SOLIVEN, PETITIONER VS.

JUDGE MAKASIAR,RESPONDENT
167 SCRA 393
FACTS:
This case is a PETITION for certiorari and prohibition to review the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila
ISSUES:
1.

Whether or not the petitioners were denied due process when information for libel
were filed against them although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case
was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently by the President

2.

Whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran (petitioner) were

violated whenrespondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without
personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine
probable clause

3.

Whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may
initiate criminal proceedings against the petitioners through filing of a complaintaffidavit

DECISION:
Finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on the part of
the public respondents, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petitions.
The Order to maintain the status quo contained in the Resolution of the Court en banc is
LIFTED.
RATIO:
Background of the first issue

MARCH 30, 1988: Secretary of Justice denied petitioners motion for reconsideration

APRIL 7, 1988: A second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was

denied by the Secretary of Justice

MAY 2, 1988: On appeal, the President, through Executive Secretary, affirmed the

resolution of the Secretary of Justice

MAY 16, 1988: Motion for reconsideration was denied by the Executive Secretary

Petitioner Beltran alleges that he has been denied due process of law.
-This is negated by the fact that instead of submitting his counter-affidavits, he filed a Motion to
Declare Proceedings Closed, in effect, waiving his right to refute the complaint by filing counteraffidavits.
Due process of law does not require that the respondent in a criminal case actually file
his counter-affidavits before the preliminary investigation is deemed completed. All that
is required is that the respondent be given the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if
he is so minded.
Second issue
This calls for an interpretation of the constitutional provision on the issuance of warrants of
arrest:
Art. III, Sec.2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Petitioner Beltran is convinced that the Constitution requires the judge to personally examine the
complainant and his witness in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants
of arrests.
-However, what the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the
issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In doing so, the judge is not
required to personally examine the complainant and his witness.

Following the established doctrine of procedure, the judge shall: (1) Personally evaluate
the report and supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of
probable cause (and on the basis, thereof, issue a warrant of arrest); or (2) If on the basis
thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscals report and require the
submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as
to the evidence of probable cause.
Third issue
Petitioner Beltran contends that proceedings ensue by virtue of the Presidents filing of her
complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a witness for the prosecution, bringing her
under the trial courts jurisdiction. This would in an indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity
from suit, as by testifying on the witness stand, she would be exposing herself to possible
contempt of court or perjury.
-This privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be
invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the Presidents behalf.
-The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive is solely the Presidents prerogative.
It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person (And there is nothing
in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege).

Additional Issue:
Beltran contends that he could not be held liable for libel because of the privileged character of
the publication. He also says that to allow the libel case to proceed would produce a chilling
effect on press freedom.
-Court reiterates that it is not a trier of facts And Court finds no basis at this stage to rule on the
chilling effect point.
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION Guitierrez, Jr., J.
Concurs with the majority opinion insofar as it revolves around the three principal issues. With
regard to whether or not the libel case would produce a chilling effect on press freedom,
Gutierrez believes that this particular issue is the most important and should be resolved now
rather than later.
Quotable quotes: Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and unjust accusation; the wound
can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience. United States v. Bustos
No longer is there a Minister of the Crown or a person in authority of such exalted position that
the citizen must speak of him only with bated breath. People v. Perfecto

OKABE VS GUTIERREZ
FACTS:

Cecilia Maruyama filed a complaint charging Lorna Tanghal and

petitioner Teresita Tanghal Okabe, a.k.a. Shiela Okabe, with estafa.

Maruyama alleged, that on December 11, 1998, she entrusted Y11,410,000
with the peso equivalent of P3,993,500 to the petitioner, who was
engaged in the business of "door-to-door delivery" from Japan to the
Philippines. It was alleged that the petitioner failed to deliver the
money as agreed upon, and, at first, denied receiving the said amount
but later returned only US$1,000 through Lorna Tanghal.
During the preliminary investigation, the complainant submitted the
affidavit of her witnesses and other documentary evidence. After the

requisite

preliminary

investigation,

2nd

Assistant

City

Prosecutor

Joselito J. Vibandor came out with a resolution, finding probable

cause for estafa against the petitioner w/c was subsequently approved
by the city prosecutor. The trial court then issued a warrant of
arrest

with

personal

recommended

bail

Philippines

bond

for

in

Japan

the
on

bond

of

said

June

P40,000.

amount.

17,

2000

The

Petitioner

posted

petitioner

left

without

the

trial

the

courts

permission, and returned to the Philippines on June 28, 2000. She left
the Philippines anew on July 1, 2000, and returned on July 12, 2000.
On July 14, 2000, the private prosecutor filed an urgent ex parte
motion

for

the

issuance

of

the

hold

departure

order.

