Professional Documents
Culture Documents
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UY V BUENO
484 SCRA 628
PUNO; March 14, 2006
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA
FACTS
- Amalia Bueno was the Manager of Countrywide Rural Bank of
La Carota, Inc. (bank hereafter) Marbel Branch. She was
verbally and summarily dismissed by Atty. Andrea Uy, interim
President and Corporate Secretary of the bank, during a
depositors' meeting.
- Bueno filed a case for illegal dismissal and prayed for
reinstatement with full backwages and damages.
ISSUE
WON Uy is an officer of the bank, making her soldarily liable
with the corporation for illegal dismissal
HELD
NO
- The minutes of the depositors' meeting clearly showed that Uy
was a mere depositor of the bank. She was only elected as
officer of the Interim Board of Directors craeted by the
association of depositors with the sole task of rehabilitating the
bank (which is under receivership).
- There is no evidence that the association of depositors that
elected the interim board was recognized by BSP. Hence, it had
no legal authority to act for the bank.
- The act of dismissing Bueno by Uy cannot be deemed as an
act as an officer of the bank. Consequently, it cannot be held
that there existed an employer-employee relationship between
Uy and Bueno.
- The requirement of employer-employee relationship is
jurisdictional for the provisions of the Labor Code on Postemployment to apply. Since such relationship was not
established, the labor arbiter never acquired jurisdiction over
Uy.
Disposition CA decision finding Uy solidarily liable with the
bank reversed
Agabon v. NLRC, G.R. No. 158693, 442 SCRA 573, Nov. 17, 2004.
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CRUZ; June 27, 1991
NATURE
Appeal from the decision of the NLRC dismissing the complaint
for illegal dismissal by the petitioners on the ground that it is
without jurisdiction.
FACTS
- Dismissed by the National Service Corporation, the petitioners
complained to the Ministry of Labor and Employment on
September 17, 1980. After considering the position papers of
the parties, the Labor Arbiter ordered the petitioners'
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and the payment
to them of two years back wages and other benefits. 3 The
decision was appealed to and affirmed by the First Division of
the NLRC on December 9, 1985, and in due time, the petitioners
moved for the issuance of a writ of execution. This was opposed
by NASECO on the ground that it had not been furnished with a
copy of the decision, but the opposition was rejected and the
petition was granted. Reconsideration of the order having been
denied, the NASECO appealed to the NLRC, which, through its
Third Division this time, declared itself without jurisdiction and
dismissed the case on August 18, 1987. 4 Citing the NHA case,
the public respondent held that the NASECO was not covered by
the Labor Code but by Civil Service rules and regulations, being
a government-owned or controlled corporation.
ISSUE
WON the National Service Corporation is covered by the Labor
Code
HELD
YES
- The decision in National Housing Corporation v. Juco was
already overturned by the decision in National Service
Corporation v. NLRC. The NLRC erred in dismissing the
petitioners' complaint for lack of jurisdiction because the rule
now is that only government-owned or controlled corporations
with original charters come under the Civil Service. The NASECO
having been organized under the Corporation Law and not by
virtue of a special legislative charter, its relations with its
personnel are governed by the Labor Code and come under the
jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Commission.
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quitclaim releases respondent from any other obligation in favor
of petitioner.
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261 SCRA 399
MENDOZA; September 4, 1996
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari to set aside the order dated
October 13, 1992 and the resolution dated March 3, 1993 of the
National Labor Relations Commission.
FACTS
Private
respondent
International
Catholic
Migration
Commission (ICMC) is a non-profit agency engaged in
international humanitarian and voluntary work. It is duly
registered with the United National Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC) and enjoys Consultative Status, Category II. It was
one of the agencies accredited by the Philippine Government to
operate the refugee processing center at Sabang, Morong,
Bataan.
- On June 24, 1985, private respondent ICMC employed
petitioner Jose G. Ebro III to teach "English as a Second
Language and Cultural Orientation Training Program" at the
refugee processing center. The employment contract provided
in pertinent part:
Salary: Your monthly salary for the first 6 months
probationary period is P3,155.00 inclusive of cost of living
allowance. Upon being made regular after successful
completion of the six (6) months probationary period your
monthly salary will be adjusted to P3,445.00 inclusive of cost
of living allowance
If either party wishes to terminate employment, a notice of
two (2) weeks should be given in writing to the party.
- After six months, ICMC notified petitioner that effective
December 21, 1985, the latter's services were terminated for
his failure to meet the requirements of "1. classroom
performance . . . up to the standards set in the Guide for
Instruction; 2. regular attendance in the mandated teacher
training, and in the schedule team meetings, one-on-one
conferences with the supervisor, etc.; and 3. compliance with
ICMC and PRPC policies and procedures."
- On February 4, 1986, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal, unfair labor practice, underpayment of wages,
accrued leave pay, 14th month pay, damages, attorney's fees,
and expenses of litigation. Petitioner alleged that there was no
objective evaluation of his performance to warrant his dismissal
and that he should have been considered a regular employee
from the start because ICMC failed to acquaint him with the
standards under which he must qualify as such. He prayed for
reinstatement with backwages; P3,155.00 for probationary and
P3,445.00 for regular salary adjustments; value of lodging or
dormitory privileges; cost of insurance coverage for group life,
medical, death, dismemberment and disability benefits; moral,
and exemplary, and nominal damages plus interest on the
above claims with attorney's fees.
- Answering the complaint, ICMC claimed that petitioner failed
to quality for regular employment because he showed no
interest in improving his professional performance both in and
out of the classroom after he had been periodically evaluated;
that petitioner was paid his salary up to December 31, 1985,
two weeks pay in lieu of notice, and 14th month pay pro-rata;
and that his accrued leave balance already been converted to
cash.
- After the parties had formally offered their evidence, private
respondents submitted their memorandum on July 31, 1989 in
which, among other things, they invoked ICMC's diplomatic
immunity on the basis of the Memorandum of Agreement
signed on July 15, 1988 between the Philippines government
and ICMC.
- The Labor Arbiter held that ICMC's legal immunity under the
Memorandum could not be given retroactive effect since "[that
would] deprive complainant's property right without due
process and impair the obligation of contract of employment."
He also expressed doubt on the ground that it was provided for
by agreement and not through an act of Congress. Accordingly,
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NATIONAL MINES AND ALLIED WORKERS UNION V
SAN ILDEFONSO COLLEGE
CHIANG KAI SHEK COLLEGE V CA (NLRC,
CALAYLAY, AQUINO, GACUTAN, BELO)
437 SCRA 171
DAVIDE, JR; August 24, 2004
FACTS
- In 1992, Ms. Diana Belo, a teacher of Chiang Kai Shek College
since 1977, applied for a leave of absence for the school year
1992-1993. Upon submitting her application, she was informed
of the school policy that if she takes a leave of absence, she is
not assured of a teaching load upon her return. She was
likewise informed that only teachers in active service may enjoy
the privilege and benefits provided by the school, such as free
tuition for the teachers children.
- Ms. Belo, nonetheless, took her leave of absence. In May 1993,
she attempted to return to CKSC and signified her readiness to
teach for the coming school year. However, she was not allowed
to return. Hence, she filed a complaint for illegal dismissal,
among others, against CKSC.
- The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint but the NLRC
disagreed. The Court of Appeals upheld the NLRCs ruling.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE
WON private respondent was constructively dismissed
HELD
YES
- Under the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, for a
private school teacher to acquire a permanent status of
employment and, therefore, be entitled to a security of
tenure, the following requisites must concur: (a) the
teacher is a full-time teacher; (b) the teacher must have
rendered three consecutive years of service; and (c)
such service must have been satisfactory. Since Ms. Belo
has measured up to these standards, she therefore enjoys
security of tenure.
- Constructive dismissal is defined as a cessation from work
because continued employment is rendered impossible,
unreasonable, or unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank or a
diminution in pay or both; or when a clear discrimination,
insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to
the employee.
- Ms. Belo was constructively dismissed when the petitioners, in
implementing their policies, effectively barred her from
teaching for the school year 1993-1994. The three policies are
(1) the non-assurance of a teaching load to a teacher who took
a leave of absence; (2) the hiring of non-permanent teachers in
April to whom teaching loads were already assigned when Ms.
Belo signified in May 1993 her intention to teach; and (3) the
non-applicability to children of teachers on leave of the free
tuition fee benefits extended to children of teachers in service.
- Ms. Belo was definitely singled out in the implementation of a
future policy (i.e., the policy that employees not in service are
not entitled to any benefit extended by the school). The
petitioners did not take heed of the principle enshrined in our
labor laws that policies should be adequately known to the
employees and uniformly implemented to the body of
employees as a whole and not in isolation.
- The continued employment of Ms. Belo was also rendered
unlikely by the insistence of the petitioners in implementing the
alleged policy that a teacher who goes on leave for one year is
not assured of a teaching load. While this alleged policy was
mentioned in Mr. Chiens letter of 9 June 1992, it was not
included in the schools written statement of policies dated 13
March 1992. Hence, it was then a non-existent policy. When a
non-existent policy is implemented and, in this case, only to Ms.
Belo, it constitutes a clear case of discrimination.
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convene the Executive Committee. Pastor Buhat denied the
request of petitioner since some committee members were out
of town and there was no quorum. Thereafter, the two
exchanged heated arguments. Petitioner then left the office of
Pastor Buhat. While on his way out, petitioner overheard Pastor
Buhat saying "Pastor daw inisog na ina iya (Pastor you are
talking tough)." Irked by such remark, petitioner returned to the
office of Pastor Buhat, and tried to overturn the latter's table,
though unsuccessfully, since it was heavy. Thereafter,
petitioner banged the attache case of Pastor Buhat on the table,
scattered the books in his office, and threw the phone.
Fortunately, Pastors Yonillo Leopoldo and Claudio Montao were
around and they pacified both.
- On 17 October 1991, petitioner received a letter inviting him
and his wife to attend the Executive Committee meeting. From
October 21 to 22, the fact-finding committee conducted an
investigation. Petitioner immediately wrote Pastor Rueben
Moralde, president of the SDA and chairman of the fact-finding
committee, requesting that certain members of the fact-finding
committee be excluded in the investigation and resolution of
the case. Out of the 6 members requested to inhibit themselves
from the investigation and decision-making, only 2 were
actually excluded: Pastor Buhat and Pastor Rodrigo.
Subsequently, petitioner received a letter of dismissal citing
misappropriation of denominational funds, willful breach of
trust, serious misconduct, gross and habitual neglect of duties,
and commission of an offense against the person of employer's
duly authorized representative, as grounds for the termination
of his services.
ISSUES
1. WON the Labor Arbiter/NLRC has jurisdiction to try and
decide the complaint filed by petitioner against the SDA
2. WON the termination of the services of petitioner is an
ecclesiastical affair, and, as such, involves the separation of
church and state
3. WON such termination is valid
HELD
1. YES and 2. NO [Resolved jointly since they are related]
Ratio An ecclesiastical affair is one that concerns doctrine,
creed or form or worship of the church, or the adoption and
enforcement within a religious association of needful laws and
regulations for the government of the membership, and the
power of excluding from such associations those deemed
unworthy of membership.
Reasoning
- Based on this definition, an ecclesiastical affair involves the
relationship between the church and its members and relate to
matters of faith, religious doctrines, worship and governance of
the congregation. To be concrete, examples of this so-called
ecclesiastical affairs to which the State cannot meddle are
proceedings for excommunication, ordinations of religious
ministers, administration of sacraments and other activities
which attached religious significance. The case at bar does not
even remotely concern any of the above cited examples. While
the matter at hand relates to the church and its religious
minister it does not ipso facto give the case a religious
significance. Simply stated, what is involved here is the
relationship of the church as an employer and the minister as
an employee. It is purely secular and has no relation
whatsoever with the practice of faith, worship or doctrines of
the church. In this case, petitioner was not excommunicated or
expelled from the membership of the SDA but was terminated
from employment.
- Aside from these, SDA admitted in a certification issued by its
officer, Ibesate, that petitioner has been its employee for 28
years. SDA even registered petitioner with the SSS as its
employee. The worker's records of petitioner have been
submitted by private respondents as part of their exhibits. From
all of these it is clear that when the SDA terminated the
services of petitioner, it was merely exercising its management
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occasion for abuse, because of its subjective nature. The
records show that there were only 6 instances when petitioner
personally collected and received from the church treasurers
the tithes, collections, and donations for the church. The
testimony of Naomi Geniebla, the Negros Mission Church
Auditor and a witness for private respondents, show that Pastor
Austria was able to remit all his collections to the treasurer of
the Negros Mission. Private respondents try to pin on petitioner
the alleged non-remittance of the tithes collected by his wife. In
the absence of conspiracy and collusion, which private
respondents failed to demonstrate, between petitioner and his
wife, he cannot be made accountable for the alleged infraction
committed by his wife. After all, they still have separate and
distinct personalities. Thus, the allegation of breach of trust has
no leg to stand on.
- Misconduct has been defined as improper or wrong conduct. It
is the transgression of some established and definite rule of
action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character,
and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment. For
misconduct to be considered serious it must be of such grave
and aggravated character and not merely trivial or unimportant.
Based on this standard, we believe that the act of petitioner in
banging the attache case on the table, throwing the telephone
and scattering the books in the office of Pastor Buhat, although
improper, cannot be considered as grave enough to be
considered as serious misconduct. After all, as correctly
observed by the Labor Arbiter, though petitioner committed
damage to property, he did not physically assault Pastor Buhat
or any other pastor present during the incident of 16 October
1991. In fact, the alleged offense committed upon the person of
the employer's representatives was never really established or
proven by private respondents. Hence, there is no basis for the
allegation that petitioner's act constituted serious misconduct
or that the same was an offense against the person of the
employer's duly authorized representative.
- The final ground alleged by private respondents, gross and
habitual neglect of duties, does not requires an exhaustive
discussion. All private respondents had were allegations but not
proof. Aside from merely citing the said ground, private
respondents failed to prove culpability. In fact, the evidence on
record shows otherwise. Petitioner's rise from the ranks proves
that he was actually a hard-worker. Private respondents'
evidence, which consisted of petitioner's Worker's Reports,
revealed how petitioner travelled to different churches to attend
to the faithful under his care. Indeed, he labored hard for the
SDA, but, in return, he was rewarded with a dismissal from the
service for a non-existent cause.
Disposition Finding of the Labor Arbiter that petitioner was
terminated from service without just or lawful cause is
SUSTAINED. Petitioner is entitled to reinstatement without loss
of seniority right and the payment of full back-wages without
any deduction corresponding to the period from his illegal
dismissal up to the actual reinstatement. Challenged Resolution
of NLRC is NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE.
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SECTION 2. Status of employees paid by the month -Employees who are uniformly
paid by the month, irrespective of the number of' working days therein with a salary
of not less than the statutory or established minimum wage, shall be presumed to be
paid for all days in the month whether worked or not.
For this purpose, the monthly minimum wage shall not be less than the statutory
minimum wage multiplied by 365 days divided by twelve.
Labor Law 1
Article 94 (formerly Article 208) of the Labor Code, is merely a
disputable presumption
Respondents Comments
- The Bank maintains that, since its inception or start of
operations in 1954, all monthly-paid employees in the Bank are
paid their monthly salaries without any deduction for unworked
Saturdays, Sundays, legals and special holidays. On the other
hand, it also maintains that, as a matter of fact, 'always
conscious of its employee who has to work, on respondent's
rest days of Saturdays and Sundays or on a legal holiday, an
employee who works overtime on any of said days is paid one
addition regular pay for the day plus 50% of said regular pay
- The Bank further maintains that the holiday pay is intended
only for daily-paid workers.
- The question submitted for arbitration is now moot and
academic.
ISSUE
WON the permanent employees of the bank are entitled to
holiday pay
HELD
YES
- In excluding the union members of herein petitioner from the
benefits of the holiday pay law, public respondent predicated
his ruling on Section 2, Rule IV, Book III of the Rules to
implement Article 94 of the labor Code promulgated by the then
Secretary of labor and Policy Instructions No. 9.
- In Insular Bank of Asia and America Employees' Union
(IBAAEU) vs. Inciong, 7 this Court's Second Division, speaking
through former Justice Makasiar, expressed the view and
declared that the aforementioned section and interpretative
bulletin are null and void, having been promulgated by the then
Secretary of Labor in excess of his rule-making authority. It
was pointed out, inter alia, that in the guise of clarifying the
provisions on holiday pay, said rule and policy instructions in
effect amended the law by enlarging the scope of the
exclusions.
- The questioned Section 2, Rule IV, Book III of the Integrated
Rules and the Secretary's Policy Instruction No. 9 add another
excluded group, namely, 'employees who are uniformly paid by
the month'. While the additional exclusion is only in the form of
a presumption that all monthly paid employees have already
been paid holiday pay, it constitutes a taking away or a
deprivation which must be in the law if it is to be valid. An
administrative interpretation which diminishes the benefits of
labor more than what the statute delimits or withholds is
obviously ultra vires.
Disposition The questioned decision set aside and the award
of the arbitrator reinstated.
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ISSUE
WON there was an employer-employee relationship between
ABS-CBN and Sonza
HELD
NO
- This is the first Court resolution on nature of relationship
between a station and a talent.
- There are 4 elements of employer-employee relationship:
1. Selection of employee
- if Sonza didnt possess his skills, talents and celebrity
status, ABS-CBN would not have entered into agreement
with him but would have hired him through personnel
department
2. Payment of wages
- whatever Sonza received arose from the contract and not
from the employer-employee relation
- the talent fee is so huge that it indicates more a
contractual than an employment relationship
3. Power to dismiss
- ABS-CBN coulnt retrench Sonza because it is obligated to
pay talent fees for duration of contract
4. Control on employee on means and methods
- also called control test; most impt to determine
relationship
- Sonza contends ABS exercised control over means and
methods of his work. Court said ABS merely reserved the
right to modify the program format and airtime schedule.
Its sole concern was the quality of the show and the
ratings. How Sonza appeared, sounded, etc. is outside
control of ABS.
- Sonza contends that ABS exercised control in providing
equipment and crew.
Court said these are not tools
needed by Sonza. What he needed were his talent, skills,
costume.
- Sonza contends that ABS subjected him to rules and
standards. Court said that the rules are the TV and Radio
Code of the Kapisanan ng Broadcaster sa Pilipinas, merely
adopted by ABS as its code of ethics.
It applies to
broadcasters, not just to ABS employees. Besides, these
rules are merely guidelines.
- Sonza said his exclusivity is a form of control by ABS.
Court said exclusivity is a widespread practice in
entertainment industry, as protection of investment in
building up a talent. Besides, the huge talent fees of an
exclusive talent compensates for exclusivity.
- Arbiter ruled that as talent of MJMDC, Sonza is not an
employee of ABS. Sonza insists that MJMDC is a labor-only
contractor and ABS is his employer. In labor-only contract,
there are 3 parties the contractor, employee and the principal
(deemed the real employer). Under this, the contractor is the
agent of the principal. If Sonzas argument was true, then
MJMDC turns to be the agent of both Sonza and ABS. Besides,
in the Agreement, there were only two parties mentioned
Sonza and ABS, with MJMDC as Sonzas agent.
- Sonza argues Policy Instruction No. 40 by Minister of Labor
said the types of employees in broadcast are the station and
program employees. Court said this instruction is a mere
executive issuance not binding on the Court.
- Court also said that Arbiter can decide a case without a formal
trial.
- Sonza argues that treating talents as contractors violates right
to security of tenure. Court said this right exists only if there is
an employer-employee relation. Besides, law also protects
rights of talents to contract. Besides, if hosts were employees,
managers can dictate what hosts will say, and this is not
conducive to press freedom.
- Difference in tax treatment also showed that theres no
employer-employee relation.
- Sonzas claim is based on their agreement. Therefore, action
should not be based on Labor Code but on breach of contract.
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RIZAL EMPIRE INSURANCE GROUP V NLRC (RUIZ,
CORIA)
150 SCRA 565
PARAS; May 29, 1987
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NATURE
Petition for certiorari
FACTS
- August, 1977- Coria was hired by Rizal Empire Insurance
Group(REIG) as a casual employee with a salary of P10.00 a
day.
- January 1, 1978- Coria was made a regular employee, having
been appointed as clerk-typist, with a monthly salary of
P300.00.
- Being a permanent employee, he was furnished a copy of
petitioner company's "General Information, Office Behavior and
Other Rules and Regulations."
- In the same year, without change in his position-designation,
he was transferred to the Claims Department and his salary was
increased to P450.00 a month.
- 1980- he was transferred to the Underwriting Department and
his salary was increased to P580.00 a month plus cost of living
allowance, until he was transferred to the Fire Department as
filing clerk.
- July, 1983- he was made an inspector of the Fire Division with
a monthly salary of P685.00 plus allowances and other benefits.
- Oct. 15, 1983- Coria was dismissed from work, on the grounds
of tardiness and unexcused absences.
- Coria filed a complaint with MOLE
- March 14, 1985- LA Ruiz reinstated him to his position with
back wages.
- REIG appealed to the NLRC but was dismissed on the ground
that the same had been filed out of time. Hence this petition.
ISSUE
WON it is still within the jurisdiction of the SC
HELD
NO
- Under the provisions of the Revised NLRC Rules, the decision
appealed from in this case has become final and executory and
can no longer be subject to appeal.
Ratio
Administrative regulations and policies enacted by
administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are
entrusted to enforce, have the force of law, and are entitled to
great respect (Espanol v. Philippine Veterans Administration,
137 SCRA 314 [1985])..
Reasoning
- The record shows that REIG received a copy of the decision of
the LA on April 1, 1985.
- It filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Memorandum of
Appeal on April 11, 1985 and filed the Memorandum of Appeal
on April 22, 1985.
- Rule VIII of the Revised Rules of the NLRC on appeal, provides
that decisions or orders of a LA shall be final and executory
unless appealed to the Commission by any or both of the
parties within 10 calendar days from receipt of notice and that
no motion or request for extension of the period within which to
perfect an appeal shall be entertained.
NLRC correctly dismissed REIGs appeal pursuant to said rules.
- The NLRC didnt commit GAD amounting to lack of jurisdiction
in arbitrarily dismissing petitioners' appeal on a technicality.
- SC need not interpret the Revised Rules of the NLRC as they
are clear and explicit and leave no room for interpretation.
- Even on the merits, the ruling of the LA appears to be correct;
the consistent promotions in rank and salary of the private
respondent indicate he must have been a highly efficient
worker, who should be retained despite occasional lapses in
Labor Law 1
that since Astra did not have a milk division, the potential
conflict of interest would be eliminated. His application was
denied in view of Glaxos least-movement-possible policy.
Glaxo transferred Tecson to the Butuan City-Surigao CityAgusan del Sur sales area. Tecson asked Glaxo to reconsider its
decision, but his request was denied.
- Tecson sought Glaxos reconsideration regarding his transfer
and brought the matter to Glaxos Grievance Committee. Glaxo,
however, remained firm in its decision and gave Tecson time to
comply with the transfer order. Tecson defied the transfer order
and continued acting as medical representative in the
Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area.
- During the pendency of the grievance proceedings, Tecson
was paid his salary, but was not issued samples of products
which were competing with similar products manufactured by
Astra.
