently, the PTC was not part of the structure of the Office
of the President prior to the enactment of Executive Order No. 1. As held in Buklod ng Kawaning
EIIB v. Hon. Executive Secretary,46
But of course, the list of legal basis authorizing the President to reorganize any department or
agency in the executive branch does not have to end here. We must not lose sight of the very
source of the power " that which constitutes an express grant of power. Under Section 31,
Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987), "the
President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy
and efficiency, shall have the continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the
Office of the President." For this purpose, he may transfer the functions of other Departments or
Agencies to the Office of the President. In Canonizado v. Aguirre [323 SCRA 312 (2000)], we ruled
that reorganization "involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition
thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions." It takes place when there is an
alteration of the existing structure of government offices or units therein, including the lines of

control, authority and responsibility between them. The EIIB is a bureau attached to the
Department of Finance. It falls under the Office of the President. Hence, it is subject to the
President's continuing authority to reorganize. [Emphasis Supplied]
In the same vein, the creation of the PTC is not justified by the President's power of control. Control
is essentially the power to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done
in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former with that of the
latter.47 Clearly, the power of control is entirely different from the power to create public offices.
The former is inherent in the Executive, while the latter finds basis from either a valid delegation
from Congress, or his inherent duty to faithfully execute the laws.
The question is this, is there a valid delegation of power from Congress, empowering the President
to create a public office?
According to the OSG, the power to create a truth commission pursuant to the above provision finds
statutory basis under P.D. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772.48 The said law granted the
President the continuing authority to reorganize the national government, including the power to
group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and
classify functions, services and activities, transfer appropriations, and to standardize salaries and
materials. This decree, in relation to Section 20, Title I, Book III of E.O. 292 has been invoked in
several cases such as Larin v. Executive Secretary.49
The Court, however, declines to recognize P.D. No. 1416 as a justification for the President to create
a public office. Said decree is already stale, anachronistic and inoperable. P.D. No. 1416 was a
delegation to then President Marcos of the authority to reorganize the administrative structure of
the national government including the power to create offices and transfer appropriations pursuant
to one of the purposes of the decree, embodied in its last "Whereas" clause:
WHEREAS, the transition towards the parliamentary form of government will necessitate flexibility
in the organization of the national government.
Clearly, as it was only for the purpose of providing manageability and resiliency during the interim,
P.D. No. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772, became functus oficio upon the convening of the First
Congress, as expressly provided in Section 6, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. In fact, even the
Solicitor General agrees with this view. Thus:
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: Because P.D. 1416 was enacted was the last whereas clause of P.D.
1416 says "it was enacted to prepare the transition from presidential to parliamentary. Now, in a
parliamentary form of government, the legislative and executive powers are fused, correct?
SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ: Yes, Your Honor.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: That is why, that P.D. 1416 was issued. Now would you agree with me
that P.D. 1416 should not be considered effective anymore upon the promulgation, adoption,
ratification of the 1987 Constitution.
SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ: Not the whole of P.D. [No.] 1416, Your Honor.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: The power of the President to reorganize the entire National
Government is deemed repealed, at least, upon the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, correct.
SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ: Yes, Your Honor.50
While the power to create a truth commission cannot pass muster on the basis of P.D. No. 1416 as
amended by P.D. No. 1772, the creation of the PTC finds justification under Section 17, Article VII of
the Constitution, imposing upon the President the duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully
executed. Section 17 reads:
Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices.
He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. (Emphasis supplied).
As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the allocation of power in the three principal branches
of government is a grant of all powers inherent in them. The President's power to conduct
investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws " in this case, fundamental

laws on public accountability and transparency " is inherent in the President's powers as the
Chief Executive. That the authority of the President to conduct investigations and to create bodies
to execute this power is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes does not mean
that he is bereft of such authority.51 As explained in the landmark case of Marcos v. Manglapus:52
x x x. The 1987 Constitution, however, brought back the presidential system of government and
restored the separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers by their actual distribution
among three distinct branches of government with provision for checks and balances.
It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power" is the power to enforce the laws,
for the President is head of state as well as head of government and whatever powers inhere in
such positions pertain to the office unless the Constitution itself withholds it. Furthermore, the
Constitution itself provides that the execution of the laws is only one of the powers of the President.
It also grants the President other powers that do not involve the execution of any provision of law,
e.g., his power over the country's foreign relations.
On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the
exercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as
within the scope of "executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be
limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power
is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated.
It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative
nor judicial has to be executive. x x x.
Indeed, the Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. As
stated above, the powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers under the
Constitution.53 One of the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this
constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the
obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully executed. Thus, in
Department of Health v. Camposano,54 the authority of the President to issue Administrative Order
No. 298, creating an investigative committee to look into the administrative charges filed against
the employees of the Department of Health for the anomalous purchase of medicines was upheld.
In said case, it was ruled:
The Chief Executive's power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted.
Having been constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to which
respondents belong, the President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and
employees faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the investigation
is sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact that the investigating team and the PCAGC had
the same composition, or that the former used the offices and facilities of the latter in conducting
the inquiry. [Emphasis supplied]
It should be stressed that the purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an
inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and
guided in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the
land. And if history is to be revisited, this was also the objective of the investigative bodies created
in the past like the PCAC, PCAPE, PARGO, the Feliciano Commission, the Melo Commission and the
Zenarosa Commission. There being no changes in the government structure, the Court is not
inclined to declare such executive power as non-existent just because the direction of the political
winds have changed.
On the charge that Executive Order No. 1 transgresses the power of Congress to appropriate funds
for the operation of a public office, suffice it to say that there will be no appropriation but only an
allotment or allocations of existing funds already appropriated. Accordingly, there is no usurpation
on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. Further, there is no
need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the commission because, in the
words of the Solicitor General, "whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the
President will be the very source of the funds for the commission."55 Moreover, since the amount
that would be allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations, there
is no impropriety in the funding.
Power of the Truth Commission to Investigate

The President's power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed is well
recognized. It flows from the faithful-execution clause of the Constitution under Article VII, Section
17 thereof.56 As the Chief Executive, the president represents the government as a whole and sees
to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department. He has the
authority to directly assume the functions of the executive department.57
Invoking this authority, the President constituted the PTC to primarily investigate reports of graft
and corruption and to recommend the appropriate action. As previously stated, no quasi-judicial
powers have been vested in the said body as it cannot adjudicate rights of persons who come
before it. It has been said that "Quasi-judicial powers involve the power to hear and determine
questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the
standards laid down by law itself in enforcing and administering the same law."58 In simpler terms,
judicial discretion is involved in the exercise of these quasi-judicial power, such that it is exclusively
vested in the judiciary and must be clearly authorized by the legislature in the case of
administrative agencies.
The distinction between the power to investigate and the power to adjudicate was delineated by
the Court in Cario v. Commission on Human Rights.59 Thus:
"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into,
research on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire
into systematically: "to search or inquire into: x x to subject to an official probe x x: to conduct an
official inquiry." The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain
information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a
controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts established by
the inquiry.
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient
inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and
accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to
inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn described as "(a)n administrative
function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; x x
an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain
matter or matters."
"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide,
determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights
and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: x x to pass judgment on:
settle judicially: x x act as judge." And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with
judicial or quasi-judicial powers: x x to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy x x."
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine
finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on
judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. x x. Implies a judicial
determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment." [Italics included. Citations Omitted]
Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice,
or even a quasi-judicial agency or office. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining
therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function. To be considered as such, the act of
receiving evidence and arriving at factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the
authority of applying the law to the factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be
decided or resolved authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to appeals or modes of review
as may be provided by law.60 Even respondents themselves admit that the commission is bereft of
any quasi-judicial power.61
Contrary to petitioners' apprehension, the PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or
erode their respective powers. If at all, the investigative function of the commission will
complement those of the two offices. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, the recommendation
to prosecute is but a consequence of the overall task of the commission to conduct a fact-finding
investigation."62 The actual prosecution of suspected offenders, much less adjudication on the
merits of the charges against them,63 is certainly not a function given to the commission. The
phrase, "when in the course of its investigation," under Section 2(g), highlights this fact and gives
credence to a contrary interpretation from that of the petitioners. The function of determining
probable cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be with the

DOJ and the Ombudsman.64

At any rate, the Ombudsman's power to investigate under R.A. No. 6770 is not exclusive but is
shared with other similarly authorized government agencies. Thus, in the case of Ombudsman v.
Galicia,65 it was written:
This power of investigation granted to the Ombudsman by the 1987 Constitution and The
Ombudsman Act is not exclusive but is shared with other similarly authorized government agencies
such as the PCGG and judges of municipal trial courts and municipal circuit trial courts. The power
to conduct preliminary investigation on charges against public employees and officials is likewise
concurrently shared with the Department of Justice. Despite the passage of the Local Government
Code in 1991, the Ombudsman retains concurrent jurisdiction with the Office of the President and
the local Sanggunians to investigate complaints against local elective officials. [Emphasis
supplied].
Also, Executive Order No. 1 cannot contravene the power of the Ombudsman to investigate criminal
cases under Section 15 (1) of R.A. No. 6770, which states:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any
public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and,
in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory
agency of government, the investigation of such cases. [Emphases supplied]
The act of investigation by the Ombudsman as enunciated above contemplates the conduct of a
preliminary investigation or the determination of the existence of probable cause. This is
categorically out of the PTC's sphere of functions. Its power to investigate is limited to obtaining
facts so that it can advise and guide the President in the performance of his duties relative to the
execution and enforcement of the laws of the land. In this regard, the PTC commits no act of
usurpation of the Ombudsman's primordial duties.
The same holds true with respect to the DOJ. Its authority under Section 3 (2), Chapter 1, Title III,
Book IV in the Revised Administrative Code is by no means exclusive and, thus, can be shared with
a body likewise tasked to investigate the commission of crimes.
Finally, nowhere in Executive Order No. 1 can it be inferred that the findings of the PTC are to be
accorded conclusiveness. Much like its predecessors, the Davide Commission, the Feliciano
Commission and the Zenarosa Commission, its findings would, at best, be recommendatory in
nature. And being so, the Ombudsman and the DOJ have a wider degree of latitude to decide
whether or not to reject the recommendation. These offices, therefore, are not deprived of their
mandated duties but will instead be aided by the reports of the PTC for possible indictments for
violations of graft laws.
Violation of the Equal Protection Clause
Although the purpose of the Truth Commission falls within the investigative power of the President,
the Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its
apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of
Rights) of the 1987 Constitution. Section 1 reads:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor
shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
The petitioners assail Executive Order No. 1 because it is violative of this constitutional safeguard.
They contend that it does not apply equally to all members of the same class such that the intent of
singling out the "previous administration" as its sole object makes the PTC an "adventure in
partisan hostility."66 Thus, in order to be accorded with validity, the commission must also cover
reports of graft and corruption in virtually all administrations previous to that of former President
Arroyo.67
The petitioners argue that the search for truth behind the reported cases of graft and corruption
must encompass acts committed not only during the administration of former President Arroyo but
also during prior administrations where the "same magnitude of controversies and anomalies"68
were reported to have been committed against the Filipino people. They assail the classification

formulated by the respondents as it does not fall under the recognized exceptions because first,
"there is no substantial distinction between the group of officials targeted for investigation by
Executive Order No. 1 and other groups or persons who abused their public office for personal gain;
and second, the selective classification is not germane to the purpose of Executive Order No. 1 to
end corruption."69 In order to attain constitutional permission, the petitioners advocate that the
commission should deal with "graft and grafters prior and subsequent to the Arroyo administration
with the strong arm of the law with equal force."70
Position of respondents
According to respondents, while Executive Order No. 1 identifies the "previous administration" as
the initial subject of the investigation, following Section 17 thereof, the PTC will not confine itself to
cases of large scale graft and corruption solely during the said administration.71 Assuming
arguendo that the commission would confine its proceedings to officials of the previous
administration, the petitioners argue that no offense is committed against the equal protection
clause for "the segregation of the transactions of public officers during the previous administration
as possible subjects of investigation is a valid classification based on substantial distinctions and is
germane to the evils which the Executive Order seeks to correct."72 To distinguish the Arroyo
administration from past administrations, it recited the following:
First. E.O. No. 1 was issued in view of widespread reports of large scale graft and corruption in the
previous administration which have eroded public confidence in public institutions. There is,
therefore, an urgent call for the determination of the truth regarding certain reports of large scale
graft and corruption in the government and to put a closure to them by the filing of the appropriate
cases against those involved, if warranted, and to deter others from committing the evil, restore the
people's faith and confidence in the Government and in their public servants.
Second. The segregation of the preceding administration as the object of fact-finding is warranted
by the reality that unlike with administrations long gone, the current administration will most likely
bear the immediate consequence of the policies of the previous administration.
Third. The classification of the previous administration as a separate class for investigation lies in
the reality that the evidence of possible criminal activity, the evidence that could lead to recovery
of public monies illegally dissipated, the policy lessons to be learned to ensure that anti-corruption
laws are faithfully executed, are more easily established in the regime that immediately precede
the current administration.
Fourth. Many administrations subject the transactions of their predecessors to investigations to
provide closure to issues that are pivotal to national life or even as a routine measure of due
diligence and good housekeeping by a nascent administration like the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG), created by the late President Corazon C. Aquino under Executive Order
No. 1 to pursue the recovery of ill-gotten wealth of her predecessor former President Ferdinand
Marcos and his cronies, and the Saguisag Commission created by former President Joseph Estrada
under Administrative Order No, 53, to form an ad-hoc and independent citizens' committee to
investigate all the facts and circumstances surrounding "Philippine Centennial projects" of his
predecessor, former President Fidel V. Ramos.73 [Emphases supplied]
Concept of the Equal Protection Clause
One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the equality of right
which is embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The equal protection of the laws
is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements
of justice and fair play. It has been embodied in a separate clause, however, to provide for a more
specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government.
Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the
particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut
it down is the equal protection clause.74
"According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed."75 It "requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a
similar manner."76 "The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a
state's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the
express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the state's duly constituted

authorities."77 "In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to
govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that
are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective."78
The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature.79
Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the government including the political and executive
departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws, through
whatever agency or whatever guise is taken. 80
It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without
distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification,
however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The
classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is
not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.81 "Superficial differences do not make for a
valid classification."82
For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all
persons who naturally belong to the class.83 "The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the
members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.
It is not necessary that the classification be made with absolute symmetry, in the sense that the
members of the class should possess the same characteristics in equal degree. Substantial
similarity will suffice; and as long as this is achieved, all those covered by the classification are to
be treated equally. The mere fact that an individual belonging to a class differs from the other
members, as long as that class is substantially distinguishable from all others, does not justify the
non-application of the law to him."84
The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to
preclude addition to the number included in the class. It must be of such a nature as to embrace all
those who may thereafter be in similar circumstances and conditions. It must not leave out or
"underinclude" those that should otherwise fall into a certain classification. As elucidated in
Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union85 and reiterated in a long line of cases,86
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the
laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the
constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected
alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on
persons merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It
guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things which are
different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause does
not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is
limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law,
as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or
practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of
simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying
that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is
required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should
be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences, that it must be germane to the
purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply
equally to each member of the class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the
classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably
arbitrary. [Citations omitted]

Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the
equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find
out the truth "concerning the reported cases of graft and corrupti
during the previous administration"87 only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and
manifest. Mention of it has been made in at least three portions of the questioned executive order. Specifically, these
are:

WHEREAS, there is a need for a separate body dedicated solely to investigating and finding out the truth concerning
the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration, and which will recommend the
prosecution of the offenders and secure justice for all;
SECTION 1. Creation of a Commission. " There is hereby created the PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION,
hereinafter referred to as the "COMMISSION," which shall primarily seek and find the truth on, and toward this
end, investigate reports of graft and corruption of such scale and magnitude that shock and offend the moral
and ethical sensibilities of the people, committed by public officers and employees, their co-principals,
accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous administration; and thereafter
recommend the appropriate action or measure to be taken thereon to ensure that the full measure of justice
shall be served without fear or favor.
SECTION 2. Powers and Functions. " The Commission, which shall have all the powers of an investigative
body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, is primarily tasked to conduct a
thorough fact-finding investigation of reported cases of graft and corruption referred to in Section 1, involving
third level public officers and higher, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if
any, during the previous administration and thereafter submit its finding and recommendations to the President,
Congress and the Ombudsman. [Emphases supplied]
In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a
class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated
constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation
clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution.
Though the OSG enumerates several differences between the Arroyo administration and other past
administrations, these distinctions are not substantial enough to merit the restriction of the investigation to the
"previous administration" only. The reports of widespread corruption in the Arroyo administration cannot be
taken as basis for distinguishing said administration from earlier administrations which were also blemished by
similar widespread reports of impropriety. They are not inherent in, and do not inure solely to, the Arroyo
administration. As Justice Isagani Cruz put it, "Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification."88
The public needs to be enlightened why Executive Order No. 1 chooses to limit the scope of the intended
investigation to the previous administration only. The OSG ventures to opine that "to include other past
administrations, at this point, may unnecessarily overburden the commission and lead it to lose its
effectiveness."89 The reason given is specious. It is without doubt irrelevant to the legitimate and noble
objective of the PTC to stamp out or "end corruption and the evil it breeds."90
The probability that there would be difficulty in unearthing evidence or that the earlier reports involving the
earlier administrations were already inquired into is beside the point. Obviously, deceased presidents and cases
which have already prescribed can no longer be the subjects of inquiry by the PTC. Neither is the PTC expected
to conduct simultaneous investigations of previous administrations, given the body's limited time and resources.
"The law does not require the impossible" (Lex non cogit ad impossibilia).91
Given the foregoing physical and legal impossibility, the Court logically recognizes the unfeasibility of
investigating almost a century's worth of graft cases. However, the fact remains that Executive Order No. 1
suffers from arbitrary classification. The PTC, to be true to its mandate of searching for the truth, must not
exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the authority to investigate all past
administrations. While reasonable prioritization is permitted, it should not be arbitrary lest it be struck down for
being unconstitutional. In the often quoted language of Yick Wo v. Hopkins,92
Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if applied and administered by public
authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations
between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the
prohibition of the constitution. [Emphasis supplied]
It could be argued that considering that the PTC is an ad hoc body, its scope is limited. The Court, however, is of
the considered view that although its focus is restricted, the constitutional guarantee of equal protection under
the laws should not in any way be circumvented. The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the
nation to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights determined and all
public authority administered.93 Laws that do not conform to the Constitution should be stricken down for being
unconstitutional.94 While the thrust of the PTC is specific, that is, for investigation of acts of graft and
corruption, Executive Order No. 1, to survive, must be read together with the provisions of the Constitution. To

exclude the earlier administrations in the guise of "substantial distinctions" would only confirm the petitioners'
lament that the subject executive order is only an "adventure in partisan hostility." In the case of US v.
Cyprian,95 it was written: "A rather limited number of such classifications have routinely been held or assumed
to be arbitrary; those include: race, national origin, gender, political activity or membership in a political party,
union activity or membership in a labor union, or more generally the exercise of first amendment rights."
To reiterate, in order for a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace
all persons who naturally belong to the class.96 "Such a classification must not be based on existing
circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude additions to the number included within a class, but must
be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar circumstances and conditions.
Furthermore, all who are in situations and circumstances which are relative to the discriminatory legislation and
which are indistinguishable from those of the members of the class must be brought under the influence of the
law and treated by it in the same way as are the members of the class."97
The Court is not unaware that "mere underinclusiveness is not fatal to the validity of a law under the equal
protection clause."98 "Legislation is not unconstitutional merely because it is not all-embracing and does not
include all the evils within its reach."99 It has been written that a regulation challenged under the equal
protection clause is not devoid of a rational predicate simply because it happens to be incomplete.100 In several
instances, the underinclusiveness was not considered a valid reason to strike down a law or regulation where
the purpose can be attained in future legislations or regulations. These cases refer to the "step by step"
process.101 "With regard to equal protection claims, a legislature does not run the risk of losing the entire
remedial scheme simply because it fails, through inadvertence or otherwise, to cover every evil that might
conceivably have been attacked."102
In Executive Order No. 1, however, there is no inadvertence. That the previous administration was picked out
was deliberate and intentional as can be gleaned from the fact that it was underscored at least three times in
the assailed executive order. It must be noted that Executive Order No. 1 does not even mention any particular
act, event or report to be focused on unlike the investigative commissions created in the past. "The equal
protection clause is violated by purposeful and intentional discrimination."103
To disprove petitioners' contention that there is deliberate discrimination, the OSG clarifies that the commission
does not only confine itself to cases of large scale graft and corruption committed during the previous
administration.104 The OSG points to Section 17 of Executive Order No. 1, which provides:
SECTION 17. Special Provision Concerning Mandate. If and when in the judgment of the President there is a need
to expand the mandate of the Commission as defined in Section 1 hereof to include the investigation of cases
and instances of graft and corruption during the prior administrations, such mandate may be so extended
accordingly by way of a supplemental Executive Order.
The Court is not convinced. Although Section 17 allows the President the discretion to expand the scope of
investigations of the PTC so as to include the acts of graft and corruption committed in other past
administrations, it does not guarantee that they would be covered in the future. Such expanded mandate of the
commission will still depend on the whim and caprice of the President. If he would decide not to include them,
the section would then be meaningless. This will only fortify the fears of the petitioners that the Executive Order
No. 1 was "crafted to tailor-fit the prosecution of officials and personalities of the Arroyo administration."105
The Court tried to seek guidance from the pronouncement in the case of Virata v. Sandiganbayan,106 that the
"PCGG Charter (composed of Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2 and 14) does not violate the equal protection clause."
The decision, however, was devoid of any discussion on how such conclusory statement was arrived at, the
principal issue in said case being only the sufficiency of a cause of action.
A final word
The issue that seems to take center stage at present is - whether or not the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its
constitutionally mandated power of Judicial Review with respect to recent initiatives of the legislature and the
executive department, is exercising undue interference. Is the Highest Tribunal, which is expected to be the
protector of the Constitution, itself guilty of violating fundamental tenets like the doctrine of separation of
powers? Time and again, this issue has been addressed by the Court, but it seems that the present political
situation calls for it to once again explain the legal basis of its action lest it continually be accused of being a
hindrance to the nation's thrust to progress.
The Philippine Supreme Court, according to Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, is vested with Judicial
Power that "includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave of abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government."
Furthermore, in Section 4(2) thereof, it is vested with the power of judicial review which is the power to declare
a treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation unconstitutional. This power also includes the duty to rule on the constitutionality of the
application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other
regulations. These provisions, however, have been fertile grounds of conflict between the Supreme Court, on
one hand, and the two co-equal bodies of government, on the other. Many times the Court has been accused of
asserting superiority over the other departments.
To answer this accusation, the words of Justice Laurel would be a good source of enlightenment, to wit: "And
when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the
other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the
solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority
under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument
secures and guarantees to them."107
Thus, the Court, in exercising its power of judicial review, is not imposing its own will upon a co-equal body but
rather simply making sure that any act of government is done in consonance with the authorities and rights
allocated to it by the Constitution. And, if after said review, the Court finds no constitutional violations of any
sort, then, it has no more authority of proscribing the actions under review. Otherwise, the Court will not be
deterred to pronounce said act as void and unconstitutional.
It cannot be denied that most government actions are inspired with noble intentions, all geared towards the
betterment of the nation and its people. But then again, it is important to remember this ethical principle: "The
end does not justify the means." No matter how noble and worthy of admiration the purpose of an act, but if the
means to be employed in accomplishing it is simply irreconcilable with constitutional parameters, then it cannot
still be allowed.108 The Court cannot just turn a blind eye and simply let it pass. It will continue to uphold the
Constitution and its enshrined principles.
"The Constitution must ever remain supreme. All must bow to the mandate of this law. Expediency must not be
allowed to sap its strength nor greed for power debase its rectitude."109
Lest it be misunderstood, this is not the death knell for a truth commission as nobly envisioned by the present
administration. Perhaps a revision of the executive issuance so as to include the earlier past administrations
would allow it to pass the test of reasonableness and not be an affront to the Constitution. Of all the branches of
the government, it is the judiciary which is the most interested in knowing the truth and so it will not allow itself
to be a hindrance or obstacle to its attainment. It must, however, be emphasized that the search for the truth
must be within constitutional bounds for "ours is still a government of laws and not of men."110
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar
as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
As also prayed for, the respondents are hereby ordered to cease and desist from carrying out the provisions of
Executive Order No. 1.
SO ORDERED.
BRIGIDO R. SIMON, JR., CARLOS QUIMPO, CARLITO ABELARDO, AND GENEROSO OCAMPO,
petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ROQUE FERMO, AND OTHERS AS JOHN DOES,
respondents.
G.R. No. 100150 | 1994-01-05
VITUG, J.:
The extent of the authority and power of the Commission on Human Rights ("CHR") is again placed into focus in
this petition for prohibition, with prayer for a restraining order and preliminary injunction. The petitioners ask us
to prohibit public respondent CHR from further hearing and investigating CHR Case No. 90 ----1580, entitled
"Fermo, et al. vs. Quimpo, et al."
The case all started when a "Demolition Notice," dated 9 July 1990, signed by Carlos Quimpo (one of the
petitioners) in his capacity as an Executive Officer of the Quezon City Integrated Hawkers Management Council
under the Office of the City Mayor, was sent to, and received by, the private respondents (being the officers and

members of the North Edsa Vendors Association, Incorporated). In said notice, the respondents were given a
grace-period of three (3) days (up to 12 July 1990) within which to vacate the questioned premises of North
EDSA. 1 Prior to their receipt of the demolition notice, the private respondents were informed by petitioner
Quimpo that their stalls should be removed to give way to the "People's Park". 2 On 12 July 1990, the group, led
by their President Roque Fermo, filed a letter-complaint (Pinag-samang Sinumpaang Salaysay) with the CHR
against the petitioners, asking the late CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista for a letter to be addressed to
then Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr., of Quezon City to stop the demolition of the private respondents' stalls, sari-sari
stores, and carinderia along North EDSA. The complaint was docketed as CHR Case No. 90-1580. 3 On 23 July
1990, the CHR issued an Order, directing the petitioners "to desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at
North EDSA pending resolution of the vendors/squatters' complaint before the Commission" and ordering said
petitioners to appear before the CHR. 4
On the basis of the sworn statements submitted by the private respondents on 31 July 1990, as well as CHR's
own ocular inspection, and convinced that on 28 July 1990 the petitioners carried out the demolition of private
respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia, 5 the CHR, in its resolution of 1 August 1990, ordered the
disbursement of financial assistance of not more than P200,000.00 in favor of the private respondents to
purchase light housing materials and food under the Commission's supervision and again directed the
petitioners to "desist from further demolition, with the warning that violation of said order would lead to a
citation for contempt and arrest." 6
A motion to dismiss, 7 dated 10 September 1990, questioned CHR's jurisdiction. The motion also averred,
among other things, that:
"1. this case came about due to the alleged violation by the (petitioners) of the Inter-Agency Memorandum of
Agreement whereby Metro-Manila Mayors agreed on a moratorium in the demolition of the dwellings of poor
dwellers in Metro-Manila;
"xxx xxx xxx
"3. . . ., a perusal of the said Agreement (revealed) that the moratorium referred to therein refers to moratorium
in the demolition of the structures of poor dwellers;
"4. that the complainants in this case (were) not poor dwellers but independent business entrepreneurs even
this Honorable Office admitted in its resolution of 1 August 1990 that the complainants are indeed, vendors;
"5. that the complainants (were) occupying government land, particularly the sidewalk of EDSA corner North
Avenue, Quezon City; . . . and
"6. that the City Mayor of Quezon City (had) the sole and exclusive discretion and authority whether or not a
certain business establishment (should) be allowed to operate within the jurisdiction of Quezon City, to revoke
or cancel a permit, if already issued, upon grounds clearly specified by law and ordinance. 8
During the 12 September 1990 hearing, the petitioners moved for postponement, arguing that the motion to
dismiss set for 21 September 1990 had yet to be resolved. The petitioners likewise manifested that they would
bring the case to the courts.
On 18 September 1990, a supplemental motion to dismiss was filed by the petitioners, stating that the
Commission's authority should be understood as being confined only to the investigation of violations of civil
and political rights, and that "the rights allegedly violated in this case (were) not civil and political rights, (but)
their privilege to engage in business." 9
On 21 September 1990, the motion to dismiss was heard and submitted for resolution, along with the contempt
charge that had meantime been filed by the private respondents, albeit vigorously objected to by petitioners (on
the ground that the motion to dismiss was still then unresolved). 10
In an Order, 11 dated 25 September 1990, the CHR cited the petitioners in contempt for carrying out the
demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia despite the "order to desist", and it imposed a fine of
P500.00 on each of them.
On 1 March 1991, 12 the CHR issued an Order, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss and supplemental motion
to dismiss, in this wise:
"Clearly, the Commission on Human Rights under its constitutional mandate had jurisdiction over the complaint
filed by the squatters-vendors who complained of the gross violations of their human and constitutional rights.

The motion to dismiss should be and hereby DENIED for lack of merit." 13
The CHR opined that "it was not the intention of the (Constitutional) Commission to create only a paper tiger
limited only to investigating civil and political rights, but it (should) be (considered) a quasi-judicial body with
the power to provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the
Philippines. . . ." It added:
"The right to earn a living is a right essential to one's right to development, to life and to dignity. All these
brazenly and violently ignored and trampled upon by respondents with little regard at the same time for the
basic rights of women and children, and their health, safety and welfare. Their actions have psychologically
scarred and traumatized the children, who were witness and exposed to such a violent demonstration of Man's
inhumanity to man."
In an Order, 14 dated 25 April 1991, petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied.
Hence, this recourse.
The petition was initially dismissed in our resolution 15 of 25 June 1991; it was subsequently reinstated,
however, in our resolution 16 of 18 June 1991, in which we also issued a temporary restraining order, directing
the CHR to "CEASE and DESIST from further hearing CHR No. 90-1580." 17
The petitioners pose the following:
Whether or not the public respondent has jurisdiction:
a) to investigate the alleged violations of the "business rights" of the private respondents whose stalls were
demolished by the petitioners at the instance and authority given by the Mayor of Quezon City;
b) to impose the fine of P500.00 each on the petitioners; and
c) to disburse the amount of P200,000.00 as financial aid to the vendors affected by the demolition.
In the Court's resolution of 10 October 1991, the Solicitor- General was excused from filing his comment for
public respondent CHR. The latter thus filed its own comment, 18 through Hon. Samuel Soriano, one of its
Commissioners. The Court also resolved to dispense with the comment of private respondent Roque Fermo, who
had since failed to comply with the resolution, dated 18 July 1991, requiring such comment.
The petition has merit.
The Commission on Human Rights was created by the 1987 Constitution. 19 It was formally constituted by then
President Corazon Aquino via Executive Order No. 163, 20 issued on 5 May 1987, in the exercise of her
legislative power at the time. It succeeded, but so superseded as well, the Presidential Committee on Human
Rights. 21
The powers and functions 22 of the Commission are defined by the 1987 Constitution, thus: to ---"(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and
political rights;
"(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in
accordance with the Rules of Court;
"(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines,
as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the
underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection;
"(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;
"(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance respect for the primacy
of human rights;
"(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide for compensation
to victims of violations of human rights, or their families;.

"(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on human rights;.
"(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or
other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under
its authority;
"(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions;.
"(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and
"(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law."
In its Order of 1 March 1991, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss, the CHR theorizes that the intention of the
members of the Constitutional Commission is to make CHR a quasi-judicial body. 23 This view, however, has not
heretofore been shared by this Court. In Cario v. Commission on Human Rights, 24 the Court, through then
Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, has observed that it is "only the first of the enumerated
powers and functions that bears any resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment," but that resemblance can in
no way be synonymous to the adjudicatory power itself. The Court explained:
". . . (T)he Commission on Human Rights . . . was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or
quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.
"The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate,
i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and
political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of
justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom
the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of
receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of
applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined
authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law.
This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have."
After thus laying down at the outset the above rule, we now proceed to the other kernel of this controversy and,
its is, to determine the extent of CHR's investigative power.
It can hardly be disputed that the phrase "human rights" is so generic a term that any attempt to define it,
albeit not a few have tried, could be at best be described as inconclusive. Let us observe. In a symposium on
human rights in the Philippines, sponsored by the University of the Philippines in 1977, one of the questions that
has been propounded is "(w)hat do you understand by 'human right'?" The participants, representing different
sectors of the society, have given the following varied answers:
"Human rights are the basic rights which inhere in man by virtue of his humanity. They are the same in all parts
of the world, whether in the Philippines or England, Kenya or the Soviet Union, the United States or Japan, Kenya
or Indonesia. . . .
"Human rights include civil rights, such as the right to life, liberty, and property; freedom of speech, of the
press, of religion, academic freedom, and the rights of the accused to due process of law; political rights, such
as the right to elect public officials, to be elected to public office, and to form political associations and engage
in politics; and social rights, such as the right to an education, employment, and social services." 25
"Human rights are the entitlement that inhere in the individual person from the sheer fact of his humanity. . . .
Because they are inherent, human rights are not granted by the State but can only be recognized and protected
by it." 26
"(Human rights include all) the civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights defined in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights." 27
"Human rights are rights that pertain to man simply because he is human. They are part of his natural birth
right, innate and inalienable." 28
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as, more specifically, the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, suggests that the
scope of human rights can be understood to include those that relate to an individual's social, economic,
cultural, political and civil relations. It thus seems to closely identify the term to the universally accepted traits

and attributes of an individual, along with what is generally considered to be his inherent and inalienable rights,
encompassing almost all aspects of life.
Have these broad concepts been equally contemplated by the framers of our 1986 Constitution Commission in
adopting the specific provisions on human rights and in creating an independent commission to safeguard these
rights? It may of value to look back at the country's experience under the martial law regime which may have, in
fact, impelled the inclusions of those provisions in our fundamental law. Many voices have been heard. Among
those voices, aptly represented perhaps of the sentiments expressed by others, comes from Mr. Justice J.B.L.
Reyes, a respected jurist and an advocate of civil liberties, who, in his paper, entitled "Present State of Human
Rights in the Philippines," 29 observes:
"But while the Constitution of 1935 and that of 1973 enshrined in their Bill of Rights most of the human rights
expressed in the International Covenant, these rights became unavailable upon the proclamation of Martial Law
on 21 September 1972. Arbitrary action then became the rule. Individuals by the thousands became subject to
arrest upon suspicion, and were detained and held for indefinite periods, sometimes for years, without charges,
until ordered released by the Commander-in-Chief or this representative. The right to petition for the redress of
grievances became useless, since group actions were forbidden. So were strikes. Press and other mass media
were subjected to censorship and short term licensing. Martial law brought with it the suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus, and judges lost independence and security of tenure, except members of the Supreme Court.
They were required to submit letters of resignation and were dismissed upon the acceptance thereof. Torture to
extort confessions were practiced as declared by international bodies like Amnesty International and the
International Commission of Jurists."
Converging our attention to the records of the Constitutional Commission, we can see the following discussions
during its 26 August 1986 deliberations:
"MR. GARCIA. . . ., the primacy of its (CHR) task must be made clear in view of the importance of human rights
and also because civil and political rights have been determined by many international covenants and human
rights legislations in the Philippines, as well as the Constitution, specifically the Bill of Rights and subsequent
legislation. Otherwise, if we cover such a wide territory in area, we might diffuse its impact and the precise
nature of its task, hence, its effectivity would also be curtailed.
"So, it is important to delineate the parameters of its tasks so that the commission can be most effective.
"MR. BENGZON. That is precisely my difficulty because civil and political rights are very broad. The Article on the
Bill of Rights covers civil and political rights. Every single right of an individual involves his civil right or his
political right. So, where do we draw the line?
"MR. GARCIA. Actually, these civil and political rights have been made clear in the language of human rights
advocates, as well as in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which addresses a number of articles on the
right to life, the right against torture, the right to fair and public hearing, and so on. These are very specific
rights that are considered enshrined in many international documents and legal instruments as constituting civil
and political rights, and these are precisely what we want to defend here.
"MR. BENGZON. So, would the commissioner say civil and political rights as defined in the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights?
"MR. GARCIA. Yes, and as I have mentioned, the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights distinguished
this against torture.
"MR. BENGZON. So as to distinguish this from the other rights that we have?
"MR. GARCIA. Yes, because the other rights will encompass social and economic rights, and there are other
violations of rights of citizens which can be addressed to the proper courts and authorities.
"xxx xxx xxx
"MR. BENGZON. So, we will authorize the commission to define its functions, and, therefore, in doing that the
commission will be authorized to take under its wings cases which perhaps heretofore or at this moment are
under the jurisdiction of the ordinary investigative and prosecutorial agencies of the government. Am I correct?
"MR. GARCIA. No. We have already mentioned earlier that we would like to define the specific parameters which
cover civil and political rights as covered by the international standards governing the behavior of governments
regarding the particular political and civil rights of citizens, especially of political detainees or prisoners. This
particular aspect we have experienced during martial law which we would now like to safeguard.

"MR. BENGZON. Then, I go back to that question that I had. Therefore, what we are really trying to say is,
perhaps, at the proper time we could specify all those rights stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and defined as human rights. Those are the rights that we envision here?
"MR. GARCIA. Yes. In fact, they are also enshrined in the Bill of Rights of our Constitution. They are integral parts
of that.
"MR. BENGZON. Therefore, is the Gentleman saying that all rights under the Bill of Rights covered by human
rights?
"MR. GARCIA. No, only those that pertain to civil and political rights.
"xxx xxx xxx
"MR. RAMA. In connection with the discussion on the scope of human rights, I would like to state that in the past
regime, everytime we invoke the violation of human rights, the Marcos regime came out with the defense that,
as a matter of fact, they had defended the rights of people to decent living, food, decent housing and a life
consistent with human dignity.
"So, I think we should really limit the definition of human rights to political rights. Is that the sense of the
committee, so as not to confuse the issue?
"MR. SARMIENTO. Yes, Madam President.
"MR. GARCIA. I would like to continue and respond also to repeated points raised by the previous speaker.
"There are actually six areas where this Commission on Human Rights could act effectively: 1) protection of
rights of political detainees; 2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of tortures; 3) fair and public trials; 4)
cases of disappearances; 5) salvagings and hamletting; and 6) other crimes committed against the religious.
"xxx xxx xxx
"The PRESIDENT. Commissioner Guingona is recognized.
"MR. GUINGONA. Thank You Madam President.
"I would like to start by saying that I agree with Commissioner Garcia that we should, in order to make the
proposed Commission more effective, delimit as much as possible, without prejudice to future expansion. The
coverage of the concept and jurisdictional area of the term 'human rights' . I was actually disturbed this morning
when the reference was made without qualification to the rights embodied in the universal Declaration of
Human Rights, although later on, this was qualified to refer to civil and political rights contained therein.
"If I remember correctly, Madam President, Commissioner Garcia, after mentioning the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights of 1948, mentioned or linked the concept of human right with other human rights specified in
other convention which I do not remember. Am I correct?
"MR. GARCIA. Is Commissioner Guingona referring to the Declaration of Torture of 1985?
"MR. GUINGONA. I do not know, but the commissioner mentioned another.
"MR. GARCIA. Madam President, the other one is the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights of
which we are signatory.
"MR. GUINGONA. I see. The only problem is that, although I have a copy of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights here, I do not have a copy of the other covenant mentioned. It is quite possible that there are rights
specified in that other convention which may not be specified here. I was wondering whether it would be wise to
link our concept of human rights to general terms like 'convention', rather than specify the rights contained in
the convention.
"As far as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is concerned, the Committee, before the period of
amendments, could specify to us which of these articles in the Declaration would fall within the concept of civil
and political rights, not for the purpose of including these in the proposed constitutional article, but to give the
sense of the Commission as to what human rights would be included, without prejudice to expansion later on, if

the need arises. For example, there was no definite reply to the question of Commissioner Regalado as to
whether the right to marry would be considered a civil or a social right. It is not a civil right?
"MR. GARCIA. Madam President, I have to repeat the various specific civil and political rights that we felt must be
envisioned initially by this provision ---- freedom from political detention and arrest prevention of torture, right to
fair and public trials, as well as crimes involving disappearance, salvagings, hamlettings and collective
violations. So, it is limited to politically related crimes precisely to protect the civil and political rights of a
specific group of individuals, and therefore, we are not opening it up to all of the definite areas.
"MR. GUINGONA. Correct. Therefore, just for the record, the Gentlemen is no longer linking his concept or the
concept of the Committee on Human Rights with the so-called civil or political rights as contained in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
"MR. GARCIA. When I mentioned earlier the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, I was referring to an
international instrument.
"MR. GUINGONA. I know.
"MR. GARCIA. But it does not mean that we will refer to each and every specific article therein, but only to those
that pertain to the civil and politically related, as we understand it in this Commission on Human Rights.
"MR. GUINGONA. Madam President, I am not clear as to the distinction between social and civil rights.
"MR. GARCIA. There are two international covenants: the International Covenant and Civil and Political Rights
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The second covenant contains all the
different rights ---- the rights of labor to organize, the right to education, housing, shelter, et cetera.
"MR. GUINGONA. So we are just limiting at the moment the sense of the committee to those that the Gentlemen
has specified.
"MR. GARCIA. Yes, to civil and political rights.
"MR. GUINGONA. Thank you.
"xxx xxx xxx
"SR. TAN. Madam President, from the standpoint of the victims of human rights, I cannot stress more on how
much we need a Commission on Human Rights. . . .
". . . human rights victims are usually penniless. They cannot pay and very few lawyers will accept clients who
do not pay. And so, they are the ones more abused and oppressed. Another reason is, the cases involved are
very delicate ---- torture, salvaging, picking up without any warrant of arrest, massacre ---- and the persons who
are allegedly guilty are people in power like politicians, men in the military and big shots. Therefore, this Human
Rights Commission must be independent.
"I would like very much to emphasize how much we need this commission, especially for the little Filipino, the
little individual who needs this kind of help and cannot get it. And I think we should concentrate only on civil and
political violations because if we open this to land, housing and health, we will have no place to go again and we
will not receive any response. . . ." 30 (emphasis supplied)
The final outcome, now written as Section 18, Article XIII, of the 1987 Constitution, is a provision empowering
the Commission on Human Rights to "investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human
rights violations involving civil and political rights" (Sec. 1).
The term "civil rights," 31 has been defined as referring ---"(t)o those (rights) that belong to every citizen of the state or country, or, in wider sense, to all its inhabitants,
and are not connected with the organization or administration of government. They include the rights of
property, marriage, equal protection of the laws, freedom of contract, etc. Or, as otherwise defined civil rights
are rights appertaining to a person by virtue of his citizenship in a state or community. Such term may also
refer, in its general sense, to rights capable of being enforced or redressed in a civil action."
Also quite often mentioned are the guarantees against involuntary servitude, religious persecution,
unreasonable searches and seizures, and imprisonment for debt. 32

Political rights, 33 on the other hand, are said to refer to the right to participate, directly or indirectly, in the
establishment or administration of government, the right of suffrage, the right to hold public office, the right of
petition and, in general, the rights appurtenant to citizenship vis-a-vis the management of government. 34
Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, aforequoted, it is readily apparent that the
delegates envisioned a Commission on Human Rights that would focus its attention to the more severe cases of
human rights violations. Delegate Garcia, for instance, mentioned such areas as the "(1) protection of rights of
political detainees, (2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of tortures, (3) fair and public trials, (4) cases
of disappearances, (5) salvagings and hamletting, and (6) other crimes committed against the religious." While
the enumeration has not likely been meant to have any preclusive effect, more than just expressing a statement
of priority, it is, nonetheless, significant for the tone it has set. In any event, the delegates did not apparently
take comfort in peremptorily making a conclusive delineation of the CHR's scope of investigatorial jurisdiction.
They have thus seen it fit to resolve, instead, that "Congress may provide for other cases of violations of human
rights that should fall within the authority of the Commission, taking into account its recommendation." 35
In the particular case at hand, there is no cavil that what are sought to be demolished are the stalls, sari-sari
stores and carinderia, as well as temporary shanties, erected by private respondents on a land which is planned
to be developed into a "People's Park." More than that, the land adjoins the North EDSA of Quezon City which,
this Court can take judicial notice of, is a busy national highway. The consequent danger to life and limb is thus
to be likewise simply ignored. It is indeed paradoxical that a right which is claimed to have been violated is one
that cannot, in the first place, even be invoked, if its is not, in fact, extant. Be that as it may, looking at the
standards hereinabove discoursed vis-a-vis the circumstances obtaining in this instance, we are not prepared to
conclude that the order for the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia of the private respondents
can fall within the compartment of "human rights violations involving civil and political rights" intended by the
Constitution.
On its contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally authorized to "adopt its operational guidelines and rules of
procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court." Accordingly, the
CHR acted within its authority in providing in its revised rules, its power "to cite or hold any person in direct or
indirect contempt, and to impose the appropriate penalties in accordance with the procedure and sanctions
provided for in the Rules of Court." That power to cite for contempt, however, should be understood to apply
only to violations of its adopted operational guidelines and rules of procedure essential to carry out its
investigatorial powers. To exemplify, the power to cite for contempt could be exercised against persons who
refuse to cooperate with the said body, or who unduly withhold relevant information, or who decline to honor
summons, and the like, in pursuing its investigative work. The "order to desist" (a semantic interplay for a
restraining order) in the instance before us, however, is not investigatorial in character but prescinds from an
adjudicative power that it does not possess. In Export Processing Zone Authority vs. Commission on Human
Rights, 36 the Court, speaking through Madame Justice Carolina Grio-Aquino, explained:
"The constitutional provision directing the CHR to 'provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the
underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection' may not be construed to confer
jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of injunction for, it that were the intention, the
Constitution would have expressly said so. 'Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by law'. It is
never derived by implication."
"Evidently, the 'preventive measures and legal aid services' mentioned in the Constitution refer to extrajudicial
and judicial remedies (including a writ of preliminary injunction) which the CHR may seek from the proper courts
on behalf of the victims of human rights violations. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction
to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued `by the judge of any court in which the
action is pending [within his district], or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. . . . A writ
of preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is available only in a pending principal action, for the
preservation or protection of the rights and interests of a party thereto, and for no other purpose." (footnotes
omitted).
The Commission does not have legal standing to indorse, for appropriate action, its findings and
recommendations to any appropriate agency of government. 37
The challenge on the CHR's disbursement of the amount of P200,000.00 by way of financial aid to the vendors
affected by the demolition is not an appropriate issue in the instant petition. Not only is there lack of locus
standi on the part of the petitioners to question the disbursement but, more importantly, the matter lies with
the appropriate administrative agencies concerned to initially consider.
The public respondent explains that this petition for prohibition filed by the petitioners has become moot and

academic since the case before it (CHR Case No. 90-1580) has already been fully heard, and that the matter is
merely awaiting final resolution. It is true that prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain the doing of an act
about to be done, and not intended to provide a remedy for an act already accomplished. 38 Here, however,
said Commission admittedly has yet to promulgate its resolution in CHR Case No. 90-1580. The instant petition
has been intended, among other things, to also prevent CHR from precisely doing that. 39
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for in this petition is GRANTED. The Commission on Human Rights is hereby
prohibited from further proceeding with CHR Case No. 90-1580 and from implementing the P500.00 fine for
contempt. The temporary restraining order heretofore issued by this Court is made permanent. No costs.
SO ORDERED
HON. ISIDRO CARINO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture &
Sports, DR. ERLINDA LOLARGA, in her capacity as Superintendent of City Schools of Manila,
petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, GRACIANO BUDOY, JULIETA BABARAN, ELSA
IBABAO, HELEN LUPO, AMPARO GONZALES, LUZ DEL CASTILLO, ELSA REYES and APOLINARIO ESBER,
respondents.
G.R. No. 96681 | 1991-12-02

Discussions citing this case are available.

Investigative and adjudicative functions, distinguished
Political Law; Constitutional Law; Social Justice and Human Right; Commission on Human Rights
DECISION
NARVASA, C.J.:
The issue raised in the special civil action of certiorari and prohibition at bar, instituted by the Solicitor General,
may be formulated as follows: where the relief sought from the Commission on Human Rights by a party in a
case consists of the review and reversal or modification of a decision or order issued by a court of justice or
government agency or official exercising quasi-judicial functions, may the Commission take cognizance of the
case and grant that relief? Stated otherwise, where a particular subject-matter is placed by law within the
jurisdiction of a court or other government agency or official for purposes of trial and adjudgment, may the
Commission on Human Rights take cognizance of the same subject-matter for the same purposes of hearing and
adjudication?
The facts narrated in the petition are not denied by the respondents and are hence taken as substantially
correct for purposes of ruling on the legal questions posed in the present action. These facts, 1 together with
others involved in related cases recently resolved by this Court, 2 or otherwise undisputed on the record, are
hereunder set forth.
1. On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school teachers, among them members
of the Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook
what they described as "mass concerted actions" to "dramatize and highlight" their plight resulting from the
alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been brought to the
latter's attention. According to them they had decided to undertake said "mass concerted actions" after the
protest rally staged at the DECS premises on September 14, 1990 without disrupting classes as a last call for
the government to negotiate the granting of demands had elicited no response from the Secretary of Education.
The "mass actions" consisted in staying away from their classes, converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio,
gathering in peaceable assemblies, etc. Through their representatives, the teachers participating in the mass
actions were served with an order of the Secretary of Education to return to work in 24 hours or face dismissal,
and a memorandum directing the DECS officials concerned to initiate dismissal proceedings against those who
did not comply and to hire their replacements. Those directives notwithstanding, the mass actions continued
into the week, with more teachers joining in the days that followed. 3
Among those who took part in the "concerted mass actions" were the eight (8) private respondents herein,
teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay High School, Manila, who had agreed to support the non-political demands of
the MPSTA. 4
2. "For failure to heed the return-to-work order, the CHR complainants (private respondents) were
administratively charged on the basis of the principal's report and given five (5) days to answer the charges.
They were also preventively suspended for ninety (90) days 'pursuant to Section 41 of P.D. 807' and temporarily

replaced (unmarked CHR Exhibits, Annexes F, G, H). An investigation committee was consequently formed to
hear the charges in accordance with P.D. 807." 5
3. In the administrative case docketed as Case No. DECS 90-082 in which CHR complainants Graciano Budoy, Jr.,
Julieta Babaran, Luz del Castillo, Apolinario Esber were, among others, named respondents, 6 the latter filed
separate answers, opted for a formal investigation, and also moved "for suspension of the administrative
proceedings pending resolution by . . . (the Supreme) Court of their application for issuance of an injunctive
writ/temporary restraining order." But when their motion for suspension was denied by Order dated November 8,
1990 of the Investigating Committee, which later also denied their motion for reconsideration orally made at the
hearing of November 14, 1990, "the respondents led by their counsel staged a walkout signifying their intent to
boycott the entire proceedings." 7 The case eventually resulted in a Decision of Secretary Cario dated
December 17, 1990, rendered after evaluation of the evidence as well as the answers, affidavits and documents
submitted by the respondents, decreeing dismissal from the service of Apolinario Esber and the suspension for
nine (9) months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo. 8
4. In the meantime, the "MPSTA filed a petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court of Manila against
petitioner (Cario), which was dismissed (unmarked CHR Exhibit, Annex I). Later, the MPSTA went to the
Supreme Court (on certiorari, in an attempt to nullify said dismissal, grounded on the) alleged violation of the
striking teachers' right to due process and peaceable assembly docketed as G.R. No. 95445, supra. The ACT also
filed a similar petition before the Supreme Court . . . docketed as G.R. No. 95590." 9 Both petitions in this Court
were filed in behalf of the teacher associations, a few named individuals, and "other teacher-members so
numerous similarly situated" or "other similarly situated public school teachers too numerous to be impleaded.
"
5. In the meantime, too, the respondent teachers submitted sworn statements dated September 27, 1990 to the
Commission on Human Rights to complain that while they were participating in peaceful mass actions, they
suddenly learned of their replacements as teachers, allegedly without notice and consequently for reasons
completely unknown to them. 10
6. Their complaints and those of other teachers also "ordered suspended by the . . . (DECS)," all numbering
forty-two (42) were docketed as "Striking Teachers CHR Case No. 90-775." In connection therewith the
Commission scheduled a "dialogue" on October 11, 1990, and sent a subpoena to Secretary Cario requiring
his attendance therein. 11
On the day of the "dialogue," although it said that it was "not certain whether he (Sec. Cario) received the
subpoena which was served at his office, . . . (the) Commission, with the Chairman presiding, and
Commissioners Hesiquio R. Mallilin and Narciso C. Monteiro, proceeded to hear the case;" it heard the
complainants' counsel (a) explain that his clients had been "denied due process and suspended without formal
notice, and unjustly, since they did not join the mass leave," and (b) expatiate on the grievances which were
"the cause of the mass leave of MPSTA teachers, (and) with which causes they (CHR complainants) sympathize."
12 The Commission thereafter issued an Order 13 reciting these facts and making the following disposition:
"To be properly apprised of the real facts of the case and be accordingly guided in its investigation and
resolution of the matter, considering that these forty two teachers are now suspended and deprived of their
wages, which they need very badly, Secretary Isidro Cario, of the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports, Dr. Erlinda Lolarga, school superintendent of Manila and the Principal of Ramon Magsaysay High School,
Manila, are hereby enjoined to appear and enlighten the Commission en banc on October 19, 1990 at 11:00 AM.
and to bring with them any and all documents relevant to the allegations aforestated herein to assist the
Commission in this matter.
Otherwise, the Commission will resolve the complaint on the basis of complainants' evidence.
xxx xxx xxx."
7. Through the Office of the Solicitor General, Secretary Cario sought and was granted leave to file a
motion to dismiss the case. His motion to dismiss was submitted on November 14, 1990 alleging as grounds
therefor, "that the complaint states no cause of action and that the CHR has no jurisdiction over the case." 14

8. Pending determination by the Commission of the motion to dismiss, judgments affecting the "striking
teachers" were promulgated in two (2) cases, as aforestated, viz.:

a)The Decision dated December 17, 1990 of Education Secretary Cario in Case No. DECS 90-082, decreeing
dismissal from the service of Apolinario Esber and the suspension for nine (9) months of Babaran, Budoy and del
Castillo; 15 and
b) The joint Resolution of this Court dated August 6, 1991 in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590 dismissing the petitions
a without prejudice to any appeals, if still timely, that the individual petitioners may take to the Civil Service
Commission on the matters complained of," 16 and inter alia "ruling that it was prima facie lawful for petitioner
Cario to issue return-to-work orders, file administrative charges against recalcitrants, preventively suspend
them, and issue decision on those charges." 17
9. In an Order dated December 28, 1990, respondent Commission denied Sec. Cario's motion to dismiss
and required him and Superintendent Lolarga "to submit their counter-affidavits within ten (10) days . . . (after
which) the Commission shall proceed to hear and resolve the case on the merits with or without respondents
counter affidavit." 18 It held that the "striking teachers" "were denied due process of law; . . . they should not
have been replaced without a chance to reply to the administrative charges;" there had been a violation of their
civil and political rights which the Commission was empowered to investigate; and while expressing its "utmost
respect to the Supreme Court . . . the facts before . . . (it) are different from those in the case decided by the
Supreme Court" (the reference being unmistakably to this Court's joint Resolution of August 6, 1991 in G.R. Nos.
95445 and 95590, supra).

It is to invalidate and set aside this Order of December 28, 1990 that the Solicitor General, in behalf of petitioner
Cario, has commenced the present action of certiorari and prohibition.
The Commission on Human Rights has made clear its position that it does not feel bound by this Court's joint
Resolution in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590, supra. It has also made plain its intention "to hear and resolve the
case (i.e., Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775) on the merits." It intends, in other words, to try and decide or
hear and determine, i.e., exercise jurisdiction over the following general issues:

1) whether or not the striking teachers were denied due process, and just cause exists for the imposition of
administrative disciplinary sanctions on them by their superiors; and
2) whether or not the grievances which were "the cause of the mass leave of MPSTA teachers, (and) with which
causes they (CHR complainants) sympathize," justify their mass action or strike.
The Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate, that is to say, determine with character of finality and
definiteness, the same issues which have been passed upon and decided by the Secretary of Education, Culture
& Sports, subject to appeal to the Civil Service Commission, this Court having in fact, as aforementioned,
declared that the teachers affected may take appeals to the Civil Service Commission on said matters, if still
timely.
The threshold question is whether or not the Commission on Human Rights has the power under the
Constitution to do so; whether or not, like a court of justice, 19 or even a quasi-judicial agency, 20 it has
jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and decide, or hear and determine, certain specific
type of cases, like alleged human rights violations involving civil or political rights.
The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was not meant by the
fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over
the functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate,
i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and
political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of
justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom
the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of

receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of
applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined
authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law.
21 This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have. 22
The proposition is made clear by the constitutional provisions specifying the powers of the Commission on
Human Rights.
The Commission was created by the 1987 Constitution as an independent office. 23 Upon its constitution, it
succeeded and superseded the Presidential Committee on Human Rights existing at the time of the effectivity of
the Constitution. 24 Its powers and functions are the following: 25

"(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and
political rights;
(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in
accordance with the Rules of Court;
(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as
well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the
underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection;
(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;
(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance respect for the primacy
of human rights;
(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide for compensation
to victims of violations of human rights, or their families;
(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on human rights;
(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other
evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its
authority;
(9) Bequest the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions;
(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and
(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law."
As should at once be observed, only the first of the enumerated powers and functions bears any resemblance to
adjudication or adjudgment. The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power to
investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. It can exercise that power on
its own initiative or on complaint of any person. It may exercise that power pursuant to such rules of procedure
as it may adopt and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court.
In the course of any investigation conducted by it or under its authority, it may grant immunity from prosecution
to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient
to determine the truth. It may also request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the
performance of its functions, in the conduct of its investigation or in extending such remedy as may be required
by its findings. 26
But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice, or even quasijudicial
bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular or the technical sense, these
terms have well understood and quite distinct meanings.
"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on,
study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire into systematically: "to
search or inquire into: . . . to subject to an official probe . . .: to conduct an official inquiry." 27 The purpose of
investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is
the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the

law to the facts established by the inquiry.