Trial

court

approved the same. Meanwhile, the petitioner filed a verified motion

for

judicial

determination

of

probable

cause

and

to

defer

proceedings/arraignment, alleging that the only documents appended to

the

Information

respondent
resolution

submitted

Maruyamas
of

the

by

the

investigating

affidavit-complaint

investigating

prosecutor;

for

prosecutor
estafa

were

and

the affidavits

the

of

the

witnesses of the complainant, the respondents counter-affidavit and

the other evidence adduced by the parties were not attached thereto.
On July 19, 2000, the petitioner also filed a Very Urgent Motion To
Lift/Recall Hold Departure Order dated July 17, 2000 and/or allow her
to regularly travel to Japan for the reason that she have 3 minor
children residing there relying on her for support. Petitioner also
questioned the irregularity of the determination of probable cause
during

the

preliminary

investigation

however

the

respondent

judge

ruled that the posting of bail and the filing motions for relief
estopped the petitioner from questioning the same. Upon arraignment,
petitioner refused to enter a plea and w/ leave of court left the
court room. Petitioner filed w/ CA a petition for Certiorari. CA set
aside the hold departure order however all the other motions were
denied, hence this case.

ISSUE: Whether the respondent judge committed a reversible error in

determining existence of probable cause despite lack of affidavits of

the

witnesses

of

respondent

Maruyama and

the

latters

documentary

evidence, as well as the counter-affidavit of the petitioner.

HELD: Yes, the rulings of this Court are now embedded in Section 8(a),
Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides
that:
SEC.

8.

complaint.

Records.
An

(a)

information

Records
or

supporting

complaint

filed

the
in

information
court

shall

or
be

supported by the affidavits and counter-affidavits of the parties and

their witnesses, together with the other supporting evidence and the
resolution on the case. The respondent judge is hereby DIRECTED to
determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the
arrest of the petitioner based on the complete records, as required
under

Section

8(a),

Rule

112

of

the

Revised

Rules

on

Criminal

Procedure.

BACHE & CO. VS. RUIZ (GR 32409, FEB. 27, 1971) Digest
FACTS:
- Commissioner of Internal Revenue Vera wrote a letter addressed to Judge Vivencio M. Ruiz
requesting the issuance of a search warrant against Bache& Co. (Phil.), Inc. and Frederick E.
Seggerman for violation of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) and authorizing
Revenue Examiner Rodolfo de Leon to make and file the application for search warrant which
was attached to the letter.
-In the afternoon of the following day, De Leon and his witness, Arturo Logronio, went to the
Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal. They brought with them the following papers: Veras letterrequest; an application for search warrant already filled up but still unsigned by De Leon; an
affidavit of Logronio subscribed before De Leon; a deposition in printed form of Logronio already
accomplished and signed by him but not yet subscribed; and a search warrant already
accomplished but still unsigned by Judge Ruiz.
- At that time Judge Ruiz was hearing a certain case; so, by means of a note, he instructed his
Deputy Clerk of Court to take the depositions of De Leon and Logronio. After the session had
adjourned, Judge Ruiz was informed that the depositions had already been taken. The
stenographer read to him her stenographic notes; and thereafter, Judge Ruiz asked respondent
Logronio to take the oath and warned him that if his deposition was found to be false and
without legal basis, he could be charged for perjury.
-The Judge signed de Leons application for search warrant and Logronios deposition. Search
Warrant was then signed by the judge and accordingly issued. 3 days later (a Saturday), the

BIR
agents
served
search warrant to the corporation and Seggerman at the offices of the corporation.

the

ISSUE:
WON the search warrant is valid.
HELD:
Search warrant is invalid.
RATIO:
There was no personal examination conducted by the Judge of the complainant (De
Leon) and his witness (Logronio). The judge did not ask either of the two any question the
answer to which could possibly be the basis for determining whether or not there was probable
cause
against
Bache
&
Co.
and
Seggerman. The participation of the judge in the proceedings which led to the issuance of
the search was thus limited to listening to the stenographers readings of her notes,
to a few words of warning against the commission of perjury, and to administering the oath to
the
complainant and his witness. This cannot be considered a personal examination. Personal
examination by the judge of the complainant and his witnesses is necessary to enable him to
determine the existence or non-existence of a probable cause.
Next, the search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense. The search
warrant was issued for at least 4 distinct offenses under the Tax Code. As ruled
in Stonehill Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the
disputed search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the
former Rules of Court that a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offense. Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court added
thereto a paragraph, directing that no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific
offense.
Lastly, the search warrant does not particularly describe the things to be s

Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 (1986)