He was also not included in product conferences
regarding such products.
- Because the parties failed to resolve the issue at the
grievance machinery level, they submitted the matter for
voluntary arbitration. Glaxo offered Tecson a separation pay of
one-half month pay for every year of service, or a total of
P50,000.00 but he declined the offer. The National Conciliation
and Mediation Board (NCMB) rendered its Decision declaring as
valid Glaxos policy on relationships between its employees and
persons employed with competitor companies, and affirming
Glaxos right to transfer Tecson to another sales territory.
- Aggrieved, Tecson filed a Petition for Review with the Court of
Appeals assailing the NCMB Decision. The Court of Appeals
promulgated its Decision denying the Petition for Review on the
ground that the NCMB did not err in rendering its Decision. The
appellate court held that Glaxos policy prohibiting its
employees from having personal relationships with employees
of competitor companies is a valid exercise of its management
prerogatives. Tecson filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
appellate courts Decision, but the motion was denied by the
appellate court.
ISSUES
1. WON the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Glaxos policy
against its employees marrying employees from competitor
companies is valid, and in not holding that said policy violates
the equal protection clause of the Constitution
2. WON petitioner was constructively dismissed
HELD
1. NO
- Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing
formulas, marketing strategies and other confidential programs
and information from competitors, especially so that it and
Astra are rival companies in the highly competitive
pharmaceutical industry.
- The prohibition against personal or marital relationships with
employees of competitor companies upon Glaxos employees is
reasonable under the circumstances because relationships of
that nature might compromise the interests of the company. In
laying down the assailed company policy, Glaxo only aims to
protect its interests against the possibility that a competitor
company will gain access to its secrets and procedures.
- That Glaxo possesses the right to protect its economic
interests cannot be denied. No less than the Constitution
recognizes the right of enterprises to adopt and enforce such a
policy to protect its right to reasonable returns on investments
and to expansion and growth. Indeed, while our laws endeavor
to give life to the constitutional policy on social justice and the
protection of labor, it does not mean that every labor dispute
will be decided in favor of the workers. The law also recognizes
that management has rights which are also entitled to respect
and enforcement in the interest of fair play.
- The challenged company policy does not violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution as petitioners erroneously
suggest. It is a settled principle that the commands of the equal
protection clause are addressed only to the state or those
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Samulde: 1982-1989 as lubeman/stationary operator
- Complaints (separate but consolidated by the LA): illegal
dismissal
- Petitioners Claim: They had been covered by a number of
contracts renewed continuously, with periods ranging from five
(5) to nine (9) years, and they performed the same kind of work
through out their employment, and such was usually necessary
and desirable in the trade or business of the respondent
corporation; and their work did not end on a project-to-project
basis, although the contrary was made to appear by the
employer through the signing of separate employment
contracts.
- LA: Dismissed petitions on the ground that the petitioners are
project employees are project employees whose work contracts
with AG & P indicate that they were employed in such category;
that they have been assigned to different work projects, not just
to one and that their work relation with AG & P, relative to
termination, is governed by Policy Instruction No. 20 (rule
governing project employees).
- Appeal to NLRC: Affirmed LAs findings
ISSUES
1. WON the petitioners are project employees
Procedural
2. WON this petition for certiorari was proper
HELD
1. NO
- The petitioners are regular employees.
- The mandate in Article 281 of the Labor Code, which
pertinently prescribes that the 'provisions of written agreement
to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral
agreements of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to
be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform
activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual
business or trade of the employer' and that any employee who
has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service
is continuous or broken shall be considered a regular employee
with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his
employment shall continue while such actually exists,' should
apply in the case of petitioner.
- Failure to report the termination to Public Employment Office
is a clear indication that petitioners were not and are not
project employees. (PI No. 20 requires reports of terminations)
- It is basic and irrefragable rule that in carrying out and
interpreting the provisions of the Labor Code and its
implementing regulations, the workingman's welfare should be
the primordial and paramount consideration. The interpretation
herein made gives meaning and substance to the liberal and
compassionate spirit of the law enunciated in Article 4 of Labor
Code that "all doubts in the implementation and interpretation
of the provisions of the Labor Code including its implementing
rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor".
- It is beyond cavil that petitioners had been providing the
respondent corporation with continuous and uninterrupted
services, except for a day or so gap in their successive
employment contracts. Their contracts had been renewed
several times, with the total length of their services ranging
from five (5) to nine (9) years. Throughout the duration of their
contracts, they had been performing the same kinds of work
(e.g., as lubeman, bulk cement operator and carpenter), which
were usually necessary and desirable in the construction
business of AG & P, its usual trade or business.
- Undoubtedly, periods in the present case have been imposed
to preclude the acquisition of tenurial security by petitioners,
and must be struck down for being contrary to public policy,
morals, good customs or public order.
2. YES
- Anent the issue that the petition should have been brought
under Rule 65 and not under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court, this rule is not inflexible. In the interest of justice, often
the Court has judiciously treated as special civil actions for
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ISSUE
WON daily-paid employees are entitled to be paid for two
regular holidays which fall on the same day
NATURE
Petition for certiorari seeking the nullification of the March 28,
2000 Decision of the Court of Appeals
FACTS
- The Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), through
Undersecretary Cresenciano B. Trajano, issued an Explanatory
Bulletin dated March 11, 1993, wherein it clarified, that
employees are entitled to 200% of their basic wage on April 9,
1993, which, apart from being Good Friday, and, therefore, a
legal holiday, is also Araw ng Kagitingan, which is also a legal
holiday, even if unworked.
- Said bulletin was reproduced on January 23, 1998, when April
9, 1998 was both Maundy Thursday and Araw ng Kagitingan
- Despite the explanatory bulletin, petitioner Asian Transmission
Corporation opted to pay its daily paid employees only 100% of
their basic pay on April 9, 1998.
- Respondent Bisig ng Asian Transmission Labor Union (BATLU)
protested.
- In accordance with Step 6 of the grievance procedure of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) existing between
petitioner and BATLU, the controversy was submitted for
voluntary arbitration.
- On July 31, 1998, the Office of the Voluntary Arbitrator
rendered a decision directing petitioner to pay its covered
employees "200% and not just 100% of their regular daily
wages for the unworked April 9, 1998
HELD
YES
- Holiday pay is a legislated benefit enacted as part of the
Constitutional imperative that the State shall afford protection
to labor. Its purpose is not merely "to prevent diminution of the
monthly income of the workers on account of work
interruptions. In other words, although the worker is forced to
take a rest, he earns what he should earn, that is, his holiday
pay."8 It is also intended to enable the worker to participate in
the national celebrations held during the days identified as with
great historical and cultural significance.
- Independence Day (June 12), Araw ng Kagitingan (April 9),
National Heroes Day (last Sunday of August), Bonifacio Day
(November 30) and Rizal Day (December 30) were declared
national holidays to afford Filipinos with a recurring opportunity
to commemorate the heroism of the Filipino people, promote
national identity, and deepen the spirit of patriotism. Labor Day
(May 1) is a day traditionally reserved to celebrate the
contributions of the working class to the development of the
nation, while the religious holidays designated in Executive
Order No. 203 allow the worker to celebrate his faith with his
family.
- As reflected above, Art. 94 of the Labor Code, as amended,
affords a worker the enjoyment of ten paid regular holidays.
The provision is mandatory, regardless of whether an employee
is paid on a monthly or daily basis. Unlike a bonus, which is a
3
ART. 94. Right to holiday pay. (a) Every worker shall be paid his regular daily
wage during regular holidays, except in retail and service establishments regularly
employing less than ten (10) workers; (b) The employer may require an employee to
work on any holiday but such employee shall be paid a compensation equivalent to
twice his regular rate; and (c) As used in this Article, "holiday" includes: New Years
Day, Maundy Thursday, Good Friday, the ninth of April, the first of May, the twelfth of
June, the fourth of July, the thirtieth of November, the twenty-fifth and thirtieth of
December and the day designated by law for holding a general election
4
regular holidays are now:1. New Years Day January 1; 2. Maundy Thursday Movable
Date; 3. Good Friday Movable Date; 4. Araw ng Kagitingan April 9 (Bataan and
Corregidor Day); 5. Labor Day May 1; 6. Independence Day June 12; 7. National
Heroes Day Last Sunday of August; 8. Bonifacio Day November 30; 9. Christmas Day
December 25; 10. Rizal Day December 30
Labor Law 1
management prerogative, holiday pay is a statutory benefit
demandable under the law. Since a worker is entitled to the
enjoyment of ten paid regular holidays, the fact that two
holidays fall on the same date should not operate to
reduce to nine the ten holiday pay benefits a worker is
entitled to receive.
- It is elementary, under the rules of statutory construction, that
when the language of the law is clear and unequivocal,
the law must be taken to mean exactly what it says. In
the case at bar, there is nothing in the law which
provides or indicates that the entitlement to ten days of
holiday pay shall be reduced to nine when two holidays
fall on the same day.
- In any event, Art. 4 of the Labor Code provides that all
doubts in the implementation and interpretation of its
provisions, including its implementing rules and
regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor. For the
working mans welfare should be the primordial and
paramount consideration.
- Moreover, Sec. 11, Rule IV, Book III of the Omnibus Rules to
Implement the Labor Code provides that "Nothing in the law or
the rules shall justify an employer in withdrawing or reducing
any benefits, supplements or payments for unworked regular
holidays as provided in existing individual or collective
agreement or employer practice or policy.
- From the pertinent provisions of the CBA entered into by the
parties, petitioner had obligated itself to pay for the legal
holidays as required by law.
Disposition Petition is dismissed.
CLEMENTE V GSIS
152 SCRA 500
GUTIERREZ, JR; July 31, 1987
NATURE
Petition to review decision of the Employees Compensation
Commission (ECC) which affirmed decision of GSIS and denied
Clementes claim for death benefits
FACTS
- Carolinas husband, Pedro Clemente was for 10 years a janitor
in the DOH Dagupan City assigned at the Ilocos Norte Skin
Clinic.
- He was hospitalized for 12 days due to his ailment of nephritis,
and was also found to be suffering from Hansens Disease
(portal cirrhosis and leprosy). He died on Nov 14, 1976.
- Petitioner then filed with GSIS a claim for employees
compensation under the Labor Code. This was denied by GSIS
on the ground that such ailments are not occupational diseases
taking into consideration nature of his work. Under Art. 167(L)
of the Labor Code and Sec. 1(b) Rule III of the Amended Rules
on Employees Compensation, for the sickness and the resulting
disability or death to be compensable, sickness must be the
result of an occupational disease listed under Annex A of the
rules; otherwise proof must be shown that the risk of
contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions.
- Petitioner claimed that the ailments were contracted in the
course of employment and were aggravated by his work since
he was in direct contact with persons suffering from different
skin diseases and was exposed to obnoxious dusts and other
dirt.
- ECC also dismissed the claim since there was no substantial
evidence of causal connection and there was evidence that
deceased had already contracted the Hansens before
employment.
ISSUE
WON petitioner is entitled to the compensation
HELD
YES
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[PAGE 12]
BONIFACIO V GSIS
146 SCRA 276
FERNAN; December 15, 1986
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS
- Lourdes Bonifacio was a classroom teacher assigned to the
district of Bagamanoc, Division of Catanduanes, from August
1965 until she contracted carcinoma of the breast with
metastases to the gastrointestinal tract and lungs which caused
her death on Oct. 5, 1978.
- Thereafter a claim for death benefits under P.D. No. 626, as
amended, was filed by petitioner with the GSIS. The same was
however denied on the ground that the decedent's principal
ailment, carcinoma of the breast with metastases to
gastrointestinal tract and lungs, is not an occupational disease
for her particular work as a teacher, nor is the risk of
contracting said disease increased by her working conditions.
- The Employees Compensation Commission (ECC), on appeal
affirmed the decision of the GSIS.
ISSUES
1. WON the GSIS and the ECC erred in denying petitioners
claim
2. WON the rule that in case of doubt in the implementation
and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code, including
its implementing rules and regulations, the same shall be
resolved in favor of the laborer applies in this case
HELD
1. NO
- A compensable sickness means "any illness definitely
accepted as an occupational disease listed by the ECC, or any
illness caused by employment subject to proof by the employee
that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working
conditions. For this purpose, the Commission is empowered to
determine and approve occupational diseases and work-related
illnesses that may be considered compensable based on
peculiar hazards of employment." [Art. 167(1) Labor Code as
amended by P.D. No. 1368, effective May 1, 1978].
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- Thus, for the sickness or the resulting disability or death to be
compensable, the sickness must be the result of an accepted
occupational disease listed by the ECC, or any other sickness
caused by employment subject to proof by claimant that the
risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions.
[Sec. 1, Rule 11, Amended Rules on Employees Compensation].
Carcinoma of the breast with metastases to the gastrointestinal
tract and lungs is not listed by the Commission as an
occupational disease.
- The cancer which affected the deceased not being
occupational in her particular employment, it became
incumbent upon petitioner to prove that the decedent's working
conditions increased the risk of her contracting the fatal illness.
This onus petitioner failed to satisfactorily discharge.
- Petitioner's contention that the decision of the ECC totally
ignored the SC's pronouncements on compensation cases is
unmeritorious. The petitioner evidently overlooked that his
claim is now within the ambit of the Labor Code and the rulings
under the old law, Act No. 3428, as amended, no longer control.
- The old law as embodied particularly in Section 43 of RA No.
772 amending Act No. 3812, provided for "the presumption of
compensability and the rule on aggravation of illness, which
favor the employee," and "paved the way for the latitudinarian
or expansive application of the Workmen's Compensation Law
in favor of the employee or worker." The presumption in
essence states that in any proceeding for the enforcement of
the claim for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation
Act "it shall be presumed in the absence of substantial evidence
to the contrary that the claim comes within the provisions of the
said Act, that sufficient notice thereof was given, that the injury
was not occasioned by the willful intention of the injured
employee to bring about the injury or death of himself or of
another, that the injury did not result solely from the
intoxicatiojn of the injured employee while on duty, and that the
contents of verified medical and surgical reports introduced in
evidence by claimants for compensation are correct."
- Thus, under the Workmen's Compensation Law, it is not
necessary for the claimant to carry the burden of proof to
establish his case to the point of demonstration It is not
necessary to prove that employment was the sole cause of the
death or injury suffered by the employee. It is sufficient to show
that the employment had contributed to the aggravation or
acceleration of such death or ailment. Once the disease had
been shown to have arisen in the course of employment, it is
presumed by law, in the absence of substantial evidence to the
contrary, that it arose out of it.
- With this legal presumption in the old law, the burden of proof
shifts to the employer and the employee no longer suffers the
burden of showing causation. Under the present Labor Code,
the "latitudinarian or expansive application of the Workmen's
Compensation Law in favor of the employee or worker" no
longer prevails as the burden of showing proof of causation has
shifted back to the employee particularly in cases of sickness or
injuries which are not accepted or listed as occupational by the
ECC. The Labor Code abolished the presumption of
compensability and the rule on aggravation of illness caused by
the nature of the employment.
2. NO
- While the court does not dispute petitioner's contention that
under the law, in case of doubt in the implementation and
interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code, including its
implementing rules and regulations, the doubt shall be resolved
in favor of the laborer, the court finds that the same has no
application in this case since the pertinent provisions of the
Labor Code leave no room for doubt either in their
interpretation or application.
Disposition Petition is dismissed and the decisions of the GSIS
and the ECC denying the claim are affirmed
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NATURE
PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Employees'
Compensation Commission
FACTS
- Evelio Bravo was a supervising cartographer engineer at the
Bureau of Coast and Geodetic Survey. As litho-photo engraving
supervisor (another term for a supervising cartographer
engineer?), he was involved in drafting and plate printing,
developing and processing either dry or wet negatives, and
supervising the formulation of lightsensitive lithographic
chemicals from reagent of nitric, phosphoric, oleic acids,
potassium ferricynamide, ammonium hydroxide and ammonium
dichromate in the kithographic laboratory.
- sometime in 1979, he complained of irregular bowel
movement, constipation and abdominal pain. In 1980 he was
admitted to St. Lukes Hospital and was diagnosed with
"adenocarcinoma sigmoid (colon) Duke's C and chronic
periappendicitis". He went through a series of operations and
incurred hospitalization expenses amounting to P8,650.05.
- He did not return to work and retired at the age of 45 under
the provisions of RA 1616. He received P37,002.31 from GSIS.
He filed a claim for disability benefits in the GSIS.
- GSIS: Denied. His diagnosed disease were not occupational
diseases in his particular employment and his working
conditions did not increase the risk of contracting them.
-He sought reconsideration, claiming that his work exposed him
to chemicals. His MFR was denied on the ground that his
exposure to photographic solutions as litho-photo
engraving supervisor had no causal relationship to the
development of his adenocarcinoma considering that
said ailment is traceable to "familial multiple polyposis,
chronic ulcerative colitis, chronic lympho-granuloma
venereum, chronic granuloma inguinale and perhaps
adenoma.
- He appealed to the Employees Compensation Commission,
but died pending the appeal. His widow, Angeles, pursued his
appeal.
- Commission: affirmed GSIS deci. Bravo's ailments were
"too remote to be related causally to his work and
working conditions" at the Bureau of Coast and Geodetic
Survey. His contention that his cancer could be traced to
exposure to photographic solutions was merely
supposition and devoid of medical support.
- Petitioners contention
> while the causes of colonic malignancy are as yet
undetermined, there is a "probability" that the fatal ailment of
Bravo was work connected as shown by the fact that he was
exposed to various chemicals which are generally considered
predisposing factors of cancer (relying on the decision in
Panotes vs. Employees' Compensation Commission where
it was held that the very fact that the cause of a disease is
unknown creates the probability that the working conditions
could have increased the risk of contracting the disease, if not
caused by it) ; that the law merely requires reasonable workconnection because of the liberal interpretation accorded to
social legislation; that under the theory of increased risk, her
husbands cancer of the colon is a compensable disease
because his exposure to chemicals and the "stressful demand"
of his work increased the risk of contracting said ailment; and
that Commission issued the Resolutions Nos. 2610 and 26775
5
Labor Law 1
which
provides
guidelines
for
deciding
on
pending
compensation cases regarding cancer.
- Solicitor Generals reply
> resolutions are just proofs that the Commission is
continuously in involved in its task "to initiate, rationalize, and
coordinate policies of the employees' compensation program."
They do not imply that the law merely requires reasonable
work-connection because that requirement which was
mandated in the repealed Workmen's Compensation Act is
different from the present requirement of clear medical basis
"where before a mere aggravation or presumption of
compensability was sufficient."
ISSUES
WON cancer of the colon and peri-appendicitis which caused
the death of a former litho-photo engraving supervisor are
compensable diseases under the Labor Code
a. WON cancer of the colon and peri-appendicitis are listed
under compensable diseases under the Labor Code and Rule III,
Section IV of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation
b. WON petitioner could claim benefits through the increased
risk doctrine
HELD
NO
Ratio Article 167, paragraph (1) of the Labor Code and Rule III,
Section IN of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation
provide that for a sickness and the resulting disability or death
to be compensable, the said sickness must be an occupational
disease listed under Annex "A" of said Rules, otherwise, the
claimant or employee concerned must prove that the risk of
contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions
(increased risk doctrine)
a. NO
- Both cancer of the colon and peri-appendicitis are not listed as
occupational diseases for Bravo's kind of employment.
b. NO
- Petitioner failed to submit convincing proofs to entitle her to
compensation benefits.
Ratio A claimant who depends on the theory of increased risk
must present substantial proof to show that his ailment was
contracted during his employment. He or she must also submit
proof that the risk of contracting the ailment was increased by
the particular working conditions.
Reasoning
- On reliance on Panotes case: In the Panotes case and the
Cristobal case, both claimants presented conditions of their
employment. In the present case, the petitioner only
enumerated the chemicals to which Bravo was allegedly
exposed as a litho-photo engraving supervisor and rely
on the "probability" that those chemicals caused his
cancer of the colon.
On interpretation in compensation cases
> Strict rules of evidence are not applied in compensation
cases. However, the present scheme and theory of employees'
compensation under the Labor Code requires a clear medical
basis for a claim for benefits to succeed. There are no more
presumptions as to what caused a particular illness because the
determination of compensability is medically and scientifically
oriented.
Resolution No. 2677 amends Resolution No. 2610 by adding to the pertinent
paragraph thereof the phrase "provided that certain predisposing factors that are
medically recognized or proven are present." It also approves the modified guidelines
on cancer of the breast, liver stomach (gastric), lungs and nasopharynx. As regards
"other types of cancer diseases", the guideline states: "An employee's prolonged
exposure to chemicals may predispose him or her to contract and develop other
types of cancer diseases". For cancer cases decided by the Supreme Court, the
guidelines states: "A claim must be resolved in favor of a claimant or appellant if
facts of his or her case on record indicate reasonable work-connection of the disease,
the disease belongs to borderline or 'twilight' cases, and if the cause of the cancer
disease is unknown".
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Labor Law 1
action on PALs part was unfounded. To further support their
decision they refer said CIR standing order which had been
imposed in relation to a pending labor dispute with the CIR.
However, having ended when the parties entered into a CBA 2
years before Irineos dismissal, the standing order was no
longer relevant to the event.
- Irineos assertion only after 17 years meant he slept on his
rightshis claim is thus time-barred.
- Premises considered, it appears that the NLRCs conclusions
are flawed by errors serious as to constitute grave abuse of
discretion
Disposition Court GRANTS the petition and issues the writ of
certiorari prayed for.
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strike alone does not make the action illegal, which would
justify the dismissal of strikers.
- The Court reiterates that good faith is still a valid defense
against claims of illegality of a strike. We do find, however, not
a semblance of good faith here, but rather, plain arrogance,
pride, and cynicism of certain workers.
- WRT respondent, Isagani Rubio, what militates against his
readmission to the firm is the fact that he had accepted the
sum of P2,448.80 "in full satisfaction of the . . . Decision" (of the
Labor Arbiter).
- The sympathy of the Court is on the side of the laboring
classes, not only because the Constitution imposes sympathy
but because of the one-sided relation between labor and
capital. The Court must take care, however, that in the contest
between labor and capital, the results achieved are fair and in
conformity with the rules. We will not accomplish that objective
here by approving the act of the National Labor Relations
Commission which we hold to constitute a grave abuse of
discretion.
Disposition petition is GRANTED.
ISSUE
1. WON the strike was illegal
2. WON the petition should be granted
FACTS
- UPSU is a union of supervisory employees. The union filed a
petition for certification election on behalf of the route
managers at Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. However, its
petition was denied by the med-arbiter and, on appeal, by the
Secretary of Labor and Employment, on the ground that the
route managers are managerial employees and, therefore,
ineligible for union membership under the first sentence of Art.
245 of the Labor Code, which says, Managerial employees are
not eligible to join, assist or form any labor organization.
Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in a
labor organization of the rank-and-file employees but may join,
assist or form separate labor organizations of their own.
HELD
1. YES
- The strike in question was illegal, for failure of the striking
personnel to observe legal strike requirements, to wit: (1) as to
the fifteen-day notice; (2) as to the two-thirds required vote to
strike done by secret ballot; (3) as to submission of the strike
vote to the Department of Labor at least seven days prior to the
strike.