The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or
observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by
careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" 28 "to inquire; to make an
investigation," "investigation" being in turn described as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which
ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; . . . an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the
discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters." 29
"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine,
resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties
to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: . . . to pass judgment on: settle judicially: . . . act as judge." 30
And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: . . . to award or
grant judicially in a case of controversy . . ." 31
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally.
Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or
decree, or to sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment."
32
Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to investigate," cannot and should
not "try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775,
as it has announced it means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative
disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human
rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed. More particularly, the Commission has no power to
"resolve on the merits" the question of (a) whether or not the mass concerted actions engaged in by the
teachers constitute a strike and are prohibited or otherwise restricted by law; (b) whether or not the act of
carrying on and taking part in those actions, and the failure of the teachers to discontinue those actions and
return to their classes despite the order to this effect by the Secretary of Education, constitute infractions of
relevant rules and regulations warranting administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the grievances
complained of by them; and (c) what where the particular acts done by each individual teacher and what
sanctions, if any, may properly be imposed for said acts or omissions.
These are matters undoubtedly and clearly within the original jurisdiction of the Secretary of Education, being
within the scope of the disciplinary powers granted to him under the Civil Service Law, and also, within the
appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.
Indeed, the Secretary of Education has, as above narrated, already taken cognizance of the issues and resolved
them, 33 and it appears that appeals have been seasonably taken by the aggrieved parties to the Civil Service
Commission; and even this Court itself has had occasion to pass upon said issues. 34
Now, it is quite obvious that whether or not the conclusions reached by the Secretary of Education in disciplinary
cases are correct and are adequately based on substantial evidence; whether or not the proceedings
themselves are void or defective in not having accorded the respondents due process; and whether or not the
Secretary of Education had in truth committed "human rights violations involving civil and political rights," are
matters which may be passed upon and determined through a motion for reconsideration addressed to the
Secretary of Education himself, and in the event of an adverse verdict, may be renewed by the Civil Service
Commission and eventually by the Supreme Court.
The Commission on Human Rights simply has no place in this scheme of things. It has no business intruding into
the jurisdiction and functions of the Education Secretary or the Civil Service Commission. It has no business
going over the same ground traversed by the latter and making its own judgment on the questions involved.
This would accord success to what may well have been the complaining teachers' strategy to abort, frustrate or
negate the judgment of the Education Secretary in the administrative cases against them which they
anticipated would be adverse to them.
This cannot be done. It will not be permitted to be done.
In any event, the investigation by the Commission on Human Rights would serve no useful purpose. If its
investigation should result in conclusions contrary to those reached by Secretary Cario, it would have no
power anyway to reverse the Secretary's conclusions. Reversal thereof can only by done by the Civil Service
Commission and lastly by this Court. The only thing the Commission can do, if it concludes that Secretary
Cario was in error, is to refer the matter to the appropriate Government agency or tribunal for assistance;
that would be the Civil Service Commission. 35 It cannot arrogate unto itself the appellate jurisdiction of the

Civil Service Commission.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the Order of December 29, 1990 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, and the
respondent Commission on Human Rights and the Chairman and Members thereof are prohibited "to hear and
resolve the case (i.e., Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775) on the merits."
SO ORDERED
3. DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTS
A.
JURISDICTION DISTINGUISHED FROM EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION
REMEDIOS ANTONINO, Petitioner, vs. THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MAKATI CITY and TAN TIAN SU,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 185663 | 2012-06-20
Nature of the Case
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision [1] dated May 26, 2008 and
Resolution[2] dated December 5, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 89145.
Factual Antecedents
Since March 21, 1978, petitioner Remedios Antonino (Antonino) had been leasing a residential property located
at Makati City and owned by private respondent Tan Tian Su (Su). Under the governing lease contract, Antonino
was accorded with the right of first refusal in the event Su would decide to sell the subject property. [3]
On July 7, 2004, the parties executed a document denominated as Undertaking Agreement [4] where Su
agreed to sell to Antonino the subject property for P39,500,000.00. However, in view of a disagreement as to
who between them would shoulder the payment of the capital gains tax, the sale did not proceed as intended. [5]
On July 9, 2004, Antonino filed a complaint against Su with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, for the
reimbursement of the cost of repairs on the subject property and payment of damages. The complaint was
raffled to Branch 149 and docketed as Civil Case No. 04-802. [6] Later that same day, Antonino filed an amended
complaint to enforce the Undertaking Agreement and compel Su to sell to her the subject property.[7]
In an Order[8] dated December 8, 2004, the RTC dismissed Antoninos complaint on the grounds of improper
venue and non-payment of the appropriate docket fees. According to the RTC, Antoninos complaint is one for
specific performance, damages and sum of money, which are personal actions that should have been filed in the
court of the place where any of the parties resides. Antonino and Su reside in Muntinlupa and Manila,
respectively, thus Makati City is not the proper venue. Specifically:
The instant case is an action for specific performance with damages, a personal action, which may be
commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any
of the principal defendants resides (Section 2, Rule 5 of the Rules of Court). Records show that plaintiff is a
resident of 706 Acacia Avenue, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa City while defendant is a resident of 550
Sto. Cristo St., Binondo, Manila. Hence, the instant case should have been filed in the place of residence of
either the plaintiff or defendant, at the election of the plaintiff. Contrary to the claim of plaintiff, the alleged
written agreements presented by the plaintiff in her Amended Complaint do not contain any stipulation as to the
venue of actions. x x x[9]
The RTC also ruled that it did not acquire jurisdiction over Antoninos complaint in view of her failure to pay the
correct amount of docket fees. Citing Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[10] the RTC ruled
that:
Anent the non-payment of filing fees on the Amended Complaint, plaintiff alleges that no new assessment was
made when the Amended Complaint was filed since there [were] no additional damages prayed
for. The Manchester decision has been recently relaxed as to allow additional payment of the necessary fees if
the Honorable Court so orders an assessment thereof.
The Court is not persuaded.
The Amended Complaint, which the Court notes to have been filed at 4:00 oclock in the afternoon or few hours
after the initial complaint was filed, further prays that judgment be rendered ordering defendant to sell his
property located at 1623 Cypress, Dasmarias Village, Makati City covered by TCT No. 426900 to plaintiff in
accordance with the terms and conditions stipulated in their agreement dated July 7, 2004 and ordering
defendant to desist from selling his property to any other party other than plaintiff., which makes the instant

case also an action for Specific Performance in addition to the claim for Damages. However, the value of the
described property was not stated in the prayer and no docket fees were paid. Thus, following the ruling of the
Supreme Court in the case of Manchester Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 75919, May 7,
1987, that the Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee, the
instant case is hereby dismissed.[11]
On December 23, 2004, Su filed an Omnibus Motion,[12] praying for the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens,
which Antonino caused to be annotated on the title covering the subject property and the issuance of a
summary judgment on his counterclaims. Su, among others, alleged the propriety of cancelling the notice of lis
pendens in view of the dismissal of the complaint and Antoninos failure to appeal therefrom.
On January 3, 2005, Antonino filed a Motion for Reconsideration, [13] claiming that her complaint is a real action
and the location of the subject property is determinative of its venue. Alternatively, she submitted a
certification issued by the Commission on Elections, stating that she is a resident of Makati City. She then
prayed for the reinstatement of her complaint and issuance of an order directing the clerk of court to assess the
proper docket fees. This was denied by the RTC in an Order[14] dated January 6, 2005, holding that there was
non-compliance with Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.
Antonino thus filed a Motion for Reconsideration[15] dated January 21, 2005, claiming that there was due
observance of the rules on motions. Antonino alleged that her motion for reconsideration from the RTCs
December 8, 2004 was set for hearing on January 7, 2005 and Su received a copy thereof on January 6, 2005.
Antonino pleaded for a liberal interpretation of the rules as Su was notified of her motion before the hearing
thereon and was not in any way prejudiced. She also reiterated her arguments for the reinstatement of her
complaint.
In a Joint Resolution[16] dated February 24, 2005, the RTC denied Sus Omnibus Motion and Antoninos January
21, 2005 Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC refused to cancel the notice of lis pendens, holding that:
It is quite clear that the dismissal of the Amended Complaint was anchored on two grounds, e.g. (1) for improper
venue and (2) for non-payment of docket fee. It is elementary that when a complaint was dismissed based on
these grounds[,] the court did not resolve the case on the merits. Moreover, a court cannot acquire jurisdiction
over the subject matter of a case unless the docket fees are paid x x x. Thus, the cause of action laid down in
the complaint remains unresolved for proper re-filing before the proper court. Furthermore, the Supreme Court
said: The cancellation of such a precautionary notice is therefore also a mere incident in the action, and may
be ordered by the Court having jurisdiction of it at any given time. x x x [17]
The RTC maintained its earlier ruling that Antoninos Motion for Reconsideration from the December 8, 2004
Order is pro-forma and did not suspend the running of the period to file an appeal. The RTC also reiterated that
Antoninos complaint is a personal action such that the proper venue therefore is either the City
of Manila or MuntinlupaCity.
On April 1, 2005, Antonino filed with the CA a petition for annulment of judgment. [18] Antonino prayed for the
nullification of the RTCs Order dated December 8, 2004 dismissing her complaint, Order dated January 6, 2005
denying her motion for reconsideration and Joint Resolution dated February 24, 2005 denying her motion for
reconsideration of the January 6, 2005 Order. According to Antonino, the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it ruled that her action for the enforcement of the Undertaking
Agreement is personal and when it deprived her of an opportunity to pay the correct amount of docket
fees. The RTCs grave abuse of discretion, Antonino posited, was likewise exhibited by its strict application of
the rules on motions and summary denial of her motion for reconsideration.
In its Decision[19] dated May 26, 2008, the CA dismissed Antoninos petition. While the CA recognized Antoninos
faulty choice of remedy, it proceeded to resolve the issues she raised relative to the dismissal of her
complaint. Thus:
It should be stressed that in this case, there is neither allegation in the petition, nor sufficient proof adduced
showing highly exceptional circumstance to justify the failure of petitioner to avail of the remedies of appeal,
petition for relief or other appropriate remedy through no fault attributable to [her] before filing this petition for
annulment of judgment. In Manipor v. Ricafort, the Supreme Court held, thus:
If the petitioner failed to avail of such remedies without sufficient justification, he cannot avail of an action for
annulment because, otherwise, he would benefit from his own inaction or negligence.

Notwithstanding the foregoing procedural infirmity, and in the interest of justice, we shall look into the issues
raised and decide the case on the merit.
xxxx
A perusal of the allegations of the complaint unambiguously shows that petitioner seeks to enforce the
commitment of private respondent to sell his property in accordance with the terms and conditions of their
purported agreement dated July 7, 2004. By implication, petitioner does not question the ownership of private
respondent over the property nor does she claim, by any color of title, right to possess the property or to its
recovery. The action is simply for the enforcement of a supposed contract, and thus, unmistakably a personal
action.
xxxx
Guided by the above rule (Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Court), petitioner should have filed the case either
in Muntinlupa City, where she resides, or in Manila, where private respondent maintains his residence. Other
than filing the complaint in any of these places, petitioner proceeds with the risk of a possible dismissal of her
case. Unfortunately for petitioner, private respondent forthwith raised improper venue as an affirmative
defense and his stand was sustained by trial court, thus, resulting to the dismissal of the case.
Further, it is important to note that in a petition for annulment of judgment based on lack of jurisdiction, the
petitioner must show not merely an abuse of jurisdictional discretion but an absolute lack of jurisdiction. The
concept of lack of jurisdiction as a ground to annul a judgment does not embrace abuse of
discretion. Petitioner, by claiming grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, actually concedes and
presupposes the jurisdiction of the court to take cognizance of the case. She only assails the manner in which
the trial court formulated its judgment in the exercise of its jurisdiction. It follows that petitioner cannot use lack
of jurisdiction as ground to annul the judgment by claiming grave abuse of discretion. In this case where the
court refused to exercise jurisdiction due to improper venue, neither lack of jurisdiction nor grave abuse of
discretion is available to challenge the assailed order of dismissal of the trial court. [20] (Citations omitted)
Antonino filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated December
5, 2008. [21]
Issue
The sole issue for the resolution of this Court is the propriety of Antoninos use of the remedy of a petition
for annulment of judgment as against the final and executory orders of the RTC.
Our Ruling
In Ramos v. Judge Combong, Jr.,[22] this Court expounded that the remedy of annulment of judgment is
only available under certain exceptional circumstances as this is adverse to the concept of immutability of final
judgments:
Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in character, allowed only in exceptional cases as where
there is no available or other adequate remedy. Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
governs actions for annulment of judgments or final orders and resolutions, and Section 2 thereof explicitly
provides only two grounds for annulment of judgment, i.e., extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. The
underlying reason is traceable to the notion that annulling final judgments goes against the grain of finality of
judgment. Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective
administration of justice that once a judgment has become final, the issue or cause involved therein should be
laid to rest. The basic rule of finality of judgment is grounded on the fundamental principle of public policy and
sound practice that at the risk of occasional error, the judgment of courts and the award of quasi-judicial
agencies must become final at some definite date fixed by law. [23] (Citations omitted)
In Barco v. Court of Appeals,[24] this Court emphasized that only void judgments, by reason of extrinsic fraud or
the courts lack of jurisdiction, are susceptible to being annulled.
The law sanctions the annulment of certain judgments which, though final, are ultimately void. Annulment of
judgment is an equitable principle not because it allows a party-litigant another opportunity to reopen a
judgment that has long lapsed into finality but because it enables him to be discharged from the burden of
being bound to a judgment that is an absolute nullity to begin with. [25]

Apart from the requirement that the existence of extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction should be amply
demonstrated, one who desires to avail this remedy must convince that the ordinary and other appropriate
remedies, such as an appeal, are no longer available for causes not attributable to him. This is clearly provided
under Section 1, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.
Antoninos recourse to annulment of judgment is seriously flawed and the reasons are patent. There is
therefore no reason to disturb the questioned issuances of the RTC that are already final and executory.
A petition for annulment of judgment cannot serve as a substitute for the lost remedy of an appeal.
First, Antonino cannot pursue the annulment of the various issuances of the RTC, primary of which is the Order
dated December 8, 2004, in order to avoid the adverse consequences of their becoming final and executory
because of her neglect in utilizing the ordinary remedies available. Antonino did not proffer any explanation for
her failure to appeal the RTCs Order dated December 8, 2004 and, thereafter, the Order dated January 6, 2005,
denying her Motion for Reconsideration dated January 3, 2005. Knowledge of rudimentary remedial rules
immediately indicates that an appeal was already available from the Order dated December 8, 2004, as this is a
final order as contemplated under Sections 2, 3 and 5 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, and there was no legal
compulsion for Antonino to move for reconsideration. Nonetheless, since there is no bar for her to file a motion
for reconsideration so as to give the RTC opportunity to reverse itself before elevating the matter for the
appellate courts review, appeal is the prescribed remedy from the denial of such motion and not another
motion for reconsideration. While Section 1 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court includes an order denying a motion
for new trial or reconsideration in the enumeration of unappealable matters, this Court clarified in Quelnan v.
VHF Philippines, Inc.[26] that such refers to a motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order and the denial
of a motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal is a final order, therefore, appealable. Moreover, a
second motion for reconsideration from a final judgment or order is prohibited, hence, can never interrupt the
period to perfect an appeal.
The RTC may have been overly strict in the observance of the three-day notice rule under Section 4, Rule 15 of
the Rules of Court contrary to liberal stance taken by this Court in cases when the purpose of such rule can be
achieved by giving the opposing party sufficient time to study and controvert the motion. [27] Justice and equity
would thus suggest that the fifteen-day period within which Antonino can appeal should be counted from her
receipt on January 7, 2005[28] of the Order dated January 6, 2005 denying her Motion for Reconsideration dated
January 3, 2005. Unfortunately, even liberality proved to be inadequate to neutralize the adverse consequences
of Antoninos negligence as she allowed such period to lapse without filing an appeal, erroneously believing that
a second motion for reconsideration is the proper remedy. While a second motion for reconsideration is not
prohibited insofar as interlocutory orders are concerned,[29] the Orders dated December 8, 2004 and January 6,
2005 are final orders.
In fact, even if the period to appeal would be counted from Antoninos receipt of the Order dated February 24,
2005 denying her second motion for reconsideration, she interposed no appeal and filed a petition for
annulment of judgment on April 1, 2005 instead. This, for sure, constitutes a categorical admission that the
assailed issuances of the RTC had already become final and executory in view of her omission to perfect an
appeal within the mandated period. By no means can her petition for annulment of judgment prosper as that
would, in effect, sanction her blatant negligence or sheer obliviousness to proper procedure.
Let it be stressed at the outset that before a party can avail of the reliefs provided for by Rule 47, i.e.,
annulment of judgments, final orders, and resolutions, it is a condition sine qua non that one must have failed to
move for new trial in, or appeal from, or file a petition for relief against said issuances or take other appropriate
remedies thereon, through no fault attributable to him. If he failed to avail of those cited remedies without
sufficient justification, he cannot resort to the action for annulment provided in Rule 47, for otherwise he would
benefit from his own inaction or negligence.[30] (Citation omitted)
Grave abuse of discretion is not a ground to annul a final and executory judgment.
Second, a petition for annulment of judgment can only be based on extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction and cannot prosper on the basis of grave abuse of discretion. By anchoring her petition on the
alleged grave abuse of discretion that attended the dismissal of her complaint and the denial of her two (2)
motions for reconsideration, Antonino, is, in effect, enlarging the concept of lack of jurisdiction. As this Court
previously clarified in Republic of the Philippines v. G Holdings, Inc.,[31]lack of jurisdiction as a ground for the

annulment of judgments pertains to lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or over the
subject matter of the claim. It does not contemplate grave abuse of discretion considering that jurisdiction
is different from the exercise thereof. As ruled in Tolentino v. Judge Leviste:[32]
Jurisdiction is not the same as the exercise of jurisdiction. As distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction,
jurisdiction is the authority to decide a cause, and not the decision rendered therein. Where there is jurisdiction
over the person and the subject matter, the decision on all other questions arising in the case is but an exercise
of the jurisdiction. And the errors which the court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of
judgment which are the proper subject of an appeal.[33] (Citation omitted)
In fact, the RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion or err in dismissing Antoninos complaint. The RTC
was correct in classifying Antoninos cause of action as personal and in holding that it was instituted in the
wrong venue. Personal action is one that is founded on privity of contracts between the parties; and in which
the plaintiff usually seeks the recovery of personal property, the enforcement of a contract, or recovery of
damages. Real action, on the other hand, is one anchored on the privity of real estate, where the plaintiff seeks
the recovery of ownership or possession of real property or interest in it. [34] Antoninos following allegations in
her amended complaint show that one of her causes of action is one for the enforcement or consummation of a
contract, hence, a personal action:
XII
On July 7, 2004, plaintiff and defendant executed a document entitled Undertaking Agreement (copy
of which is hereto attached as Annex H) wherein defendant agreed to sell said property to plaintiff who has
leased said property since March 21, 1978 up to the present with the plaintiff paying a downpayment of
$50,000.00 US dollars the following day, July 8, 2004.
xxxx
XIV
Defendant also refused to accept the $50,000.00 US Dollars and was about to tear up the document they
previously signed the day before when plaintiff prevented him from doing so.
XV
Consequently, plaintiff discovered that defendant was already negotiating to sell the said property to another
Chinese national who incidentally is also one of plaintiffs buyers.
xxxx
Premises considered, in the interest of substantial justice, it is most respectfully prayed that after due
hearing that judgment be rendered:
1.
Ordering defendant to sell his property located at
1623 Cypress, Dasmarias Village, Makati City covered by TCT No. 426900 to plaintiff in accordance with the
terms and conditions stipulated in their agreement dated July 7, 2004.
x x x x[35]
Antoninos cause of action is premised on her claim that there has already been a perfected contract of
sale by virtue of their execution of the Undertaking Agreement and Su had refused to comply with his
obligations as seller. However, by claiming the existence of a perfected contract of sale, it does not mean that
Antonino acquired title to the subject property. She does not allege otherwise and tacitly acknowledges Sus
title to the subject property by asking for the consummation of the sale.
That there is a private document supposedly evidencing the alleged sale does not confer to Antonino title to the
subject property. Ownership is transferred when there is actual or constructive delivery and the thing is
considered delivered when it is placed in the control or possession of the buyer or when the sale is made
through a public instrument and the contrary does not appear or cannot be clearly inferred. [36] In other words,
Antoninos complaint is not in the nature of a real action as ownership of the subject property is not at issue.

Moreover, that the object of the alleged sale is a real property does not make Antoninos complaint real in
nature in the absence of a contrary claim of title. After a contract of sale is perfected, the right of the parties to
reciprocally demand performance, thus consummation, arises the vendee may require the vendor to compel
the transfer the title to the object of the sale[37] and the vendor may require the payment of the purchase price.
[38]
The action to cause the consummation of a sale does not involve an adverse claim of ownership as the
vendors title is recognized and the vendor is simply being asked to perform an act, specifically, the transfer of
such title by any of the recognized modes of delivery.
Considering that the filing of the complaint in a wrong venue sufficed for the dismissal thereof, it would be
superfluous to discuss if Antoninos non-payment of the correct docket fees likewise warranted it.
At any rate, even if the RTC erred in ordering the dismissal of her complaint, such had already become final and
executory and will not be disturbed as it had jurisdiction and it was not alleged, much less, proved that there
was extrinsic fraud. Moreover, annulment of the assailed orders of the RTC will not issue if ordinary remedies,
such as an appeal, were lost and were not availed of because of Antoninos fault. Litigation should end and
terminate sometime and somewhere. It is essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice that,
once a judgment has become final, the winning party should not be deprived of the fruits of the verdict. [39]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit and the Decision dated May 26, 2008
and Resolution dated December 5, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 89145 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
SPOUSES ATTY. ERLANDO A. ABRENICA and JOENA B. ABRENICA, Petitioners, vs. LAW FIRM OF
ABRENICA, TUNGOL and TIBAYAN, ATTYS. ABELARDO M. TIBAYAN and DANILO N. TUNGOL,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 180572 | 2012-06-18
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
The present case is a continuation of G.R. No. 169420[1] decided by this Court on 22 September 2006. For
brevity, we quote the relevant facts narrated in that case:
Petitioner Atty. Erlando A. Abrenica was a partner of individual respondents, Attys. Danilo N. Tungol and Abelardo
M. Tibayan, in the Law Firm of Abrenica, Tungol and Tibayan (the firm).
In 1998, respondents filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) two cases against petitioner. The
first was SEC Case No. 05-98-5959, for Accounting and Return and Transfer of Partnership Funds With Damages
and Application for Issuance of Preliminary Attachment, where they alleged that petitioner refused to return
partnership funds representing profits from the sale of a parcel of land in Lemery, Batangas. The second was
SEC Case No. 10-98-6123, also for
Accounting and Return and Transfer of Partnership Funds where respondents sought to recover from petitioner
retainer fees that he received from two clients of the firm and the balance of the cash advance that he obtained
in 1997.
The SEC initially heard the cases but they were later transferred to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
pursuant to Republic Act No. 8799, which transferred jurisdiction over intra-corporate controversies from the
SEC to the courts. In a Consolidated Decision dated November 23, 2004, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 226, held that:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
CIVIL CASE NO. Q01-42948
1.
Ordering the respondent Atty. Erlando Abrenica to render full accounting of the amounts he received as
profits from the sale and resale of the Lemery property in the amount of P4,524,000.00;
2.
Ordering the respondent Atty. Erlando Abrenica to remit to the law firm the said amount of
P4,524,000.00 plus interest of 12% per annum from the time he received the same and converted the same to
his own personal use or from September 1997 until fully paid; and
3.
To pay the costs of suit.
CIVIL CASE NO. Q01-42959
1.
Ordering Atty. Erlando Abrenica to render a full accounting of the amounts he received under the
retainer agreement between the law firm and Atlanta Industries Inc. and Atlanta Land Corporation in the amount
of P320,000.00.
2.
Ordering Atty. Erlando Abrenica to remit to the law firm the amount received by him under the Retainer
Agreement with Atlanta Industries, Inc. and Atlanta Land Corporation in the amount of P320,000.00 plus
interests of 12% per annum from June 1998 until fully paid;
3.
Ordering Atty. Erlando Abrenica to pay the law firm his balance on his cash advance in the amount of
P25,000.00 with interest of 12% per annum from the date this decision becomes final; and

4.
To pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner received a copy of the decision on December 17, 2004. On December 21, 2004, he filed a notice of
appeal under Rule 41 and paid the required appeal fees.
Two days later, respondents filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution pursuant to A.M. 01-2-04-SC, which
provides that decisions in intra-corporate disputes are immediately executory and not subject to appeal unless
stayed by an appellate court.
On January 7, 2005, respondents filed an Opposition (To Defendant's Notice of Appeal) on the ground that it
violated A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC[2] prescribing appeal by certiorari under Rule 43 as the correct mode of appeal from
the trial courts decisions on intra-corporate disputes.
Petitioner thereafter filed a Reply with Manifestation (To the Opposition to Defendant's Notice of Appeal) and an
Opposition to respondents motion for execution.
On May 11, 2005, the trial court issued an Order requiring petitioner to show cause why it should take
cognizance of the notice of appeal in view of A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC. Petitioner did not comply with the said Order.
Instead, on June 10, 2005, he filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion for Leave of Court to Admit Attached
Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court. Respondents opposed the motion.
The Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion in its assailed Resolution dated June 29, 2005 x x x.
xxx
xxx
xxx
The Court of Appeals also denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration in its August 23, 2005 Resolution.
Given the foregoing facts, we dismissed the Petition in G.R. No. 169420 on the ground that the appeal filed by
petitioner was the wrong remedy. For that reason, we held as follows: [3]
Time and again, this Court has upheld dismissals of incorrect appeals, even if these were timely filed.
In Lanzaderas v. Amethyst Security and General Services, Inc., this Court affirmed the dismissal by the Court of
Appeals of a petition for review under Rule 43 to question a decision because the proper mode of appeal should
have been a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. x x x.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Indeed, litigations should, and do, come to an end. Public interest demands an end to every litigation and a
belated effort to reopen a case that has already attained finality will serve no purpose other than to delay the
administration of justice. In the instant case, the trial court's decision became final and executory on January 3,
2005. Respondents had already acquired a vested right in the effects of the finality of the decision, which should
not be disturbed any longer.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Resolutions dated June 29, 2005 and August 23, 2005
in CA-G.R. SP No. 90076 denying admission of petitioners Petition for Review are AFFIRMED.
Thus, respondents sought the execution of the judgment. On 11 April 2007, G.R. No. 169420 became final and
executory.[4]
Apparently not wanting to be bound by this Courts Decision in G.R. No. 169420, petitioners Erlando and Joena
subsequently filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a Petition for Annulment of Judgment with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
98679. The Petition for Annulment of Judgment assailed the merits of the RTCs Decision in Civil Case Nos. Q-0142948 and Q-01-42959, subject of G.R. No. 169420. In that Petition for Annulment, Petitioners raised the
following grounds:
I.
The lower court erred in concluding that both petitioners and respondents did not present direct
documentary evidence to substantiate [their] respective claims.
II.
The lower court erred in concluding that both petitioners and respondents relied mainly on testimonial
evidence to prove their respective position[s].
III.
The lower court erred in not ruling that the real estate transaction entered into by said petitioners and
spouses Roman and Amalia Aguzar was a personal transaction and not a law partnership transaction.
IV.
The lower court erred in ruling that the testimonies of the respondents are credible.
V.
The lower court erred in ruling that the purchase price for the lot involved was P3 million and not P8
million.
VI.
The lower court erred in ruling that petitioners retainer agreement with Atlanta Industries, Inc. was a
law partnership transaction.
VII.
The lower court erred when it failed to rule on said petitioners permissive counterclaim relative to the
various personal loans secured by respondents.
VIII.
The lower court not only erred in the exercise of its jurisdiction but more importantly it acted without
jurisdiction or with lack of jurisdiction. [5]
We note that petitioners were married on 28 May 1998. The cases filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) on 6 May 1998 and 15 October 1998 were filed against petitioner Erlando only. It was with
the filing of CA-G.R. SP No. 98679 on 24 April 2007 that Joena joined Erlando as a co-petitioner.
On 26 April 2007, the CA issued a Resolution[6] dismissing the Petition. First, it reasoned that the remedy of
annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is available only when the ordinary remedies of new
trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of
petitioners.[7] Considering that the dismissal of the appeal was directly attributable to them, the remedy under
Rule 47 was no longer available.

Second, the CA stated that the grounds alleged in the Petition delved on the merits of the case and the
appreciation by the trial court of the evidence presented to the latter. Under Rule 47, the grounds for annulment
are limited only to extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
Lastly, the CA held that the fact that the trial court was not designated as a special commercial court did not
mean that the latter had no jurisdiction over the case. The appellate court stated that, in any event, petitioners
could have raised this matter on appeal or through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, but they did not do so.
Petitioners filed an Amended Petition for Annulment of Judgment dated 2 May 2007, but the CA had by then
already issued the 26 April 2007 Resolution dismissing the Petition.
On 24 May 2007, the 26 April 2007 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 98679 became final and executory. [8]
Petitioners did not give up. They once again filed a 105-page Petition for Annulment of Judgment with the CA
dated 25 May 2007[9] docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 99719. This time, they injected the ground of extrinsic fraud
into what appeared to be substantially the same issues raised in CA-G.R. SP No. 98679. The following were the
grounds raised in CA-G.R. SP No. 99719:
A. Extrinsic fraud and/or collusion attended the rendition of the Consolidated Decision x x x based on the
following badges of fraud and/or glaring errors deliberately committed, to wit:
I.
The lower court deliberately erred in concluding that both petitioners and respondents did not present
direct documentary evidence to substantiate their respective claims, as it relied purely on the gist of what its
personnel did as regards the transcript of stenographic notes the latter [sic] in collusion with the respondents.
II. The lower court deliberately erred in concluding that both petitioners and respondents relied mainly on
testimonial evidence to prove their respective positions by relying totally on what was presented to it by its
personnel who drafted the Consolidated Decision in collusion with the respondents.
III. The lower court deliberately erred in not ruling that the real estate transaction entered into by said
petitioners and spouses Roman and Amalia Aguzar was a personal transaction and not a law partnership
transaction for the same reasons as stated in Nos. 1 and II above.
IV. The lower court deliberately erred in ruling that the testimonies of the respondents are credible as against
the petitioner Erlando Abrenica and his witnesses for the same reasons as stated in Nos. I and II above.
V. The lower court deliberately erred in ruling that the purchase price for the lot involved was P3 million and
not P8 million for the same reasons as stated in Nos. 1 and II above.
VI. The lower court deliberately erred in ruling that petitioners retainer agreement with Atlanta Industries, Inc.
was a law partnership transaction for the same reasons as stated in Nos. 1 and II above.
VII. The lower court deliberately erred when it failed to rule on said petitioners permissive counterclaim relative
to the various personal loans secured by respondents also for the same reasons as the above.
B.
As an incident of the extrinsic fraud[,] the lower court[,] despite full knowledge of its incapacity[,]
rendered/promulgated the assailed Consolidated Decision x x x without jurisdiction or with lack of jurisdiction.
[10]
(Underscoring in the original.)
On 2 August 2007, the CA issued the first assailed Resolution [11] dismissing the Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 99719,
which held the Petition to be insufficient in form and substance. It noted the following:
x x x. Readily noticeable is that CA-G.R. SP No. 90076 practically contained the prayer for the annulment of the
subject consolidated Decision premised on the very same allegations, grounds or issues as the present
annulment of judgment case.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in character, allowed only in exceptional cases as where there is
no available or other adequate remedy (Espinosa vs. Court of Appeals, 430 SCRA 96[2004]). Under Section 2 of
Rule 47 of the Revised Rules of Court, the only grounds for an annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and
lack of jurisdiction (Cerezo vs. Tuazon, 426 SCRA 167[2004]). Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was
availed of, or could have been availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief.
xxx
xxx
xxx
x x x. In the case at bar, not only has the court a quo jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the persons
of the parties, what petitioner is truly complaining [of] here is only a possible error in the exercise of jurisdiction,
not on the issue of jurisdiction itself. Where there is jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter (as in
this case), the decision on all other questions arising in the case is but an exercise of the jurisdiction. And the
errors which the court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the
proper subject of
an appeal (Republic vs. G Holdings, supra, citing Tolentino vs. Leviste, supra). (Emphasis supplied.)
Subsequently, petitioners filed a Humble Motion for Reconsideration [12] on 28 August 2007.
While the 28 August 2007 motion was pending, on 13 September 2007, petitioner Erlando filed an Urgent
Omnibus Motion[13] with Branch 226, alleging that the sheriff had levied on properties belonging to his children
and petitioner Joena. In addition, Erlando alleged that the trial court still had to determine the manner of
distribution of the firms assets and the value of the levied properties. Lastly, he insisted that the RTC still had to
determine the issue of whether the Rule 41 appeal was the correct remedy.
On the same day, Joena filed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim[14] also with Branch 226 of the RTC of Quezon City,
alleging that she[15] and her stepchildren[16] owned a number of the personal properties sought to be levied. She
also insisted that she owned half of the two (2) motor vehicles as well as the house and lot covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 216818, which formed part of the absolute community of property. She likewise

alleged that the real property, being a family home, and the furniture and the utensils necessary for
housekeeping having a depreciated combined value of one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000) were exempt
from execution pursuant to Rule 39, Section 13 of the Rules of Court. Thus, she sought their discharge and
release and likewise the immediate remittance to her of half of the proceeds, if any.
Accordingly, the RTC scheduled[17] a hearing on the motion. On 17 October 2007, however, petitioner Erlando
moved to withdraw his motion on account of ongoing negotiations with respondents. [18]
Thereafter, petitioner Erlando and respondent Abelardo Tibayan, witnessed by Sheriff Nardo de Guzman, Jr. of
Branch 226 of the RTC of Quezon City, executed an agreement to postpone the auction sale of the property
covered by TCT No. 216818 in anticipation of an amicable settlement of the money judgment. [19]
Finally, on 30 October 2007, the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 99719 issued the second assailed Resolution [20] denying
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration for having been filed out of time, as the last day for filing was on 27
August 2007. Moreover, the CA found that the grounds stated in the motion were merely recycled and rehashed
propositions, which had already been dispensed with.
Petitioners are now assailing the CA Resolutions dated 2 August 2007 and 30 October 2007, respectively, in CAG.R. SP No. 99719. They insist that there is still a pending issue that has not been resolved by the RTC. That
issue arose from the Order[21] given by the trial court to petitioner Erlando to explain why it should take
cognizance of the Notice of Appeal when the proper remedy was a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules
of Court.
Further, petitioners blame the trial and the appellate courts for the dismissal of their appeal despite this Courts
explanation in G.R. No. 169420 that the appeal was the wrong remedy and was thus correctly dismissed by the
CA. Instead of complying with the show-cause Order issued by the RTC, petitioners went directly to the CA and
insisted that the remedy they had undertaken was correct.
Petitioners also contend that there was extrinsic fraud in the appreciation of the merits of the case. They raise in
the present Petition the grounds they cited in the three (3) Petitions for Annulment of Judgment (including the
Amended Petition) quoted above.
Next, they assert that petitioner Joenas right to due process was also violated when she was not made a partyin-interest to the proceedings in the lower courts, even if her half of the absolute community of property was
included in the execution of the judgment rendered by Branch 226 of the RTC of Quezon City.
Finally, they insist that their Humble Motion for Reconsideration was filed on time, since 27 August 2007 was a
holiday. Therefore, they had until 28 August 2007 to file their motion.
Since then, it appears that a Sheriffs Certificate of Sale was issued on 3 January 2008 in favor of the law firm for
the sum of P5 million for the property covered by TCT No. 216818.
On 18 March 2009, while the case was pending with this Court, petitioners filed a Complaint [22] with a prayer for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction before the RTC of Marikina City against herein respondents and
Sheriff Nardo I. de Guzman, Jr. of Branch 226 of the RTC of Quezon City. The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
09-1323-MK and was raffled to Branch 273 of the RTC of Marikina City. [23] Petitioners sought the nullification of
the sheriffs sale on execution of the Decision in the consolidated cases rendered by Branch 226, as well as the
payment of damages. They alleged that the process of the execution sale was conducted irregularly, unlawfully,
and in violation of their right to due process.
On 2 July 2009, Branch 273 of the RTC of Marikina City issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction enjoining
respondents and/or their agents, and the Register of Deeds of Marikina City from consolidating TCT No. 216818.
[24]

The filing of the Complaint with the RTC of Marikina City prompted respondents to file a Motion [25] before us to
cite for contempt petitioner spouses and their counsel, Atty. Antonio R. Bautista. This Motion was on the ground
that petitioners committed forum shopping when they filed the Complaint pending with Branch 273 of the RTC
of Marikina City, while the present case was also still pending.
Meanwhile, on 22 September 2009, respondents filed before Branch 226 an Ex Parte Motion for Issuance of Writ
of Possession.[26] That Motion was granted by Branch 226 through a Resolution [27] issued on 10 November 2011.
This Resolution then became the subject of a Petition for Certiorari [28] under Rule 65 filed by petitioners before
the CA docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 123164.
Soon after, on 6 March 2012, petitioners filed with the CA an Urgent Motion for Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order (T.R.O.)[29] after Sheriff De Guzman, Jr. served on them a Notice to Vacate within five days from
receipt or until 11 March 2012. As of the writing of this Decision, the CA has not resolved the issue raised in the
Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 123164.
Our Ruling
Petitioners elevated this case to this Court, because they were allegedly denied due process when the CA
rejected their second attempt at the annulment of the Decision of the RTC and their Humble Motion for
Reconsideration.
We DENY petitioners claims.
The rules of procedure were formulated to achieve the ends of justice, not to thwart them. Petitioners may not
defy the pronouncement of this Court in G.R. No. 169420 by pursuing remedies that are no longer available to
them. Twice, the CA correctly ruled that the remedy of annulment of judgment was no longer available to them,
because they had already filed an appeal under Rule 41. Due to their own actions, that appeal was dismissed.

It must be emphasized that the RTC Decision became final and executory through the fault of petitioners
themselves when petitioner Erlando (1) filed an appeal under Rule 41 instead of Rule 43; and (2) filed a Petition
for Review directly with the CA, without waiting for the resolution by the RTC of the issues still pending before
the trial court.
In Enriquez v. Court of Appeals,[30] we said:
It is true that the Rules should be interpreted so as to give litigants ample opportunity to prove their respective
claims and that a possible denial of substantial justice due to legal technicalities should be avoided. But it is
equally true that an appeal being a purely statutory right, an appealing party must strictly comply with the
requisites laid down in the Rules of Court. In other words, he who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must play
by the rules. x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
With regard to the allegation of petitioner Joena that her right to due process was violated, it must be recalled
that after she filed her Affidavit of Third Party Claim on 13 September 2007 and petitioner Erlando filed his
Urgent Omnibus Motion raising the same issues contained in that third-party claim, he subsequently filed two
Motions withdrawing his Urgent Omnibus Motion. Petitioner Joena, meanwhile, no longer pursued her third-party
claim or any other remedy available to her. Her failure to act gives this Court the impression that she was no
longer interested in her case. Thus, it was through her own fault that she was not able to ventilate her claim.
Furthermore, it appears from the records that petitioner Erlando was first married to a certain Ma. Aline Lovejoy
Padua on 13 October 1983. They had three children: Patrik Erlando (born on 14 April 1985), Maria Monica Erline
(born on 9 September 1986), and Patrik Randel (born on 12 April 1990).
After the dissolution of the first marriage of Erlando, he and Joena got married on 28 May 1998. [31] In her
Affidavit, Joena alleged that she represented her stepchildren; that the levied personal properties in particular,
a piano with a chair, computer equipment and a computer table were owned by the latter. We note that two of
these stepchildren were already of legal age when Joena filed her Affidavit. As to Patrik Randel, parental
authority over him belongs to his parents. Absent any special power of attorney authorizing Joena to represent
Erlandos children, her claim cannot be sustained.
Petitioner Joena also asserted that the two (2) motor vehicles purchased in 1992 and 1997, as well as the house
and lot covered by TCT No. 216818 formed part of the absolute community regime. However, Art. 92, par. (3) of
the Family Code excludes from the community property the property acquired before the marriage of a spouse
who has legitimate descendants by a former marriage; and the fruits and the income, if any, of that
property. Neither these two vehicles nor the house and lot belong to the second marriage.
We now proceed to discuss the Motion for contempt filed by respondents.
Respondents claim that petitioners and their present counsel, Atty. Antonio R. Bautista, were guilty of forum
shopping when the latter filed Civil Case No. 09-1323-MK with the RTC of Marikina City while the case was still
pending before us. In Executive Secretary v. Gordon,[32] we explained forum shopping in this wise:
Forum-shopping consists of filing multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either
simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. Thus, it has been held that
there is forum-shopping
(1) whenever as a result of an adverse decision in one forum, a party seeks a favorable decision (other than by
appeal or certiorari) in another, or
(2) if, after he has filed a petition before the Supreme Court, a party files another before the Court of Appeals
since in such case he deliberately splits appeals in the hope that even as one case in which a particular remedy
is sought is dismissed, another case (offering a similar remedy) would still be open, or
(3) where a party attempts to obtain a preliminary injunction in another court after failing to obtain the same
from the original court.
Civil Case No. 09-1323-MK was filed to question the proceedings undertaken by the sheriff in executing the
judgment in Civil Case Nos. Q01-42948 and Q01-42959. On the other hand, the present case questions the
merits of the Decision itself in Civil Case Nos. Q01-42948 and Q01-42959. These cases have different causes of
action. Thus, it cannot be said that petitioners were clearly guilty of forum shopping when they filed the
Complaint before the RTC of Marikina City.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The Resolutions dated 2 August 2007 and
30 October 2007 issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 99719 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
SPOUSES EULOGIA MANILA and RAMON MANILA, Petitioners,vs.SPOUSES EDERLINDA GALLARDOMANZO and DANIEL MANZO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 163602 | 2011-09-07
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
This resolves the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, assailing the Decision1 dated February 27, 2004 and Resolution2 dated May 14, 2004 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 49998 which granted the petition for annulment of judgment filed by the
respondents.

The controversy stemmed from an action for ejectment3 filed by the respondents, spouses Ederlinda GallardoManzo and Daniel Manzo, against the petitioners, spouses Ramon and Eulogia Manila, before the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC) of Las Pias City, Branch 79 (Civil Case No. 3537). The facts as summarized by the said court
are as follows:
On June 30, 1982, Ederlinda Gallardo leased two (2) parcels of land situated along Real St., Manuyo, Las Pias,
Metro Manila, to Eulogia Manila for a period of ten (10) years at a monthly rental(s) of P2,000.00 for the first two
years, and thereafter an increase of ten (10) percent every after two years. They also agreed that the lessee
shall have the option to buy the property within two (2) years from the date of execution of the contract of lease
at a fair market value of One Hundred and Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00)
The contract of lease expired on July 1, 1992 but the lessee continued in possession of the property despite a
formal demand letter dated August 8, 1992, to vacate the same and pay the rental arrearages. In a letter reply
dated August 12, 1992, herein defendant claimed that no rental fee is due because she allegedly became the
owner of the property at the time she communicated to the plaintiff her desire to exercise the option to buy the
said property.
Their disagreement was later brought to the Barangay for conciliation but the parties failed to reach a
compromise, hence the present action.4
On July 14, 1993, the MeTC rendered its decision,5 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, a judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiffs ordering the defendants:
1) To vacate the subject parcels of land and surrender possession thereof upon the payment by the plaintiff of
one-half of the value of the building constructed by the lessee. Should the lessor refuse to reimburse the
aforesaid amount, the lessee shall have the option to exercise her right under Article 1678 of the New Civil
Code;
2) To pay rental arrearages up to July 1, 1992 in the amount of Two Hundred Twenty Eight Thousand and Forty
Four 80/100 Pesos (P228,044.80);
3) To pay, as reasonable compensation for their continued withholding of possession of the subject lots, the sum
of Three Thousand Two Hundred and Twenty One Pesos (P3,221.00) every month, commencing July 2, 1992 up
to such time that they finally yield possession thereof to the plaintiffs, subject to an increase of ten percent
(10%) after every two (2) years from said date; and
4) To pay plaintiffs attorney's fees in the sum of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00)
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.6
Petitioners appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 63 (Civil Case No. 93-3733) which
reversed the MeTC. The RTC found that petitioners have in fact exercised their option to buy the leased property
but the respondents refused to honor the same. It noted that respondents even informed the petitioners about
foreclosure proceedings on their property, whereupon the petitioners tried to intervene by tendering rental
payments but the respondents advised them to withhold such payments until the appeal of respondents in the
case they filed against the Rural Bank of Bombon (Camarines Sur), Inc. (Civil Case No. 6062) is resolved. It
further noted that respondents' intention to sell the lot to petitioners is confirmed by the fact that the former
allowed the latter to construct a building of strong materials on the premises. The RTC thus decreed:
IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered reversing the decision of the lower court dated
July 14, 1993 and ordering as follows:
1) That plaintiffs execute a deed of absolute sale over that parcel of land subject of the Contract of Lease dated
June 30, 1982 after full payment of defendants of the purchase price of P150,000.00;
2) That plaintiffs pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.7
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration on December 23, 1994. In its Order dated March 24, 1995, the
RTC denied the motion for having been filed beyond the fifteen (15)-day period considering that respondents

received a copy of the decision on December 7, 1994.8 Consequently, the November 18, 1994 decision of the
RTC became final and executory.9
On December 22, 1998, respondents filed a petition for annulment of the RTC decision in the CA. Respondents
assailed the RTC for ordering them to sell their property to petitioners arguing that said court's appellate
jurisdiction in ejectment cases is limited to the determination of who is entitled to the physical possession of
real property and the only judgment it can render in favor of the defendant is to recover his costs, which
judgment is conclusive only on the issue of possession and does not affect the ownership of the land. They
contended that the sale of real property by one party to another may be ordered by the RTC only in a case for
specific performance falling under its original exclusive jurisdiction, not in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction in an ejectment case. Respondents also alleged that the petition for annulment is the only remedy
available to them because the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate
remedies are no longer available through no fault on their part.
By Decision dated February 27, 2004, the CA granted the petition, annulled the November 18, 1994 RTC
decision and reinstated the July 14, 1993 MeTC decision. On the issue of lack of jurisdiction raised by the
respondents, the CA ruled as follows:
It must be stressed that the main action before the Metropolitan Trial Court is one for ejectment grounded on the
expiration of the parties' contract of lease. And said court, finding that petitioners have a valid right to ask for
the ejectment of private respondents, ordered the latter to vacate the premises and to pay their rentals in
arrears. To Our mind, what the respondent court should have done in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction,
was to confine itself to the issue of whether or not petitioners have a valid cause of action for ejectment against
the private respondents.
Unfortunately, in the decision herein sought to be annulled, the respondent court went further than what is
required of it as an appellate court when it ordered the petitioners to sell their properties to the private
respondents. In a very real sense, the respondent court materially changed the nature of petitioners' cause of
action by deciding the question of ownership even as the appealed case involves only the issue of prior physical
possession which, in every ejectment suit, is the only question to be resolved. As it were, the respondent court
converted the issue to one for specific performance which falls under its original, not appellate jurisdiction. Sad
to say, this cannot be done by the respondent court in an appealed ejectment case because the essential
criterion of appellate jurisdiction is that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause already instituted and
does not create that cause (Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch (U.S.), 137, 172, 2 L. edition 60, cited in 15 Corpus
Juris 727).
It follows that the respondent Regional Trial Court clearly acted without jurisdiction when it ordered the
petitioners to sell their properties to the private respondents. The order to sell can be made only by the
respondent court in an action for specific performance under its exclusive original jurisdiction, and not in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction in an appealed ejectment suit, as in this case. Worse, the relief granted by
the same court was not even prayed for by the private respondents in their Answer and position paper before
the MTC, whereat they only asked for the dismissal of the complaint filed against them.10 (Emphasis supplied.)
With the denial of their motion for reconsideration, petitioners filed the present petition raising the following
issues:
A
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR IN ANNULLING THE JUDGMENT BY THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI CITY NOTWITHSTANDING THE FINDING THAT THE ORDINARY REMEDIES OF
NEW TRIAL, APPEAL, PETITION FOR RELIEF OR OTHER APPROPRIATE REMEDIES WERE LOST THROUGH THE FAULT
OF THE RESPONDENTS
B
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR IN ANNULLING THE JUDGMENT BY THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI CITY ON THE GROUND OF "LACK OF JURISDICTION" WHEN IT HAS NOT BEEN
SHOWN THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI CITY HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF THE
RESPONDENTS OR THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CLAIM11
The petition is meritorious.
A petition for annulment of judgments or final orders of a Regional Trial Court in civil actions can only be availed
of where "the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no

longer available through no fault of the petitioner."12 It is a remedy granted only under exceptional
circumstances and such action is never resorted to as a substitute for a party's own neglect in not promptly
availing of the ordinary or other appropriate remedies.13 The only grounds provided in Sec. 2, Rule 47 are
extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
In this case, respondents alleged that the loss of remedies against the RTC decision was attributable to their
former counsel's late filing of their motion for reconsideration and failure to file any proper petition to set aside
the said decision. They claimed that they had been constantly following up the status of the case with their
counsel, Atty. Jose Atienza, who repeatedly assured them he was on top of the situation and would even get
angry if repeatedly asked about the case. Out of their long and close relationship with Atty. Atienza and due
regard for his poor health due to his numerous and chronic illnesses which required frequent prolonged
confinement at the hospital, respondents likewise desisted from hiring the services of another lawyer to assist
Atty. Atienza, until the latter's death on September 10, 1998. Thus, it was only on November 1998 that
respondents engaged the services of their new counsel who filed the petition for annulment of judgment in the
CA.
We are not persuaded by respondents' asseveration. They could have directly followed up the status of their
case with the RTC especially during the period of Atty. Atienza's hospital confinement. As party litigants, they
should have constantly monitored the progress of their case. Having completely entrusted their case to their
former counsel and believing his word that everything is alright, they have no one to blame but themselves
when it turned out that their opportunity to appeal and other remedies from the adverse ruling of the RTC could
no longer be availed of due to their counsel's neglect. That respondents continued to rely on the services of
their counsel notwithstanding his chronic ailments that had him confined for long periods at the hospital is
unthinkable. Such negligence of counsel is binding on the client, especially when the latter offered no plausible
explanation for his own inaction. The Court has held that when a party retains the services of a lawyer, he is
bound by his counsel's actions and decisions regarding the conduct of the case. This is true especially where he
does not complain against the manner his counsel handles the suit.14 The oft-repeated principle is that an
action for annulment of judgment cannot and is not a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal.15
In any event, the petition for annulment was based not on fraudulent assurances or negligent acts of their
counsel, but on lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioners assail the CA in holding that the RTC decision is void because it granted a relief inconsistent with the
nature of an ejectment suit and not even prayed for by the respondents in their answer. They contend that
whatever maybe questionable in the decision is a ground for assignment of errors on appeal - or in certain
cases, as ground for a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 - and not as ground for its annulment. On
the other hand, respondents assert that the CA, being a higher court, has the power to adopt, reverse or modify
the findings of the RTC in this case. They point out that the CA in the exercise of its sound discretion found the
RTC's findings unsupported by the evidence on record which also indicated that the loss of ordinary remedies of
appeal, new trial and petition for review was not due to the fault of the respondents.
We agree with the petitioners.
Lack of jurisdiction as a ground for annulment of judgment refers to either lack of jurisdiction over the person of
the defending party or over the subject matter of the claim.16 In a petition for annulment of judgment based on
lack of jurisdiction, petitioner must show not merely an abuse of jurisdictional discretion but an absolute lack of
jurisdiction. Lack of jurisdiction means absence of or no jurisdiction, that is, the court should not have taken
cognizance of the petition because the law does not vest it with jurisdiction over the subject matter. Jurisdiction
over the nature of the action or subject matter is conferred by law.17
There is no dispute that the RTC is vested with appellate jurisdiction over ejectment cases decided by the MeTC,
MTC or MCTC. We note that petitioners' attack on the validity of the RTC decision pertains to a relief erroneously
granted on appeal, and beyond the scope of judgment provided in Section 6 (now Section 17) of Rule 70.18
While the court in an ejectment case may delve on the issue of ownership or possession de jure solely for the
purpose of resolving the issue of possession de facto, it has no jurisdiction to settle with finality the issue of
ownership19 and any pronouncement made by it on the question of ownership is provisional in nature.20 A
judgment in a forcible entry or detainer case disposes of no other issue than possession and establishes only
who has the right of possession, but by no means constitutes a bar to an action for determination of who has
the right or title of ownership.21 We have held that although it was proper for the RTC, on appeal in the
ejectment suit, to delve on the issue of ownership and receive evidence on possession de jure, it cannot
adjudicate with semblance of finality the ownership of the property to either party by ordering the cancellation
of the TCT.22