F: The challenged SW was issued by the resp. judge on 5/10/84. The petitioner''s house was
searched 2 days later but none of the articles listed in the warrant was discovered. The officers
conducting the search found 1 colt Magnum revolver & 18 live bullets w/c they confiscated.
They are now the bases of the charge against the petitioner.
RULING: Search warrant issued by resp. judge is hereby declared null and void and accordingly
set aside. The petitioner claims that no depositions were taken by the resp. judge in accordance
w/ Rule 126, Sec. 4 of the ROC, but this is not entirely true. Depositions were taken of the
complainant''s 2 witnesses in addition to the affidavit executed by them. It is correct to say,
however, that the complainant himself was not subjected to a similar interrogation. By his own
accounts, all that resp. judge did was question Capt. Quillosa on the contents of his affidavit
only "to ascertain among others, if he knew and understood the same," and only bec. "the

application was not yet subscribed and sworn to." The suggestion is that he would not have
asked any questions at all if the affidavit had already been completed when it was submitted to
him. In any case, he did not ask his own searching questions. He limited himself to the contents
of the affidavit. He did not take the applicant''s deposition in writing and attach them to the
record, together w/ the affidavit presented to him. Such written deposition is necessary in order
that the Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or non-existence of the
probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his
declarations are false. (Mata v. Bayona.) The applicant was asking for the issuance of the SW
on the basis of mere hearsay and not of info. personally known to him. His application, standing
alone, was insufficient to justify the issuance of the warrant sought.
It was, therefore, necessary for the witnesses themselves, by their own personal info., to
establish the applicant''s claims. Even assuming then that it would have suffied to take the
deposition only of the witnesses and not of the applicant himself, there is still the question of the
sufficiency of their depositions. A study of the deposition taken from witnesess Esmael Morada
and Jesus Tohilida, who both claimed to be "intelligence informers," shows that they were in the
main a mere restatement of their allegations in their affidavits, except that they were made in
the form of answers to the questions put to them by the resp. judge. One may well wonder why
it did not occur to the resp. judge to ask how the witness could be so certain even as to the
caliber of the guns, or how far he was from the window, or whether it was on the first floor or
second floor, or why his presence was not noticed at all, or if the acts related were really done
openly, in the full view of the witnesses, considering that these acts were against the law. These
would have been judicious questions but they were injudiciously omitted. Instead, the
declaration of the witnesses were readily accepted and the warrant sought was issued forthwith.
SOL-GEN ARGUES THAT THE PETITIONER WAIVED WHATEVER DEFECT WHEN THE
PETITIONER VOLUNTARILY SUBMITTED TO THE SEARCH AND MANIFESTED HIS
CONFORMITY IN WRITING. We do not agree. What we see here is pressure exerted by the
military authorities, who practically coerced the petitioner to sign the supposed waiver as guaran

PEOPLE VS TEE
FACTS: Appellant is a Chinese national in his forties, a businessman,
and a resident of Baguio City. A raid conducted by operatives of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and Philippine National Police
Narcotics Command (PNP NARCOM) at premises allegedly leased by
appellant and at his residence yielded huge quantities of marijuana.
Appellant moved to quash the search warrant on the ground that it was
too general and that the NBI had not complied with the requirements
for the issuance of a valid search warrant. The pendency of said
motion, however, did not stop the filing of the appropriate charges
against appellant. In an information dated July 24, 1998, the City
Prosecutor of Baguio City charged Modesto Tee, alias Estoy Tee, with
illegal possession of marijuana.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant's contention that the description

on the serach warrant which says an undetermined amount of
marijuana, was too general and hence makes the warrant void for
vagueness.
HELD: SC held that the appellants contention, has no leg to stand on.
The constitutional requirement of reasonable particularity of
description of the things to be seized is primarily meant to enable
the law enforcers serving the warrant to: (1) readily identify the
properties to be seized and thus prevent them from seizing the wrong
items; and (2) leave said peace officers with no discretion regarding
the articles to be seized and thus prevent unreasonable searches and
seizures. What the Constitution seeks to avoid are search warrants of
broad or general characterization or sweeping descriptions, which will
authorize police officers to undertake a fishing expedition to seize
and confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to
an offense. However, it is not required that technical precision of
description be required, particularly, where by the nature of the
goods to be seized, their description must be rather general, since
the requirement of a technical description would mean that no warrant
could issue.

