Professional Documents
Culture Documents
141529
June 6, 2001
21
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SERGON MANES and RAMIL MANES, accused-appellants.
PARDO, J.:
The case before the Court is an appeal taken by accused
Sergon Manes and Ramil Manes from the judgment 1of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, 2 Iloilo City, convicting them of
murder and sentencing them to each "suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties as provided
in Article 41 of the Revised Penal Code" and "to indemnify the
family of their victim in the amount of P50,000.00 plus
P21.250.00 as expenses for the burial, wake and other related
matter and to pay the costs."
however, did not hear the petition for bail. Neither did the
accused invoke the right to bail at any stage of the trial.
The prosecution presented six witnesses, 4 two of whom were
eyewitnesses to the crime, while the defense presented
three, 5 two of whom were the accused themselves.
On January 13, 1995, the trial court rendered judgment
convicting the accused of murder, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
Accordingly, finding the accused, Ramil Manes and
Sergon Manes, guilty of murder beyond reasonable
doubt, they are therefore sentenced to each suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetuawith the accessory
penalties provided in Article 41 of the Revised Penal
Code and they are also ordered to indemnify the family
of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 plus P21,250.00
as expenses for the burial, wake and other related
matter and to pay the costs. 6
On February 10, 1995, both accused appealed to this Court. 7
In the appeal, accused questioned the trial court's failure (a) to
hear the petition for bail; (b) to consider defense of relative in
favor of Ramil Manes; and (c) to take note that Sergon Manes
was a mere victim of Tamorite's unlawful aggression.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
(a) According to the prosecution
On June 23, 1991, at about 5:00 in the afternoon, Alan
Catequista together with Nicanor Tamorite and Jose Cubita,
went to see a basketball game at the barangay plaza. When
the game was over, Alan approached and invited Nicanor
Tamorite to go home; at that time, he was still seated. Accused
Ramil Manes approached Nicanor Tamorite and pointed a .38
caliber revolver at him, saying "It is a bad luck you did not kill
me during the fiesta in Barangay Cabayugan. Now I will be the
The appeal has no merit. The trial court did not err in finding
appellants guilty of murder.
Appellants contend that the trial court committed a serious error
of law when it went on with the trial of the case without hearing
the petition for bail that was set for hearing several times.
Under the law, 13 in offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua, life imprisonment or death, the accused has no right
to bail when evidence of guilt is strong. The court must hear a
petition for bail to determine whether the evidence of guilt is
strong before deciding to grant or deny bail to the
accused. 14
While the accused can apply for bail and have the court hear
his application summarily and promptly, such right may be
waived expressly or impliedly. 15
In this case, the trial court proceeded to try the case without
resolving the petition for bail that appellants filed. However, the
latter did not call the attention of the trial court to their
unresolved application for bail. It was only in the appeal that
they raised this issue. Thus, for failure to bring to the attention
SO ORDERED.
On the other hand, the trial court must not have appreciated the
aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior strength and
aid of armed men because these are in absorbed treachery. 24
Consequently, we sustain the trial court's conviction of the
accused, including the civil liability imposed against them.
However, the aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation and abuse of superior strength and aid of armed
men are not to be appreciated.
WHEREFORE, We AFFIRM the judgment of the convicting
accused-appellants Sergon Manes and Ramil Manes of murder
and sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua with the accessory penalties of the law and to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased Nicanor Tamorite in the
amount of P50,000.00 plus P21,250.00, as actual damages.
Costs against accused-appellants.
OBOSA, petitioner,
and
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The main issue in this case is whether petitioner Jose T. Obosa,
who was charged with two (2) counts of murder(a capital
offense) 1 for the ambush slaying of former Secretary of Interior
and Local Governments Jaime N. Ferrer and his driver Jesus
D. Calderon, but who was convicted only of two (2) counts of
homicide by the trial court, may be granted bail after such
conviction for homicide, a non-capital offense. The Regional
Trial Court of Makati answered in the affirmative but the Court
of Appeals ruled otherwise.
Petitioner thus asks this Court to resolve said issue in this
petition under Rule 65 assailing the two Resolutions 2 of the
respondent Court 3 promulgated on November 19, 1993 and
sentences of four (4) years, five (5) months and two (2)
day(s). Consequently, he has to serve sentence and
remain in confinement up to October 1, 1996. Of
course, he may be given allowance for good conduct.
