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employee gave rise to the presumption that the defendant employer did not
exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision
of its employees. This presumption not having been overcome, the employer must
be
adjudged
pecuniarily
liable
for
the
death
of
the
passenger.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SUFFICIENT ALLEGATION IN THE COMPLAINT; CASE AT BAR.
The allegation in the complaint to the effect that "the death of Raquel Beltran,
plaintiffs daughter, was caused by the negligence and want of exercise of the
utmost diligence of a very cautious person on the part of the defendants and their
agent," sufficiently pleads the culpa or negligence upon which the claim was
predicated. This allegation was proved when it was established during the trial that
the driver, even before receiving the proper signal from the conductor, and while
there were still persons on the running board of the bus and near it, started to run
off
the
vehicle.
7. APPEALS; WHAT CAN BE PASSED UPON ON APPEAL; CASE AT BAR. Generally,
the appellate court can only pass upon and consider questions or issues raised and
argued in appellants brief. In the case at bar, plaintiffs did not appeal from that
portion of the judgment of the trial court awarding them only P3,000.00 as damages
for the death of their daughter. Neither did they point out in their brief in the Court
of Appeals that the award was inadequate, or that the inclusion of that figure was
merely a clerical error, in order that the matter may be treated as an exception to
the general rule (Section 7, Rule 51, new Rules of Court). The Court of Appeals
therefore erred in raising the amount of the award.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF THE VICTIMS; NOT A GROUND FOR
EXCULPATION OF OFFENDER. The negligence of petitioner-appellant in
prematurely and erroneously announcing the next flag stop was the proximate
cause of the deaths of Martina Bool and Emelita Gesmundo. Any negligence of the
victims was at most contributory and does not exculpate the accused from criminal
liability.
4. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; INCLUSION OF CIVIL LIABILITY IN
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION DESPITE THE FILING OF AN INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION;
ACTIONS CONSTITUTE TWO DISTINCT SOURCES OF OBLIGATION WITHIN THE
COURTS JURISDICTION. The source of the obligation sought to be enforced in
Civil Case No. 5978 is culpa contractual, not an act or omission punishable by law.
We also note from the appellants arguments and from the title of the civil case that
the party defendant is the Manila Railroad Company and not petitioner-appellant
Brias. Culpa contractual and an act or omission punishable by law are two distinct
sources of obligation. The complainants in the criminal action for double homicide
thru reckless imprudence did not only reserve their right to file at independent civil
action but in fact filed a separate civil action against the Manila Railroad Company.
The trial court acted within its jurisdiction when, despite the filing with it of the
separate civil action against the Manila Railroad Company, it still awarded death
indemnity in the judgment of conviction against the Petitioner-Appellant.
5. CRIMINAL LAW; ITEMS OF DAMAGES THAT MAY BE RECOVERED IN CASE OF DEATH
BY REASON OF THE COMMISSION OF A CRIME, WELL-SETTLED. It is well-settled
that when death occurs as a result of the commission of a crime, the following items
of damages may be recovered: (1) an indemnity for the death of the victim; (2) an
indemnity for loss of earning capacity of the deceased; (3) moral damages; (4)
exemplary damages; (5) attorneys fees and expenses of litigation, and (6) interest
in proper cases.
6. CIVIL LAW; OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACT; INDEMNITY RECOVERABLE SEPARATELY
FROM AND IN ADDITION TO THE FIXED INDEMNITY FOR THE SOLE FACT OF DEATH.
The indemnity for loss of earning capacity, moral damages, exemplary damages,
attorneys fees, and interests are recoverable separately from and in addition to the
fixed sum of P12,000.00 corresponding to the indemnity for the sole fact of death.
This indemnity arising from the fact of death due to a crime is fixed whereas the
others are still subject to the determination of the court based on the evidence
presented. The fact that the witnesses were not interrogated on the issue of
damages is of no moment because the death indemnity fixed for death is separate
and distinct from the other forms of indemnity for damages.
damages is of no moment because the death indemnity fixed for death is separate
and distinct from the other forms of indemnity for damages.