Tambasen vs People
FACTS: On August 31, 1988, P/Sgt. Flumar Natuel applied for the
issuance of a search warrant from the MTCC, alleging that he received
information that petitioner had in his possession at his house at the
North Capitol Road, Bacolod City, "M-16 Armalite Rifles (Mags &
Ammos), Hand Grenades, .45 Cal. Pistols (Mags & Ammos), Dynamite
Sticks and Subversive Documents," which articles were "used or
intended to be used" for illegal purposes]. On the same day, the
application was granted by the MTCC with the issuance of Search
Warrant No. 365, which allowed the seizure of the items specified in
the application (Rollo, p. 15). At around 6:30 P.M. of September 9,
1988, a police team searched the house of petitioner and seized among
others, 2 envelopes containing cash in the total amount of Php 14,000.
Petitioner filed an urgent motion for the return of the seized
articles. MTCC issued an order directing Sgt. Natuel to make a return
of the search warrant. The following day, Sgt. Natuel submitted a
report to the court. Not considering the report as a "return in
contemplation of law," petitioner filed another motion praying that
Sgt. Natuel be required to submit a complete and verified inventory of
the seized articles. Thereafter, Sgt. Natuel manifested that although
he was the applicant for the issuance of the search warrant, he was
not present when it was served. On October 7, 1988, petitioner filed
before the MTCC a motion praying that the search and seizure be
declared illegal and that the seized articles be returned to him. MTCC
ruled in favor of the petitioner, however the Solicitor General
alleged that assuming that the seizure of the money had been invalid,
petitioner was not entitled to its return citing the rulings stating

that pending the determination of the legality of the seizure of the

articles, they should remain in custodia legis.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SW was valid.
HELD: On its face, the search warrant violates Section 3, Rule 126 of
the Revised Rules of Court, which prohibits the issuance of a search
warrant for more than one specific offense. The caption of Search
Warrant No. 365 reflects the violation of two special laws: P.D. No.
1866 for illegal possession of firearms, ammunition and explosives;
and R.A. No. 1700, the Anti-Subversion Law. Search Warrant No. 365 was
therefore a "scatter-shot warrant" and totally null and void (People
v. Court of Appeals, 216 SCRA 101 [1992]). Moreover, by their seizure
of articles not described in the search warrant, the police acted
beyond the parameters of their authority under the search warrant.
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution requires that a search
warrant should particularly describe the things to be seized. "The
presumption juris tantum of regularity in the performance of official
duty cannot by itself prevail against the constitutionally protected
rights of an individual (People v. Cruz, 231 SCRA 759)
As the Court aptly puts it in Bagalihog v. Fernandez, 198 SCRA 614
(1991), "[z]eal in the pursuit of criminals cannot ennoble the use of
arbitrary methods that the Constitution itself abhors."
Section 3(2) of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that
evidence obtained in violation of the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.

33PEOPLE VS VELOSO48 PHIL. 169 (1925)MALCOLM, J.

Facts:In May, 1923, the building located at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, was used by
anorganization known as the Parliamentary Club. Jose Ma. Veloso was at that time a member
of theHouse of Representative of the Philippine Legislature. He was also the manager of the
club.-The police of Manila had reliable information that the so-called Parliamentary Club
was nothingmore than a gambling house. Indeed, on May 19, 1923, J. F. Townsend, the chief of
the gamblingsquad, had been to the club and verified this fact. As a result, on May 25, 1923,
Detective AndresGeronimo of the secret service of the City of Manila, applied for, and obtained
a search warrantfrom Judge Garduo of the municipal court. Thus provided, the police
attempted to raid theParliamentary Club a little after three in the afternoon of the date
above- mentioned. They foundthe doors to the premises closed and barred. Accordingly,
one band of police including policemanRosacker, ascended a telephone pole, so as to enter
a window of the house. Other policemen,headed by Townsend, broke in the outer door.-Once
inside the Parliamentary Club, nearly fifty persons were apprehended by the police. One
of them was the defendant Veloso. Veloso asked Townsend what he wanted, and the latter
showedhim the search warrant. Veloso read it and told Townsend that he was Representative
Veloso andnot John Doe, and that the police had no right to search the house. Townsend
answered thatVeloso was considered as John Doe. As Veloso's pocket was bulging, as if it
contained gamblingutensils, Townsend required Veloso to show him the evidence of the game.