In this case, the RTC acted in excess of its jurisdiction in deciding the appeal of respondents when, instead of
simply dismissing the complaint and awarding any counterclaim for costs due to the defendants (petitioners), it
ordered the respondents-lessors to execute a deed of absolute sale in favor of the petitioners-lessees, on the
basis of its own interpretation of the Contract of Lease which granted petitioners the option to buy the leased
premises within a certain period (two years from date of execution) and for a fixed price (P150,000.00).23 This
cannot be done in an ejectment case where the only issue for resolution is who between the parties is entitled
to the physical possession of the property.
Such erroneous grant of relief to the defendants on appeal, however, is but an exercise of jurisdiction by the
RTC. Jurisdiction is not the same as the exercise of jurisdiction. As distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction,
jurisdiction is the authority to decide a cause, and not the decision rendered therein.24 The ground for
annulment of the decision is absence of, or no, jurisdiction; that is, the court should not have taken cognizance
of the petition because the law does not vest it with jurisdiction over the subject matter.25
Thus, while respondents assailed the content of the RTC decision, they failed to show that the RTC did not have
the authority to decide the case on appeal. As we held in Ybaez v. Court of Appeals:26
On the first issue, we feel that respondent court acted inadvertently when it set aside the RTC ruling relative to
the validity of the substituted service of summons over the persons of the petitioners in the MTC level. We must
not lose sight of the fact that what was filed before respondent court is an action to annul the RTC judgment and
not a petition for review. Annulment of judgment may either be based on the ground that a judgment is void for
want of jurisdiction or that the judgment was obtained by extrinsic fraud. There is nothing in the records that
could cogently show that the RTC lacked jurisdiction. Chiefly, Section 22 of B.P. Blg. 129, otherwise known as the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, vests upon the RTC the exercise of an "appellate jurisdiction over all cases
decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in their
respective territorial jurisdictions." Clearly then, when the RTC took cognizance of petitioners' appeal from the
adverse decision of the MTC in the ejectment suit, it (RTC) was unquestionably exercising its appellate
jurisdiction as mandated by law. Perforce, its decision may not be annulled on the basis of lack of jurisdiction as
it has, beyond cavil, jurisdiction to decide the appeal.27 (Emphasis supplied.)
The CA therefore erred in annulling the November 18, 1994 RTC decision on the ground of lack of jurisdiction as
said court had jurisdiction to take cognizance of petitioners' appeal.
On the timeliness of the petition for annulment of judgment filed with the CA, Section 3, Rule 47 of the Rules of
Court provides that a petition for annulment of judgment based on extrinsic fraud must be filed within four years
from its discovery; and if based on lack of jurisdiction, before it is barred by laches or estoppel. The principle of
laches or "stale demands" ordains that the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of
time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier-negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warrants a presumption that the party entitled to assert it
has abandoned it or declined to assert it.28 There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or staleness
of demand; each case is to be determined according to its particular circumstances.29
Here, respondents' failure to assail the RTC ruling in a petition for review or certiorari before the CA, rendered
the same final and executory. Having lost these remedies due to their lethargy for three and a half years, they
cannot now be permitted to assail anew the said ruling rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction. Their inaction and neglect to pursue available remedies to set aside the RTC decision for such length
of time, without any acceptable explanation other than the word of a former counsel who already passed away,
constitutes unreasonable delay warranting the presumption that they have declined to assert their right over
the leased premises which continued to be in the possession of the petitioners. Clearly, respondents' petition to
annul the final RTC decision is barred under the equitable doctrine of laches.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision dated February 27, 2004 and
Resolution dated May 14, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 49998 are SET ASIDE. The petition for
annulment of judgment filed by herein respondents is DISMISSED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
NAVIDA ET AL VS DIZON ET AL AND ALLIED CASES
FIRST DIVISION
DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Before the Court are consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which
arose out of two civil cases that were filed in different courts but whose factual background and issues are
closely intertwined.
The petitions in G.R. Nos. 125078 [1] and 125598 [2] both assail the Order [3] dated May 20, 1996 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of General Santos City, Branch 37, in Civil Case No. 5617. The said Order decreed the
dismissal of the case in view of the perceived lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matter of the
complaint. The petition in G.R. No. 125598 also challenges the Orders dated June 4, 1996 [4] and July 9,
1996, [5] which held that the RTC of General Santos City no longer had jurisdiction to proceed with Civil Case
No. 5617.
On the other hand, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 126654, [6] 127856, [7] and 128398 [8] seek the reversal of the
Order [9] dated October 1, 1996 of the RTC of Davao City, Branch 16, in Civil Case No. 24,251-96, which also
dismissed the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
G.R. Nos. 125078, 125598, 126654, 127856, and 128398 were consolidated in the Resolutions dated February
10, 1997, [10] April 28, 1997 [11] and March 10, 1999. [12]
The factual antecedents of the petitions are as follows:
Proceedings before the Texas Courts
Beginning 1993, a number of personal injury suits were filed in different Texas state courts by citizens of twelve
foreign countries, including the Philippines. The thousands of plaintiffs sought damages for injuries they
allegedly sustained from their exposure to dibromochloropropane (DBCP), a chemical used to kill nematodes
(worms), while working on farms in 23 foreign countries. The cases were eventually transferred to, and
consolidated in, the Federal District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division. The cases therein
that involved plaintiffs from the Philippines were "Jorge Colindres Carcamo, et al. v. Shell Oil Co., et al.," which
was docketed as Civil Action No. H-94-1359, and "Juan Ramon Valdez, et al. v. Shell Oil Co., et al.," which was
docketed as Civil Action No. H-95-1356. The defendants in the consolidated cases prayed for the dismissal of all
the actions under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
In a Memorandum and Order dated July 11, 1995, the Federal District Court conditionally granted the
defendants motion to dismiss. Pertinently, the court ordered that:
Delgado, Jorge Carcamo, Valdez and Isae Carcamo will be dismissed 90 days after the entry of this
Memorandum and Order provided that defendants and third- and fourth-party defendants have:
(1) participated in expedited discovery in the United States xxx;
(2) either waived or accepted service of process and waived any other jurisdictional defense within 40 days after
the entry of this Memorandum and Order in any action commenced by a plaintiff in these actions in his home
country or the country in which his injury occurred. Any plaintiff desiring to bring such an action will do so within
30 days after the entry of this Memorandum and Order;
(3) waived within 40 days after the entry of this Memorandum and Order any limitations-based defense that has
matured since the commencement of these actions in the courts of Texas;
(4) stipulated within 40 days after the entry of this Memorandum and Order that any discovery conducted
during the pendency of these actions may be used in any foreign proceeding to the same extent as if it had
been conducted in proceedings initiated there; and
(5) submitted within 40 days after the entry of this Memorandum and Order an agreement binding them to
satisfy any final judgment rendered in favor of plaintiffs by a foreign court.
xxxx
Notwithstanding the dismissals that may result from this Memorandum and Order, in the event that the highest
court of any foreign country finally affirms the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction of an action commenced by a
plaintiff in these actions in his home country or the country in which he was injured, that plaintiff may return to

this court and, upon proper motion, the court will resume jurisdiction over the action as if the case had never
been dismissed for [forum non conveniens]. [13]
Civil Case No. 5617 before the RTC of General Santos City and G.R. Nos. 125078 and 125598
In accordance with the above Memorandum and Order, a total of 336 plaintiffs from General Santos City (the
petitioners in G.R. No. 125078, hereinafter referred to as NAVIDA, et al.) filed a Joint Complaint [14] in the RTC of
General Santos City on August 10, 1995. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 5617. Named as defendants
therein were: Shell Oil Co. (SHELL); Dow Chemical Co. (DOW); Occidental Chemical Corp. (OCCIDENTAL); Dole
Food Co., Inc., Dole Fresh Fruit Co., Standard Fruit Co., Standard Fruit and Steamship Co. (hereinafter collectively
referred to as DOLE); Chiquita Brands, Inc. and Chiquita Brands International, Inc. (CHIQUITA); Del Monte Fresh
Produce N.A. and Del Monte Tropical Fruit Co. (hereinafter collectively referred to as DEL MONTE); Dead Sea
Bromine Co., Ltd.; Ameribrom, Inc.; Bromine Compounds, Ltd.; and Amvac Chemical Corp. (The aforementioned
defendants are hereinafter collectively referred to as defendant companies.)
Navida, et al., prayed for the payment of damages in view of the illnesses and injuries to the reproductive
systems which they allegedly suffered because of their exposure to DBCP. They claimed, among others, that
they were exposed to this chemical during the early 1970s up to the early 1980s when they used the same in
the banana plantations where they worked at; and/or when they resided within the agricultural area where such
chemical was used. Navida, et al., claimed that their illnesses and injuries were due to the fault or negligence of
each of the defendant companies in that they produced, sold and/or otherwise put into the stream of commerce
DBCP-containing products. According to NAVIDA, et al., they were allowed to be exposed to the said products,
which the defendant companies knew, or ought to have known, were highly injurious to the formers health and
well-being.
Instead of answering the complaint, most of the defendant companies respectively filed their Motions for Bill of
Particulars. [15] During the pendency of the motions, on March 13, 1996, NAVIDA, et al., filed an Amended Joint
Complaint, [16] excluding Dead Sea Bromine Co., Ltd., Ameribrom, Inc., Bromine Compounds, Ltd. and Amvac
Chemical Corp. as party defendants.
Again, the remaining defendant companies filed their various Motions for Bill of Particulars. [17] On May 15,
1996, DOW filed an Answer with Counterclaim. [18]
On May 20, 1996, without resolving the motions filed by the parties, the RTC of General Santos City issued an
Order dismissing the complaint. First, the trial court determined that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the case,
to wit:
THE COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES FILED WITH THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR LACK OF
JURISDICTION
xxxx
The substance of the cause of action as stated in the complaint against the defendant foreign companies cites
activity on their part which took place abroad and had occurred outside and beyond the territorial domain of the
Philippines. These acts of defendants cited in the complaint included the manufacture of pesticides, their
packaging in containers, their distribution through sale or other disposition, resulting in their becoming part of
the stream of commerce.
Accordingly, the subject matter stated in the complaint and which is uniquely particular to the present case,
consisted of activity or course of conduct engaged in by foreign defendants outside Philippine territory, hence,
outside and beyond the jurisdiction of Philippine Courts, including the present Regional Trial Court. [19]
Second, the RTC of General Santos City declared that the tort alleged by Navida, et al., in their complaint is a
tort category that is not recognized in Philippine laws. Said the trial court:
THE TORT ASSERTED IN THE PRESENT COMPLAINT AGAINST DEFENDANT FOREIGN COMPANIES IS NOT WITHIN
THE SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BECAUSE IT IS NOT A TORT CATEGORY
WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF THE PHILIPPINE LAW
The specific tort asserted against defendant foreign companies in the present complaint is product liability tort.
When the averments in the present complaint are examined in terms of the particular categories of tort
recognized in the Philippine Civil Code, it becomes stark clear that such averments describe and identify the
category of specific tort known as product liability tort. This is necessarily so, because it is
the product manufactured by defendant foreign companies, which is asserted to be the proximate cause of the

damages sustained by the plaintiff workers, and the liability of the defendant foreign companies, is premised on
being the manufacturer of the pesticides.
It is clear, therefore, that the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the present case, if and only if the Civil
Code of the Philippines, or a suppletory special law prescribes a product liability tort, inclusive of and
comprehending the specific tort described in the complaint of the plaintiff workers. [20]
Third, the RTC of General Santos City adjudged that Navida, et al., were coerced into submitting their case to the
Philippine courts, viz:
FILING OF CASES IN THE PHILIPPINES - COERCED AND ANOMALOUS
The Court views that the plaintiffs did not freely choose to file the instant action, but rather were coerced to do
so, merely to comply with the U.S. District Courts Order dated July 11, 1995, and in order to keep open to the
plaintiffs the opportunity to return to the U.S. District Court. [21]
Fourth, the trial court ascribed little significance to the voluntary appearance of the defendant companies
therein, thus:
THE DEFENDANTS SUBMISSION TO JURISDICTION IS CONDITIONAL AS IT IS ILLUSORY
Defendants have appointed their agents authorized to accept service of summons/processes in the Philippines
pursuant to the agreement in the U.S. court that defendants will voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of this
court. While it is true that this court acquires jurisdiction over persons of the defendants through their voluntary
appearance, it appears that such voluntary appearance of the defendants in this case is conditional. Thus in the
"Defendants Amended Agreement Regarding Conditions of Dismissal for Forum Non Conveniens" (Annex to the
Complaint) filed with the U.S. District Court, defendants declared that "(t)he authority of each designated
representative to accept service of process will become effective upon final dismissal of these actions by the
Court". The decision of the U.S. District Court dismissing the case is not yet final and executory since both the
plaintiffs and defendants appealed therefrom (par. 3(h), 3(i), Amended Complaint). Consequently, since the
authority of the agent of the defendants in the Philippines is conditioned on the final adjudication of the case
pending with the U.S. courts, the acquisition of jurisdiction by this court over the persons of the defendants is
also conditional. x x x.
The appointment of agents by the defendants, being subject to a suspensive condition, thus produces no legal
effect and is ineffective at the moment. [22]
Fifth, the RTC of General Santos City ruled that the act of NAVIDA, et al., of filing the case in the Philippine courts
violated the rules on forum shopping and litis pendencia. The trial court expounded:
THE JURISDICTION FROWNS UPON AND PROHIBITS FORUM SHOPPING
This court frowns upon the fact that the parties herein are both vigorously pursuing their appeal of the decision
of the U.S. District court dismissing the case filed thereat. To allow the parties to litigate in this court when they
are actively pursuing the same cases in another forum, violates the rule on forum shopping so abhorred in this
jurisdiction. x x x.
xxxx
THE FILING OF THE CASE IN U.S. DIVESTED THIS COURT OF ITS OWN JURISDICTION
Moreover, the filing of the case in the U.S. courts divested this court of its own jurisdiction. This court takes note
that the U.S. District Court did not decline jurisdiction over the cause of action. The case was dismissed on the
ground of forum non conveniens, which is really a matter of venue. By taking cognizance of the case, the U.S.
District Court has, in essence, concurrent jurisdiction with this court over the subject matter of this case. It is
settled that initial acquisition of jurisdiction divests another of its own jurisdiction. x x x.
xxxx
THIS CASE IS BARRED BY THE RULE OF "LITIS PENDENCIA"
Furthermore, the case filed in the U.S. court involves the same parties, same rights and interests, as in this case.
There exists litis pendencia since there are two cases involving the same parties and interests. The court would
like to emphasize that in accordance with the rule on litis pendencia x x x; the subsequent case must be

dismissed. Applying the foregoing [precept] to the case-at-bar, this court concludes that since the case between
the parties in the U.S. is still pending, then this case is barred by the rule on "litis pendencia." [23]
In fine, the trial court held that:
It behooves this Court, then to dismiss this case. For to continue with these proceedings, would be violative of
the constitutional provision on the Bill of Rights guaranteeing speedy disposition of cases (Ref. Sec. 16, Article
III, Constitution). The court has no other choice. To insist on further proceedings with this case, as it is now
presented, might accord this court a charming appearance. But the same insistence would actually thwart the
very ends of justice which it seeks to achieve.
This evaluation and action is made not on account of but rather with due consideration to the fact that the
dismissal of this case does not necessarily deprive the parties especially the plaintiffs of their possible
remedies. The court is cognizant that the Federal Court may resume proceedings of that earlier case between
the herein parties involving the same acts or omissions as in this case.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, this case is now considered DISMISSED. [24]
On June 4, 1996, the RTC of General Santos City likewise issued an Order, [25] dismissing DOWs Answer with
Counterclaim.
CHIQUITA, DEL MONTE and SHELL each filed a motion for reconsideration [26] of the RTC Order dated May 20,
1996, while DOW filed a motion for reconsideration [2] of the RTC Order dated June 4, 1996. Subsequently, DOW
and OCCIDENTAL also filed a Joint Motion for Reconsideration [28] of the RTC Order dated May 20, 1996.
In an Order [29] dated July 9, 1996, the RTC of General Santos City declared that it had already lost its
jurisdiction over the case as it took into consideration the Manifestation of the counsel of NAVIDA, et al., which
stated that the latter had already filed a petition for review on certiorari before this Court.
CHIQUITA and SHELL filed their motions for reconsideration [30] of the above order.
On July 11, 1996, NAVIDA, et al., filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari in order to assail the RTC Order dated
May 20, 1996, which was docketed as G.R. No. 125078.
The RTC of General Santos City then issued an Order [31] dated August 14, 1996, which merely noted the
incidents still pending in Civil Case No. 5617 and reiterated that it no longer had any jurisdiction over the case.
On August 30, 1996, DOW and OCCIDENTAL filed their Petition for Review on Certiorari, [32] challenging the
orders of the RTC of General Santos City dated May 20, 1996, June 4, 1996 and July 9, 1996. Their petition was
docketed as G.R. No. 125598.
In their petition, DOW and OCCIDENTAL aver that the RTC of General Santos City erred in ruling that it has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case as well as the persons of the defendant companies.
In a Resolution [33] dated October 7, 1996, this Court resolved to consolidate G.R. No. 125598 with G.R. No.
125078.
CHIQUITA filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari, [34] which sought the reversal of the RTC Orders dated May
20, 1996, July 9, 1996 and August 14, 1996. The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 126018. In a
Resolution [35] dated November 13, 1996, the Court dismissed the aforesaid petition for failure of CHIQUITA to
show that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion. CHIQUITA filed a Motion for Reconsideration, [36] but
the same was denied through a Resolution [37] dated January 27, 1997.
Civil Case No. 24,251-96 before the RTC of Davao City and G.R. Nos. 126654, 127856, and 128398
Another joint complaint for damages against SHELL, DOW, OCCIDENTAL, DOLE, DEL MONTE, and CHIQUITA was
filed before Branch 16 of the RTC of Davao City by 155 plaintiffs from Davao City. This case was docketed as Civil
Case No. 24,251-96. These plaintiffs (the petitioners in G.R. No. 126654, hereinafter referred to as ABELLA, et
al.) amended their Joint-Complaint on May 21, 1996. [38]
Similar to the complaint of NAVIDA, et al., ABELLA, et al., alleged that, as workers in the banana plantation
and/or as residents near the said plantation, they were made to use and/or were exposed to nematocides, which
contained the chemical DBCP. According to ABELLA, et al., such exposure resulted in "serious and permanent
injuries to their health, including, but not limited to, sterility and severe injuries to their reproductive

capacities." [39] ABELLA, et al., claimed that the defendant companies manufactured, produced, sold,
distributed, used, and/or made available in commerce, DBCP without warning the users of its hazardous effects
on health, and without providing instructions on its proper use and application, which the defendant companies
knew or ought to have known, had they exercised ordinary care and prudence.
Except for DOW, the other defendant companies filed their respective motions for bill of particulars to which
ABELLA, et al., filed their opposition. DOW and DEL MONTE filed their respective Answers dated May 17, 1996
and June 24, 1996.
The RTC of Davao City, however, junked Civil Case No. 24,251-96 in its Order dated October 1, 1996, which, in
its entirety, reads:
Upon a thorough review of the Complaint and Amended Complaint For: Damages filed by the plaintiffs against
the defendants Shell Oil Company, DOW Chemicals Company, Occidental Chemical Corporation, Standard Fruit
Company, Standard Fruit and Steamship, DOLE Food Company, DOLE Fresh Fruit Company, Chiquita Brands,
Inc., Chiquita Brands International, Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A. and Del Monte Tropical Fruits Co., all foreign
corporations with Philippine Representatives, the Court, as correctly pointed out by one of the defendants, is
convinced that plaintiffs "would have this Honorable Court dismiss the case to pave the way for their getting an
affirmance by the Supreme Court" (#10 of Defendants Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A. and Del Monte Tropical
Fruit Co., Reply to Opposition dated July 22, 1996). Consider these:
1) In the original Joint Complaint, plaintiffs state that: defendants have no properties in the Philippines; they
have no agents as well (par. 18); plaintiffs are suing the defendants for tortuous acts committed by these
foreign corporations on their respective countries, as plaintiffs, after having elected to sue in the place of
defendants residence, are now compelled by a decision of a Texas District Court to file cases under torts in this
jurisdiction forcauses of actions which occurred abroad (par. 19); a petition was filed by same plaintiffs against
same defendants in the Courts of Texas, USA, plaintiffs seeking for payment of damages based on negligence,
strict liability, conspiracy and international tort theories (par. 27); upon defendants Motion to Dismiss on Forum
non [conveniens], said petition was provisionally dismissed on condition that these cases be filed in the
Philippines or before 11 August 1995 (Philippine date; Should the Philippine Courts refuse or deny jurisdiction,
the U. S. Courts will reassume jurisdiction.)
11. In the Amended Joint Complaint, plaintiffs aver that: on 11 July 1995, the Federal District Court issued a
Memorandum and Order conditionally dismissing several of the consolidated actions including those filed by the
Filipino complainants. One of the conditions imposed was for the plaintiffs to file actions in their home countries
or the countries in which they were injured x x x. Notwithstanding, the Memorandum and [O]rder further
provided that should the highest court of any foreign country affirm the dismissal for lack of jurisdictions over
these actions filed by the plaintiffs in their home countries [or] the countries where they were injured, the said
plaintiffs may return to that court and, upon proper motion, the Court will resume jurisdiction as if the case had
never been dismissed for forum non conveniens.
The Court however is constrained to dismiss the case at bar not solely on the basis of the above but because it
shares the opinion of legal experts given in the interview made by the Inquirer in its Special report "Pesticide
Cause Mass Sterility," to wit:
1. Former Justice Secretary Demetrio Demetria in a May 1995 opinion said: The Philippines should be an
inconvenient forum to file this kind of damage suit against foreign companies since the causes of action alleged
in the petition do not exist under Philippine laws. There has been no decided case in Philippine Jurisprudence
awarding to those adversely affected by DBCP. This means there is no available evidence which will prove and
disprove the relation between sterility and DBCP.
2. Retired Supreme Court Justice Abraham Sarmiento opined that while a class suit is allowed in the Philippines
the device has been employed strictly. Mass sterility will not qualify as a class suit injury within the
contemplation of Philippine statute.
3. Retired High Court Justice Rodolfo Nocom stated that there is simply an absence of doctrine here that permits
these causes to be heard. No product liability ever filed or tried here.
Case ordered dismissed. [40]
Docketed as G.R. No. 126654, the petition for review, filed on November 12, 1996 by ABELLA, et al., assails
before this Court the above-quoted order of the RTC of Davao City.

ABELLA, et al., claim that the RTC of Davao City erred in dismissing Civil Case No. 24,251-96 on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction.
According to ABELLA, et al., the RTC of Davao City has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case since
Articles 2176 and 2187 of the Civil Code are broad enough to cover the acts complained of and to support their
claims for damages.
ABELLA, et al., further aver that the dismissal of the case, based on the opinions of legal luminaries reported in
a newspaper, by the RTC of Davao City is bereft of basis. According to them, their cause of action is based on
quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. They also maintain that the absence of jurisprudence regarding
the award of damages in favor of those adversely affected by the DBCP does not preclude them from presenting
evidence to prove their allegations that their exposure to DBCP caused their sterility and/or infertility.
SHELL, DOW, and CHIQUITA each filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the Order dated October 1,
1996 of the RTC of Davao City. DEL MONTE also filed its motion for reconsideration, which contained an
additional motion for the inhibition of the presiding judge.
The presiding judge of Branch 16 then issued an Order [41] dated December 2, 1996, voluntarily inhibiting
himself from trying the case. Thus, the case was re-raffled to Branch 13 of the RTC of Davao City.
In an Order [42] dated December 16, 1996, the RTC of Davao City affirmed the Order dated October 1, 1996,
and denied the respective motions for reconsideration filed by defendant companies.
Thereafter, CHIQUITA filed a Petition for Review dated March 5, 1997, questioning the Orders dated October 1,
1996 and December 16, 1996 of the RTC of Davao City. This case was docketed as G.R. No. 128398.
In its petition, CHIQUITA argues that the RTC of Davao City erred in dismissing the case motu proprio as it
acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case as well as over the persons of the defendant companies
which voluntarily appeared before it. CHIQUITA also claims that the RTC of Davao City cannot dismiss the case
simply on the basis of opinions of alleged legal experts appearing in a newspaper article.
Initially, this Court in its Resolution [43] dated July 28, 1997, dismissed the petition filed by CHIQUITA for
submitting a defective certificate against forum shopping. CHIQUITA, however, filed a motion for
reconsideration, which was granted by this Court in the Resolution [44] dated October 8, 1997.
On March 7, 1997, DEL MONTE also filed its petition for review on certiorari before this Court assailing the
above-mentioned orders of the RTC of Davao City. Its petition was docketed as G.R. No. 127856.
DEL MONTE claims that the RTC of Davao City has jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 24,251-96, as defined under
the law and that the said court already obtained jurisdiction over its person by its voluntary appearance and the
filing of a motion for bill of particulars and, later, an answer to the complaint. According to DEL MONTE, the RTC
of Davao City, therefore, acted beyond its authority when it dismissed the case motu proprio or without any
motion to dismiss from any of the parties to the case.
In the Resolutions dated February 10, 1997, April 28, 1997, and March 10, 1999, this Court consolidated G.R.
Nos. 125078, 125598, 126654, 127856, and 128398.
The Consolidated Motion to Drop DOW, OCCIDENTAL, and SHELL as Party-Respondents filed by NAVIDA, et al.
and ABELLA, et al.
On September 26, 1997, NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., filed before this Court a Consolidated Motion (to
Drop Party-Respondents). [45] The plaintiff claimants alleged that they had amicably settled their cases with
DOW, OCCIDENTAL, and SHELL sometime in July 1997. This settlement agreement was evidenced by facsimiles
of the "Compromise Settlement, Indemnity, and Hold Harmless Agreement," which were attached to the said
motion. Pursuant to said agreement, the plaintiff claimants sought to withdraw their petitions as against DOW,
OCCIDENTAL, and SHELL.
DOLE, DEL MONTE and CHIQUITA, however, opposed the motion, as well as the settlement entered into between
the plaintiff claimants and DOW, OCCIDENTAL, and SHELL.
The Memoranda of the Parties
Considering the allegations, issues, and arguments adduced by the parties, this Court, in a Resolution dated
June 22, 1998, [46] required all the parties to submit their respective memoranda.

CHIQUITA filed its Memorandum on August 28, 1998; [47] SHELL asked to be excused from the filing of a
memorandum alleging that it had already executed a compromise agreement with the plaintiff
claimants. [48] DOLE filed its Memorandum on October 12, 1998 [49] while DEL MONTE filed on October 13,
1998. [50] NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., filed their Consolidated Memorandum on February 3,
1999; [51] and DOW and OCCIDENTAL jointly filed a Memorandum on December 23, 1999. [52]
The Motion to Withdraw Petition for Review in G.R. No. 125598
On July 13, 2004, DOW and OCCIDENTAL filed a Motion to Withdraw Petition for Review in G.R. No.
125598, [53] explaining that the said petition "is already moot and academic and no longer presents a
justiciable controversy" since they have already entered into an amicable settlement with NAVIDA, et al. DOW
and OCCIDENTAL added that they have fully complied with their obligations set forth in the 1997 Compromise
Agreements.
DOLE filed its Manifestation dated September 6, 2004, [54] interposing no objection to the withdrawal of the
petition, and further stating that they maintain their position that DOW and OCCIDENTAL, as well as other
settling defendant companies, should be retained as defendants for purposes of prosecuting the cross-claims of
DOLE, in the event that the complaint below is reinstated.
NAVIDA, et al., also filed their Comment dated September 14, 2004, [55] stating that they agree with the view of
DOW and OCCIDENTAL that the petition in G.R. No. 125598 has become moot and academic because Civil Case
No. 5617 had already been amicably settled by the parties in 1997.
On September 27, 2004, DEL MONTE filed its Comment on Motion to Withdraw Petition for Review Filed by
Petitioners in G.R. No. 125598, [56] stating that it has no objections to the withdrawal of the petition filed by
DOW and OCCIDENTAL in G.R. No. 125598.
In a Resolution [57] dated October 11, 2004, this Court granted, among others, the motion to withdraw petition
for review filed by DOW and OCCIDENTAL.
THE ISSUES
In their Consolidated Memorandum, NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., presented the following issues for our
consideration:
IN REFUTATION
I. THE COURT DISMISSED THE CASE DUE TO LACK OF JURISDICTION.
a) The court did not simply dismiss the case because it was filed in bad faith with petitioners intending to have
the same dismissed and returned to the Texas court.
b) The court dismissed the case because it was convinced that it did not have jurisdiction.
IN SUPPORT OF THE PETITION
II. THE TRIAL COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE.
a. The acts complained of occurred within Philippine territory.
b. Art. 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines is broad enough to cover the acts complained of.
c. Assumption of jurisdiction by the U.S. District Court over petitioner[s] claims did not divest Philippine [c]ourts
of jurisdiction over the same.
d. The Compromise Agreement and the subsequent Consolidated Motion to Drop Party Respondents Dow,
Occidental and Shell does not unjustifiably prejudice remaining respondents Dole, Del Monte and Chiquita. [58]
DISCUSSION
On the issue of jurisdiction
Essentially, the crux of the controversy in the petitions at bar is whether the RTC of General Santos City and the
RTC of Davao City erred in dismissing Civil Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96, respectively, for lack of jurisdiction.

Remarkably, none of the parties to this case claims that the courts a quo are bereft of jurisdiction to determine
and resolve the above-stated cases. All parties contend that the RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of
Davao City have jurisdiction over the action for damages, specifically for approximately P2.7 million for each of
the plaintiff claimants.
NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., argue that the allegedly tortious acts and/or omissions of defendant
companies occurred within Philippine territory. Specifically, the use of and exposure to DBCP that was
manufactured, distributed or otherwise put into the stream of commerce by defendant companies happened in
the Philippines. Said fact allegedly constitutes reasonable basis for our courts to assume jurisdiction over the
case. Furthermore, NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., assert that the provisions of Chapter 2 of the Preliminary
Title of the Civil Code, as well as Article 2176 thereof, are broad enough to cover their claim for damages. Thus,
NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., pray that the respective rulings of the RTC of General Santos City and the RTC
of Davao City in Civil Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96 be reversed and that the said cases be remanded to the
courts a quo for further proceedings.
DOLE similarly maintains that the acts attributed to defendant companies constitute a quasi-delict, which falls
under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. In addition, DOLE states that if there were no actionable wrongs committed
under Philippine law, the courts a quo should have dismissed the civil cases on the ground that the Amended
Joint-Complaints of NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., stated no cause of action against the defendant
companies. DOLE also argues that if indeed there is no positive law defining the alleged acts of defendant
companies as actionable wrong, Article 9 of the Civil Code dictates that a judge may not refuse to render a
decision on the ground of insufficiency of the law. The court may still resolve the case, applying the customs of
the place and, in the absence thereof, the general principles of law. DOLE posits that the Philippines is the situs
of the tortious acts allegedly committed by defendant companies as NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., point to
their alleged exposure to DBCP which occurred in the Philippines, as the cause of the sterility and other
reproductive system problems that they allegedly suffered. Finally, DOLE adds that the RTC of Davao City
gravely erred in relying upon newspaper reports in dismissing Civil Case No. 24,251-96 given that newspaper
articles are hearsay and without any evidentiary value. Likewise, the alleged legal opinions cited in the
newspaper reports were taken judicial notice of, without any notice to the parties. DOLE, however, opines that
the dismissal of Civil Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96 was proper, given that plaintiff claimants merely prosecuted
the cases with the sole intent of securing a dismissal of the actions for the purpose of convincing the U.S.
Federal District Court to re-assume jurisdiction over the cases.
In a similar vein, CHIQUITA argues that the courts a quo had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the cases
filed before them. The Amended Joint-Complaints sought approximately P2.7 million in damages for each
plaintiff claimant, which amount falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC. CHIQUITA avers that the pertinent matter
is the place of the alleged exposure to DBCP, not the place of manufacture, packaging, distribution, sale, etc., of
the said chemical. This is in consonance with the lex loci delicti commisi theory in determining the situs of a tort,
which states that the law of the place where the alleged wrong was committed will govern the action. CHIQUITA
and the other defendant companies also submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the RTC by making
voluntary appearances and seeking for affirmative reliefs during the course of the proceedings. None of the
defendant companies ever objected to the exercise of jurisdiction by the courts a quo over their persons.
CHIQUITA, thus, prays for the remand of Civil Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96 to the RTC of General Santos City
and the RTC of Davao City, respectively.
The RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City have jurisdiction over Civil Case Nos. 5617 and
24,251-96, respectively
The rule is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is determined by
the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are
entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein. [59] Once vested by law, on a particular court or body, the
jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action cannot be dislodged by anybody other than by the
legislature through the enactment of a law.
At the time of the filing of the complaints, the jurisdiction of the RTC in civil cases under Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, was:
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
xxxx
(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees,
litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds One hundred thousand pesos

(P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand, exclusive of the abovementioned
items exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00). [60]
Corollary thereto, Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 09-94, states:
2. The exclusion of the term "damages of whatever kind" in determining the jurisdictional amount under Section
19 (8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, applies to cases where the damages
are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action. However, in cases where the claim for
damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be
considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court.
Here, NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., sought in their similarly-worded Amended Joint-Complaints filed before
the courts a quo, the following prayer:
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed that after hearing, judgment be rendered in
favor of the plaintiffs ordering the defendants:
a) TO PAY EACH PLAINTIFF moral damages in the amount of One Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P1,500,00.00);
b) TO PAY EACH PLAINTIFF nominal damages in the amount of Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (P400,000.00)
each;
c) TO PAY EACH PLAINTIFF exemplary damages in the amount of Six Hundred Thousand Pesos (P600,000.00);
d) TO PAY EACH PLAINTIFF attorneys fees of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00); and
e) TO PAY THE COSTS of the suit. [61]
From the foregoing, it is clear that the claim for damages is the main cause of action and that the total amount
sought in the complaints is approximately P2.7 million for each of the plaintiff claimants. The RTCs unmistakably
have jurisdiction over the cases filed in General Santos City and Davao City, as both claims by NAVIDA, et al.,
and ABELLA, et al., fall within the purview of the definition of the jurisdiction of the RTC under Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129.
Moreover, the allegations in both Amended Joint-Complaints narrate that:
THE CAUSES OF ACTION
4. The Defendants manufactured, sold, distributed, used, AND/OR MADE AVAILABLE IN COMMERCE nematocides
containing the chemical dibromochloropropane, commonly known as DBCP. THE CHEMICAL WAS USED AGAINST
the parasite known as the nematode, which plagued banana plantations, INCLUDING THOSE in the Philippines.
AS IT TURNED OUT, DBCP not only destroyed nematodes. IT ALSO CAUSED ILL-EFFECTS ON THE HEALTH OF
PERSONS EXPOSED TO IT AFFECTING the human reproductive system as well.
5. The plaintiffs were exposed to DBCP in the 1970s up to the early 1980s WHILE (a) they used this product in
the banana plantations WHERE they were employed, and/or (b) they resided within the agricultural area WHERE
IT WAS USED. As a result of such exposure, the plaintiffs suffered serious and permanent injuries TO THEIR
HEALTH, including, but not limited to, STERILITY and severe injuries to their reproductive capacities.
6. THE DEFENDANTS WERE AT FAULT OR WERE NEGLIGENT IN THAT THEY MANUFACTURED, produced, sold,
and/or USED DBCP and/or otherwise, PUT THE SAME into the stream of commerce, WITHOUT INFORMING THE
USERS OF ITS HAZARDOUS EFFECTS ON HEALTH AND/OR WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS ON ITS PROPER USE AND
APPLICATION. THEY allowed Plaintiffs to be exposed to, DBCP-containing materials which THEY knew, or in the
exercise of ordinary care and prudence ought to have known, were highly harmful and injurious to the Plaintiffs
health and well-being.
7. The Defendants WHO MANUFACTURED, PRODUCED, SOLD, DISTRIBUTED, MADE AVAILABLE OR PUT DBCP
INTO THE STREAM OF COMMERCE were negligent OR AT FAULT in that they, AMONG OTHERS:
a. Failed to adequately warn Plaintiffs of the dangerous characteristics of DBCP, or to cause their subsidiaries or
affiliates to so warn plaintiffs;

b. Failed to provide plaintiffs with information as to what should be reasonably safe and sufficient clothing and
proper protective equipment and appliances, if any, to protect plaintiffs from the harmful effects of exposure to
DBCP, or to cause their subsidiaries or affiliates to do so;
c. Failed to place adequate warnings, in a language understandable to the worker, on containers of DBCPcontaining materials to warn of the dangers to health of coming into contact with DBCP, or to cause their
subsidiaries or affiliates to do so;
d. Failed to take reasonable precaution or to exercise reasonable care to publish, adopt and enforce a safety
plan and a safe method of handling and applying DBCP, or to cause their subsidiaries or affiliates to do so;
e. Failed to test DBCP prior to releasing these products for sale, or to cause their subsidiaries or affiliates to do
so; and
f. Failed to reveal the results of tests conducted on DBCP to each plaintiff, governmental agencies and the
public, or to cause their subsidiaries or affiliate to do so.
8. The illnesses and injuries of each plaintiff are also due to the FAULT or negligence of defendants Standard
Fruit Company, Dole Fresh Fruit Company, Dole Food Company, Inc., Chiquita Brands, Inc. and Chiquita Brands
International, Inc. in that they failed to exercise reasonable care to prevent each plaintiffs harmful exposure to
DBCP-containing products which defendants knew or should have known were hazardous to each plaintiff in that
they, AMONG OTHERS:
a. Failed to adequately supervise and instruct Plaintiffs in the safe and proper application of DBCP-containing
products;
b. Failed to implement proper methods and techniques of application of said products, or to cause such to be
implemented;
c. Failed to warn Plaintiffs of the hazards of exposure to said products or to cause them to be so warned;
d. Failed to test said products for adverse health effects, or to cause said products to be tested;
e. Concealed from Plaintiffs information concerning the observed effects of said products on Plaintiffs;
f. Failed to monitor the health of plaintiffs exposed to said products;
g. Failed to place adequate labels on containers of said products to warn them of the damages of said products;
and
h. Failed to use substitute nematocides for said products or to cause such substitutes to [be]
used. [62] (Emphasis supplied and words in brackets ours.)
Quite evidently, the allegations in the Amended Joint-Complaints of NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., attribute
to defendant companies certain acts and/or omissions which led to their exposure to nematocides containing
the chemical DBCP. According to NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., such exposure to the said chemical caused
ill effects, injuries and illnesses, specifically to their reproductive system.
Thus, these allegations in the complaints constitute the cause of action of plaintiff claimants a quasi-delict,
which under the Civil Code is defined as an act, or omission which causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence. To be precise, Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides:
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged
to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
As specifically enumerated in the amended complaints, NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., point to the acts
and/or omissions of the defendant companies in manufacturing, producing, selling, using, and/or otherwise
putting into the stream of commerce, nematocides which contain DBCP, "without informing the users of its
hazardous effects on health and/or without instructions on its proper use and application." [63]
Verily, in Citibank, N.A. v. Court of Appeals, [64] this Court has always reminded that jurisdiction of the court
over the subject matter of the action is determined by the allegations of the complaint, irrespective of whether

or not the plaintiffs are entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. The jurisdiction of the
court cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or upon the motion to dismiss, for
otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the defendants. What determines the
jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint.
The averments therein and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted.
Clearly then, the acts and/or omissions attributed to the defendant companies constitute a quasi-delict which is
the basis for the claim for damages filed by NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., with individual claims of
approximately P2.7 million for each plaintiff claimant, which obviously falls within the purview of the civil action
jurisdiction of the RTCs.
Moreover, the injuries and illnesses, which NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., allegedly suffered resulted from
their exposure to DBCP while they were employed in the banana plantations located in the Philippines or while
they were residing within the agricultural areas also located in the Philippines. The factual allegations in the
Amended Joint-Complaints all point to their cause of action, which undeniably occurred in the Philippines. The
RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City obviously have reasonable basis to assume jurisdiction
over the cases.
It is, therefore, error on the part of the courts a quo when they dismissed the cases on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction on the mistaken assumption that the cause of action narrated by NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al.,
took place abroad and had occurred outside and beyond the territorial boundaries of the Philippines, i.e., "the
manufacture of the pesticides, their packaging in containers, their distribution through sale or other disposition,
resulting in their becoming part of the stream of commerce," [65] and, hence, outside the jurisdiction of the
RTCs.
Certainly, the cases below are not criminal cases where territoriality, or the situs of the act complained of, would
be determinative of jurisdiction and venue for trial of cases. In personal civil actions, such as claims for payment
of damages, the Rules of Court allow the action to be commenced and tried in the appropriate court, where any
of the plaintiffs or defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant, where he may be found, at the
election of the plaintiff. [66]
In a very real sense, most of the evidence required to prove the claims of NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., are
available only in the Philippines. First, plaintiff claimants are all residents of the Philippines, either in General
Santos City or in Davao City. Second, the specific areas where they were allegedly exposed to the chemical
DBCP are within the territorial jurisdiction of the courts a quo wherein NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., initially
filed their claims for damages. Third, the testimonial and documentary evidence from important witnesses, such
as doctors, co-workers, family members and other members of the community, would be easier to gather in the
Philippines. Considering the great number of plaintiff claimants involved in this case, it is not far-fetched to
assume that voluminous records are involved in the presentation of evidence to support the claim of plaintiff
claimants. Thus, these additional factors, coupled with the fact that the alleged cause of action of NAVIDA, et al.,
and ABELLA, et al., against the defendant companies for damages occurred in the Philippines, demonstrate that,
apart from the RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City having jurisdiction over the subject matter
in the instant civil cases, they are, indeed, the convenient fora for trying these cases. [67]
The RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City validly acquired jurisdiction over the persons of all the
defendant companies
It is well to stress again that none of the parties claims that the courts a quo lack jurisdiction over the cases filed
before them. All parties are one in asserting that the RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City have
validly acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the defendant companies in the action below. All parties
voluntarily, unconditionally and knowingly appeared and submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the courts a
quo.
Rule 14, Section 20 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "[t]he defendants voluntary appearance
in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons." In this connection, all the defendant companies
designated and authorized representatives to receive summons and to represent them in the proceedings
before the courts a quo. All the defendant companies submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the courts a
quo by making several voluntary appearances, by praying for various affirmative reliefs, and by actively
participating during the course of the proceedings below.
In line herewith, this Court, in Meat Packing Corporation of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, [68] held that
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in civil cases is acquired either by his voluntary appearance in
court and his submission to its authority or by service of summons. Furthermore, the active participation of a

party in the proceedings is tantamount to an invocation of the courts jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by
the resolution of the case, and will bar said party from later on impugning the court or bodys jurisdiction. [69]
Thus, the RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City have validly acquired jurisdiction over the
persons of the defendant companies, as well as over the subject matter of the instant case. What is more, this
jurisdiction, which has been acquired and has been vested on the courts a quo, continues until the termination
of the proceedings.
It may also be pertinently stressed that "jurisdiction" is different from the "exercise of jurisdiction." Jurisdiction
refers to the authority to decide a case, not the orders or the decision rendered therein. Accordingly, where a
court has jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants and the subject matter, as in the case of the courts a
quo, the decision on all questions arising therefrom is but an exercise of such jurisdiction. Any error that the
court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is merely an error of judgment, which does not affect its
authority to decide the case, much less divest the court of the jurisdiction over the case. [70]
Plaintiffs purported bad faith in filing the subject civil cases in Philippine courts
Anent the insinuation by DOLE that the plaintiff claimants filed their cases in bad faith merely to procure a
dismissal of the same and to allow them to return to the forum of their choice, this Court finds such argument
much too speculative to deserve any merit.
It must be remembered that this Court does not rule on allegations that are unsupported by evidence on record.
This Court does not rule on allegations which are manifestly conjectural, as these may not exist at all. This Court
deals with facts, not fancies; on realities, not appearances. When this Court acts on appearances instead of
realities, justice and law will be short-lived. [71] This is especially true with respect to allegations of bad faith, in
line with the basic rule that good faith is always presumed and bad faith must be proved. [72]
In sum, considering the fact that the RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City have jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the amended complaints filed by NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., and that the courts a
quo have also acquired jurisdiction over the persons of all the defendant companies, it therefore, behooves this
Court to order the remand of Civil Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96 to the RTC of General Santos City and the RTC
of Davao City, respectively.
On the issue of the dropping of DOW, OCCIDENTAL and SHELL as respondents in view of their amicable
settlement with NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al.
NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., are further praying that DOW, OCCIDENTAL and SHELL be dropped as
respondents in G.R. Nos. 125078 and 126654, as well as in Civil Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96. The non-settling
defendants allegedly manifested that they intended to file their cross-claims against their co-defendants who
entered into compromise agreements. NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., argue that the non-settling defendants
did not aver any cross-claim in their answers to the complaint and that they subsequently sought to amend their
answers to plead their cross-claims only after the settlement between the plaintiff claimants and DOW,
OCCIDENTAL, and SHELL were executed. NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., therefore, assert that the crossclaims are already barred.
In their Memoranda, CHIQUITA and DOLE are opposing the above motion of NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al.,
since the latters Amended Complaints cited several instances of tortious conduct that were allegedly
committed jointly and severally by the defendant companies. This solidary obligation on the part of all the
defendants allegedly gives any co-defendant the statutory right to proceed against the other co-defendants for
the payment of their respective shares. Should the subject motion of NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., be
granted, and the Court subsequently orders the remand of the action to the trial court for continuance,
CHIQUITA and DOLE would allegedly be deprived of their right to prosecute their cross-claims against their other
co-defendants. Moreover, a third party complaint or a separate trial, according to CHIQUITA, would only unduly
delay and complicate the proceedings. CHIQUITA and DOLE similarly insist that the motion of NAVIDA, et al., and
ABELLA, et al., to drop DOW, SHELL and OCCIDENTAL as respondents in G.R. Nos. 125078 and 126654, as well
as in Civil Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96, be denied.
Incidentally, on April 2, 2007, after the parties have submitted their respective memoranda, DEL MONTE filed a
Manifestation and Motion [73] before the Court, stating that similar settlement agreements were allegedly
executed by the plaintiff claimants with DEL MONTE and CHIQUITA sometime in 1999. Purportedly included in
the agreements were Civil Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96. Attached to the said manifestation were copies of the
Compromise Settlement, Indemnity, and Hold Harmless Agreement between DEL MONTE and the settling
plaintiffs, as well as the Release in Full executed by the latter. [74] DEL MONTE specified therein that there were
"only four (4) plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 5617 who are claiming against the Del Monte parties" [75] and that the

latter have executed amicable settlements which completely satisfied any claims against DEL MONTE. In
accordance with the alleged compromise agreements with the four plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 5617, DEL MONTE
sought the dismissal of the Amended Joint-Complaint in the said civil case. Furthermore, in view of the above
settlement agreements with ABELLA, et al., in Civil Case No. 24,251-96, DEL MONTE stated that it no longer
wished to pursue its petition in G.R. No. 127856 and accordingly prayed that it be allowed to withdraw the same.
Having adjudged that Civil Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96 should be remanded to the RTC of General Santos
City and the RTC of Davao City, respectively, the Court deems that the Consolidated Motions (to Drop PartyRespondents) filed by NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., should likewise be referred to the said trial courts for
appropriate disposition.
Under Article 2028 of the Civil Code, "[a] compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal
concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced." Like any other contract, an
extrajudicial compromise agreement is not excepted from rules and principles of a contract. It is a consensual
contract, perfected by mere consent, the latter being manifested by the meeting of the offer and the
acceptance upon the thing and the cause which are to constitute the contract. [76] Judicial approval is not
required for its perfection. [77] A compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res
judicata [78] and this holds true even if the agreement has not been judicially approved. [79] In addition, as a
binding contract, a compromise agreement determines the rights and obligations of only the parties to it. [80]
In light of the foregoing legal precepts, the RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City should first
receive in evidence and examine all of the alleged compromise settlements involved in the cases at bar to
determine the propriety of dropping any party as a defendant therefrom.
The Court notes that the Consolidated Motions (to Drop Party-Respondents) that was filed by NAVIDA, et al., and
ABELLA, et al., only pertained to DOW, OCCIDENTAL and SHELL in view of the latter companies alleged
compromise agreements with the plaintiff claimants. However, in subsequent developments, DEL MONTE and
CHIQUITA supposedly reached their own amicable settlements with the plaintiff claimants, but DEL MONTE
qualified that it entered into a settlement agreement with only four of the plaintiff claimants in Civil Case No.
5617. These four plaintiff claimants were allegedly the only ones who were asserting claims against DEL MONTE.
However, the said allegation of DEL MONTE was simply stipulated in their Compromise Settlement, Indemnity,
and Hold Harmless Agreement and its truth could not be verified with certainty based on the records elevated to
this Court. Significantly, the 336 plaintiff claimants in Civil Case No. 5617 jointly filed a complaint without
individually specifying their claims against DEL MONTE or any of the other defendant companies. Furthermore,
not one plaintiff claimant filed a motion for the removal of either DEL MONTE or CHIQUITA as defendants in Civil
Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96.
There is, thus, a primary need to establish who the specific parties to the alleged compromise agreements are,
as well as their corresponding rights and obligations therein. For this purpose, the courts a quo may require the
presentation of additional evidence from the parties. Thereafter, on the basis of the records of the cases at bar
and the additional evidence submitted by the parties, if any, the trial courts can then determine who among the
defendants may be dropped from the said cases.
It is true that, under Article 2194 of the Civil Code, the responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for
the same quasi-delict is solidary. A solidary obligation is one in which each of the debtors is liable for the entire
obligation, and each of the creditors is entitled to demand the satisfaction of the whole obligation from any or all
of the debtors. [81]
In solidary obligations, the paying debtors right of reimbursement is provided for under Article 1217 of the Civil
Code, to wit:
Art. 1217. Payment made by one of the solidary debtors extinguishes the obligation. If two or more solidary
debtors offer to pay, the creditor may choose which offer to accept.
He who made the payment may claim from his co-debtors only the share which corresponds to each, with the
interest for the payment already made. If the payment is made before the debt is due, no interest for the
intervening period may be demanded.
When one of the solidary debtors cannot, because of his insolvency, reimburse his share to the debtor paying
the obligation, such share shall be borne by all his co-debtors, in proportion to the debt of each.
The above right of reimbursement of a paying debtor, and the corresponding liability of the co-debtors to
reimburse, will only arise, however, if a solidary debtor who is made to answer for an obligation actually delivers
payment to the creditor. As succinctly held in Lapanday Agricultural Development Corporation v. Court of

Appeals, [82] "[p]ayment, which means not only the delivery of money but also the performance, in any other
manner, of the obligation, is the operative fact which will entitle either of the solidary debtors to seek
reimbursement for the share which corresponds to each of the [other] debtors." [83]
In the cases at bar, there is no right of reimbursement to speak of as yet. A trial on the merits must necessarily
be conducted first in order to establish whether or not defendant companies are liable for the claims for
damages filed by the plaintiff claimants, which would necessarily give rise to an obligation to pay on the part of
the defendants.
At the point in time where the proceedings below were prematurely halted, no cross-claims have been
interposed by any defendant against another defendant. If and when such a cross-claim is made by a nonsettling defendant against a settling defendant, it is within the discretion of the trial court to determine the
propriety of allowing such a cross-claim and if the settling defendant must remain a party to the case purely in
relation to the cross claim.
In Armed Forces of the Philippines Mutual Benefit Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, [84] the Court had the
occasion to state that "where there are, along with the parties to the compromise, other persons involved in the
litigation who have not taken part in concluding the compromise agreement but are adversely affected or feel
prejudiced thereby, should not be precluded from invoking in the same proceedings an adequate relief
therefor." [85]
Relevantly, in Philippine International Surety Co., Inc. v. Gonzales, [86] the Court upheld the ruling of the trial
court that, in a joint and solidary obligation, the paying debtor may file a third-party complaint and/or a crossclaim to enforce his right to seek contribution from his co-debtors.
Hence, the right of the remaining defendant(s) to seek reimbursement in the above situation, if proper, is not
affected by the compromise agreements allegedly entered into by NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., with some
of the defendant companies.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby GRANTS the petitions for review on certiorari in G.R. Nos. 125078, 126654, and
128398. We REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Order dated May 20, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court of General Santos
City, Branch 37, in Civil Case No. 5617, and the Order dated October 1, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao
City, Branch 16, and its subsequent Order dated December 16, 1996 denying reconsideration in Civil Case No.
24,251-96, and REMAND the records of this case to the respective Regional Trial Courts of origin for further and
appropriate proceedings in line with the ruling herein that said courts have jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the amended complaints in Civil Case Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96.
The Court likewise GRANTS the motion filed by Del Monte to withdraw its petition in G.R. No. 127856. In view of
the previous grant of the motion to withdraw the petition in G.R. No. 125598, both G.R. Nos. 127856 and 125598
are considered CLOSED AND TERMINATED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. HON. MAMINDIARA P. MANGOTARA, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 1, ILIGAN CITY, LANAO DEL
NORTE, AND MARIA CRISTINA FERTILIZER CORPORATION, AND THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK,
RESPONDENTS, [G.R. No. 170375]
LAND TRADE REALTY CORPORATION,PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION AND
NATIONAL TRANSMISSION CORPORATION (TRANSCO), RESPONDENTS, [G.R. NO. 170505]
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL TWENTYTHIRD DIVISION, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY), AND LAND TRADE REALTY CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS,
[G.R. NOS. 173355-56]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,PETITIONER, VS. DEMETRIA CACHO, REPRESENTED BY ALLEGED
HEIRS DEMETRIA CONFESOR VIDAL AND/OR TEOFILO CACHO, AZIMUTH INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION AND LAND TRADE REALTY CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS. [G.R. NO.
173401]
NATIONAL TRANSMISSION CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL
TWENTY-THIRD DIVISION, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY), AND LAND TRADE REALTY CORPORATION AS

REPRESENTED BY ATTY. MAX C. TABIMINA, RESPONDENTS, [G.R. NOS. 173563-64]

LAND TRADE REALTY CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. DEMETRIA CONFESOR VIDAL AND AZIMUTH
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS, [G.R. NO. 178779]
TEOFILO CACHO AND/OR ATTY. GODOFREDO CABILDO,PETITIONER, VS. DEMETRIA CONFESOR VIDAL
AND AZIMUTH INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS. [G.R. NO. 178894]
G.R. No. 170375 | 2010-07-07
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before the Court are seven consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari and a Petition for Certiorari under
Rules 45 and 65 of the Rules of Court, respectively, arising from actions for quieting of title, expropriation,
ejectment, and reversion, which all involve the same parcels of land.
In G.R. No. 170375, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), by way of consolidated Petitions for Review on
Certiorari and for Certiorari under Rules 45 and 65 of the Rules of Court, respectively, seeks to set aside the
issuances of Judge Mamindiara P. Mangotara (Judge Mangotara) of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1 (RTCBranch 1) of Iligan City, Lanao del Norte, in Civil Case No. 106, particularly, the: (1) Resolution[1] dated July 12,
2005 which, in part, dismissed the Complaint for Expropriation of the Republic for the latter's failure to implead
indispensable parties and forum shopping; and (2) Resolution[2] dated October 24, 2005, which denied the
Partial Motion for Reconsideration of the Republic.
G.R. Nos. 178779 and 178894 are two Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
where Landtrade Realty Corporation (LANDTRADE), Teofilo Cacho, and/or Atty. Godofredo Cabildo assail the
Decision[3] dated January 19, 2007 and Resolution[4] dated July 4, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 00456. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision[5] dated July 17, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
3 (RTC-Branch 3) of Iligan City, Lanao del Norte, in Civil Case No. 4452, granting the Petition for Quieting of Title,
Injunction and Damages filed by Demetria Vidal and Azimuth International Development Corporation (AZIMUTH)
against Teofilo Cacho and Atty. Godofredo Cabildo.
G.R. No. 170505 is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in which LANDTRADE
urges the Court to reverse and set aside the Decision[6] dated November 23, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP Nos. 85714 and 85841. The appellate court annulled several issuances of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 5 (RTC-Branch 5) of Iligan City, Lanao del Norte, and its sheriff, in Civil Case No. 6613, specifically, the:
(1) Order[7] dated August 9, 2004 granting the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal of LANDTRADE; (2) Writ of
Execution[8] dated August 10, 2004; (3) two Notices of Garnishment[9] both dated August 11, 2004, and (4)
Notification[10] dated August 11, 2004. These issuances of the RTC-Branch 5 allowed and/or enabled execution
pending appeal of the Decision[11] dated February 17, 2004 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch
2 of Iligan City, Lanao del Norte, favoring LANDTRADE in Civil Case No. 11475-AF, the ejectment case said
corporation instituted against the National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) and the National Transmission
Corporation (TRANSCO).
G.R. Nos. 173355-56 and 173563-64 are two Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court with prayer for the immediate issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction filed separately by NAPOCOR and TRANSCO. Both Petitions seek to annul the Resolution[12] dated
June 30, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in the consolidated cases of CA-G.R. SP Nos. 00854 and 00889, which (1)
granted the Omnibus Motion of LANDTRADE for the issuance of a writ of execution and the designation of a
special sheriff for the enforcement of the Decision[13] dated December 12, 2005 of the RTC-Branch 1 in Civil
Case No. 6613, and (2) denied the applications of NAPOCOR and TRANSCO for a writ of preliminary injunction to
enjoin the execution of the same RTC Decision. The Decision dated December 12, 2005 of RTC-Branch 1 in Civil
Case No. 6613 affirmed the Decision dated February 17, 2004 of the MTCC in Civil Case No. 11475-AF, favoring
LANDTRADE.
G.R. No. 173401 involves a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the
Republic, which raises pure questions of law and seeks the reversal of the following issuances of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 4 (RTC-Branch 4) of Iligan City, Lanao del Norte, in Civil Case No. 6686, an action for
cancellation of titles and reversion: (1) Order[14] dated December 13, 2005 dismissing the Complaint in Civil
Case No. 6686; and (2) Order[15] dated May 16, 2006, denying the Motion for Reconsideration of the Republic.
I
THE PRECEDING CASES

The consolidated seven cases have for their common genesis the 1914 case of Cacho v. Government of the
United States[16] (1914 Cacho case).
The 1914 Cacho Case
Sometime in the early 1900s, the late Doa Demetria Cacho (Doa Demetria) applied for the registration of two
parcels of land: (1) Lot 1 of Plan II-3732, the smaller parcel with an area of 3,635 square meters or 0.36 hectares
(Lot 1); and (2) Lot 2 of Plan II-3732, the larger parcel with an area of 378,707 square meters or 37.87 hectares
(Lot 2). Both parcels are situated in what was then the Municipality of Iligan, Moro Province, which later became
Sitio Nunucan, then Brgy. Suarez, in Iligan City, Lanao del Norte. Doa Demetria's applications for registration
were docketed as GLRO Record Nos. 6908 and 6909.
The application in GLRO Record No. 6908 covered Lot 1, the smaller parcel of land. Doa Demetria allegedly
acquired Lot 1 by purchase from Gabriel Salzos (Salzos). Salzos, in turn, bought Lot 1 from Datto Darondon and
his wife Alanga, evidenced by a deed of sale in favor of Salzos signed solely by Alanga, on behalf of Datto
Darondon.
The application in GLRO Record No. 6909 involved Lot 2, the bigger parcel of land. Doa Demetria purportedly
purchased Lot 2 from Datto Bunglay. Datto Bunglay claimed to have inherited Lot 2 from his uncle, Datto
Anandog, who died without issue.
Only the Government opposed Doa Demetria's applications for registration on the ground that the two parcels
of land were the property of the United States and formed part of a military reservation, generally known as
Camp Overton.
On December 10, 1912, the land registration court (LRC) rendered its Decision in GLRO Record Nos. 6908 and
6909.
Based on the evidence, the LRC made the following findings in GLRO Record No. 6908:
6th. The court is convinced from the proofs that the small parcel of land sold by the Moro woman Alanga was
the home of herself and her husband, Darondon, and was their conjugal property; and the court so finds.
xxxx
As we have seen, the deed on which applicant's title to the small parcel rests, is executed only by the Moro
woman Alanga, wife of Datto Darondon, which is not permitted either by the Moro laws or the Civil Code of the
Philippine Islands. It appears that the husband of Alanga, Datto Darondon, is alive yet, and before admitting this
parcel to registration it is ordered that a deed from Datto Darondon, husband of Alanga, be presented,
renouncing all his rights in the small parcel of land object of Case No. 6908, in favor of the applicant.[17]
(Emphases supplied.)
In GLRO Record No. 6909, the LRC observed and concluded that:
A tract of land 37 hectares in area, which is the extent of the land under discussion, is larger than is cultivated
ordinarily by the Christian Filipinos. In the Zamboanga cadastral case of thousands of parcels now on trial before
this court, the average size of the parcels is not above 3 or 4 hectares, and the court doubts very much if a Moro
with all his family could cultivate as extensive a parcel of land as the one in question. x x x
xxxx
The court is also convinced from the proofs that the small portion in the southern part of the larger parcel,
where, according to the proofs, Datto Anandog had his house and where there still exist some cocos and fruit
trees, was the home of the said Moro Datto Anandog; and the court so finds. As to the rest of the large parcel
the court does not find the title of Datto Bunglay established. According to his own declaration his residence on
this land commenced only a few days before the sale. He admitted that the coco trees he is supposed to have
planted had not yet begun to bear fruit at the time of the sale, and were very small. Datto Duroc positively
denies that Bunglay lived on the land, and it clearly appears that he was not on the land when it was first
occupied by the military. Nor does Datto Bunglay claim to have planted the three mango trees by the roadside
near point 25 of the plan. The court believes that all the rest of this parcel, not occupied nor cultivated by Datto
Anandog, was land claimed by Datto Duroc and also by Datto Anandog and possibly by other dattos as a part of
their general jurisdiction, and that it is the class of land that Act No. 718 prohibits the sale of, by the dattos,
without the express approval of the Government.

It is also found that Datto Bunglay is the nephew of Dato Anandog, and that the Moro woman Alanga, grantor of
the small parcel, is the sister of Datto Anandog, and that he died without issue.
xxxx
It appears also that according to the provisions of the Civil Code as also the provisions of the `Luwaran Code' of
the Moros, the Moro woman Alanga has an interest in the portion of land left by her deceased brother, Datto
Anandog. By article LXXXV, section 3, of the `Luwaran Code,' it will be seen that the brothers and sisters of a
deceased Moro inherit his property to the exclusion of the more distant relatives. Therefore Datto Bunglay had
no legal interest whatever in the land to sell to the applicant, Doa Demetria Cacho. But the Moro woman,
Alanga, having appeared as a witness for the applicant without having made any claim to the land, the court
finds from this fact that she has ratified the sale made by her nephew.
The court therefore finds that the applicant Doa Demetria Cacho is owner of the portion of land occupied and
planted by the deceased Datto Anandog in the southern part of the large parcel object of expediente No. 6909
only; and her application as to all the rest of the land solicited in said case is denied. And it is ordered that a
new survey of the land be made and a corrected plan be presented, excluding all the land not occupied and
cultivated by Datto Anandog; that said survey be made and the corrected plan presented on or before the 30th
day of March, 1913, with previous notice to the commanding general of the Division of the Philippines.
On the 8th day of December, the court was at Camp Overton and had another ocular inspection of the land for
the purpose of fixing the limits of the part cultivated by Datto Anandog, so often mentioned herein, with
previous notice to the applicant and her husband and representative, Seor Dionisio Vidal. Having arrived late,
Seor Vidal did not assist in the ocular inspection, which was fixed for 3 o'clock, p.m. of the day mentioned. But
the court, nevertheless, set stakes marking the N.E., S.E., and S.W. corners of the land found to have been
cultivated by the deceased Anandog. The N.E. limit of said land is a brook, and the N.W. corner is the point
where the brook intersects the shore line of the sea, the other corners mentioned being marked with pine
stakes. And it is ordered that the new survey be made in accordance with the points mentioned, by tracing four
straight lines connecting these four points. Between the portion cultivated by Datto Anandog and the mouth of
the River Agus there is a high steep hill and the court does not believe it possible to cultivate said hill, it being
covered with rocks and forest.[18] (Emphases supplied.)
The LRC additionally decreed at the end of its December 10, 1912 Decision:
It is further ordered that one-half of the costs of the new survey be paid by the applicant and the other half by
the Government of the United States, and that the applicant present the corresponding deed from Datto
Darondon on or before the above-mentioned 30th day of March, 1913. Final decision in these cases is reserved
until the presentation of the said deed and the new plan.[19]
Apparently dissatisfied with the foregoing LRC judgment, Doa Demetria appealed to this Court. In its Decision
dated December 10, 1914, the Court affirmed in toto the LRC Decision of December 10, 1912, well satisfied that
the findings of fact of the court below were fully sustained by the evidence adduced during trial.
Eighty-three years later, in 1997, the Court was again called upon to settle a matter concerning the registration
of Lots 1 and 2 in the case of Cacho v. Court of Appeals[20] (1997 Cacho case).
The 1997 Cacho Case
On June 29, 1978, Teofilo Cacho (Teofilo), claiming to be the late Doa Demetria's son and sole heir, filed before
the RTC a petition for reconstitution of two original certificates of title (OCTs), docketed under the original GLRO
Record Nos. 6908 and 6909.
Teofilo's petition was opposed by the Republic, National Steel Corporation (NSC), and the City of Iligan.
Acting on the motion for judgment on demurrer to evidence filed by the Republic and NSC, the RTC initially
dismissed Teofilo's petition for reconstitution of titles because there was inadequate evidence to show the prior
existence of the titles sought to be restored. According to the RTC, the proper remedy was a petition for the
reconstitution of decrees since "it is undisputed that in Cases No. 6908 and 6909, Decrees No. 10364 and
18969, respectively, were issued." Teofilo sought leave of court for the filing and admission of his amended
petition, but the RTC refused. When elevated to this Court in Cacho v. Mangotara, docketed as G.R. No. 85495,
the Court resolved to remand the case to the RTC, with an order to the said trial court to accept Teofilo's
amended petition and to hear it as one for re-issuance of decrees.