Under the circumstances of the case, the Court holds that the proximate cause
was the overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when the vehicle
turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the
gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming
of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made
not only by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the
conductor themselves, and that because it was dark (about 2:30 in the
morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with them, and coming as they
did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not available;
and what was more natural than that said rescuers should innocently approach the
vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them. In other
words, the coming of the men with a torch was to be expected and was a natural
sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and
the call for outside help. What is more, the burning of the bus can also in part be
attributed to the negligence of the carrier, through is driver and its conductor.
According to the witness, the driver and the conductor were on the road walking
back and forth. They, or at least, the driver should and must have known that in the
position in which the overturned bus was, gasoline could and must have leaked from
the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus, this aside from the
fact that gasoline when spilled, specially over a large area, can be smelt and
directed even from a distance, and yet neither the driver nor the conductor would
appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the
lighted torch too near the bus.
1. DAMAGES; CARRIERS LIABILITY; WORDS AND PHRASES; PROXIMATE CAUSE
DEFINED. "The proximate legal cause is that the acting first and producing the
injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion., all constituting a
natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with
its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately affecting the
injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such
circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as ordinarily
prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of
his act or default that an injury to some person might be probably result therefrom.
2. ID.; ID.; OVERTURNING OF BUS; PROXIMATE CAUSE OF DEATH. When a vehicle
turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline
from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the men with
the lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made not only by the
passengers, but most probably by the driver and the conductor themselves, and
that because it was very dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry
a light with them; and coming as they did from a rural area where the lanterns and
flashlights were not available, they had to use a torch the most handy and
available; and what was more natural, that said rescuers should innocently
approached the overtuned vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested
from them. Held: That the proximate cause of the death of B was overturning of the
vehicle thru the negligence of defendant and his agent.
3. ID.; ID.; CARRIERS NEGLIGENCE; BURNING OF THE BUS. The burning of the bus
wherein some of the passengers were trapped can also be attributed to the
negligence of the carrier, through the driver and conductor who were on the road
walking back and forth. They should and must have known that in the position in
which the overtuned bus was, gasoline could and must have leaked from the
gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus, this aside from the fact
that gasoline when spilled, especially over a large area, can be smelt and detected
even from a distance, Held: That the failure of the driver and the conductor to have
cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near
the bus, constitute negligence on the part of the agents of the carrier under the
provisions of the Civil Code, particularly, Article 1733, 1759 and 1763 thereof.
HELD: Yes. The doctrine that a corporation is a legal entity distinct and separate
from the members and stockholders who compose it is recognized and respected in
all cases which are within reason and the law. When the fiction is urged as a means
of perpetrating fraud or an illegal act or as a vehicle for the evasion of an existing
obligation, the circumvention of statutes, the achievement of perfection of a
monopoly or generally the perpetration of knavery or crime, the veil of corporate
fiction will be lifted to allow for its consideration merely as a aggregation of
individuals.
Based on the facts, the preponderance of evidence shows that VRTI is an alter ego
of Jose Villarama and that the restricted clause in the contract between Villarama
and Pantranco is also enforceable and binding against VRTI. For the rule is that a
seller or promisor may not make use of a corporate entity as a means to evading
the obligation of his covenant. Where the corporation is substantially the alter ego
of the covenantor to the restrictive agreement, it can be enjoined from competing
with the covenantee.