About five minuteswas consumed in conversation between the policemen and the accused the
policemen insistingon searching Veloso, and Veloso insisting in his refusal to submit to the
search.-At last the patience of the officers was exhausted. So policeman Rosacker took hold of
Velosoonly to meet with his resistance. Veloso bit Rosacker in the right forearm, and gave him a
blow inanother part of the body, which injured the policeman quite severely. Through the
combinedefforts of Townsend and Rosacker, Veloso was finally laid down on the floor, and long
sheets of paper, of reglas de monte, cards, cardboards, and chips were taken from his pockets.All of the persons arrested were searched and then conducted to the patrol wagons.
Velosoagain refused to obey and shouted offensive epithets against the police department.
It wasnecessary for the policemen to conduct him downstairs. At the door, Veloso resisted
sotenaciously that three policemen were needed to place him in the patrol wagon.-The warrant
read as follows:

SEARCH WARRANT (G) The People of the Philippine Islands, to any member of thePolice Force
of the City of Manila.GREETINGProof by affidavit having this day been made before me by
Andres Geronimo that hehas good reason to believe and does believe that John Doe has
illegally in hispossession in the building occupied by him and which is under his control, namely
inthe building numbered 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippines Islands, certaindevices
and effects used in violation of the Gambling Law, to wit: money, cards,chips, reglas, pintas,
tables and chairs and other utensils used in connection with thegame commonly known as
monte and that the said John Doe keeps and conceals saiddevices and effects with the illegal
and criminal intention of using them in violation of the Gambling Law.Now therefore, you are
hereby commanded that at any time in the day or nightwithin ten (10) days on or after this date
to make a search on the person of said JohnDoe and in the house situated at No. 124 Calle
Arzobispo, City of Manila, PhilippineIslands, in quest of the above described devices and effects
and if you find the sameor any part thereof, you are commanded to bring it forthwith before me
as providedfor by law.Given under my hand, this 25th day of May, 1923.
(Sgd.) L. GARDUO Judge, Municipal Court
Issue:
WON the search warrant and the arrest of Veloso was valid.
Ruling:
Yes.
RD:
It is provided, among other things, in the Philippine Code on Criminal Procedure that a
searchwarrant shall not issue except for probable cause and upon application supported by
oathparticularly describing the place to be searched and the person of thing to be seized. The
name and description of the accused should be inserted in the body of the warrant andwhere
the name is unknown there must be such a description of the person accused as willenable the
officer to identify him when found.A warrant for the apprehension of a person whose true
name is unknown, by the name of "JohnDoe" or "Richard Roe," "whose other or true name in
unknown," is void, without other and furtherdescriptions of the person to be apprehended, and
such warrant will not justify the officer inacting under it. Such a warrant must, in addition, contain
the best descriptio personae possibleto be obtained of the person or persons to be
apprehended, and this description must be

sufficient to indicate clearly the proper person or persons upon whom the warrant is
to beserved; and should state his personal appearance and peculiarities, give his occupation
andplace of residence, and any other circumstances by means of which he can be identified.In
the first place, the affidavit for the search warrant and the search warrant itself described
thebuilding to be searched as "the building No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila,
PhilippineIslands." This, without doubt, was a sufficient designation of the premises to be
searched.As the search warrant stated that John Doe had gambling apparatus in his possession
in thebuilding occupied by him at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, and as this John Doe
was Jose Ma. Veloso, the manager of the club, the police could identify John Doe as Jose Ma.
Velosowithout difficulty.

LIM VS FELIX
FACTS: On March 17, 1989, at about 7:30 o'clock in the
morning, at the vicinity of the airport road of the Masbate
Domestic Airport, located at the municipality of Masbate
province of Masbate, Congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr. and
his security escorts, namely Provincial Guards Antonio
Cortes, Gaspar Amaro, and Artemio Fuentes were attacked and
killed by a lone assassin. Dante Siblante another security
escort
of
Congressman
Espinosa,
Sr.
survived
the
assassination plot, although, he himself suffered a gunshot
wound. An investigation of the incident then followed.
Thereafter,
and
for
the
purpose
of
preliminary
investigation, the designated investigator filed an amended
complaint with the Municipal Trial Court of Masbate accusing
Vicente Lim, Sr. et al of the crime of multiple murder and
frustrated murder in connection with the airport incident.
After conducting the preliminary investigation, the court
issued an order concluding that a probable cause has been
established for the issuance of a warrant of arrest of named
accused..
On October 30, 1989, Fiscal Alfane filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Masbate, four (4) separate informations of
murder against the twelve (12) accused with a recommendation
of no bail.