In opposing Teofilo's petition, the Republic and NSC argued that the same suffered from jurisdictional infirmities;
that Teofilo was not the real party-in-interest; that Teofilo was guilty of laches; that Doa Demetria was not the
registered owner of the subject parcels of land; that no decrees were ever issued in Doa Demetria's name; and
that the issuance of the decrees was dubious and irregular.
After trial, on June 9, 1993, the RTC rendered its Decision granting Teofilo's petition and ordering the
reconstitution and re-issuance of Decree Nos. 10364 and 18969. The RTC held that the issuance of Decree No.
10364 in GLRO No. 6908 on May 9, 1913 and Decree No. 18969 in GLRO Record No. 6909 on July 8, 1915 was
sufficiently established by the certifications and testimonies of concerned officials. The original issuance of
these decrees presupposed a prior judgment that had become final.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC Decision dated June 9, 1993 and dismissed the petition for reissuance of Decree Nos. 10364 and 18969 because: (1) re-issuance of Decree No. 18969 in GLRO Record No.
6909 could not be made in the absence of the new survey ordered by this Court in the 1914 Cacho case; (2) the
heir of a registered owner may lose his right to recover possession of the property and title thereto by laches;
and (3) Teofilo failed to establish his identity and existence and that he was a real party-in-interest.
Teofilo then sought recourse from this Court in the 1997 Cacho case. The Court reversed the judgment of the
Court of Appeals and reinstated the decision of the RTC approving the re-issuance of Decree Nos. 10364 and
18969. The Court found that such decrees had in fact been issued and had attained finality, as certified by the
Acting Commissioner, Deputy Clerk of Court III, Geodetic Engineer, and Chief of Registration of the then Land
Registration Commission, now National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration (NALTDRA). The Court
further reasoned that:
[T]o sustain the Court of Appeals ruling as regards requiring petitioners to fulfill the conditions set forth in Cacho
vs. U.S. would constitute a derogation of the doctrine of res judicata. Significantly, the issuance of the subject
decrees presupposes a prior final judgment because the issuance of such decrees is a mere ministerial act on
part of the Land Registration Commission (now the NALTDRA), upon presentation of a final judgment. It is also
worth noting that the judgment in Cacho vs. U.S. could not have acquired finality without the prior fulfillment of
the conditions in GLRO Record No. 6908, the presentation of the corresponding deed of sale from Datto
Dorondon on or before March 30, 1913 (upon which Decree No. 10364 was issued on May 9, 1913); and in GLRO
Record No. 6909, the presentation of a new survey per decision of Judge Jorge on December 10, 1912 and
affirmed by this Court on December 10, 1914 (upon which Decree No. 18969 was issued on July 8, 1915).
Requiring the submission of a new plan as a condition for the re-issuance of the decree would render the finality
attained by the Cacho vs. U.S. case nugatory, thus, violating the fundamental rule regarding res judicata. It
must be stressed that the judgment and the resulting decree are res judicata, and these are binding upon the
whole world, the proceedings being in the nature of proceedings in rem. Besides, such a requirement is an
impermissible assault upon the integrity and stability of the Torrens System of registration because it also
effectively renders the decree inconclusive.[21]
As to the issue of laches, the Court referred to the settled doctrine that laches cannot bar the issuance of a
decree. A final decision in land registration cases can neither be rendered inefficacious by the statute of
limitations nor by laches.
Anent the issue of the identity and existence of Teofilo and he being a real party-in-interest, the Court found that
these were sufficiently established by the records. The Court relied on Teofilo's Affidavit of Adjudication as Doa
Demetria's sole heir, which he executed before the Philippine Consulate General in Chicago, United States of
America (U.S.A.); as well as the publication in the Times Journal of the fact of adjudication of Doa Demetria's
estate. Teofilo also appeared personally before the Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate General in Chicago to
execute a Special Power of Attorney in favor of Atty. Godofredo Cabildo (Atty. Cabildo) who represented him in
this case. The Court stressed that the execution of public documents is entitled to the presumption of regularity
and proof is required to assail and controvert the same.
In the Resolution dated July 28, 1997,[22] the Court denied the Motions for Reconsideration of the Republic and
NSC.
As a result of the 1997 Cacho case, the decrees of registration were re-issued bearing new numbers and OCTs
were issued for the two parcels of land in Doa Demetria's name. OCT No. 0-1200 (a.f.) was based on re-issued
Decree No. N-219464 in GLRO Record No. 6908, while OCT No. 0-1201 (a.f.) was based on re-issued Decree No.
N-219465 in GLRO Record No. 6909.
II
THE ANTECENT FACTS

OF THE PETITIONS AT BAR

The dispute over Lots 1 and 2 did not end with the termination of the 1997 Cacho case. Another four cases
involving the same parcels of land were instituted before the trial courts during and after the pendency of the
1997 Cacho case. These cases are: (1) the Expropriation Case, G.R. No. 170375; (2) the Quieting of Title Case,
G.R. Nos. 178779 and 178894; (3) the Ejectment or Unlawful Detainer Case, G.R. No. 170505 (execution pending
appeal before the RTC) and G.R. Nos. 173355-56 and 173563-64 (execution pending appeal before the Court of
Appeals); and (4) the Cancellation of Titles and Reversion Case, G.R. No. 173401. These cases proceeded
independently of each other in the courts a quo until they reached this Court via the present Petitions. In the
Resolution[23] dated October 3, 2007, the Court consolidated the seven Petitions considering that they either
originated from the same case or involved similar issues.
Expropriation Case
(G.R. No. 170375)
The Complaint for Expropriation was originally filed on August 15, 1983 by the Iron and Steel Authority (ISA),
now the NSC, against Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corporation (MCFC), and the latter's mortgagee, the Philippine
National Bank (PNB). The Complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 106 and raffled to RTC-Branch 1, presided
over by Judge Mangotara.
ISA was created pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 2729[24] dated August 9, 1973, to strengthen, develop,
and promote the iron and steel industry in the Philippines. Its existence was extended until October 10, 1988.
On November 16, 1982, during the existence of ISA, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential
Proclamation No. 2239,[25] reserving in favor of ISA a parcel of land in Iligan City, measuring 302,532 square
meters or 30.25 hectares, to be devoted to the integrated steel program of the Government. MCFC occupied
certain portions of this parcel of land. When negotiations with MCFC failed, ISA was compelled to file a
Complaint for Expropriation.
When the statutory existence of ISA expired during the pendency of Civil Case No. 106, MCFC filed a Motion to
Dismiss the case alleging the lack of capacity to sue of ISA. The RTC-Branch 1 granted the Motion to Dismiss in
an Order dated November 9, 1988. ISA moved for reconsideration or, in the alternative, for the substitution of
the Republic as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 106, but the motion was denied by RTC-Branch 1. The dismissal of Civil
Case No. 106 was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, thus, ISA appealed to this Court. In Iron and Steel Authority
v. Court of Appeals[26] (ISA case), the Court remanded the case to RTC-Branch 1, which was ordered to allow
the substitution of the Republic for ISA as plaintiff. Entry of Judgment was made in the ISA case on August 31,
1998. In an Order[27] dated November 16, 2001, the RTC-Branch 1 allowed the substitution of the Republic for
ISA as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 106.
Alleging that Lots 1 and 2 involved in the 1997 Cacho case encroached and overlapped the parcel of land
subject of Civil Case No. 106, the Republic filed with the RTC-Branch 1 a Motion for Leave to File Supplemental
Complaint dated October 7, 2004 and to Admit the Attached Supplemental Complaint dated September 28,
2004[28] seeking to implead in Civil Case No. 106 Teofilo Cacho and Demetria Vidal and their respective
successors-in-interest, LANDTRADE and AZIMUTH.
MCFC opposed the Motion for leave to file and to admit the Supplemental Complaint on the ground that the
Republic was without legal personality to file the same because ISA was the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 106. MCFC
argued that the Republic failed to move for the execution of the decision in the ISA case within the prescriptive
period of five years, hence, the only remedy left was for the Republic to file an independent action to revive the
judgment. MCFC further pointed out that the unreasonable delay of more than six years of the Republic in
seeking the substitution and continuation of the action for expropriation effectively barred any further
proceedings therein on the ground of estoppel by laches.
In its Reply, the Republic referred to the Order dated November 16, 2001 of the RTC-Branch 1 allowing the
substitution of the Republic for ISA.
In an Order dated April 4, 2005, the RTC-Branch 1 denied the Motion of the Republic for leave to file and to
admit its Supplemental Complaint. The RTC-Branch 1 agreed with MCFC that the Republic did not file any motion
for execution of the judgment of this Court in the ISA case. Since no such motion for execution had been filed,
the RTC-Branch 1 ruled that its Order dated November 16, 2001, which effected the substitution of the Republic
for ISA as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 106, was an honest mistake. The Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration
of the April 4, 2005 Order of the RTC-Branch 1.

MCFC then filed a Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 106 for: (1) failure of the Republic to implead indispensable
parties because MCFC insisted it was not the owner of the parcels of land sought to be expropriated; and (2)
forum shopping considering the institution by the Republic on October 13, 2004 of an action for the reversion of
the same parcels subject of the instant case for expropriation.
Judge Mangotara of RTC-Branch 1 issued a Resolution[29] on July 12, 2005, denying for lack of merit the Motion
for Reconsideration of the Order dated April 4, 2005 filed by the Republic, and granting the Motion to Dismiss
Civil Case No. 106 filed by MCFC. Judge Mangotara justified the dismissal of the Expropriation Case thus:
What the Republic seeks [herein] is the expropriation of the subject parcels of land. Since the exercise of the
power of eminent domain involves the taking of private lands intended for public use upon payment of just
compensation to the owner x x x, then a complaint for expropriation must, of necessity, be directed against the
owner of the land subject thereof. In the case at bar, the decision of the Supreme Court in Cacho v. Government
of the United States x x x, decreeing the registration of the subject parcels of land in the name of the late Doa
Demetria Cacho has long attained finality and is conclusive as to the question of ownership thereof. Since MCFC,
the only defendant left in this case, is not a proper party defendant in this complaint for expropriation, the
present case should be dismissed.
This Court notes that the Republic [has filed reversion proceedings] dated September 27, 2004, involving the
same parcels of land, docketed as Case No. 6686 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte,
Iligan City Branch 4. [The Republic], however, did not state such fact in its "Verification and Certification of NonForum Shopping" attached to its Supplemental Complaint dated September 28, 2004. [It is therefore] guilty of
forum shopping. Moreover, considering that in the Reversion case, [the Republic] asserts ownership over the
subject parcels of land, it cannot be allowed to take an inconsistent position in this expropriation case without
making a mockery of justice.[30]
The Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated July 12, 2005, insofar as it dismissed
Civil Case No. 106, but said Motion was denied by Judge Mangatora in a Resolution[31] dated October 24, 2005.
On January 16, 2006, the Republic filed with this Court the consolidated Petition for Review on Certiorari and
Petition for Certiorari under Rules 45 and 65 of the Rules of Court, respectively, docketed as G.R. No. 170375.
The Quieting of Title Case
(G.R. Nos. 178779 and 178894)
Demetria Vidal (Vidal) and AZIMUTH filed on November 18, 1998, a Petition[32] for Quieting of Title against
Teofilo, Atty. Cabildo, and the Register of Deeds of Iligan City, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 4452 and
raffled to RTC-Branch 3.
In the Petition, Vidal claimed that she, and not Teofilo, was the late Doa Demetria's sole surviving heir, entitled
to the parcels of land covered by OCT Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201 (a.f.). She averred that she is the daughter
of Francisco Cacho Vidal (Francisco) and Fidela Arellano Confesor. Francisco was the only child of Don Dionisio
Vidal and Doa Demetria.
AZIMUTH, for its part, filed the Petition as Vidal's successor-in-interest with respect to a 23-hectare portion of the
subject parcels of land pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement dated April 2, 1998 and Deed of Conditional
Conveyance dated August 13, 2004, which Vidal executed in favor of AZIMUTH.
Teofilo opposed the Petition contending that it stated no cause of action because there was no title being
disturbed or in danger of being lost due to the claim of a third party, and Vidal had neither legal nor beneficial
ownership of the parcels of land in question; that the matter and issues raised in the Petition had already been
tried, heard, and decided by the RTC of Iligan City and affirmed with finality by this Court in the 1997 Cacho
case; and that the Petition was barred by the Statute of Limitations and laches.
LANDTRADE, among other parties, was allowed by the RTC-Branch 3 to intervene in Civil Case No. 4452.
LANDTRADE alleged that it is the owner of a portion of the subject parcels of land, measuring 270,255 square
meters or about 27.03 hectares, which it purportedly acquired through a Deed of Absolute Sale dated October 1,
1996 from Teofilo, represented by Atty. Cabildo. LANDTRADE essentially argued that Vidal's right as heir should
be adjudicated upon in a separate and independent proceeding and not in the instant Quieting of Title Case.
During the pre-trial conference, the parties manifested that there was no possibility of any amicable settlement
among them.

Vidal and AZIMUTH submitted testimonial and documentary evidence during the trial before the RTC-Branch 3.
Teofilo and Atty. Cabildo failed to present any evidence as they did not appear at all during the trial, while
LANDTRADE was declared by the RTC-Branch 3 to have waived its right to present evidence on its defense and
counterclaim.
On July 17, 2004, the RTC-Branch 3 rendered its Decision[33] in Civil Case No. 4452 in favor of Vidal and
AZIMUTH, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioners and against the respondents and
intervenors:
1) DECLARING:
a.) Petitioner Demetria C. Vidal the sole surviving heir of the late Doa Demetria Cacho;
b.) Petitioner Demetria C. Vidal alone has the hereditary right to and interest in the Subject Property;
c.) Petitioner Azimuth International Development Corporation is the successor-in-interest of petitioner Demetria
C. Vidal to a portion of the Subject Property to the extent provided in their 2 April 1998 Memorandum of
Agreement and 13 August 1998 Deed of Conditional Conveyance;
d.) Respondent Teofilo Cacho is not a son or heir of the late Dona Demetria Cacho; and
e.) Respondent Teofilo Cacho, Godofredo Cabildo and any of their transferees/assignees have no valid right to or
interest in the Subject Property.
2) ORDERING:
a.) Respondent Register of Deeds of Iligan City, and any other person acting in his behalf, stop, cease and
desist:
i) From accepting or registering any affidavit of self- adjudication or any other document executed by
respondents Teofilo Cacho, Godofredo Cabildo and/or any other person which in any way transfers the title to
the Subject Property from Dona Demetria Cacho to respondent Teofilo Cacho, Godofredo Cabildo and/or any of
their transferees/assignees, including the intervenors.
ii) From cancelling the OCTs or any certificate of title over the Subject Property in the name of Demetria Cacho
or any successor certificate of title, and from issuing new certificates of title in the name of respondents Teofilo
Cacho, Godofredo Cabildo their transferees/assignees, including the intervenors.
b) Respondents Teofilo Cacho, Godofredo Cabildo, their transferees/assignees, and any other person acting in
their behalf, to stop, cease and desist:
i) From executing, submitting to any Register of Deeds, or registering or causing to be registered therein, any
affidavit of self-adjudication or any other document which in any way transfers title to the Subject Property from
Demetria Cacho to respondents Teofilo Cacho, Godofredo Cabildo and/or any of their transferees/assignees,
including the intervenors.
ii) From canceling or causing the cancellation of OCTs or any certificate of title over the Subject Property in the
name of Demetria Cacho or any successor certificate of title, and from issuing new certificates of title in the
name of respondent Teofilo Cacho, Godofredo Cabildo and/or any of their transferees/assignees, including the
intervenors.
iii) From claiming or representing in any manner that respondent Teofilo Cacho is the son or heir of Demetria
Cacho or has rights to or interest in the Subject Property.
3) ORDERING respondents Teofilo Cacho and Atty. Godofredo Cabildo to pay petitioners, jointly and severally,
the following:
a) For temperate damages - P 80,000.00
b) For nominal damages - P 60,000.00
c) For moral damages - P500,000.00
d) For exemplary damages - P 500,000.00
e) For attorney's fees (ACCRA Law)-P1,000,000.00
f) For Attorney's fees - P500,000.00
(Atty. Voltaire Rovira)
g) For litigation expenses - P300,000.00

For lack of factual and legal basis, the counterclaim of Teofilo Cacho and Atty. Godofredo Cabildo is hereby
dismissed.
Likewise, the counterclaim of intervenor IDD/Investa is dismissed for lack of basis as the petitioners succeeded
in proving their cause of action.
On the cross-claim of intervenor IDD/Investa, respondents Teofilo Cacho and Atty. Godofredo Cabildo are
ORDERED to pay IDD/Investa, jointly and severally, the principal sum of P5,433,036 with 15% interest per
annum.
For lack of legal basis, the counterclaim of Intervenor Landtrade Realty Development Corporation is dismissed.
Likewise, Intervenor Manguera's counterclaim is dismissed for lack of legal basis.[34]
The joint appeal filed by LANDTRADE, Teofilo, and Atty. Cabildo with the Court of Appeals was docketed as CAG.R. CV No. 00456. The Court of Appeals, in its Decision[35] of January 19, 2007, affirmed in toto the Decision
dated July 17, 2004 of the RTC-Branch 3.
According to the Court of Appeals, the RTC-Branch 3 did not err in resolving the issue on Vidal's status, filiation,
and hereditary rights as it is determinative of the issue on ownership of the subject properties. It was
indubitable that the RTC-Branch 3 had jurisdiction over the person of Teofilo and juridical personality of
LANDTRADE as they both filed their Answers to the Petition for Quieting of Title thereby voluntarily submitting
themselves to the jurisdiction of said trial court. Likewise, the Petition for Quieting of Title is in itself within the
jurisdiction of the RTC-Branch 3. Hence, where there is jurisdiction over the person and subject matter, the
resolution of all other questions arising in the case is but an exercise by the court of its jurisdiction. Moreover,
Teofilo and LANDTRADE were guilty of estoppel by laches for failing to assail the jurisdiction of the RTC-Branch 3
at the first opportunity and even actively participating in the trial of the case and seeking affirmative reliefs.
In addition, the Court of Appeals held that the 1997 Cacho case only determined the validity and efficacy of the
Affidavit of Adjudication that Teofilo executed before the Philippine Consulate General in the U.S.A. The decision
of this Court in the 1997 Cacho case, which had become final and executory, did not vest upon Teofilo ownership
of the parcels of land as it merely ordered the re-issuance of a lost duplicate certificate of title in its original form
and condition.
The Court of Appeals agreed in the finding of the RTC-Branch 3 that the evidence on record preponderantly
supports Vidal's claim of being the granddaughter and sole heiress of the late Doa Demetria. The appellate
court further adjudged that Vidal did not delay in asserting her rights over the subject parcels of land. The
prescriptive period for real actions over immovables is 30 years. Vidal's rights as Doa Demetria's successor-ininterest accrued upon the latter's death in 1974, and only 24 years thereafter, in 1998, Vidal already filed the
present Petition for Quieting of Title. Thus, Vidal's cause of action had not yet prescribed. And, where the action
was filed within the prescriptive period provided by law, the doctrine of laches was also inapplicable.
LANDTRADE, Teofilo, and Atty. Cabildo filed separate Motions for Reconsideration of the January 19, 2007
Decision of the Court of Appeals, which were denied in the July 4, 2007 Resolution[36] of the same court.
On August 24, 2007, LANDTRADE filed with this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, which was docketed as G.R. No. 178779. On September 6, 2007, Teofilo and Atty. Cabildo filed
their own Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which was docketed as G.R. No.
178894.
The Ejectment or Unlawful Detainer Case
(G.R. Nos. 170505, 173355-56, and 173563-64)
Three Petitions before this Court are rooted in the Unlawful Detainer Case instituted by LANDTRADE against
NAPOCOR and TRANSCO.
On August 9, 1952, NAPOCOR took possession of two parcels of land in Sitio Nunucan, Overton, Fuentes, Iligan
City, denominated as Lots 2029 and 2043, consisting of 3,588 square meters (or 0.36 hectares) and 3,177
square meters (or 0.32 hectares), respectively. On Lot 2029, NAPOCOR constructed its power sub-station, known
as the Overton Sub-station, while on Lot 2043, it built a warehouse, known as the Agus 7 Warehouse, both for
the use of its Agus 7 Hydro-Electric Power Plant. For more than 30 years, NAPOCOR occupied and possessed
said parcels of land pursuant to its charter, Republic Act No. 6395.[37] With the enactment in 2001 of Republic
Act No. 9136, otherwise known as the Electric Power Industry Reform Act (EPIRA), TRANSCO assumed the

functions of NAPOCOR with regard to electrical transmissions and took over possession of the Overton Substation.
Claiming ownership of the parcels of land where the Overton Sub-station and Agus 7 Warehouse are located,
LANDTRADE filed with the MTCC on April 9, 2003 a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer against NAPOCOR and
TRANSCO, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 11475-AF.
In its Complaint, LANDTRADE alleged that it acquired from Teofilo, through Atty. Cabildo, two parcels of land at
Sitio Nunucan, Overton, Fuentes, Brgy. Maria Cristina, Iligan City, with a combined area of 270,255 square
meters or around 27.03 hectares, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale[38] dated October 1, 1996. Certain
portions of said parcels of land were being occupied by the Overton Sub-station and Agus 7 Warehouse of
NAPOCOR and TRANSCO, through the tolerance of LANDTRADE. Upon failure of NAPOCOR and TRANSCO to pay
rentals or to vacate the subject properties after demands to do so, LANDTRADE filed the present Complaint for
Unlawful Detainer, plus damages in the amount of P450,000.00 as yearly rental from date of the first extrajudicial demand until NAPOCOR and TRANSCO vacate the subject properties.
In their separate Answers, NAPOCOR and TRANSCO denied the material allegations in the Complaint and
countered, by way of special and affirmative defenses, that the Complaint was barred by res judicata; that the
MTCC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action; and that LANDTRADE lacked the legal capacity to
sue.
On February 17, 2004, the MTCC rendered its Decision[39] in favor of LANDTRADE. The MTCC disposed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of Plaintiff Land Trade Realty
Corporation represented by Atty. Max C. Tabimina and against defendant National Power Corporation
represented by its President, Mr. Rogelio M. Murga and co-defendant TRANSCO represented by its President Dr.
Allan T. Ortiz and Engr. Lorrymir A. Adaza, Manager, NAPOCOR-Mindanao, Regional Center, Ma. Cristina, Iligan
City, ordering:
1. Defendants National Power Corporation and TRANSCO, their agents or representatives or any person/s acting
on its behalf or under its authority to vacate the premises;
2. Defendants NAPOCOR and TRANSCO to pay Plaintiff jointly and solidarily:
a. Php500,000.00 a month representing fair rental value or compensation since June 29, 1978 until defendant
shall have vacated the premises;
b. Php20,000.00 for and as attorney's fees and
c. Cost of suit.
Execution shall issue immediately upon motion, unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay
execution files a sufficient supersedeas bond, approved by this Court and executed in favor of the plaintiff, to
pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time of judgment appealed from, and unless, during the
pendency of the appeal, defendants deposit with the appellate court the amount of P500,000.00 per month, as
reasonable value of the use and occupancy of the premises for the preceding month or period on or before the
tenth day of each succeeding month or period.[40]
NAPOCOR and TRANSCO seasonably filed a Joint Notice of Appeal. Their appeal, docketed as Civil Case No.
6613, was initially assigned to the RTC-Branch 5, presided over by Judge Maximino Magno Libre (Judge Libre).
LANDTRADE filed on June 24, 2004 a Motion for Execution, asserting that NAPOCOR and TRANSCO had neither
filed a supersedeas bond with the MTCC nor periodically deposited with the RTC the monthly rental for the
properties in question, so as to stay the immediate execution pending appeal of the MTCC judgment. However,
the said Motion failed to comply with the required notice of hearing under Rule 15, Section 5 of the Rules of
Court. LANDTRADE then filed a Motion to Withdraw and/or Replace Notice of Hearing.
NAPOCOR and TRANSCO filed on July 13, 2004 a Joint Motion to Suspend Proceedings citing Amagan v. Marayag,
[41] in which the Court ruled that if circumstances should require, the proceedings in an ejectment case may be
suspended in whatever stage it may be found. Since LANDTRADE anchors its right to possession of the subject
parcels of land on the Deed of Sale executed in its favor by Teofilo on October 1, 1996, the ejectment case
should be held in abeyance pending the resolution of other cases in which title over the same properties are in
issue, i.e., (1) Civil Case No. 6600, the action for the annulment of the Deed of Sale dated October 1, 1996 filed
by Teofilo against LANDTRADE pending before the RTC-Branch 4; and (2) Civil Case No. 4452, the Quieting of
Title Case filed by Vidal and AZIMUTH against Teofilo and Atty. Cabildo pending before the RTC-Branch 3.

LANDTRADE filed on July 19, 2004 another Motion for Execution, which was heard together with the Joint Motion
to Suspend Proceedings of NAPOCOR and TRANSCO. After said hearing, the RTC-Branch 5 directed the parties to
file their memoranda on the two pending Motions.
LANDTRADE, in its Memorandum, maintained that the pendency of Civil Case No. 4452, the Quieting of Title
Case, should not preclude the execution of the MTCC judgment in the Unlawful Detainer Case because the issue
involved in the latter was only the material possession or possession de facto of the parcels of land in question.
LANDTRADE also reported that Civil Case No. 6600, the action for annulment of the Deed of Sale dated October
1, 1996 instituted by Teofilo, was already dismissed given that the RTC-Branch 4 had approved the Compromise
Agreement executed between LANDTRADE and Teofilo.
NAPOCOR and TRANSCO likewise filed their respective Memoranda. Subsequently, NAPOCOR filed a Supplement
to its Memorandum to bring to the attention of the RTC-Branch 5 the Decision rendered on July 17, 2004 by the
RTC-Branch 3 in Civil Case No. 4452, the Quieting of Title Case, categorically declaring Teofilo, the predecessorin-interest of LANDTRADE, as having no right at all to the subject parcels of land. Resultantly, the right of
LANDTRADE to the two properties, which merely emanated from Teofilo, was effectively declared as non-existent
too.
On August 4, 2004, the RTC-Branch 5 issued an Order[42] denying the Joint Motion to Suspend Proceedings of
NAPOCOR and TRANSCO. The RTC held that the pendency of other actions involving the same parcels of land
could not stay execution pending appeal of the MTCC judgment because NAPOCOR and TRANSCO failed to post
the required bond and pay the monthly rentals.
Five days later, on August 9, 2004, the RTC-Branch 5 issued another Order[43] granting the Motion of
LANDTRADE for execution of the MTCC judgment pending appeal.
The next day, on August 10, 2004, the Acting Clerk of Court, Atty. Joel M. Macaraya, Jr., issued a Writ of
Execution Pending Appeal[44] which directed Sheriff IV Alberto O. Borres (Sheriff Borres) to execute the MTCC
Decision dated February 17, 2004.
A day later, on August 11, 2004, Sheriff Borres issued two Notices of Garnishment[45] addressed to PNB and
Land Bank of the Philippines in Iligan City, garnishing all the goods, effects, stocks, interests in stocks and
shares, and any other personal properties belonging to NAPOCOR and TRANSCO which were being held by and
under the possession and control of said banks. On even date, Sheriff Borres also issued a Notification[46] to
NAPOCOR and TRANSCO for them to vacate the subject parcels of land; and to pay LANDTRADE the sums of (a)
P156,000,000.00, representing the total fair rental value for the said properties, computed at P500,000.00 per
month, beginning June 29, 1978 until June 29, 2004, or for a period of 26 years, and (b) P20,000.00 as
attorney's fees.
Thereafter, NAPOCOR and TRANSCO each filed before the Court of Appeals in Cagayan de Oro City a Petition for
Certiorari, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with prayer for the issuance of a TRO and writ of preliminary
injunction. The Petitions, docketed as CA-G.R. SP Nos. 85174 and 85841, were eventually consolidated.
The Court of Appeals issued on August 18, 2004 a TRO[47] enjoining the enforcement and implementation of
the Order of Execution and Writ of Execution Pending Appeal of the RTC-Branch 5 and Notices of Garnishment
and Notification of Sheriff Borres.
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision[48] dated November 23, 2005, determined that public respondents did
commit grave abuse of discretion in allowing and/or effecting the execution of the MTCC judgment pending
appeal, since NAPOCOR and TRANSCO were legally excused from complying with the requirements for a stay of
execution specified in Rule 70, Section 19 of the Rules of Court, particularly, the posting of a supersedeas bond
and periodic deposits of rental payments. The decretal portion of said appellate court Decision states:
ACCORDINGLY, the two petitions at bench are GRANTED; the Order dated 9 August 2004, the Writ of Execution
Pending Appeal dated 10 August 2004, the two Notices of Garnishment dated 11 August 2004, and the
Notification dated 11 August 2004, are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.[49]
Displeased, LANDTRADE elevated the case to this Court on January 10, 2006 via a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which was docketed as G.R. No. 170505.
In the meantime, with the retirement of Judge Libre and the inhibition[50] of Judge Oscar Badelles, the new
presiding judge of RTC-Branch 5, Civil Case No. 6613 was re-raffled to the RTC-Branch 1, presided over by Judge
Mangotara. The RTC-Branch 1 promulgated on December 12, 2005 a Decision[51] in Civil Case No. 6613 which
affirmed in toto the February 17, 2004 Decision of the MTCC in Civil Case No. 11475-AF favoring LANDTRADE.

NAPOCOR and TRANSCO filed with the RTC-Branch 1 twin Motions, namely: (1) Motion for Reconsideration of the
Decision dated December 12, 2005; and (2) Motion for Inhibition of Judge Mangotara. The RTC-Branch 1 denied
both Motions in a Resolution dated January 30, 2006.
NAPOCOR and TRANSCO filed with the Court of Appeals separate Petitions for Review with prayer for TRO and/or
a writ of preliminary injunction, which were docketed as CA-G.R. SP Nos. 00854 and 00889, respectively. In a
Resolution dated March 24, 2006, the Court of Appeals granted the prayer for TRO of NAPOCOR and TRANSCO.
With the impending lapse of the effectivity of the TRO on May 23, 2006, NAPOCOR filed on May 15, 2006 with
the Court of Appeals a Manifestation and Motion praying for the resolution of its application for preliminary
injunction.
On May 23, 2006, the same day the TRO lapsed, the Court of Appeals granted the motions for extension of time
to file a consolidated comment of LANDTRADE. Two days later, LANDTRADE filed an Omnibus Motion seeking the
issuance of (1) a writ of execution pending appeal, and (2) the designation of a special sheriff in accordance with
Rule 70, Section 21 of the Rules of Court.
In a Resolution[52] dated June 30, 2006, the Court of Appeals granted the Omnibus Motion of LANDTRADE and
denied the applications for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction of NAPOCOR and TRANSCO. In effect,
the appellate court authorized the execution pending appeal of the judgment of the MTCC, affirmed by the RTCBranch 1, thus:
IN LIGHT OF THE ABOVE DISQUISITIONS, this Court resolves to grant the [LANDRADE]'s omnibus motion for
execution pending appeal of the decision rendered in its favor which is being assailed in these consolidated
petitions for review. Accordingly, the [NAPOCOR and TRANSCO's] respective applications for issuance of writ of
preliminary injunction are both denied for lack of factual and legal bases. The Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Branch 2, Iligan City, which at present has the custody of the records of the case a quo, is hereby ordered to
cause the immediate issuance of a writ of execution relative to its decision dated 17 February 2004 in Civil Case
No. 11475-AF.[53]
On July 20, 2006, NAPOCOR filed with this Court a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court with an urgent plea for a TRO, docketed as G.R. No. 173355-56. On August 2, 2006, TRANSCO
filed with this Court its own Petition for Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 173563-64.
On July 21, 2006, NAPOCOR filed an Urgent Motion for the Issuance of a TRO in G.R. No. 173355-56. In a
Resolution[54] dated July 26, 2006, the Court granted the Motion of NAPOCOR and issued a TRO,[55] effective
immediately, which enjoined public and private respondents from implementing the Resolution dated June 30,
2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 00854 and 00889 and the Decision dated February 17, 2004 of
the MTCC in Civil Case No. 11475-AF.
On July 31, 2006, Vidal and AZIMUTH filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Attached Comment-inIntervention, contending therein that Vidal was the lawful owner of the parcels of land subject of the Unlawful
Detainer Case as confirmed in the Decision dated July 17, 2004 of the RTC-Branch 3 in Civil Case No. 4452. In a
Resolution dated September 30, 2006, the Court required the parties to comment on the Motion of Vidal and
AZIMUTH, and deferred action on the said Motion pending the submission of such comments.
The Cancellation of Titles and Reversion Case
(G.R. No. 173401)
On October 13, 2004, the Republic filed a Complaint for the Cancellation of OCT Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201
(a.f.) and Reversion against the late Doa Demetria, represented by her alleged heirs, Vidal and/or Teofilo,
together with AZIMUTH and LANDTRADE. The Complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 6686, was raffled to the
RTC-Branch 4.
The Republic sought the cancellation of OCT Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201 (a.f.) and the reversion of the parcels
of land covered thereby to the Government based on the following allegations in its Complaint, under the
heading "Cause of Action":
5. On October 15, 1998, Original Certificates of Title (OCTs) Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201 (a.f.) were issued in
the name of "Demetria Cacho, widow, now deceased..." consisting of a total area of Three Hundred SeventyEight Thousand Seven Hundred and Seven (378,707) square meters and Three Thousand Seven Hundred ThirtyFive (3,635) square meters, respectively, situated in Iligan City, x x x

xxxx
6. The afore-stated titles were issued in implementation of a decision rendered in LRC (GLRO) Record Nos. 6908
and 6909 dated December 10, 1912, as affirmed by the Honorable Supreme Court in Cacho v. Government of
the United States, 28 Phil. 616 (December 10, 1914),
7. The decision in LRC (GLRO) Record Nos. 6908 and 6909, upon which the titles were issued, did not grant the
entire area applied for therein. x x x
xxxx
9. As events turned out, the titles issued in connection with LRC (GLRO) Record Nos. 6908 and 6909 - i.e. OCT
Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201 (a.f.) - cover property MUCH LARGER in area than that granted by the land
registration court in its corresponding decision, supra.
10. While the LRC Decision, as affirmed by the Honorable Supreme Court, granted only the southern part of the
37.87 hectare land subject of LRC (GLRO) Record Case No. 6909, the ENTIRE 37.87 hectares is indicated as the
property covered by OCT 0-1200 (a.f.). Worse, OCT No. 0-1200 (a.f.) made reference to Case No. 6908 as basis
thereof, yet, the decision in said case is clear:
(i) The parcel "object of Case No. 6908 is small" (Cacho vs. Government of the United States, 28 Phil. 616, p.
619)
(ii) "The parcel of land claimed by the applicant in Case No. 6909 is the bigger of two parcels and contains 37.87
hectares..."
11. More significantly, the technical description in Original Certificate of Title No. 0-1200 (a.f.) specifies the date
of survey as "August 31 to September 1, 1910," which is EARLIER than the date the Supreme Court, in Cacho
supra, resolved LRC (GLRO) Record No. 6909 (involving 37.87 hectares). In resolving the application involving
the 37.87 hectares, the Honorable Supreme Court declared that only the southern part of the 37.87 hectare
property applied for is granted and that a new survey specifying the "southern part" thereof should be
submitted. Accordingly, any survey involving the "granted southern part" should bear a date subsequent to the
December 10, 1914 Supreme Court decision. x x x
xxxx
12. The Honorable Supreme Court further declared that the Decision in LRC (GLRO) Record No. 6909 was
reserved:
"Final decision in these case is reserved until the presentation of the ... new plan." (28 Phil. 616, p. 631;
Underscoring supplied)
In other words, as of December 10, 1914, when the Honorable Supreme Court rendered its Decision on appeal in
LRC (GLRO) Record No. 6909, "final decision" of the case was still reserved until the presentation of a new plan.
The metes and bounds of OCT No. 0-1200 (a.f.) could not have been the technical description of the property
granted by the court - described as "the southern part of the large parcel object of expediente 6909 only"
(Cacho vs. Government of the United States, 28 Phil. 617, 629). As earlier stated, the technical description
appearing in said title was the result of a survey conducted in 1910 or before the Supreme Court decision was
rendered in 1914.
13. In the same vein, Original Certificate of Title No. 0-1201 (a.f.) specifies LRC (GLRO) Record No. 6909 as the
basis thereof (see front page of OCT No. 0-1201 (a.f.)). Yet, the technical description makes, as its reference, Lot
1, Plan II-3732, LR Case No. 047, LRC (GLRO) Record No. 6908 (see page 2 of said title). A title issued pursuant
to a decision may only cover the property subject of the case. A title cannot properly be issued pursuant to a
decision in Case 6909, but whose technical description is based on Case 6908.
14. The decision in LRC (GLRO) Record Nos. 6908 and 6909 has become final and executory, and it cannot be
modified, much less result in an increased area of the property decreed therein.
xxxx
16. In sum, Original Certificates of Title Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201 (a.f.), as issued, are null and void since the
technical descriptions vis--vis the areas of the parcels of land covered therein went beyond the areas granted
by the land registration court in LRC (GLRO) Record Nos. 6908 and 6909.[56]

Vidal and AZIMUTH filed a Motion to Dismiss dated December 23, 2004 on the grounds that (1) the Republic has
no cause of action; (2) assuming arguendo that the Republic has a cause of action, its Complaint failed to state
a cause of action; (3) assuming arguendo that the Republic has a cause of action, the same is barred by prior
judgment; (4) assuming further that the Republic has a cause of action, the same was extinguished by
prescription; and (4) the Republic is guilty of forum shopping.
Upon motion of the Republic, the RTC-Branch 4 issued an Order[57] dated October 4, 2005, declaring
LANDTRADE and Teofilo, as represented by Atty. Cabildo, in default since they failed to submit their respective
answers to the Complaint despite the proper service of summons upon them.
LANDTRADE subsequently filed its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim dated September 28, 2005. It also
moved for the setting aside and reconsideration of the Order of Default issued against it by the RTC-Branch 4 on
October 20, 2005.
On December 13, 2005, the RTC-Branch 4 issued an Order[58] dismissing the Complaint of the Republic in Civil
Case No. 6686, completely agreeing with Vidal and AZIMUTH.
The RTC-Branch 4 reasoned that the Republic had no cause of action because there was no showing that the late
Doa Demetria committed any wrongful act or omission in violation of any right of the Republic. Doa Demetria
had sufficiently proven her ownership over the parcels of land as borne in the ruling of the LRC in GLRO Record
Nos. 6908 and 6909. On the other hand, the Republic had no more right to the said parcels of land. The Regalian
doctrine does not apply in this case because the titles were already issued to Doa Demetria and segregated
from the mass of the public domain.
The RTC-Branch 4 likewise held that the Republic failed to state a cause of action in its Complaint. The
arguments of the Republic - i.e., the absence of a new survey plan and deed, the titles covered properties with
much larger area than that granted by the LRC - had been answered squarely in the 1997 Cacho case. Also, the
Complaint failed to allege that fraud had been committed in having the titles registered and that the Director of
Lands requested the reversion of the subject parcels of land.
The RTC-Branch 4 was convinced that the Complaint was barred by res judicata because the 1914 Cacho case
already decreed the registration of the parcels of land in the late Doa Demetria's name and the 1997 Cacho
case settled that there was no merit in the argument that the conditions imposed in the first case have not been
complied with.
The RTC-Branch 4 was likewise persuaded that the cause of action or remedy of the Republic was lost or
extinguished by prescription pursuant to Article 1106 of the Civil Code and Section 32 of Presidential Decree No.
1529, otherwise known as the Land Registration Decree, which prescribes a one-year period within which to file
an action for the review of a decree of registration.
Finally, the RTC-Branch 4 found the Republic guilty of forum shopping because there is between this case, on
one hand, and the 1914 and 1997 Cacho cases, on the other, identity of parties, as well as rights asserted and
reliefs prayed for, as the contending parties are claiming rights of ownership over the same parcels of land.
The Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the dismissal of its Complaint but the same was denied by the
RTC-Branch 4 in its Order[59] dated May 16, 2006.
Assailing the Orders dated December 13, 2005 and May 16, 2006 of the RTC-Branch 4, the Republic filed on
August 11, 2006 a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which was docketed as
G.R. No. 173401.
III
ISSUES AND DISCUSSIONS
Expropriation Case
(G.R. No. 170375)
The Republic, in its consolidated Petitions challenging the Resolutions dated July 12, 2005 and October 24, 2005
of the RTC-Branch 1 in Civil Case No. 106, made the following assignment of errors:
RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ERRED IN ORDERING THE DISMISSAL OF THE EXPROPRIATION COMPLAINT IN CIVIL
CASE NO. 106 CONSIDERING THAT:

(a) THE NON-JOINDER OF PARTIES IS NOT A GROUND FOR THE DISMISSAL OF AN ACTION PURSUANT TO SECTION
11, RULE 3 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE;
(b) AN EXPROPRIATION PROCEEDING IS AN ACTION QUASI IN REM WHEREIN THE FACT THAT THE OWNER OF THE
PROPERTY IS MADE A PARTY TO THE ACTION IS NOT ESSENTIALLY INDISPENSABLE;
(c) PETITIONER DID NOT COMMIT ANY FORUM SHOPPING WITH THE FILING OF THE REVERSION COMPLAINT
DOCKETED AS CIVIL CASE NO. 6686 WHICH IS PENDING BEFORE BRANCH 4 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
ILIGAN CITY.[60]
Filing of consolidated petitions
under both Rules 45 and 65
At the outset, the Court notes that the Republic filed a pleading with the caption Consolidated Petitions for
Review on Certiorari (Under Rule 45) and Certiorari (Under Rule 65) of the Rules of Court. The Republic explains
that it filed the Consolidated Petitions pursuant to Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) v.
Court of Appeals[61] (MWSS case).
The reliance of the Republic on the MWSS case to justify its mode of appeal is misplaced, taking the
pronouncements of this Court in said case out of context.
The issue in the MWSS case was whether a possessor in good faith has the right to remove useful
improvements, and not whether consolidated petitions under both Rules 45 and 65 of the Rules of Court can be
filed. Therein petitioner MWSS simply filed an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, but
named the Court of Appeals as a respondent. The Court clarified that the only parties in an appeal by certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the appellant as petitioner and the appellee as respondent. The court
which rendered the judgment appealed from is not a party in said appeal. It is in the special civil action of
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court where the court or judge is required to be joined as party
defendant or respondent. The Court, however, also acknowledged that there may be an instance when in an
appeal by certiorari under Rule 45, the petitioner-appellant would also claim that the court that rendered the
appealed judgment acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, in which case,
such court should be joined as a party-defendant or respondent. While the Court may have stated that in such
an instance, "the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is at the same time a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65," the Court did not hold that consolidated petitions under both Rules 45 and
65 could or should be filed.
The Court, in more recent cases, had been stricter and clearer on the distinction between these two modes of
appeal. In Nunez v. GSIS Family Bank,[62] the Court elucidated:
In Ligon v. Court of Appeals where the therein petitioner described her petition as "an appeal under Rule 45 and
at the same time as a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court," this Court, in
frowning over what it described as a "chimera," reiterated that the remedies of appeal and certiorari are
mutually exclusive and not alternative nor successive.
To be sure, the distinctions between Rules 45 and 65 are far and wide. However, the most apparent is that errors
of jurisdiction are best reviewed in a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 while errors of judgment can
only be corrected by appeal in a petition for review under Rule 45.
But in the same case, the Court also held that:
This Court, x x x, in accordance with the liberal spirit which pervades the Rules of Court and in the interest of
justice may treat a petition for certiorari as having been filed under Rule 45, more so if the same was filed within
the reglementary period for filing a petition for review.[63]
It is apparent in the case at bar that the Republic availed itself of the wrong mode of appeal by filing
Consolidated Petitions for Review under Rule 45 and for Certiorari under Rule 65, when these are two separate
remedies that are mutually exclusive and neither alternative nor successive. Nevertheless, the Court shall treat
the Consolidated Petitions as a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 and the allegations therein as
errors of judgment. As the records show, the Petition was filed on time under Rules 45. Before the lapse of the
15-day reglementary period to appeal under Rule 45, the Republic filed with the Court a motion for extension of
time to file its petition. The Court, in a Resolution[64] dated January 23, 2006, granted the Republic a 30-day
extension, which was to expire on December 29, 2005. The Republic was able to file its Petition on the last day
of the extension period.

Hierarchy of courts
The direct filing of the instant Petition with this Court did not violate the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
According to Rule 41, Section 2(c)[65] of the Rules of Court, a decision or order of the RTC may be appealed to
the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, provided that such petition raises only
questions of law.[66]
A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence
to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted.[67] A question of fact exists when the doubt
or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration of the whole
evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding
circumstances, as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation.[68]
Here, the Petition of the Republic raises pure questions of law, i.e., whether Civil Case No. 106 should have been
dismissed for failure to implead indispensable parties and for forum shopping. Thus, the direct resort by the
Republic to this Court is proper.
The Court shall now consider the propriety of the dismissal by the RTC-Branch 1 of the Complaint for
Expropriation of the Republic.
The proper parties in the expropriation proceedings
The right of the Republic to be substituted for ISA as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 106 had long been affirmed by no
less than this Court in the ISA case. The dispositive portion of the ISA case reads:
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 8 October 1991 to the extent that
it affirmed the trial court's order dismissing the expropriation proceedings, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and the case is REMANDED to the court a quo which shall allow the substitution of the Republic of the
Philippines for petitioner Iron Steel Authority for further proceedings consistent with this Decision. No
pronouncement as to costs.[69]
The ISA case had already become final and executory, and entry of judgment was made in said case on August
31, 1998. The RTC-Branch 1, in an Order dated November 16, 2001, effected the substitution of the Republic for
ISA.
The failure of the Republic to actually file a motion for execution does not render the substitution void. A writ of
execution requires the sheriff or other proper officer to whom it is directed to enforce the terms of the writ.[70]
The November 16, 2001 Order of the RTC-Branch 1 should be deemed as voluntary compliance with a final and
executory judgment of this Court, already rendering a motion for and issuance of a writ of execution
superfluous.
Besides, no substantive right was violated by the voluntary compliance by the RTC-Branch 1 with the directive in
the ISA case even without a motion for execution having been filed. To the contrary, the RTC-Branch 1 merely
enforced the judicially determined right of the Republic to the substitution. While it is desirable that the Rules of
Court be faithfully and even meticulously observed, courts should not be so strict about procedural lapses that
do not really impair the administration of justice. If the rules are intended to insure the orderly conduct of
litigation it is because of the higher objective they seek which is the protection of the substantive rights of the
parties.[71]
The Court also observes that MCFC did not seek any remedy from the Order dated November 16, 2001 of the
RTC-Branch 1. Consequently, the said Order already became final, which even the RTC-Branch 1 itself cannot
reverse and set aside on the ground of "honest mistake."
The RTC-Branch 1 dismissed the Complaint in Civil Case No. 106 on another ground: that MCFC is not a proper
party to the expropriation proceedings, not being the owner of the parcels of land sought to be expropriated.
The RTC-Branch 1 ratiocinated that since the exercise of the power of eminent domain involves the taking of
private land intended for public use upon payment of just compensation to the owner, then a complaint for
expropriation must be directed against the owner of the land sought to be expropriated.
The Republic insists, however, that MCFC is a real party-in-interest, impleaded as a defendant in the Complaint
for Expropriation because of its possessory or occupancy rights over the subject parcels of land, and not by

reason of its ownership of the said properties. In addition, the Republic maintains that non-joinder of parties is
not a ground for the dismissal of an action.
Rule 67, Section 1 of the then Rules of Court[72] described how expropriation proceedings should be instituted:
Section 1. The complaint. - The right of eminent domain shall be exercised by the filing of a complaint which
shall state with certainty the right and purpose of condemnation, describe the real or personal property sought
to be condemned, and join as defendants all persons owning or claiming to own, or occupying, any
part thereof or interest therein, showing, so far as practicable, the interest of each defendant separately. If
the title to any property sought to be condemned appears to be in the Republic of the Philippines,
although occupied by private individuals, or if the title is otherwise obscure or doubtful so that the plaintiff
cannot with accuracy or certainty specify who are the real owners, averment to that effect may be made in the
complaint.[73] (Emphases supplied.)
For sure, defendants in an expropriation case are not limited to the owners of the property to be expropriated,
and just compensation is not due to the property owner alone. As this Court held in De Knecht v. Court of
Appeals[74]:
The defendants in an expropriation case are not limited to the owners of the property condemned.
They include all other persons owning, occupying or claiming to own the property. When [property]
is taken by eminent domain, the owner x x x is not necessarily the only person who is entitled to
compensation. In the American jurisdiction, the term `owner' when employed in statutes relating to eminent
domain to designate the persons who are to be made parties to the proceeding, refer, as is the rule in respect of
those entitled to compensation, to all those who have lawful interest in the property to be condemned, including
a mortgagee, a lessee and a vendee in possession under an executory contract. Every person having an estate
or interest at law or in equity in the land taken is entitled to share in the award. If a person claiming an interest
in the land sought to be condemned is not made a party, he is given the right to intervene and lay claim to the
compensation. (Emphasis supplied.)
At the time of the filing of the Complaint for Expropriation in 1983, possessory/occupancy rights of MCFC over
the parcels of land sought to be expropriated were undisputed. In fact, Letter of Instructions No. 1277[75] dated
November 16, 1982 expressly recognized that portions of the lands reserved by Presidential Proclamation No.
2239, also dated November 16, 1982, for the use and immediate occupation by the NSC, were then occupied by
an idle fertilizer plant/factory and related facilities of MCFC. It was ordered in the same Letter of Instruction that:
(1) NSC shall negotiate with the owners of MCFC, for and on behalf of the Government, for the compensation of
MCFC's present occupancy rights on the subject lands at an amount of Thirty (P30.00) Pesos per square meter
or equivalent to the assessed value thereof (as determined by the City Assessor of Iligan), whichever is higher.
NSC shall give MCFC the option to either remove its aforesaid plant, structures, equipment, machinery and other
facilities from the lands or to sell or cede ownership thereof to NSC at a price equivalent to the fair market value
thereof as appraised by the Asian Appraisal Inc. as may be mutually agreed upon by NSC and MCFC.
(2) In the event that NSC and MCFC fail to agree on the foregoing within sixty (60) days from the date hereof,
the Iron and Steel Authority (ISA) shall exercise its authority under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 272, as
amended, to initiate the expropriation of the aforementioned occupancy rights of MCFC on the subject lands
as well as the plant, structures, equipment, machinery and related facilities, for and on behalf of NSC, and
thereafter cede the same to NSC. During the pendency of the expropriation proceedings, NSC shall take
possession of the properties, subject to bonding and other requirements of P.D. 1533. (Emphasis supplied.)
Being the occupant of the parcel of land sought to be expropriated, MCFC could very well be named a defendant
in Civil Case No. 106. The RTC-Branch 1 evidently erred in dismissing the Complaint for Expropriation against
MCFC for not being a proper party.
Also erroneous was the dismissal by the RTC-Branch 1 of the original Complaint for Expropriation for having
been filed only against MCFC, the occupant of the subject land, but not the owner/s of the said property.
Dismissal is not the remedy for misjoinder or non-joinder of parties. According to Rule 3, Section 11 of the Rules
of Court:
SEC. 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties. - Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is ground for
dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or
on its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim against a misjoined
party may be severed and proceeded with separately. (Emphasis supplied.)

MCFC contends that the aforequoted rule does not apply in this case where the party not joined, i.e., the owner
of the property to be expropriated, is an indispensable party.
An indispensable party is a party-in-interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action.[76]
Now, is the owner of the property an indispensable party in an action for expropriation? Not necessarily. Going
back to Rule 67, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, expropriation proceedings may be instituted even when "title to
the property sought to be condemned appears to be in the Republic of the Philippines, although occupied by
private individuals." The same rule provides that a complaint for expropriation shall name as defendants "all
persons owning or claiming to own, or occupying, any part thereof or interest" in the property sought to be
condemned. Clearly, when the property already appears to belong to the Republic, there is no sense in the
Republic instituting expropriation proceedings against itself. It can still, however, file a complaint for
expropriation against the private persons occupying the property. In such an expropriation case, the owner of
the property is not an indispensable party.
To recall, Presidential Proclamation No. 2239 explicitly states that the parcels of land reserved to NSC are part of
the public domain, hence, owned by the Republic. Letter of Instructions No. 1277 recognized only the occupancy
rights of MCFC and directed NSC to institute expropriation proceedings to determine the just compensation for
said occupancy rights. Therefore, the owner of the property is not an indispensable party in the original
Complaint for Expropriation in Civil Case No. 106.
Assuming for the sake of argument that the owner of the property is an indispensable party in the expropriation
proceedings, the non-joinder of said party would still not warrant immediate dismissal of the complaint for
expropriation. In Vda. De Manguerra v. Risos,[77] the Court applied Rule 3, Section 11 of the Rules of Court even
in case of non-joinder of an indispensable party, viz:
[F]ailure to implead an indispensable party is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. In such a case, the
remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. Parties may be added by order of the court, on
motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as are just. If the
petitioner/plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, the
latter may dismiss the complaint/petition for the petitioner's/plaintiff's failure to comply. (Emphasis
supplied.)
In this case, the RTC-Branch 1 did not first require the Republic to implead the alleged owner/s of the parcel of
land sought to be expropriated. Despite the absence of any order from the Court, the Republic - upon becoming
aware that the parcels of land involved in the 1914 Cacho case and 1997 Cacho case, claimed by Teofilo and
LANDTRADE, and Vidal and AZIMUTH, encroached into and overlapped with the parcel of land subject of Civil
Case No. 106 - sought leave of court to file a Supplemental Complaint to implead these four parties. The RTCBranch 1 did not take the Supplemental Complaint of the Republic into consideration. Instead, it dismissed
outright the original Complaint for Expropriation against MCFC.
Forum shopping
The RTC-Branch 1 further erred in finding that the Republic committed forum shopping by (1) simultaneously
instituting the actions for expropriation (Civil Case No. 106) and reversion (Civil Case No. 6686) for the same
parcels of land; and (2) taking inconsistent positions when it conceded lack of ownership over the parcels of land
in the expropriation case but asserted ownership of the same properties in the reversion case.
There is no dispute that the Republic instituted reversion proceedings (Civil Case No. 6686) for the same parcels
of land subject of the instant Expropriation Case (Civil Case No. 106). The Complaint for Cancellation of Titles
and Reversion[78] dated September 27, 2004 was filed by the Republic with the RTC on October 13, 2004. The
records, however, do not show when the Supplemental Complaint for Expropriation[79] dated September 28,
2004 was filed with the RTC. Apparently, the Supplemental Complaint for Expropriation was filed after the
Complaint for Cancellation of Titles and Reversion since the Republic mentioned in the former the fact of filing of
the latter.[80] Even then, the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping[81] attached to the
Supplemental Complaint for Expropriation did not disclose the filing of the Complaint for Cancellation of Titles
and Reversion. Notwithstanding such non-disclosure, the Court finds that the Republic did not commit forum
shopping for filing both Complaints.
In NBI-Microsoft Corporation v Hwang,[82] the Court laid down the circumstances when forum shopping exists:
Forum-shopping takes place when a litigant files multiple suits involving the same parties, either simultaneously
or successively, to secure a favorable judgment. Thus, it exists where the elements of litis pendentia are
present, namely: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties who represent the same interests in both

actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c)
the identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases is such that any judgment that may
be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the
other case. Forum-shopping is an act of malpractice because it abuses court processes. x x x.
Here, the elements of litis pendencia are wanting. There is no identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for in
Civil Case No. 106 and Civil Case No. 6686.
Civil Case No. 106 was instituted against MCFC to acquire, for a public purpose, its possessory/occupancy rights
over 322,532 square meters or 32.25 hectares of land which, at the time of the filing of the original Complaint in
1983, was not yet covered by any certificate of title. On the other hand, Civil Case No. 6686 sought the
cancellation of OCT Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201 (a.f.), which was entered into registration on December 4,
1998 in Doa Demetria's name, on the argument that the parcels of land covered by said certificates exceeded
the areas granted by the LRC to Doa Demetria in GLRO Record Nos. 6908 and 6909, as affirmed by this Court
in the 1914 Cacho case.
Expropriation vis--vis reversion
The Republic is not engaging in contradictions when it instituted both expropriation and reversion proceedings
for the same parcels of land. The expropriation and reversion proceedings are distinct remedies that are not
necessarily exclusionary of each other.
The filing of a complaint for reversion does not preclude the institution of an action for expropriation. Even if the
land is reverted back to the State, the same may still be subject to expropriation as against the occupants
thereof.
Also, Rule 67, Section 1 of the Rules of Court allows the filing of a complaint for expropriation even when "the
title to any property sought to be condemned appears to be in the Republic of the Philippines, although
occupied by private individuals, or if the title is otherwise obscure or doubtful so that the plaintiff cannot with
accuracy or certainty specify who are the real owners." Rule 67, Section 9 of the Rules of Court further provides:
SEC. 9. Uncertain ownership; conflicting claims. - If the ownership of the property taken is uncertain, or
there are conflicting claims to any part thereof, the court may order any sum or sums awarded as
compensation for the property to be paid to the court for the benefit of the person adjudged in the same
proceeding to be entitled thereto. But the judgment shall require the payment of the sum or sums awarded to
either the defendant or the court before the plaintiff can enter upon the property, or retain it for the public use
or purpose if entry has already been made. (Emphasis supplied.)
Hence, the filing by the Republic of the Supplemental Complaint for Expropriation impleading Teofilo, Vidal,
LANDTRADE, and AZIMUTH, is not necessarily an admission that the parcels of land sought to be expropriated
are privately owned. At most, the Republic merely acknowledged in its Supplemental Complaint that there are
private persons also claiming ownership of the parcels of land. The Republic can still consistently assert, in both
actions for expropriation and reversion, that the subject parcels of land are part of the public domain.
In sum, the RTC-Branch 1 erred in dismissing the original Complaint and disallowing the Supplemental Complaint
in Civil Case No. 106. The Court reverses and sets aside the Resolutions dated July 12, 2005 and October 24,
2005 of the RTC-Branch 1 in Civil Case 106, and reinstates the Complaint for Reversion of the Republic.
The Quieting of Title Case
(G.R. Nos. 178779 and 178894)
Essentially, in their Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, LANDTRADE and
Teofilo, and/or Atty. Cabildo are calling upon this Court to determine whether the Court of Appeals, in its Decision
dated January 19, 2007 in CA-G.R. CV No. 00456, erred in (1) upholding the jurisdiction of the RTC-Branch 3 to
resolve the issues on Vidal's status, filiation, and heirship in Civil Case No. 4452, the action for quieting of title;
(2) not holding that Vidal and AZIMUTH have neither cause of action nor legal or equitable title or interest in the
parcels of land covered by OCT Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201 (a.f.); (3) finding the evidence sufficient to
establish Vidal's status as Doa Demetria's granddaughter and sole surviving heir; and (4) not holding that Civil
Case No. 4452 was already barred by prescription.
In their Comment, Vidal and AZIMUTH insisted on the correctness of the Court of Appeals Decision dated January
19, 2007, and questioned the propriety of the Petition for Review filed by LANDTRADE as it supposedly raised
only factual issues.

The Court rules in favor of Vidal and AZIMUTH.

