Name: Carlo Bardoli Student ID: 4184931 Tutor: Prof Terry Moore

Quebec Bridge (1st Failure )

Introduction
In 1900 construction of the largest Cantilever bridge commenced. The Quebec
Bridge was to span the harsh Icy waters of the St Louisiana River providing an
alternative to inefficient boat conveyance. Despite the superior reputation of the
chosen Engineering team the bridge saw catastrophic failure on August 1907
killing 86 workers and injuring 9 others. A second attempt to bridge Quebec City,
and Lvis was attempted which also led to a partial collapse of the middle span
killing a further 13 workers. Completion of the Quebec Bridge occurred on the
third attempt of construction in 1917.

Design & Construction

The Quebec Bridge company were granted the contract to build the Quebec
Bridge in 1882. Theodore Cooper, a highly respected engineer at the time would
be the consulting engineer for the project. His vision was to construct the worlds
longest spanning cantilever bridge set to date. The initial designs would be
drafted by Peter Szalapka and constructed by the Phoenix Bridge Company with
the supplementary help of the Quebec Bridge company.
On the 6th September 1898 tenders were requested for the project. The Phoenix
Bridge company took almost a year to generate 6 different proposals. Cantilever
bridges (fig 1) were a highly favoured option as displayed in a statement made
by Cooper I hereby conclude and report that the cantilever superstructure plan
of the Phoenix Bridge Company is the best and cheapest plan and proposal
submitted to me for examination and report. (p. 15, Holgate et al., 1908, p. 34,
Middleton, 2001). It was clear that costing was a convincing element of the
elected final proposal.
The bridge was set to stand 45.7m over the St Lawrence River with a clear span
of 487.7m. The riveted steel structure would link Quebec City and Lvis , a highly
anticipated and required connection which was estimated to cost $8,000,000. In
May 1900 Cooper increased this proposed cantilevered span to 548.6m. He
stated that this would eliminate the uncertainty of constructing piers in such
deep water, lessen the effects of ice, and shorten the time of construction of the
piers. (Petroski, 1995, p. 46, Middleton, 2001). The ambiguity in this
proclamation is such that Cooper was speculated to have made these
modifications to enhance his standing as an Engineer. Despite this the Phoenix
bridge & Quebec Bridge Company were standing with Cooper on his decisions
and were in correspondence with him throughout the whole process of change.
Later that year the Quebec bridge company were awarded the construction
contract by Phoenix causing further speculation into whether tenders were
favoured and unfairly decided upon to suit Coopers needs.
Construction of the bridge began on October, 2, 1900 and was contracted for
completion in 1908. The cantilever superstructure; designed by the phoenix
bridge company was to be erected into place almost 5 years later. The prior work
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Name: Carlo Bardoli Student ID: 4184931 Tutor: Prof Terry Moore
involved the production and erection of Concrete backed piers, vertical posts,
tension eye-bars and approach spans; all key structural foundation elements
within the design of a cantilever bridge. In 1905 the scope of the work was
focused towards the superstructure. Construction Work began on the cantilever
span whilst working drawings were being approved by Cooper. This process took
almost 7 months and many calculations of self-weight and maximum load were
based on the initial design proposal where the span was 200ft shorter. These
miscalculations were to have consequential effects on the upcoming building
phase.

Events Leading to Collapse

By June 1905 workers started witnessing deflections in chords. Riveting the joints
between chords was attempted but misalignment on the pre drilled holes
occurred from the excessive compression on unintentionally cambered members.
Norman Mclure the onsite inspector notified Cooper of these concerns but after
discussion the glitches were disregarded small deflections had occurred due to
a pre-existing condition. Cooper & Mclure were not alarmed (p. 72, Middleton,
2001). Although not disconcerted further reviews were carried out at regular
time intervals. Chords 7L and 8L were of Coopers main concern; 19mm
deflections had been recorded and were expected to increase in magnitude with
time (Fig 2). Mclure reported a similar bend in chords 8L and 9L, he believed
these errors were due to inadequate quality checks during manufacture,
although it is believed that the design team were circumventing the blame. One
thing I am reasonably sure of, and that is that the bend has occurred since the
chord has been under stress, and was not present when the chords were
placed.(Quote - Mclure)
In one week chord 9L of the south anchor-arm experienced an increase in
deflection of 38 mm; the members subject to high compressive load and moment
were slowly buckling. Cooper was left confounded and came to the conclusion
that during erection of chord 9L a fatal blow with another suspended beam
occurred, however no evidence of this was found after thorough checks by
Mclure ,leaving the issues unresolved. Cooper at the time of construction was of
ill health and did not visit the site once during erection of the superstructure.
This left him relying heavily on Mclure for answers. The manufacture of the
chords assured that all members were straight upon leaving the workshop,
However it was reported in 1905 that chord A9L was dropped and bent while
being handled in the storage yard. The A9L notation refers to the chord located
in the anchor arm, within the ninth panel, and on the left or west side of the
bridge. It was repaired and placed into the structure. (Petroski, 1995,
Middleton, 2001).
Workers were informed of the increasingly cambered members and B.A Yenser
the general Foreman of the Phoenix Bridge Company decided to temporarily
suspend work for others safety . Cooper was notified in a meeting and approved
the decision Add no more load to the bridge until after due consideration of
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Name: Carlo Bardoli Student ID: 4184931 Tutor: Prof Terry Moore
facts.(Quote - Cooper). Work still commenced for many hours after Cooper had
made this imperative declaration due to the tight deadlines of completion.