On November 21, 1989, petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and

Susana Lim filed with us a verified petition for change of
venue w/c was authorized, from the RTC of Masbate to the
RTCt of Makati to avoid miscarriage of justice. The cases
were raffled to Branch 56 presided by respondent Judge
Nemesio S. Felix.
Petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed with the
respondent court several motions and manifestations, among
others was an order be issued requiring the transmittal of
the
initial
records
of
the
preliminary
inquiry
or
investigation conducted by the Municipal Judge Barsaga of
Masbate for the best enlightenment of this Honorable Court
in its personal determination of the existence of a probable
cause or prima facie evidence as well as its determination
of the existence of guilt, pursuant to the mandatory mandate
of the constitution that no warrant shall issue unless the
issuing magistrate shall have himself been personally
convinced of such probable cause.
Respondent court issued an order denying for lack of merit
the motions and manifestations and issued warrants of arrest
against the accused including the petitioners herein.
ISSUE : Whether or not a judge may issue a warrant of arrest
without bail by simply relying on the prosecution's
certification and recommendation that a probable cause
exists.
HELD: If a Judge relies solely on the certification of the
Prosecutor as in this case where all the records of the
investigation are in Masbate, he or she has not personally
determined probable cause. The determination is made by the
Provincial Prosecutor. The constitutional requirement has
not been satisfied. The Judge commits a grave abuse of
discretion.

Yousef Al Ghoul vs CA
FACTS: Herein petitioners are detention prisoners who were
arrested and charged with illegal possession of firearms,
ammunitions and explosives before the Regional Trial Court
of Kalookan City, Branch 123, as a consequence of the search
conducted pursuant to the search warrants issued by the RTC
of Kalookan City. After their arrest, petitioners filed a
motion for bail. However, the resolution of the same was
held in abeyance by the trial court pending the presentation
of evidence by the prosecution to enable the court to
determine whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong.
Subsequently, the trial court issued the Order dated
February 19, 1996 denying petitioners motion for bail on
the ground that the law under which petitioners are charged
prescribes a penalty of reclusion perpetua and that the
evidence of guilt is strong. Thereafter, petitioners
proceeded to file a petition for certiorari before the Court
of Appeals, assailing the aforementioned orders issued by
the trial court admitting the evidence of the prosecution
and denying petitioners motion for bail. In its Decision
dated September 30, 1996, the CA affirmed the assailed
orders of trial court, hence this case. On October 30, 1997,
petitioners filed a Manifestation with alleging that with
the enactment of Republic Act No. 8294, amending P.D. 1866,
the penalty for the offenses under which petitioners are
being charged has been reduced from the penalty ranging from
reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua, to only the
penalty ranging from prision mayor to reclusion temporal,
hence, petitioners are now entitled to bail regardless of
the strength of evidence against them.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner, thru the enactment of Republic
Act No. 8294, amending P.D. 1866 reducing the penalty for
the crime charge against him is now entitled to bail.
HELD: Consequent to the enactment of RA 8294, the penalty
prescribed in Section 1 and 3 of P.D. 1866 for illegal
possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives under
which petitioners were charged, has now been reduced to
prision mayor in its minimum period[11] and prision mayor in

its maximum period to reclusion temporal,[12] respectively.

Evidently, petitioners are now entitled to bail as a matter
of right prior to their conviction by the trial court
pursuant to Section 4 of SC Administrative Circular No. 1294 which provides as follows:
SEC. 4.
Bail, a matter of right.x x x.
(b) before
conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable
by
death,
reclusion
perpetua
or
life
imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of right, with
sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as
prescribed by law or this Rule.

MICROSOFT vs. MAXICORP

Intellectual Property Law on Copyright Probable Cause in Issuing Search
Warrant
In 1996, Dominador Samiano, an agent of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) conducted a surveillance against Maxicorp Inc. He observed that Microsoft
Software (Windows Operating Systems) were being produced and packaged
within the premises of Maxicorp. Samiano, together with a civilian witness (John
Benedict Sacriz) then bought a computer unit from Maxicorp. The unit was preinstalled with a pirated copy of Windows. For their purchase, they were issued a
receipt, however, the receipt was in the name of a certain Joel Diaz.
Subsequently, Samiano applied for a search warrant before the RTC. He brought
with him Sacriz as witness. He also brought the computer unit they bought as
evidence as well as the receipt. He even added an additional witness (Felixberto
Pante), a computer technician, who showed the judge that the software in the
computer unit bought by Samiano from Maxicorp was pirated. The RTC judge,
convinced that there is a probable cause for a case of copyright infringement
and unfair competition committed by Maxicorp, issued the corresponding
warrant. Maxicorp assailed the legality of the warrant before the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Maxicorp and in its decision it
highlighted the fact that the receipt issued was not in Samianos or Sacriz name
hence the proceeding in the trial court was infirm from the onset.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct.
HELD: No. The testimonies of the two witnesses, coupled with the object and
documentary evidence they presented, are sufficient to establish the existence of

probable cause. From what they have witnessed, there is reason to believe that
Maxicorp engaged in copyright infringement and unfair competition to the
prejudice of Microsoft. Both NBI Agent Samiano and Sacriz were clear and
insistent that the counterfeit software were not only displayed and sold within
Maxicorps premises, they were also produced, packaged and in some cases,
installed there.
The fact that the receipt issued was not in Samianos name nor was it in Sacriz
name does not render the issuance of the warrant void. No law or rule states that
probable cause requires a specific kind of evidence. No formula or fixed rule for
its determination exists. Probable cause is determined in the light of conditions
obtaining in a given situation.Thus, it was improper for the Court of Appeals to
reverse the RTCs findings simply because the sales receipt evidencing NBI
Agent Samianos purchase of counterfeit goods is not in his name.