Petitions for review under Rule 45
A scrutiny of the issues raised, not just in the Petition for Review of LANDTRADE, but also those in the Petition
for Review of Teofilo and/or Atty. Cabildo, reveals that they are both factual and legal.
The Court has held in a long line of cases that in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, only questions of law may be raised as the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. It is settled that as a rule,
the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals especially those affirming the trial court are final and conclusive and
cannot be reviewed on appeal to the Supreme Court. The exceptions to this rule are: (a) when the conclusion is
a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (b) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (c) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the judgment is based on
a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (f) when the Court of Appeals, in
making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee; (g) where the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed
by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and (h) where the findings
of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court, or are mere conclusions without citation of
specific evidence, or where the facts set forth by the petitioner are not disputed by the respondent, or where the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on absence of evidence but are contradicted by the
evidence on record.[83] None of these exceptions exists in the Petitions at bar.
Be that as it may, the Court shall address in full-length all the issues tendered in the instant Petitions for Review,
even when factual, if only to bolster the conclusions reached by the RTC-Branch 3 and the Court of Appeals, with
which the Court fully concurs.
Jurisdiction vis--vis exercise of jurisdiction
LANDTRADE, Teofilo, and/or Atty. Cabildo argue that the RTC-Branch 3 had no jurisidiction to resolve the issues
of status, filiation, and heirship in an action for quieting of title as said issues should be ventilated and
adjudicated only in special proceedings under Rule 90, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, pursuant to the ruling of
this Court in Agapay v. Palang[84] (Agapay case) and Heirs of Guido Yaptinchay and Isabel Yaptinchay v. Del
Rosario[85] (Yaptinchay case). Even on the assumption that the RTC-Branch 3 acquired jurisdiction over their
persons, LANDTRADE, Teofilo, and/or Atty. Cabildo maintain that the RTC-Branch 3 erred in the exercise of its
jurisdiction by adjudicating and passing upon the issues on Vidal's status, filiation, and heirship in the Quieting
of Title Case. Moreover, LANDTRADE, Teofilo, and/or Atty. Cabildo aver that the resolution of issues regarding
status, filiation, and heirship is not merely a matter of procedure, but of jurisdiction which cannot be waived by
the parties or by the court.
The aforementioned arguments fail to persuade.
In the first place, jurisdiction is not the same as the exercise of jurisdiction. The Court distinguished between the
two, thus:
Jurisdiction is not the same as the exercise of jurisdiction. As distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction,
jurisdiction is the authority to decide a cause, and not the decision rendered therein. Where there is
jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter, the decision on all other questions arising in
the case is but an exercise of the jurisdiction. And the errors which the court may commit in the exercise
of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an appeal.[86] (Emphasis supplied.)
Here, the RTC-Branch 3 unmistakably had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties in Civil Case No.
4452.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action is conferred only by the Constitution or by law. Once
vested by law on a particular court or body, the jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action
cannot be dislodged by anybody other than by the legislature through the enactment of a law. The power to
change the jurisdiction of the courts is a matter of legislative enactment, which none but the legislature may do.
Congress has the sole power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the courts.[87]
The RTC has jurisdiction over an action for quieting of title under the circumstances described in Section 19(2) of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended:
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:

xxxx
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein,
where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or,
for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for
forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon
the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
Records show that the parcels of land subject of Civil Case No. 4452 have a combined assessed value
ofP35,398,920.00,[88] undisputedly falling within the jurisdiction of the RTC-Branch 3.
The RTC-Branch 3 also acquired jurisdiction over the person of Teofilo when he filed his Answer to the Complaint
of Vidal and AZIMUTH; and over the juridical personality of LANDTRADE when the said corporation was allowed
to intervene in Civil Case No. 4452.
Considering that the RTC-Branch 3 had jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties in Civil Case No. 4452,
then it can rule on all issues in the case, including those on Vidal's status, filiation, and heirship, in exercise of its
jurisdiction. Any alleged erroneous finding by the RTC-Branch 3 concerning Vidal's status, filiation, and heirship
in Civil Case No. 4452, is merely an error of judgment subject to the affirmation, modification, or reversal by the
appellate court when appealed.
The Agapay and Yaptinchay cases
LANDTRADE, Teofilo, and/or Atty. Cabildo cannot rely on the cases of Agapay and Yaptinchay to support their
position that declarations on Vidal's status, filiation, and heirsip, should be made in special proceedings and not
in Civil Case No. 4452.
In the Agapay case, the deceased Miguel Agapay (Miguel) contracted two marriages. Miguel married Carlina
(sometimes referred to as Cornelia) in 1949, and they had a daughter named Herminia, who was born in 1950.
Miguel left for Hawaii a few months after his wedding to Carlina. When Miguel returned to the Philippines in
1972, he did not live with Carlina and Herminia. He married Erlinda in 1973, with whom he had a son named
Kristopher, who was born in 1977. Miguel died in 1981. A few months after Miguel's death, Carlina and Herminia
filed a complaint for recovery of ownership and possession with damages against Erlinda over a riceland and
house and lot in Pangasinan, which were allegedly purchased by Miguel during his cohabitation with Erlinda. The
RTC dismissed the complaint, finding little evidence that the properties pertained to the conjugal property of
Miguel and Carlina. The RTC went on to provide for the intestate shares of the parties, particularly of Kristopher,
Miguel's illegitimate son. On appeal, the Court of Appeals: (1) reversed the RTC judgment; (2) ordered Erlinda to
vacate and deliver the properties to Carlina and Herminia; and (3) ordered the Register of Deeds to cancel the
Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) over the subject property in the name of Erlinda and to issue new ones in the
names of Carlina and Herminia. Erlinda filed a Petition for Review with this Court.
In resolving Erlinda's Petition, the Court held in the Agapay case that Article 148 of the Family Code applied to
Miguel and Erlinda. Article 148 specifically governs the property relations of a man and a woman who are not
capacitated to marry each other and live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage or under a void marriage. Under said provision, only the properties acquired by both parties through
their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion
to their respective contributions. In this case, the Court found that the money used to buy the subject properties
all came from Miguel.
The Court then proceeded to address another issue in the Agapay case, more relevant to the one at bar:
The second issue concerning Kristopher Palang's status and claim as an illegitimate son and heir to Miguel's
estate is here resolved in favor of respondent court's correct assessment that the trial court erred in making
pronouncements regarding Kristopher's heirship and filiation "inasmuch as questions as to who are the heirs of
the decedent, proof of filiation of illegitimate children and the determination of the estate of the latter and
claims thereto should be ventilated in the proper probate court or in a special proceeding instituted for the
purpose and cannot be adjudicated in the instant ordinary civil action which is for recovery of ownership and
possession."[89]
The Yaptinchay case involved two parcels of land in Cavite which were supposedly owned by Guido and Isabel
Yaptinchay (spouses Yaptinchay). Upon the death of the spouses Yaptinchay, their heirs (Yaptinchay heirs)
executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the deceased spouses' estate. However, the Yaptinchay heirs
discovered that the properties were already covered by TCTs in the name of Golden Bay Realty Corporation
(Golden Bay), prompting the Yaptinchay heirs to file with the RTC a complaint against Golden Bay for the

annulment and/or declaration of nullity of TCT Nos. 493363 to 493367 and all their derivatives, or in the
alternative, the reconveyance of realty with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or restraining order
with damages. The Yaptinchay heirs later filed an amended complaint to include additional defendants to whom
Golden Bay sold portions of the subject properties. The RTC initially dismissed the amended complaint, but
acting on the motion for reconsideration of the Yaptinchay heirs, eventually allowed the same. Golden Bay and
its other co-defendants presented a motion to dismiss the amended complaint, which was granted by the RTC.
The Yaptinchay heirs came before this Court via a Petition for Certiorari.
The Court first observed in the Yaptinchay case that the Yaptinchay heirs availed themselves of the wrong
remedy. An order of dismissal is the proper subject of an appeal, not a petition for certiorari. Next, the Court
affirmed the dismissal of the amended complaint, thus:
Neither did the respondent court commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned Order dismissing
the Second Amended Complaint of petitioners, x x x.
xxxx
In Litam, etc., et al. v. Rivera, this court opined that the declaration of heirship must be made in an
administration proceeding, and not in an independent civil action. This doctrine was reiterated in Solivio v. Court
of Appeals where the court held:
"In Litam, et al. v. Rivera, 100 Phil. 364, where despite the pendency of the special proceedings for the
settlement of the intestate estate of the deceased Rafael Litam, the plaintiffs-appellants filed a civil action in
which they claimed that they were the children by a previous marriage of the deceased to a Chinese woman,
hence, entitled to inherit his one-half share of the conjugal properties acquired during his marriage to Marcosa
Rivera, the trial court in the civil case declared that the plaintiffs-appellants were not children of the deceased,
that the properties in question were paraphernal properties of his wife, Marcosa Rivera, and that the latter was
his only heir. On appeal to this Court, we ruled that `such declarations (that Marcosa Rivera was the only heir of
the decedent) is improper, in Civil Case No. 2071, it being within the exclusive competence of the court in
Special Proceedings No. 1537, in which it is not as yet, in issue, and, will not be, ordinarily, in issue until the
presentation of the project of partition.' (p. 378)."
The trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can
only be made in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action
is defined as "one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention
or redress of a wrong' while a special proceeding is "a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a
right, or a particular fact." It is then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a
special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right.[90]
LANDTRADE, Teofilo, and/or Atty. Cabildo missed one vital factual distinction between the Agapay and
Yaptinchay cases, on one hand, and the present Petitions, on the other, by reason of which, the Court shall not
apply the prior two to the last.
The Agapay and Yaptinchay cases, as well as the cases of Litam v. Rivera[91] and Solivio v. Court of Appeals,
[92] cited in the Yaptinchay case, all arose from actions for reconveyance; while the instant Petitions stemmed
from an action for quieting of title. The Court may have declared in previous cases that an action for
reconveyance is in the nature of an action for quieting of title,[93] but the two are distinct remedies.
Ordinary civil action for
reconveyance vis-a-vis special
proceeding for quieting of title
The action for reconveyance is based on Section 55 of Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration
Act, as amended, which states "[t]hat in all cases of registration procured by fraud the owner may pursue all his
legal and equitable remedies against the parties to such fraud, without prejudice, however, to the rights of any
innocent holder for value of a certificate of title."
The Court, in Heirs of Eugenio Lopez, Sr. v. Enriquez,[94] described an action for reconveyance as follows:
An action for reconveyance is an action in personam available to a person whose property has been
wrongfully registered under the Torrens system in another's name. Although the decree is recognized as
incontrovertible and no longer open to review, the registered owner is not necessarily held free from liens. As a
remedy, an action for reconveyance is filed as an ordinary action in the ordinary courts of justice and not with

the land registration court. Reconveyance is always available as long as the property has not passed to an
innocent third person for value. x x x (Emphases supplied.)
On the other hand, Article 476 of the Civil Code lays down the circumstances when a person may institute an
action for quieting of title:
ART. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any
instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and
in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be
brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or any interest
therein.
In Calacala v. Republic,[95] the Court elucidated on the nature of an action to quiet title:
Regarding the nature of the action filed before the trial court, quieting of title is a common law remedy for the
removal of any cloud upon or doubt or uncertainty with respect to title to real property. Originating in equity
jurisprudence, its purpose is to secure `x x x an adjudication that a claim of title to or an interest in property,
adverse to that of the complainant, is invalid, so that the complainant and those claiming under him may be
forever afterward free from any danger of hostile claim.' In an action for quieting of title, the competent court is
tasked to determine the respective rights of the complainant and other claimants, `x x x not only to
place things in their proper place, to make the one who has no rights to said immovable respect and not disturb
the other, but also for the benefit of both, so that he who has the right would see every cloud of doubt over the
property dissipated, and he could afterwards without fear introduce the improvements he may desire, to use,
and even to abuse the property as he deems best x x x . (Emphases supplied.)
The Court expounded further in Spouses Portic v. Cristobal[96] that:
Suits to quiet title are characterized as proceedings quasi in rem. Technically, they are neither in rem nor in
personam. In an action quasi in rem, an individual is named as defendant. However, unlike suits in rem, a quasi
in rem judgment is conclusive only between the parties.
Generally, the registered owner of a property is the proper party to bring an action to quiet title. However, it
has been held that this remedy may also be availed of by a person other than the registered
owner because, in the Article reproduced above, "title" does not necessarily refer to the original or transfer
certificate of title. Thus, lack of an actual certificate of title to a property does not necessarily bar an action to
quiet title. x x x (Emphases supplied.)
The Court pronounced in the Agapay and Yaptinchay cases that a declaration of heirship cannot be made in an
ordinary civil action such as an action for reconveyance, but must only be made in a special proceeding, for it
involves the establishment of a status or right.
The appropriate special proceeding would have been the settlement of the estate of the decedent. Nonetheless,
an action for quieting of title is also a special proceeding, specifically governed by Rule 63 of the Rules of Court
on declaratory relief and similar remedies.[97] Actions for declaratory relief and other similar remedies are
distinguished from ordinary civil actions because:
2. In declaratory relief, the subject-matter is a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute, executive
order or regulation, or ordinance. The issue is the validity or construction of these documents. The relief sought
is thedeclaration of the petitioner's rights and duties thereunder.
The concept of a cause of action in ordinary civil actions does not apply to declaratory relief as this special civil
action presupposes that there has been no breach or violation of the instruments involved. Consequently, unlike
other judgments, the judgment in an action for declaratory relief does not essentially entail any executional
process as the only relief to be properly granted therein is a declaration of the rights and duties of the parties
under the instrument, although some exceptions have been recognized under certain situations.[98]
Civil Case No. 4452 could not be considered an action for reconveyance as it is not based on the allegation that
the two parcels of land, Lots 1 and 2, have been wrongfully registered in another person's name. OCT Nos. 01200 (a.f.) and 0-1201 (a.f.), covering the subject properties, are still in Doa Demetria's name. Vidal and Teofilo
each claims to have inherited the two parcels of land from the late Doa Demetria as said decedent's sole heir,
but neither Vidal nor Teofilo has been able to transfer registration of the said properties to her/his name as of
yet.

Instead, Civil Case No. 4452 is indisputably an action for quieting of title, a special proceeding wherein the court
is precisely tasked to determine the rights of the parties as to a particular parcel of land, so that the
complainant and those claiming under him/her may be forever free from any danger of hostile claim. Vidal
asserted title to the two parcels of land as Doa Demetria's sole heir. The cloud on Vidal's title, which she sought
to have removed, was Teofilo's adverse claim of title to the same properties, also as Doa Demetria's only heir.
For it to determine the rights of the parties in Civil Case No. 4452, it was therefore crucial for the RTC-Branch 3
to squarely make a finding as to the status, filiation, and heirship of Vidal in relation to those of Teofilo. A finding
that one is Doa Demetria's sole and rightful heir would consequently exclude and extinguish the claim of the
other.
Even assuming arguendo that the proscription in the Agapay and Yaptinchay cases against making declarations
of heirship in ordinary civil actions also extends to actions for quieting of title, the same is not absolute.
In Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran[99] (Portugal case), the Court recognized that there are instances when a
declaration of heirship need not be made in a separate special proceeding:
The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which the adverse parties are putative heirs to the estate of
a decedent or parties to the special proceedings for its settlement is that if the special proceedings are pending,
or if there are no special proceedings filed but there is, under the circumstances of the case, a need to file one,
then the determination of, among other issues, heirship should be raised and settled in said special
proceedings. Where special proceedings had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated,
however, or if a putative heir has lost the right to have himself declared in the special proceedings as co-heir
and he can no longer ask for its re-opening, then an ordinary civil action can be filed for his declaration as heir
in order to bring about the annulment of the partition or distribution or adjudication of a property or properties
belonging to the estate of the deceased.[100]
In the Portugal case itself, the Court directed the trial court to already determine petitioners' status as heirs of
the decedent even in an ordinary civil action, i.e., action for annulment of title, because:
It appearing x x x that in the present case the only property of the intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan
parcel of land, to still subject it, under the circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding which could be
long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status of petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it is
burdensome to the estate with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in
light of the fact that the parties to the civil case--subject of the present case, could and had already in fact
presented evidence before the trial court which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined
during pre-trial.
In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling reason to still subject Portugal's
estate to administration proceedings since a determination of petitioners' status as heirs could be achieved in
the civil case filed by petitioners, the trial court should proceed to evaluate the evidence presented by the
parties during the trial and render a decision thereon upon the issues it defined during pre-trial, x x x.[101]
Another case, Heirs of Teofilo Gabatan v. Court of Appeals[102] (Gabatan case), involved an action for recovery
of ownership and possession of property with the opposing parties insisting that they are the legal heirs of the
deceased. Recalling the Portugal case, the Court ruled:
Similarly, in the present case, there appears to be only one parcel of land being claimed by the contending
parties as their inheritance from Juan Gabatan. It would be more practical to dispense with a separate special
proceeding for the determination of the status of respondent as the sole heir of Juan Gabatan, specially in light
of the fact that the parties to Civil Case No. 89-092, had voluntarily submitted the issue to the RTC and already
presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship in these proceeding. Also the RTC assumed jurisdiction
over the same and consequently rendered judgment thereon.
In Fidel v. Court of Appeals[103] (Fidel case), therein respondents, the heirs of the late Vicente Espineli (Vicente)
from his first marriage, instituted an action to annul the sale of Vicente's property to therein petitioners, the
spouses Fidel. The subject property was sold to petitioners by Vicente's heirs from his second marriage. Even
though one's legitimacy can only be questioned in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, the Court
held that it was necessary to pass upon respondents' relationship to Vicente in the action for annulment of sale
so as to determine respondents' legal rights to the subject property. In fact, the issue of whether respondents
are Vicente's heirs was squarely raised by petitioners in their Pre-Trial Brief. Hence, petitioners were estopped
from assailing the ruling of the trial court on respondents' status.

In Civil Case No. 4452, Teofilo and/or Atty. Cabildo themselves asked the RTC-Branch 3 to resolve the issue of
Vidal's legal or beneficial ownership of the two parcels of land.[104] During trial, Vidal already presented before
the RTC-Branch 3 evidence to establish her status, filiation, and heirship. There is no showing that Doa
Demetria left any other property that would have required special administration proceedings. In the spirit of the
Portugal, Gabatan, and Fidel cases, the Court deems it more practical and expeditious to settle the issue on
Vidal's status, filiation, and heirship in Civil Case No. 4452.
"Title" in quieting of title
LANDTRADE, Teofilo, and/or Atty. Cabildo further contend that Vidal and AZIMUTH have no cause of action for
quieting of title since Vidal has no title to the two parcels of land. In comparison, Teofilo's title to the same
properties, as Doa Demetria's only heir, was already established and recognized by this Court in the 1997
Cacho case.
Again, the Court cannot sustain the foregoing contention of LANDTRADE, Teofilo, and/or Atty. Cabildo.
It must be borne in mind that the concept of a cause of action in ordinary civil actions does not apply to quieting
of title. In declaratory relief, the subject-matter is a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute,
executive order or regulation, or ordinance. The issue is the validity or construction of these documents. The
relief sought is the declaration of the petitioner's rights and duties thereunder. Being in the nature of declaratory
relief, this special civil action presupposes that there has yet been no breach or violation of the instruments
involved.[105]
In an action for quieting of title, the subject matter is the title sought to have quieted. "Title" is not limited to the
certificate of registration under the Torrens System (i.e., OCT or TCT). Pursuant to Article 477 of the Civil Code,
the plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in, the real property subject of the action for
quieting of title. The plaintiff need not even be in possession of the property. If she is indeed Doa Demetria's
sole heir, Vidal already has equitable title to or interest in the two parcels of land by right of succession, even
though she has not yet secured certificates of title to the said properties in her name.
LANDTRADE, Teofilo, and/or Atty. Cabildo mistakenly believe that the 1997 Cacho case had conclusively settled
Teofilo's identity and existence as Doa Demetria's sole heir. They failed to appreciate that the 1997 Cacho case
involved Teofilo's petition for reconstitution of title, treated as a petition for the re-issuance of Decree Nos.
10364 and 18969. The grant by the RTC of Teofilo's petition, affirmed by this Court, only conclusively
established the prior issuance and existence and the subsequent loss of the two decrees, thus, entitling
Teofilo to the re-issuance of the said decrees in their original form and condition.
As the Court of Appeals pointed out in its assailed Decision dated January 19, 2007, the issue of Teofilo's
heirship was not the lis mota of the 1997 Cacho case. It was addressed by the Court in the 1997 Cacho case for
the simple purpose of determining Teofilo's legal interest in filing a petition for the re-issuance of the lost
decrees. The Court merely found therein that Teofilo's Affidavit of Adjudication, executed in the U.S.A. before the
Philippine Consulate General, enjoyed the presumption of regularity and, thus, sufficiently established Teofilo's
legal interest. The 1997 Cacho case, however, did not conclusively settle that Teofilo is indeed Doa Demetria's
only heir and the present owner, by right of succession, of the subject properties.
Factual findings of the RTC-Branch 3 and the Court of Appeals
LANDTRADE, Teofilo, and/or Atty. Cabildo additionally posit that the evidence presented by Vidal and AZIMUTH
were insufficient to prove the fact of Vidal's filiation and heirship to Doa Demetria. LANDTRADE, Teofilo, and/or
Atty. Cabildo particularly challenged the reliance of the RTC-Branch 3 on Vidal's baptismal certificate, arguing
that it has no probative value and is not conclusive proof of filiation.
Alternative means of proving an individual's filiation have been recognized by this Court in Heirs of Ignacio Conti
v. Court of Appeals.[106] The property in litigation in said case was co-owned by Lourdes Sampayo (Sampayo)
and Ignacio Conti, married to Rosario Cuario (collectively referred to as the spouses Conti). Sampayo died
without issue. Therein respondents, claiming to be Sampayo's collateral relatives, filed a petition for partition of
the subject property, plus damages. To prove that they were collaterally related to Sampayo through the latter's
brothers and sisters, respondents submitted photocopies of the birth certificates, certifications on the nonavailability of records of births, and certified true copies of the baptismal certificates of Sampayo's siblings. The
spouses Conti questioned the documentary evidence of respondents' filiation on the ground that these were
incompetent and inadmissible, but the Court held that:
Under Art. 172 of the Family Code, the filiation of legitimate children shall be proved by any other means
allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws, in the absence of a record of birth or a parent's admission of

such legitimate filiation in a public or private document duly signed by the parent. Such other proof of one's
filiation may be a baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered,
common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses and other kinds
of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. By analogy, this method of proving filiation may also
be utilized in the instant case.
xxxx
The admissibility of baptismal certificates offered by Lydia S. Reyes, absent the testimony of the officiating
priest or the official recorder, was settled in People v. Ritter, citing U.S. v. de Vera (28 Phil. 105 [1914]), thus x x x the entries made in the Registry Book may be considered as entries made in the course of the business
under Section 43 of Rule 130, which is an exception to the hearsay rule. The baptisms administered by the
church are one of its transactions in the exercise of ecclesiastical duties and recorded in the book of the church
during the course of its business.
It may be argued that baptismal certificates are evidence only of the administration of the sacrament, but in this
case, there were four (4) baptismal certificates which, when taken together, uniformly show that Lourdes,
Josefina, Remedios and Luis had the same set of parents, as indicated therein. Corroborated by the undisputed
testimony of Adelaida Sampayo that with the demise of Lourdes and her brothers Manuel, Luis and sister
Remedios, the only sibling left was Josefina Sampayo Reyes, such baptismal certificates have acquired
evidentiary weight to prove filiation.[107]
Thus, Vidal's baptismal certificate is not totally bereft of any probative value. It may be appreciated, together
with all the other documentary and testimonial evidence submitted on Vidal's filiation, to wit:
The first issue proposed by petitioners for resolution is whether or not petitioner Demetria C. Vidal is the sole
surviving heir of the late Doa Demetria Cacho. To prove that, indeed, she is the sole surviving heir of the late
Doa Demetria Cacho, she testified in open court and identified the following documentary evidence, to wit:
Exhibit "A" - Birth Certificate of Demetria C. Vidal
Exhibit "B" - Partida de Bautismo of Demetria C. Vidal
Exhibit "C" - Certificate of Baptism Demetria C. Vidal
Exhibit "D" - Cacho Family Tree
Exhibit "D-1" - Branch of Demetria Cacho
Exhibit "F" - Death Certificate of Demetria Cacho.
Exhibit "P" - Driver's license of Demetria C. Vidal.
Exhibit "Q" to "Q5" - The book entitled "CACHO", the introductory page on March 1988 when the data were
compiled, page 58 on the Vidal branch of the Cacho family, page 62 on Demetria Cacho and her descendants,
page 69 on the family member with the then latest birth day 26 March 1988, and page 77 with the picture of
Demetria Cacho Vidal, Dionisio Vidal and Francisco Vidal.[108]
In contrast, LANDTRADE, Teofilo, and/or Atty. Cabildo failed to present any evidence at all in support of their
claims. According to the RTC-Branch 3:
Landtrade was also declared to have waived its right to present evidence on its defense and counterclaim in the
above-entitled case in view of its failure to present evidence on their scheduled trial date.
xxxx
Since respondents Teofilo Cacho and Atty. Godofredo Cabildo opted not to adduce evidence in this case as they
failed to appear during the scheduled trial dates, the court shall decide on the basis of the evidence for the
respondents-intervenor and petitioners.[109]
Based on the evidence presented before it, the RTC-Branch 3 made the following factual findings:
From the evidence adduced, both testimonial and documentary, the court is convinced that petitioner Vidal is
the granddaughter of Demetria Cacho Vidal, the registered owner of the subject property covered by decree
Nos. 10364 & 18969, reissued as Decrees No. 19364 and No. 16869. Such being the case, she is an heir of
Demetria Cacho Vidal.
Petitioner Vidal's Certificate of Birth (Exh. "A") shows that she was born on June 3, 1941, with the name
Demetria Vidal. [Her] father was Francisco Vidal and her mother was Fidela Confesor, Francisco Vidal is the son
of Dionisio Vidal and Demetria Cacho as shown by [his] Partida de Bautismo (Baptismal Certificate). Moreover, it

was shown in the same document that her godmother was Demetria Cacho. By inference, this Demetria Cacho
is actually Demetria Cacho Vidal because she was married to Dionisio Vidal, the father of Francisco Vidal.
Now then, is Demetria Cacho Vidal the same person referred to in Cacho v. Government of the United States (28
Phil. 616 [1914])? Page 618, Vol. 28 of the Philippine Reports would indicate that the applicant for registration
was Doa Demetria Cacho y Soriano (Exh. "R-1"). The Death Certificate of Demetria Cacho Vidal shows that her
mother was Candelaria Soriano (Exh. "F"). Necessarily, they are one and the same person. This is further
confirmed by the fact that the husband of Demetria Cacho Vidal, Seor Dionisio Vidal, was quoted in pp. 629630 of the aforecited decision as the husband of Demetria Cacho (Exh. "R-3").
The book "CACHO" (Exhs. "Q" to "Q-5") and the Cacho Family Tree (Exhs. "D" to "D-1") further strengthen the
aforecited findings of this Court.
It was established by petitioner Vidal's own testimony that at the time of Doa Demetria Cacho's death, she left
no heir other than petitioner Vidal. Her husband, Don Dionisio, died even before the war, while her only child,
Francisco Cacho Vidal - xxx Vidal's father - died during the war. Petitioner's only sibling - Francisco Dionisio - died
at childbirth.
xxxx
The next factual issue proposed by petitioners is whether or not respondent Teofilo Cacho is the son or heir of
the late Doa Demetria Cacho. The following facts and circumstances negate the impression that he is the son,
as he claims to be, of Doa Demetria Cacho. Thus:
a) Doa Demetria Cacho was married to Don Dionisio Vidal, and thus her full name was Doa Demetria Cacho
Vidal. Her only child, expectedly, carried the surname Vidal (Francisco Cacho Vidal). Had Teofilo Cacho actually
been a son of Demetria Cacho, he would and should have carried the name "Teofilo Cacho Vidal", but he did not.
b) Teofilo Cacho admits to being married to one Elisa Valderrama in the Special Power of Attorney he issued to
Atty. Godofredo [Cabildo] (Exh. "O"). Teofilo Cacho married Elisa Valderrama on 27 May 1953, in the Parish of the
Immaculate Conception, Bani, Pangasinan. The Certificate of Marriage shows that Teofilo Cacho is the son of
Agustin Cacho and Estefania Cordial, not Demetria Cacho. In his Certificate of Baptism (Exh. "G"), he was born
to Agustin Cacho and Estefania Cordial on May 1930 (when Doa Demetria Cacho was already 50 years old).
c) The Cacho Family Tree (Exh. "D") (that is, the Cacho Family to which Doa Demetria Cacho belonged) as well
as the book on the Cacho Family (Exh. "Q") are bereft of any mention of Teofilo Cacho or his wife Elisa
Valderrama, or even his real father Agustin Cacho, or mother Estefania Cordial. They are not known to be
related to the Cacho family of Doa Demetria Cacho.
d) Paragraph 1.11 of the Petition charges respondent Teofilo Cacho of having falsely and fraudulently claiming to
be the son and sole heir of the late Doa Demetria Cacho. In his answer to this particular paragraph, he denied
the same for lack of knowledge or information to form a belief. He should know whether this allegation is true or
not because it concerns him. If true, he should admit and if false, he opted to deny the charges for lack of
knowledge or information to form a belief. The Court considers his denial as an admission of the allegation that
he is falsely and fraudulently claiming to be the son and sole heir of the late Doa Demetria Cacho.[110]
Considering the aforequoted factual findings, the RTC-Branch 3 arrived at the following legal conclusions,
quieting the titles of Vidal and AZIMUTH, viz:
The first proposed legal issue to be resolved had been amply discussed under the first factual issue. Certainly,
petitioner Vidal has hereditary rights, interest, or title not only to a portion of the Subject Property but to the
entire property left by the late Doa Demetria Cacho Vidal, subject, however, to the Deed of Conditional
Conveyance executed by petitioner Vidal of a portion of the Subject Property in favor of petitioner Azimuth
International Development Corporation (Exh. "J") executed pursuant to their Memorandum of Agreement (Exh.
"I"). Consequently, it goes without saying that petitioner Azimuth International Development Corporation has a
right, interest in, or title to a portion of the subject property.
As discussed earlier in this decision, Teofilo Cacho, not being the son, as he claims to be, of the late Doa
Demetria Cacho Vidal, has no hereditary rights to the Subject Property left by Doa Demetria Cacho Vidal. He
failed to show any evidence that he is the son of the late Doa Demetria Cacho Vidal as he and his co
respondent, Atty. Godofredo Cabildo, even failed to appear on the scheduled trial date.
It is, therefore, safe to conclude that respondents Teofilo Cacho and/or Atty. Godofredo Cabildo and their
transferees/assignees have no right, interest in, or title to the subject property.

Prescinding from the finding of this Court that respondent Teofilo Cacho is not the son of the registered owner of
the Subject Property, the late Doa Demetria Cacho Vidal, respondent Cacho committed false pretenses and
fraudulent acts in representing himself as son and sole heir of Doa Demetria Cacho (Vidal) in his petition in
court, which eventually led to the reconstitution of the titles of Doa Demetria Cacho (Vidal). Certainly, his
misrepresentation in the reconstitution case, which apparently is the basis of his claim to the subject property,
casts clouds on [respondents'] title to the subject property.
It is only right that petitioner Vidal should seek protection of her ownership from acts tending to cast doubt on
her title. Among the legal remedies she could pursue, is this petition for Quieting of Title under Chapter 3, Title I,
Book II of the Civil Code, Articles 476 to 481 inclusive. x x x.[111]
The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the judgment of the RTC-Branch 3. The appellate court even soundly
trounced Teofilo's attack on the factual findings of the trial court:
[T]he material facts sought to be established by the afore-mentioned documentary evidence corroborated by
the testimony of VIDAL, whose testimony or credibility neither Teofilo and LANDTRADE even attempted to
impeach, only proves one thing, that she is the granddaughter of DOA DEMETRIA and the sole heiress thereof.
xxxx
Hence, it is now too late for appellant TEOFILO to assail before Us the facts proven during the trial, which he
failed to refute in open court. Verily, TEOFILO's lackadaisical attitude in the conduct of his defense only shows
that he has no proof to offer in refutation of the evidence advanced by appellee VIDAL.
Otherwise stated, appellant TEOFILO is an impostor, a pretender and bogus heir of DOA DEMETRIA.
xxxx
Besides, it is quite unnatural and against human nature for a rightful heir, if TEOFILO is really one, to merely
stand still with folded arms, while the accusing finger of VIDAL is right on his very nose. In all likelihood, and
with all his might and resources, a rightful heir may even be expected to cross continents and reach distant
shores to protect his interest over the subject properties, which in this case is arguably worth more than a King's
ransom.
It stands on record that TEOFILO CACHO has all along even prior to executing his Affidavit of Adjudication in
1985 in Chicago, United States of America, and in simultaneously executing a Special Power of Attorney in favor
of ATTY. CABILDO, had remained in the United States, and not for a single moment appeared in court except
through his agents or representatives. To Our mind, this fact alone adversely affects his pretension in claiming to
be an heir of DOA DEMETRIA.[112]
As a rule, the findings of fact of the trial court when affirmed by the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive,
and cannot be reviewed on appeal by this Court as long as they are borne out by the record or are based on
substantial evidence. It is not the function of the Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence or
premises supportive of such factual determination. The Court has consistently held that the findings of the Court
of Appeals and other lower courts are, as a rule, accorded great weight, if not binding upon it, save for the most
compelling and cogent reasons.[113] There is no justification for the Court to deviate from the factual findings of
the RTC-Branch 3 and the Court of Appeals which are clearly supported by the evidence on record.
Prescription
LANDTRADE finally asserts that the action for quieting of title of Vidal and AZIMUTH already prescribed since
LANDTRADE has been in possession of the two parcels of land in question. The prescriptive period for filing said
action lapsed in 1995, ten years from the time Teofilo executed his Affidavit of Adjudication in 1985. Yet, Vidal
and AZIMUTH instituted Civil Case No. 4452 only in 1998.
It is too late in the day for LANDTRADE to raise the issue of prescription of Civil Case No. 4452 for the first time
before this Court. In this jurisdiction, the defense of prescription cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
Such defense may be waived, and if it was not raised as a defense in the trial court, it cannot be considered on
appeal, the general rule being that the Appellate Court is not authorized to consider and resolve any question
not properly raised in the lower court.[114]
But even if the Court takes cognizance of the issue of prescription, it will rule against LANDTRADE.

A real action is one where the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property or, as indicated in what is now Rule 4,
Section 1 of the Rules of Court, a real action is an action affecting title to or recovery of possession of real
property.[115] An action for quieting of title to real property, such as Civil Case No. 4452, is indubitably a real
action.
Article 1141 of the Civil Code plainly provides that real actions over immovables prescribe after thirty years.
Doa Demetria died in 1974, transferring by succession, her title to the two parcels of land to her only heir,
Vidal. Teofilo, through Atty. Cabildo, filed a petition for reconstitution of the certificates of title covering said
properties in 1978. This is the first palpable display of Teofilo's adverse claim to the same properties,
supposedly, also as Doa Demetria's only heir. When Vidal and AZIMUTH instituted Civil Case No. 4452 in 1998,
only 20 years had passed, and the prescriptive period for filing an action for quieting of title had not yet
prescribed.
Nevertheless, the Court notes that Article 1411 of the Civil Code also clearly states that the 30-year prescriptive
period for real actions over immovables is without prejudice to what is established for the acquisition of
ownership and other real rights by prescription. Thus, the Court must also look into the acquisitive prescription
periods of ownership and other real rights.
Acquisitive prescription of dominion and real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary. [116]
Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good faith and with just title for the time fixed
by law.[117] In the case of ownership and other real rights over immovable property, they are acquired by
ordinary prescription through possession of 10 years.[118]
LANDTRADE cannot insist on the application of the 10-year ordinary acquisitive prescription period since it
cannot be considered a possessor in good faith. The good faith of the possessor consists in the reasonable belief
that the person from whom he received the thing was the owner thereof, and could transmit his ownership.[119]
LANDTRADE came to possession of the two parcels of land after purchasing the same from Teofilo. The Court
stresses, however, that Teofilo is not the registered owner of the subject properties. The said properties are still
registered in Doa Demetria's name under OCT Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201 (a.f.). The Affidavit of Adjudication,
by which Teofilo declared himself to be the sole heir of Doa Demetria's estate, is not even annotated on the
OCTs. Worse, LANDTRADE is not dealing directly with Teofilo, but only with the latter's attorney-in-fact, Atty.
Cabildo. It is axiomatic that one who buys from a person who is not a registered owner is not a purchaser in
good faith.[120]
Furthermore, in its Complaint for Unlawful Detainer against NAPOCOR and TRANSCO, which was docketed as
Civil Case No. 11475-AF before the MTCC, LANDTRADE itself alleged that when it bought the two parcels of land
from Teofilo, portions thereof were already occupied by the Overton Sub-station and Agus 7 Warehouse of
NAPOCOR and TRANSCO. This is another circumstance which should have prompted LANDTRADE to investigate
or inspect the property being sold to it. It is, of course, expected from the purchaser of a valued piece of land to
inquire first into the status or nature of possession of the occupants, i.e., whether or not the occupants possess
the land en concepto de dueo, in concept of owner. As is the common practice in the real estate industry, an
ocular inspection of the premises involved is a safeguard a cautious and prudent purchaser usually takes.
Should he find out that the land he intends to buy is occupied by anybody else other than the seller who, as in
this case, is not in actual possession, it would then be incumbent upon the purchaser to verify the extent of the
occupant's possessory rights. The failure of a prospective buyer to take such precautionary steps would mean
negligence on his part and would thereby preclude him from claiming or invoking the rights of a "purchaser in
good faith."[121]
Since the ordinary acquisitive prescription period of 10 years does not apply to LANDTRADE, then the Court
turns its attention to the extraordinary acquisitive prescription period of 30 years set by Article 1137 of the Civil
Code, which reads:
ART. 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse
possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith.
LANDTRADE adversely possessed the subject properties no earlier than 1996, when it bought the same from
Teofilo, and Civil Case No. 4452 was already instituted two years later in 1998. LANDTRADE cannot tack its
adverse possession of the two parcels of land to that of Teofilo considering that there is no proof that the latter,
who is already residing in the U.S.A., adversely possessed the properties at all.
Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err when it affirmed in toto the judgment of the RTC-Branch 3 which declared,
among other things, that (a) Vidal is the sole surviving heir of Doa Demetria, who alone has rights to and

interest in the subject parcels of land; (b) AZIMUTH is Vidal's successor-in-interest to portions of the said
properties in accordance with the 1998 Memorandum of Agreement and 2004 Deed of Conditional Conveyance;
(c) Teofilo is not the son or heir of Doa Demetria; and (d) Teofilo, Atty. Cabildo, and their transferees/assignees,
including LANDTRADE, have no valid right to or interest in the same properties.
The Ejectment or Unlawful Detainer Case
(G.R. Nos. 170505, 173355-56, and 173563-64)
The Petitions in G.R. Nos. 170505, 173355-56, and 173563-64 all concern the execution pending appeal of the
Decision dated February 17, 2004 of the MTCC in Civil Case No. 11475-AF, which ordered NAPOCOR and
TRANSCO to vacate the two parcels of land in question, as well as to pay rent for the time they occupied said
properties.
LANDTRADE filed its Petition for Review in G.R. No. 170505 when it failed to have the MTCC Decision dated
February 17, 2004 executed while Civil Case No. 6613, the appeal of the same judgment by NAPOCOR and
TRANSCO, was still pending before the RTC-Branch 5.
NAPOCOR and TRANSCO sought recourse from this Court through their Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition in
G.R. Nos. 173355-56 and 173563-64 after the RTC-Branch 1 (to which Civil Case No. 6613 was re-raffled) already
rendered a Decision dated December 12, 2005 in Civil Case No. 6613, affirming the MTCC Decision dated
February 17, 2004. Expectedly, NAPOCOR and TRANSCO appealed the judgment of the RTC-Branch 1 to the
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals granted the motion for execution pending appeal of LANDTRADE, and
denied the application for preliminary injunction of NAPOCOR and TRANSCO.
The requirements of posting a
supersedeas bond and depositing
rent to stay execution
The pivotal issue in G.R. No. 170505 is whether LANDTRADE is entitled to the execution of the MTCC Decision
dated February 17, 2004 even while said judgment was then pending appeal before the RTC-Branch 5. The RTCBranch 5 granted the motion for immediate execution pending appeal of LANDTRADE because of the failure of
NAPOCOR and TRANSCO to comply with the requirements for staying the execution of the MTCC judgment, as
provided in Rule 70, Section 19 of the Rules of Court. The Court of Appeals subsequently found grave abuse of
discretion on the part of RTC-Branch 5 in issuing the Order dated August 9, 2004 which granted execution
pending appeal and the Writ of Execution Pending Appeal dated August 10, 2004; and on the part of Sheriff
Borres, in issuing the Notices of Garnishment and Notification to vacate, all dated August 11, 2004. According to
the appellate court, NAPOCOR and TRANSCO are exempt from the requirements of filing a supersedeas bond
and depositing rent in order to stay the execution of the MTCC judgment.
Rule 70, Section 19 of the Rules of Court lays down the requirements for staying the immediate execution of the
MTCC judgment against the defendant in an ejectment suit:
SEC. 19. Immediate execution of judgment; how to stay same. - If judgment is rendered against the defendant,
execution shall issue immediately upon motion, unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to
stay execution files a sufficient supersedeas bond, approved by the Municipal Trial Court and executed in
favor of the plaintiff to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed
from, and unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount of
rent due from time to time under the contract, if any, as determined by the judgment of the Municipal Trial
Court. In the absence of a contract, he shall deposit with the Regional Trial Court the reasonable value of the use
and occupation of the premises for the preceding month or period at the rate determined by the judgment of
the lower court on or before the tenth day of each succeeding month or period. The supersedeas bond shall be
transmitted by the Municipal Trial Court, with the other papers, to the clerk of the Regional Trial Court to which
the action is appealed.
All amounts so paid to the appellate court shall be deposited with said court or authorized government
depositary bank, and shall be held there until the final disposition of the appeal, unless the court, by agreement
of the interested parties, or in the absence of reasonable grounds of opposition to a motion to withdraw, or for
justifiable reasons, shall decree otherwise. Should the defendant fail to make the payments above prescribed
from time to time during the pendency of the appeal, the appellate court, upon motion of the plaintiff, and upon
proof of such failure, shall order the execution of the judgment appealed from with respect to the restoration of
possession, but such execution shall not be a bar to the appeal taking its course until the final disposition
thereof on the merits.

After the case is decided by the Regional Trial Court, any money paid to the court by the defendant for purposes
of the stay of execution shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the judgment of the Regional
Trial Court. In any case wherein it appears that the defendant has been deprived of the lawful possession of land
or building pending the appeal by virtue of the execution of the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court, damages
for such deprivation of possession and restoration of possession may be allowed the defendant in the judgment
of the Regional Trial Court disposing of the appeal. (Emphases supplied.)
The Court had previously recognized the exemption of NAPOCOR from filing a supersedeas bond. The Court
stated in Philippine Geothermal, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue[122] that a chronological review of
the NAPOCOR Charter will show that it has been the lawmakers' intention that said corporation be completely
exempt not only from all forms of taxes, but also from filing fees, appeal bonds, and supersedeas bonds in any
court or administrative proceedings. The Court traced the history of the NAPOCOR Charter, thus:
Republic Act No. 6395 (10 September 1971) enumerated the details covered by the exemptions by stating
under Sec. 13 that "The Corporation shall be non-profit and shall devote all its returns from its capital
investment, as well as excess revenues from its operation, for expansion...the Corporation is hereby declared
exempt from the payment of all taxes, duties, fees, imposts, charges, costs and service fees in any court or
administrative proceedings in which it may be a party, restrictions and duties to the Republic of the Philippines,
its provinces, cities, municipalities and other government agencies and instrumentalities . . ."
Subsequently, Presidential Decree No. 380 (22 January 1974), Sec. 10 made even more specific the details
of the exemption of NPC to cover, among others, both direct and indirect taxes on all petroleum products used
in its operation. Presidential Decree No. 938 (27 May 1976), Sec. 13 amended the tax exemption by
simplifying the same law in general terms. It succinctly exempts service fees, including filing fees, appeal bonds,
supersedeas bonds, in any court or administrative proceedings. The use of the phrase "all forms" of taxes
demonstrate the intention of the law to give NPC all the exemption it has been enjoying before. The rationale for
this exemption is that being non-profit, the NPC "shall devote all its return from its capital investment as well as
excess revenues from its operation, for expansion.[123] (Emphases supplied.)
As presently worded, Section 13 of Republic Act No. 6395, the NAPOCOR Charter, as amended, reads:
SEC. 13. Non-profit Character of the Corporation; Exemption from All Taxes, Duties, Fees, Imposts and Other
Charges by the Government and Government Instrumentalities. - The Corporation shall be non-profit and shall
devote all its returns from its capital investment as well as excess revenues from its operation, for expansion. To
enable the Corporation to pay its indebtedness and obligations and in furtherance and effective implementation
of the policy enunciated in Section One of this Act, the Corporation, including its subsidiaries, is hereby declared
exempt from the payment of all forms of taxes, duties, fees, imposts as well as costs and service fees including
filing fees, appeal bonds, supersedeas bonds, in any court or administrative proceedings. (Emphasis
supplied.)
In A.M. No. 05-10-20-SC, captioned In Re: Exemption of the National Power Corporation from Payment of
Filing/Docket Fees, the Court addressed the query of a Clerk of Court from the RTC of Urdaneta, Pangasinan on
whether NAPOCOR is exempt from the payment of filing fees and Sheriff's Trust Fund. In its Resolution dated
December 6, 2005, the Court, upon the recommendation of the Court Administrator, declared that NAPOCOR is
still exempt from the payment of filing fees, appeal bonds, and supersedeas bonds.
Consistent with the foregoing, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dated November 23, 2005 in CA-G.R.
SP Nos. 85714 and 85841 declaring that NAPOCOR was exempt from filing a supersedeas bond to stay the
execution of the MTCC judgment while the same was pending appeal before the RTC-Branch 5. The appellate
court also held that the exemption of NAPOCOR extended even to the requirement for periodical deposit of rent,
ratiocinating that:
On the whole, the posting of supersedeas bond and the making of the periodical deposit are designed primarily
to insure that the plaintiff would be paid the back rentals and the compensation for the use and occupation of
the premises should the municipal trial court's decision be eventually affirmed on appeal. Elsewise stated, both
the posting of the supersedeas bond and the payment of monthly deposit are required to accomplish one and
the same purpose, namely, to secure the performance of, or to satisfy the judgment appealed from in case it is
affirmed on appeal by the appellate court.
xxxx
Thus viewed, the inescapable conclusion is, and so We hold, that although the term "making of monthly deposit
in ejectment cases" is not expressly or specifically mentioned in Section 13 of R.A. 6395, however, inasmuch as
it has the same or similar function, purpose, and essence as a supersedeas bond, it should be deemed included
in the enumeration laid down under the said provision. This accords well with the principle of ejusdem generis

which says that where a statute uses a general word followed by an enumeration of specific words embraced
within the general word merely as examples, the enumeration does not restrict the meaning of the general word
which should be construed to include others of the same class although not enumerated therein; or where a
general word or phrase follows an enumeration of particular and specific words of the same class or where the
latter follow the former, the general word or phrase is to be construed to include persons, things or cases akin
to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned.
In a nutshell, We hold that petitioner NAPOCOR enjoys exemption not only from posting supersedeas bond in
courts in appealed ejectment cases, but also from periodically depositing the amount of the monthly rental or
the reasonable compensation of the use and occupancy of the property, as determined in the municipal trial
court's decision.[124]
The Court of Appeals further adjudged that the exemptions of NAPOCOR similarly applied to TRANSCO since "[i]t
is all too obvious that the interests of NAPOCOR and TRANSCO over the premises in litigation are so interwoven
and dependent upon each other, such that whatever is adjudged in regard to the former, whether favorable or
adverse, would ineluctably and similarly affect the latter[;]" and "[c]onsequently, x x x the stay of the execution
of the appealed decision insofar as NAPOCOR is concerned necessarily extends and inures to its co-defendant
TRANSCO, not by virtue of the former's statutory exemption privilege from filing supersedeas bond and making
periodic deposits, but by the indisputably operative fact that the rights and liabilities in litis of BOTH defendants
are so intimately interwoven, interdependent, and indivisible."[125]
Only recently, however, the Court reversed its stance on the exemption of NAPOCOR from filing fees, appeal
bonds, and supersedeas bonds. Revisiting A.M. No. 05-10-20-SC, the Court issued Resolutions dated October 27,
2009 and March 10, 2010, wherein it denied the request of NAPOCOR for exemption from payment of filing fees
and court fees for such request appears to run counter to Article VIII, Section 5(5)[126] of the Constitution, on
the rule-making power of the Supreme Court over the rules on pleading, practice and procedure in all courts,
which includes the sole power to fix the filing fees of cases in courts. The Court categorically pronounced that
NAPOCOR can no longer invoke its amended Charter as basis for exemption from the payment of legal fees.
Nevertheless, in this case, the RTC-Branch 1 already promulgated its Decision in Civil Case No. 6613 on
December 12, 2005, denying the appeal of NAPOCOR and TRANSCO and affirming the MTCC judgment against
said corporations. NAPOCOR and TRANSCO presently have pending appeals of the RTC-Branch 1 judgment
before the Court of Appeals.
Rule 70, Section 19 of the Rules of Court applies only when the judgment of a Municipal Trial Court (and any
same level court such as the MTCC) in an ejectment case is pending appeal before the RTC. When the RTC had
already resolved the appeal and its judgment, in turn, is pending appeal before the Court of Appeals, then Rule
70, Section 21 of the Rules of Court governs.
The Court already pointed out in Northcastle Properties and Estate Corporation v. Paas[127] that Section 19
applies only to ejectment cases pending appeal with the RTC, and Section 21 to those already decided by the
RTC. The Court again held in Uy v. Santiago[128] that:
[I]t is only execution of the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts' judgment pending appeal with the Regional
Trial Court which may be stayed by a compliance with the requisites provided in Rule 70, Section 19 of the 1997
Rules on Civil Procedure. On the other hand, once the Regional Trial Court has rendered a decision in its
appellate jurisdiction, such decision shall, under Rule 70, Section 21 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, be
immediately executory, without prejudice to an appeal, via a Petition for Review, before the Court of Appeals
and/or Supreme Court. (Emphases supplied.)
According to Rule 70, Section 21 of the Rules of Court, "[t]he judgment of the Regional Trial Court against the
defendant shall be immediately executory, without prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken therefrom."
It no longer provides for the stay of execution at such stage.
Thus, subsequent events have rendered the Petition of LANDTRADE in G.R. No. 170505 moot and academic. It
will serve no more purpose for the Court to require NAPOCOR and TRANSCO to still comply with the
requirements of filing a supersedeas bond and depositing rent to stay execution pending appeal of the MTCC
judgment, as required by Rule 70, Section 19 of the Rules of Court, when the appeal had since been resolved by
the RTC.
Preliminary injunction to stay execution of RTC
judgment against defendant in an ejectment case

The issues raised by NAPOCOR and TRANSCO in their Petitions in G.R. Nos. 173355-56 and 173563-64 boil down
to the sole issue of whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in refusing to enjoin the execution of the Decision dated December 12, 2005 of the RTCBranch 1 in Civil Case No. 6613 while the same is pending appeal before the appellate court.
The Court of Appeals granted the issuance of a writ of execution in favor of LANDTRADE and denied the
application for writ of preliminary injunction of NAPOCOR and TRANSCO because Rule 70, Section 21 of the Rules
of Court explicitly provides that the RTC judgment in an ejectment case, which is adverse to the defendant and
pending appeal before the Court of Appeals, shall be immediately executory and can be enforced despite further
appeal. Therefore, the execution of the RTC judgment pending appeal is the ministerial duty of the Court of
Appeals, specifically enjoined by law to be done.
NAPOCOR and TRANSCO argue that neither the rules nor jurisprudence explicitly declare that Rule 70, Section
21 of the Rules of Court bars the application of Rule 58 on preliminary injunction. Regardless of the immediately
executory character of the RTC judgment in an ejectment case, the Court of Appeals, before which said
judgment is appealed, is not deprived of power and jurisdiction to issue a writ of preliminary injunction when
circumstances so warrant.
There is merit in the present Petitions of NAPOCOR and TRANSCO.
The Court expounded on the nature of a writ of preliminary injunction in Levi Strauss & Co. v. Clinton Apparelle,
Inc. [129]:
Section 1, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court defines a preliminary injunction as an order granted at any stage of an
action prior to the judgment or final order requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a
particular act or acts. Injunction is accepted as the strong arm of equity or a transcendent remedy to be used
cautiously as it affects the respective rights of the parties, and only upon full conviction on the part of the court
of its extreme necessity. An extraordinary remedy, injunction is designed to preserve or maintain the status quo
of things and is generally availed of to prevent actual or threatened acts until the merits of the case can be
heard. It may be resorted to only by a litigant for the preservation or protection of his rights or interests and for
no other purpose during the pendency of the principal action. It is resorted to only when there is a pressing
necessity to avoid injurious consequences, which cannot be remedied under any standard compensation. The
resolution of an application for a writ of preliminary injunction rests upon the existence of an emergency or of a
special recourse before the main case can be heard in due course of proceedings.
Section 3, Rule 58, of the Rules of Court enumerates the grounds for the issuance of a preliminary injunction:
SEC. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. - A preliminary injunction may be granted when it is
established:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in
restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of
an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance, or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during the litigation
would probably work injustice to the applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or
suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject
of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
Under the cited provision, a clear and positive right especially calling for judicial protection must be shown.
Injunction is not a remedy to protect or enforce contingent, abstract, or future rights; it will not issue to protect a
right not in esse and which may never arise, or to restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause of action.
There must exist an actual right. There must be a patent showing by the complaint that there exists a right to
be protected and that the acts against which the writ is to be directed are violative of said right.
Benedicto v. Court of Appeals[130] sets forth the following elucidation on the applicability of Rule 58 vis--vis
Rule 70, Section 21 of the Rules of Court:
This section [Rule 70, Section 21] presupposes that the defendant in a forcible entry or unlawful detainer case is
unsatisfied with the judgment of the Regional Trial Court and decides to appeal to a superior court. It authorizes
the RTC to immediately issue a writ of execution without prejudice to the appeal taking its due course. It is our
opinion that on appeal the appellate court may stay the said writ should circumstances so require.

In the case of Amagan v. Marayag, we reiterated our pronouncement in Vda. de Legaspi v. Avendao that the
proceedings in an ejectment case may be suspended in whatever stage it may be found. We further drew a fine
line between forcible entry and unlawful detainer, thus:
Where the action, therefore, is one of illegal detainer, as distinguished from one of forcible entry, and the right
of the plaintiff to recover the premises is seriously placed in issue in a proper judicial proceeding, it is more
equitable and just and less productive of confusion and disturbance of physical possession, with all its
concomitant inconvenience and expenses. For the Court in which the issue of legal possession, whether
involving ownership or not, is brought to restrain, should a petition for preliminary injunction be filed with it, the
effects of any order or decision in the unlawful detainer case in order to await the final judgment in the more
substantive case involving legal possession or ownership. It is only where there has been forcible entry that as a
matter of public policy the right to physical possession should be immediately set at rest in favor of the prior
possession regardless of the fact that the other party might ultimately be found to have superior claim to the
premises involved thereby to discourage any attempt to recover possession thru force, strategy or stealth and
without resorting to the courts.
Patently, even if RTC judgments in unlawful detainer cases are immediately executory, preliminary injunction
may still be granted. There need only be clear showing that there exists a right to be protected and that the acts
against which the writ is to be directed violate said right. (Emphasis supplied.)
As in Benedicto, substantial considerations exist herein that compels the Court to issue a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining the execution of the February 17, 2004 Decision of the MTCC, as affirmed by the December
12, 2005 Decision of the RTC-Branch 1, until the appeal of latter judgment, sought by NAPOCOR and TRANSCO,
is finally resolved by the Court of Appeals.
First, the two parcels of land claimed by LANDTRADE are the subject of several other cases. In fact, Vidal and
AZIMUTH, who instituted the Quieting of Title Case against Teofilo and LANDTRADE (also presently before the
Court in G.R. Nos. 178779 and 178894) have filed a Motion For Leave to Intervene in the instant case, thus,
showing that there are other parties who, while strangers to the ejectment case, might be greatly affected by its
result and who want to protect their interest in the subject properties. And although cases involving title to real
property, i.e., quieting of title, accion publiciana, etc., are not prejudicial to and do not suspend an ejectment
case,[131] the existence of such cases should have already put the Court of Appeals on guard that the title of
LANDTRADE to the subject properties - on which it fundamentally based its claim of possessory right - is being
fiercely contested.
Second, it is undisputed that TRANSCO and its predecessor, NAPOCOR, have been in possession of the disputed
parcels of land for more than 40 years. Upon said properties stand the TRANSCO Overton Sub-station and Agus
7 Warehouse. The Overton Sub-station, in particular, is a crucial facility responsible for providing the power
requirements of a large portion of Iligan City, the two Lanao Provinces, and other nearby provinces. Without
doubt, having TRANSCO vacate its Overton Sub-station, by prematurely executing the MTCC judgment of
February 17, 2004, carries serious and irreversible implications, primordial of which is the widespread disruption
of the electrical power supply in the aforementioned areas, contributing further to the electric power crisis
already plaguing much of Mindanao.
Lastly, allowing execution pending appeal would result in the payment of an astronomical amount in rentals
which, per Sheriff Borres's computation, already amounted to P156,000,000.00 by August 11, 2004, when he
issued the Notices of Garnishment and Notification against NAPOCOR and TRANSCO; plus, P500,000.0 each
month thereafter. Payment of such an amount may seriously put the operation of a public utility in peril, to the
detriment of its consumers.
These circumstances altogether present a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences, not just to
NAPOCOR and TRANSCO, but to a substantial fraction of the consuming public as well, which cannot be
remedied under any standard compensation. The issuance by the Court of Appeals of a writ of preliminary
injunction is justified by the circumstances.
The Court must emphasize though that in so far as the Ejectment Case is concerned, it has only settled herein
issues on the propriety of enjoining the execution of the MTCC Decision dated February 17, 2004 while it was on
appeal before the RTC, and subsequently, before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals has yet to render a
judgment on the appeal itself. But it may not be amiss for the Court to also point out that in G.R. Nos. 178779
and 178894 (Quieting of Title Case), it has already found that Vidal, not Teofilo, is the late Doa Demetria's sole
heir, who alone inherits Doa Demetria's rights to and interests in the disputed parcels of land. This conclusion
of the Court in the Quieting of Title Case will inevitably affect the Ejectment Case still pending appeal before the

Court of Appeals since LANDTRADE is basing its right to possession in the Ejectment Case on its supposed title
to the subject properties, which it derived from Teofilo.
The Cancellation of Titles and Reversion Case
(G.R. No. 173401)
The Republic is assailing in its Petition in G.R. No. 173401 the (1) Order dated December 13, 2005 of the RTCBranch 4 dismissing Civil Case No. 6686, the Complaint for Cancellation of Titles and Reversion filed by the
Republic against the deceased Doa Demetria, Vidal and/or Teofilo, and AZIMUTH and/or LANDTRADE; and (2)
Order dated May 16, 2006 of the same trial court denying the Motion for Reconsideration of the Republic,
averring that:
With due respect, the trial court decided a question of substance contrary to law and jurisprudence in ruling:
(i) THAT PETITIONER HAD NO CAUSE OF ACTION IN INSTITUTING THE SUBJECT COMPLAINT FOR CANCELLATION
OF OCT NOS. 0-1200 (A.F.) AND 0-1201 (A.F.), INCLUDING ALL DERIVATIVE TITLES, AND REVERSION.
(ii) THAT PETITIONER'S COMPLAINT FOR CANCELLATION OF OCT NOS. 0-1200 (A.F.) AND 0-1201 (A.F.)
INCLUDING ALL DERIVATIVE TITLES, AND REVERSION IS BARRED BY THE DECISIONS IN CACHO VS GOVERNMENT
OF THE UNITED STATES (28 PHIL. 616 [1914] AND CACHO VS COURT OF APPEALS (269 SCRA 159 [1997].
(iii) THAT PETITIONER'S CAUSE OF ACTION HAS PRESCRIBED; AND
(iv) THAT PETITIONER IS GUILTY OF FORUM SHOPPING.[132]
The Court finds merit in the present Petition.
Cause of action for reversion
The Complaint in Civil Case No. 6686 seeks the cancellation of OCT Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201 (a.f.), with all
their derivative titles, and reversion. The Complaint was dismissed by the RTC-Branch 4 in its Order dated
December 13, 2005, upon Motion of Vidal and AZIMUTH, on the ground that the State does not have a cause of
action for reversion. According to the RTC-Branch 4, there was no showing that the late Doa Demetria
committed any wrongful act or omission in violation of any right of the Republic. Additionally, the Regalian
doctrine does not apply to Civil Case No. 6686 because said doctrine does not extend to lands beyond the public
domain. By the own judicial admission of the Republic, the two parcels of land in question are privately owned,
even before the same were registered in Doa Demetria's name.
The Court disagrees.
Rule 2, Section 2 of the Rules of Court defines a cause of action as "the act or omission by which a party violates
a right of another." Its essential elements are the following: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff; (2) an obligation
on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) such defendant's act or
omission that is violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the former to
the latter.[133]
Reversion is an action where the ultimate relief sought is to revert the land back to the government under the
Regalian doctrine. Considering that the land subject of the action originated from a grant by the government, its
cancellation is a matter between the grantor and the grantee.[134] In Estate of the Late Jesus S. Yujuico v.
Republic[135] (Yujuico case), reversion was defined as an action which seeks to restore public land fraudulently
awarded and disposed of to private individuals or corporations to the mass of public domain. It bears to point
out, though, that the Court also allowed the resort by the Government to actions for reversion to cancel titles
that were void for reasons other than fraud, i.e., violation by the grantee of a patent of the conditions imposed
by law;[136] and lack of jurisdiction of the Director of Lands to grant a patent covering inalienable forest
land[137] or portion of a river, even when such grant was made through mere oversight.[138] In Republic v.
Guerrero,[139] the Court gave a more general statement that the remedy of reversion can be availed of "only in
cases of fraudulent or unlawful inclusion of the land in patents or certificates of title."
The right of the Republic to institute an action for reversion is rooted in the Regalian doctrine. Under the
Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and that the State is the source of any
asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. This same doctrine
also states that all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong
to the State.[140] It is incorporated in the 1987 Philippine Constitution under Article XII, Section 2 which
declares "[a]ll lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of

potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by
the State. x x x" No public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from
the government; it is indispensable that there be a showing of the title from the State.[141]
The reversion case of the Republic in Civil Case No. 6686 rests on the main argument that OCT Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.)
and 0-1201 (a.f.), issued in Doa Demetria's name, included parcels of lands which were not adjudicated to her
by the Court in the 1914 Cacho case. Contrary to the statement made by the RTC-Branch 4 in its December 13,
2005 Order, the Republic does not make any admission in its Complaint that the two parcels of land registered
in Doa Demetria's name were privately owned even prior to their registration. While the Republic does not
dispute that that two parcels of land were awarded to Doa Demetria in the 1914 Cacho case, it alleges that
these were not the same as those covered by OCT Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201 (a.f.) issued in Doa Demetria's
name 84 years later. If, indeed, the parcels of land covered by said OCTs were not those granted to Doa
Demetria in the 1914 Cacho case, then it can be presumed, under the Regalian doctrine, that said properties
still form part of the public domain belonging to the State.
Just because OCTs were already issued in Doa Demetria's name does not bar the Republic from instituting an
action for reversion. Indeed, the Court made it clear in Francisco v. Rodriguez[142] that Section 101 of the Public
Land Act "may be invoked only when title has already vested in the individual, e.g., when a patent or a
certificate of title has already been issued[,]" for the basic premise in an action for reversion is that the
certificate of title fraudulently or unlawfully included land of the public domain, hence, calling for the
cancellation of said certificate. It is actually the issuance of such a certificate of title which constitutes the third
element of a cause of action for reversion.
The Court further finds that the Complaint of the Republic in Civil Case No. 6686 sufficiently states a cause of
action for reversion, even though it does not allege that fraud was committed in the registration or that the
Director of Lands requested the reversion.
It is a well-settled rule that the existence of a cause of action is determined by the allegations in the complaint.
In the resolution of a motion to dismiss based on failure to state a cause of action, only the facts alleged in the
complaint must be considered. The test in cases like these is whether a court can render a valid judgment on
the complaint based upon the facts alleged and pursuant to the prayer therein. Hence, it has been held that a
motion to dismiss generally partakes of the nature of a demurrer which hypothetically admits the truth of the
factual allegations made in a complaint.[143] The hypothetical admission extends to the relevant and material
facts well pleaded in the complaint and inferences fairly deducible therefrom. Hence, if the allegations in the
complaint furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed
regardless of the defense that may be assessed by the defendants.[144]
In Vergara v. Court of Appeals,[145] the Court additionally explained that:
In determining whether allegations of a complaint are sufficient to support a cause of action, it must be borne in
mind that the complaint does not have to establish or allege facts proving the existence of a cause of action at
the outset; this will have to be done at the trial on the merits of the case. To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack
of cause of action, the complaint must show that the claim for relief does not exist, rather than that a claim has
been defectively stated, or is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain.
The Republic meticulously presented in its Complaint the discrepancies between the 1914 Cacho case, on one
hand, which granted Doa Demetria title to two parcels of land; and OCT Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201 (a.f.), on
the other, which were supposedly issued pursuant to the said case. In paragraphs 9 and 16 of its Complaint, the
Republic clearly alleged that OCT Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201 (a.f.) cover properties much larger than or areas
beyond those granted by the land registration court in GLRO Record Nos. 6908 and 6909. Thus, the Republic
was able to satisfactorily allege the unlawful inclusion, for lack of an explicit grant from the Government, of
parcels of public land into Doa Demetria's OCTs, which, if true, will justify the cancellation of said certificates
and the return of the properties to the Republic.
That the Complaint in Civil Case No. 6686 does not allege that it had been filed by the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), at the behest of the Director of Lands, does not call for its dismissal on the ground of failure to
state a cause of action. Section 101 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, as
amended, simply requires that:
SEC. 101. All actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain or improvements
thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the
name of the Republic of the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied.)