- NLRC also found that certain strikers harassed non-striking
employees, called company officers names, and committed acts
of violence (as a result of which, criminal charges were brought
with the fiscal's office.)
- The strike itself was prompted by no actual, existing unfair
labor practice committed by the petitioner. In effecting a
change in the seating arrangement, the petitioner merely
exercised a reasonable prerogative employees could not validly
question, much less assail as an act of unfair labor practice.
Rearranging furniture cannot justify a four-month-long strike. As
to the private respondent's charges of harassment, the
Commission found none, and as a general rule, the Court is
bound by its findings of fact.
2. YES
- The strike that was illegal in more ways than one, the
reinstated union officers were clearly in bad faith, and to
reinstate them without loss of seniority rights, is to reward them
for an act public policy does not sanction.
- The Ferrer and Almira cases did not involve illegal strikes. In
Ferrer was a defective strike, one conducted in violation of the
thirty-day "cooling-off" period, but one carried out in good faith
"to offset what petitioners were warranted in believing in good
faith to be unfair labor practices [committed by] Management.
What Almira on the other hand declared was that a violent
ISSUE
1. WON the route managers at Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines,
Inc. are managerial employees
2. WON the first sentence of Art. 245 of the Labor Code,
prohibiting managerial employees from forming, assisting or
joining any labor organization, is constitutional in light of Art. III,
Sec.8 of the Constitution. The right of the people, including
those employed in the public and private sectors, to form
unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to
law shall not be abridged.
HELD
1. YES
- Their job descriptions clearly reveal so. They also fall under
this category under the purview of art. 212. The term
manager generally refers to anyone who is responsible for
subordinates and other organization resources. As a class,
managers constitute three levels of a pyramid.
- What distinguishes them from the rank-and file employees is
that they act in the interest of the employer in supervising such
rank-and-file employees
- Managerial employees may therefore be said to fall into two
distinct categories: the managers per se, who compose the
Labor Law 1
former group described above, and the supervisors who form
the latter group. Whether they belong to the first or second
category, managers, vis--vis employers, are, likewise,
employees
2. NO
- As already stated, whether they belong to the first category
(managers per se) or the second category (supervisors),
managers are employees. Nonetheless, in the United States,
as Justice Puno's separate opinion notes, supervisors have no
right to form unions. They are excluded from the definition of
the term "employee" in 2(3) of the Labor-Management
Relations Act of 1947.
- Commission intended the absolute right to organize of
government workers, supervisory employees, and security
guards to be constitutionally guaranteed. By implication, no
similar absolute constitutional right to organize for labor
purposes should be deemed to have been granted to top-level
and middle managers. As to them the right of self-organization
may be regulated and even abridged conformably to Art. III, 8.
- Types of Managerial Employees:
> FIRST-LINE MANAGERS The lowest level in an organization
at which individuals are responsible for the work of others is
called first-line or first-level management. First-line managers
direct operating employees only; they do not supervise other
managers. Example of first-line managers are the foreman or
production supervisor in a manufacturing plant, the technical
supervisor in a research department, and the clerical supervisor
in a large office. First-level managers are often called
supervisors.
> MIDDLE MANAGERS The term middle management can refer
to more than one level in an organization. Middle managers
direct the activities of other managers and sometimes also
those of operating employees. Middle managers principal
responsibilities are to direct the activities that implement their
organizations policies and to balance the demands of their
superiors with the capacities of their subordinates. A plant
manager in an electronics firm is an example of a middle
manager.
> TOP MANAGERS Composed of a comparatively small group
of executives, top management is responsible for the overall
management of the organization. It establishes operating
policies and guides the organizations interactions with its
environment. Typical titles of top managers are chief
executive officer, president, and senior vice-president.
Actual titles vary from one organization to another and are not
always a reliable guide to membership in the highest
management classification.
Disposition petition is DISMISSED
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Labor Law 1
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the questioned Order of
respondent Commission there being no reversible error.
ISSUE
1. WON there was an employer-employee relationship between
petitioners' deceased son, Arturo Villavilla, and herein private
respondents
2. WON private respondents are liable for death compensation
benefits of Arturo Villavilla
3. WON there was a violation of the Social Security Act, as
amended, by private respondents for not registering Arturo
Villavilla with the System as their employee as mandated by
law
HELD
1. NO
- The records disclose that the relationship between Mercado
and the crew members of the ship headed by its skipper, Capt.
Pedro Matibag, is one positively showing the existence of a joint
venture. This is clearly revealed in the testimonies of Capt.
Pedro Matibag and Gil Chua, a crew member, both witnesses for
petitioners.
- The arrangement between the boat owner and the crew
members, one of whom was petitioners' son, partook of the
nature of a joint venture: the crew members did not receive
fixed compensation as they only shared in their catch; they
ventured to the sea irrespective of the instructions of the boat
owners, i.e., upon their own best judgment as to when, how
long, and where to go fishing; the boat owners did not hire
them but simply joined the fishing expedition upon invitation of
the ship master, even without the knowledge of the boat owner.
In short, there was neither right of control nor actual exercise of
such right on the part of the boat owner over his crew
members.
- It is clear that there was no employer-employee relationship
between petitioner's son Arturo and private respondent
Mercado, much less private respondent Cosuco. As such, Arturo
could not be made subject of compulsory coverage under the
Social Security Act; hence, private respondents cannot be said
to have violated said law when they did not register him with
the Social Security System. A fortiori, respondent as well as
intervenor are not answerable to petitioners for any death
benefits under the law.
- Culled from the foregoing, the inexorable conclusion is that
respondent Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining the
judgment of respondent Social Security Commission.
- It may not be amiss to mention that while petitioners merely
raise factual questions which are not proper under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, We nevertheless went to great lengths in
dissecting the facts of this case if only to convince Us that
petitioners, who are pauper litigants and seeking claims under a
social legislation, have not been denied its benefits. For, We are
not unaware that in this jurisdiction all doubts in the
implementation and interpretation of provisions of social
legislations should be resolved in favor of the working class.
But, alas, justice is not fully served by sustaining the contention
of the poor simply because he is poor. Justice is done by
properly applying the law regardless of the station in life of the
contending parties.
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There is no dispute that given the nature of their functions and
length of services, were regular employees. But the question is:
who was/were their employer/s?
- MOA: does not appear that JCT became the employer of
Miguel et al by virtue of this
- NLRC: silent on JCT being the employer of Miguel et al after
Glorious Sun ceased operations, save for its conclusion that
they were absorbed by, or their work continued under JCT and
did not state the reason for liability in solidum of Cuevas.
Computation of the monetary award totaling P37,557,317.08
(exclusive of attorneys fees) covers a period starting on initial
employment (with Glorious Sun) some dating back to 1978
- Saballa v NLRC > This Court has previously held that judges
and arbiters should draw up their decisions and resolutions with
due care, and make certain that they truly and accurately
reflect their conclusions and their final dispositions. The same
thing goes for the findings of fact made by the NLRC, as it is a
settled rule that such findings are entitled to great respect and
even finality when supported by substantial evidence;
otherwise, they shall be struck down for being whimsical and
capricious and arrived at with grave abuse of discretion. It is a
requirement of due process and fair play that the parties to a
litigation be informed of how it was decided, with an
explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the
conclusions of the court. A decision that does not clearly and
distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves
the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is
especially prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to
pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher
tribunal.
Obiter
- employer-employee relationship test:
1) power to select employees
2) who pays for their wages
3) who has the power to dismiss them, and
4) who exercises control in the methods and the results by
which the work is accomplished
*** The last factor, the control test, is the most important.
Disposition Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision
AFFIRMED
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relationship
exists
between
HELD
NO
- De Vera was an independent contractor beinf the retained
physician of petitioner company.
- In a long line of decisions, the Court, in determining the
existence of an employer-employee relationship, has invariably
adhered to the four-fold test, to wit: the selection and
engagement of the employee; the payment of wages; the
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has never cited even a single instance when petitioner
interfered with his work.
Disposition petition is GRANTED and the challenged decision
of the Court of Appeals REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The 21
December 1998 decision of the labor arbiter is REINSTATED.
SONZA V ABS-CBN
[PAGE 42]
JARDIN V NLRC (PHILJAMA INTL)
326 SCRA 299
QUISUMBING; February 23, 2000
NATURE
Special civil action for certiorari seeks to annul the decision of
public respondent promulgated on October 28, 1994, in NLRC
NCR CA No. 003883-92, and its resolution dated December 13,
1994 which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
FACTS
- Petitioners were drivers of private respondent, Philjama
International Inc., a domestic corporation engaged in the
operation of "Goodman Taxi." Petitioners used to drive private
respondents taxicabs every other day on a 24-hour work
schedule under the boundary system. Under this arrangement,
the petitioners earned an average of P400.00 daily.
Nevertheless, private respondent admittedly regularly deducts
from petitioners daily earnings the amount of P30.00
supposedly for the washing of the taxi units. Believing that the
deduction is illegal, petitioners decided to form a labor union to
protect their rights and interests.
- Upon learning about the plan of petitioners, private
respondent refused to let petitioners drive their taxicabs when
they reported for work on August 6, 1991, and on succeeding
days. Petitioners suspected that they were singled out because
they were the leaders and active members of the proposed
union. Aggrieved, petitioners filed with the labor arbiter a
complaint against private respondent for unfair labor practice,
illegal dismissal and illegal deduction of washing fees. In a
decision dated August 31, 1992, the labor arbiter dismissed said
complaint for lack of merit.
- On appeal, the NLRC (public respondent herein), in a decision
dated April 28, 1994, reversed and set aside the judgment of
the labor arbiter. The labor tribunal declared that petitioners
are employees of private respondent, and, as such, their
dismissal must be for just cause and after due process.
- Private respondents first motion for reconsideration was
denied. Remaining hopeful, private respondent filed another
motion for reconsideration. This time, public respondent, in its
decision dated October 28, 1994, granted aforesaid second
motion for reconsideration. It ruled that it lacks jurisdiction over
the case as petitioners and private respondent have no
employer-employee relationship. It held that the relationship of
the parties is leasehold which is covered by the Civil Code
rather than the Labor Code.
ISSUE
WON the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in
entertaining the motion for reconsideration and in holding that
there is no employer-employee relationship in the boundary
system.
HELD
YES
Ratio Only one motion for reconsideration from the same party
is allowed before the NLRC in line with the policy of assisting
the parties in obtaining an expeditious and inexpensive
settlement of labor cases. When the NLRC entertained the
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responsible for the damages to the lessor. In the case of
jeepney owners/operators and jeepney drivers, the former
exercise supervision and control over the latter. The
management of the business is in the owners hands. The
owner as holder of the certificate of public convenience must
see to it that the driver follows the route prescribed by the
franchising authority and the rules promulgated as regards its
operation.
- As consistently held by this Court, termination of employment
must be effected in accordance with law. The just and
authorized causes for termination of employment are
enumerated under Articles 282, 283 and 284 of the Labor Code.
The requirement of notice and hearing is set-out in Article 277
(b) of the said Code. Hence, petitioners, being employees of
private respondent, can be dismissed only for just and
authorized cause, and after affording them notice and hearing
prior to termination. In the instant case, private respondent had
no valid cause to terminate the employment of petitioners.
Neither were there two (2) written notices sent by private
respondent informing each of the petitioners that they had
been dismissed from work. These lack of valid cause and failure
on the part of private respondent to comply with the twin-notice
requirement underscored the illegality surrounding petitioners
dismissal.
- Under the law, an employee who is unjustly dismissed from
work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority
rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive
of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary
equivalent computed from the time his compensation was
withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement It
must
be
emphasized,
though,
that
recent
judicial
pronouncements distinguish between employees illegally
dismissed prior to the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6715 on
March 21, 1989, and those whose illegal dismissals were
effected after such date. Thus, employees illegally dismissed
prior to March 21, 1989, are entitled to backwages up to three
(3) years without deduction or qualification, while those illegally
dismissed after that date are granted full backwages inclusive
of allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent
from the time their actual compensation was withheld from
them up to the time of their actual reinstatement. The
legislative policy behind Republic Act No. 6715 points to "full
backwages" as meaning exactly that, i.e., without deducting
from backwages the earnings derived elsewhere by the
concerned employee during the period of his illegal dismissal.
Considering that petitioners were terminated from work on
August 1, 1991, they are entitled to full backwages on the basis
of their last daily earnings.
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ISSUE
WON persons rendering caddying services for members of golf
clubs and their guests in said clubs' courses or premises are the
employees of such clubs and therefore within the compulsory
coverage of the Social Security System (SSS)
HELD
NO
Ratio The Court does not agree that said facts necessarily or
logically point to such a relationship, and to the exclusion of any
form of arrangements, other than of employment, that would
make the respondent's services available to the members and
guest of the petitioner. As long as it is, the list made in the
appealed decision detailing the various matters of conduct,
dress, language, etc. covered by the petitioner's regulations,
does not, in the mind of the Court, so circumscribe the actions
or judgment of the caddies concerned as to leave them little or
no freedom of choice whatsoever in the manner of carrying out
their services.
Reasoning
- In the very nature of things, caddies must submit to some
supervision of their conduct while enjoying the privilege of
pursuing their occupation within the premises and grounds of
whatever club they do their work in. For all that is made to
appear, they work for the club to which they attach themselves
on sufference but, on the other hand, also without having to
observe any working hours, free to leave anytime they
please, to stay away for as long they like. It is not
pretended that if found remiss in the observance of said rules,
any discipline may be meted them beyond barring them
from the premises which, it may be supposed, the Club
may do in any case even absent any breach of the rules,
and without violating any right to work on their part. All
these considerations clash frontally with the concept of
employment. The IAC would point to the fact that the Club
suggests the rate of fees payable by the players to the caddies
as still another indication of the latter's status as employees. It
seems to the Court, however, that the intendment of such fact
is to the contrary, showing that the Club has not the
measure of control over the incidents of the caddies'
work and compensation that an employer would
possess. In the final analysis, petitioner has no was of
compelling the presence of the caddies as they are not
required to render a definite number of hours of work on
a single day. Even the group rotation of caddies is not
absolute because a player is at liberty to choose a caddy of his
preference regardless of the caddy's order in the rotation.
Obiter (on issue of res judicata)
- That same issue of res adjudicata, ignored by the IAC beyond
bare mention thereof, as already pointed out, is now among the
mainways of the private respondent's defenses to the petition
for review.
- Because the same question of employer-employee relationship
has been dragged into three different fora, willy-nilly and in
quick succession, it has birthed controversy as to which of the
resulting adjudications must now be recognized as decisive. On
the one hand, there is the certification case where the decision
found for the existence of employer-employee relationship
between the parties; on the other, the compulsory arbitration
case which was dismissed for lack of merit on the ground that
there existed no such relationship between the Club and the
private respondent.
- It is well settled that for res adjudicata, or the principle of bar
by prior judgment, to apply, the following essential requisites
must concur: (1) there must be a final judgment or order; (2)
said judgment or order must be on the merits; (3) the court
rendering the same must have jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; and (4) there must be between the two
cases identity of parties, identity of subject matter and identity
of cause of action.
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FELIX V BUENASEDA
240 SCRA 139
KAPUNAN; January 17, 1995
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS
- Petitioner Dr. Alfredo Felix joined the National Center for
Mental Health (NCMH) as a resident physician and after only 3
years, was promoted to Senior Resident Physician, a position he
held until the Ministry of Health reorganized the NCMH in Jan.
1988, pursuant to E.O. 119. Under the said reorganization, Felix
was appointed to the position of Sr. Resident Physician in a
temporary capacity immediately after he and other employees
allegedly tendered their courtesy resignations to the Sec. of
Health. Felix was later promoted to the position of Medical
Specialist 1 (Temporary Status) which was renewed the
following year.
- In 1988, the Dept. of Health or DoH issued Dept. Order (D.O.)
347, which required board certification as a prerequisite for
renewal of specialist positions in various med. centers, hospitals
and agencies and specifically provided that specialists working
in various branches of DoH be recognized as Fellows of their
respective societies and/or Diplomates of their specialty
boards or both, the purpose of which was to upgrade the quality
of specialists in DoH hospitals by requiring them to pass
rigorous theoretical and clinical exams given by recognized
specialty boards.
- (Then) Sec. of Health Alfredo Bengzon issued D.O. 478
(amending Sec.4 of D.O. 347) which provided for an extension
of appointments of Medical Specialists in cases where
termination of those who failed to meet the requirement for
board certification might result in disruption of hospital
services. The said order provided, among others, that:
xxxxx 2. Medical specialists recommended for extension of
appointment shall meet the following minimum criteria:
a. DOH medical specialist certified
b. Has been in the service of the Department at least three
(3) years prior to December 1988
c. Has applied or taken the specialty board examination.
- In 1991, after reviewing petitioners service record and
performance, the Medical Credentials Committee of the NCMH
recommended non-renewal of his appointment as Medical
Labor Law 1
Specialist 1, informing him of its decision on Aug. 22, 1991. He
was, however, allowed to continue in the service, and receive
his salary even after being informed of the termination of his
appointment.
- On Nov. 25, 1991, the Chiefs of Service held an emergency
meeting to discuss the petitioners case. In the meeting, the
overall consensus among the dept. heads was for petitioners
non-renewal where his poor performance, frequent tardiness
and inflexibility were pointed as among the factors responsible
for the recommendation not to renew his appointment. The
matter was referred to the CSC, which ruled that the temporary
appointment can be terminated any time and that any renewal
of such appointment is within the discretion of the appointing
authority. Consequently, petitioner was advised by hospital
authorities to vacate his cottage. Refusing to comply, petitioner
filed a petition with the Merit System Protection Board (MSPB)
complaining about the alleged harassment and questioning the
non-renewal of his appointment, the MSPB, however, dismissed
his complaint for lack of merit.
- This decision was appealed to the Civil Service Commission
(CSC) which dismissed the same. The MFR was also denied by
the CSC hence this appeal.
Petitioners claims
1. CSC erred in holding that by submitting his courtesy
resignation and accepting his temporary appointment,
petitioner had effectively divested himself of his security of
tenure, considering the circumstances of such courtesy
resignation and acceptance of appointment.
2. Respondent commission erred in not declaring that the
conversion of the permanent appointment of petitioner to
temporary was done in bad faith in the guise of reorganization
and thus invalid, being violative of the petitioners right of
security of tenure.
Respondent CSCs claims
1. The petitioners temporary appointments after the
reorganization pursuant to E.O. 119 were valid and did not
violate his constitutional right to security of tenure.
2. Petitioner is guilty of estoppel or laches, having acquiesced
to such temporary appointments from 1988-1991
3. The respondent CSC did not act with grave abuse of
discretion in affirming the petitioners non-renewal of his
appointment to the NCMH.
ISSUE
WON petitioners removal from a permanent position (Medical
Specialist 1), as a result of the reorganization of the DoH, was
void for being violative of the constitutional provision on
security of tenure
HELD
NO
Reasoning
- A residency or resident physician position in a medical
specialty is never a permanent one. Residency connotes
training and temporary status. Promotion to the next postgraduate year is based on merit and performance determined
by periodic evaluations and examinations of knowledge, skills
and bedside manner. Under this system, residents, especially
those in university teaching hospitals enjoy their right to
security of tenure only to the extent that they periodically make
the grade. While physicians (or consultants) of specialist rank
are not subject to the same stringent evaluation procedures,
specialty societies require continuing education as a
requirement for accreditation in good standing, in addition to
peer review processes based on performance, mortality and
morbidity audits, feedback from residents, interns and medical
students and research output. The nature of the contracts
of resident physicians meets traditional tests for
determining employer employee relationships, but
because the focus of residency is training, they are
neither here nor there. Moreover, stringent standards and
requirements for renewal of specialist rank positions or for
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- Petitioner, on the other hand, claims that Ejandra is a habitual
absentee and has abandoned his job. To belie private
respondents allegation that his license had been confiscated,
petitioner asserted that, had it been true, he should have
presented an apprehension report and informed petitioner of
his problems with the LTO. But he did not. Petitioner further
argued that private respondent was not an employee because
theirs was a contract of lease and not of employment, with
petitioner being paid on commission basis
- The labor arbiter ruled in favor of Ejandra. It was held that he
didnt abandon his work, since there was valid reason for his 1
week absence. He also was not afforded due process. NLRC and
CA affirmed.
ISSUES
1. WON there was an employee employer relationship
2. WON Ejandra was dismissed for a just cause
HELD
1. YES
- Petitioner is barred to negate the existence of an employeremployee relationship. He has invoked rulings on the right of an
employer to dismiss an employee for just cause. The power to
dismiss an employee is one of the indications that there was
such relationship. Also, A97 of the Labor Code says that
employees can be paid in form of commissions.
2. NO
- To constitute abandonment, two elements must concur: (1)
the failure to report for work or absence without valid or
justifiable reason and (2) a clear intention to sever the
employer-employee relationship. Petitioner did not fulfill the
requisites. First, Ejandras absence was justified since his
license wasnt release until after a week. Second, Ejandra did
not want to sever their relationship when he got his license
back. Third, labor arbiter Yulo correctly observed that, if private
respondent really abandoned his work, petitioner should have
reported such fact to the nearest Regional Office of the
Department of Labor and Employment in accordance with
Section 7, Rule XXIII, Book V of Department Order No. 9, series
of 1997 (Rules Implementing Book V of the Labor Code).
Petitioner made no such report.
- In addition, he wasnt also given due process by not giving him
notice and hearing.
Disposition Decision reversed
SONZA V ABS-CBN
[PAGE 42]
INSULAR LIFE V NLRC (BASIAO)
179 SCRA 459
NARVASA; November 15, 1989
NATURE
Petition for certiorari and prohibition to review the resolution of
the NLRC.
FACTS
- In 1968, Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. (Company) and
Melecio T. Basiao entered into a contract by w/c Basiao was
"authorized to solicit w/in the Phils applications for insurance
policies and annuities in accordance with the existing rules and
regulations" of the Company; he would receive "compensation,
in the form of commissions . . . ", and the "rules in Rate Book
and its Agent's Manual, as well as all its circulars and those
which may from time to time be promulgated by it . . ." were
made part of said contract.
- The contract also contained provisions governing the relations
of the parties, the duties of the Agent, the acts prohibited to
him, and the modes of termination of the agreement, viz.:
"RELATION WITH THE COMPANY. The Agent shall be free to
exercise his own judgment as to time, place and means of
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methodology and bind or restrict the party hired to the use of
such means. The first, which aim only to promote the result,
create no employer-employee relationship unlike the second,
which address both the result and the means used to achieve it.
- Rules and regulations governing the conduct of the business
are provided for in the Insurance Code and enforced by the
Insurance Commissioner. It is, therefore, usual and expected for
an insurance company to promulgate a set of rules to guide its
commission agents in selling its policies that they may not run
afoul of the law and what it requires or prohibits. Of such a
character are the rules which prescribe the qualifications of
persons who may be insured, subject insurance applications to
processing and approval by the Company, and also reserve to
the Company the determination of the premiums to be paid and
the schedules of payment. None of these really invades the
agent's contractual prerogative to adopt his own selling
methods or to sell insurance at his own time and convenience,
hence cannot justifiably be said to establish an employeremployee relationship between him and the company.