Collapse
At 5:30 on 29th June 1907 the deflected chords on the Quebec Bridge could no
longer hold the increasing self-weight of the bridge. Those on the northern
shore saw the end of the half arch bend down a little and a moment later One
Whole, enormous fabric began to break down. Slowly at first, then with a terrific
crash (Manitoba Free Press 1907) 75 workers were killed that day and 11
injured. In addition to the tremendous loss of life, it is estimated that property
loss through the collapse of the section of the bridge will not be less than
$2,000,000. (Manitoba Free Press, 1907)

Investigation
Three forensic engineers John Kerry, Henry Holgate and John Galbraith formed a
royal commission report as instructed by the Governor General of Canada. They
constructed a 200 page document with over twenty appendices. Their findings
were considered a breakthrough in forensic engineering. During investigation,
deliberations were made into the planning, design and collapse. It was reported
that grave error was made during the calculation phase, the dead load of the
bridge was assumed safe even though it was an approximation which turned out
to be off by almost 18% This erroneous assumption was made by Mr Szlapka
and accepted by Mr Cooper, and tended to hasten the disaster. (Royal
commission report, 1908).The stated critical stresses were also incorrect and
much higher than those calculated by AISC standardised formulas. Poor
management skills were a key finding in the report, communication error led to
work not stopping when instructed and many workers were unfit for their job.

Main Cause
It was ultimately concluded that the critical compression members responsible
for the collapse were chord 9L and 9R (Fig 3) The failure of these chords were
due to their defective design. (Royal commission report, 1908) This was later
confirmed on Nov 1907 when compression tests were performed on 1/3 scale
models of chord 9L and 9R. The structural lattice found within the chords was
meant to increase stiffness but proved to act in contrary. During testing, the
lattice system failed explosively due to shearing of its rivets, immediately
followed by buckling of the chord. (Holgate et al.,1908.) The cantilever and
anchor arms were also designed to be slightly curved; these curved members are
known to increase secondary stresses. As a rule secondary stresses are much
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Name: Carlo Bardoli Student ID: 4184931 Tutor: Prof Terry Moore
more dangerous in tension that in compression members, which seem to have
been the first to give way in the Quebec bridge (ER, 1907e).

Lessons Learnt
Assumptions should never be made in any project; calculations should be
checked and approved by multiple people. If a worker does not agree with a
decision they should make their opinion heard, this proved fatal for the Quebec
Bridge. Projects should never be rushed, an unrealistic deadline puts
unnecessary pressure on workers; errors are likely to be made. Most importantly
workers should be capable of the work they are undertaking too avoid fatalities.
It was clear that on that day the greatest bridge in the world was being built
without there being a single man within reach who by experience, knowledge
and ability was competent to deal with the crisis. (Holgate et al., 1908).

Word Count: 1524

Figures

Figure 1: Principle of Cantilever (http://matdl.org/failurecases/File:Cantilever_Bridge.gif)

Month of
Observation
June
June
June
June
June
August
August

Chord

A3R & A4R

A7R & A8R
A8R & A9R
A8L & A9L
7L & 8L
8L & 9L

Deflection
mm
1.56.5
1.56.5
1.56.5
1.56.5
19
19
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Name: Carlo Bardoli Student ID: 4184931 Tutor: Prof Terry Moore
August
August
August

8R
5R & 6R
A9L

Bent
13
57

Figure 2: Deflection of chords information sourced from (http://ascelibrary.org/action/showFullPopup?

id=t2&doi=10.1061%2F%28ASCE%290887-3828%282006%2920%3A1%2884%29)

Fig 3: Location of Chords (Modjeski et al. 1919)

Bibliography
ENR. (1907e). The Quebec Bridge superstructure details, Part VII. Engineering
Record, Building Record Sanitary Engineer, 169-170
Holgate, H., Derry, J., G. G., and Galbraith, J. (1908). Royal Commission Quebec
Bridge Inquiry Rep. Sessional Paper No 154, S.E. Dawson, printer to the
King, Ottawa.
John Kerry, Henry Holgate, John Galbraith. Royal Commission Quebec Bridge
Inquiry. Quebec: S.E. Dawson, 1908.
Petroski, H. (1995). Engineers of dreams: Great bridge builders and the spanning
of America, Knopf, New York.
Unknown (1907). Manitoba Free Press, Winnipeg, Canada, Friday, August 30,
1907, Page 8.
Unknown (1907). Manitoba Free Press, Winnipeg, Canada, Friday, August 30,
1907, Page 1
William D Middleton (2001). The Bridge at Quebec. United States: Indiana
University Press.