But good conduct time allowance can not be computed
in advance (Frank vs. Wolfe, 11 Phil. 466). This is
counted only during the time an accused actually served
with good conduct and diligence (Frank vs.
Wolfe, supra; See Aquino, The Revised Penal Code,
Vol. I, 1987 ed., pp. 803-804). However, accused Obosa
can not avail himself of this beneficent provision of the
law because, while he was at large, he committed
infraction of prison rules (escaping) and other crimes,
including the Ferrer assassination, and for which he was
placed under preventive imprisonment commencing on
December 4, 1987, the date the informations at bar
were filed against him. Because he was then under
custody, no warrant of arrest or commitment order need
be issued (Asuncion vs. Peralejo, G.R. No. 82915, June
22, 1988, minute resolution; Cf. People vs. Wilson, 4
Phil. 381; Umil vs. Ramos, 187 SCRA 311). Allowance
for good conduct does not apply to detention prisoners
(Baking vs. Director of Prisons, 28 SCRA 851).
Consequently, by all reckoning, accused Obosa could
not be released from prison on June 4, 1990, when he
was admitted to bail. His release was illegal. He still has
to serve the balance of his unserved sentences until
October 1, 1996.
On September 6, 1993, respondent People, through the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed with respondent Court an
urgent motion, 13 praying for cancellation of petitioner's bail
bond.
14
But it should be noted that the bail was granted on May 31,
1990 by the trial Court. 26 The validity and effectivity of the
subsequent approval of the bail bond by the trial court on June
4, 1990 is therefore the matter at issue. We agree with
respondent Court and respondent People that, while bail was
granted by the trial court when it had jurisdiction, the approval
of the bail bond was done without authority, because by then,
the appeal had already been perfected and the trial court had
lost jurisdiction. Needless to say, the situation would have been
different had bail been granted and approval thereof given
before the notice of appeal was filed.
Petitioner
Entitled
To
Bail
And the grave caution that must attend the exercise of judicial
discretion in granting bail to a convicted accused is best
illustrated and exemplified in Administrative Circular No. 12-94
amending Rule 114, Section 5 which now specifically provides
SO ORDERED.
We also hold that the trial court had failed to exercise the
degree of discretion and caution required under and mandated
by our statutes and rules, for, aside from being too hasty in
granting bail immediately after promulgation of judgment, and
acting without jurisdiction in approving the bailbond, it
inexplicably ignored the undeniable fact of petitioner's previous
escape from legal confinement as well as his prior convictions.
V
THE ISSUANCE OF A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER IN THIS CASE VIOLATES NOT ONLY
RESPONDENT SALAS' RIGHT TO BAIL BUT ALSO
HIS OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS.
We required the petitioner to reply to the comment of private
respondent. 21 The reply was filed on 18 September 1987. 22
In Our resolution of 15 October 1987 23 We gave due course to
the petition and required the parties to file simultaneously their
memoranda within twenty days from notice.
In their respective manifestations and motions dated 5
November 24 and 23 November 1987 25 petitioner and private
respondents asked to be excused from filing their Memoranda
and that the petition and reply be considered as the
Memorandum for petitioner and the Comment as the
Memorandum for private respondent, which We granted in Our
resolution of 19 November 1987 26 and 1 December
1987, 27 respectively.
In Our resolution of 14 September 1989 We required the
Solicitor General to express his stand on the issues raised in
this petitions, 28 which he complied with by filing his
Manifestation on 30 May 1990 29 wherein he manifests that he
supports the petition and submits that the Order of respondent
Judge of July 7, July 17 and July 30, 1987 should be annulled
and set aside asserting that private respondent had waived the
light to bail in view of the agreement in G.R. No. 76009; that
granting bail to him is accepting wide-eyed his undertaking
which he is sure to break; in determining bail, the primary
consideration is to insure the attendance of the accused at the
trial of the case against him which would be frustrated by the
"almost certainty that respondent Salas will lump bail of
whatever amount"; and application of the guidelines provided
for in Section 10 of Rule 114, 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure on the amount of bail dictates denial of bail to