- Mafinco Trading Corporation v Ople: a person engaged to
sell soft drinks for another, using a truck supplied by the latter,
but with the right to employ his own workers, sell according to
his own methods subject only to prearranged routes, observing
no working hours fixed by the other party and obliged to secure
his own licenses and defray his own selling expenses, all in
consideration of a peddler's discount given by the other party
for at least 250 cases of soft drinks sold daily, was not an
employee but an independent contractor.
- Investment Planning Corporation of the Philippines v
SSS: there was no employer-employee relationship between a
commission agent and an investment company, but that the
former was an independent contractor where said agent and
others similarly placed were: (a) paid compensation in the form
of commissions based on percentages of their sales, any
balance of commissions earned being payable to their legal
representatives in the event of death or registration; (b)
required to put up performance bonds; (c) subject to a set of
rules and regulations governing the performance of their duties
under the agreement with the company and termination of their
services for certain causes; (d) not required to report for work
at any time, nor to devote their time exclusively to working for
the company nor to submit a record of their activities, and who,
finally, shouldered their own selling and transportation
expenses.
- Sara v NLRC: one who had been engaged by a rice miller to
buy and sell rice and palay without compensation except a
certain percentage of what he was able to buy or sell, did work
at his own pleasure without any supervision or control on the
part of his principal and relied on his own resources in the
performance of his work, was a plain commission agent, an
independent contractor and not an employee.
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an existence of an employer-employee
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Ratio
Under the control test, an employer-employee
relationship exists where the person for whom the services are
performed reserves the right to control not only the end
achieved but also the manner and means to be used in
reaching the end.
Reasoning
- The Court has consistently held a four tier test to evaluate the
existence of an employer-employee relationship which include:
1) manner of selection of engagement, 2) payment of wages, 3)
presence or absence of power of dismissal and 4) presence or
absence of power of control.
- The last test is known as the control test and is regarded as
the most crucial and determinative indicator of the presence of
absence of an employer-employee relationship.
- There is no showing of a controlling power of Infinite Loop over
Almirez. They only specified what she needed to achieve but
now how she was go on about it.
- The company had hired her based on her expertise but the
company naturally had to appraised of the work progress.
- The deduction for SSS and tax do not bolster Almirezs
contention that there was an employee-employer relationship.
However, only one pay slip was issued (Januaryb 16-31, 2000)
and the rest were in cash vouchers. As such, the payslip cannot
be considered as proof of an employer-employee relationship.
- The use of the word salary is not determinative of such a
relationship either.
Salary is defined as remuneration for
services given. The contract details her salary and it serves
between the parties was the law governing them. But the
contract, as pointed out earlier, is bereft of proof of control of
Infinite Loop over Almirez.
Disposition Petition is denied for lack of merit with costs
against petitioner.
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ISSUE
1. WON there was an employer-employee relation between
TWS and Sevilla
2. WON the padlocking of the premises by TWS without the
knowledge and consent of Sevilla entitled the latter to the relief
of damages prayed for
HELD
1. NO. It was a principal-agent relationship.
Ratio In this jurisdiction, there has been no uniform test to
determine the existence of an employer-employee relation. In
general, We have relied on the so-called right of control test,
where the person for whom the services are performed
reserves a right to control not only the end to be achieved but
also the means to be used in reaching such end. In addition, the
existing economic conditions prevailing between the
parties, like the inclusion of the employee in the payrolls, are
also considered in determining the existence of an employeremployee relationship.
Reasoning
- Sevilla was not subject to control by TWS either as to the
result of the enterprise or as to the means used in connection
therewith.
- Under the contract of lease, Sevilla bound herself in solidum
for the rental payments; an arrangement that would belie the
claims of a master-servant relationship for a true employee
cannot be made to part with his own money in pursuance of his
employers business, or otherwise assume liability thereof.
- Sevilla was not in the companys payroll. She retained 4% in
commissions from airline bookings, the remaining 3% going to
TWS. Unlike an employee who usually earns a fixed salary, she
earned compensation in fluctuating amounts depending on her
booking successes.
- The fact that Sevilla has been designated branch manager
does not make her, ergo, TWS employee. Employment is
determined by the right of control test and certain economic
parameters. Titles are weak indicators.
- When Sevilla agreed to man TWS Ermita branch office, she
did so pursuant to a contract of agency. It is the essence of this
contract that the agent renders services in representation or
on behalf of another. In the case at bar, Sevilla solicited airline
fares, but she did so for and on behalf of her principal, TWS.
2. YES
Ratio For its unwarranted revocation of the contact of agency,
TWS should be sentenced to pay damages.
Reasoning
- Sevilla had acquired a personal stake in the business itself,
and necessarily, in the equipment pertaining thereto.
- Sevilla was not a stranger to that contract of lease having
been explicitly named therein as third party in charge of rental
payments. She could not be ousted from possession summarily
as one would eject an interloper.
- The Court is satisfied with the chronicle of events, there was
indeed some malevolent design to put the petitioner Sevilla in a
bad light following the disclosures that she had worked for a
rival firm.
Disposition REVERSED.
Labor Law 1
annuities for which he would be paid compensation in the form
of commissions. The contract was prepared by petitioner in its
entirety and De los Reyes merely signed his conformity thereto.
It contained the stipulation that no employer-employee
relationship shall be created between the parties and that the
agent shall be free to exercise his own judgment as to time,
place and means of soliciting insurance. De los Reyes however
was prohibited by petitioner from working for any other life
insurance company, and violation of this stipulation was
sufficient ground for termination of the contract. Aside from
soliciting insurance for the petitioner, private respondent was
required to submit to the former all completed applications for
insurance within ninety (90) consecutive days, deliver policies,
receive and collect initial premiums and balances of first year
premiums, renewal premiums, deposits on applications and
payments on
policy loans. Private respondent was also bound to turn over to
the company immediately any and all sums of money collected
by him.
- On 1 March 1993 petitioner and private respondent entered
into another contract where the latter was appointed as Acting
Unit Manager under its office atthe Cebu DSO V. As such, the
duties and responsibilities of De los Reyes included the
recruitment, training, organization and development within his
designated territory of a sufficient number of qualified,
competent and trustworthy underwriters, and to supervise and
coordinate the sales efforts of the underwriters in the active
solicitation of new business and in the furtherance of the
agency's assigned goals. It was similarly provided in the
management contract that the relation of the acting unit
manager and/or the agents of his unit to the company shall be
that of independent contractor. If the appointment was
terminated for any reason other than for cause, the acting unit
manager would be reverted to agent status and assigned to any
unit. As in the previous agency contract, De los Reyes together
with his unit force was granted freedom to exercise judgment
as to time, place and means of soliciting insurance. Aside from
being granted override commissions, the acting unit manager
was given production bonus, development allowance and a unit
development financing scheme euphemistically termed
"financial assistance" consisting of payment to him of a free
portion of P300.00 per month and a validate portion of
P1,200.00. While the latter amount was deemed as an advance
against expected commissions, the former was not and would
be freely given to the unit manager by the company only upon
fulfillment by him of certain manpower and premium quota
requirements. The agents and underwriters recruited and
trained by the acting unit manager would be attached to the
unit but petitioner reserved the right to determine if such
assignment would be made or, for any reason, to reassign them
elsewhere. Aside from soliciting insurance, De los Reyes was
also expressly obliged to participate in the company's
conservation program, i.e., preservation and maintenance of
existing insurance policies, and to accept moneys duly
receipted on agent's receipts provided the same were turned
over to the company. As long as he was unit manager in an
acting capacity, De los Reyes was prohibited from working for
other life insurance companies or with the government. He
could not also accept a managerial or supervisory position in
any firm doing business in the Philippines without the written
consent of petitioner.
- Private respondent worked concurrently as agent and Acting
Unit Manager until he was notified by petitioner on 18
November 1993 that his services were terminated effective 18
December 1993. He filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter
on the ground that he was illegally dismissed and that he was
not paid his salaries and separation pay.
ISSUE
WON there exist an employer-employee relationship between
petitioner and respondent
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HELD
YES
- It is axiomatic that the existence of an employer-employee
relationship cannot be negated by expressly repudiating it in
the management contract and providing therein that the
"employee" is an independent contractor when the terms of the
agreement clearly show otherwise. For, the employment status
of a person is defined and prescribed by law and not by what
the parties say it should be. In determining the status of the
management contract, the "four-fold test" on employment
earlier mentioned has to be applied.
(a) selection and engagement of employee
> Petitioner contends that De los Reyes was ever required to go
through the pre-employment procedures and that the
probationary employment status was reserved only to
employees of petitioner. On this score, it insists that the first
requirement of selection and engagement of the employee was
not met. A look at the provisions of the contract shows that
private respondent was appointed as Acting Unit Manager only
upon recommendation of the District Manager. This indicates
that private respondent was hired by petitioner because of the
favorable endorsement of its duly authorized officer. But, this
approbation could only have been based on the performance of
De los Reyes as agent under the agency contract so that there
can be no other conclusion arrived under this premise than the
fact that the agency or underwriter phase of the relationship of
De los Reyes with petitioner was nothing more than a trial or
probationary period for his eventual appointment as Acting Unit
Manager of petitioner. Then, again, the very designation of the
appointment of private respondent as "acting" unit manager
obviously implies a temporary employment status which may
be made permanent only upon compliance with company
standards such as those enumerated under the management
contract.
(b) payment of wages
> Petitioner points out that respondent was compensated
strictly on commission basis, the amount of which was totally
dependent on his total output. But, the manager's contract,
speaks differently. It unquestionably demonstrate that the
performance requirement imposed on De los Reyes was
applicable quarterly while his entitlement to the free portion
(P300) and the validated portion (P1,200) was monthly starting
on the first month of the twelve (12) months of the
appointment. Thus, it has to be admitted that even before the
end of the first quarter and prior to the so-called quarterly
performance evaluation, private respondent was already
entitled to be paid both the free and validated portions of the
UDF every month because his production performance could
not be determined until after the lapse of the quarter involved.
This indicates quite clearly that the unit manager's quarterly
performance had no bearing at all on his entitlement at least to
the free portion of the UDF which for all intents and purposes
comprised the salary regularly paid to him by petitioner. Thus it
cannot be validly claimed that the financial assistance
consisting of the free portion of the UDF was purely dependent
on the premium production of the agent. Be that as it may, it is
worth considering that the payment of compensation by way of
commission does not militate against the conclusion that
private respondent was an employee of petitioner. Under Art.
97 of the Labor Code, "wage" shall mean "however designated,
capable of being expressed in terms of money, whether fixed or
ascertained on a time, task, price or commission basis . . . .".
(c) power of dismissal and power of control
> petitioner asserts that its termination of De los Reyes was but
an exercise of its inherent right as principal under the contracts
and that the rules and guidelines it set forth in the contract
cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be deemed as an
exercise of control over the private respondent as these were
merely directives that fixed the desired result without dictating
the means or method to be employed in attaining it. The
management contract, however, prescribes reveals that the
company practically dictates the manner by which their jobs are
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to be carried out particularly exclusivity of service, control of
assignments and removal of agents under private respondent's
unit, collection of premiums, furnishing of company facilities
and materials as well as capital described as Unit Development
Fund.
- These are but hallmarks of the management system in which
herein private respondent worked. This obtaining, there is no
escaping the conclusion that private respondent Pantaleon de
los Reyes was an employee of herein petitioner.
Disposition Petition denied.
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herein contracted. The cooperative and its members
recognize that it is taking a business risk in accepting a fixed
service fee to provide the services contracted for and its
realization of profit or loss from its undertaking, in relation to
all its other undertakings, will depend on how efficiently it
deploys and fields its members and how they perform the
work and manage its operations.
- Pursuant to the contract, Sunflower engaged private
respondents to, as they did, render services at SMCs Bacolod
Shrimp Processing Plant at Sta. Fe, Bacolod City. The contract
was deemed renewed by the parties every month after its
expiration on January 1, 1994 and private respondents
continued to perform their tasks until September 11, 1995. In
July 1995, private respondents filed a complaint before the
NLRC, Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI, Bacolod City, praying
to be declared as regular employees of SMC, with claims for
recovery of all benefits and privileges enjoyed by SMC rank and
file employees. Private respondents subsequently filed on
September 25, 1995 an Amended Complaint to include illegal
dismissal as additional cause of action following SMCs closure
of its Bacolod Shrimp Processing Plant on September 15,
1995which resulted in the termination of their services. SMC
filed a Motion for Leave to File Attached Third Party Complaint
dated November 27, 1995 to implead Sunflower as Third Party
Defendant which was, by Order of December 11, 1995, granted
by Labor Arbiter Ray Alan T. Drilon. In the meantime, on
September 30, 1996, SMC filed before the Regional Office at
Iloilo City of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a
Notice of Closure of its aquaculture operations effective on even
date, citing serious business losses. By Decision of September
23, 1997, Labor Arbiter Drilon dismissed private respondents
complaint for lack of merit.
- Private respondents appealed to the NLRC. By Decision of
December 29, 1998, the NLRC dismissed the appeal for lack of
merit, it finding that third party respondent Sunflower was an
independent contractor in light of its observation that [i]n all
the activities of private respondents, they were under the actual
direction, control and supervision of third party respondent
Sunflower, as well as the payment of wages, and power of
dismissal. By Decision of February 7, 2001, the appellate court
reversed the NLRC decision and accordingly found for private
respondents. Justifying its reversal of the findings of the labor
arbiter and the NLRC, the appellate court reasoned:Although
the terms of the non-exclusive contract of service between SMC
and [Sunflower] showed a clear intent to abstain from
establishing an employer-employee relationship between SMC
and [Sunflower] or the latters members, the extent to which
the parties successfully realized this intent in the light of the
applicable law is the controlling factor in determining the real
and actual relationship between or among the parties.There
being a finding of labor-only contracting, liability must be
shouldered either by SMC or [Sunflower] or shared by both (See
Tabas vs. California Manufacturing, Inc., supra, p. 502). SMC
however should be held solely liable for [Sunflower] became
non-existent with the closure of the aquaculture business of
SMC.
ISSUE
1. WON the respondents are employees of SMC
2. WON the retrenchment was valid and consequently, whether
the respondents are entitled to relief
HELD
1. YES
- Since private respondents who were engaged in shrimp
processing performed tasks usually necessary or desirable in
the aquaculture business of SMC, they should be deemed
regular employees of the latter and as such are entitled to all
the benefits and rights appurtenant to regular employment.
They should thus be awarded differential pay corresponding to
the difference between the wages and benefits given them and
those accorded SMCs other regular employees. Respecting the
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they were no longer to report for work as SMC would be
closing its operations. Where the dismissal is based on
an authorized cause under Article 283 of the Labor Code
but the employer failed to comply with the notice
requirement, the sanction should be stiff as the
dismissal process was initiated by the employers
exercise of his management prerogative, as opposed to
a dismissal based on a just cause under Article 282 with
the same procedural infirmity where the sanction to be
imposed upon the employer should be tempered as the
dismissal process was, in effect, initiated by an act
imputable to the employee. In light of the factual
circumstances of the case at bar, the Court awards P50,000.00
to each private respondent as nominal damages.The grant of
separation pay as an incidence of termination of employment
due to retrenchment to prevent losses is a statutory obligation
on the part of the employer and a demandable right on the part
of the employee. Private respondents should thus be awarded
separation pay equivalent to at least one (1) month pay or to at
least one-half month pay for every year of service, whichever is
higher, as mandated by Article 283 of the Labor Code or the
separation pay awarded by SMC to other regular SMC
employees that were terminated as a result of the
retrenchment, depending on which is most beneficial to private
respondents.Considering that private respondents were not
illegally dismissed, however, no backwages need be awarded.
It is well settled that backwages may be granted only when
there is a finding of illegal dismissal.[80] The appellate court thus
erred in awarding backwages to private respondents. What was
involved in that case was one of illegal dismissal
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MWSS
and,
HELD
YES
- The Court has invariably affirmed that it will not hesitate to tilt
the scales of justice to the labor class for no less than the
Constitution dictates that the State . . . shall protect the rights
of workers and promote their welfare. It is committed to this
policy and has always been quick to rise to defense in the rights
of labor, as in this case.
- Protection to labor, it has been said, extends to all of
labor local and overseas, organized and unorganized, in the
public and private sectors.[52] Besides, there is no reason not to
apply this principle in favor of workers in the government. The
government, including government-owned and controlled
corporations, as employers, should set the example in
upholding the rights and interests of the working class.
- For purposes of determining the existence of employeremployee relationship, the Court has consistently adhered to
the four-fold test, namely: (1) whether the alleged employer has
the power of selection and engagement of an employee; (2)
whether he has control of the employee with respect to the
means and methods by which work is to be accomplished; (3)
whether he has the power to dismiss; and (4) whether the
employee was paid wages. Of the four, the control test is the
most important element.
- A review of the circumstances surrounding the case reveals
that petitioners are employees of MWSS. MWSS wielded its
power of selection when it contracted with the individual
petitioners, undertaking separate contracts or agreements. The
same goes true for the power to dismiss. Although termed as
causes for termination of the Agreement, a review of the same
shows that the grounds indicated therein can similarly be
grounds for termination of employment.
- On the issue of remuneration, MWSS claims that the
compensation received by petitioners does not fall under the
definition of wages as provided in Section 2(i) of P.D. 1146. This
assertion, however, simply begs the question. The provision is a
simple statement of meaning, operating on the a priori premise
or presumption that the recipient is already classified as an
employee, and does not lay down any basis or standard for
determining who are employees and who are not.
- On the other hand, relevant and appropriate is the definition of
wages in the Labor Code, namely, that it is the remuneration,
however designated, for work done or to be done, or for
services rendered or to be rendered. The commissions due
petitioners were based on the bills collected as per the schedule
indicated in the Agreement. Significantly, MWSS granted
petitioners benefits usually given to employees, to wit: COLA,
meal, emergency, and traveling allowances, hazard pay, cash
gift, and other bonuses. Petitioners rendered services to MWSS
for which they were paid and given similar benefits due the
other employees of MWSS.
- Now the aspect of control. MWSS makes an issue out of the
proviso in the Agreement that specifically denies the existence
of employer-employee relationship between it and petitioners. It
is axiomatic that the existence of an employer-employee
relationship cannot be negated by expressly repudiating it in an
agreement and providing therein that the employee is not an
MWSS employee when the terms of the agreement and the
surrounding circumstances show otherwise. The employment
status of a person is defined and prescribed by law and not by
what the parties say it should be.
- In addition, the control test merely calls for the existence of
the right to control, and not the exercise thereof. It is not
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essential for the employer to actually supervise the
performance of duties of the employee, it is enough that the
former has a right to wield the power.
- Other manifestations of control are evident from the records.
The power to transfer or reassign employees is a management
prerogative exclusively enjoyed by employers. In this case,
MWSS had free reign over the transfer of bill collectors from one
branch to another. MWSS also monitored the performance of
the petitioners and determined their efficiency ratings.
Disposition Petition was GRANTED IN PART. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals in C.A.G.R. SP No. 55263, as well as the
Civil Service Commissions Resolutions Nos. 991384 and
992074, were REVERSED and SET ASIDE. MWSS is ordered to
pay terminal leave pay and separation pay and/or severance
pay to each of herein petitioners on the basis of
remunerations/commissions, allowances and bonuses each
were actually receiving at the time of termination of their
employment as contract collectors of MWSS. The case was
remanded to the Civil Service Commission for the computation
of the above awards and the appropriate disposition in
accordance with the pronouncements in this Decision.
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HELD
YES
Doctrine For the purposes of coverage under the Social
Security Act, the determination of employer-employee
relationship warrants the application of the "control test," that
is, whether the employer controls or has reserved the right to
control the employee, not only as to the result of the work
done, but also as to the means and methods by which the same
is accomplished.
- The fact that Laudato was paid by way of commission does not
preclude the establishment of an employer-employee
relationship. In Grepalife v. Judico, the Court upheld the
existence of an employer-employee relationship between the
insurance company and its agents, despite the fact that the
compensation that the agents on commission received was not
paid by the company but by the investor or the person insured.
- Neither does it follow that a person who does not observe
normal hours of work cannot be deemed an employee. In
Cosmopolitan Funeral Homes, Inc. v. Maalat, the Supreme Court
declared that there was an employer-employee relationship,
noting that "[the] supervisor, although compensated on
commission basis, [is] exempt from the observance of normal
hours of work for his compensation is measured by the number
of sales he makes.
- The determination of an employer-employee relationship
depends heavily on the particular factual circumstances
attending the professional interaction of the parties. SC sees no
reversible error in the findings of fact of the courts below. Both
SSC and CA found that Laudato was a sales supervisor and not
a mere agent. As such, Laudato oversaw and supervised the
sales agents of the company, and thus was subject to the
control of management as to how she implements its policies
and its end results. This is proven by several documentary
evidence.
Disposition Petition is DENIED. CA Decision AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.
FACTS
- Complaint was instituted by Eddie Domasig against
respondents Cata Garments Corporation, a company engaged
in garments business and its owner/manager Otto Ong and
Catalina Co for illegal dismissal, unpaid commission and other
monetary claim(s).
- Complainant alleged that he started working with the
respondent on July 6, 1986 as Salesman; three (3) years ago,
because of a complaint against respondent by its workers, the
company changed its name to Cata Garments Corporation; and
that on August 29, 1992, he was dismissed when respondent
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learned that he was being pirated by a rival corporation which
offer he refused.
- The Labor Arbiter held that complainant was illegally
dismissed and entitled to reinstatement and backwages as well
as underpayment of salary; 13th month pay; service incentive
leave and legal holiday. The Arbiter also awarded complainant
his claim for unpaid commission in the amount of P143,955.00.
- NLRC remanded the case for further proceedings.
- Petitioners Claim
> Petitioner claims he was an employee, and that he was
illegally dismissed.
- Respondents Comments
> Respondents claim that Domasig was a mere commission
worker, and not a regular employee (which would warrant
backwages).
ISSUE
WON Domasig is a regular employee (this case is under the
topic of proof of employment)
HELD
YES, Domasig is a regular employee.
Ratio Substantial evidence is sufficient as a basis for judgment
on the existence of employer-employee relationship.
Reasoning
- Proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required as a basis for
judgment on the legality of an employers dismissal of an
employee, nor even preponderance of evidence for that matter,
substantial evidence being sufficient. Any competent and
relevant evidence to prove the relationship may be admitted.
- Substantial evidence
> relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion, and its absence is not shown
by stressing that there is contrary evidence on record, direct or
circumstantial, for the appellate court cannot substitute its own
judgment or criterion for that of the trial court in determining
wherein lies the weight of evidence or what evidence is entitled
to belief.
> In a business establishment, an identification card is usually
provided not only as a security measure but mainly to identify
the holder thereof as a bona fide employee of the firm that
issues it. Together with the cash vouchers covering petitioners
salaries for the months stated therein, these matters constitute
substantial evidence adequate to support a conclusion that
petitioner was indeed an employee of private respondent.
> The list presented by private respondents would even support
petitioners allegation that, aside from a monthly salary of
P1,500.00, he also received commissions for his work as a
salesman of private respondents.
- Having been in the employ of private respondents
continuously for more than one year, under the law, petitioner
is considered a regular employee.