Clear from the aforequoted provision that the authority to institute an action for reversion, on behalf of the
Republic, is primarily conferred upon the OSG. While the OSG, for most of the time, will file an action for
reversion upon the request or recommendation of the Director of Lands, there is no basis for saying that the
former is absolutely bound or dependent on the latter.
RTC-Branch 4 cited Sherwill Development Corporation v. Sitio Nio Residents Association, Inc. [146] (Sherwill
case), to support its ruling that it is "absolutely necessary" that an investigation and a determination of fraud
should have been made by the Director of Lands prior to the filing of a case for reversion. The Sherwill case is
not in point and does not constitute a precedent for the case at bar. It does not even involve a reversion case.
The main issue therein was whether the trial court properly dismissed the complaint of Sherwill Development
Corporation for quieting of title to two parcels of land, considering that a case for the declaration of nullity of its
TCTs, instituted by the Sto. Nio Residents Association, Inc., was already pending before the Land Management
Bureau (LMB). The Court recognized therein the primary jurisdiction of the LMB over the dispute, and affirmed
the dismissal of the quieting of title case on the grounds of litis pendentia and forum shopping.
Res judicata
Public policy and sound practice enshrine the fundamental principle upon which the doctrine of res judicata
rests that parties ought not to be permitted to litigate the same issues more than once. It is a general rule
common to all civilized system of jurisprudence, that the solemn and deliberate sentence of the law,
pronounced by its appointed organs, upon a disputed fact or a state of facts, should be regarded as a final and
conclusive determination of the question litigated, and should forever set the controversy at rest. Indeed, it has
been well said that this maxim is more than a mere rule of law; more even than an important principle of public
policy; and that it is not too much to say that it is a fundamental concept in the organization of every jural
system. Public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts
should become final at some definite date fixed by law. The very object for which courts were constituted was to
put an end to controversies.[147]
The doctrine of res judicata comprehends two distinct concepts - (1) bar by former judgment, and (2)
conclusiveness of judgment. For res judicata to serve as an absolute bar to a subsequent action, the following
requisites must concur: (1) the former judgment or order must be final; (2) the judgment or order must be on
the merits; (3) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties;
and (4) there must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes
of action. When there is no identity of causes of action, but only an identity of issues, there exists res judicata in
the concept of conclusiveness of judgment. Although it does not have the same effect as res judicata in the form
of bar by former judgment which prohibits the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand, or
cause of action, the rule on conclusiveness of judgment bars the relitigation of particular facts or issues in
another litigation between the same parties on a different claim or cause of action.[148]
The 1914 Cacho case does not bar the Complaint for reversion in Civil Case No. 6686 by res judicata
in either of its two concepts.
There is no bar by prior judgment because the 1914 Cacho case and Civil Case No. 6686 do not have the same
causes of action and, even possibly, they do not involve identical subject matters.
Land registration cases, such as GLRO Record Nos. 6908 and 6909, from which the 1914 Cacho case arose, are
special proceedings where the concept of a cause of action in ordinary civil actions does not apply. In special
proceedings, the purpose is to establish a status, condition or fact; in land registration proceedings, the
ownership by a person of a parcel of land is sought to be established.[149] Civil Case No. 6686 is an action for
reversion where the cause of action is the alleged unlawful inclusion in OCT Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201 (a.f.)
of parcels of public land that were not among those granted to Doa Demetria in the 1914 Cacho case. Thus,
Civil Case No. 6686 even rests on supposition that the parcels of land covered by the certificates of title in Doa
Demetria's name, which the Republic is seeking to have cancelled, are different from the parcels of land that
were the subject matter of the 1914 Cacho case and adjudged to Doa Demetria.
Res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment, likewise, does not apply as between the 1914 Cacho
case and Civil Case No. 6686. A careful study of the Complaint in Civil Case No. 6686 reveals that the Republic
does not seek to re-litigate any of the issues resolved in the 1914 Cacho case. The Republic no longer questions
in Civil Case No. 6686 that Doa Demetria was adjudged the owner of two parcels of land in the 1914 Cacho
case. The Republic is only insisting on the strict adherence to the judgment of the Court in the 1914 Cacho case,
particularly: (1) the adjudication of a smaller parcel of land, consisting only of the southern portion of the 37.87hectare Lot 2 subject of Doa Demetria's application in GLRO Record No. 6909; and (2) the submission of a new
technical plan for the adjudicated southern portion of Lot 2 in GLRO Record No. 6909, and the deed executed by

Datto Darondon, husband of Alanga, renouncing all his rights to Lot 1, in GLRO Record No. 6908, in Doa
Demetria's favor.[150]
Similarly, the 1997 Cacho case is not an obstacle to the institution by the Republic of Civil Case No. 6686 on the
ground of res judicata.
Bar by prior judgment does not apply for lack of identity of causes of action between the 1997 Cacho case and
Civil Case No. 6686. The 1997 Cacho case involves a petition for re-issuance of decrees of registration. In the
absence of principles and rules specific for such a petition, the Court refers to those on reconstitution of
certificates of title, being almost of the same nature and granting closely similar reliefs.
Reconstitution denotes a restoration of the instrument which is supposed to have been lost or destroyed in its
original form or condition. The purpose of the reconstitution of title or any document is to have the same
reproduced, after observing the procedure prescribed by law, in the same form they were when the loss or
destruction occurred.[151] Reconstitution is another special proceeding where the concept of cause of action in
an ordinary civil action finds no application.
The Court, in the 1997 Cacho case, granted the reconstitution and re-issuance of the decrees of registration
considering that the NALTDRA, through then Acting Commissioner Santiago M. Kapunan,[152] its Deputy Clerk of
Court III, the Head Geodetic Engineer, and the Chief of Registration, certified that "according to the Record Book
of Decrees for Ordinary Land Registration Case, Decree No. 18969 was issued in GLRO Record No. 6909 and
Decree No. 10364 was issued in GLRO Record No. 6908[;]"[153] thus, leaving no doubt that said decrees had in
fact been issued.
The 1997 Cacho case only settled the issuance, existence, and subsequent loss of Decree Nos. 10364 and
18969. Consequently, said decrees could be re-issued in their original form or condition. The Court, however,
could not have passed upon in the 1997 Cacho case the issues on whether Doa Demetria truly owned the
parcels of land covered by the decrees and whether the decrees and the OCTs subsequently issued pursuant
thereto are void for unlawfully including land of the public domain which were not awarded to Doa Demetria.
The following pronouncement of the Court in Heirs of Susana de Guzman Tuazon v. Court of Appeals[154] is
instructive:
Precisely, in both species of reconstitution under Section 109 of P.D. No. 1529 and R.A. No. 26, the nature of the
action denotes a restoration of the instrument which is supposed to have been lost or destroyed in its original
form and condition. The purpose of the action is merely to have the same reproduced, after proper proceedings,
in the same form they were when the loss or destruction occurred, and does not pass upon the ownership of the
land covered by the lost or destroyed title. It bears stressing at this point that ownership should not be confused
with a certificate of title. Registering land under the Torrens System does not create or vest title because
registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. A certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title
over the particular property described therein. Corollarily, any question involving the issue of ownership must be
threshed out in a separate suit, which is exactly what the private respondents did when they filed Civil Case No.
95-3577 before Branch 74. The trial court will then conduct a full-blown trial wherein the parties will present
their respective evidence on the issue of ownership of the subject properties to enable the court to resolve the
said issue. x x x. (Emphases supplied.)
Whatever findings the Court made on the issue of ownership in the 1997 Cacho case are mere obiter dictum. As
the Court held in Amoroso v. Alegre, Jr.[155]:
Petitioner claims in his petition that the 3 October 1957 Decision resolved the issue of ownership of the lots and
declared in the body of the decision that he had "sufficiently proven uncontroverted facts that he had been in
possession of the land in question since 1946 x x x [and] has been in possession of the property with sufficient
title." However, such findings made by the CFI in the said decision are mere obiter, since the ownership of the
properties, titles to which were sought to be reconstituted, was never the issue in the reconstitution case.
Ownership is not the issue in a petition for reconstitution of title. A reconstitution of title does not pass upon the
ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title.
It may perhaps be argued that ownership of the properties was put in issue when petitioner opposed the petition
for reconstitution by claiming to be the owner of the properties. However, any ruling that the trial court may
make on the matter is irrelevant considering the court's limited authority in petitions for reconstitution. In a
petition for reconstitution of title, the only relief sought is the issuance of a reconstituted title because the
reconstituting officer's power is limited to granting or denying a reconstituted title. As stated earlier, the
reconstitution of title does not pass upon the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title, and
any change in the ownership of the property must be the subject of a separate suit. (Emphases supplied.)

The Court concedes that the 1997 Cacho case, by reason of conclusiveness of judgment, prevents the Republic
from again raising as issues in Civil Case No. 6686 the issuance and existence of Decree Nos. 10364 and 18969,
but not the validity of said decrees, as well as the certificates of title issued pursuant thereto.
Forum shopping
Forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either
simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. A party violates the rule
against forum shopping if the elements of litis pendentia are present; or if a final judgment in one case would
amount to res judicatain the other.[156]
There is forum shopping when the following elements are present: (a)identity of parties, or at least such parties
as represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief
being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars, is such that any
judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the
action under consideration; said requisites are also constitutive of the requisites for auter action pendant or lis
pendens.[157]
Given the preceding disquisition of the Court that the 1914 and 1997 Cacho cases do not constitute res judicata
in Civil Case No. 6686, then the Court also cannot sustain the dismissal by the RTC-Branch 4 of the Complaint of
the Republic in Civil Case No. 6686 for forum shopping.
Prescription
According to the RTC-Branch 4, the cause of action for reversion of the Republic was already lost or extinguished
by prescription, citing Section 32 of the Property Registration Decree, which provides:
SEC. 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for value. - The decree of registration shall not be
reopened or revised by reason of absence, minority, or other disability of any person adversely affected thereby,
nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgment, subject, however, to the right of any person,
including the government and the branches thereof, deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by such
adjudication or confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud, to file in the proper Court of First Instance a
petition for reopening and review of the decree of registration not later than one year from and after the date of
the entry of such decree of registration, but in no case shall such petition be entertained by the court where an
innocent purchaser for value has acquired the land or an interest therein, whose rights may be prejudiced.
Whenever the phrase "innocent purchaser of value" or an equivalent phrase occurs in this Decree, it shall be
deemed to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value.
Upon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree of registration and the certificate of title issued shall
become incontrovertible. Any person aggrieved by such decree of registration in any case may pursue his
remedy by action for damages against the applicant or any other persons responsible for the fraud.
Decree No. 10364 in GLRO Record No. 6908 was issued on May 9, 1913, while Decree No. 18969 in GLRO Record
No. 6909 was issued on July 8, 1915. In the course of eight decades, the decrees were lost and subsequently
reconstituted per order of this Court in the 1997 Cacho case. The reconstituted decrees were issued on October
15, 1998 and transcribed on OCT Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201 (a.f.). The reconstituted decrees were finally
entered into the Registration Book for Iligan City on December 4, 1998 at 10:00 a.m. Almost six years had
elapsed from entry of the decrees by the time the Republic filed its Complaint in Civil Case No. 6686 on October
13, 2004.
Nonetheless, elementary is the rule that prescription does not run against the State and its subdivisions. When
the government is the real party in interest, and it is proceeding mainly to assert its own right to recover its own
property, there can as a rule be no defense grounded on laches or prescription. Public land fraudulently included
in patents or certificates of title may be recovered or reverted to the State in accordance with Section 101 of the
Public Land Act. The right of reversion or reconveyance to the State is not barred by prescription.[158]
The Court discussed lengthily in Republic v. Court of Appeals[159] the indefeasibility of a decree of
registration/certificate of title vis--vis the remedy of reversion available to the State:
The petitioner invokes Republic v. Animas, where this Court declared that a title founded on fraud may be
cancelled notwithstanding the lapse of one year from the issuance thereof. Thus:

x x x The misrepresentations of the applicant that he had been occupying and cultivating the land and residing
thereon are sufficient grounds to nullify the grant of the patent and title under Section 91 of the Public Land Law
which provides as follows:
"The statements made in the application shall be considered as essential conditions or parts of any concession,
title or permit issued on the basis of such application, and any false statement thereon or omission of facts,
changing, or modifying the consideration of the facts set forth in such statement, and any subsequent
modification, alteration, or change of the material facts set forth in the application shall ipso facto produce the
cancellation of the concession, title or permit granted. x x x"
A certificate of title that is void may be ordered cancelled. A title will be considered void if it is procured through
fraud, as when a person applies for registration of the land under his name although the property belongs to
another. In the case of disposable public lands, failure on the part of the grantee to comply with the conditions
imposed by law is a ground for holding such title void. The lapse of the one year period within which a decree of
title may be reopened for fraud would not prevent the cancellation thereof, for to hold that a title may become
indefeasible by registration, even if such title had been secured through fraud or in violation of the law, would
be the height of absurdity. Registration should not be a shield of fraud in securing title.
This doctrine was reiterated in Republic v. Mina, where Justice Relova declared for the Court:
A certificate of title that is void may be ordered cancelled. And, a title will be considered void if it is procured
through fraud, as when a person applies for registration of the land on the claim that he has been occupying
and cultivating it. In the case of disposable public lands, failure on the part of the grantee to comply with the
conditions imposed by law is a ground for holding such title void. x x x The lapse of one (1) year period within
which a decree of title may be reopened for fraud would not prevent the cancellation thereof for to hold that a
title may become indefeasible by registration, even if such title had been secured through fraud or in violation
of the law would be the height of absurdity. Registration should not be a shield of fraud in securing title.
Justifying the above-quoted provision, the Court declared in Piero, Jr. v. Director of Lands:
It is true that under Section 122 of the Land Registration Act, a Torrens title issued on the basis of a free patent
or a homestead patent is as indefeasible as one judicially secured. And in repeated previous decisions of this
Court that indefeasibility has been emphasized by Our holding that not even the Government can file an action
for annulment, but at the same time, it has been made clear that an action for reversion may be instituted by
the Solicitor General, in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. It is to the public interest that one who
succeeds in fraudulently acquiring title to a public land should not be allowed to benefit therefrom, and the
State should, therefore, have an even existing authority, thru its duly authorized officers, to inquire into the
circumstances surrounding the issuance of any such title, to the end that the Republic, thru the Solicitor General
or any other officer who may be authorized by law, may file the corresponding action for the reversion of the
land involved to the public domain, subject thereafter to disposal to other qualified persons in accordance with
law. In other words, the indefeasibility of a title over land previously public is not a bar to an investigation by the
Director of Lands as to how such title has been acquired, if the purpose of such investigation is to determine
whether or not fraud had been committed in securing such title in order that the appropriate action for reversion
may be filed by the Government.
Private respondent PNB points out that Animas involved timberland, which is not alienable or disposable public
land, and that in Piero the issue raised was whether the Director of Lands would be enjoined by a writ of
prohibition from investigating allegations of fraud that led to the issuance of certain free patents. Nevertheless,
we find that the doctrine above quoted is no less controlling even if there be some factual disparities (which are
not material here), especially as it has been buttressed by subsequent jurisprudence.
In Director of Lands v. Jugado, upon which the appellate court based its ruling, the Court declared meaningfully
that:
There is, however, a section in the Public Land Law (Sec. 101 of Commonwealth Act 141), which affords a
remedy whereby lands of the public domain fraudulently awarded may be recovered or reverted back to its
original owner, the Government. But the provision requires that all such actions for reversion shall be instituted
by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines (See Director of Lands v. De Luna, supra). As the party in interest in this case is the Director of Lands
and not the Republic of the Philippines, the action cannot prosper in favor of the appellant.
The reference was to the Public Land Law which authorizes the reversion suit under its Sec. 101, thus:

Sec. 101. All actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain or improvements thereon
shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of
the Republic of the Philippines.
This remedy was recently affirmed by the Court in Heirs of Gregorio Tengco v. Heirs of Jose and Victoria Aliwalas,
thus:
x x x Title to the property having become incontrovertible, such may no longer be collaterally attacked. If indeed
there had been any fraud or misrepresentation in obtaining the title, an action for reversion instituted by the
Solicitor General would be the proper remedy.
It is evident from the foregoing jurisprudence that despite the lapse of one year from the entry of a decree of
registration/certificate of title, the State, through the Solicitor General, may still institute an action for reversion
when said decree/certificate was acquired by fraud or misrepresentation. Indefeasibility of a title does not attach
to titles secured by fraud and misrepresentation. Well-settled is the doctrine that the registration of a patent
under the Torrens system does not by itself vest title; it merely confirms the registrant's already existing one.
Verily, registration under the Torrens system is not a mode of acquiring ownership.[160]
But then again, the Court had several times in the past recognized the right of the State to avail itself of the
remedy of reversion in other instances when the title to the land is void for reasons other than having been
secured by fraud or misrepresentation. One such case is Spouses Morandarte v. Court of Appeals,[161] where
the Bureau of Lands (BOL), by mistake and oversight, granted a patent to the spouses Morandarte which
included a portion of the Miputak River. The Republic instituted an action for reversion 10 years after the
issuance of an OCT in the name of the spouses Morandarte. The Court ruled:
Be that as it may, the mistake or error of the officials or agents of the BOL in this regard cannot be invoked
against the government with regard to property of the public domain. It has been said that the State cannot be
estopped by the omission, mistake or error of its officials or agents.
It is well-recognized that if a person obtains a title under the Public Land Act which includes, by oversight, lands
which cannot be registered under the Torrens system, or when the Director of Lands did not have jurisdiction
over the same because it is a public domain, the grantee does not, by virtue of the said certificate of title alone,
become the owner of the land or property illegally included. Otherwise stated, property of the public domain is
incapable of registration and its inclusion in a title nullifies that title.
Another example is the case of Republic of the Phils. v. CFI of Lanao del Norte, Br. IV,[162] in which the
homestead patent issued by the State became null and void because of the grantee's violation of the conditions
for the grant. The Court ordered the reversion even though the land subject of the patent was already covered
by an OCT and the Republic availed itself of the said remedy more than 11 years after the cause of action
accrued, because:
There is merit in this appeal considering that the statute of limitation does not lie against the State. Civil Case
No. 1382 of the lower court for reversion is a suit brought by the petitioner Republic of the Philippines as a
sovereign state and, by the express provision of Section 118 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, any transfer or
alienation of a homestead grant within five (5) years from the issuance of the patent is null and void and
constitute a cause for reversion of the homestead to the State. In Republic vs. Ruiz, 23 SCRA 348, We held that
"the Court below committed no error in ordering the reversion to plaintiff of the land grant involved herein,
notwithstanding the fact that the original certificate of title based on the patent had been cancelled and another
certificate issued in the names of the grantee heirs. Thus, where a grantee is found not entitled to hold and
possess in fee simple the land, by reason of his having violated Section 118 of the Public Land Law, the Court
may properly order its reconveyance to the grantor, although the property has already been brought under the
operation of the Torrens System. And, this right of the government to bring an appropriate action for
reconveyance is not barred by the lapse of time: the Statute of Limitations does not run against the State."
(Italics supplied). The above ruling was reiterated in Republic vs. Mina, 114 SCRA 945.
If the Republic is able to establish after trial and hearing of Civil Case No. 6686 that the decrees and OCTs in
Doa Demetria's name are void for some reason, then the trial court can still order the reversion of the parcels
of land covered by the same because indefeasibility cannot attach to a void decree or certificate of title. The
RTC-Branch 4 jumped the gun when it declared that the cause of action of the Republic for reversion in Civil
Case No. 6686 was already lost or extinguished by prescription based on the Complaint alone.
All told, the Court finds that the RTC-Branch 4 committed reversible error in dismissing the Complaint for
Cancellation of Titles and Reversion of the Republic in Civil Case No. 6686. Resultantly, the Court orders the

reinstatement of said Complaint. Yet, the Court also deems it opportune to recall the following statements in
Saad-Agro Industries, Inc. v. Republic[163]:
It has been held that a complaint for reversion involves a serious controversy, involving a question of fraud and
misrepresentation committed against the government and it is aimed at the return of the disputed portion of the
public domain. It seeks to cancel the original certificate of registration, and nullify the original certificate of title,
including the transfer certificate of title of the successors-in-interest because the same were all procured
through fraud and misrepresentation. Thus, the State, as the party alleging the fraud and misrepresentation that
attended the application of the free patent, bears that burden of proof. Fraud and misrepresentation, as grounds
for cancellation of patent and annulment of title, should never be presumed but must be proved by clear and
convincing evidence, mere preponderance of evidence not even being adequate. It is but judicious to require
the Government, in an action for reversion, to show the details attending the issuance of title over the alleged
inalienable land and explain why such issuance has deprived the State of the claimed property. (Emphasis
supplied.)
It may do well for the Republic to remember that there is a prima facie presumption of regularity in the issuance
of Decree Nos. 10364 and 18969, as well as OCT Nos. 0-1200 (a.f.) and 0-1201 (a.f.), in Doa Demetria's name,
and the burden of proof falls upon the Republic to establish by clear and convincing evidence that said decrees
and certificates of title are null and void.
IV
DISPOSITIVE PART
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court renders the following judgment in the Petitions at bar:
1) In G.R. No. 170375 (Expropriation Case), the Court GRANTS the Petition for Review of the Republic of the
Philippines. It REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Resolutions dated July 12, 2005 and October 24, 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 1 of Iligan City, Lanao del Norte. It further ORDERS the reinstatement of the
Complaint in Civil Case No. 106, the admission of the Supplemental Complaint of the Republic, and the return of
the original record of the case to the court of origin for further proceedings. No costs.
2) In G.R. Nos. 178779 and 178894 (Quieting of Title Case), the Court DENIES the consolidated Petitions for
Review of Landtrade Realty Corporation, Teofilo Cacho, and/or Atty. Godofredo Cabildo for lack of merit. It
AFFIRMS the Decision dated January 19, 2007 and Resolution dated July 4, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV. No. 00456, affirming in toto the Decision dated July 17, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3 of
Iligan City, Lanao del Norte, in Civil Case No. 4452. Costs against Landtrade Realty Corporation, Teofilo Cacho,
and Atty. Godofredo Cabildo.
3) In G.R. No. 170505 (The Ejectment or Unlawful Detainer Case - execution pending appeal before the Regional
Trial Court), the Court DENIES the Petition for Review of Landtrade Realty Corporation for being moot and
academic given that the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1 of Iligan City, Lanao del Norte had already rendered a
Decision dated December 12, 2005 in Civil Case No. 6613. No costs.
4) In G.R. Nos. 173355-56 and 173563-64 (The Ejectment or Unlawful Detainer Case - execution pending appeal
before the Court of Appeals), the Court GRANTS the consolidated Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition of the
National Power Corporation and National Transmission Corporation. It SETS ASIDE the Resolution dated June 30,
2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 00854 and 00889 for having been rendered with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It further ORDERS the Court of Appeals to issue a writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining the execution of the Decision dated December 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 1 of Iligan City, Lanao del Norte, in Civil Case No. 6613, while the same is pending appeal before
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 00854 and 00889. It finally DIRECTS the Court of Appeals to resolve
without further delay the pending appeals before it, in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 00854 and 00889, in a manner not
inconsistent with this Decision. No costs.
5) In G.R. No. 173401 (Cancellation of Titles and Reversion Case), the Court GRANTS the Petition for Review of
the Republic of the Philippines. It REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Orders dated December 13, 2005 and May 16,
2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 4 of Iligan City in Civil Case No. 6686. It further ORDERS the
reinstatement of the Complaint in Civil Case No. 6686 and the return of the original record of the case to the
court of origin for further proceedings. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
B. CONTRADISTINGUISHED FROM VENUE
1, VENUE

MARICRIS D. DOLOT, CHAIRMAN OF THE BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN-SORSOGON, PETITIONER

VS. HON. RAMON PAJE, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT
AND NATURAL RESOURCES, REYNULFO A. JUAN, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, MINES AND GEOSCIENCES
BUREAU, DENR, HON. RAUL R. LEE, GOVERNOR, PROVINCE OF SORSOGON, ANTONIO C. OCAMPO,
JR., VICTORIA A. AJERO, ALFREDO M. AGUILAR, AND JUAN M. AGUILAR, ANTONES ENTERPRISES,
GLOBAL SUMMIT MINES DEV'T CORP., AND TR ORE, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 199199 | 2013-08-27
EN BANC
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Order[2] dated
September 16, 2011 and Resolution[3] dated October 18, 2011 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Sorsogon, Branch 53. The assailed issuances dismissed Civil Case No. 2011-8338 for Continuing Mandamus,
Damages and Attorneys Fees with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Environment Protection Order.
Antecedent Facts
On September 15, 2011, petitioner Maricris D. Dolot (Dolot), together with the parish priest of the Holy Infant
Jesus Parish and the officers of Alyansa Laban sa Mina sa Matnog (petitioners), filed a petition for continuing
mandamus, damages and attorneys fees with the RTC of Sorsogon, docketed as Civil Case No. 2011-8338.[4]
The petition contained the following pertinent allegations: (1) sometime in 2009, they protested the iron ore
mining operations being conducted by Antones Enterprises, Global Summit Mines Development Corporation and
TR Ore in Barangays Balocawe and Bon-ot Daco, located in the Municipality of Matnog, to no avail; (2) Matnog is
located in the southern tip of Luzon and there is a need to protect, preserve and maintain the geological
foundation of the municipality; (3) Matnog is susceptible to flooding and landslides, and confronted with the
environmental dangers of flood hazard, liquefaction, ground settlement, ground subsidence and landslide
hazard; (4) after investigation, they learned that the mining operators did not have the required permit to
operate; (5) Sorsogon Governor Raul Lee and his predecessor Sally Lee issued to the operators a small-scale
mining permit, which they did not have authority to issue; (6) the representatives of the Presidential
Management Staff and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), despite knowledge, did
not do anything to protect the interest of the people of Matnog;[5] and (7) the respondents violated Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 7076 or the Peoples Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991, R.A. No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of
1995, and the Local Government Code.[6] Thus, they prayed for the following reliefs: (1) the issuance of a writ
commanding the respondents to immediately stop the mining operations in the Municipality of Matnog; (2) the
issuance of a temporary environment protection order or TEPO; (3) the creation of an inter-agency group to
undertake the rehabilitation of the mining site; (4) award of damages; and (5) return of the iron ore, among
others.[7]
The case was referred by the Executive Judge to the RTC of Sorsogon, Branch 53 being the designated
environmental court.[8] In the Order[9] dated September 16, 2011, the case was summarily dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction.
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in the Resolution[10] dated October 18,
2011. Aside from sustaining the dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction, the RTC[11] further ruled that: (1)
there was no final court decree, order or decision yet that the public officials allegedly failed to act on, which is a
condition for the issuance of the writ of continuing mandamus; (2) the case was prematurely filed as the
petitioners therein failed to exhaust their administrative remedies; and (3) they also failed to attach judicial
affidavits and furnish a copy of the complaint to the government or appropriate agency, as required by the
rules.[12]
Petitioner Dolot went straight to this Court on pure questions of law.
Issues
The main issue in this case is whether the RTC-Branch 53 has jurisdiction to resolve Civil Case No. 2011-8338.
The other issue is whether the petition is dismissible on the grounds that: (1) there is no final court decree,
order or decision that the public officials allegedly failed to act on; (2) the case was prematurely filed for failure

to exhaust administrative remedies; and (3) the petitioners failed to attach judicial affidavits and furnish a copy
of the complaint to the government or appropriate agency.
Ruling of the Court
Jurisdiction and Venue
In dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction, the RTC, in its Order dated September 16, 2011, apparently
relied on SC Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 7 defining the territorial areas of the Regional Trial Courts in Regions
1 to 12, and Administrative Circular (Admin. Circular) No. 23-2008,[13] designating the environmental courts to
try and decide violations of environmental laws x x x committed within their respective territorial
jurisdictions.[14] Thus, it ruled that its territorial jurisdiction was limited within the boundaries of Sorsogon City
and the neighboring municipalities of Donsol, Pilar, Castilla, Casiguran and Juban and that it was bereft of
jurisdiction to entertain, hear and decide [the] case, as such authority rests before another co-equal court.[15]
Such reasoning is plainly erroneous. The RTC cannot solely rely on SC A.O. No. 7 and Admin. Circular No. 232008 and confine itself within its four corners in determining whether it had jurisdiction over the action filed by
the petitioners.
None is more well-settled than the rule that jurisdiction, which is the power and authority of the court to hear,
try and decide a case, is conferred by law.[16] It may either be over the nature of the action, over the subject
matter, over the person of the defendants or over the issues framed in the pleadings.[17] By virtue of Batas
Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, jurisdiction over special civil actions for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is vested in the RTC. Particularly, Section 21(1) thereof provides that the
RTCs shall exercise original jurisdiction
in the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction which
may be enforced in any part of their respective regions. (Emphasis ours)
A.O. No. 7 and Admin. Circular No. 23-2008 was issued pursuant to Section 18 of B.P. Blg. 129, which gave the
Court authority to define the territory over which a branch of the RTC shall exercise its authority. These
administrative orders and circulars issued by the Court merely provide for the venue where an action may be
filed. The Court does not have the power to confer jurisdiction on any court or tribunal as the allocation of
jurisdiction is lodged solely in Congress.[18] It also cannot be delegated to another office or agency of the
Government.[19] Section 18 of B.P. Blg. 129, in fact, explicitly states that the territory thus defined shall be
deemed to be the territorial area of the branch concerned for purposes of determining the venue of all suits,
proceedings or actions. It was also clarified in Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Matas[20] that
Administrative Order No. 3 [defining the territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts in the National Capital
Judicial Region] and, in like manner, Circular Nos. 13 and 19, did not per se confer jurisdiction on the covered
regional trial courts or its branches, such that non-observance thereof would nullify their judicial acts. The
administrative order merely defines the limits of the administrative area within which a branch of the court may
exercise its authority pursuant to the jurisdiction conferred by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.[21]
The RTC need not be reminded that venue relates only to the place of trial or the geographical location in which
an action or proceeding should be brought and does not equate to the jurisdiction of the court. It is intended to
accord convenience to the parties, as it relates to the place of trial, and does not restrict their access to the
courts.[22] Consequently, the RTCs motu proprio dismissal of Civil Case No. 2011-8338 on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction is patently incorrect.
At most, the error committed by the petitioners in filing the case with the RTC of Sorsogon was that of improper
venue. A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC or the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (Rules) specifically states that a
special civil action for continuing mandamus shall be filed with the [RTC] exercising jurisdiction over the
territory where the actionable neglect or omission occurred x x x.[23] In this case, it appears that the alleged
actionable neglect or omission occurred in the Municipality of Matnog and as such, the petition should have
been filed in the RTC of Irosin.[24] But even then, it does not warrant the outright dismissal of the petition by the
RTC as venue may be waived.[25] Moreover, the action filed by the petitioners is not criminal in nature where
venue is an essential element of jurisdiction.[26] In Gomez-Castillo v. Commission on Elections,[27] the Court
even expressed that what the RTC should have done under the circumstances was to transfer the case (an
election protest) to the proper branch. Similarly, it would serve the higher interest of justice[28] if the Court
orders the transfer of Civil Case No. 2011 8338 to the RTC of Irosin for proper and speedy resolution, with the
RTC applying the Rules in its disposition of the case.
At this juncture, the Court affirms the continuing applicability of Admin. Circular No. 23-2008 constituting the
different green courts in the country and setting the administrative guidelines in the raffle and disposition of
environmental cases. While the designation and guidelines were made in 2008, the same should operate in
conjunction with the Rules.

A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC: Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases

In its Resolution dated October 18, 2011, which resolved the petitioners motion for reconsideration of the order
of dismissal, the RTC further ruled that the petition was dismissible on the following grounds: (1) there is no final
court decree, order or decision yet that the public officials allegedly failed to act on; (2) the case was
prematurely filed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies; and (3) there was failure to attach judicial
affidavits and furnish a copy of the complaint to the government or appropriate agency.[29] The respondents,
and even the Office of the Solicitor General, in behalf of the public respondents, all concur with the view of the
RTC.
The concept of continuing mandamus was first introduced in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v.
Concerned Residents of Manila Bay.[30] Now cast in stone under Rule 8 of the Rules, the writ of continuing
mandamus enjoys a distinct procedure than that of ordinary civil actions for the enforcement/violation of
environmental laws, which are covered by Part II (Civil Procedure). Similar to the procedure under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court for special civil actions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules
requires that the petition filed should be sufficient in form and substance before a court may take further action;
otherwise, the court may dismiss the petition outright. Courts must be cautioned, however, that the
determination to give due course to the petition or dismiss it outright is an exercise of discretion that must be
applied in a reasonable manner in consonance with the spirit of the law and always with the view in mind of
seeing to it that justice is served.[31]
Sufficiency in form and substance refers to the contents of the petition filed under Rule 8, Section 1:
When any agency or instrumentality of the government or officer thereof unlawfully neglects the performance of
an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station in connection with the
enforcement or violation of an environmental law rule or regulation or a right therein, or unlawfully excludes
another from the use or enjoyment of such right and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the
facts with certainty, attaching thereto supporting evidence, specifying that the petition concerns an
environmental law, rule or regulation, and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to
do an act or series of acts until the judgment is fully satisfied, and to pay damages sustained by the petitioner
by reason of the malicious neglect to perform the duties of the respondent, under the law, rules or regulations.
The petition shall also contain a sworn certification of non-forum shopping.
On matters of form, the petition must be verified and must contain supporting evidence as well as a sworn
certification of non-forum shopping. It is also necessary that the petitioner must be one who is aggrieved by an
act or omission of the government agency, instrumentality or its officer concerned. Sufficiency of substance, on
the other hand, necessitates that the petition must contain substantive allegations specifically constituting an
actionable neglect or omission and must establish, at the very least, a prima facie basis for the issuance of the
writ, viz: (1) an agency or instrumentality of government or its officer unlawfully neglects the performance of an
act or unlawfully excludes another from the use or enjoyment of a right; (2) the act to be performed by the
government agency, instrumentality or its officer is specifically enjoined by law as a duty; (3) such duty results
from an office, trust or station in connection with the enforcement or violation of an environmental law, rule or
regulation or a right therein; and (4) there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law.
[32]
The writ of continuing mandamus is a special civil action that may be availed of to compel the performance of
an act specifically enjoined by law.[33] The petition should mainly involve an environmental and other related
law, rule or regulation or a right therein. The RTCs mistaken notion on the need for a final judgment, decree or
order is apparently based on the definition of the writ of continuing mandamus under Section 4, Rule 1 of the
Rules, to wit:
(c) Continuing mandamus is a writ issued by a court in an environmental case directing any agency or
instrumentality of the government or officer thereof to perform an act or series of acts decreed by final
judgment which shall remain effective until judgment is fully satisfied. (Emphasis ours)
The final court decree, order or decision erroneously alluded to by the RTC actually pertains to the judgment or
decree that a court would eventually render in an environmental case for continuing mandamus and which
judgment or decree shall subsequently become final.
Under the Rules, after the court has rendered a judgment in conformity with Rule 8, Section 7 and such
judgment has become final, the issuing court still retains jurisdiction over the case to ensure that the
government agency concerned is performing its tasks as mandated by law and to monitor the effective
performance of said tasks. It is only upon full satisfaction of the final judgment, order or decision that a final
return of the writ shall be made to the court and if the court finds that the judgment has been fully
implemented, the satisfaction of judgment shall be entered in the court docket.[34] A writ of continuing
mandamus is, in essence, a command of continuing compliance with a final judgment as it permits the court to

retain jurisdiction after judgment in order to ensure the successful implementation of the reliefs mandated
under the courts decision.[35]
The Court, likewise, cannot sustain the argument that the petitioners should have first filed a case with the
Panel of Arbitrators (Panel), which has jurisdiction over mining disputes under R.A. No. 7942.
Indeed, as pointed out by the respondents, the Panel has jurisdiction over mining disputes.[36] But the petition
filed below does not involve a mining dispute. What was being protested are the alleged negative environmental
impact of the small-scale mining operation being conducted by Antones Enterprises, Global Summit Mines
Development Corporation and TR Ore in the Municipality of Matnog; the authority of the Governor of Sorsogon
to issue mining permits in favor of these entities; and the perceived indifference of the DENR and local
government officials over the issue. Resolution of these matters does not entail the technical knowledge and
expertise of the members of the Panel but requires an exercise of judicial function. Thus, in Olympic Mines and
Development Corp. v. Platinum Group Metals Corporation,[37] the Court stated
Arbitration before the Panel of Arbitrators is proper only when there is a disagreement between the parties as to
some provisions of the contract between them, which needs the interpretation and the application of that
particular knowledge and expertise possessed by members of that Panel. It is not proper when one of the
parties repudiates the existence or validity of such contract or agreement on the ground of fraud or oppression
as in this case. The validity of the contract cannot be subject of arbitration proceedings. Allegations of fraud and
duress in the execution of a contract are matters within the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts of law. These
questions are legal in nature and require the application and interpretation of laws and jurisprudence which is
necessarily a judicial function.[38] (Emphasis supplied in the former and ours in the latter)
Consequently, resort to the Panel would be completely useless and unnecessary.
The Court also finds that the RTC erred in ruling that the petition is infirm for failure to attach judicial affidavits.
As previously stated, Rule 8 requires that the petition should be verified, contain supporting evidence and must
be accompanied by a sworn certification of non-forum shopping. There is nothing in Rule 8 that compels the
inclusion of judicial affidavits, albeit not prohibited. It is only if the evidence of the petitioner would consist of
testimony of witnesses that it would be the time that judicial affidavits (affidavits of witnesses in the question
and answer form) must be attached to the petition/complaint.[39]
Finally, failure to furnish a copy of the petition to the respondents is not a fatal defect such that the case should
be dismissed. The RTC could have just required the petitioners to furnish a copy of the petition to the
respondents. It should be remembered that courts are not enslaved by technicalities, and they have the
prerogative to relax compliance with procedural rules of even the most mandatory character, mindful of the
duty to reconcile both the need to speedily put an end to litigation and the parties right to an opportunity to be
heard.[40]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Order dated September 16, 2011 and Resolution dated October 18,
2011 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Branch 53, dismissing Civil Case No. 2011-8338 are
NULLIFIED AND SET ASIDE. The Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon is DIRECTED to transfer
the case to the Regional Trial Court of Irosin, Branch 55, for further proceedings with dispatch. Petitioner Maricris
D. Dolot is also ORDERED to furnish the respondents with a copy of the petition and its annexes within ten (10)
days from receipt of this Decision and to submit its Compliance with the RTC of Irosin.
SO ORDERED.
THEODORE and NANCY ANG, represented by ELDRIGE MARVIN B. ACERON, Petitioners, vs. SPOUSES
ALAN and EM ANG, Respondents.
G.R. No. 186993 | 2012-08-22

A discussion citing this case is available.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Parties to Civil Actions; Parties in Interest (Real Parties in Interest)
SECOND DIVISION
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul and
set aside the Decision1 dated August 28, 2008 and the Resolution2 dated February 20, 2009 rendered by the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 101159. The assailed decision annulled and set aside the Orders dated

April 12, 20073 and August 27, 20074 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 81 in Civil
Case No. Q-06-58834.
The Antecedent Facts
On September 2, 1992, spouses Alan and Em Ang (respondents) obtained a loan in the amount of Three
Hundred Thousand U.S. Dollars (US$300,000.00) from Theodore and Nancy Ang (petitioners). On even date, the
respondents executed a promissory note5 in favor of the petitioners wherein they promised to pay the latter the
said amount, with interest at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum, upon demand. However, despite
repeated demands, the respondents failed to pay the petitioners.
Thus, on August 28, 2006, the petitioners sent the respondents a demand letter asking them to pay their
outstanding debt which, at that time, already amounted to Seven Hundred Nineteen Thousand, Six Hundred
Seventy-One U.S. Dollars and Twenty-Three Cents (US$719,671.23), inclusive of the ten percent (10%) annual
interest that had accumulated over the years. Notwithstanding the receipt of the said demand letter, the
respondents still failed to settle their loan obligation.
On August 6, 2006, the petitioners, who were then residing in Los Angeles, California, United States of America
(USA), executed their respective Special Powers of Attorney6 in favor of Attorney Eldrige Marvin B. Aceron (Atty.
Aceron) for the purpose of filing an action in court against the respondents. On September 15, 2006, Atty.
Aceron, in behalf of the petitioners, filed a Complaint7 for collection of sum of money with the RTC of Quezon
City against the respondents.
On November 21, 2006, the respondents moved for the dismissal of the complaint filed by the petitioners on the
grounds of improper venue and prescription.8 Insisting that the venue of the petitioners' action was improperly
laid, the respondents asserted that the complaint against them may only be filed in the court of the place where
either they or the petitioners reside. They averred that they reside in Bacolod City while the petitioners reside in
Los Angeles, California, USA. Thus, the respondents maintain, the filing of the complaint against them in the RTC
of Quezon City was improper.
The RTC Orders
On April 12, 2007, the RTC of Quezon City issued an Order9 which, inter alia, denied the respondents' motion to
dismiss. In ruling against the respondents' claim of improper venue, the court explained that:
Attached to the complaint is the Special Power of Attorney x x x which clearly states that plaintiff Nancy Ang
constituted Atty. Eldrige Marvin Aceron as her duly appointed attorney-in-fact to prosecute her claim against
herein defendants. Considering that the address given by Atty. Aceron is in Quezon City, hence, being the
plaintiff, venue of the action may lie where he resides as provided in Section 2, Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.10
The respondents sought reconsideration of the RTC Order dated April 12, 2007, asserting that there is no law
which allows the filing of a complaint in the court of the place where the representative, who was appointed as
such by the plaintiffs through a Special Power of Attorney, resides.11
The respondents' motion for reconsideration was denied by the RTC of Quezon City in its Order12 dated August
27, 2007.
The respondents then filed with the CA a petition for certiorari13 alleging in the main that, pursuant to Section
2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, the petitioners' complaint may only be filed in the court of the place where they
or the petitioners reside. Considering that the petitioners reside in Los Angeles, California, USA, the respondents
assert that the complaint below may only be filed in the RTC of Bacolod City, the court of the place where they
reside in the Philippines.
The respondents further claimed that, the petitioners' grant of Special Power of Attorney in favor of Atty. Aceron
notwithstanding, the said complaint may not be filed in the court of the place where Atty. Aceron resides, i.e.,
RTC of Quezon City. They explained that Atty. Aceron, being merely a representative of the petitioners, is not the
real party in interest in the case below; accordingly, his residence should not be considered in determining the
proper venue of the said complaint.
The CA Decision
On August 28, 2008, the CA rendered the herein Decision,14 which annulled and set aside the Orders dated
April 12, 2007 and August 27, 2007 of the RTC of Quezon City and, accordingly, directed the dismissal of the

complaint filed by the petitioners. The CA held that the complaint below should have been filed in Bacolod City
and not in Quezon City. Thus:
As maybe clearly gleaned from the foregoing, the place of residence of the plaintiff's attorney-in-fact is of no
moment when it comes to ascertaining the venue of cases filed in behalf of the principal since what should be
considered is the residence of the real parties in interest, i.e., the plaintiff or the defendant, as the case may be.
Residence is the permanent home - the place to which, whenever absent for business or pleasure, one intends
to return. Residence is vital when dealing with venue. Plaintiffs, herein private respondents, being residents of
Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., which is beyond the territorial jurisdiction of Philippine courts, the case should
have been filed in Bacolod City where the defendants, herein petitioners, reside. Since the case was filed in
Quezon City, where the representative of the plaintiffs resides, contrary to Sec. 2 of Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of
Court, the trial court should have dismissed the case for improper venue.15
The petitioners sought a reconsideration of the Decision dated August 28, 2008, but it was denied by the CA in
its Resolution dated February 20, 2009.16
Hence, the instant petition.
Issue
In the instant petition, the petitioners submit this lone issue for this Court's resolution:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT RULED THAT THE
COMPLAINT MUST BE DISMISSED ON THE GROUND THAT VENUE WAS NOT PROPERLY LAID.17
The Court's Ruling
The petition is denied.
Contrary to the CA's disposition, the petitioners maintain that their complaint for collection of sum of money
against the respondents may be filed in the RTC of Quezon City. Invoking Section 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court,
they insist that Atty. Aceron, being their attorney-in-fact, is deemed a real party in interest in the case below and
can prosecute the same before the RTC. Such being the case, the petitioners assert, the said complaint for
collection of sum of money may be filed in the court of the place where Atty. Aceron resides, which is the RTC of
Quezon City.
On the other hand, the respondents in their Comment18 assert that the petitioners are proscribed from filing
their complaint in the RTC of Quezon City. They assert that the residence of Atty. Aceron, being merely a
representative, is immaterial to the determination of the venue of the petitioners' complaint.
The petitioners' complaint should
have been filed in the RTC of
Bacolod City, the court of the place
where the respondents reside, and
not in RTC of Quezon City.
It is a legal truism that the rules on the venue of personal actions are fixed for the convenience of the plaintiffs
and their witnesses. Equally settled, however, is the principle that choosing the venue of an action is not left to
a plaintiff's caprice; the matter is regulated by the Rules of Court.19
The petitioners' complaint for collection of sum of money against the respondents is a personal action as it
primarily seeks the enforcement of a contract. The Rules give the plaintiff the option of choosing where to file
his complaint. He can file it in the place (1) where he himself or any of them resides, or (2) where the defendant
or any of the defendants resides or may be found. The plaintiff or the defendant must be residents of the place
where the action has been instituted at the time the action is commenced.20
However, if the plaintiff does not reside in the Philippines, the complaint in such case may only be filed in the
court of the place where the defendant resides. In Cohen and Cohen v. Benguet Commercial Co., Ltd.,21 this
Court held that there can be no election as to the venue of the filing of a complaint when the plaintiff has no
residence in the Philippines. In such case, the complaint may only be filed in the court of the place where the
defendant resides. Thus:
Section 377 provides that actions of this character "may be brought in any province where the defendant or any
necessary party defendant may reside or be found, or in any province where the plaintiff or one of the plaintiffs

resides, at the election of the plaintiff." The plaintiff in this action has no residence in the Philippine
Islands. Only one of the parties to the action resides here. There can be, therefore, no election by
plaintiff as to the place of trial. It must be in the province where the defendant resides. x x x.22
(Emphasis ours)
Here, the petitioners are residents of Los Angeles, California, USA while the respondents reside in Bacolod City.
Applying the foregoing principles, the petitioners' complaint against the respondents may only be filed in the
RTC of Bacolod City - the court of the place where the respondents reside. The petitioners, being residents of Los
Angeles, California, USA, are not given the choice as to the venue of the filing of their complaint.
Thus, the CA did not commit any reversible error when it annulled and set aside the orders of the RTC of Quezon
City and consequently dismissed the petitioners' complaint against the respondents on the ground of improper
venue.
In this regard, it bears stressing that the situs for bringing real and personal civil actions is fixed by the Rules of
Court to attain the greatest convenience possible to the litigants and their witnesses by affording them
maximum accessibility to the courts.23 And even as the regulation of venue is primarily for the convenience of
the plaintiff, as attested by the fact that the choice of venue is given to him, it should not be construed to
unduly deprive a resident defendant of the rights conferred upon him by the Rules of Court.24
Atty. Aceron is not a real party in
interest in the case below; thus, his
residence is immaterial to the venue
of the filing of the complaint.
Contrary to the petitioners' claim, Atty. Aceron, despite being the attorney-in-fact of the petitioners, is not a real
party in interest in the case below. Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court reads:
Sec. 2. Parties in interest. - A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured
by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized
by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.
(Emphasis ours)
Interest within the meaning of the Rules of Court means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected
by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved.25 A
real party in interest is the party who, by the substantive law, has the right sought to be enforced.26
Applying the foregoing rule, it is clear that Atty. Aceron is not a real party in interest in the case below as he
does not stand to be benefited or injured by any judgment therein. He was merely appointed by the petitioners
as their attorney-in-fact for the limited purpose of filing and prosecuting the complaint against the respondents.
Such appointment, however, does not mean that he is subrogated into the rights of petitioners and ought to be
considered as a real party in interest.
Being merely a representative of the petitioners, Atty. Aceron in his personal capacity does not have the right to
file the complaint below against the respondents. He may only do so, as what he did, in behalf of the petitioners
- the real parties in interest. To stress, the right sought to be enforced in the case below belongs to the
petitioners and not to Atty. Aceron. Clearly, an attorney-in-fact is not a real party in interest.27
The petitioner's reliance on Section 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court to support their conclusion that Atty. Aceron is
likewise a party in interest in the case below is misplaced. Section 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides that:
Sec. 3. Representatives as parties. - Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted and defended by a
representative or someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of
the case and shall be deemed to be the real property in interest. A representative may be a trustee of
an expert trust, a guardian, an executor or administrator, or a party authorized by law or these Rules. An agent
acting in his own name and for the benefit of an undisclosed principal may sue or be sued without joining the
principal except when the contract involves things belonging to the principal. (Emphasis ours)
Nowhere in the rule cited above is it stated or, at the very least implied, that the representative is likewise
deemed as the real party in interest. The said rule simply states that, in actions which are allowed to be
prosecuted or defended by a representative, the beneficiary shall be deemed the real party in interest and,
hence, should be included in the title of the case.

Indeed, to construe the express requirement of residence under the rules on venue as applicable to the
attorney-in-fact of the plaintiff would abrogate the meaning of a "real party in interest", as defined in Section 2
of Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Court vis-a -vis Section 3 of the same Rule.28
On this score, the CA aptly observed that:
As may be unerringly gleaned from the foregoing provisions, there is nothing therein that expressly allows,
much less implies that an action may be filed in the city or municipality where either a representative or an
attorney-in-fact of a real party in interest resides. Sec. 3 of Rule 3 merely provides that the name or names of
the person or persons being represented must be included in the title of the case and such person or persons
shall be considered the real party in interest. In other words, the principal remains the true party to the case and
not the representative. Under the plain meaning rule, or verba legis, if a statute is clear, plain and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without interpretation. xxx29 (Citation omitted)
At this juncture, it bears stressing that the rules on venue, like the other procedural rules, are designed to insure
a just and orderly administration of justice or the impartial and even-handed determination of every action and
proceeding. Obviously, this objective will not be attained if the plaintiff is given unrestricted freedom to choose
the court where he may file his complaint or petition. The choice of venue should not be left to the plaintiff's
whim or caprice. He may be impelled by some ulterior motivation in choosing to file a case in a particular court
even if not allowed by the rules on venue.30
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated
August 28, 2008 and Resolution dated February 20, 2009 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
101159 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
ESTRELLA TAGLAY, PETITIONER, VS. JUDGE MARIVIC TRABAJO DARAY AND LOVERIE PALACAY,
RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 164258 | 2012-08-22
THIRD DIVISION
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and
set aside the Orders[1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Digos City, Branch 18, dated March 9, 2004 and June
7, 2004, in Criminal Case No. FC-71-02. The March 9, 2004 Order denied herein petitioner's Motion to Dismiss,
while the June 7, 2004 Order denied her Motion for Reconsideration.
The instant petition arose from a Criminal Complaint[2] for Qualified Trespass to Dwelling filed by private
respondent against herein petitioner with the 5th Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Sta. Maria-Malita-Don
Marcelino, Davao del Sur on June 19, 2001.
Finding probable cause to indict petitioner, the Public Prosecutor assigned to handle the case filed an
Information[3] against her on November 19, 2001. The Information reads as follows:
The undersigned Prosecutor accuses ESTRELLA TAGLAY of the crime of Qualified Trespass to Dwelling as defined
and penalized under Article 280 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, committed as follows:
That on June 2, 2001 at about 2:30 o'clock in the afternoon at Tibangao, Malita, Davao del Sur, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the aforesaid accused, a private person and without any
justifiable reason and by means of violence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter into the
dwelling of Loverie Palacay without her consent and against her will and once inside maltreated, boxed and
choked her, to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
Upon arraignment on June 7, 2002, petitioner pleaded not guilty.[5] Pre-trial conference was set on August 13,
2002.
However, on August 15, 2002, the MCTC issued an Order,[6] to wit:

It appearing that private complainant Loverie Palacay was a minor on June 2, 2001, the date of the incident,
since she was born on August 7, 1983, per Certification dated August 15, 2002 issued by Municipal Registrar
Josephine A. Marquez, this case, upon manifestation of Prosecutor Perfecto P. Ordaneza and pursuant to Republic
Act. No. 8369 and Circular 11-99, is hereby transferred to Branch 20, Regional Trial Court, Digos City, for proper
disposition.
SO ORDERED.
Subsequently, the case was transferred to the RTC of Digos City where petitioner was brought to trial.
Witnesses were then presented by the prosecution. Prior to the presentation of the final witness for the
prosecution, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner contended that
the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case, because the MCTC erroneously transferred the case to the RTC
instead of dismissing it. Petitioner also argued that the RTC's lack of jurisdiction was further aggravated when
she was not arraigned before the RTC.
On March 9, 2004, the RTC issued its assailed Order[7] ruling that it acquired jurisdiction over the case when it
received the records of the case as a consequence of the transfer effected by the MCTC; that the transfer of the
case from the MCTC is authorized under Administrative Matter No. 99-1-13-SC and Circular No. 11-99; that there
is no doubt that the offended party is a minor and, thus, the case falls within the original jurisdiction of Family
Courts pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8369. The RTC also held that even granting that there was defect or
irregularity in the procedure because petitioner was not arraigned before the RTC, such defect was fully cured
when petitioner's counsel entered into trial without objecting that his client had not yet been arraigned.
Furthermore, the RTC noted that petitioner's counsel has cross-examined the witnesses for the prosecution.
Consequently, the RTC denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was denied by the RTC via its Order[8] dated June 7,
2004.
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari.
Petitioner raises two main grounds.
First, petitioner contends that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case because Circular No. 11-99,
which authorizes the transfer of Family Courts cases filed with first-level courts to the RTCs, is applicable only to
cases which were filed prior to the effectivity of the said Circular on March 1, 1999. Petitioner argues that all
Family Courts cases filed with first-level courts after the effectivity of the said Circular can no longer be
transferred to the RTC; instead they should be dismissed. Considering that the Information in the instant case
was filed with the MCTC on November 19, 2001, petitioner avers that the MCTC should have dismissed the case
instead of ordering its transfer to the RTC.
Second, petitioner insists that she should have been arraigned anew before the RTC and that her arraignment
before the MCTC does not count because the proceedings conducted therein were void.
The petition is meritorious.
At the outset, it is necessary to stress that, generally, a direct recourse to this Court in a petition for certiorari is
highly improper for it violates the established policy of strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts.[9]
While this Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the RTCs and the CA to issue writs of certiorari, this concurrence
is not to be taken as an unrestrained freedom of choice as to which court the application for the writ will be
directed.[10] There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals and
should also serve as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs.[11]
This Court is a court of last resort and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to
it by the Constitution and immemorial tradition.[12] A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original
jurisdiction to issue these extraordinary writs is allowed only when there are special and important reasons
therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition.[13]
However, it is also settled that this Court has full discretionary power to take cognizance of a petition filed
directly with it if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised, so warrant.[14] Under
the present circumstances, the Court will take cognizance of this case as an exception to the principle of
hierarchy of courts, considering that the Information against petitioner was filed way back in November 2001.
[15] Any further delay in the resolution of the instant petition will be prejudicial to petitioner. Moreover, the
principle may be relaxed when pure questions of law are raised as in this case.[16]

Now, on the merits of the petition.