UY vs BIR
FACTS: Petitioners assail the validity of the warrants
issued for the search of the premises of the Unifish Packing
Corporation, and pray for the return of the items seized by
virtue thereof.
On 30 September 1993, a certain Rodrigo Abos reported to the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) that petitioners Unifish
Packing Corporation and Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy were
engaged in activities constituting violations of the
National Internal Revenue Code. Abos, who claimed to be a
former employee of Unifish, executed an Affidavit alleging
illegal activities being practiced by the said company among
others, selling thousands of cartons of canned sardines w/o
issuing receipt.
On 1 October 1993, Nestor N. Labaria, Assistant Chief of the
Special Investigation Branch of the BIR, applied for several
search warrants.The application sought permission to search
the premises of Unifish.
On the strength of these warrants, agents of the BIR,
accompanied by members of the Philippine National Police, on
2 October 1993, searched the premises of the Unifish Packing
Corporation. They seized, among other things, the records

and documents of petitioner corporation. A return of said

search was duly made by Nestor Labaria with the RTC of
Cebu , Branch 28.
Petitioner impugned the intrinsic validity of the SW stating
that it violates constitutional right to unreasonable search
and seizure.
xxxx
1. Multiple sets of Books of Accounts; Ledgers, Journals,
Columnar Books, Cash Register Books, Sales Books or Records;
Provisional & Official Receipts;
2. Production Record Books/Inventory Lists [,] Stock Cards;
3. Unregistered Delivery Receipts;
4. Unregistered Purchase & Sales Invoices;
5. Sales Records, Job Order;
6. Corporate Financial Records; and
7. Bank Statements/Cancelled Checks
xxxxx
ISSUE: WON the SW complied with the proper constitutional
mandates.

HELD: The SC AFFIRMED the order of the RTC insofar as said

Resolutions upheld the validity of the subject Search
Warrants authorizing the seizure of the unregistered
delivery receipts and unregistered purchase and sales
invoices, but REVERSED with respect to the rest of the
articles subject of said warrants.

GO VS. COURT OF APPEALS [206 SCRA 138; G.R.

NO. 101837; 11 FEB 1992]
Facts: Petitioner, while traveling in the wrong direction on
a one-way street, almost had a collision with another
vehicle. Petitioner thereafter got out of his car, shot the
driver of the other vehicle, and drove off. An eyewitness of

the incident was able to take down petitioners plate number

and reported the same to the police, who subsequently
ordered a manhunt for petitioner. 6 days after the shooting,
petitioner presented himself in the police station,
accompanied by 2 lawyers, the police detained him.
Subsequently a criminal charge was brought against him.
Petitioner posted bail, the prosecutor filed the case to the
lower
court,
setting
and
commencing
trial
without
preliminary investigation. Prosecutor reasons that the
petitioner has waived his right to preliminary investigation
as bail has been posted and that such situation, that
petitioner has been arrested without a warrant lawfully,
falls under Section 5, Rule 113 and Section 7, Rule 112 of
The 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides for the
rules and procedure pertaining to situations of lawful
warrantless arrests. Petitioner in his petition for
certiorari assails such procedure and actions undertaken and
files for a preliminary investigation.
Issues:
(1) WON warrantless arrest of petitioner was lawful.
(2) WON petitioner effectively waived his right
preliminary investigation.

to

Held: Petitioner and prosecutor err in relying on Umil v.

Ramos, wherein the Court upheld the warrantless arrest as
valid effected 1 to 14 days from actual commission of the
offenses, which however constituted continuing crimes,
i.e. subversion, membership in an outlawed organization,
etc. There was no lawful warrantless arrest under Section 5,
Rule 113. This is because the arresting officers were not
actually there during the incident, thus they had no
personal
knowledge
and
their
information
regarding
petitioner were derived from other sources. Further, Section
7, Rule 112, does not apply.
Petitioner was not arrested at all, as when he walked in the
police station, he neither expressed surrender nor any
statement that he was or was not guilty of any crime. When a
complaint
was
filed
to
the
prosecutor,
preliminary
investigation should have been scheduled to determine
probable cause. Prosecutor made a substantive error,
petitioner
is
entitled
to
preliminary
investigation,
necessarily in a criminal charge, where the same is required
appear thereat. Petition granted, prosecutor is ordered to

conduct preliminary investigation, trial for the criminal

case
is
suspended
pending
result
from
preliminary
investigation, petitioner is ordered released upon posting a
bail bond.