Disposition The decision of the labor arbiter dated 19 May
1993 is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
ABANTE V LAMADRID
430 SCRA 368
YNARES-SANTIAGO; May 28, 2004
NATURE
Petition for review assailing the Decision of the CA which
affirmed the Resolution of the NLRC
FACTS
- Petitioner was employed by respondent company Lamadrid
Bearing and Parts Corporation sometime in June 1985 as a
salesman covering the whole area of Mindanao. His average
monthly income was more or less P16,000.00, but later was
increased to approximately P20,269.50. Aside from selling the
merchandise of respondent corporation, he was also tasked to
collect payments from his various customers. Sometime in
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[PAGE 19]
MANILA ELECTRIC CO V BENAMIRA
302 SCRA 173
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ; July 14, 2005
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari of the Court of Appeals decision
FACTS
- The individual respondents are licensed security guards
formerly employed by Peoples Security, Inc. (PSI) and deployed
as such at MERALCOs head office in Ortigas Avenue, Pasig,
Metro Manila. On November 30, 1990, the security service
agreement between PSI and MERALCO was terminated.
Immediately thereafter, fifty-six of PSIs security guards,
including herein eight individual respondents, filed a complaint
for unpaid monetary benefits against PSI and MERALCO.
Meanwhile, the security service agreement between respondent
Armed Security & Detective Agency, Inc., (ASDAI) and MERALCO
took effect on December 1, 1990. In the agreement, ASDAI was
designated as the AGENCY while MERALCO was designated as
the COMPANY.
- Subsequently, the individual respondents were absorbed by
ASDAI and retained at MERALCOs head office.
- Asuncion rendered a decision in NLRC-NCR Case No. 0502746-90 in favor of the former PSI security guards, including
the individual respondents.
- Less than a month later, or on July 21, 1992, the individual
respondents filed another complaint for unpaid monetary
benefits, this time against ASDAI and MERALCO.
- On July 25, 1992, the security service agreement between
respondent Advance Forces Security & Investigation Services,
Inc. (AFSISI) and MERALCO took effect, terminating the previous
security service agreement with ASDAI. Except as to the
number of security guards, the amount to be paid the agency,
and the effectivity of the agreement, the terms and conditions
were substantially identical with the security service agreement
with ASDAI.
- The individual respondents amended their complaint to
implead AFSISI as party respondent. They again amended their
complaint to allege that AFSISI terminated their services on
August 6, 1992 without notice and just cause and therefore
guilty of illegal dismissal.
- The individual respondents alleged that: MERALCO and ASDAI
never paid their overtime pay, service incentive leave pay,
premium pay for Sundays and Holidays, P50.00 monthly
uniform allowance and underpaid their 13th month pay; on July
24, 1992, when the security service agreement of ASDAI was
terminated and AFSISI took over the security functions of the
former on July 25, 1992, respondent security guard Benamira
was no longer given any work assignment when AFSISI learned
that the former has a pending case against PSI, in effect,
dismissing him from the service without just cause; and, the
rest of the individual respondents were absorbed by AFSISI but
were not given any assignments, thereby dismissing them from
the service without just cause.
- ASDAI denied in general terms any liability for the claims of
the individual respondents, claiming that there is nothing due
them in connection with their services.
- On the other hand, MERALCO denied liability on the ground of
lack of employer-employee relationship with individual
respondents. It averred that the individual respondents are the
employees of the security agencies it contracted for security
services; and that it has no existing liability for the individual
respondents claims since said security agencies have been
fully paid for their services per their respective security service
agreement.
- For its part, AFSISI asserted that: it is not liable for illegal
dismissal since it did not absorb or hire the individual
respondents, the latter were merely hold-over guards from
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HELD
1. It is a settled rule that in the exercise of the Supreme Courts
power of review, the Court is not a trier of facts and does not
normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence
presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case
considering that the findings of facts of the CA are conclusive
and binding on the Court.
However, jurisprudence has
recognized several exceptions in which factual issues may be
resolved by this Court.
- In the present case, the existence of an employer-employee
relationship is a question of fact which is well within the
province of the CA. Nonetheless, given the reality that the CAs
findings are at odds to those of the NLRC, the Court is
constrained to look deeper into the attendant circumstances
obtaining in the present case, as appearing on record.
The individual respondents never alleged in their complaint in
the Labor Arbiter, in their appeal in the NLRC and even in their
petition for certiorari in the CA that MERALCO was their
employer. They have always advanced the theory that AFSISI is
their employer. A perusal of the records shows it was only in
their Memorandum in the CA that this thesis was presented and
discussed for the first time. We cannot ignore the fact that this
position of individual respondents runs contrary to their earlier
submission in their pleadings filed in the Labor Arbiter, NLRC
and even in the petition for certiorari in the CA that AFSISI is
their employer and liable for their termination. As the object of
the pleadings is to draw the lines of battle, so to speak,
between the litigants and to indicate fairly the nature of the
claims or defenses of both parties, a party cannot subsequently
take a position contrary to, or inconsistent, with his pleadings.
Moreover, it is a fundamental rule of procedure that higher
courts are precluded from entertaining matters neither alleged
in the pleadings nor raised during the proceedings below, but
ventilated for the first time only in a motion for reconsideration
or on appeal. The individual respondents are bound by their
submissions that AFSISI is their employer and they should not
be permitted to change their theory. Such a change of theory
cannot be tolerated on appeal, not due to the strict application
of procedural rules but as a matter of fairness. A change of
theory on appeal is objectionable because it is contrary to the
rules of fair play, justice and due process.
- Thus, the CA should not have considered the new theory
offered by the individual respondents in their memorandum.
- The present petition for review on certiorari is far from novel
and, in fact, not without precedence. We have ruled in Social
Security System vs. Court of Appeals that:
...The guards or watchmen render their services to private
respondent by allowing themselves to be assigned by said
respondent, which furnishes them arms and ammunition, to
guard and protect the properties and interests of private
respondent's clients, thus enabling that respondent to fulfill
its contractual obligations. Who the clients will be, and under
what terms and conditions the services will be rendered, are
matters determined not by the guards or watchmen, but by
private respondent. On the other hand, the client companies
have no hand in selecting who among the guards or
watchmen shall be assigned to them. It is private respondent
that issues assignment orders and instructions and exercises
control and supervision over the guards or watchmen, so
much so that if, for one reason or another, the client is
dissatisfied with the services of a particular guard, the client
cannot himself terminate the services of such guard, but has
to notify private respondent, which either substitutes him
with another or metes out to him disciplinary measures. That
in the course of a watchman's assignment the client
conceivably issues instructions to him, does not in the least
detract from the fact that private respondent is the employer
of said watchman, for in legal contemplation such instructions
carry no more weight than mere requests, the privity of
contract being between the client and private respondent, not
between the client and the guard or watchman. Corollarily,
such giving out of instructions inevitably spring from the
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by petitioner with ASDAI and AFSISI, we are convinced that
ASDAI and AFSISI were engaged in job contracting.
2. YES
- The individual respondents can not be considered as regular
employees of the MERALCO for, although security services are
necessary and desirable to the business of MERALCO, it is not
directly related to its principal business and may even be
considered unnecessary in the conduct of MERALCOs principal
business, which is the distribution of electricity.
- Furthermore, the fact that the individual respondents filed
their claim for unpaid monetary benefits against ASDAI is a
clear indication that the individual respondents acknowledge
that ASDAI is their employer.
- We cannot give credence to individual respondents insistence
that they were absorbed by AFSISI when MERALCOs security
service agreement with ASDAI was terminated. The individual
respondents failed to present any evidence to confirm that
AFSISI absorbed them into its workforce. Thus, respondent
Benamira was not retained in his post at MERALCO since July
25, 1992 due to the termination of the security service
agreement of MERALCO with ASDAI. As for the rest of the
individual respondents, they retained their post only as holdover guards until the security guards of AFSISI took over their
post on August 6, 1992.
- In the present case, respondent Benamira has been offdetail for seventeen days while the rest of the individual
respondents have only been off- detail for five days when
they amended their complaint on August 11, 1992 to include
the charge of illegal dismissal. The inclusion of the charge of
illegal dismissal then was premature. Nonetheless, bearing in
mind that ASDAI simply stopped giving the individual
respondents any assignment and their inactivity clearly
persisted beyond the six-month period allowed by Article 286 of
the Labor Code, the individual respondents were, in effect,
constructively dismissed by ASDAI from employment, hence,
they should be reinstated.
3. YES, as an indirect employer.
- The fact that there is no actual and direct employer-employee
relationship between MERALCO and the individual respondents
does not exonerate MERALCO from liability as to the monetary
claims of the individual respondents.
When MERALCO
contracted for security services with ASDAI as the security
agency that hired individual respondents to work as guards for
it, MERALCO became an indirect employer of individual
respondents pursuant to Article 107 of the Labor Code, which
reads:
ART.
107. Indirect employer - The provisions of the
immediately preceding Article shall likewise apply to any
person, partnership, association or corporation which, not
being an employer, contracts with an independent contractor
for the performance of any work, task, job or project.
- When ASDAI as contractor failed to pay the individual
respondents, MERALCO as principal becomes jointly and
severally liable for the individual respondents wages, under
Articles 106 and 109 of the Labor Code, which provide:
ART.
106. Contractor or subcontractor. - Whenever an
employer enters into a contract with another person for the
performance of the former[s] work, the employees of the
contractor and of the latter[s] subcontractor, if any, shall be
paid in accordance with the provisions of this Code.
In the event that the contractor or subcontractor fails to pay
the wages of his employees in accordance with this Code, the
employer shall be jointly and severally liable with his
contractor or subcontractor to such employees to the extent
of the work performed under the contract, in the same
manner and extent that he is liable to employees directly
employed by him.
ART. 109. Solidary liability - The provisions of existing laws to
the contrary notwithstanding, every employer or indirect
employer shall be held responsible with his contractor or
subcontractor for any violation of any provision of this Code.
For purpose of determining the extent of their civil liability
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dismissed without just cause and due process; hence, their
prayer for reinstatement and full backwages.
- Petitioner Big AA Manufacturer
> That it is a sole proprietorship registered in the name of
Enrico Alejo and engaged in manufacturing office furniture, but
it denied that respondents were its regular employees. It
claimed that Eutiquio Antonio was one of its independent
contractors who used the services of the other respondents. It
said that its independent contractors were paid by results and
were responsible for the salaries of their own workers.
Allegedly, there was no employer-employee relationship
between petitioner and respondents. But it allowed respondents
to use its facilities to meet job orders. It also denied that
respondents were laid-off by Big AA Manufacturer, since they
were project employees only. It added that since Eutiquio
Antonio had refused a job order of office tables, their
contractual relationship ended.
- Labor Arbiter ruled againstpetitioners. Both appealed to NLRC.
Respondents appealed for not ordering their reinstatement to
their former positions. The NLRC modified the Labor Arbiters
decision. It ordered petitioner to reinstate respondents to their
former positions or to pay them separation pay in case
reinstatement was no longer feasible, with full backwages in
either case. The NLRC ruled that respondents were regular
employees, not independent contractors. It further held that
petitioner failed to justify its reason for terminating respondents
and its failure to comply with the due process requirements. CA
affirmed NLRC ruling.
ISSUES
1. WON respondents were regular employees
2. WON respondents were illegally dismissed
HELD
1. YES
- Respondents were employed for more than 1 year and their
work as carpenters was necessary or desirable in petitioners
usual trade or business of manufacturing office furniture. Under
Art. 280 of the Labor Code, the applicable test to determine
whether an employment should be considered regular or nonregular is the reasonable connection between the particular
activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual
business or trade of the employer.
- True, certain forms of employment require the performance of
usual or desirable functions and exceed 1 year but do not
necessarily result to regular employment under Art. 280 of the
Labor Code. Some specific exceptions include project or
seasonal employment. Yet, in this case, respondents cannot be
considered project employees. Petitioner had neither shown
that respondents were hired for a specific project the duration
of which was determined at the time of their hiring nor
identified the specific project or phase thereof for which
respondents were hired.
Obiter on Requirements for an Independent contractor: a) he
carries a distinct and independent business, b) possesses
substantial capital or investment in tools, equipment,
machinery or work premises, c) he does not work within another
employer/companys premises using the latters tools and
materials, and d) he is not under the control and supervision of
an employer or company
2. YES
- The consistent rule is that the employer must affirmatively
show rationally adequate evidence that the dismissal was for a
justifiable cause, failing in which would make the termination
illegal, as in this case.
- Contrary to petitioners claim of abandonment as a valid just
cause for termination, herein respondents did not abandon their
work. Petitioner failed to prove that (1) not only of respondents
failure to report for work or absence without valid reason, but
(2) also of respondents clear intention to sever employeremployee relations as manifested by some overt acts.
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longer deal with whether there exists an employment bond but
whether the employee may be considered regular or casual as
to deserve the application of Art. 280 of the Labor Code.
- It was error therefore for the NLRC to apply Art. 280 of the
Labor Code in determining the existence of an employment
relationship of the parties herein, especially in light of our
explicit holding in Singer Sewing Machine Company v. Drion
that The Court agrees with the petitioner's argument that Article
280 is not the yardstick for determining the existence of an
employment relationship because it merely distinguishes
between two kinds of employees, i.e., regular employees and
casual employees, for purposes of determining the right of an
employee to certain benefits, to join or form a union, or to
security of tenure. Article 280 does not apply where the
existence of an employment relationship is in dispute
- In determining the existence of an employer-employee
relationship it is necessary to determine whether the following
factors are present: (a) the selection and engagement of the
employee; (b) the payment of wages; (c) the power to dismiss;
and, (d) the power to control the employee's conduct. Notably,
these are all found in the relationship between BJS and
Canonicato and not between Canonicato and petitioner COCA
COLA. As the Solicitor-General manifested
- BJS satisfied all the requirements of a job-contractor under the
law, namely, (a) the ability to carry on an independent business
and undertake the contract work on its own account under its
own responsibility according to its manner and method, free
from the control and direction of its principal or client in all
matters connected with the performance of the work except as
to the results thereof; and, (b) the substantial capital or
investment in the form of tools, equipment, machinery, work
premises, and other materials which are necessary in the
conduct of its business.
- All told, there being no employer-employee relationship
between Canonicato and COCA COLA, the latter cannot be
validly ordered to reinstate the former and pay him back wages.
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regular
HELD
1. No employer-employee relation between complainants and
petitioner.
Ratio
a) Janitorial service agreement is not labor-only
contacting AND
b) Extension of service contract is not a source of employeremployee relation.
Reasoning
a) Prohibited labor-only contracting is defined in Article 106 of
the Labor Code as follows:
There is "labor-only" contracting where the person supplying
workers to an employer does not have substantial capital or
investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work
premises, among others, and the workers recruited and placed
by such persons are performing activities which are directly
related to the principal business of such employer. In such
cases, the person or intermediary shall be considered merely as
an agent of the employer who shall be responsible to the
workers in the same manner and extent as if the latter were
directly employed by him.
- This definition covers any person who undertakes to supply
workers to an employer, where such person:
(1) Does not have substantial capital or investment in the form
of tools, equipment, [machinery], work premises and other
materials; and
(2) The workers recruited and placed by such person are
performing activities which are directly related to the principal
business or operations of the employer in which workers are
habitually employed.
- On the other hand, permissible job contracting requires the
following conditions:
(1) The contractor carries on an independent business and
undertakes the contract work on his own account under his own
responsibility according to his own manner and method, free
from the control and direction of his employer or principal in all
Labor Law 1
matters connected with the performance of the work except as
to the results thereof; and
(2) The contractor has substantial capital or investment in the
form of tools, equipment, [machinery], work premises, and
other materials which are necessary in the conduct of his
business.
- The employee-employer relation existed between the
individual private respondents and STELLAR, not PAL. STELLAR
possessed these earmarks of an employer:
(1) the power of selection and engagement of employees
(2) the payment of wages
(3) the power of dismissal, and
(4) the power to control the employee's conduct
- A contract of employment existed between STELLAR and the
individual private respondents, proving that it was said
corporation which hired them. It was also STELLAR which
dismissed them, as evidenced by Complainant Parenas'
termination letter, which was signed by Carlos P. Callanga, vice
president
for
operations
and
comptroller
of
STELLAR. Likewise, they worked under STELLAR's own
supervisors, Rodel Pagsulingan, Napoleon Parungao and Renato
Topacio. STELLAR even had its own collective bargaining
agreement with its employees, including the individual private
respondents. Moreover, PAL had no power of control and
dismissal over them.
- In fact, STELLAR claims that it falls under the definition of an
independent job contractor. Thus, it alleges that it has sufficient
capital in the form of tools and equipment, like vacuum
cleaners and polishers, and substantial capitalization as proven
by its financial statements. Further, STELLAR has clients other
than petitioner, like San Miguel Corporation, Hongkong and
Shanghai Bank, Eveready, Benguet Management Corporation
and Japan Airlines.
- All these circumstances establish that STELLAR undertook said
contract on its account, under its own responsibility, according
to its own manner and method, and free from the control and
direction of the petitioner. Where the control of the principal is
limited only to the result of the work, independent job
contracting exists. The janitorial service agreement between
petitioner and STELLAR is definitely a case of permissible job
contracting.
b) What actually happened was that PAL and STELLAR impliedly
renewed, as they had previously done before, their service
agreement until PAL's janitorial requirements were bidded to
other job contractors. This explains why the individual private
respondents remained working at PAL's premises even after
December 31, 1990.
- It is evident that petitioner was engaged in permissible job
contracting and that the individual private respondents, for the
entire duration of their employ, were employees not of
petitioner but of STELLAR. In legitimate job contracting, no
employer-employee relation exists between the principal and
the job contractor's employees. The principal is responsible to
the job contractor's employees only for the proper payment of
wages. But in labor-only contracting, an employer-employee
relation is created by law between the principal and the laboronly contractor's employees, such that the former is responsible
to such employees, as if he or she had directly employed them.
Besides, the Court has already taken judicial notice of the
general practice adopted in several government and private
institutions of securing janitorial services on an independent
contractor basis.
2. NO, STELLAR is the one liable for separation pay.
Ratio Despite the protestations of STELLAR, the service
agreement was not a project because its duration was not
determined or determinable.
Reasoning
- In order to avoid liability for separation pay, STELLAR argues
that it terminated the services of the individual private
respondents for a just and valid cause: the completion of a
specific project. Thus, they are not entitled to separation pay.
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to discourage disrespect of the public by such acts as were
committed by defendants
ISSUE
WON the remedy of the petitioner is proper (that Mercury Drug
be liable for Sidos actions)
HELD
NO
Ratio The petitioner was not Sidos employer; hence, CC A
2180 should not be applied against petitioner.
Reasoning
- The respondent was burdened to prove that the petitioner was
the employer of Sido but failed to discharge this burden.
- The respondents counsel admitted Sido was not employed by
the petitioner
- Store manager Santos testified that Sido was not an employee
of the petitioner, but of BSSC, Black Shield Agency.
- The petitioner adduced in evidence its contract with the BSSC,
which contained the following provisions: 1. THE AGENCY shall
provide the CLIENT with the necessary number of armed,
uniformed and qualified security guards properly licensed by
the Chief of Philippine Constabulary; who shall provide security
services to the CLIENT at its establishment at
These security guards during the life of the Agreement shall
be assigned in accordance with arrangements to be made
between the CLIENT and the AGENCY.
...
6. The AGENCY assumes full responsibility for any claim or
cause of action which may accrue in favor of any security
guard by reason of employment with the AGENCY, it being
understood that security guards are employees of the
AGENCY and not of the CLIENT.
- Therefore, the respondent had no cause of action against the
petitioner for damages for Sidos illegal and harmful acts. The
respondent should have sued Sido and the BSSC for damages,
conformable to A2180.
- In Soliman, Jr. v. Tuazon the court held that where the security
agency recruits, hires and assigns the works of its watchmen or
security guards to a client, the employer of such guards or
watchmen is such agency, and not the client, since the latter
has no hand in selecting the security guards. Thus, the duty to
observe the diligence of a good father of a family cannot be
demanded from the said client
- The petitioner had assigned Sido to help the management
open and close the door of the drug store; inspect the bags of
customers as they enter the store; and, check the receipts
issued by the cashier to said customers for their purchases.
Such circumstances do not automatically make the security
guard the employee of the petitioner, and, as such, liable for
the guard's tortious acts. The fact that a client company may
give instructions or directions to the security guards assigned
to it, does not, by itself, render the client responsible as an
employer of the security guards concerned and liable for their
wrongful acts or omissions.
Disposition petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated
June 9, 2000 and the Resolution dated August 9, 2000 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59754 are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The complaint filed by the respondent against
petitioner Mercury Drug Corporation in Civil Case No. Q-9214114 is DISMISSED. The counterclaims of the latter are also
DISMISSED. No costs.
MARIVELESSHIPYARD V CA
415 SCRA573
QUISUMBING; November 11, 2003
FACTS
- In October 1993, petitioner Mariveles Shipyard Corporation
engaged the services of Longest Force Investigation and
Security Agency, Inc. to render security services at its premises.
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was not necessary. In any event, petitioner was given ample
opportunity to present its side in several hearings conducted
before the Labor Arbiter and in the position papers and other
supporting documents that it had submitted. Such opportunity
more than satisfies the requirement of due process in labor
cases.
3. YES
- Petitioners liability is joint and several with that of Longest
Force, pursuant to Articles 106, 107 and 109 of the Labor Code.
In this case, when petitioner contracted for security services
with Longest Force as the security agency that hired private
respondents to work as guards for the shipyard corporation,
petitioner became an indirect employer of private respondents
pursuant to Article 107. Following Article 106, when the agency
as contractor failed to pay the guards, the corporation as
principal becomes jointly and severally liable for the guards
wages.
This is mandated by the Labor Code to ensure
compliance with its provisions, including payment of statutory
minimum wage. The security agency is held liable by virtue of
its status as direct employer, while the corporation is deemed
the indirect employer of the guards for the purpose of paying
their wages in the event of failure of the agency to pay them.
This statutory scheme gives the workers the ample protection
consonant with labor and social justice provisions of the 1987
Constitution.
- Petitioner cannot evade its liability by claiming that it had
religiously paid the compensation of guards as stipulated under
the contract with the security agency. Labor standards are
enacted by the legislature to alleviate the plight of workers
whose wages barely meet the spiraling costs of their basic
needs. Labor laws are considered written in every contract.
Stipulations in violation thereof are considered null. Similarly,
legislated wage increases are deemed amendments to the
contract.
- However, we must emphasize that the joint and several
liability imposed on petitioner is without prejudice to a claim for
reimbursement by petitioner against the security agency for
such amounts as petitioner may have to pay to complainants,
the private respondents herein. The security agency may not
seek exculpation by claiming that the principals payments to it
were inadequate for the guards lawful compensation. As an
employer, the security agency is charged with knowledge of
labor laws; and the adequacy of the compensation that it
demands for contractual services is its principal concern and
not any others.
- On the issue of the propriety of the award of overtime pay
despite the alleged lack of proof thereof, suffice it to state that
such involves a determination and evaluation of facts which
cannot be done in a petition for review.