bookings would be made before the flight time, the reservations supervisor decided
to withhold from plaintiffs the information that their reservations had been
cancelled. Upon arrival in Tokyo, defendant informed plaintiffs that there was no
accommodation for them in the first class, stating that they could not go unless
they take the tourist class. Due to pressing engagements in the United States,
plaintiffs were constrained to take the flight as tourist passengers, but they did so
under protest. Query: Whether defendant acted in bad faith in the breach of its
contract with plaintiffs. Held: In so misleading plaintiffs into purchasing first class
tickets in the conviction that they had confirmed reservations for the same, when in
fact they had none, defendant wilfully and knowingly placed itself into the position
of having to breach its aforesaid contracts with plaintiffs should there be no lastminute cancellation by other passengers before flight time, as it turned out in this
case. Such actuation of defendant may indeed have been prompted by nothing
more than the promotion of its self interest in holding on the plaintiffs as passengers
in its flight and foreclosing on their chances to seek the services of other airlines
that may have been able to afford them first class accommodations. All the same, in
legal contemplation such conduct already amounts to action in bad faith.
2. ID.; ID.; MORAL DAMAGES RECOVERABLE. - As a proximate result of defendants
breach in bad faith of its contracts with plaintiffs, the latter suffered social
humiliation, wounded feelings, serious anxiety and mental anguish. For plaintiffs
were travelling with first class tickets issued by defendant and yet they were given
only the tourist class. At stop-overs, they were expected to be among the first-class
passengers by those awaiting to welcome them, only to be found among the tourist
passengers. It may not be humiliating to travel as tourist passengers; it is
humiliating to be compelled to travel as such, contrary to what is rightfully to be
expected from the contractual undertaking.
3. ID.; ID.; RATIONALE BEHIND EXEMPLARY OR CORRECTIVE DAMAGES. The
rationable behind exemplary or corrective rationale is, as the name implies, to
provide an example or correction for public good. Defendant having breached its
contracts in bad faith, the court may award exemplary damages in addition to moral
damages. (Articles 2229, 2232, New Civil Code). In view of its nature, it should be
imposed in such an amount as to sufficiently and effectively deter similar breach of
contracts in the future by defendant or other airlines.
4. ATTORNEYS FEES; WHEN WRITTEN CONTRACT FOR ATTORNEYS SERVICES SHALL
CONTROL THE AMOUNT TO BE PAID THEREFORE. A written contract for attorneys
services shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be
unconscionable or unreasonable. A consideration of the subject matter of the
present controversy, of the professional standing the attorney for plaintiffsappellants, and of the extent of the service rendered by him, shows that the amount
provided for in the written agreement is reasonable.
8. ID.; ID.; FAILURE TO TRANSPORT PASSENGERS SAFELY. The theory that carriers
violation of its engagement to safely transport the passenger involves a breach of
the passengers confidence, and therefore should be regarded as a breach of
contract in bad faith, justifying recovery of moral damages, under Article 2220 of
the New Code is untenable, for under it the carrier would always be deemed in bad
faith in every case its obligation to the passenger is infringed and it would never be
accountable for simple negligence while under Article 1756 of the Civil Code the
presumption is that common carriers acted negligently and not maliciously, and
Article 1762 speaks of negligence of the common carrier.
9. ID.; CARRIERS; ACTIONS FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT; WHEN PRESUMPTION OR
CARRIERS LIABILITY ARISES. An action for breach of contract imposes on the
carrier a presumption of liability upon mere proof of injury of the passenger; the
latter does not have to establish the fault of the carrier, or of his employees, and
the burden is placed on the carrier to prove that it was due to an unforeseen event
or to force majeure (Congco v. Manila Railroad Co. 38 Phil., 768, 777.) Morever, the
carrier, unlike in suits for quasi-delict may not escape liability by proving that it has
exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees. (Art. 1759
New Civil Code, Cangco v. Manila Railroad Co. Supra; Prado v. Manila Electric Co., 51
Phil., 900)
which were made the basis of the trial courts conclusions, such judgment of
affirmance is (1) a determination by the Court of Appeals that the proceeding in the
lower court was free from prejudicial error; (7) that all questions raised by the
assignments of error and all questions that might have been so raised have been
finally adjudicated as free from all error.