It is significant to point out, at this juncture, the well-entrenched doctrine that the jurisdiction of a tribunal over
the subject matter of an action is conferred by law.[17] Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the
statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action.[18] The Family Courts Act of 1997, which took
effect on November 23, 1997.[19] Section 5 (a) of R.A. 8369 clearly provides that Family Courts have exclusive
original jurisdiction over criminal cases where one or more of the accused is below eighteen (18) years of age
but not less than nine (9) years of age, or where one or more of the victims is a minor at the time of the
commission of the offense. In the present case, there is no dispute that at the time of the commission of the
alleged offense on June 2, 2001, private respondent, who is also the private complainant, was a minor. Hence,
the case falls under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Family Courts.
Anent the first issue raised, the Court agrees that the Resolution of this Court in Administrative Matter No. 99-113-SC and Circular No. 11-99, issued pursuant thereto, is applicable only to Family Courts cases which were filed
with first-level courts prior to the effectivity of the said Resolution on March 1, 1999.[20] This is evident in the
language used by the Court in the third "Whereas" clause of the subject Resolution wherein it was stated that
"pending the constitution and organization of the Family Courts and the designation of branches of the Regional
Trial Courts as Family Courts in accordance with Section 17 (Transitory Provisions) of R.A. 8369, there is a need
to provide guidelines in the hearing and determination of criminal cases falling within the jurisdiction of Family
Courts which have heretofore been filed with first-level courts." The operative word, as correctly cited by
petitioner, is "heretofore" which means "before this" or "up to this time."[21] Moreover, Section 1 of the same
Resolution directs all first-level courts, within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy of the subject Resolution, to
take an inventory of all criminal cases falling within the jurisdiction of the Family Courts which were filed with
them (first-level courts), to prepare an appropriate inventory and to submit the same to the Court Management
Office of the Office of the Court Administrator. Logic dictates that only those cases which were filed prior to the
issuance of the Resolution shall be included in the inventory and, therefore, shall be subject to transfer by firstlevel courts to the appropriate RTCs. The necessary implication then is that all cases filed with first-level courts
after the effectivity of the Resolution on March 1, 1999 should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. In the
present case, the Information was filed against petitioner on November 19, 2001. Thus, the MCTC is already
bereft of any authority to transfer the case to the RTC as the same no longer falls under the coverage of Circular
No. 11-99. What the MCTC should have done was to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.
More importantly, what justifies the dismissal of the case is that the Information filed with the MCTC cannot be
used as a basis for the valid indictment of petitioner before the RTC acting as a Family Court, because there was
no allegation therein of private complainant's minority. To proceed to trial before the RTC on the basis of the
Information filed with the MCTC would be an exercise in futility as there is an infirmity in the Information
constituting a jurisdictional defect which cannot be cured. There is no point in proceeding under a defective
Information that could never be the basis of a valid conviction.[22] The Information filed with the MCTC must
thus first be amended and thereafter filed with the RTC. Pending the filing of such Information, the RTC has not
yet acquired jurisdiction because while a court may have jurisdiction over the subject matter, it does not acquire
jurisdiction over the case itself until its jurisdiction is invoked with the filing of a valid Information.[23]
The Court also agrees with petitioner in her contention in the second issue raised that she should have been
arraigned by the RTC.
It is true that petitioner was arraigned by the MCTC. However, the MCTC has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the present case. It is settled that the proceedings before a court or tribunal without jurisdiction,
including its decision, are null and void.[24] Considering that the MCTC has no jurisdiction, all the proceedings
conducted therein, including petitioner's arraignment, are null and void. Thus, the need for petitioner's
arraignment on the basis of a valid Information filed with the RTC.
It is also true that petitioner's counsel participated in the proceedings held before the RTC without objecting that
his client had not yet been arraigned. However, it is wrong for the RTC to rely on the case of People v. Cabale,
[25] because the accused therein was in fact arraigned, although the same was made only after the case was
submitted for decision. In the similar cases of People v. Atienza and Closa[26] and People v. Pangilinan,[27] the
accused in the said cases were also belatedly arraigned. The Court, in these three cases, held that the active
participation of the counsels of the accused, as well as their opportunity to cross-examine the prosecution
witnesses during trial without objecting on the ground that their clients had not yet been arraigned, had the
effect of curing the defect in the belated arraignment. Moreover, the accused in these cases did not object when
they were belatedly arraigned. The same, however, cannot be said in the instant case. There is no arraignment
at all before the RTC. On the other hand, the arraignment conducted by the MCTC is null and void. Thus, there is
nothing to be cured. Petitioner's counsel also timely raised before the RTC the fact that her client, herein
petitioner, was not arraigned.

Arraignment is the formal mode and manner of implementing the constitutional right of an accused to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.[28] The purpose of arraignment is, thus, to
apprise the accused of the possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of the crime
imputed to him, or at the very least to inform him of why the prosecuting arm of the State is mobilized against
him.[29] As an indispensable requirement of due process, an arraignment cannot be regarded lightly or
brushed aside peremptorily.[30] Otherwise, absence of arraignment results in the nullity of the proceedings
before the trial court.[31]
As a final note, it may not be amiss to stress that at all stages of the proceedings leading to his trial and
conviction, the accused must be charged and tried according to the procedure prescribed by law and marked by
observance of the rights given to him by the Constitution.[32] In the same way that the reading of the
Information to the accused during arraignment is not a useless formality, so is the validity of the information
being read not an idle ceremony.[33]
Criminal due process requires that the accused must be proceeded against under the orderly processes of law.
[34] In all criminal cases, the judge should follow the step-by-step procedure required by the Rules.[35] The
reason for this is to assure that the State makes no mistake in taking the life or liberty except that of the guilty.
[36]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Digos City, Branch 18,
dated March 9, 2004 and June 7, 2004, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one rendered dismissing the
Information in Criminal Case No. FC-71-02, without prejudice to refiling the same in the proper court.
SO ORDERED.
SPOUSES RAMON MENDIOLA and ARACELI N. MENDIOLA, Petitioners, vs. THE HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, and TABANGAO REALTY, INC., Respondents.
G.R. No. 159746 | 2012-07-18
FIRST DIVISION
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Through their petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition, petitioners assail the resolutions
promulgated on November 22, 20021 and July 31, 2002,2 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) respectively
denied petitioners' motion to dismiss the appeal and motion for reconsideration. They allege that the CA thereby
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Antecedents
On July 31, 1985, Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Shell) entered into an agreement for the
distribution of Shell petroleum products (such as fuels, lubricants and allied items) by Pacific Management &
Development (Pacific), a single proprietorship belonging to petitioner Ramon G. Mendiola (Ramon). To secure
Pacific's performance of its obligations under the agreement, petitioners executed on August 1, 1985 a real
estate mortgage in favor of Shell3 covering their real estate and its improvements, located in the then
Municipality of Paranaque, Rizal, and registered under Transfer Certificate of Title No. S-59807 of the Registry of
Deeds of Rizal (in the name of "Ramon Mendiola, married to Araceli Mendoza").4
Pacific ultimately defaulted on its obligations, impelling Shell to commence extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings in April 1987. Having received a notice of the extrajudicial foreclosure scheduled to be held at the
main entrance of the Paranaque Municipal Hall on May 14, 1987,5 petitioners proceeded to the announced
venue on the scheduled date and time but did not witness any auction being conducted and did not meet the
sheriff supposed to conduct the auction despite their being at the lobby from 9:00 am until 11:30 am of May 14,
1987.6 They later learned that the auction had been held as scheduled by Deputy Sheriff Bernardo San Juan of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Makati, and that their mortgaged realty had been sold to Tabangao Realty, Inc.
(Tabangao), as the corresponding certificate of sale bears out.7 They further learned that Tabangao's winning
bidder bid of P670,000.00 had topped Shell's bid of P660,000.00.8
After application of the proceeds of the sale to the obligation of Pacific, a deficiency of P170,228.00
(representing the foreclosure expenses equivalent of 25% of the amount claimed plus interest) remained. The
deficiency was not paid by Ramon. Thus, on September 2, 1987, Shell sued in the RTC in Manila to recover the
deficiency, docketed as Civil Case No. 87-41852 entitled Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Ramon G.

Mendiola, doing business under the name and style Pacific Management & Development (Manila case).9
In his answer with counterclaim filed on October 28, 1987, Ramon asserted that the extra-judicial
foreclosure of the mortgage had been devoid of basis in fact and in law; and that the foreclosure and the filing
of the action were made in bad faith, with malice, fraudulently and in gross and wanton violation of his rights.
On March 22, 1988, petitioners commenced in the RTC in Makati an action to annul the extrajudicial
foreclosure docketed as Civil Case No. 88-398 entitled Ramon G. Mendiola and Araceli N. Mendiola v. Pilipinas
Shell Petroleum Corporation, Tabangao Realty, Inc., and Maximo C. Contreras, as Clerk of Court and Ex Oficio
Sheriff of Rizal,10 which was assigned to Branch 134 (Makati case).
As defendants in the Makati case, Shell and Tabangao separately moved for dismissal,11 stating similar
grounds, namely: (a) that the Makati RTC had no jurisdiction due to the pendency of the Manila case; (b) that the
complaint stated no cause of action, the Makati case having been filed more than a year after the registration of
the certificate of sale; (c) that another action (Manila case) involving the same subject matter was pending; (d)
that the venue was improperly laid; and (e) that the Makati case was already barred by petitioners' failure to
raise its cause of action as a compulsory counterclaim in the Manila case.
After the Makati RTC denied both motions on September 23, 1988,12 Shell filed its answer ad cautelam,13
whereby it denied petitioners' allegation that no auction had been held; insisted that there had been proper
accounting of the deliveries made to Pacific and its clients; and averred that petitioners' failure to file their
compulsory counterclaim in the Manila case already barred the action.
Pending the trial of the Makati case, the Manila RTC rendered its judgment in favor of Shell on May 31,
1990, viz:

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, defendants (sic) is ordered to pay plaintiffs as follows:

1. On the First Cause of Action -

a) P167,585.50 representing the deficiency as of the date of the foreclosure sale;

b) P2,643.26 representing the interest due on the unpaid principal as of 30 June 1987; and
c) The sum corresponding to the interest due on the unpaid principal from 30 June 1987 to date.
2. On the Second Cause of Action - attorney's fees and expenses of litigation to (sic) the amount of
P15,000.00; and finally,
3. Costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.14
As sole defendant in the Manila case, Ramon appealed (C.A.-G.R. No. CV-28056), but his appeal was
decided adversely to him on July 22, 1994,15 with the CA affirming the Manila RTC's decision and finding that he
was guilty of forum shopping for instituting the Makati case.
Undaunted, he next appealed to the Court (G.R. No. 122795), which denied his petition for review on
February 26, 1996,16 and upheld the foreclosure of the mortgage. The decision of the Court became final and
executory, as borne out by the entry of judgment issued on June 10, 1996.17
Nonetheless, on February 3, 1998, the Makati RTC resolved the Makati case,18 finding that there had
been no auction actually conducted on the scheduled date; that had such auction taken place, petitioners could
have actively participated and enabled to raise their objections against the amount of their supposed obligation;
and that they had been consequently deprived of notice and hearing as to their liability. The Makati RTC

disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, plaintiffs having duly established their case that the SHERIFF's
Certificate of Sale of May 14, 1987, is void for lack of actual auction sale and lack of valid consideration as the
amount utilized by the SHERIFF was based on an invalid amount as a basis of an Extra-Judicial Foreclosure of
Mortgage where the amount of the mortgage is based on a future obligation unilaterally adjudicated by SHELL
alone in violation of MENDIOLA's right of due process, and judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. Declaring as NULL and VOID the Extra-Judicial Foreclosure of Mortgage of plaintiff's house and lot under
TCT No. T-59807 issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal;
2. Declaring as NULL and VOID the Certificate of Sale issued by Maximo C. Contreras on May 14, 1987 in
favor of TABANGAO REALTY, INC.;
3. Ordering defendant PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION to make a full accounting of the extent
of the future obligation of plaintiff MENDIOLA in the Mortgage Contract before any foreclosure proceedings are
initiated;
4. Ordering defendants PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION and TABANGAO REALTY INC. to pay
the amount of P20,000.00 as and by way of attorney's fees; and
5. To pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Shell sought the reconsideration of the decision,19 maintaining that the issues raised on the validity of
the foreclosure sale and on the amount of the outstanding obligation of Pacific had been settled in the Manila
case; and that the Makati RTC became bereft of jurisdiction to render judgment on the same issues pursuant to
the principle of res judicata.
Tabangao adopted Shell's motion for reconsideration.
On October 5, 1999, however, the Makati RTC denied Shell's motion for reconsideration,20 to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, there is NO RES JUDICATA to speak of in this case. Consequently, the
"Motion for Reconsideration" filed by defendant Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation, which was later adopted
by defendant Tabangao Realty, Inc., is hereby DENIED. Plaintiff's "Motion for Execution" is likewise DENIED for
reasons as stated above.

SO ORDERED.21
Aggrieved by the decision of the Makati RTC, Shell and Tabangao filed a joint notice of appeal.22 The
appeal was docketed in the CA as C.A.-G.R. No. 65764.
In their appellants' brief filed in C.A.-G.R. No. 65764,23 Shell and Tabangao assigned the following errors,
namely:
I

THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN NOT DISMISSING THE CASE ON THE GROUND OF LITIS
PENDENTIA AND, SUBSEQUENTLY, ON THE GROUND OF RES JUDICATA.
II

THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED MANIFEST ERROR IN DISREGARDING THAT THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR A
VALID EXTRAJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE WERE SATISFIED.

III

THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN RENDERING THE ASSAILED DECISION AND ASSAILED
RESOLUTION IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE RULINGS OF A CO-EQUAL COURT AND SUPERIOR COURTS.
Instead of filing their appellees' brief, petitioners submitted a motion to dismiss appeal,24 mainly positing
that Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court prohibited an appeal of the order denying a motion for
reconsideration.
On November 22, 2002, the CA denied petitioners' motion to dismiss appeal through the first assailed
resolution, stating:25

For consideration is the Motion to Dismiss Appeal dated August 6, 2002 filed by counsel for plaintiffsappellees praying for the dismissal of the appeal on the grounds that the Notice of Appeal filed by defendantsappellants was specifically interposed solely against the Resolution of the trial court dated October 20, 1999
which merely denied defendant-appellants' Motion for Reconsideration of the trial court's decision, dated
February 3, 1998.
Upon perusal of the records of the case, it seems apparent that herein defendants-appellants intended to
appeal not only the Resolution dated October 2, 1999 but also the Decision dated February 3, 1998. Assuming
arguendo that defendants-appellants indeed committed a technical error, it is best that the parties be given
every chance to fight their case fairly and in the open without resort to technicality to afford petitioners their
day in court (Zenith Insurance vs. Purisima, 114 SCRA 62).
The Motion to Dismiss Appeal must not be granted if only to stress that the rules of procedure may not be
misused as instruments for the denial of substantial justice. We must not forget the plain injunction of Section 2
of (now Sec. 6 of Rule 1, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure) Rule 1 that the "rules shall be liberally construed
in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining not only speedy, but more imperatively
just and inexpensive determination of justice in every action and proceeding" (Lim Tanhu vs. Ramolete 66 SCRA
425).
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion to Dismiss Appeal is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
On July 31, 2002, the CA denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration through the second assailed
resolution.26
Hence, petitioners brought these special civil actions for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition, insisting
that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying their
motion to dismiss appeal and their motion for reconsideration.
Issue
Petitioners contend that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the appeal of Shell
and Tabangao in contravention of Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, which proscribes an appeal of the
denial of a motion for reconsideration.
Shell and Tabangao counter that their appeal was not proscribed because the action could be said to be
completely disposed of only upon the rendition on October 5, 1999 of the assailed resolution denying their
motion for reconsideration; that, as such, the decision of February 3, 1998 and the denial of their motion for
reconsideration formed one integrated disposition of the merits of the action; and that the CA justifiably applied
the rules of procedure liberally.
Two issues have to be determined. The first is whether or not an appeal may be taken from the denial of a
motion for reconsideration of the decision of February 3, 1998. The determination of this issue necessarily
decides whether the petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus were warranted. The second is whether
the Makati case could prosper independently of the Manila case. The Court has to pass upon and resolve the
second issue without waiting for the CA to decide the appeal on its merits in view of the urging by Shell and

Tabangao that the Makati case was barred due to litis pendentia or res judicata.

Ruling
The petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition lacks merit.
1.
Appeal by Shell and Tabangao of the denial of their motion for reconsideration was not proscribed
Petitioners' contention that the appeal by Shell and Tabangao should be rejected on the ground that an
appeal of the denial of their motion for reconsideration was prohibited cannot be sustained.
It is true that the original text of Section 1, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure expressly limited
an appeal to a judgment or final order, and proscribed the taking of an appeal from an order denying a motion
for new trial or reconsideration, among others, viz:

Section 1. Subject of appeal. - An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely
disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable.

No appeal may be taken from:

(a) An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration;

(b) An order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion seeking relief from judgment;
(c) An interlocutory order;
(d) An order disallowing or dismissing an appeal;
(e) An order denying a motion to set aside a judgment by consent, confession or compromise on the
ground of fraud, mistake or duress, or any other ground vitiating consent;
(f) An order of execution;
(g) A judgment or final order for or against one or more of several parties or in separate claims,
counterclaims, cross-claims and third-party complaints, while the main case is pending, unless the court allows
an appeal therefrom; and
(h) An order dismissing an action without prejudice.

In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may
file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65. (n)
The inclusion of the order denying a motion for new trial or a motion for reconsideration in the list of
issuances of a trial court not subject to appeal was by reason of such order not being the final order terminating
the proceedings in the trial court. This nature of the order is reflected in Section 9 of Rule 37 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, which declares that such order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration is not
appealable, "the remedy being an appeal from the judgment or final order."
In Heirs of Spouses Teofilo M. Reterta and Elisa Reterta v. Spouses Lorenzo Mores and Virginia Lopez,27
the Court further expounded:

The restriction against an appeal of a denial of a motion for reconsideration independently of a judgment
or final order is logical and reasonable. A motion for reconsideration is not putting forward a new issue, or
presenting new evidence, or changing the theory of the case, but is only seeking a reconsideration of the

judgment or final order based on the same issues, contentions, and evidence either because: (a) the damages
awarded are excessive; or (b) the evidence is insufficient to justify the decision or final order; or (c) the decision
or final order is contrary to law. By denying a motion for reconsideration, or by granting it only partially,
therefore, a trial court finds no reason either to reverse or to modify its judgment or final order, and leaves the
judgment or final order to stand. The remedy from the denial is to assail the denial in the course of an appeal of
the judgment or final order itself.
In Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc.,28 however, the Court has interpreted the proscription against
appealing the order denying a motion for reconsideration to refer only to a motion for reconsideration filed
against an interlocutory order, not to a motion for reconsideration filed against a judgment or final order, to wit:

This Court finds that the proscription against appealing from an order denying a motion for
reconsideration refers to an interlocutory order, and not to a final order or judgment. That that was
the intention of the above-quoted rules is gathered from Pagtakhan v. CIR, 39 SCRA 455 (1971),
cited in above-quoted portion of the decision in Republic, in which this Court held that an order
denying a motion to dismiss an action is interlocutory, hence, not appealable.

The rationale behind the rule proscribing the remedy of appeal from an interlocutory order is
to prevent undue delay, useless appeals and undue inconvenience to the appealing party by having
to assail orders as they are promulgated by the court, when they can be contested in a single
appeal. The appropriate remedy is thus for the party to wait for the final judgment or order and
assign such interlocutory order as an error of the court on appeal.
The denial of the motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a complaint is not an
interlocutory order, however, but a final order as it puts an end to the particular matter resolved, or
settles definitely the matter therein disposed of, and nothing is left for the trial court to do other
than to execute the order.
Not being an interlocutory order, an order denying a motion for reconsideration of an order
of dismissal of a complaint is effectively an appeal of the order of dismissal itself.
The reference by petitioner, in his notice of appeal, to the March 12, 1999 Order denying his Omnibus
Motion-Motion for Reconsideration should thus be deemed to refer to the January 17, 1999 Order which declared
him non-suited and accordingly dismissed his complaint.
If the proscription against appealing an order denying a motion for reconsideration is applied
to any order, then there would have been no need to specifically mention in both above-quoted
sections of the Rules "final orders or judgments" as subject of appeal. In other words, from the
entire provisions of Rule 39 and 41, there can be no mistaking that what is proscribed is to appeal
from a denial of a motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order.29
In Apuyan v. Haldeman,30 too, the Court categorized an order denying the motion for reconsideration as
the final resolution of the issues a trial court earlier passed upon and decided, and accordingly held that the
notice of appeal filed against the order of denial was deemed to refer to the decision subject of the motion for
reconsideration.31
Subsequently, in Neypes v. Court of Appeals,32 where the decisive issue was whether or not the appeal
was taken within the reglementary period, with petitioners contending that they had timely filed their notice of
appeal based on their submission that the period of appeal should be reckoned from July 22, 1998, the day they
had received the final order of the trial court denying their motion for reconsideration (of the order dismissing
their complaint), instead of on March 3, 1998, the day they had received the February 12, 1998 order dismissing
their complaint, the Court, citing Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc. and Apuyan v. Haldeman, ruled that the receipt
by petitioners of the denial of their motion for reconsideration filed against the dismissal of their complaint,
which was a final order, started the reckoning point for the filing of their appeal, to wit:

Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:

SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. - The appeal shall be taken wi thin fifteen (15) days from the
notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant
shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from the notice of judgment or final
order.
The period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion
for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed. (emphasis supplied)

Based on the foregoing, an appeal should be taken within 15 days from the notice of judgment or final
order appealed from. A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more for
the court to do with respect to it. It is an adjudication on the merits which, considering the evidence presented
at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are; or it may be an order or
judgment that dismisses an action.
As already mentioned, petitioners argue that the order of July 1, 1998 denying their motion for
reconsideration should be construed as the "final order," not the February 12, 1998 order which dismissed their
complaint. Since they received their copy of the denial of their motion for reconsideration only on July 22, 1998,
the 15-day reglementary period to appeal had not yet lapsed when they filed their notice of appeal on July 27,
1998.
What therefore should be deemed as the "final order," receipt of which triggers the start of the 15-day
reglementary period to appeal - the February 12, 1998 order dismissing the complaint or the July 1, 1998 order
dismissing the MR?
In the recent case of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc., the trial court declared petitioner Quelnan nonsuited and accordingly dismissed his complaint. Upon receipt of the order of dismissal, he filed an omnibus
motion to set it aside. When the omnibus motion was filed, 12 days of the 15-day period to appeal the order had
lapsed. He later on received another order, this time dismissing his omnibus motion. He then filed his notice of
appeal. But this was likewise dismissed - for having been filed out of time.

The court a quo ruled that petitioner should have appealed within 15 days after the dismissal of his
complaint since this was the final order that was appealable under the Rules. We reversed the trial court and
declared that it was the denial of the motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a complaint which
constituted the final order as it was what ended the issues raised there.
This pronouncement was reiterated in the more recent case of Apuyan v. Haldeman et al. where we again
considered the order denying petitioner Apuyan's motion for reconsideration as the final order which finally
disposed of the issues involved in the case.
Based on the aforementioned cases, we sustain petitioners' view that the order dated July 1, 1998
denying their motion for reconsideration was the final order contemplated in the Rules.33
As the aftermath of these rulings, the Court issued its resolution in A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC to approve certain
amendments to Rules 41, 45, 58 and 65 of the Rules of Court effective on December 27, 2007. Among the
amendments was the delisting of an order denying a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration from the
enumeration found in Section 1, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure of what are not appealable. The
amended rule now reads:

Section 1. Subject of appeal.- An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely
disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable.
No appeal may be taken from:
(a) An order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion seeking relief from judgment;
(b) An interlocutory order;
(c) An order disallowing or dismissing an appeal;

(d) An order denying a motion to set aside a judgment by consent, confession or compromise on the
ground of fraud, mistake or duress, or any other ground vitiating consent;
(e) An order of execution;
(f) A judgment or final order for or against one or more of several parties or in separate claims,
counterclaims, cross-claims and third-party complaints, while the main case is pending, unless the court allows
an appeal therefrom; and
(g) An order dismissing an action without prejudice.
In any of the foregoing circumstances, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action as
provided in Rule 65.
Based on the foregoing developments, Shell and Tabangao's appeal, albeit seemingly directed only at the
October 5, 1999 denial of their motion for reconsideration, was proper. Thus, we sustain the CA's denial for
being in accord with the rules and pertinent precedents. We further point out that for petitioners to insist that
the appeal was limited only to the assailed resolution of October 5, 1999 was objectively erroneous, because
Shell and Tabangao expressly indicated in their appellant's brief that their appeal was directed at both the
February 3, 1998 decision and the October 5, 1999 resolution.34
The petition cannot prosper if the CA acted in accordance with law and jurisprudence. Certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus are extraordinary remedies intended to correct errors of jurisdiction and to check
grave abuse of discretion. The term grave abuse of discretion connotes capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to excess, or a lack of jurisdiction.35 The abuse must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion
or hostility.36 Yet, here, petitioners utterly failed to establish that the CA abused its discretion, least of all
gravely.
2.
Makati case is barred and should be dismissed on ground of res judicata and waiver
The dismissal of the petition should ordinarily permit the CA to resume its proceedings in order to enable
it to resolve the appeal of Shell and Tabangao. But the Court deems itself bound to first determine whether the
Makati case could still proceed by virtue of their insistence that the cause of action for annulment of the
foreclosure sale in the Makati case, which was intimately intertwined with the cause of action for collection of
the deficiency amount in the Manila case, could not proceed independently of the Manila case.
Shell and Tabangao's insistence has merit. The Makati case should have been earlier disallowed to
proceed on the ground of litis pendentia, or, once the decision in the Manila case became final, should have
been dismissed on the ground of being barred by res judicata.
In the Manila case, Ramon averred a compulsory counterclaim asserting that the extrajudicial foreclosure
of the mortgage had been devoid of basis in fact and in law; and that the foreclosure and the filing of the action
had been made in bad faith, with malice, fraudulently and in gross and wanton violation of his rights. His
pleading thereby showed that the cause of action he later pleaded in the Makati case - that of annulment of the
foreclosure sale - was identical to the compulsory counterclaim he had set up in the Manila case.
Rule 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines a compulsory counterclaim as follows:
Section 7. Compulsory counterclaim. - A compulsory counterclaim is one which, being cognizable by the
regular courts of justice, arises out of or is connected with the transaction or occurrence constituting the subject
matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of
whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. Such a counterclaim must be within the jurisdiction of the court both
as to the amount and the nature thereof, except that in an original action before the Regional Trial Court, the
counterclaim may be considered compulsory regardless of the amount. (n)
Accordingly, a counterclaim is compulsory if: (a) it arises out of or is necessarily connected with the
transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim; (b) it does not require for its
adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction; and (c) the court has
jurisdiction to entertain the claim both as to its amount and nature, except that in an original action before the
RTC, the counterclaim may be considered compulsory regardless of the amount.
A compulsory counterclaim that a defending party has at the time he files his answer shall be contained
therein.37 Pursuant to Section 2, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a compulsory counterclaim not set

up shall be barred.
The four tests to determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or not are the following, to wit: (a) Are
the issues of fact or law raised by the claim and the counterclaim largely the same? (b) Would res judicata bar a
subsequent suit on defendant's claims, absent the compulsory counterclaim rule? (c) Will substantially the same
evidence support or refute plaintiff's claim as well as the defendant's counterclaim? and (d) Is there any logical
relation between the claim and the counterclaim, such that the conduct of separate trials of the respective
claims of the parties would entail a substantial duplication of effort and time by the parties and the court?38 Of
the four, the one compelling test of compulsoriness is the logical relation between the claim alleged in the
complaint and that in the counterclaim. Such relationship exists when conducting separate trials of the
respective claims of the parties would entail substantial duplication of time and effort by the parties and the
court; when the multiple claims involve the same factual and legal issues; or when the claims are offshoots of
the same basic controversy between the parties.39 If these tests result in affirmative answers, the counterclaim
is compulsory.
The four tests are affirmatively met as far as the Makati case was concerned. The Makati case had the
logical relation to the Manila case because both arose out of the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate
mortgage constituted to secure the payment of petitioners' credit purchases under the distributorship
agreement with Shell. Specifically, the right of Shell to demand the deficiency was predicated on the validity of
the extrajudicial foreclosure, such that there would not have been a deficiency to be claimed in the Manila case
had Shell not validly foreclosed the mortgage. As earlier shown, Ramon's cause of action for annulment of the
extrajudicial foreclosure was a true compulsory counterclaim in the Manila case. Thus, the Makati RTC could not
have missed the logical relation between the two actions.
We hold, therefore, that the Makati case was already barred by res judicata. Hence, its immediate
dismissal is warranted.
Bar by res judicata avails if the following elements are present, to wit: (a) the former judgment or order
must be final; (b) the judgment or order must be on the merits; (c) it must have been rendered by a court
having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (d) there must be, between the first and the second
action, identity of parties, of subject matter and cause of action.40
The Manila RTC had jurisdiction to hear and decide on the merits Shell's complaint to recover the
deficiency, and its decision rendered on May 31, 1990 on the merits already became final and executory. Hence,
the first, second and third elements were present.
Anent the fourth element, the Makati RTC concluded that the Manila case and the Makati case had no
identity as to their causes of action, explaining that the former was a personal action involving the collection of
a sum of money, but the latter was a real action affecting the validity of the foreclosure sale, stating in its order
of October 5, 1999 denying Shell's motion for reconsideration as follows:
Finally, as to whether there is identity of causes of action between the two (2) cases, this Court finds in
negative.
xxxx
True, the test of identity of causes of action lies not in the form of an action but on whether the same
evidence would support and establish the former and the present causes of action. The difference of actions in
the aforesaid cases is of no moment. It has been held that a party cannot by varying the form of action or
adopting a different method of presenting his case, escape the operation of the principle that one and the same
cause of action shall not be twice litigated between the same parties and their privies. (Sangalang vs. Caparas,
151 SCRA 53; Gutierrez vs. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 437. This ruling however does not fall squarely on the
present controversy.
Civil Case No. 42852 is for collection of sum of money, a personal action where what is at issue is whether
spouses Mendiola have indebtedness to Pilipinas Shell. There is no concrete findings on questions regarding the
validity of sale affecting the mortgaged property, otherwise, there would be a determination of transferring of
title over the property which is already a real action. In the latter action, Manila courts has no jurisdiction
considering that the property is located in Paranaque, then sitting under Makati RTC. At any rate, this Court is
not unmindful of series of cases which state that from an otherwise rigid rule outlining jurisdiction of courts
being limited in character, deviations have been sanctioned where the (1) parties agreed or have acquiesced in
submitting the issues for determination by the court; (2) the parties were accorded full opportunity in presenting
their respective arguments of the issues litigated and of the evidence in support thereof; and (3) the court has
already considered the evidence on record and is convinced that the same is sufficient and adequate for
rendering a decision upon the issues controverted. xxx. While there is a semblance of substantial compliance
with the aforesaid criteria, primarily because the issue of validity of foreclosure proceedings was submitted for

determination of RTC Manila when this was stated as an affirmative defense by spouses Mendiola in their
Answer to the complaint in Civil Case No. 42852, however it appears from the Decision rendered in said case
that the issue on validity of foreclosure sale was not fully ventilated before the RTC Manila because spouses
Mendiola's right to present evidence in its behalf was declared waived. Naturally, where this issue was not fully
litigated upon, no resolution or declaration could be made therein.
On the other hand, Civil Case No. 88-398 is an action for declaration of nullity or annulment of foreclosure
sale, a real action where the location of property controls the venue where it should properly be filed. This Court
undoubtedly has jurisdiction to adjudicate this case. Plaintiff spouses Mendiola merely claimed that no actual
foreclosure sale was conducted, and if there was, the same was premature for lack of notice and hearing. Take
note that plaintiffs do not deny their indebtedness to Pilipinas Shell although the amount being claimed is
disputed. They are simply asserting their rights as owners of the mortgaged property, contending that they were
not afforded due process in the course of foreclosure proceedings. And based mainly on the testimonial and
documentary evidence presented, as well as the postulations, expositions and arguments raised by all parties in
this case, it is the Court's considered view that spouses Mendiola have established the material allegations in
their complaint and have convincingly shown to the satisfaction of the Court that they are entitled to the reliefs
prayed for. With these findings and adjudications, the Court does not find inconsistency with those held in Civil
Case No. 42852. As to whether spouses Mendiola is still indebted to Pilipinas Shell is not in issue here, and not
even a single discussion touched that matter as this would tantamount to encroaching upon the subject matter
litigated in Civil Case No. 42852.41
The foregoing conclusion of the Makati RTC on lack of identity between the causes of action was patently
unsound. The identity of causes of action does not mean absolute identity; otherwise, a party may easily escape
the operation of res judicata by changing the form of the action or the relief sought. The test to determine
whether the causes of action are identical is to ascertain whether the same evidence will sustain the actions, or
whether there is an identity in the facts essential to the maintenance of the actions. If the same facts or
evidence will sustain the actions, then they are considered identical, and a judgment in the first case is a bar to
the subsequent action.42 Petitioners' Makati case and Shell's Manila case undeniably required the production of
the same evidence. In fact, Shell's counsel faced a dilemma upon being required by the Makati RTC to present
the original copies of certain documents because the documents had been made part of the records of the
Manila case elevated to the CA in connection with the appeal of the Manila RTC's judgment.43 Also, both cases
arose from the same transaction (i.e., the foreclosure of the mortgage), such that the success of Ramon in
invalidating the extrajudicial foreclosure would have necessarily negated Shell's right to recover the deficiency.
Apparently, the Makati RTC had the erroneous impression that the Manila RTC did not have jurisdiction
over the complaint of petitioners because the property involved was situated within the jurisdiction of the
Makati RTC. Thereby, the Makati RTC confused venue of a real action with jurisdiction. Its confusion was
puzzling, considering that it was well aware of the distinction between venue and jurisdiction, and certainly
knew that venue in civil actions was not jurisdictional and might even be waived by the parties.44 To be clear,
venue related only to the place of trial or the geographical location in which an action or proceeding should be
brought and does not equate to the jurisdiction of the court. It is intended to accord convenience to the parties,
as it relates to the place of trial, and does not restrict their access to the courts.45 In contrast, jurisdiction refers
to the power to hear and determine a cause,46 and is conferred by law and not by the parties.47
By virtue of the concurrence of the elements of res judicata, the immediate dismissal of the Makati case
would have been authorized under Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides:
Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. - Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion
to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence
on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action pending
between the same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of
limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim. (2a)
The rule expressly mandated the Makati RTC to dismiss the case motu proprio once the pleadings or the
evidence on record indicated the pendency of the Manila case, or, later on, disclosed that the judgment in the
Manila case had meanwhile become final and executory.
Yet, we are appalled by the Makati RTC's flagrant disregard of the mandate. Its reason for the disregard
was not well-founded. We stress that its disregard cannot be easily ignored because it needlessly contributed to
the clogging of the dockets of the Judiciary. Thus, we deem it to be imperative to again remind all judges to
consciously heed any clear mandate under the Rules of Court designed to expedite the disposition of cases as
well as to declog the court dockets.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus for lack of
merit; CONSIDER Civil Case No. 88-398 dismissed with prejudice on the. ground of res judicata;

and ORDER petitioners to pay the costs of suit to respondents.

The Office of the Court Administrator is DIRECTED to disseminate this decision to all trial courts for their
guidance.
SO ORDERED.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Petitioner, versus LARRY M. ALFONSO, Respondent.
G.R. No. 179452 | 2009-06-11
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This is a Rule 45 petition assailing the May 21, 2007 Decision[1] and August 23, 2007 Resolution[2] of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 97284, which reversed Civil Service Commission (CSC) Resolution Nos.
061821[3] and 061908[4] dated October 16, 2006 and November 7, 2006, respectively, as well as its Order[5]
dated December 11, 2006, formally charging respondent Larry Alfonso with Grave Misconduct and Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and preventively suspending him from his position as Director of
the Human Resources Management Department of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines (PUP).
The facts, as summarized by the CA, are as follows:
Respondent Larry M. Alfonso is the Director of the Human Resources Management Department of PUP. On July 6,
2006, Dr. Zenaida Pia, Professor IV in PUP-Sta. Mesa, and Dindo Emmanuel Bautista, President of Unyon ng mga
Kawani sa PUP, jointly filed an Affidavit-Complaint against Alfonso for violation of Republic Act (RA) No. 6713,
charging the latter with grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the Service, and violation
of Civil Service Law, rules and regulations. The affidavit-complaint was lodged before the Civil Service
Commission (CSC). In their affidavit, Dr. Pia and Bautista alleged, among others, that respondent repeatedly
abused his authority as head of PUP's personnel department when the latter prepared and included his name in
Special Order Nos. 0960 and 1004 for overnight services, ostensibly authorizing him to work for 24 hours
straight from May 16 to 20, May 22 to 27 and May 29 to June 2, 2006. As a result thereof, Alfonso made
considerable earnings for allegedly working in humanly impossible conditions 24 hours straight daily, for three
consecutive weeks.[6]
In support of their complaint, Dr. Pia and Bautista submitted the following documentary evidence:
1. Special Order No. 1004, s. 2006;
2. Special Order No. 0960, s. 2006;
3. Daily time records of Saturday and Overnight Services of Alfonso;
4. PUP Perm-OT overnight May 2006 payroll register;
5. Xerox copy of check no. 162833 dated May 31, 2006;
6. Summary of Alfonso's Saturday, overnight and overtime schedule;
7. Computation of the number of hours, days and weeks that Alfonso allegedly served; and
8. Explanation of official time, night service, Saturday overtime and overnight services rendered by Alfonso for
the month of May.[7]
On August 10, 2006, the Office of Legal Affairs (OLA) of the CSC issued an order directing Alfonso to submit his
counter-affidavit/comment within three (3) days from receipt thereof.
In his Counter-Affidavit[8] dated August 30, 2006, respondent averred that he only rendered overnight work on
May 17, 19, 22, 24, 26, 29 and 31, 2006. He explained that his daily time record explicitly indicates that it
covers overnight services pursuant to S.O. No. 1004, series of 2006, and that an entry such as "Day 17, arrival
8:00 PM; Day 18, departure 8:00 AM" connoted only a day of overnight work and not continuous two (2) days of
rendition of services.[9]
The CSC, however, found Alfonso's explanation wanting. On October 25, 2006, it issued Resolution No. 061821

formally charging Alfonso with grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the Service, and
imposing a 90-day preventive suspension against him.[10]
Aggrieved, respondent filed an omnibus motion for reconsideration of the preventive suspension order and
requested a change of venue[11] from the CSC-Central Office to the CSC-National Capital Region (CSC-NCR). In
the motion, he argued that it is the CSC-NCR regional office that has jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to
Section 6 of CSC Resolution No. 99-1936, and that to hold otherwise may deprive him of his right to appeal.[12]
The motion was denied.[13]
Undaunted, Alfonso filed another motion for reconsideration on November 20, 2006, accompanied by a motion
to admit his supplemental answer.[14] This time, however, respondent argued that the CSC had no jurisdiction
to hear and decide the administrative case filed against him. According to him, it is the PUP Board of Regents
that has the exclusive authority to appoint and remove PUP employees pursuant to the provisions of R.A. No.
8292[15] in relation to R.A. No. 4670.[16]
Without ruling on the motion, Assistant Commissioner Atty. Anicia Marasigan-de Lima, head of CSC-NCR, issued
an Order[17] dated December 11, 2006 directing the Office of the President of PUP to implement the preventive
suspension order against respondent.[18]
Dissatisfied, respondent sought relief before the CA via a petition for certiorari and prohibition.
On May 21, 2007, the CA rendered a Decision[19] in favor of Alfonso. The pertinent portion of the decision
declares:
Applying the foregoing provisions, it appears that the CSC may take cognizance of an administrative case in two
ways: (1) through a complaint filed by a private citizen against a government official or employee; and (2)
appealed cases from the decisions rendered by Secretaries or heads of agencies, instrumentalities, provinces,
cities and municipalities in cases filed against officers and employees under their jurisdiction.
Indisputably, the persons who filed the affidavit-complaint against petitioner held positions in and were under
the employ of PUP. Hence, they cannot be considered as private citizens in the contemplation of the said
provision. It is likewise undisputed that the subject CSC resolutions were not rendered in the exercise of its
power to review or its appellate jurisdiction but was an ordinary administrative case. Hence, the present case
falls short of the requirement that would otherwise have justified the CSC's immediate exercise of its jurisdiction
over the administrative case against petitioner.
Even assuming that the CSC may directly entertain the complaints filed with it, the doctrine of exhaustion [of]
administrative remedies still prevents it from entertaining the present administrative case. If a remedy within
the administrative machinery can still be had by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity
to decide on the matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy should be priorly exhausted.
The circumstances in this case do not justify the disregard of the doctrine. Hence, the administrative complaint
should have been lodged with the PUP board of regents.
xxx
The CA ratiocinated that since Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1341, the law creating PUP, is the special law
governing PUP, then it is the Board of Regents (BOR) that should carry out the duties of the investigating
committee and has the proper authority to discipline PUP personnel corollary to the BOR's general powers of
administration.[20] According to the CA, the power of the BOR to hire carries with it the corresponding power to
discipline PUP personnel pursuant to Section 7(c) of P.D.1341, to wit:
Section 7. The Board of Regents shall have the following powers and duties in addition to his general powers of
administration and the exercise of all the powers of a corporation as provided in Section 13 of Act Numbered
fourteen hundred fifty-nine as amended, otherwise known as the Philippine Corporation Law:
xxxx
(c) To appoint, on the recommendation of the President of the University, professors, instructors, lecturers and
other members of the faculty, and other officials and employees of the University; to fix their compensation,
hours of service, and such, other duties and conditions as it may deem proper, any other provisions of the law to
the contrary notwithstanding; to grant to them in his discretion, leave of absence under such regulations as it
may promulgate, any other conditions of the law to the contrary notwithstanding, and to remove them for cause
after an investigation and hearing shall have been had;

xxx
This provision in the PUP Charter is substantially in accord with Section 4(h) of R.A. 8292,
Section 4. Powers and Duties of Governing Boards. - The governing board shall have the following specific
powers and duties in addition to its general powers of administration and the exercise of all the powers granted
to the board of directors of a corporation under Section 36 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 68, otherwise known as the
Corporation Code of the Philippines:
xxxx
(h) to fix and adjust salaries of faculty members and administrative officials and employees subject to the
provisions of the revised compensation and classification system and other pertinent budget and compensation
laws governing hours of service, and such other duties and conditions as it may deem proper; to grant them, at
its discretion, leaves of absence under such regulations as it may promulgate, any provisions of existing law to
the contrary notwithstanding; and to remove them for cause in accordance with the requirements of due
process of law.
Given the foregoing antecedents, the pivotal issue we have to resolve is whether the CSC has jurisdiction to
hear and decide the complaint filed against Alfonso.
We find in favor of petitioner.
Section 2(1) and Section 3, Article IX-B of our Constitution, are clear, as they provide that:
Sec. 2. (1) The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.
Sec. 3. The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the Government, shall establish a
career service and adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness,
and courtesy in the civil service. It shall strengthen the merit and rewards system, integrate all human resources
development programs for all levels and ranks, and institutionalize a management climate conducive to public
accountability. It shall submit to the President and the Congress an annual report on its personnel programs.
As the central personnel agency of the government,[21] the CSC has jurisdiction to supervise the performance
of and discipline, if need be, all government employees, including those employed in government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters such as PUP. Accordingly, all PUP officers and employees, whether
they be classified as teachers or professors pursuant to certain provisions of law, are deemed, first and
foremost, civil servants accountable to the people and answerable to the CSC in cases of complaints lodged by a
citizen against them as public servants. Admittedly, the CSC has appellate jurisdiction over disciplinary cases
decided by government departments, agencies and instrumentalities. However, a complaint may be filed
directly with the CSC, and the Commission has the authority to hear and decide the case, although it may opt to
deputize a department or an agency to conduct the investigation. Specifically, Sections 9(j) and 37(a) of P.D.
807, otherwise known as the Civil Service
Law of 1975, provide:
SECTION 9. Powers and Functions of the Commission. - The Commission shall administer the Civil Service and
shall have the following powers and function:
xxxx
(j) Hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly with it in accordance with Section 37 or
brought to it on appeal;
xxxx
Section 37. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. - (a) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative
disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an
amount exceeding thirty days' salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from Office. A
complaint may be filed directly with the Commission by a private citizen against a government official or
employee in which case it may hear and decide the case or it may deputize any department or agency or official
or group of officials to conduct the investigation. The results of the investigation shall be submitted to the
Commission with recommendation as to the penalty to be imposed or other action to be taken.[22]

We are not unmindful of certain special laws that allow the creation of disciplinary committees and governing
bodies in different branches, subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities of the government to hear and decide
administrative complaints against their respective officers and employees. Be that as it may, we cannot
interpret the creation of such bodies nor the passage of laws such as - R.A. Nos. 8292 and 4670 allowing for the
creation of such disciplinary bodies - as having divested the CSC of its inherent power to supervise and
discipline government employees, including those in the academe. To hold otherwise would not only negate the
very purpose for which the CSC was established, i.e. to instill professionalism, integrity, and accountability in our
civil service, but would also impliedly amend the Constitution itself.
In Office of the Ombudsman v. Masing,[23] we explained that it is error to contend that R.A. No. 4670 conferred
exclusive disciplinary authority on the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS, now Department of
Education or DepEd) over public school teachers and to have prescribed exclusive procedure in administrative
investigations involving them.[24] Hence, it is equally erroneous for respondent to argue that the PUP Charter
and R.A. No. 8292 in relation to R.A. 4670 confer upon the BOR of PUP exclusive jurisdiction to hear disciplinary
cases against university professors and personnel.
In Civil Service Commission v. Sojor,[25] an administrative case was filed against a state university president.
There, we struck down the argument that the BOR has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide an
administrative case filed against the respondent. We said:
In light of the other provisions of R.A. No. 9299, respondent's argument that the BOR has exclusive power to
remove its university officials must fail. Section 7 of R.A. No. 9299 states that the power to remove faculty
members, employees, and officials of the university is granted to the BOR "in addition to its general powers of
administration." This provision is essentially a reproduction of Section 4 of its predecessor, R.A. No. 8292,
demonstrating that the intent of the lawmakers did not change even with the enactment of the new law. x x x
xxxx
Verily, the BOR of NORSU has the sole power of administration over the university. But this power is not
exclusive in the matter of disciplining and removing its employee and officials.
Although the BOR of NORSU is given the specific power under R.A. No. 9299 to discipline its employees and
officials, there is no showing that such power is exclusive. When the law bestows upon a government body the
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving specific matters, it is to be presumed that such jurisdiction is
exclusive unless it be proved that another body is likewise vested with the same jurisdiction, in which case, both
bodies have concurrent jurisdiction over the matter.[26] (Emphasis supplied)
But it is not only for this reason that Alfonso's argument must fail. Equally significant is the fact that he had
already submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the CSC when he filed his counter-affidavit[27] and his motion for
reconsideration and requested for a change of venue, not from the CSC to the BOR of PUP, but from the CSCCentral Office to the CSC-NCR.[28] It was only when his motion was denied that he suddenly had a change of
heart and raised the question of proper jurisdiction.[29] This cannot be allowed because it would violate the
doctrine of res judicata, a legal principle that is applicable to administrative cases as well.[30] At the very least,
respondent's active participation in the proceedings by seeking affirmative relief before the CSC already bars
him from impugning the Commission's authority under the principle of estoppel by laches.[31]
In this case, the complaint-affidavits were filed by two PUP employees. These complaints were not lodged before
the disciplinary tribunal of PUP, but were instead filed before the CSC, with averments detailing respondent's
alleged violation of civil service laws, rules and regulations. After a fact-finding investigation, the Commission
found that a prima facie case existed against Alfonso, prompting the Commission to file a formal charge against
the latter.[32] Verily, since the complaints were filed directly with the CSC, and the CSC has opted to assume
jurisdiction over the complaint, the CSC's exercise of jurisdiction shall be to the exclusion of other tribunals
exercising concurrent jurisdiction. To repeat, it may, however, choose to deputize any department or agency or
official or group of officials such as the BOR of PUP to conduct the investigation, or to delegate the investigation
to the proper regional office.[33] But the same is merely permissive and not mandatory upon the Commission.
We likewise affirm the order of preventive suspension issued by the CSC-NCR against respondent.
There are two kinds of preventive suspension of government employees charged with offenses punishable by
removal or suspension, viz: (1) preventive suspension pending investigation; and (2) preventive suspension
pending appeal if the penalty imposed by the disciplining authority is suspension or dismissal and, after review,
the respondent is exonerated. Preventive suspension pending investigation is not a penalty. It is a measure

intended to enable the disciplining authority to investigate charges against respondent by preventing the latter
from intimidating or in any way influencing witnesses against him. If the investigation is not finished and a
decision is not rendered within that period, the suspension will be lifted and the respondent will automatically be
reinstated. If after investigation, respondent is found innocent of the charges and is exonerated, he should be
reinstated.[34]
The first kind, subject of the CSC Order against the respondent, is appropriately covered by Sections 51 and 52
of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292) which provide:
SEC. 51. Preventive Suspension. - The proper disciplining authority may preventively suspend any subordinate
officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if the charge against such officer or employee
involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, or neglect in the performance of duty, or if there are
reasons to believe that the respondent is guilty of charges which would warrant his removal from the service.
SEC. 52. Lifting of Preventive Suspension. Pending Administrative Investigation. - When the administrative case
against the officer or employee under preventive suspension is not finally decided by the disciplining authority
within the period of ninety (90) days after the date of suspension of the respondent who is not a presidential
appointee, the respondent shall be automatically reinstated in the service: Provided, That when the delay in the
disposition of the case is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, the period of delay shall not
be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided.
Respondent was charged with grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. A
person charged with grave misconduct is put on notice that he stands accused of misconduct coupled with any
of the elements of corruption or willful intent to violate the law or established rules.[35] Meanwhile, conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service is classified as a grave offense with a corresponding penalty of
suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year for the first offense, and the penalty of dismissal
for the second offense.[36]
In addition to the gravity of the charges against Alfonso, and equally relevant, is the opportunity available to
him to use his position as Director of the Human Resources Management Department of the university to exert
undue influence or pressure on the potential witnesses that the complainants may produce, or to tamper with
the documentary evidence that may be used against him. Preventive suspension is, therefore, necessary so that
respondent's delicate yet powerful position in the university may not be used to compromise the integrity and
impartiality of the entire proceedings.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the May 21, 2007 Decision[37] and August 23, 2007 Resolution[38] of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97284 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, Civil Service
Commission Resolution Nos. 061821[39] and 061908[40] dated October 16, 2006 and November 7, 2006,
respectively, as well as its Order[41] dated December 11, 2006 placing respondent under preventive suspension
are hereby REINSTATED. The CSC is ordered to proceed hearing the administrative case against respondent with
dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Petitioner, versus HENRY A. SOJOR, Respondent.
G.R. No. 168766 | 2008-05-22

View Summary
DECISION

REYES, R.T., J.:

IS the president of a state university outside the reach of the disciplinary jurisdiction constitutionally granted to
the Civil Service Commission (CSC) over all civil servants and officials?
Does the assumption by the CSC of jurisdiction over a president of a state university violate academic freedom?
The twin questions, among others, are posed in this petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) which annulled two (2) CSC Resolutions[2] against respondent Henry A. Sojor.
The Facts
The uncontroverted facts that led to the controversy, as found by the CSC and the CA, are as follows:
On August 1, 1991, respondent Sojor was appointed by then President Corazon Aquino as president of the
Central Visayas Polytechnic College (CVPC) in Dumaguete City. In June 1997, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8292, or the
"Higher Education Modernization Act of 1997," was enacted. This law mandated that a Board of Trustees (BOT)
be formed to act as the governing body in state colleges. The BOT of CVPC appointed respondent as president,
with a four-year term beginning September 1998 up to September 2002.[3] Upon the expiration of his first term
of office in 2002, he was appointed president of the institution for a second four-year term, expiring on
September 24, 2006.[4]
On June 25, 2004, CVPC was converted into the Negros Oriental State University (NORSU).[5] A Board of Regents
(BOR) succeeded the BOT as its governing body.
Meanwhile, three (3) separate administrative cases against respondent were filed by CVPC faculty members
before the CSC Regional Office (CSC-RO) No. VII in Cebu City, to wit:
1. ADMC DC No. 02-20(A) - Complaint for dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service filed on June 26, 2002 by Jose Rene A. Cepe and Narciso P. Ragay. It was alleged that
respondent approved the release of salary differentials despite the absence of the required Plantilla and Salary
Adjustment Form and valid appointments.[6]
2. ADM DC No. 02-20 - Complaint for dishonesty, misconduct and falsification of official documents filed on July
10, 2002 by Jocelyn Juanon and Carolina Fe Santos. The complaint averred that respondent maliciously allowed
the antedating and falsification of the reclassification differential payroll, to the prejudice of instructors and
professors who have pending request for adjustment of their academic ranks.[7]
3. ADM DC No. 02-21 - Complaint for nepotism filed on August 15, 2002 by Rose Marie Palomar, a former parttime instructor of CVPC. It was alleged that respondent appointed his half-sister, Estrellas Sojor-Managuilas, as
casual clerk, in violation of the provisions against nepotism under the Administrative Code.[8]
Before filing his counter-affidavits, respondent moved to dismiss the first two complaints on grounds of lack of
jurisdiction, bar by prior judgment and forum shopping.
He claimed that the CSC had no jurisdiction over him as a presidential appointee. Being part of the noncompetitive or unclassified service of the government, he was exclusively under the disciplinary jurisdiction of
the Office of the President (OP). He argued that CSC had no authority to entertain, investigate and resolve
charges against him; that the Civil Service Law contained no provisions on the investigation, discipline, and
removal of presidential appointees. He also pointed out that the subject matter of the complaints had already
been resolved by the Office of the Ombudsman.[9]
Finding no sufficient basis to sustain respondent's arguments, the CSC-RO denied his motion to dismiss in its
Resolution dated September 4, 2002.[10] His motion for reconsideration[11] was likewise denied. Thus,
respondent was formally charged with three administrative cases, namely: (1) Dishonesty, Misconduct, and
Falsification of Official Document; (2) Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest
of the Service; and (3) Nepotism.[12]
Respondent appealed the actions of the regional office to the Commission proper (CSC), raising the same
arguments in his motion to dismiss.[13] He argued that since the BOT is headed by the Committee on Higher
Education Chairperson who was under the OP, the BOT was also under the OP. Since the president of CVPC was
appointed by the BOT, then he was a presidential appointee. On the matter of the jurisdiction granted to

CSC by virtue of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 807[14] enacted in October 1975, respondent contended that this
was superseded by the provisions of R.A. No. 8292,[15] a later law which granted to the BOT the power to
remove university officials.
CSC Disposition
In a Resolution dated March 30, 2004,[16] the CSC dismissed respondent's appeal and authorized its regional
office to proceed with the investigation. He was also preventively suspended for 90 days. The fallo of the said
resolution states:
WHEREFORE, the appeal of Henry A. Sojor, President of Central Visayas Polytechnic College, is hereby
DISMISSED. The Civil Service Commission Regional Office No. VII, Cebu City, is authorized to proceed with the
formal investigation of the cases against Sojor and submit the investigation reports to the Commission within
one hundred five (105) days from receipt hereof. Finally, Sojor is preventively suspended for ninety (90) days.
[17]
In decreeing that it had jurisdiction over the disciplinary case against respondent, the CSC opined that his claim
that he was a presidential appointee had no basis in fact or in law. CSC maintained that it had concurrent
jurisdiction with the BOT of the CVPC. We quote:
His appointment dated September 23, 2002 was signed by then Commission on Higher Education (CHED)
Chairman Ester A. Garcia. Moreover, the said appointment expressly stated that it was approved and adopted by
the Central Visayas Polytechnic College Board of Trustees on August 13, 2002 in accordance with Section 6 of
Republic Act No. 8292 (Higher education Modernization Act of 1997), which explicitly provides that, "He (the
president of a state college) shall be appointed by the Board of Regents/Trustees, upon recommendation of a
duly constituted search committee." Since the President of a state college is appointed by the Board of
Regents/Trustees of the college concerned, it is crystal clear that he is not a presidential appointee. Therefore, it
is without doubt that Sojor, being the President of a state college (Central Visayas Polytechnic College), is within
the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Commission.
The allegation of appellant Sojor that the Commission is bereft of disciplinary jurisdiction over him since the
same is exclusively lodged in the CVPC Board of Trustees, being the appointing authority, cannot be considered.
The Commission and the CVPC Board of Trustees have concurrent jurisdiction over cases against officials and
employees of the said agency. Since the three (3) complaints against Sojor were filed with the Commission and
not with the CVPC, then the former already acquired disciplinary jurisdiction over the appellant to the exclusion
of the latter agency.[18] (Emphasis supplied)
The CSC categorized respondent as a third level official, as defined under its rules, who are under the
jurisdiction of the Commission proper. Nevertheless, it adopted the formal charges issued by its regional office
and ordered it to proceed with the investigation:
Pursuant to the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, Sojor, being a third level official, is
within the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Commission Proper. Thus, strictly speaking, the Commission has the
sole jurisdiction to issue the formal charge against Sojor. x x x However, since the CSC RO No. VII already issued
the formal charges against him and found merit in the said formal charges, the same is adopted. The CSC RO
No. VII is authorized to proceed with the formal investigation of the case against Sojor in accordance with the
procedure outlined in the aforestated Uniform Rules.[19] (Emphasis supplied)
No merit was found by the CSC in respondent's motion for reconsideration and, accordingly, denied it with
finality on July 6, 2004.[20]
Respondent appealed the CSC resolutions to the CA via a petition for certiorari and prohibition. He alleged that
the CSC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it issued the assailed resolutions; that CSC encroached upon the academic freedom
of CVPC; and that the power to remove, suspend, and discipline the president of CVPC was exclusively lodged in
the BOT of CVPC.
CA Disposition
On September 29, 2004, the CA issued a writ of preliminary injunction directing the CSC to cease and desist
from enforcing its Resolution dated March 30, 2004 and Resolution dated July 6, 2004.[21] Thus, the formal
investigation of the administrative charges against Sojor before the CSC-RO was suspended.