- Upon review of the award of backwages and attorneys fees,
we discovered certain errors that happened in the addition of
the amount of individual backwages that resulted in the
erroneous total amount of backwages and attorneys fees.
These errors ought to be properly rectified now. Thus, the
correct sum of individual backwages should be P126,648.40
instead of P126,684.40, while the correct sum of total
backwages awarded and attorneys fees should be
P3,926,100.40 and P392,610.04, instead of P3,927,216.40
and P392,721.64, respectively.
Disposition The Court of Appeals Resolution is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION.
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Ratio In legitimate job contracting, the law creates an
employer-employee relationship for a limited purpose, i.e., to
ensure that the employees are paid their wages. The principal
employer becomes jointly and severally liable with the job
contractor only for the payment of the employees wages
whenever the contractor fails to pay the same. Other than that,
the principal employer is not responsible for any claim made by
the employees.
Reasoning
- The petitioner did not, as it could not, illegally dismissed the
private complainants. Hence, it could not be held liable for back
wages and separation pay. Nevertheless, it is jointly and
severally liable with Nilo Layno Builders for the private
complainants wages, in the same manner and extent that it is
liable to its direct employees. The pertinent provisions of the
Labor Code read:
ART. 106. Contractor or subcontractor. Whenever an
employer enters into a contract with another person for the
performance of the formers work, the employees of the
contractor and of the latters subcontractor, if any, shall be
paid in accordance with the provisions of this Code. XXX In
the event that the contractor or subcontractor fails to pay the
wages of his employees in accordance with this Code, the
employer shall be jointly and severally liable with his
contractor or subcontractor to such employees to the extent
of the work performed under the contract, in the same
manner and extent that he is liable to employees directly
employed by him.
ART. 107.
Indirect employer. The provisions of the
immediately preceding Article shall likewise apply to any
person, partnership, association or corporation which, not
being an employer, contracts with an independent contractor
for the performance of any work, task, job or project.
- This liability covers the payment of service incentive leave and
13th month pay of the private complainants during the time
they were working at petitioners Prince David Project. So long
as the work, task, job or project has been performed for
petitioners benefit or on its behalf, the liability accrues for such
period even if, later on, the employees are eventually
transferred or reassigned elsewhere.
Disposition Petition PARTLY GRANTED. Decision of the CA
MODIFIED. Petitioner ABSOLVED from liability for back wages.
However, he is ORDERED to pay, jointly and severally with Nilo
Layno Builders, private complainants Service Incentive Leave
Pay and 13th Month Pay.
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matters connected with the performance of the work except as
to the results thereof; (b) The contractor or subcontractor has
substantial capital or investment; and (c) The agreement
between the principal and contractor or subcontractor assures
the contractual employees entitlement to all labor and
occupational safety and health standards, free exercise of the
right to self-organization, security of tenure, and social and
welfare benefits.
- First of all, PMCI does not have substantial capitalization or
investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work
premises, among others, to qualify as an independent
contractor.
-Second, PMCI did not carry on an independent business nor did
it undertake the performance of its contract according to its
own manner and method, free from the control and supervision
of its principal, RFC. The evidence at hand shows that the
workers assigned by PMCI to RFC were under the control and
supervision of the latter.
-Third, PMCI was not engaged to perform a specific and special
job or service.. As stated in the Contract of Service, the sole
undertaking of PMCI was to provide RFC with a temporary
workforce able to carry out whatever service may be required
by it. Apart from that, no other particular job, work or service
was required from PMCI. Obviously, with such an arrangement,
PMCI merely acted as a recruitment agency for RFC.
- Lastly, in labor-only contracting, the employees recruited,
supplied or placed by the contractor perform activities which
are directly related to the main business of its principal. In this
case, the work of petitioner as sales representative is directly
related to the business of RFC. Being in the business of food
manufacturing and sales, it is necessary for RFC to hire a sales
representative like petitioner to take charge of booking its sales
orders and collecting payments for such. Thus, the work of
petitioner as sales representative in RFC can only be
categorized as clearly related to, and in the pursuit of the
latters business. Logically, when petitioner was assigned by
PMCI to RFC, PMCI acted merely as a labor-only contractor.
2. Petitioner was an employee of RFC
Ratio In determining the existence of employer-employee
relationship the following elements of the "four-fold test" are
generally considered, namely: (1) the selection and
engagement of the employee or the power to hire; (2) the
payment of wages; (3) the power to dismiss; and (4) the power
to control the employee. Of these four, the "control test" is the
most important.
- No particular form of proof is required to prove the existence
of an employer-employee relationship. Any competent and
relevant evidence may show the relationship.
Reasoning
- PMC I as a labor-only contractor, cannot be considered as the
employer of petitioner
- Even granting that PMCI is an independent contractor, still, a
finding of the same will not save the day for RFC. A perusal of
the Contract of Service entered into between RFC and PMCI
reveals that petitioner is actually not included in the
enumeration of the workers to be assigned to RFC. This only
shows that petitioner was never intended to be a part of those
to be contracted out.
-With regard to the first element, ID card is enough proof that
petitioner was previously hired by RFC prior to his transfer as
agency worker to PMCI. ID card issued by RFC to petitioner was
dated more than one year before the Employment Contract was
signed by petitioner in favor of PMCI. While the Employment
Contract indicates the word "renewal," presumably an attempt
to show that petitioner had previously signed a similar contract
with PMCI, no evidence of a prior contract entered into between
petitioner and PMCI was ever presented by RFC. It follows that it
was RFC who actually hired and engaged petitioner to be its
employee
- With respect to the payment of wages, the Court takes judicial
notice of the practice of employers who, in order to evade the
liabilities under the Labor Code, do not issue payslips directly to
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Labor Law 1
1. WON theres employer-employee relationship
2. WON respondents were illegally dismissed
HELD
1. YES
- We must resolve WON ACGI is an independent contractor or a
labor-only contractor.
- Labor-only contracting refers to arrangement where contractor
merely recruits and places workers for a principal. Elements
- contractor doesnt have substantial capital
- contractor doesnt control performance of contractual
employee
- Arbiter correctly ruled that ACGI was not an independent
contractor. ACGI doesnt have substantial capital. It has no
office. The work of the respondents was directly related to
business of petitioner.
And ACGI did not carry on an
independent business according to its own manner.
- ACGI was a labor-only contractor, an agent of the petitioner.
- Then the workers are employees of the petitioner.
- Even the four-fold test (selection, payment of wages, dismissal
power, control of conduct) indicate the relationship.
2. YES
- The term fixed in the subsequent contract was used to defeat
the tenurial security.
- Dismissal was illegal.
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(1) it is not registered as a building contractor with the SEC;
(2) it has no contract with petitioner; and
(3) there is no proof of its financial capability and has no list
of equipment, tools, machineries and implements used in the
business.
- Kiamco vs. NLRC: The principal test for determining whether
particular employees are properly characterized as project
employees, as distinguished from regular employees, is
whether or not the project employees were assigned to carry
out a specific project or undertaking, the duration and scope of
which were specified at the time the employees were engaged
for that project. As defined, project employees are those
workers hired (1) for a specific project or undertaking, and (2)
the completion or termination of such project or undertaking
has been determined at the time of engagement of the
employee.
- Grandspan could not present employment contracts signed by
respondents showing that their employment was for the
duration of the HCMG or Sogo project and failed to present any
report terminating the services of respondents when its projects
were actually finished pursuant to Sec2.2 (e) of the Labor
Department Order No. 19
SC: The failure of the employer to file termination reports after
every project completion with the nearest public employment
office is an indication that respondents were not project
employees.
TF: respondents are Grandspans regular
employees. As such, they are entitled to security of tenure and
can only be dismissed for a just or authorized cause, as
provided by Article 279 of the Labor Code.
- Bolinao Security and Investigation Service, Inc. vs. Toston- it
is incumbent upon the employer to prove by the quantum of
evidence required by law that the dismissal of an employee is
not illegal, otherwise, the dismissal would be unjustified.
- SC: Termination is ILLEGAL. Grandspan violated respondents
right (both substantive and procedural) to due process as
records show that respondents were not served by notices of
any kind nor were asked to explain the misconduct imputed to
them.
> Loadstar Shipping Co., Inc. vs. Mesano: The law requires
that an employee sought to be dismissed must be served two
written notices before termination of his employment. The
first notice is to apprise the employee of the particular acts or
omissions by reason of which his dismissal has been decided
upon; and the second notice is to inform the employee of the
employers decision to dismiss him. Failure to comply with
the requirement of two notices makes the dismissal illegal.
The procedure is mandatory. Non-observance thereof
renders the dismissal of an employee illegal and void.
- SC: they are entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority
rights, full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and other
benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the
time their compensation was withheld from them up to
the time of their actual reinstatement.
Disposition CAs decision AFFIRMED with modification.
Reinstatement in this case is N/A because of antagonism.
Respondents are entitled
to
a
separation
pay
of
P4,992.00 plus their respective full backwages, and other
privileges and benefits, or their monetary equivalent, during the
period of their dismissal up to their supposed actual
reinstatement.
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petitioner. The Labor Arbiter then declared the termination of
private respondents services illegal, and held petitioner and
G.C. Services Enterprises jointly and severally liable to pay
private respondents their separation pay, backwages as well as
attorneys fees.
- Both parties appealed to the NLRC, which, affirmed the Labor
Arbiters decision with modification as to the computation of the
monetary award.
- Its motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner
filed the instant petition.
ISSUES
1. WON the public respondents committed grave abuse of
discretion in declaring the dismissal of private respondents
illegal despite the finding of redundancy
2. WON private respondents are entitled to separation pay as
well as backwages
3. WON petitioner should be held jointly and severally liable
HELD
1. YES
- The petitioner regularized and/or re-employed 23 original
complainants as there were vacant positions to which they
could qualify. However, the remaining 12 complainants (private
respondents herein) could no longer be absorbed into
petitioners regular workforce as there were no longer vacant
positions as evidenced by the Table of Organization of PAL
Construction and Corporate Services Department. Simply put,
the services of private respondents were already in excess of
what is reasonably demanded by the actual manpower
requirement of petitioner. It is settled that where there is need
for reduction of workforce, management has the right to choose
whom to layoff, depending on the work still required to be done
and the qualities of the workers to be retained.
- Under Article 203 (must be 283) of the Labor Code, the
employer may terminate an employee due to redundancy or
retrenchment.
- In Wilshire (sic) File Co., Inc. v. NLRC, 193 SCRA 672 the
Supreme Court aptly ruled:
Redundancy, for purposes of our Labor code, exists where
the services of an employee are in excess of what is
reasonably demanded by the actual requirements of the
enterprise. Succinctly put, a position is redundant where it is
superfluous and the superfluity of a position or positions may
be the outcome of a number of factors, such as over-hiring of
workers xxx. The employer has no legal obligation to keep in
its payroll more employees than are necessary for the
operation of its business. (underscoring supplied)
- Clearly, the Labor Arbiter recognized the existence of
redundancy. Despite said findings the Labor Arbiter ruled as
follows:
xxx In consonance therefore under Art. 280 of the Labor
Code of the Philippines, herein complainants are regular
employees. For being so, they are protected by the Security
of Tenure provision of law (Art. 279, Labor Code) the
complainant dismissal being not in contemplation with Art.
282 of the Labor Code it is therefore illegal. xxx
- The reference to Article 282 is misplaced.
Article 282
enumerates the causes for termination by reason of some
blameworthy act or omission on the part of the employee.
- In the instant case, the cause of termination is redundancy
which is an authorized cause for termination under Article 283.
In any event, it is absurd for the Labor Arbiter to declare a
finding of redundancy, on one hand, and to conclude, on the
other, that the termination of private respondents services is
illegal. There being redundancy, the dismissal of private
respondents is valid
2. NO
- Since private respondents were validly dismissed under Art.
283, they are not entitled to backwages. Apparently, public
respondents awarded backwages to private respondents to
penalize PAL for engaging in a labor-only scheme. However,
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the law does not give public respondents such authority. The
only effect of labor-only contracting is that the person or
intermediary shall be considered merely as an agent of the
employer who shall be responsible to the workers in the same
manner and extent as if the latter were directly employed by
him (Art. 106, Labor Code).
- Thus, private respondents are entitled to separation pay only.
The award of backwages to them has no basis in law.
3. YES
- Petitioner and G.C. Services Enterprises are jointly and
severally liable to the private respondents for the latters
monetary claims. The reason is that G.C. Services Enterprises,
being a labor only contractor, is merely an agent of the
petitioner (the employer); the resultant liability must be
shouldered by either one or shared by both. Hence, petitioner
cannot avoid liability by invoking its Service Agreement with
G.C. Services Enterprises considering that here the liability is
imposed by law.
Labor Law 1
- The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) ruled that
MAERC was a labor-only contractor and that complainants were
employees of SMC. The NLRC also held that whether MAERC
was a job contractor or a labor-only contractor, SMC was still
solidarily liable with MAERC for the latter's unpaid obligations,
citing Art. 109 4 of the Labor Code. Thus, the NLRC modified the
judgment of the Labor Arbiter and held SMC jointly and
severally liable with MAERC for complainants' separation
benefits. In addition, both respondents were ordered to pay
jointly and severally an indemnity fee of P2,000.00 to each
complainant.
- SMC filed petition for certiorari
ISSUE
WON the complainants are employees of petitioner SMC or of
respondent MAERC
HELD
Employees of SMC
- In ascertaining an employer-employee relationship, the
following factors are considered: (a) the selection and
engagement of employee; (b) the payment of wages; (c) the
power of dismissal; and, (d) the power to control an employee's
conduct, the last being the most important. Application of the
aforesaid criteria clearly indicates an employer-employee
relationship between petitioner and the complainants.
- Evidence discloses that petitioner played a large and
indispensable part in the hiring of MAERC's workers. It also
appears that majority of the complainants had already been
working for SMC long before the signing of the service contract
between SMC and MAERC.
- The incorporators of MAERC admitted having supplied and
recruited workers for SMC even before MAERC was created. The
NLRC also found that when MAERC was organized into a
corporation, the complainants who were then already working
for SMC were made to go through the motion of applying for
work with Ms. Olga Ouano, President and General Manager of
MAERC, upon the instruction of SMC through its supervisors to
make it appear that complainants were hired by MAERC. This
was testified to by two (2) of the workers who were segregator
and forklift operator assigned to the Beer Marketing Division at
the SMC compound and who had been working with SMC under
a purported contractor Jopard Services since March 1979 and
March 1981, respectively. Both witnesses also testified that
together with other complainants they continued working for
SMC without break from Jopard Services to MAERC.
- As for the payment of workers' wages, it is conceded that
MAERC was paid in lump sum but records suggest that the
remuneration was not computed merely according to the result
or the volume of work performed. The memoranda of the labor
rates bearing the signature of a Vice-President and General
Manager for the Vismin Beer Operations as well as a director of
SMC appended to the contract of service reveal that SMC
assumed the responsibility of paying for the mandated
overtime, holiday and rest day pays of the MAERC workers. SMC
also paid the employer's share of the SSS and Medicare
contributions, the 13th month pay, incentive leave pay and
maternity benefits. In the lump sum received, MAERC earned a
marginal amount representing the contractor's share. These
lend credence to the complaining workers' assertion that while
MAERC paid the wages of the complainants, it merely acted as
an agent of SMC.
- Petitioner insists that the most significant determinant of an
employer-employee relationship, i.e., the right to control, is
absent. The contract of services between MAERC and SMC
provided that MAERC was an independent contractor and that
the workers hired by it "shall not, in any manner and under any
circumstances, be considered employees of the Company, and
that the Company has no control or supervision whatsoever
over the conduct of the Contractor or any of its workers in
respect to how they accomplish their work or perform the
Contractor's obligations under the Contract."
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employer. For its failure, petitioner was justly ordered to
indemnify each displaced worker P2,000.00.
Disposition Petition is DENIED.
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Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of
Appeals
FACTS
- Respondent General Milling Corporation is a domestic
corporation engaged in the production and sale of livestock and
poultry. It is, likewise, the distributor of dressed chicken to
various restaurants and establishments nationwide.
- Petitioners were employed by the respondent as emergency
workers under separate "temporary/casual contracts of
employment" for a period of five months.
- Upon the expiration of their respective contracts, their
services were terminated.
- They later filed separate complaints for illegal dismissal and
non-payment of holiday pay, 13th month pay, night-shift
differential and service incentive leave pay against the
respondent before the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor
Relations Commission,
- Petitioners alleged that their work as chicken dressers was
necessary and desirable in the usual business of the
respondent, and added that although they worked from 10:00
p.m. to 6:00 a.m., they were not paid night-shift differential.
- They stressed that based on the nature of their work, they
were regular employees of the respondent; hence, could not be
dismissed from their employment unless for just cause and
after due notice.
- Labor Arbiter Voltaire A. Balitaan rendered a decision in favor
of the petitioners declaring that they were regular employees.
- Finding that the termination of their employment was not
based on any of the just causes provided for in the Labor Code,
the Labor Arbiter declared that they were allegedly illegally
dismissed.
- On May 25, 1998, the NLRC rendered a decision reversing that
of the Labor Arbiter
- The NLRC held that the petitioners, who were temporary or
contractual employees of the respondent, were legally
terminated upon the expiration of their respective contracts.
Citing the case of Brent School, Inc. vs. Zamora, the NLRC
explained that while the petitioners' work was necessary and
desirable in the usual business of GMC, they cannot be
considered as regular employees since they agreed to a fixed
term.
- The petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the decision
having been denied by the NLRC, they filed a petition for
certiorari before the Court of Appeals.
- On September 29, 2000, the CA rendered a decision affirming
decision of the NLRC
- The CA ruled that where the duties of the employee consist of
activities usually necessary or desirable in the usual business of
the employer, it does not necessarily follow that the parties are
forbidden from agreeing on a period of time for the
performance of such activities.
- Petitioners MFR was denied, hence, this petition
ISSUE
WON the petitioners were regular employees of the respondent
GMC when their employment was terminated
HELD
NO
- Petitioners were employees with a fixed period, and, as such,
were not regular employees.
- Article 280 of the Labor Code comprehends three kinds of
employees: (a) regular employees or those whose work
is necessary or desirable to the usual business of the
employer; (b) project employees or those whose
employment has been fixed for a specific project or
undertaking the completion or termination of which has
been determined at the time of the engagement of the
employee or where the work or services to be performed
is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the
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Labor Arbiter Hernandez; and, (2) the Resolution denying
petitioner's MFR
FACTS
- DE LEON was employed by LA TONDENA (business of
manufacture and distillery of wines and liquors) on Dec 11,
1981, at the Maintenance Section of its Engineering Dept in
Tondo.
- His work consisted mainly of painting company building and
equipment, and other odd jobs relating to maintenance. He was
paid on a daily basis through petty cash vouchers.
- After service of more than 1 year, DE LEON requested that he
be included in the payroll of regular workers. LA TONDENA
responded by dismissing him from work.
- Weeks after this, he was re-hired indirectly through the VitasMagsaysay Village Livelihood Council, a labor agency of
respondent, and was made to perform tasks he used to do.
- Having been refused reinstatement despite repeated
demands, petitioner filed a complaint before the Office of the
Labor Arbiter.
- LA TONDENA claimed he was a casual worker hired only to
paint a certain bldg in the company premises, and such work
terminated upon completion of the painting job.
- Labor Arbiter Hernandez ordered reinstatement and payment
of backwages to petitioner. Complainant's being hired on
casual basis did not dissuade from the cold fact that such jobs
he performed related to maintenance as a maintenance man is
necessary and desirable to the better operation of the business
company.
- On appeal, NLRC reversed such decision because his job
cannot be considered necessary in the usual trade of employer:
"Painting the business or factory building is not a part of the
respondent's manufacturing or distilling process of wines and
liquors.
ISSUE
WON petitioner is a regular employee
HELD
1. YES
Ratio An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not
covered by Art.2816 of Labor Code: provided, That any
employee who has rendered at least one year of service,
whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be
considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in
which he is employed and his employment shall continue while
such actually exists.
Reasoning
- During petitioner's period of employment, the records reveal
that the tasks assigned to him included not only painting of
company buildings, equipment and tools but also cleaning and
oiling machines, even operating a drilling machine, and other
odd jobs assigned to him when he had no painting job.
- It is not the will and word of the employer that determines
whether a certain employment is regular or casual, to which the
desperate worker often accedes, but the nature of the activities
performed in relation to the particular business or trade
considering all circumstances, and in some cases the length of
time of its performance and its continued existence.
Disposition Petition is GRANTED.
6
Art. 281. Regular and casual employment. The provisions of a written agreement to
the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreements of the parties, an
employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged
to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or
trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific
project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined
at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be
performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the
season.
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considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in
which he is employed and his employment shall continue
while such actually exists.
- The above mentioned provision reinforces the Constitutional
mandate to protect the interest of labor as it sets the legal
framework for ascertaining one's nature of employment, and
distinguishing different kinds of employees. Its language
manifests the intent to safeguard the tenurial interest of worker
who may be denied the enjoyment of the rights and benefits
due to an employee, regardless of the nature of his
employment, by virtue of lopsided agreements which the
economically powerful employer who can maneuver to keep an
employee on a casual or contractual status for as long as it is
convenient to the employer.
- Thus, under Article 280 of the Labor Code, an employment is
deemed regular when the activities performed by the employee
are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade
of the employer even if the parties enter into an agreement
stating otherwise. But considered not regular under said Article
(1) the so-called "project employment" the termination of which
is more or less determinable at the time of employment, such
as those connected, which by its nature is only for one season
of the year and the employment is limited for the duration of
that season, such as the Christmas holiday season.
Nevertheless, an exception to this exception is made: any
employee who has rendered at least 1 year of service, whether
continuous or intermitent, with respect to the activity he
performed and while such activity actually exists, must be
deemed regular.
- Following Article 280, whether one is employed as a project
employee or not would depend on whether he was hired to
carry out a "specific project or undertaking", the duration and
scope of which were specified at the time his services were
engaged for that particular project. Another factor that may be
undertaken by the employee in relation to the usual trade or
business of the employer, if without specifying the duration and
scope, the work to be undertaken is usually necessary or
desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, then it
is regular employment and not just "project" must less "casual"
employment.
- Thus, the nature of one's employment does not depend on
the will or word of the employer. Nor on the procedure of hiring
and the manner of designating the employee, but on the nature
of the activities to be performed by the employee, considering
the employer's nature of business and the duration and scope
of the work to be done.
- Project could refer to 2 distinguishable types of activity.
Firstly, a project could refer to a particular job or undertaking
that is within the regular or usual business of the employer
company, but which is distinct at separate, and identifiable as
such, from the other undertakings of the company. Such job or
undertaking begins and ends at determined or determinable
times. . . . Secondly, a project could refer to a particular job or
undertaking that is not within the regular business of the
corporation. Such a job or undertaking must also be identifiably
separate and distinct from the ordinary or regular business
operations of the employer. The job or undertaking also begins
and ends at determined or determinable times . .