7. ID.; COMPLAINT; SPECIFIC MENTION OF THE TERM "BAD FAITH" IN THE
COMPLAINT NOT REQUIRED. Although there is no specific mention of the term
bad faith in the complaint, the inference of bad faith may be drawn from the facts
and circumstances set forth therein. 8. EVIDENCE; FINDING OF COURT OF APPEALS
THAT RESPONDENT WAS ENTITLED TO A FIRST CLASS SEAT. The Court of Appeals
properly found that a first class-ticket holder is entitled to first class seat, given the
fact that seat availability in specific flights is therein confirmed; otherwise, an air
passenger will be placed in the hollow of the hands of an airline, because it will
always be easy for an airline to strike out the very stipulations in the ticket and say
that there was verbal agreement to the contrary. If only to achieve stability in the
relations between passenger and air carrier, adherence to the ticket so issued is
desirable.
9. ID.; LACK OF SPECIFIC AVERMENT OF BAD FAITH CURED BY NOTICE TO
DEFENDANT OF WHAT PLAINTIFF INTENDS TO PROVE AND BY EVIDENCE PRESENTED
WITHOUT OBJECTION; AMENDMENT OF COMPLAINT TO CONFORM TO EVIDENCE
UNNECESSARY. If there was lack of specific averment of bad faith in the
complaint, such deficiency was cured by notice, right at the start of the trial, by
plaintiffs counsel to defendant as to what plaintiff intended to prove: while in the
plane in Bangkok, plaintiff was ousted by defendants manager who gave his seat to
a white man; and by evidence of bad faith in the fulfillment of the contract
presented without objection on the part of the defendant. An amendment of the
complaint
to
conform
to
the
evidence
is
not
even
required.
10. ID.; ADMISSIBILITY OF TESTIMONY ON AN ENTRY IN A NOTEBOOK; TESTIMONY
NOT COVERED BY BEST EVIDENCE RULE. The testimony of a witness that the
purser made an entry in his notebook reading "First Class passenger was forced to
go to the tourist class against his will and that the captain refused to intervene," is
competent and admissible because the subject of the inquiry is not the entry but
the ouster incident. It does not come within the prescription of the best evidence
rule.
11. CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE; QUASI-DELICT; LIABILITY OF COMMON CARRIERS;
CASE AT BAR. Neglect or malfeasance of the carriers employees could give
ground for an action for damages. Damages here are proper because the stress of
respondents action is placed upon his wrongful expulsion, which is a violation of a
public
duty
by
petitioneraircarrier
a
case
of
quasi-delict.
12. ID.; ID.; ID.; AWARD OF MORAL DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT. Award
of moral damages is proper, despite petitioners argument that respondents action
is planted upon breach of contract, where the stress of the action is put on wrongful
expulsion, the contract having been averred only to establish the relation between
the
parties.
13. ID.; ID.; ID.; EMPLOYER IS RESPONSIBLE FOR TORTIOUS ACTS OF HIS EMPLOYEE;
CASE AT BAR. The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of his
employees is well settled in law. (Art. 2130, Civil Code). Petitioner-aircarrier must
answer
for
the
willful,
malevolent
act
of
its
manager.
14. ID.; ID.; ID.; LIABILITY FOR EXEMPLARY DAMAGES; POWER OF COURTS TO
GRANT; CASE AT BAR. The Civil Code gives the court ample power to grant
exemplary damages, the only condition being that defendant should have "acted in
a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner." As the manner
of ejectment of plaintiff from his first class seat fits into this legal precept,
exemplary damages are well awarded, in addition to moral damages.
15. ID.; ID.; LIABILITY FOR ATTORNEYS FEES; COURT DISCRETION WELL EXERCISED
SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED. The grant of exemplary damages justifies a similar
judgment for attorneys fees. The court below felt that it is but just and equitable
that attorneys fees be given and the Supreme Court does not intend to break faith
with the tradition that discretion well-exercised as it is here should not be
disturbed.