Alvarez
v CFI 64 PH
IL 33 (1937)
Facts: On 3
June 1936,

the chief of
the secret
service of the
Anti-Usury
Board, of the
Department

of Justice,
presented to
Judge
Eduardo
Gutierrez
David then

presiding over
the Court
of First
Instance
of Tayabas,
an affidavit

alleging that
according to
reliable
information,
Narciso
Alvarez kept

in his house
inInfanta,
Tayabas,
books,
documents,
receipts,

lists, chits
and other
papers used
by him in
connectionwit
h his

activities as a
moneylender,
charging
usurious
rates of
interest in

violation of
the law. In
hisoath at
the end of
the affidavit,
the chief of

the secret
service
stated that
his answers
to the
questionswer

e correct to
the best of
his knowledge
and belief. He
did not swear
to the truth

of his
statementsup
on his own
knowledge of
the facts
but upon the

information
received by
him from a
reliable
person.Upon
the affidavit

the judge, on
said
date, issued
the warrant
which is the
subject matt

er of the
petition,
ordering the
search of the
Alvarezs
house at any

time of the
day or night,
the seizur
e of the
books
anddocuments

and the
immediate
delivery
thereof
to him to be
disposed of in

accordance
with
the law.With
said warrant,
several

agents of the
AntiUsury Board
entered
Alvarezs
store and

residence at
7:00
p.m. of 4
June 1936,
and seized
and took

possession of
the following
articles:
internal
revenue
licensesfor

the years
1933 to 1936,
1 ledger, 2
journals, 2
cashbooks, 9
order books,

4 notebooks,
4 check
stubs,2
memorandums
,3
bankbooks, 2

contracts,
4 stubs, 48
stubs of
purchases of
copra, 2
inventories,

2bundles of
bills of lading,
1 bundle of
credit
receipts, 1
bundle of

stubs of
purchases of
copra,
2 packagesof
corresponden
ce, 1 receipt

book belongin
g to Luis
Fernandez, 14
bundles of
invoices and
other

papers,many
documents
and loan
contracts
with security
and

promissory
notes,
504 chits,
promissory
notesand
stubs of used

checks of
the Hongkong
& Shanghai
Banking
Corporation
(HSBC). The

search for
andseizure of
said articles
were made
with the
opposition of

Alvarez who
stated his
protest below
theinventorie
s on the
ground that

the
agents seized
even the
originals of
the
documents.

As the
articles
hadnot been
brought
immediately
to the

judge who
issued the
search
warrant,
Alvarez,
through

hisattorney,
filed a motion
on 8
June 1936,
praying that
the

agent Emilio
L. Siongco, or
any other
agent,
beordered
immediately

to deposit all
the
seized article
s in the
office of
the clerk of

court and
that
saidagent be
declared
guilty of
contempt for

having
disobeyed the
order of
the court. On
said date the
courtissued

an order
directing
Siongco to
deposit all
the articles
seized within

24 hours
from
the receipt
of notice
thereof and
giving him a

period of
5 days within
which to show
cause why he
should not
bepunished

for contempt
of court. On
10
June, Attorne
y Arsenio
Rodriguez,

representing
the AntiUsuryBoard,
filed a motion
praying that
the order of

the 8th of
said month
be set aside
and that the
Anti-Usury
Board be

authorized to
retain the
articles
seized for a
period of
30 days for

the
necessaryinve
stigation. On
June 25, the
court issued
an order

requiring
agent Siongco
forthwith to
file
the searchwa
rrant and the

affidavit in
the court,
together with
the
proceedings
taken by him,

and to
present
aninventory
duly verified
by oath of all
the

articles seize
d. On July 2,
the attorney
for the
petitioner
filed

apetition
alleging that
the search
warrant issue
d was illegal
and that it

had not yet

been
returned to
datetogether
with the
proceedings

taken in
connection
therewith,
and praying
that said
warrant beca

ncelled, that
an order be
issued
directing the
return of all
the articles

seized to
Alvarez, that
the agentwho
seized them
be declared
guilty of

contempt of
court, and
that
charges be
filed against
him forabuse

of authority.
On
September
10, the court
issued an
order holding:

that
the search
warrant
wasobtained
and issued in
accordance

with the
law, that it
had been duly
complied with
and,
consequently,

should not be
cancelled, and
that
agent Siongco
did not
commit any

contempt of
court and
must,