- The plant where De Guzman was employed for only 7 months
is engaged in the manufacturer of glass, an integral component
of the packaging and manufacturing business of petitioner. The
process of manufacturing glass requires a furnace, which has a
limited operating life. SMC resorted to hiring project or fixed
term employees in having said furnaces repaired since said
activity is not regularly performed. Said furnaces are to be
repaired or overhauled only in case of need and after being
used continuously for a varying period of 5-10 years. In 1990,
one of the furnaces of petitioner required repair and upgrading.
This was an undertaking distinct and separate from SMC's
business of manufacturing glass. For this purpose, SMC must
hire workers to undertake the said repair and upgrading. De
Guzman was, thus, hired by SMC on November 28, 1990 on a
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they accomplish their work; (2) that Livi is an independent
contractor and that the relationship between Livi and California
should not be construed to be of principal-agent or employeremployee; (3) that California is free and harmless (!?!) from any
liability arising from such laws or from any accident that may
befall the workers and employees of Livi while in the
performance of their duties for California; (4) that the
assignment of workers to California shall be on a seasonal and
contractual basis; (5) that most of living allowance and the 10
legal holidays will be charged directly to California at cost; and
(6) that the payroll for the preceding week shall be delivered by
LIvi at Californias premises.
- Petitioners were then made to sign employment contracts with
durations of six months, upon the expiration of which
they signed new agreements with the same period, and
so on. Unlike regular California employees, who received not
less than P2,823.00 a month in addition to a host of fringe
benefits and bonuses, they received P38.56 plus P15.00 in
allowance daily.
- Petitioners filed complaints, demanding to have similar
benefits as regular employees; but pending their claims,
California notified them that they would not be rehired.
California then amended their complaint charging California
with illegal dismissal. Thereafter, Livi reabsorbed them into its
labor pool on a wait-in or standby status.
- Respondents claim: they are not the petitioners employer
(Livi is, therefore, no employer-employee relationship between
them) and that the "retrenchment" had been forced by
business losses as well as expiration of contracts
("unfavorable political and economic atmosphere coupled by
the February Revolution.")
- LA: no employer-employee relationship in the light of the
manpower supply contract; California not liable for the money
claims demanded. Livi also absolved from any obligation
because retrenchment was allegedly beyond its control, but
were to pay separation pay and attorneys fees.
- NLRC: affirm labor arbiters deci
ISSUES
1. WON the petitioners are employees of California
Manufacturing Company
2. WON the petitioners were illegally dismissed
HELD
1. YES
Ratio The existence of an employer-employees relation is a
question of law and being such, it cannot be made the subject
of agreement. The determination of whether or not there is an
employer-employee relation depends upon four standards: (1)
the manner of selection and engagement of the putative
employee; (2) the mode of payment of wages; (3) the presence
or absence of a power of dismissal; and (4) the presence or
absence of a power to control the putative employee's conduct.
Of the four, the right-of-control test has been held to be the
decisive factor.
Reasoning
- IN RELATION TO THE MANPOWER SUPPLY AGREEMENT: The fact that the
manpower supply agreement between Livi and California had
specifically designated the former as the petitioners' employer
and had absolved the latter from any liability as an employer,
will not erase either party's obligations as an employer, if an
employer-employee relation otherwise exists between the
workers and either firm. At any rate, since the agreement was
between Livi and California, they alone are bound by it, and the
petitioners cannot be made to suffer from its adverse
consequences.
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1987, and the resolution, dated August 19, 1987; (2) ORDERING
the respondent, the California Manufacturing Company, to
REINSTATE the petitioners with fall status and rights of regular
employees; and (3) ORDERING the respondent, the California
Manufacturing Company, and the respondents, Livi Manpower
Service, Inc. and/or Lily-Victoria A. Azarcon, to PAY, jointly and
severally, unto the petitioners: (a) backwages and differential
pays effective as and from the time they had acquired a regular
status under the second paragraph, of Section 281, of the Labor
Code, but not to exceed three (3) years, and (b) all such other
and further benefits as may be provided by existing collective
bargaining agreement(s) or other relations, or by law, beginning
such time; and (4) ORDERING the private respondents to PAY
unto the petitioners attorney's fees equivalent to ten (10%)
percent of all money claims hereby awarded, in addition to
those money claims.
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403 SCRA 199
VITUG; May 9, 2003
FACTS
- Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc., herein petitioner, engaged the
services of respondent workers as sales route helpers for a
limited period of five months. After five months, respondent
workers were employed by petitioner company on a day-to-day
basis to substitute for regular sales route helpers whenever the
latter would be unavailable or when there would be an
unexpected shortage of manpower in any of its work places or
an unusually high volume of work. The practice was for the
workers to wait every morning outside the gates of the sales
office of petitioner company. If thus hired, the workers would
then be paid their wages at the end of the day.
- Ultimately, respondent workers asked petitioner company to
extend to them regular appointments. Petitioner company
refused.
- November 7, 1997 - twenty-three (23) of the temporary
workers (herein respondents) filed with the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) a complaint for the
regularization of their employment with petitioner
company. The complaint was amended a number of times to
include other complainants that ultimately totaled fifty-eight
(58) workers. Claiming that petitioner company meanwhile
terminated their services, respondent workers filed a notice of
strike and a complaint for illegal dismissal and unfair labor
practice with the NLRC.
- 01 April 1998 - voluntary arbitration
- 18 May 1998 - the voluntary arbitrator rendered a decision
dismissing the complaint on the thesis that respondents (then
complainants) were not regular employees of petitioner
company.
- 11 August 2000, the Court of Appeals reversed and set
aside the ruling of the voluntary arbitrator ; (Petitioners were
declared regular employees of Coca Cola Bottlers; dismissal
illegal; ordered to reinstate the workers)
ISSUES
1. WON the nature of work of respondents in the company is of
such nature as to be deemed necessary and desirable in the
usual business or trade of petitioner that could qualify them to
be regular employees
2.
WON the quitclaims executed by the 36 individual
respondents were valid
HELD
1. YES
Ratio
In determining whether an employment should be
considered regular or non-regular, the applicable test is the
reasonable connection between the particular activity
performed by the employee in relation to the usual business or
trade of the employer.
Reasoning
a. Intentionalist approach - Even while the language of law (Art
280)8 might have been more definitive, the clarity of its spirit
and intent, i.e., to ensure a regular workers security of
tenure, however, can hardly be doubted.
b. Although the work to be performed is only for a specific
8
Art. 280.
Regular and Casual Employment. The provisions of
written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral
agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular
where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually
necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except
where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the
completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the
engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed
is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.
An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the
preceding paragraph: Provided, That, any employee who has rendered at least
one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be
considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is
employed and his employment shall continue while such activity exists.
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- The CA affirmed that while the work of respondents was
seasonal in nature, they were considered to be merely on leave
during the off-season and were therefore still employed by
petitioners. Moreover, the workers enjoyed security of tenure.
Any infringement upon this right was deemed by the CA to be
tantamount to illegal dismissal. Hence this Petition.
ISSUES
1. WON CA erred in holding that respondents, admittedly
seasonal workers, were regular employees, contrary to the clear
provisions of Article 2809 of the Labor Code, which categorically
state that seasonal employees are not covered by the definition
of regular employees under paragraph 1, nor covered under
paragraph 2 which refers exclusively to casual employees who
have served for at least one year
2. WON CA committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding
the NLRCs conclusion that private respondents were illegally
dismissed, that petitioner[s were] guilty of unfair labor practice,
and that the union be awarded moral and exemplary damages.
HELD
1. NO, the CA did not err when it held that respondents were
regular employees.
- The fact that respondents do not work continuously for one
whole year but only for the duration of the season does not
detract from considering them in regular employment since in a
litany of cases this Court has already settled that seasonal
workers who are called to work from time to time and are
temporarily laid off during off-season are not separated from
service in said period, but merely considered on leave until reemployed.
- For respondents to be excluded from those classified as
regular employees, it is not enough that they perform work or
services that are seasonal in nature. They must have also been
employed only for the duration of one season. The evidence
proves the existence of the first, but not of the second,
condition. The fact that respondents -- with the exception of
Luisa Rombo, Ramona Rombo, Bobong Abriga and Boboy Silva
-- repeatedly worked as sugarcane workers for petitioners for
several years is not denied by the latter. Evidently, petitioners
employed respondents for more than one season. Therefore,
the general rule of regular employment is applicable.
- The test of WON an employee is a regular employee has
been laid down in De Leon v. NLRC, in which this Court held:
- The primary standard of determining regular employment is
the reasonable connection between the particular activity
performed by the employee in relation to the usual trade or
business of the employer. The test is whether the former is
usually necessary or desirable in the usual trade or business of
the employer.
The connection can be determined by
considering the nature of the work performed and its relation to
the scheme of the particular business or trade in its entirety.
Also if the employee has been performing the job for at least a
year, even if the performance is not continuous and merely
intermittent, the law deems repeated and continuing need for
its performance as sufficient evidence of the necessity if not
indispensability of that activity to the business. Hence, the
employment is considered regular, but only with respect to such
activity and while such activity exists. (Abasolo v. National
Labor Relations Commission)
9
Art. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. - The provisions of written agreement to
the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an
employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged
to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or
trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific
project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined
at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be
performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the
season.
An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding
paragraph: Provided, That, any employee who has rendered at least one year of
service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular
employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment
shall continue while such activity exist.
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of his intention to avail the early retirement. His request was
denied on the same grounds and he too was dropped from
work.
- On October 5, 1989, petitioners Millares and Lagda filed a
complaint-affidavit for illegal dismissal and non-payment of
employee
benefits
against
private
respondents
Esso
International and Trans-Global, before the POEA.
POEA
dismissed it for lack of merit. NLRC affirmed.
ISSUE
WON the petitioners are contractual employees whose
employment are terminated everytime their contracts expire
HELD
YES
- it is clear that seafarers are considered contractual
employees. They can not be considered as regular employees
under Article 280 of the Labor Code. Their employment is
governed by the contracts they sign everytime they are rehired
and their employment is terminated when the contract expires.
Their employment is contractually fixed for a certain period of
time. They fall under the exception of Article 280 whose
employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking
the completion or termination of which has been determined at
the time of engagement of the employee or where the work or
services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the
employment is for the duration of the season. We need not
depart from the rulings of the Court in the two aforementioned
cases which indeed constitute stare decisis with respect to the
employment status of seafarers. Petitioners make much of the
fact that they have been continually re-hired or their contracts
renewed before the contracts expired (which has admittedly
been going on for twenty (20) years). By such circumstance
they claim to have acquired regular status with all the rights
and benefits appurtenant to it.
- Such contention is untenable. Undeniably, this circumstance
of continuous re-hiring was dictated by practical considerations
that experienced crew members are more preferred.
Petitioners were only given priority or preference because of
their experience and qualifications but this does not detract the
fact that herein petitioners are contractual employees. They
can not be considered regular employees.
Disposition
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, THE COURT
Resolved to Partially GRANT Private Respondents Second
Motion for Reconsideration and Intervenor FAMES Motion for
Reconsideration in Intervention. The Decision of the National
Labor Relations Commission dated June 1, 1993 is hereby
REINSTATED with MODIFICATION. The Private Respondents,
Trans-Global Maritime Agency, Inc. and Esso International
Shipping Co.,Ltd. are hereby jointly and severally ORDERED to
pay petitioners One Hundred Percent (100%) of their total
credited contributions as provided under the Consecutive
Enlistment Incentive Plan(CEIP).
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Appeals failed to consider that Tanchicos employment
terminated with the end of each contract.
- Indications that Tanchico was suffering from ischemia were
detected on 8 December 1992 during Tanchicos vacation
period. Thus, petitioners paid him disability benefits for 18 days
in accordance with the Contract. Tanchico cannot claim that he
only acquired the illness during his last deployment since the
Medical Report26 he submitted to the NLRC showed that he has
been hypertensive since 1983 and diabetic since 1987. In the
absence of concrete proof that Tanchico acquired his disability
during his last deployment and not during his vacation, he is
only entitled to disability benefits for 18 days.
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employment, is applicable at bar. Also, landmark case of
Millares v NLRC applies
Ratio It is clear that seafarers are considered contractual
employees. They can not be considered as regular employees
under A280 LC. Their employment is governed by the contracts
they sign every time they are rehired and their employment is
terminated when the contract expires. Their employment is
contractually fixed for a certain period of time. They fall under
the exception of A280 LC whose employment has been fixed for
a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination
of which has been determined at the time of engagement of the
employee or where the work or services to be performed is
seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of
the season. (Millares v NLRC)
Reasoning
- Coyoca v NLRC: Filipino seamen are governed by the Rules
and Regulations of the POEA. The Standard Employment
Contract governing the Employment of All Filipino Seamen on
Board Ocean-Going Vessels of the POEA, particularly in Part I,
Sec. C specifically provides that the contract of seamen shall be
for a fixed period. In no case should the contract of seamen be
longer than 12 months and any extension of the Contract period
shall be subject to the mutual consent of the parties.
- It should be stressed that whatever status of employment or
increased benefits that the complainant may have gained while
under the employ of Dubai Ports Authority, the undisputed fact
remains that prior to his deployment, he agreed to be hired
under a 12-month POEA contract, the duration of which is the
basis for the determination of the extent of the respondents
liability.
- Moreover, it is an accepted maritime industry practice that
employment of seafarers is for a fixed period only. Constrained
by the nature of their employment which is quite peculiar and
unique in itself, it is for the mutual interest of both the seafarer
and the employer why the employment status must be
contractual only or for a certain period of time. Seafarers spend
most of their time at sea and understandably, they can not stay
for a long and an indefinite period of time at sea. Limited
access to shore society during the employment will have an
adverse impact on the seafarer. The national, cultural and
lingual diversity among the crew during the COE is a reality that
necessitates the limitation of its period.
Disposition Petition is partly GRANTED and CA decision is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Pentagon International
Shipping, Inc. is ORDERED to pay private respondent William B.
Adelantar the amount equivalent to the unexpired portion of the
September 3, 1997 POEA Standard Contract of Employment
plus ten percent (10%) of the award as attorneys fees.
LOPEZ V MWSS
[PAGE 60]
AUDION ELECTRIC CO INC V NLRC (MADOLID)
308 SCRA 340
GONZAGA-REYES; June 17, 1999
NATURE
Petition for certiorari, seeking annulment of resolution of the
NLRC (of which the presiding officer was our very own Dean
Carale )
FACTS
- Madolid was employed by Audion Electric Co. on June 30, 1976
as fabricator and continuously rendered service in different
offices and projects as helper technician, stockman, and
timekeeper. He rendered 13 years of service with a clean
record. On August 3, Madolid received a letter informing him
that he will be considered terminated after the turnover of
materials, including companys tools and equipments not later
than August 15, 1989.
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Disposition
Petition denied, resolutions affirmed with
modifications (deletion of award of damages and attorneys
fees)
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would, in effect, permit petitioners to avoid hiring permanent or
regular employees by simply hiring them on a temporary or
casual basis, thereby violating the employees security of
tenure in their jobs. Petitioners act of repeatedly and
continuously hiring private respondents in a span of 3 to 5
years to do the same kind of work negates their contention that
private respondents were hired for a specific project or
undertaking only.
- Further, factual findings of labor officials who are deemed to
have acquired expertise in matters within their respective
jurisdiction are generally accorded not only respect but even
finality, and bind us when supported by substantial evidence.
Disposition petition is DENIED DUE COURSE. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
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HELD
1. YES
Ratio We rule that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court is the proper remedy for one who
complains that the NLRC acted in total disregard of evidence
material to or decisive of the controversy. In the instant case,
petitioners allege that the NLRCs conclusions have no basis in
fact and in law, hence the petition may not be dismissed on
procedural or jurisdictional grounds.
2. YES
Ratio The relationship between VIVA and its producers or
associate producers seems to be that of agency, as the latter
make movies on behalf of VIVA, whose business is to make
movies.
As such, the employment relationship between
petitioners and producers is actually one between petitioners
and VIVA, with the latter being the direct employer.
The employer-employee relationship between petitioners and
VIVA can further be established by the control test. While four
elements are usually considered in determining the existence of
an employment relationship, namely: (a) the selection and
engagement of the employee; (b) the payment of wages; (c) the
power of dismissal; and (d) the employers power to control the
employees conduct, the most important element is the
employers control of the employees conduct, not only as to
the result of the work to be done but also as to the means and
methods to accomplish the same. These four elements are
present here.
Reasoning (On job contracting)
It is settled that the contracting out of labor is allowed only in
case of job contracting.10
- Assuming that the associate producers are job contractors,
they must then be engaged in the business of making motion
pictures. As such, and to be a job contractor under the
preceding description, associate producers must have tools,
equipment, machinery, work premises, and other materials
necessary to make motion pictures.The associate producer did
not have substantial capital nor investment in the form of tools,
equipment and other materials necessary for making a movie. If
private respondents insist that their associate producers are
labor contractors, then these producers can only be labor-only
contractors.11
- As labor-only contracting is prohibited, the law considers the
person or entity engaged in the same a mere agent or
intermediary of the direct employer. But even by the preceding
standards, the associate producers of VIVA cannot be
considered labor-only contractors as they did not supply, recruit
nor hire the workers.
Reasoning (On control test)
- VIVAs control is evident in its mandate that the end result
must be a quality film acceptable to the company. The
means and methods to accomplish the result are likewise
controlled by VIVA, viz., the movie project must be finished
within schedule without exceeding the budget, and additional
expenses must be justified; certain scenes are subject to
10
Section 8, Rule VIII, Book III of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code
describes permissible job contracting in this wise:
Sec. 8. Job contracting. -- There is job contracting permissible under the Code if the
following conditions are met:
(1) The contractor carries on an independent business and undertakes the contract
work on his own account under his own responsibility according to his own manner
and method, free from the control and direction of his employer or principal in all
matters connected with the performance of the work except as to the results thereof;
and
(2) The contractor has substantial capital or investment in the form of tools,
equipment, machineries, work premises, and other materials which are necessary in
the conduct of his business.
11
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A work pool may exist although the workers in the pool do not receive
salaries and are free to seek other employment during temporary breaks in
the business, provided that the worker shall be available when called to report
for a project. Although primarily applicable to regular seasonal workers, this
set-up can likewise be applied to project workers insofar as the effect of
temporary cessation of work is concerned. This is beneficial to both the
employer and employee for it prevents the unjust situation of coddling labor
at the expense of capital and at the same time enables the workers to attain
the status of regular employees.
Labor Law 1
stress, not at the expense of management.
Lest it be
misunderstood, this ruling does not mean that simply because
an employee is a project or work pool employee even outside
the construction industry, he is deemed, ipso jure, a regular
employee. All that we hold today is that once a project or work
pool employee has been: (1) continuously, as opposed to
intermittently, re-hired by the same employer for the same
tasks or nature of tasks; and (2) these tasks are vital, necessary
and indispensable to the usual business or trade of the
employer, then the employee must be deemed a regular
employee, pursuant to Article 280 of the Labor Code and
jurisprudence.
Disposition instant petition is GRANTED.
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HELD
1. YES
Ratio In determining the nature of ones employment, length of
service is not a controlling factor
Reasoning
- Jurisprudence: The SC ruled that respondents were regular
employees but not for the reasons given by the LA (which both
the NLRC and the CA affirmed). Citing Palomar, et al. v. NLRC,
the SC held that contrary to the disquisitions of the LA,
employees (like respondents) who work under different project
employment contracts for several years do not automatically
become regular employees; they can remain as project
employees regardless of the number of years they work. Length
of time is not a controlling factor in determining the nature of
ones employment.
- Moreover, employees who are members of a work pool from
which a company (like petitioner corp.) draws workers for
deployment to its different projects do not become regular
employees by reason of that fact alone. The Court has
enunciated in the cases of Raycor Aircontrol Systems, Inc. v.
NLRC, and ALU-TUCP v. NLRC, that members of a work pool
can either be project employees or regular employees
- The principal test for determining whether employees are
project employees or regular employees is whether they
are assigned to carry out a specific project or undertaking, the
duration and scope of which are specified at the time they are
engaged for that project. Such duration, as well as the
particular work/service to be performed, is defined in an
employment agreement and is made clear to the employees at
the time of hiring.
- Petitioners did not have that kind of agreement with
respondents. Neither did they inform the respondents of the
nature of their work at the time of hiring. Hence, for failure of
petitioners to substantiate their claim that respondents were
project employees, we are constrained to declare them as
regular employees
- Furthermore, petitioners cannot belatedly argue that
respondents continue to be their employees (so as to escape
liability for illegal dismissal). Before the LA, petitioners
staunchly postured that respondents were only project
employees whose employment tenure was coterminous with
the projects they were assigned to. However, before the CA,
they took a different stance by insisting that respondents
continued to be their employees. Petitioners inconsistent and
conflicting positions on their true relation with respondents
make it all the more evident that the latter were indeed their
regular employees.
2. YES
Ratio The law requires that the employer furnish the employee
2 written notices: (1) a notice informing them of the particular
acts for which they are being dismissed and (2) a notice
advising them of the decision to terminate the employment,
before termination can be validly effected.
Reasoning
- In resolving the issue of illegal dismissal, the SC simply stated
that petitioners failed to adhere to the two-notice rule, and
said that respondents were never given such notices.
Disposition Petition denied
Labor Law 1
Expansion Program (FAYEP I and II) for varying lengths of time
when they were separated from NSCs service.
- Petitioners filed separate complaints for unfair labor practice,
regularization and monetary benefits. The Labor Arbiter
declared petitioners regular project employees who shall
continue their employment as such for as long as such (project)
activity exists, but entitled to the salary of a regular employee
pursuant to the provisions in the collective bargaining
agreement. It also ordered payment of salary differentials.
- Both parties appealed. Petitioners argued they were regular,
not project employees. NSC claimed petitioners are project
employees as they were employed to undertake a specific
project.
- The NLRC modified the Labor Arbiters decision, affirming the
holding that they were project employees since they were hired
to perform work in a specific undertaking. It, however, set aside
the award to petitioners of the same benefits enjoyed by
regular employees for lack of legal and factual basis.
- Petitioners appealed to the SC, arguing that they are regular
employees of NSC because: (i) their jobs are necessary,
desirable and work-related to private respondents main
business, steel-making; and (ii) they have rendered service for
six (6) or more years to NSC.
ISSUE
WON petitioners are properly characterized as project
employees rather than regular employees of NSC
SCs NOTE: The issue relates to an important consequence: the
services of project employees are co-terminous with the project
and may be terminated upon the end or completion of the
project for which they were hired. Regular employees, in
contrast, are legally entitled to remain in the service of their
employer until that service is terminated by one or another of
the recognized modes of termination of service under the Labor
Code.
HELD
YES
petitioners are project employees.
- The law governing the matter is Article 280 of the Labor Code:
ART. 280. Regular and casual employment. - The
provisions of written agreement to the contrary
notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of
the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be
regular where the employee has been engaged to
perform activities which are usually necessary or
desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer,
except where the employment has been fixed for a
specific project or undertaking the completion or
termination of which has been determined at the time of
the engagement of the employee or where the work or
service to be performed is seasonal in nature and the
employment is for the duration of the season.
An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not
covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided, That any
employee who has rendered at least one year of service,
whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be
considered a regular employee with respect to the
activity in which he is employed and his employment
shall continue while such activity exists.