On June 27, 2005, after giving both parties an opportunity to air their sides, the CA resolved in favor of
respondent. It annulled the questioned CSC resolutions and permanently enjoined the CSC from proceeding with
the administrative investigation. The dispositive part of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, and finding that the respondent Civil Service Commission acted
without jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Resolution Nos. 040321 and 040766 dated March 20, 2004 and July 6,
2004, respectively, the same are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The preliminary injunction issued by this
Court on September 29, 2004 is hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.[22]
The CA ruled that the power to appoint carries with it the power to remove or to discipline. It declared that the
enactment of R.A. No. 9299[23] in 2004, which converted CVPC into NORSU, did not divest the BOT of the power
to discipline and remove its faculty members, administrative officials, and employees. Respondent was
appointed as president of CVPC by the BOT by virtue of the authority granted to it under Section 6 of R.A. No.
8292.[24] The power of the BOT to remove and discipline erring employees, faculty members, and
administrative officials as expressly provided for under Section 4 of R.A. No. 8292 is also granted to the BOR of
NORSU under Section 7 of R.A. No. 9299. The said provision reads:
Power and Duties of Governing Boards. - The governing board shall have the following specific powers and
duties in addition to its general powers of administration and exercise of all the powers granted to the board of
directors of a corporation under Section 36 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 68, otherwise known as the Corporation
Code of the Philippines:
xxxx
to fix and adjust salaries of faculty members and administrative officials and employees x x x; and to remove
them for cause in accordance with the requirements of due process of law. (Emphasis added)
The CA added that Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292,[25] which grants disciplinary jurisdiction to the CSC over all
branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters, is a general law. According to the appellate court, E.O. No. 292
does not prevail over R.A. No. 9299,[26] a special law.
Issues
Petitioner CSC comes to Us, seeking to reverse the decision of the CA on the ground that THE COURT OF
APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN ISSUING
RESOLUTION NO. 040321 DATED MARCH 30, 2004 AND RESOLUTION NO. 04766 DATED JULY 6, 2004.[27]
Our Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
I. Jurisdiction of the CSC
The Constitution grants to the CSC administration over the entire civil service.[28] As defined, the civil service
embraces every branch, agency, subdivision, and instrumentality of the government, including every
government-owned or controlled corporation.[29] It is further classified into career and non-career service
positions. Career service positions are those where: (1) entrance is based on merit and fitness or highly
technical qualifications; (2) there is opportunity for advancement to higher career positions; and (3) there is
security of tenure. These include:
(1) Open Career positions for appointment to which prior qualification in an appropriate examination is
required;
(2) Closed Career positions which are scientific, or highly technical in nature; these include the faculty and
academic staff of state colleges and universities, and scientific and technical positions in scientific or research
institutions which shall establish and maintain their own merit systems;
(3) Positions in the Career Executive Service; namely, Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director,
Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief of Department Service and other
officers of equivalent rank as may be identified by the Career Executive Service Board, all of whom are
appointed by the President;

(4) Career officers, other than those in the Career Executive Service, who are appointed by the President, such
as the Foreign Service Officers in the Department of Foreign Affairs;
(5) Commissioned officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces which shall maintain a separate merit system;
(6) Personnel of government-owned or controlled corporations, whether performing governmental or proprietary
functions, who do not fall under the non-career service; and
(7) Permanent laborers, whether skilled, semi-skilled, or unskilled.[30]
Career positions are further grouped into three levels. Entrance to the first two levels is determined through
competitive examinations, while entrance to the third level is prescribed by the Career Executive Service Board.
[31] The positions covered by each level are:
(a) The first level shall include clerical, trades, crafts, and custodial service positions which involve nonprofessional or subprofessional work in a non-supervisory or supervisory capacity requiring less than four years
of collegiate studies;
(b) The second level shall include professional, technical, and scientific positions which involve professional,
technical, or scientific work in a non-supervisory or supervisory capacity requiring at least four years of college
work up to Division Chief level; and
(c) The third level shall cover positions in the Career Executive Service.[32]
On the other hand, non-career service positions are characterized by: (1) entrance not by the usual tests of
merit and fitness; and (2) tenure which is limited to a period specified by law, coterminous with the appointing
authority or subject to his pleasure, or limited to the duration of a particular project for which purpose
employment was made.[33] The law states:
The Non-Career Service shall include:
(1) Elective officials and their personal or confidential staff;
(2) Secretaries and other officials of Cabinet rank who hold their positions at the pleasure of the President and
their personal or confidential staff(s);
(3) Chairman and members of commissions and boards with fixed terms of office and their personal or
confidential staff;
(4) Contractual personnel or those whose employment in the government is in accordance with a special
contract to undertake a specific work or job, requiring special or technical skills not available in the employing
agency, to be accomplished within a specific period, which in no case shall exceed one year, and performs or
accomplishes the specific work or job, under his own responsibility with a minimum of direction and supervision
from the hiring agency; and
(5) Emergency and seasonal personnel.[34]
It is evident that CSC has been granted by the Constitution and the Administrative Code jurisdiction over all civil
service positions in the government service, whether career or non-career. From this grant of general
jurisdiction, the CSC promulgated the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.[35] We
find that the specific jurisdiction, as spelled out in the CSC rules, did not depart from the general jurisdiction
granted to it by law. The jurisdiction of the Regional Office of the CSC and the Commission central office
(Commission Proper) is specified in the CSC rules as:
Section 4. Jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. - The Civil Service Commission shall hear and decide
administrative cases instituted by, or brought before it, directly or on appeal, including contested appointments,
and shall review decisions and actions of its offices and of the agencies attached to it.
Except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, the Civil Service Commission shall have the final
authority to pass upon the removal, separation and suspension of all officers and employees in the civil service
and upon all matters relating to the conduct, discipline and efficiency of such officers and employees.

Section 5. Jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission Proper. - The Civil Service Commission Proper shall have
jurisdiction over the following cases:
A. Disciplinary
1. Decisions of Civil Service Regional Offices brought before it on petition for review;
2. Decisions of heads of departments, agencies, provinces, cities, municipalities and other instrumentalities,
imposing penalties exceeding thirty days suspension or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary brought
before it on appeal;
3. Complaints brought against Civil Service Commission Proper personnel;
4. Complaints against third level officials who are not presidential appointees;
5. Complaints against Civil Service officials and employees which are not acted upon by the agencies and such
other complaints requiring direct or immediate action, in the interest of justice;
6. Requests for transfer of venue of hearing on cases being heard by Civil Service Regional Offices;
7. Appeals from the Order of Preventive Suspension; and
8. Such other actions or requests involving issues arising out of or in connection with the foregoing
enumerations.
B. Non-Disciplinary
1. Decisions of Civil Service Commission Regional Offices brought before it;
2. Requests for favorable recommendation on petition for executive clemency;
3. Protests against the appointment, or other personnel actions, involving third level officials; and
4. Such other analogous actions or petitions arising out of or in relation with the foregoing enumerations.
Section 6. Jurisdiction of Civil Service Regional Offices. - The Civil Service Commission Regional Offices shall
have jurisdiction over the following cases:
A. Disciplinary
1. Complaints initiated by, or brought before, the Civil Service Commission Regional Offices provided that the
alleged acts or omissions were committed within the jurisdiction of the Regional Office, including Civil Service
examination anomalies or irregularities and the persons complained of are employees of agencies, local or
national, within said geographical areas;
2. Complaints involving Civil Service Commission Regional Office personnel who are appointees of said office;
and
3. Petitions to place respondent under Preventive Suspension.
B. Non-Disciplinary
1. Disapproval of appointments brought before it on appeal;
2. Protests against the appointments of first and second level employees brought before it directly or on appeal.
(Emphasis supplied)
Respondent, a state university president with a fixed term of office appointed by the governing board of trustees
of the university, is a non-career civil service officer. He was appointed by the chairman and members of the
governing board of CVPC. By clear provision of law, respondent is a non-career civil servant who is under the
jurisdiction of the CSC.
II. The power of the BOR to discipline officials and employees is not exclusive. CSC has concurrent
jurisdiction over a president of a state university.

Section 4 of R.A. No. 8292, or the Higher Education Modernization Act of 1997, under which law respondent was
appointed during the time material to the present case, provides that the school's governing board shall have
the general powers of administration granted to a corporation. In addition, Section 4 of the law grants to the
board the power to remove school faculty members, administrative officials, and employees for cause:
Section 4. Powers and Duties of Governing Boards. - The governing board shall have the following specific
powers and duties in addition to its general powers of administration and the exercise of all the powers granted
to the board of directors of a corporation under Section 36 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 68, otherwise known as the
Corporation Code of the Philippines:
xxxx
h) to fix and adjust salaries of faculty members and administrative officials and employees subject to the
provisions of the revised compensation and classification system and other pertinent budget and compensation
laws governing hours of service, and such other duties and conditions as it may deem proper; to grant them, at
its discretion, leaves of absence under such regulations as it may promulgate, any provisions of existing law to
the contrary not withstanding; and to remove them for cause in accordance with the requirements of due
process of law. (Emphasis supplied)
The above section was subsequently reproduced as Section 7(i) of the succeeding law that converted CVPC into
NORSU, R.A. No. 9299. Notably, and in contrast with the earlier law, R.A. No. 9299 now provides that the
administration of the university and exercise of corporate powers of the board of the school shall be exclusive:
Sec. 4. Administration. - The University shall have the general powers of a corporation set forth in Batas
Pambansa Blg. 68, as amended, otherwise known as "The Corporation Code of the Philippines." The
administration of the University and the exercise of its corporate powers shall be vested exclusively in the Board
of Regents and the president of the University insofar as authorized by the Board.
Measured by the foregoing yardstick, there is no question that administrative power over the school exclusively
belongs to its BOR. But does this exclusive administrative power extend to the power to remove its erring
employees and officials?
In light of the other provisions of R.A. No. 9299, respondent's argument that the BOR has exclusive power to
remove its university officials must fail. Section 7 of R.A. No. 9299 states that the power to remove faculty
members, employees, and officials of the university is granted to the BOR "in addition to its general powers of
administration." This provision is essentially a reproduction of Section 4 of its predecessor, R.A. No. 8292,
demonstrating that the intent of the lawmakers did not change even with the enactment of the new law. For
clarity, the text of the said section is reproduced below:
Sec. 7. Powers and Duties of the Board of Regents. - The Board shall have the following specific powers and
duties in addition to its general powers of administration and the exercise of all the powers granted to the Board
of Directors of a corporation under existing laws:
xxxx
i. To fix and adjust salaries of faculty members and administrative officials and employees, subject to the
provisions of the Revised Compensation and Position Classification System and other pertinent budget and
compensation laws governing hours of service and such other duties and conditions as it may deem proper; to
grant them, at its discretion, leaves of absence under such regulations as it may promulgate, any provision of
existing law to the contrary notwithstanding; and to remove them for cause in accordance with the
requirements of due process of law.[36] (Emphasis supplied)
Verily, the BOR of NORSU has the sole power of administration over the university. But this power is not
exclusive in the matter of disciplining and removing its employees and officials.
Although the BOR of NORSU is given the specific power under R.A. No. 9299 to discipline its employees and
officials, there is no showing that such power is exclusive. When the law bestows upon a government body the
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving specific matters, it is to be presumed that such jurisdiction is
exclusive unless it be proved that another body is likewise vested with the same jurisdiction, in which case, both
bodies have concurrent jurisdiction over the matter.[37]

All members of the civil service are under the jurisdiction of the CSC, unless otherwise provided by law. Being a
non-career civil servant does not remove respondent from the ambit of the CSC. Career or non-career, a civil
service official or employee is within the jurisdiction of the CSC.
This is not a case of first impression.
In University of the Philippines v. Regino,[38] this Court struck down the claim of exclusive jurisdiction of the UP
BOR to discipline its employees. The Court held then:
The Civil Service Law (PD 807) expressly vests in the Commission appellate jurisdiction in administrative
disciplinary cases involving members of the Civil Service. Section 9(j) mandates that the Commission shall have
the power to "hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly with it in accordance with
Section 37 or brought to it on appeal." And Section 37(a) provides that, "The Commission shall decide upon
appeal all administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than
thirty (30) days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days' salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer,
removal or dismissal from office." (Emphasis supplied)
Under the 1972 Constitution, all government-owned or controlled corporations, regardless of the manner of their
creation, were considered part of the Civil Service. Under the 1987 Constitution, only government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters fall within the scope of the Civil Service pursuant to Article IX-B,
Section 2(1), which states:
"The Civil Service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters."
As a mere government-owned or controlled corporation, UP was clearly a part of the Civil Service under the
1973 Constitution and now continues to be so because it was created by a special law and has an original
charter. As a component of the Civil Service, UP is therefore governed by PD 807 and administrative cases
involving the discipline of its employees come under the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.
[39] (Emphasis supplied)
In the more recent case of Camacho v. Gloria,[40] this Court lent credence to the concurrent jurisdiction of the
CSC when it affirmed that a case against a university official may be filed either with the university's BOR or
directly with the CSC. We quote:
Further, petitioner contends that the creation of the committee by the respondent Secretary, as Chairman of the
USP Board of Regents, was contrary to the Civil Service Rules. However, he cites no specific provision of the Civil
Service Law which was violated by the respondents in forming the investigating committee. The Civil Service
Rules embodied in Executive Order 292 recognize the power of the Secretary and the university, through its
governing board, to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers and employees
under their jurisdiction. Of course under EO 292, a complaint against a state university official may be filed
either with the university's Board of Regents or directly with the Civil Service Commission, although the CSC
may delegate the investigation of a complaint and for that purpose, may deputize any department, agency,
official or group of officials to conduct such investigation.[41] (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, CSC validly took cognizance of the administrative complaints directly filed before the regional office,
concerning violations of civil service rules against respondent.
III. Academic freedom may not be invoked when there are alleged violations of civil service laws
and rules.
Certainly, academic institutions and personnel are granted wide latitude of action under the principle of
academic freedom. Academic freedom encompasses the freedom to determine who may teach, who may be
taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.[42] Following that doctrine, this Court has
recognized that institutions of higher learning has the freedom to decide for itself the best methods to achieve
their aims and objectives, free from outside coercion, except when the welfare of the general public so requires.
[43] They have the independence to determine who to accept to study in their school and they cannot be
compelled by mandamus to enroll a student.[44]
That principle, however, finds no application to the facts of the present case. Contrary to the matters
traditionally held to be justified to be within the bounds of academic freedom, the administrative complaints
filed against Sojor involve violations of civil service rules. He is facing charges of nepotism, dishonesty,
falsification of official documents, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

These are classified as grave offenses under civil service rules, punishable with suspension or even dismissal.
[45]
This Court has held that the guaranteed academic freedom does not give an institution the unbridled authority
to perform acts without any statutory basis.[46] For that reason, a school official, who is a member of the civil
service, may not be permitted to commit violations of civil service rules under the justification that he was free
to do so under the principle of academic freedom.
Lastly, We do not agree with respondent's contention that his appointment to the position of president of
NORSU, despite the pending administrative cases against him, served as a condonation by the BOR of the
alleged acts imputed to him. The doctrine this Court laid down in Salalima v. Guingona, Jr.[47] and Aguinaldo v.
Santos[48] are inapplicable to the present circumstances. Respondents in the mentioned cases are elective
officials, unlike respondent here who is an appointed official. Indeed, election expresses the sovereign will of the
people.[49] Under the principle of vox populi est suprema lex, the re-election of a public official may, indeed,
supersede a pending administrative case. The same cannot be said of a re-appointment to a non-career
position. There is no sovereign will of the people to speak of when the BOR re-appointed respondent Sojor to the
post of university president.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The assailed Resolutions of the Civil Service Commission are REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
ASSOCIATED LABOR UNION, DEMOCRITO T. MENDOZA and CECILIO T. SENO, petitioners, vs.THE HON.
JUDGE MODESTO R. RAMOLETE of the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
KATIPUNAN LUMBER CO., INC., and ROQUE ABELLAR, respondents.
Seno, Mendoza, Ruiz and Associates and Jose C. Espinas and Associates for petitioners.
Judge Modesto R. Ramolete for and in his own behalf as respondent.
Nitafan, Maceren and Zosa for other respondents.
PAREDES, J.:
Respondent Katipunan Lumber Co., Inc. (Katipunan for short), is engaged in the Lumber business, and maintains
a regular and permanent staff of office employees, drivers and laborers, who perform the routinary phases of its
operations, and who are affiliated with the Cebu Industrial Labor Organization, a duly accredited labor union.
Regarding the other phases of its business, specially those which are occasional, it engages, as all other firms
dealing in the same kind of business, independent labor contractors, the compensation of which was dependent
upon the work done, so much per thousand board feet of lumber hauled, piled, transferred and/or classified. For
the handling and hauling, loading and unloading of lumber cargoes from the pier to the lumberyard of
Katipunan, Dionisio Antioquia was engaged; the City Trucking Service, Inc., took care of handling the hauling,
loading and unloading of plywood cargoes from pier to bodega or from bodega to pier and other places; Luis
Amores was in charge of the classification, piling and transfer of stocks from one place to another inside the
lumberyard; and Cirilo Cabasa, other manual work not included in the routinary exigencies of work within the
lumberyard. Since the case at bar arose out of the contract of Cirilo Cabasa with Katipunan, We will refrain from
discussing the participation of the other independent contractors.
Cirilo Cabasa had an existing contract with Katipunan to supply all the laborers occasionally needed by it on the
jobs not assigned to other independent contractors and not embraced in the regular routinary conduct of
business. On August 18, 1964, Cabasa asked for the termination of his contract. Roque Abellar who also had
similar contracts, with other lumber companies in Cebu City, entered into a written contract with respondent
Katipunan, to furnish all the labor needed by the latter, in connection with its business phases, before performed
by Cabasa.
On September 3, 1964, Katipunan and Roque Abelar, filed with the CFI of Cebu, presided over by the Honorable
Modesto Ramolete, a complaint for Injunction and Damages, with a Preliminary Injunction (Civil Case No. R8564), against Democrito T. Mendoza, Cecilio T. Seno and the Associated Labor Union. In the complaint, besides
stating the jurisdictional facts and the harassing and coercive tactics, threats, cajoleries and other overt acts
which Katipunan claimed to be an illegal interference by the respondents therein, in thecontractual
obligations of Katipunan and Abellar, it was also alleged that there was absolutely no employer-employee
relationship between the Katipunan and the laborers of the independent contractor Abellar, the latter being
strictly responsible in matters of control and supervision.
On September 8, 1964, respondent Judge Ramolete handed down an Order, the pertinent portions of which
recite:
The allegations of facts of the plaintiffs and the further fact that the said plaintiffs will suffer great and
irreparable damage unless the acts complained of by the defendants will be restrained by a writ of preliminary
injunction. The Court believes that the writ may be issued upon the plaintiffs' filing a bond of P50,000.00 to

guarantee the damages that may be suffered by the defendants in case the issuance of the writ is not justified
under the authority of Section 3 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, considering the request for the issuance in the meantime of the writ of preliminary injunction
justified and authorized under the provisions of the said Rules of Court, the Court hereby grants the request and
let a writ of preliminary injunction be issued upon plaintiffs' filing of a bond of P50,000.00 to answer for any
damage that may be caused on the defendants by the issuance of the writ, restraining the said defendants,
their agents, laborers, officials and representatives from (a) blocking and disturbing the passage of trucks used
by co-plaintiff Roque Abellar in the course of the performance of the duties assumed by him under his contract
with plaintiff Katipunan Lumber Co., Inc., especially in the entry and exit of the same to and from the premises
of latter plaintiff's lumberyard; (b) disturbing and molesting the laborers of co-plaintiff Roque Abellar in the
piers, wharf and other places of loading and unloading of the lumber, plywood and other construction materials,
including the premises of plaintiff Katipunan Lumber Co., Inc.; (c) persuading, cajoling and/or coercing shipping
companies into refusing to accept the shipment of incoming and outgoing cargoes of plaintiff Katipunan Lumber
Co., Inc., and (d) persuading and/or threatening plaintiff Katipunan Lumber Co., Inc.'s customers and dealers into
refusing to purchase or deal with.
Defendants presented a Motion for Reconsideration and for Lifting of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction, claiming
that
(1) the Court did not have jurisdiction to issue the restraining order in cases of the same nature as the one at
bar;
(2) that peaceful picketing cannot be lawfully enjoined by any court in this jurisdiction;
(3) that the requisites enumerated in Section 9 (d) of Republic Act 875 should have been followed and not those
provided in Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court in issuing the restraining Order in cases of the same nature;
(4) that there is already pending an Unfair Labor practice case involving the labor dispute presented with the
CIR, by the ALU against the Katipunan Lumber Co., Inc., where all the incidents relative to the parties should be
ventilated.
Plaintiffs therein, now private-parties respondents, on September 12, 1964, opposed the motion for
reconsideration, arguing that the Court had jurisdiction for the allegations in the complaint are the basis in
determining jurisdiction; that what respondent Court had enjoined was not a peaceful picketing, but interference
in the performance of the contractual obligations of the plaintiffs; that Section 9 (d) of Republic Act 875 does not
apply; and that there was no unfair labor practice case actually filed against Katipunan, although there was a
charge, which had not yet been investigated by the CIR.
Without waiting for resolution of their Motion for Reconsideration and to lift the injunction, petitioners came to
this Court on a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction, raising the same issues alleged
in their motion for reconsideration in the lower court. In effect, their petition centers on their assumption that
the matter between the Katipunan Lumber and Abellar on one hand, and petitioners on the other, is a labor
dispute of which the CFI cannot validly take cognizance, and that in entertaining the same and in issuing the
Writ of Preliminary Injunction, respondent Judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and/or with grave
abuse of discretion and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.
We gave Due Course to the petition and directed the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction as prayed for
upon the posting of a P1,000.00 bond, and ordered respondents to answer. Before the Writ could be issued,
however, private-parties respondents presented a Manifestation, inviting the attention of this Court to the fact
that the petition under consideration was filed prematurely, since there was, at the time, pending resolution by
the respondent Court, the Motion for Reconsideration and Lifting of the Writ. This Court suspended the issuance
of the Injunctive Writ, and ordered petitioners to answer the manifestation.
In a Very Urgent Reply to Respondents' Manifestation, petitioners alleged that since the case involves a labor
dispute, the respondent court cannot validly take cognizance thereof, and while they did not wait for the
resolution of their motion for reconsideration, their case falls within the exception, for there existed special
reasons for not exhausting all the remedies in the lower court, such as the enforcement of the ex-parte writ,
which resulted in the paralyzation of their right to self-organization, to picket and to otherwise promote the
collective welfare of petitioners and the members of the ALU. Thereafter, several incidents had taken place,
which need not be considered, since they are not necessary in the determination of the issues presently
involved.
Under date of September 25, 1964, private-parties respondents filed an Urgent Motion for Dismissal, claiming
that the petition was manifestly premature, and that the determination of whether the lower court had
jurisdiction over the case was dependent upon facts which must be shown before respondent Court. Attached to
said urgent motion was the Order of the respondent Court, dated September 17, 1964, the pertinent portions of
which read:
... Under these circumstances based on the opposing mere allegations of the parties in which no evidence so far
has been formally presented, the Court finds itself unable to determine whether the present case involves labor
dispute or unfair labor practice, or it is merely a simple civil case involving the restraining of some unlawful and
illegal acts committed and continued to be committed by the defendants.
For these reasons the Court instead of resolving to lift or to maintain the writ already issued defers the
resolution of the defendants' motion until evidence is presented by the parties to prove their respective

allegations and contentions, and, in order to expedite matters, the hearing and reception of evidence of the
parties on the main case shall be set by the Clerk of Court as soon as the issues are joined; and the defendants
are required to answer the complaint within the legal period counted from the time they are served copies of
this order embodying in their answer all the grounds they alleged in their motion so that the issues may be put
squarely before the Court for its decision.1wph1.t
WHEREFORE, the consideration and resolution of the defendants' motion for reconsideration and lifting of the
writ of preliminary injunction are hereby deferred until evidence is presented by the parties to establish their
respective allegations and contentions and the defendants are required to answer within the reglementary
period the plaintiffs' complaint; and, as soon as the issues are joined the Clerk of Court shall immediately
calendar the hearing of the main case for the reception of the evidence of the parties with due notice to them.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Both parties, in the interim, filed various pleadings. On October 26, 1964, respondents presented a
Manifestation inviting the attention of this Court to the fact that aside from the petitioners, filing their Answer to
the Complaint, they have also availed and/or actually commenced to take advantage of the remedies
available to them before the respondent Court. So much so, that on October 23, 1964, respondent Judge
entered a Pre-Trial Order, which contained matters agreed upon to be proved by the parties and those which
they did not dispute. On November 17, 1964, private-parties respondents, filed their Answer to the Petition
forCertiorari and Prohibition, and invoked the following defenses, to wit:
1. The instant petition is premature;
2. Petitioners have speedy and adequate remedy before the lower court which they failed to exhaust before
presenting the instant petition;
3. The instant proceedings have been rendered moot and academic, because petitioners have actually taken
advantage of the remedies available to them in the court below;
4. That whether the case involves a labor dispute could only be determined after a hearing, which the
respondent court has already ordered;
5. That the principal cause of action as alleged in the complaint is for the recovery of P50,000.00 as damages, a
matter of which the respondent Court has jurisdiction, and all orders issued in connection therewith being within
its power and authority;
6. That the nature of an action as appearing in the complaint, cannot be changed nor varied by the impleading
by the defendants of defenses tending to change the cause of action;
7. The alleged failure of respondent judge to observe the procedural requirements of section 9(a) of Act 875,
merely amounted to an error of judgment, not reviewable by certiorari;
8. That the acts enjoined by respondent judge are not the acts insulated from injunction under section 9(a) of
Act 875;
9. That there is no pending Unfair Labor Practice Case against the Katipunan Lumber; and
10. That petitioner are amply protected of any damage that may be caused them with the P50,000.00 injunction
bond posted by respondents.
A panoramic appraisal of the facts of the case will show that the issue primarily involved is whether the
respondent Court had jurisdiction over the case, as the allegation of the complaint indicates, and/or there was
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent Court in issuing the injunctive writ, so that certiorari or
prohibition would lie.
No plausible argument could be offered to dispute the proposition that what confers jurisdiction are the
allegations of the complaint. In the case at bar, the plaintiffs sought the amount of P50,000.00 by way of
damages on overt acts, which they considered illegal, and which had caused them losses. They also asserted
that there existed no employer-employee relationship whatsoever between them. Generally, therefore, upon
such allegations, the CFI had jurisdiction over the case and it was authorized under the Rules of Court to issue
an injunctive writ, even ex parte, upon a valid showing of the necessity thereof. It is true that petitioners herein,
in their motion for reconsideration and to lift the writ of injunction, they alleged that there is a labor dispute.
This mere allegation did not serve to automatically deprive the Court of its jurisdiction duly conferred by the
allegations of the complaint. In the wake of the assertions in the motion for reconsideration that there was, in
the opinion of the petitioners, a labor dispute, the respondent Court was duty bound to find out if such a
circumstance really existed. In order to intelligently form an opinion regarding the matter, respondent Court
ordered the presentation of evidence by both parties. Unfortunately, however, petitioners, without waiting for
the resolution of the court a quo on their motion for reconsideration and to lift the injunction, they filed with this
Court the instant petition. In the case of Villa-Rey Transit, vs. Hon. E. Bello, G.R. No. L-18957. April 23, 1963, We
said:
True, that petitioner had filed a motion to lift order of default, and a motion for new trial and to set aside the
default judgment, but before they could be resolved, petitioner had already brought the matter to this Court, on
a petition for Certiorari and Injunction, without giving the respondent Court an opportunity to pass upon the said
motions, which act renders the filing of the present petition premature.
Obviously, therefore, the petition at bar is premature.
There is manifestly, a need for evidence towards proving the allegations pertaining to petitioners' claim of a
labor dispute. This act is properly within the power and prerogative of respondent Court. Even petitioners are
aware of this fact, for they have already presented their Answer to the complainant and have entered into a

pre-trial. When there are other remedies, proper and adequate in the premises, certiorari or prohibition will not
lie. Should the lower court ultimately hold that it has jurisdiction, appeal in due time would perhaps be the
proper remedy.
Petitioner further ascribe excess of jurisdiction and/or grave abuse of discretion to respondent Court, because it
issued the Writ of Preliminary Injunction ex parte and in violation of the provisions of Act No. 875. The Rules
properly gives the Court the authority to issue injunctive writs ex parte. Since the cause of action was for
damages, arising from what plaintiffs, now respondents, pointed as interference in the performance
ofcontractual obligations, there was no occasion, at that time, for respondent Judge to consider the applicability
of Act No. 875. It was only when the matter of an apparent labor dispute was injected by petitioners in their
motion for reconsideration, that said act could be considered Judge wanted to hear evidence to assure himself
whether there is or excess of jurisdiction and/or grave abuse of discretion. Predicated upon the allegations of the
complaint, the respondent Judge though it had jurisdiction, which conclusion, if erroneous, was merely a judicial
error or a mistake of law. When the court has jurisdiction over or a subject matter, the orders or decisions upon
all questions pertaining to the cause are orders or decisions within its jurisdiction and, however irregular or
erroneous they may be, they cannot be corrected by certiorari (Gala v. Cui and Rodriguez, 23 Phil. 522; Galang
v. Endencia, 73 Phil. 399; Villa-Rey Transit v. Bello, G.R. No. L-21399, Jan. 31, 1964).
WHEREFORE, the petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Writ of Preliminary Injunction, should be, as it is
hereby dismissed. Costs against petitioner.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ.,
concur.
JUAN DE LA CRUZ, petitioner,
vs.
PERCY M. MOIR, judge of first instance of Pampanga, MELECIO M. TRINIDAD, FULGENCIO JAYME and
LEOCADIO BLANCO, respondents.
Ramon Diokno for petitioner.
Gibbs, McDonough and Blanco for respondents.
MORELAND, J.:
This is a petition for a writ of certiorari to be directed to the Court of First Instance of Pampanga requiring him to
remit to this court all the records and papers relating to a certain election contest pending therein instituted by
Juan de la Cruz against Melecio M. Trinidad, that the proceeding had in said contest may be revised by this court
and certain of the steps taken therein be declared null and void on the ground that they were taken by the court
without or in excess of its jurisdiction.
The petition shows that on the 20th of June, 1916, Juan de la Cruz filed a protest in the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga against Melecio M. Trinidad and others challenging the validity of the election of said Trinidad to the
office of municipal president of Macabebe, Pampanga. The contest was duly brought on for hearing. After
hearing and the presentation of evidence the court dismissed the proceedings on the merits. The particular acts
of the court of which complaint is made are set out in the petition in this case as follows:
That in trying and dismissing the said election protest filed by the petitioner, the said respondent the Hon. Percy
M. Moir, as judge, of first instance of Pampanga, has exceeded his jurisdiction in that although the said
respondent judge admits that there were 193 electors of Macabebe who voted as illiterates and most of whom
took no oath regarding their illiteracy before voting and who were aided only by one inspector of election and
not by two as required by the election law, yet the said respondent judge has entirely and voluntarily failed,
omitted and refused to separate the votes of the said illiterates and to declare the same as null and void, and
act which is not only in excess of his jurisdiction but is manifestly against the law, for the votes of illiterates who
have not taken the necessary oath regarding their illiteracy before voting and who were aided only by one
inspector of election are null and void.
That in trying to identify these votes of the illiterates, the petitioner moved the court below to put the election
inspectors of Macabebe on the witness stand requiring them to select and separate the ballots prepared by each
of them, with a view to separate and annul the said votes of the supposed illiterates, but the respondent judge
refused to grant said motion of the petitioner, thereby exceeding his jurisdiction and abusing his judicial
discretion.
That during the trial of the protest the petitioner has offered to prove that of the 193 voters who voted as
illiterates a great majority could write and could personally prepare their own ballots without the necessity of
the aid of the inspectors, and that this mode of voting was adopted by the inspectors of the election only to
perpetrate fraud on the voters; but all the evidence offered to this point by the petitioner, to wit,(1) Exhibit D (in
the court below) which is a collection of the certificates of oaths of all the electors of Macabebe wherein can be
seen who can write and who cannot; (2) Exhibit E (court below) which is the list of the 193 voters who voted as
illiterates and (3) witness Cornelio Bustos who knew the majority of these voters as he has been an election
inspector too in the said municipality of Macabebe in one of the last elections, was rejected by the respondent
judge notwithstanding this evidence is material, competent and relevant to the allegations of the petitioner in
the protest. This rejection of evidence constitutes on the part of the respondent judge a violation of his duty and
an abuse of his judicial discretion the correction of which law and justice demand.

That by separating and annulling the votes of the illiterates who voted in violation of the law the result of the
election at the municipality of Macabebe, Pampanga, will be changed in that the petitioner herein will have the
majority of the legal votes cast at that election and will therefore have to be declared elected instead of
respondent Melecio M. Trinidad.
That the said respondent judge, the Hon. Percy M. Moir, has also exceeded his jurisdiction and abused his
discretion in that upon opening the ballot box he has refused, to the prejudice of the petitioner, to annul 62
ballots for the respondent Melecio M. Trinidad in spite of the fact that these 62 ballots were marked with certain
initials, said initials having not been proven to have been put without the knowledge and consent of the voters.
On the other hand the petitioner has conclusively proven that the voters themselves made those marks while
preparing their ballots, that the ballot boxes were carefully and duly cared for by the municipal secretary until
said ballot boxes were delivered to the court.
That the said respondent judge has also abused his discretion and thus exceeded his jurisdiction in finding and
concluding after the ballot box was opened that the said ballot box has been tampered with while in the custody
of the municipal secretary, when in fact there was no evidence produced by the respondents proving the
tampering of the ballot box.
That by annulling these 62 marked ballots for respondent Melecio M. Trinidad, the result of the election at the
municipality of Macabebe will be changed in that the petitioner Juan de la Cruz will have the majority of the
legal votes cast in that election and will therefore be declared elected as municipal president instead of said
respondent Melecio M. Trinidad.
That the respondent the Hon. Percy M. Moir, as judge of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, has also
exceeded his jurisdiction and abused his discretion in not annulling the election had on June 6, 1916, at the
municipality of Macabebe, Pampanga, in spite of the fact that the evidence establishes (1) that while the
inspectors were preparing the ballots of the alleged illiterates, there were present around them in the voting
booths several other voters watching how the ballots were being filled by the inspectors thereby violating the
secrecy of the election; (2) that the inspectors of respondent Melecio M. Trinidad in preparing the ballots for the
illiterate voters did not at all ascertain the wishes of said illiterates but filled their ballots as said inspectors
wished; (3) that the inspectors of respondent Melecio M. Trinidad were guilty of electioneering in the voting
booths; (4) that the voting booths were not constructed in the manner provided for by the election law and were
without doors; (5) that those who were waiting to vote near them could well see the ballots filled by the voters
in their respective booths and could read such ballots if they wanted it; (6) that the voting booths were
constructed outside of the guard rail; (7) that the public were prohibited by the inspectors to approach and
observe the election within the distance of 30 meters with the exception of 10 voters at a time who were called
to vote; (8) that the entrance of the voters to the electoral college was regulated in groups of 10 by 10 from
each party, a mode adopted to discover before hand the force of each party, but a mode contrary to law. These
facts have been proven although the respondent judge has failed to make findings of them, and these facts are
sufficient to annul an election.
Another ground upon which the petition was based was added by an amendment to the petition which says:
Not less than 40 marked and countersigned ballots were counted in favor of Melecio M. Trinidad and legal and
valid ballots cast in favor of the petitioner were rejected by the court and not counted in his favor.
An answer was duly filed by which, while certain allegations of the petition are denied, the main facts are
admitted. The denials referred chiefly not to facts alleged in the petition but to conclusions which the petitioner
draws from facts.
We are of the opinion that the petition does not state facts sufficient to warrant the relief prayed for. We have
held in a long line of decisions that certiorari will not lie under the law of the Philippine Islands except in cases
where the court has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction and the acts thus performed are void (In re
Prautch, 1 Phil. Rep., 132; Springer vs. Odlin, 3 Phil., Rep., 344; Arzadon vs. Chanco, 14 Phil. Rep., 710; De
Fiesta vs. Llorente and Manila Railroad Co., 25 Phil. Rep., 554; Herrera vs. Barretto and Joaquin, 25 Phil. Rep.,
245; Gala vs. Cui, and Rodriguez, 25 Phil. Rep., 522; Province of Tarlac vs. Gale, 26 Phil. Rep., 338;
Napa vs. Weissenhagen, 29 Phil. Rep., 180; Government of the P. I. vs. Judge of First Instance of Iloilo and
Bantillo, 34 Phil. Rep., 157). Certiorari, as a necessary consequence, will not lie to correct errors. In the case of
Herrera vs. Barretto and Joaquin (P25 Phil. Rep., 245) we said:
It has been repeatedly held by this court that a writ of certiorari will not be issued unless it clearly appears that
the court to which it is to be directed acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. It will not be issued to cure errors
in the proceedings or to correct erroneous conclusions of law or of fact. If the court has jurisdiction of the
subject-matter and of the person, decisions upon all question pertaining to the cause are decisions within its
jurisdiction and, however irregular or erroneous they may be, cannot be corrected by certiorari (p. 249).
Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a cause the right to act in a case. Since it is the power to
hear and determined, it does not depend either upon the regularity of the exercise of that power or upon the
rightfulness of the decisions made. Jurisdiction should therefore be distinguished from the exercise of
jurisdiction. The authority to decide a cause at all, and not the decision rendered therein, is what makes up
jurisdiction. Where there is jurisdiction of the person and subject-matter, as we have said before, the decision of
all other questions arising in the case is but an exercise of that jurisdiction. (p. 251).
A full and thorough examination of all the decided cases in this court touching the question of certiorari and
prohibition fully supports the proposition already stated that, where a Court of First Instance has jurisdiction of

the subject-matter and of the person, its decision of any question pertaining to the cause, however erroneous,
cannot be reviewed by certiorari, but must be corrected by appeal (p.271).
None of the acts set out in the petition affect the jurisdiction of the court. They are acts performed in
the exercise of jurisdiction; and even though the decision of the court upon each one of the questions presented
by the allegations of the petition was wrong in fact and in law, his jurisdiction would remain unaffected. As we
have said so many times, it is always necessary to bear in mind the difference between jurisdiction and
the exercise of jurisdiction. When a court exercises its jurisdiction an error committed while engaged in that
exercise does not deprive it of the jurisdiction which it is exercising when the error is committed. If it did, every
error committed by a court would deprive if of jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void
judgment. This, of course, is not possible. The administration of justice would not survive such a rule. The
decision of the trial court in the case before us holding that certain ballots cast by illiterates which had been
prepared for them by the inspectors of election were legal and valid although the illiterates did not, previous to
the preparation of their ballots by the inspectors, take the oath required by law showing that they could not cast
their ballots without assistance, is a decision entirely within the jurisdiction of the court, even if we concede for
the sake or argument that the court was wrong in that decision. The same could be said if he had held the
precise contrary and had excluded all of the ballots cast by illiterates; and, of course, it necessarily follows that
his failure to separate those which the petitioner claims were illegal from those he claims were legal does not
alter the situation. The court has power and authority to conduct the case as he believes law and justice require
and whatever he does is within his jurisdiction so long as he does not violate the principle of due process of law
or transcend the limits of the case before him.
We reach the same result in discussing the other alleged errors. The denial of the motion to separate the illegal
from the legal ballots, the rejection of the offer to prove that the majority of the illiterate voters could read and
write, the refusal to annul 62 ballots in favor of Melecio M. Trinidad in spite of the fact that they were marked
with certain letters, the finding that a certain ballot box had been tampered with after the ballots have been
counted and the box sealed by the inspectors, the refusal to annul the election in the municipality of Macabebe
on account of certain irregularities and violations of law which took place in the conduct thereof, and the
counting of more than 40 marked ballots in favor of Trinidad and the refusal to count legal ballots in favor of
Juan de la Cruz, do not touch the jurisdiction of the court in any way. They are all decisions made in the exercise
of its jurisdiction and however erroneous they may be, if they or any of them are erroneous at all, it had power
and authority to make them and they cannot be attacked on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
On the oral argument it was said by counsel for the petitioner that some of the findings of the trial court were
without evidence to support them. There is no allegation to this effect in the petition and no question of that
sort is presented by the pleadings. We might say, however, that, even if the question were presented and it
were admitted that certain findings were without evidence to support them, that would not mean necessarily
that the judgment on the whole case was rendered without jurisdiction and was void. If the judgment was utterly
without basis in the record as a whole to such an extent that it was a purely arbitrary act of the court, then a
different question might be presented. That is not the case here and we have no reason to consider or decide
such a question.
The petition is dismissed on the merits, with costs. So ordered.
i. VENUE AND JURISDICTION IN CRIMINAL ACTIONS
HON. PATRICIA A. STO. TOMAS,ROSALINDA BALDOZ and LUCITA LAZO, Petitioners, versus REY
SALAC, WILLIE D. ESPIRITU, MARIO MONTENEGRO, DODGIE BELONIO, LOLIT SALINEL and BUDDY
BONNEVIE, Respondents. and HON. PATRICIA A. STO. TOMAS,in her capacity as Secretary of
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), HON. ROSALINDA D. BALDOZ, in her capacity as
Administrator, Philippine Overseas Employment Administration POEA), and the PHILIPPINE
OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION GOVERNING BOARD, Petitioners, versus HON. JOSE G.
PANEDA, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of Branch 220, Quezon City, ASIAN RECRUITMENT
COUNCIL PHILIPPINE CHAPTER, INC. (ARCOPHIL), for itself and in behalf of its members:
WORLDCARE PHILIPPINES SERVIZO INTERNATIONALE, INC., STEADFAST INTERNATIONAL
RECRUITMENT CORP., VERDANT MANPOWER MOBILIZATION CORP., BRENT OVERSEAS PERSONNEL,
INC., ARL MANPOWER SERVICES, INC., DAHLZEN INTERNATIONAL SERVICES, INC., INTERWORLD
PLACEMENT CENTER, INC., LAKAS TAO CONTRACT SERVICES LTD. CO., SSC MULTISERVICES, DMJ
INTERNATIONAL, and MIP INTERNATIONAL ANPOWER SERVICES, represented by its proprietress,
MARCELINA I. PAGSIBIGAN, Respondents. and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, the HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT
(DOLE), the PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION (POEA), the OVERSEAS
WORKERS WELFARE ADMINISTRATION (OWWA), the LABOR ARBITERS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC), the HONORABLE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, the HONORABLE
SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS and the COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA),Petitioners, versus
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF
SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC. (PASEI), Respondent. and BECMEN SERVICE EXPORTER AND PROMOTION,
INC., Petitioner, versus SPOUSES SIMPLICIO AND MILA CUARESMA (for and in behalf of daughter,

Jasmin G. Cuaresma), WHITE FALCON SERVICES, INC., and JAIME ORTIZ (President of White Falcon
Services, Inc.), Respondents. and SPOUSES SIMPLICIO AND MILA CUARESMA (for and in behalf of
deceased daughter, Jasmin G. Cuaresma), Petitioners, versus WHITE FALCON SERVICES, INC. and
BECMEN SERVICES EXPORTER AND PROMOTION, INC., Respondents.
G.R. No. 152642 and G.R. No. 152710 and G.R. No. 167590 and G.R. Nos. 182978-89 and G.R. Nos.
184298-99 | 2012-11-13
EN BANC
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
These consolidated cases pertain to the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act 8042,
otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995.
The Facts and the Case
On June 7, 1995 Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) 8042 or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of
1995 that, for among other purposes, sets the Government's policies on overseas employment and establishes
a higher standard of protection and promotion of the welfare of migrant workers, their families, and overseas
Filipinos in distress.
G.R. 152642 and G.R. 152710
(Constitutionality of Sections 29 and 30, R.A. 8042)
Sections 29 and 30 of the Act1 commanded the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) to begin
deregulating within one year of its passage the business of handling the recruitment and migration of
overseas Filipino workers and phase out within five years the regulatory functions of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA).
On January 8, 2002 respondents Rey Salac, Willie D. Espiritu, Mario Montenegro, Dodgie Belonio, Lolit Salinel,
and Buddy Bonnevie (Salac, et al.) filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for
temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction against petitioners, the DOLE Secretary, the
POEA Administrator, and the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA) Secretary-General
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 96.2
Salac, et al. sought to: 1) nullify DOLE Department Order 10 (DOLE DO 10) and POEA Memorandum Circular 15
(POEA MC 15); 2) prohibit the DOLE, POEA, and TESDA from implementing the same and from further issuing
rules and regulations that would regulate the recruitment and placement of overseas Filipino workers (OFWs);
and 3) also enjoin them to comply with the policy of deregulation mandated under Sections 29 and 30 of
Republic Act 8042.
On March 20, 2002 the Quezon City RTC granted Salac, et al.'s petition and ordered the government agencies
mentioned to deregulate the recruitment and placement of OFWs.3 The RTC also annulled DOLE DO 10, POEA
MC 15, and all other orders, circulars and issuances that are inconsistent with the policy of deregulation under
R.A. 8042.
Prompted by the RTC's above actions, the government officials concerned filed the present petition in G.R.
152642 seeking to annul the RTC's decision and have the same enjoined pending action on the petition.
On April 17, 2002 the Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. intervened in the case before the Court,
claiming that the RTC March 20, 2002 Decision gravely affected them since it paralyzed the deployment abroad
of OFWs and performing artists. The Confederated Association of Licensed Entertainment Agencies,
Incorporated (CALEA) intervened for the same purpose.4
On May 23, 2002 the Court5 issued a TRO in the case, enjoining the Quezon City RTC, Branch 96, from enforcing
its decision. In a parallel case, on February 12, 2002 respondents Asian Recruitment Council Philippine Chapter,
Inc. and others (Arcophil, et al.) filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for TRO
and preliminary injunction against the DOLE Secretary, the POEA Administrator, and the TESDA DirectorGeneral,6 before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 220, to enjoin the latter from implementing the 2002 Rules
and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Overseas Workers and to cease and desist
from issuing other orders, circulars, and policies that tend to regulate the recruitment and placement of OFWs
in violation of the policy of deregulation provided in Sections 29 and 30 of R.A. 8042.

On March 12, 2002 the Quezon City RTC rendered an Order, granting the petition and enjoining the government
agencies involved from exercising regulatory functions over the recruitment and placement of OFWs.
This prompted the DOLE Secretary, the POEA Administrator, and the TESDA Director-General to file the present
action in G.R. 152710. As in G.R. 152642, the Court issued on May 23, 2002 a TRO enjoining the Quezon
City RTC, Branch 220 from enforcing its decision.
On December 4, 2008, however, the Republic informed7 the Court that on April 10, 2007 former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. 94228 which expressly repealed Sections 29 and 30 of R.A. 8042 and
adopted the policy of close government regulation of the recruitment and deployment of OFWs. R.A. 9422
pertinently provides:
xxxx
SEC. 1. Section 23, paragraph (b.1) of Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as the "Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995" is hereby amended to read as follows:
(b.1) Philippine Overseas Employment Administration - The Administration shall regulate private sector
participation in the recruitmentand overseas placement of workers by setting up a licensing and registration
system. It shall also formulate and implement, in coordination with appropriate entities concerned, when
necessary, a system for promoting and monitoring the overseas employment of Filipino workers taking into
consideration their welfare and the domestic manpower requirements.
In addition to its powers and functions, the administration shall inform migrant workers not only of their rights
as workers but also of their rights as human beings, instruct and guide the workers how to assert their rights
and provide the available mechanism to redress violation of their rights.
In the recruitment and placement of workers to service the requirements for trained and competent Filipino
workers of foreign governments and their instrumentalities, and such other employers as public interests may
require, the administration shall deploy only to countries where the Philippines has concluded bilateral labor
agreements or arrangements: Provided, That such countries shall guarantee to protect the rights of Filipino
migrant workers; and:Provided, further, That such countries shall observe and/or comply with the international
laws and standards for migrant workers.
SEC. 2. Section 29 of the same law is hereby repealed.
SEC. 3. Section 30 of the same law is also hereby repealed.
xxxx
On August 20, 2009 respondents Salac, et al. told the Court in G.R. 152642 that they agree9 with the Republic's
view that the repeal of Sections 29 and 30 of R.A. 8042 renders the issues they raised by their action moot and
academic. The Court has no reason to disagree. Consequently, the two cases, G.R. 152642 and 152710, should
be dismissed for being moot and academic.
G.R. 167590
(Constitutionality of Sections 6, 7, and 9 of R.A. 8042)
On August 21, 1995 respondent Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI) filed a petition for
declaratory relief and prohibition with prayer for issuance of TRO and writ of preliminary injunction before the
RTC of Manila, seeking to annul Sections 6, 7, and 9 of R.A. 8042 forG.R. 167590(Constitutionality of Sections 6,
7, and 9 of R.A. 8042)being unconstitutional. (PASEI also sought to annul a portion of Section 10 but the Court
will take up this point later together with a related case.)
Section 6 defines the crime of "illegal recruitment" and enumerates the acts constituting the same. Section 7
provides the penalties for prohibited acts. Thus:
SEC. 6. Definition. - For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, procuring workers and includes referring, contract services, promising
or advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by a non-license or nonholder of authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise
known as the Labor Code of the Philippines: Provided, That such non-license or non-holder, who, in any manner,
offers or promises for a fee employment abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed so engaged. It shall

likewise include the following acts, whether committed by any person, whether a non-licensee, non-holder,
licensee or holder of authority:
xxxx
SEC. 7. Penalties. (a) Any person found guilty of illegal recruitment shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6)
years and one (1) day but not more than twelve (12) years and a fine not less than two hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00) nor more than five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00).
(b) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) nor
more than one million pesos (P1,000,000.00) shall be imposed if illegal recruitment constitutes economic
sabotage as defined herein.
Provided, however, That the maximum penalty shall be imposed if the person illegally recruited is less than
eighteen (18) years of age or committed by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority.10
Finally, Section 9 of R.A. 8042 allowed the filing of criminal actions arising from "illegal recruitment" before the
RTC of the province or city where the offense was committed or where the offended party actually resides at the
time of the commission of the offense.
The RTC of Manila declared Section 6 unconstitutional after hearing on the ground that its definition of "illegal
recruitment" is vague as it fails to distinguish between licensed and non-licensed recruiters11 and for
that reason gives undue advantage to the non-licensed recruiters in violation of the right to equal protection of
those that operate with government licenses or authorities.
But "illegal recruitment" as defined in Section 6 is clear and unambiguous and, contrary to the RTC's finding,
actually makes a distinction between licensed and non-licensed recruiters. By its terms, persons who engage in
"canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers" without the appropriate
government license or authority are guilty of illegal recruitment whether or not they commit the wrongful acts
enumerated in that section. On the other hand, recruiters who engage in the canvassing, enlisting, etc. of
OFWs, although with the appropriate government license or authority, are guilty of illegal recruitment only if
they commit any of the wrongful acts enumerated in Section 6.
The Manila RTC also declared Section 7 unconstitutional on the ground that its sweeping application of the
penalties failed to make any distinction as to the seriousness of the act committed for the application of the
penalty imposed on such violation. As an example, said the trial court, the mere failure to render a report under
Section 6(h) or obstructing the inspection by the Labor Department under Section 6(g) are penalized
by imprisonment for six years and one day and a minimum fine of P200,000.00 but which could unreasonably
go even as high as life imprisonment if committed by at least three persons.
Apparently, the Manila RTC did not agree that the law can impose such grave penalties upon what it believed
were specific acts that were not as condemnable as the others in the lists. But, in fixing uniform penalties
for each of the enumerated acts under Section 6, Congress was within its prerogative to determine what
individual acts are equally reprehensible, consistent with the State policy of according full protection to labor,
and deserving of the same penalties. It is not within the power of the Court to question the wisdom of this kind
of choice. Notably, this legislative policy has been further stressed in July 2010 with the enactment of R.A.
1002212 which increased even more the duration of the penalties of imprisonment and the amounts of fine for
the commission of the acts listed under
Section 7.
Obviously, in fixing such tough penalties, the law considered the unsettling fact that OFWs must work outside
the country's borders and beyond its immediate protection. The law must, therefore, make an effort
to somehow protect them from conscienceless individuals within its jurisdiction who, fueled by greed, are willing
to ship them out without clear assurance that their contracted principals would treat such OFWs fairly
and humanely.
As the Court held in People v. Ventura,13 the State under its police power "may prescribe such regulations as in
its judgment will secure or tend to secure the general welfare of the people, to protect them against
the consequence of ignorance and incapacity as well as of deception and fraud." Police power is "that inherent
and plenary power of the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare
of society."14

The Manila RTC also invalidated Section 9 of R.A. 8042 on the ground that allowing the offended parties to file
the criminal case in their place of residence would negate the general rule on venue of criminal cases which is
the place where the crime or any of its essential elements were committed. Venue, said the RTC, is
jurisdictional in penal laws and, allowing the filing of criminal actions at the place of residence of the offended
parties violates their right to due process. Section 9 provides:
SEC. 9. Venue. - A criminal action arising from illegal recruitment as defined herein shall be filed with the
Regional Trial Court of the province or city where the offense was committed or where the offended party
actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided, That the court where the criminal action
is first filed shall acquire jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts: Provided, however, That the aforestated
provisions shall also apply to those criminal actions that have already been filed in court at the time of the
effectivity of this Act.
But there is nothing arbitrary or unconstitutional in Congress fixing an alternative venue for violations of Section
6 of R.A. 8042 that differs from the venue established by the Rules on Criminal Procedure. Indeed,
Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the latter Rules allows exceptions provided by laws. Thus:
SEC. 15. Place where action is to be instituted.- (a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be
instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any of
its essential ingredients occurred. (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
Section 9 of R.A. 8042, as an exception to the rule on venue of criminal actions is, consistent with that law's
declared policy15 of providing a criminal justice system that protects and serves the best interests of
the victims of illegal recruitment.
G.R. 167590, G.R. 182978-79,16 and G.R. 184298-9917
(Constitutionality of Section 10, last sentence of 2nd paragraph)
G.R. 182978-79 and G.R. 184298-99 are consolidated cases. Respondent spouses Simplicio and Mila Cuaresma
(the Cuaresmas) filed a claim for death and insurance benefits and damages against petitioners Becmen Service
Exporter and Promotion, Inc. (Becmen) and White Falcon Services, Inc. (White Falcon) for the death of their
daughter Jasmin Cuaresma while working as staff nurse in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
The Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed the claim on the ground that the Cuaresmas had already received insurance
benefits arising from their daughter's death from the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA). The LA
also gave due credence to the findings of the Saudi Arabian authorities that Jasmin committed suicide.
On appeal, however, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) found Becmen and White Falcon jointly
and severally liable for Jasmin's death and ordered them to pay the Cuaresmas the amount of US$113,000.00 as
actual damages. The NLRC relied on the Cabanatuan City Health Office's autopsy finding that Jasmin died of
criminal violence and rape.
Becmen and White Falcon appealed the NLRC Decision to the Court of Appeals (CA).18 On June 28, 2006 the CA
held Becmen and White Falcon jointly and severally liable with their Saudi Arabian employer for actual damages,
with Becmen having a right of reimbursement from White Falcon. Becmen and White Falcon appealed the CA
Decision to this Court.
On April 7, 2009 the Court found Jasmin's death not work-related or work-connected since her rape and death
did not occur while she was on duty at the hospital or doing acts incidental to her employment. The
Court deleted the award of actual damages but ruled that Becmen's corporate directors and officers are
solidarily liable with their company for its failure to investigate the true nature of her death. Becmen and White
Falcon abandoned their legal, moral, and social duty to assist the Cuaresmas in obtaining justice for their
daughter. Consequently, the Court held the foreign employer Rajab and Silsilah, White Falcon, Becmen, and the
latter's corporate directors and officers jointly and severally liable to the Cuaresmas for: 1) P2,500,000.00 as
moral damages; 2) P2,500,000.00 as exemplary damages; 3) attorney's fees of 10% of the total monetary
award; and 4) cost of suit.
On July 16, 2009 the corporate directors and officers of Becmen, namely, Eufrocina Gumabay, Elvira Taguiam,
Lourdes Bonifacio and Eddie De Guzman (Gumabay, et al.) filed a motion for leave to Intervene.
They questioned the constitutionality of the last sentence of the second paragraph of Section 10, R.A. 8042
which holds the corporate directors, officers and partners jointly and solidarily liable with their company for

money claims filed by OFWs against their employers and the recruitment firms. On September 9, 2009 the
Court allowed the intervention and admitted Gumabay, et al.'s motion for reconsideration.
The key issue that Gumabay, et al. present is whether or not the 2nd paragraph of Section 10, R.A. 8042, which
holds the corporate directors, officers, and partners of recruitment and placement agencies jointly and solidarily
liable for money claims and damages that may be adjudged against the latter agencies, is unconstitutional.
In G.R. 167590 (the PASEI case), the Quezon City RTC held as unconstitutional the last sentence of the
2nd paragraph of Section 10 of R.A.8042. It pointed out that, absent sufficient proof that the corporate
officers and directors of the erring company had knowledge of and allowed the illegal recruitment, making them
automatically liable would violate their right to due process of law.
The pertinent portion of Section 10 provides:
SEC. 10. Money Claims. - x x x
The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any and all claims under this
section shall be joint and several. This provision shall be incorporated in the contract for overseas employment
and shall be a condition precedent for its approval. The performance bond to be filed by
the recruitment/placement agency, as provided by law, shall be answerable for all money claims or damages
that may be awarded to the workers. If the recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being, the
corporate officers and directors and partners as the case may be, shall themselves be jointly and solidarily liable
with the corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages. (Emphasis supplied)
But the Court has already held, pending adjudication of this case, that the liability of corporate directors and
officers is not automatic. To make them jointly and solidarily liable with their company, there must be a
finding that they were remiss in directing the affairs of that company, such as sponsoring or tolerating the
conduct of illegal activities.19 In the case of Becmen and White Falcon,20 while there is evidence that these
companies were at fault in not investigating the cause of Jasmin's death, there is no mention of any evidence in
the case against them that intervenors Gumabay, et al., Becmen's corporate officers and directors, were
personally involved in their company's particular actions or omissions in Jasmin's case.
As a final note, R.A. 8042 is a police power measure intended to regulate the recruitment and deployment of
OFWs. It aims to curb, if not eliminate, the injustices and abuses suffered by numerous OFWs seeking to work
abroad. The rule is settled that every statute has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. The Court
cannot inquire into the wisdom or expediency of the laws enacted by the Legislative Department. Hence, in the
absence of a clear and unmistakable case that the statute is unconstitutional, the Court must uphold its
validity.
WHEREFORE, in G.R. 152642 and 152710, the Court DISMISSES the petitions for having become moot and
academic.
In G.R. 167590, the Court SETS ASIDE the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila dated December 8,
2004 andDECLARES Sections 6, 7, and 9 of Republic Act 8042 valid and constitutional.
In G.R. 182978-79 and G.R. 184298-99 as well as in G.R. 167590, the Court HOLDS the last sentence of the
second paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act 8042 valid and constitutional. The Court,
however, RECONSIDERS and SETS ASIDE the portion of its Decision in G.R. 182978-79 and G.R. 18429899 that held intervenors Eufrocina Gumabay, Elvira Taguiam, Lourdes Bonifacio, and Eddie De Guzman
jointly and ' solidarily liable with respondent Becmen Services Exporter and Promotion, Inc. to spouses Simplicia
and Mila Cuaresma for lack of a finding in those cases that such intervenors had a part in the act or omission
imputed to their corporation.
SO ORDERED.