- As evident in Article 280 of the Labor Code, the principal test
for determining whether particular employees are properly
characterized as project employees as distinguished from
regular employees is whether or not the project employees
were assigned to carry out a specific project or undertaking,
the duration (and scope) of which were specified at the time the
employees were engaged for that project.
- In business and industry, project could refer to one or the
other of at least two distinguishable types of activities. Firstly, a
project could refer to a particular job or undertaking that is
within the regular or usual business of the employer company,
but which is distinct and separate, and identifiable as such,
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Department of Labor and Employment that petitioner Kiamco
was terminated on Nov 1 1993 due to the expiration of his
employment contract and the abolition of his position.
- On April 25 1994 Kiamco filed before the NLRC Sub-Regional
Arbitration Branch No. VII a Complaint for illegal suspension and
dismissal against the PNOC. He prayed that he be reinstated to
his former position and paid back wages. Labor Arbiter
dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. According to the
Labor Arbiter, the three (3) employment contracts were freely
and
voluntarily
signed
by
Kiamco
and
the
PNOC
representatives. The contracts plainly stated that Kiamco was
being hired for a specific project and for a fixed term. Therefore
Kiamco could not question his dismissal since it was in
accordance with his employment contract.
- Kiamco appealed the decision of the Labor Arbiter to public
respondent NLRC which on Sept 27 1996 reversed the Labor
Arbiter and declared Kiamco as a regular employee of the
respondents and to have been illegally dismissed by the latter.
Ordering respondents to REINSTATE the complainant to his
former position without loss of seniority rights and privileges
with back wages from the date of his dismissal up to actual
reinstatement less any income he may have earned during the
pendency of the case.
- Private respondents filed a MFR of the decision of the NLRC
contending that it erred in holding that Kiamco was a regular
employee and that the findings of the Labor Arbiter that Kiamco
was a project employee should be affirmed.
- NLRC modified its Sept 27 1996 Decision declaring that the
complainant-appellant is declared a project employee at
respondents Geothermal Plant and to continue with said
employment until the full completion of the project but in the
absence of proof to that effect, complainant is hereby awarded
back wages for a period of 6 months or in the amount of
P23,100.00. The order declaring the complainant-appellant as a
regular employee of respondent PNOC, and for said company to
reinstate the complainant with full back wages is hereby
deleted.
- In his petition for certiorari, Kiamco charges the NLRC with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the questioned Resolution and prays that
it be nullified and he reinstated to his former position. He also
seeks payment of back wages, damages and attorneys fees.
ISSUES
1. WON petitioner is a regular employee or a project employee
2. WON petitioner is entitled to reinstatement without loss of
seniority rights and privileges and to the payment of full back
wages
3.
WON petitioner is entitled to moral and exemplary
damages.
HELD
1. Kiamco was correctly labeled by the NLRC as a project
employee.
-Article 280 of the Labor Code
Regular and casual employment. - The provisions of written
agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of
the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be
deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged
to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable
in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where
the employment has been fixed - for a specific project or
undertaking the completion or termination of which has been
determined at the time of the engagement of the employee
or where the work or service to be performed is seasonal in
nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.
- An employee shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered
by the preceding paragraph: Provided, that any employee who
has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service
is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee
with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his
employment shall continue while such activity exists.
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open to extension should the need for the arise in the course of
the renovation.
- Renovation was completed by October 1976. Management
then decided to construct an annex to the building and private
respondents worked on the fire escape.
- November 27, 1976 Notice of termination given to the
respondents effective November 29 but they still continued to
work nonetheless. They worked until December 11 and were
fully paid for the work they rendered up to that date.
- December 13, 1976 - Petitioner filed with the former
Department of Labor a report of termination of the services of
private respondents and 30 others, listing them as casual
emergency workers.
Private workers alleged illegal
termination.
Assistant Minister Leogardo ordered the
reinstatement of the workers with full backwages before
petitioner could file a reply to the letter-complaint of the
respondents.
- Leogardo said that the respondents were already regular
employees according to Art. 170 (now Art. 281) of the CC and
that termination was unjust.
- An appeal was filed which Clave, in his capacity as Presidential
Executive Assistant, dismissed it.
ISSUE
WON private respondents are regular employees entitled to
security of tenure
HELD
NO
Ratio Casual employees are engaged for a specific project or
undertaking and fall within the exception provided for in Article
281 of the Labor Code, supra . Not being regular employees, it
cannot be justifiably said that petitioner had dismissed them
without just cause. They are not entitled to reinstatement with
full backwages.
Reasoning
- A281 defines regular and casual employees. In the case at
hand, the casual or limited character of private respondents'
employment, therefore, is evident.
- Private respondents were hired for a specific project - to
renovate the main budding, where major repairs such as
painting the main building, repair of the roof, cleaning of
clogged water pipes and drains, and other necessary repairs
were required.
- It was made known, and so understood at the start of the
hiring, that their services would last until the completion of the
renovation. They rendered service from February 2 to
December 11, 1976, almost 11 months, but less than a year.
- There could be no other reason, however, than that the
termination of private respondents was because their services
were no longer needed and they had nothing more to do since
the project for which they were hired had been completed.
Disposition Order of public respondent Vicente Leogardo, Jr.,
dated December 24, 1976, and the Orders of the other public
respondents dated July 13, 1977, January 25, 1979, March 19,
1979, and June 5, 1980, are hereby reversed and set aside. The
Complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner in Case No.
R04-12-11832-76 LS (Regional Office No. IV, Department of
Labor) is dismissed, and the Temporary Restraining Order
heretofore issued is hereby made permanent.
SANDOVAL V NLRC
136 SCRA 675
AQUINO; May 31, 1985
NATURE
Appeal by certiorari
FACTS
- 5 workers were assigned to the construction of the LCT
Catamaran. After three months of work, the project was
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- Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for
service incentive leave pay and 13th month differential with
NLRC alleging that her employment was terminated not due to
the low volume of work but because she "signed a petition for
certification election among the rank and file employees of
respondents,"
thus
charging private respondent with
committing unfair labor practices.
- Private respondent maintained that it had valid reasons to
terminate petitioner's employment and disclaimed any
knowledge of the existence or formation of a union among its
rank-and-file employees at the time petitioner's services were
terminated. Private respondent stressed that its business ". . .
relies heavily on companies availing of its services. Its retention
by client companies with particular emphasis on data encoding
is on a project to project basis," usually lasting for a period of
"two (2) to five (5) months." Private respondent further argued
that petitioner's employment was for a "specific project with a
specified period of engagement." According to private
respondent, ". . . the certainty of the expiration of complainant's
engagement has been determined at the time of its
engagement (until 27 November 1991) or when the project is
earlier completed or when the client withdraws," as provided in
the contract. "The happening of the second event [completion
of the project] has materialized, thus, her contract of
employment is deemed terminated.
ISSUE
WON petitioner is a "project employee" and not a "regular
employee" who has security of tenure
HELD
- We agree with the findings of the NLRC that petitioner is a
project employee. The principal test for determining whether an
employee is a project employee or a regular employee is
whether the project employee was assigned to carry out a
specific project or undertaking, the duration and scope of which
were specified at the time the employee was engaged for that
project. A project employee is one whose employment has been
fixed for a specific project or undertaking, the completion or
termination of which has been determined at the time of the
engagement of the employee or where the work or service to
be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for
the duration of the season. In the instant case, petitioner was
engaged to perform activities which were usually necessary or
desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, as
admittedly, petitioner worked as a data encoder for private
respondent, a corporation engaged in the business of data
encoding and keypunching, and her employment was fixed for a
specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of
which had been determined at the time of her engagement, as
may be observed from the series of employment contracts 32
between petitioner and private respondent, all of which
contained a designation of the specific job contract and a
specific period of employment.
- However, even as when petitioner is a project employee,
according to jurisprudence "[a] project employee or a member
of a work pool may acquire the status of aregular employee
when the following concur:
1) There is a continuous rehiring of project employees even
after the cessation of a project; and
2) The tasks performed by the alleged "project employee" are
vital, necessary and indispensable to the usual business or
trade of the employer.
- The evidence on record reveals that petitioner was employed
by private respondent as a data encoder, performing activities
which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business
or trade of her employer, continuously for a period of more than
three (3) years, from August 26, 1988 to October 18, 1991 and
contracted for a total of thirteen (13) successive projects. We
have previously ruled that "[h]owever, the length of time during
which the employee was continuouslyre-hired is not controlling,
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DE OCAMPO V NLRC
186 SCRA 360
DAVIDE JR; May 7, 2002
NATURE
The petition seeks a reversal of the decision of the respondent
NLRC (ordering respondent to reinstate, without back
wages, the individual complainants who were regular
employees except those who were officers of the union among
them or paid separation pay at their option, equivalent to one
month's pay or one-half month's pay for every year of service,
whichever is greater. )
FACTS
- On September 30, 1980, the services of 65 employees of
private respondent Makati Development Corporation were
terminated on the ground of the expiration of their contracts.
The said employees filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
against the MDC on October 1, 1980; On October 8, 1980, as a
result of the aforementioned termination, the Philippine
Transport and General Workers Association, of which the
complainants were members, filed a notice of strike on the
grounds of union-busting, subcontracting of projects which
could have been assigned to the dismissed employees, and
Labor Law 1
unfair labor practice; that on October 14, 1980, the PTGWA
declared a strike and established picket lines in the perimeter of
the MDC premises- On November 4, 1980, the MDC filed with
the Bureau of Labor Relations a motion to declare the strike
illegal and restrain the workers from continuing the strike; that
on that same day and several days thereafter the MDC filed
applications for clearance to terminate the employment of 90 of
the striking workers, whom it had meanwhile preventively
suspended; that of the said workers, 74 were project employees
under contract with the MDC with fixed terms of employment;
and that on August 31, 1982, Labor Arbiter Apolinar L. Sevilla
rendered a decision 1 denying the applications for clearance
filed by the MDC and directing it to reinstate the individual
complainants with two months back wages each.
- This is the decision modified by the NLRC 2 which is now
faulted by the petitioners for grave abuse of discretion. The
contention is that the public respondent acted arbitrarily and
erroneously in ruling that: a) the motion for reconsideration was
filed out of time; b) the strike was illegal; and c) the separation
of the project employees was justified
ISSUES
1.
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rushed to the New Jeddah Clinic and was confined there for 12
days.
- On August 27, 1980, Grulla was discharged from the hospital
and was told that he could resume his normal duties after
undergoing physical therapy for two weeks.
- On September 18, 1980, respondent Grulla reported back to
his Project Manager and presented to the latter a medical
certificate declaring the former already physically fit for work.
Since then, he stated working again until he received a notice of
termination of his employment on October 9, 1980.
- Grulla filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, recovery of
medical benefits, unpaid wages for the unexpired ten (10)
months of his contract and the sum of P1,000.00 as
reimbursement of medical expenses against A.M. Oreta and
Company, Inc. and ENDECO with the POEA.
- The petitioner A.M. Oreta and Company, Inc. and ENDECO filed
their answer and alleged that the contract of employment
entered into between petitioners and Grulla provides, as one of
the grounds for termination of employment, violation of the
rules and regulations promulgated by the contractor; and that
Grulla was dismissed because he has not performed his duties
satisfactorily within the probationary period of three months.
- POEA held that complainant's dismissal was illegal and
warrants the award of his wages for the unexpired portion of
the contract.
- Petitioner appealed from the adverse decision to the
respondent Commission.
- Respondent Commission dismissed the appeal for lack of merit
and affirmed in toto the decision of the POEA..
ISSUES
1. WON the employment of respondent Grulla was illegally
terminated by the petitioner
2. WON Grulla is entitled to salaries corresponding to the
unexpired portion of his employment contract.
HELD
1. YES
- Article 280 (formerly Article 281) of the Labor Code, as
amended, provides:
"Article 280.
Regular and Casual Employment. - The
provisions of written agreement to the contrary
notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreements of
the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular
where the employee has been engaged to perform
activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the
usual business or trade of the employer, except where the
employment has been fixed for a specific project or
undertaking the completion or termination of which has
been determined at the time of the engagement of the
employment or where the work or service to be performed
is seasonal in nature and the employment is far the
duration of the season.
"An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not
covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided, that any
employee who has rendered at least one year of service,
whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be
considered a regular employee with respect to the activity
in which he is employed and his employment shall continue
while such actually exists."
- Policy Instructions No. 12 of the then Minister of Labor (now
Secretary of Labor and Employment) which provides:
"PD 850 has defined the concept of regular and casual
employment. What determines regularity or casualness is
not the employment contract, written or otherwise, but the
nature of the job. If the job is usually necessary or
desirable to the main business of the employer, then
employment is regular. . . ."
- A perusal of the employment contract reveals that although
the period of employment of respondent Grulla is 12 months,
the contract period is renewable subject to future agreement of
the parties. It is clear from the employment contract that the
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employment in June and July 1991, their services were
terminated. They forthwith executed a "Release and Quitclaim"
stating that they had no claim whatsoever against PFC.
- 29 July 1991: private respondents filed before the NLRC SubRegional Arbitration Branch a complaint for illegal dismissal
against PFC and its plant manager, Marciano Aganon. Labor
Arbiter Arturo P. Aponesto dismissed the complaint on the
ground that the private respondents were mere contractual
workers, and not regular employees; hence, they could not avail
of the law on security of tenure. The termination of their
services by reason of the expiration of their contracts of
employment was, therefore, justified.
- On appeal, NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter's decision. But on
MR, NLRC held that the private respondent and their cocomplainants were regular employees. It declared that the
contract of employment for five months was a "clandestine
scheme employed by PFC to stifle private respondents' right to
security of tenure" and should therefore be struck down and
disregarded for being contrary to law, public policy, and morals.
Hence, their dismissal on account of the expiration of their
respective contracts was illegal.
- Accordingly, the NLRC ordered PFC to reinstate the private
respondents to their former position without loss of seniority
rights and other privileges, with full back wages; and in case
their reinstatement would no longer be feasible, PFC should pay
them separation pay equivalent to one-month pay or one-halfmonth pay for every year of service, whichever is higher, with
back wages and 10% of the monetary award as attorney's fees.
- PFC's motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this
petition.
Purefoods Corp's Contention: that the private respondents
are now estopped from questioning their separation from
petitioner's employ in view of their express conformity with the
five-month duration of their employment contracts; that the
"Release and Quitclaim" private respondents had executed has
unconditionally released PFC from any and all other claims
which might have arisen from their past employment with PFC.
OSG's Comment: the private respondents were regular
employees, since they performed activities necessary and
desirable in the business or trade of PFC. The period of
employment stipulated in the contracts of employment was null
and void for being contrary to law and public policy, as its
purpose was to circumvent the law on security of tenure. The
expiration of the contract did not, therefore, justify the
termination of their employment. Also, private respondents'
quitclaim was ineffective to bar the enforcement for the full
measure of their legal rights.
Private Respondent's Argument: contracts with a specific
period of employment may be given legal effect provided,
however, that they are not intended to circumvent the
constitutional guarantee on security of tenure; the practice of
PFC in hiring workers to work for a fixed duration of five months
only to replace them with other workers of the same
employment duration was apparently to prevent the
regularization of these so-called "casuals," which is a clear
circumvention of the law on security of tenure.
ISSUES
1. WON employees hired for a definite period and whose
services are necessary and desirable in the usual business or
trade of the employer are regular employees
2. WON the private respondents' five-month contracts of
employment are valid
3. WON the execution by the private respondents of a "Release
and Quitclaim" precluded them from questioning the
termination of their services
HELD
1. YES
- Art. 280 of the Labor Code defines regular and casual
employment. Under this provision, there are two kinds of
regular employees: (1) those who are engaged to perform
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dismissed until the time petitioner's cannery plant ceased
operation.
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be determined by the application of the "control test, the
elements of which are: (a) selection and engagement of the
employee; (b) payment of wages; (c) the power of dismissal;
and (d) the power of control with regard to the means and
methods by which the work is to be accomplished, with the
power of control being the most determinative factor.
- There is no dispute that private respondents were employees
of petitioner. Petitioner himself admitted that they worked in his
construction projects, although the period of their employment
was allegedly co-terminus with their phase of work. It is clear
that private respondents are employees of petitioner, the latter
having control over the results of the work done, as well as the
means and methods by which the same were accomplished.
Suffice it to say that regardless of the nature of their
employment, whether it is regular or project, private
respondents are subject of the compulsory coverage under the
SSS Law, their employment not falling under the exceptions
provided by the law. This rule is in accord with the Courts ruling
in Luzon Stevedoring Corp. v. SSS to the effect that all
employees, regardless of tenure, would qualify for compulsory
membership in the SSS, except those classes of employees
contemplated in Section 8(j) of the Social Security Act.
- In Violeta v. NLRC, this Court ruled that to be exempted from
the presumption of regularity of employment, the agreement
between a project employee and his employer must strictly
conform to the requirements and conditions under Article 280
of the Labor Code. It is not enough that an employee is hired for
a specific project or phase of work. There must also be a
determination of, or a clear agreement on, the completion or
termination of the project at the time the employee was
engaged if the objectives of Article 280 are to be achieved. This
second requirement was not met in this case.
- This Court has held that an employment ceases to be coterminus with specific projects when the employee is
continuously rehired due to the demands of the employers
business and re-engaged for many more projects without
interruption. The Court likewise takes note of the fact that, as
cited by the SSC, even the National Labor Relations Commission
in a labor case involving the same parties, found that private
respondents were regular employees of the petitioner.
- Another cogent factor militates against the allegations of the
petitioner. In the proceedings before the SSC and the Court of
Appeals, petitioner was unable to show that private
respondents were appraised of the project nature of their
employment, the specific projects themselves or any phase
thereof undertaken by petitioner and for which private
respondents were hired. He failed to show any document such
as private respondents employment contracts and employment
records that would indicate the dates of hiring and termination
in relation to the particular construction project or phases in
which they were employed. Moreover, it is peculiar that
petitioner did not show proof that he submitted reports of
termination after the completion of his construction projects,
considering that he alleges that private respondents were hired
and rehired for various projects or phases of work therein
- To be exempted from the presumption of regularity of
employment, the agreement between a project employee and
his employer must strictly conform to the requirements and
conditions under Article 280 of the Labor Code. It is not enough
that an employee is hired for a specific project or phase of work.
There must also be a determination of, or a clear agreement on,
the completion or termination of the project at the time the
employee was engaged if the objectives of Article 280 are to be
achieved.
A2010
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Disini
MARAGUINOT V NLRC
[PAGE 82]
AGUILAR V NLRC (ACEDILLO)
269 SCRA 596
ROMERO; March 13, 1997
NATURE
Petition for certiorari
FACTS
- Romeo Acedillo worked for the petitioner as a helperelectrician. He was dismissed from allegedly due to lack of
available projects and excess in the number of workers needed.
- He filed a case for illegal dismissal before the NLRC upon
learning that the petitioner as hiring new workers and his
request to be reinstated was denied. In reply, petitioner
Labor Law 1
maintained that its need for workers varied, depending on
contracts procured in the course of its business of contracting
refrigeration and other related works. According to them,
Acedillo was a contractual employee.
- NLRC ruled in favor of Acedilo. It held that Acedillo was a
regular employee, as seen from the nature of his job and the
length of time he has served. The petitioner was also held liable
for the monetary benefits being claimed by Acedillo since
employees, whether regular or not, are entitled to such.
ISSUE
WON Acedillo is a regular employee
HELD
YES
- definition of project employee: a project employee is one
whose "employment has been fixed for a specific project or
undertaking, the completion or termination of which has been
determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or
where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in
nature and the employment is for the duration of the season
- petitioner did not specify the duration and scope of the
undertaking at the time Acedillo's services were contracted.
Neither is there any proof that the duration of his assignment
was made clear to him other than the self-serving assertion of
petitioner that the same can be inferred from the tasks he was
made to perform
- Acedillos work clearly was an activity "necessary or desirable
in the usual business or trade" of petitioner, since refrigeration
requires considerable electrical work. This necessity is further
bolstered by the fact that petitioner would hire him anew after
the completion of each project, a practice which persisted
throughout the duration of his tenure
- Petitioners assertion that it held 2 sets of workers. This
practice renders untenable petitioner's position that Acedillo is
not a regular employee. Citing Philippine National Construction
Corp v NLRC: "Members of a work pool from which a
construction company draws its project employees, if
considered employees of the construction company while in the
work pool, are non-project employees or employees for an
indefinite period. If they are employed in a particular project,
the completion of the project or any phase thereof will not
mean severance of (the) employer-employee relationship."
Disposition Petition dismissed
A2010
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Disini
Labor Law 1
- Respondent Puentes contention:
> That he began working with Petitioner Filsystems, Inc., a
corporation engaged in construction business, on June 12, 1989;
that he was initially hired by [petitioner] company as an
installer; that he was later promoted to mobile crane operator
and was stationed at the company premises in Quezon City;
that his work was not dependent on the completion or
termination of any project; that since his work was not
dependent on any project, his employment with the Filsystems
was continuous and without interruption for the past 10 years;
that on Oct. 1, 1999, he was dismissed from his employment
allegedly because he was a project employee.
He filed
complaint for illegal dismissal against the petitioner.
- Petitioner-companys claims
> That complainant was hired as a project employee in the
companys various projects; that his employment contracts
showed that he was a project worker with specific project
assignments; that after completion of each project assignment,
his employment was likewise terminated and the same was
correspondingly reported to the DOLE.
Labor Arbiter dismissed complaint. NLRC affirmed. CA reversed
LA and NLRC rulings holding that respondent was a regular
employee of petitioners.
ISSUES
1. WON respondent Roger Puente is a project employee
2. WON he is entitled to reinstatement with full back wages
HELD
1. YES
Ratio Provisions in the Labor Code and DOLE Order No.
19(1993) make it clear that a project employee is one whose
employment has been fixed for a specific project or
undertaking the completion or termination of which has been
determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or
where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in
nature and the employment is for the duration of the season. It
is a settled rule that the length of service of a project
employee is not the controlling test of employment tenure but
whether or not the employment has been fixed for a specific
project or undertaking the completion or termination of which
has been determined at the time of the engagement of the
employee.
Reasoning
1) The contracts of employment of Puente show that he was
hired for specific projects. His employment was coterminous
with the completion of the projects for which he had been hired.
Those contracts expressly provided that his tenure of
employment depended on the duration of any phase of the
project or on the completion of the construction projects. Also,
petitioners regularly submitted to DOLE reports of the
termination of services of project workers. Such compliance
with the requirement confirms that respondent was a project
employee
2) Evidently, although the employment contract did not state a
particular date, it did specify that the termination of the parties
employment relationship was to be on a day certain -- the day
when the phase of work termed Lifting & Hauling of Materials
for the World Finance Plaza project would be completed.
Thus, respondent cannot be considered to have been a regular
employee. He was a project employee.
3) That he was employed with Filsystems for 10 yrs. in various
projects did not ipso facto make him a regular employee,
considering that the definition of regular employment in Art.280
of the Labor Code makes a specific exception with respect to
project employment. The mere rehiring of respondent on a
project-to-project basis did not confer upon him regular
employment status. The practice was dictated by the practical
consideration that experienced construction workers are more
preferred. It did not change his status as a project employee.
2. YES
A2010
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Disini