16. ID.; RIGHTS OF PASSENGERS. Passengers do not contract merely for
transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carriers employees with
kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected
against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such
employees. So, any rude or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards
a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier. (4 R. C. L1174-1175).
17. ID.; BREACH OF CONTRACT MAY BE A TORT. Although the relation of
passenger and carrier is contractual both in origin and nature, nevertheless, the act
that
breaks
the
contract
may
also
be
a
tort.
18. WORDS AND PHRASES; BAD FAITH DEFINED. "Bad faith", as understood in
law, contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with
some motive of self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purpose
a decision state the "essential ultimate facts" upon which the courts conclusion is
drawn.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; APPEAL AND ERROR; FAILURE TO MAKE FINDINGS ON EVIDENCE AND
CONTENTIONS OF ONE PARTY, EFFECT OF; DECISION NOT TO BE CLOGGED WITH
DETAILS. The mere failure to make specific findings of fact on the evidence
presented for the defense or to specify in the decision the contentions of the
appellant and the reasons for refusing to believe them is not sufficient to hold the
same contrary to the requirement of the law and the Constitution. There is no law
that so requires. A decision is not to be clogged with details such that prolixity, if
not confusion, may result.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; FINDINGS OF FACT BY COURTS DEFINED. Findings of fact may be
defined as the written statement of the ultimate facts as found by the court and
essential to support the decision and judgment rendered thereon; they consist of
the courts "conclusions with respect to the determinative facts on issue."
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; QUESTION OF LAW EXPLAINED. A question of law is "one which
does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented
by
the
parties."
virtua1aw
library
5. PLEADING AND PRACTICE; APPEAL; WHAT MAY BE RAISED ON APPEAL FROM
COURT OF APPEALS. It is not appropriately the business of the Supreme Court to
alter the facts or to review the questions of fact because, by statute, only questions
of law may be raised in an appeal by certiorarifrom a judgment of the Court of
Appeals, which judgment is conclusive as to the facts.
6. ID.; ID.; EFFECT OF AFFIRMANCE BY COURT OF APPEALS OF TRIAL COURTS
DECISION. When the Court of Appeals affirms a judgment of the trial court, and
the findings of fact of said appellate court are not in any way at war with those of
the trial court, nor is said affirmance upon a ground or grounds different from those
which were made the basis of the trial courts conclusions, such judgment of
affirmance is (1) a determination by the Court of Appeals that the proceeding in the
lower court was free from prejudicial error; (7) that all questions raised by the
assignments of error and all questions that might have been so raised have been
finally adjudicated as free from all error.
7. ID.; COMPLAINT; SPECIFIC MENTION OF THE TERM "BAD FAITH" IN THE
COMPLAINT NOT REQUIRED. Although there is no specific mention of the term
bad faith in the complaint, the inference of bad faith may be drawn from the facts
and circumstances set forth therein. 8. EVIDENCE; FINDING OF COURT OF APPEALS
THAT RESPONDENT WAS ENTITLED TO A FIRST CLASS SEAT. The Court of Appeals
properly found that a first class-ticket holder is entitled to first class seat, given the
fact that seat availability in specific flights is therein confirmed; otherwise, an air
passenger will be placed in the hollow of the hands of an airline, because it will
always be easy for an airline to strike out the very stipulations in the ticket and say
that there was verbal agreement to the contrary. If only to achieve stability in the
relations between passenger and air carrier, adherence to the ticket so issued is
desirable.
a
case
of
quasi-delict.
12. ID.; ID.; ID.; AWARD OF MORAL DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT. Award
of moral damages is proper, despite petitioners argument that respondents action
is planted upon breach of contract, where the stress of the action is put on wrongful
expulsion, the contract having been averred only to establish the relation between
the
parties.
13. ID.; ID.; ID.; EMPLOYER IS RESPONSIBLE FOR TORTIOUS ACTS OF HIS EMPLOYEE;
CASE AT BAR. The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of his
employees is well settled in law. (Art. 2130, Civil Code). Petitioner-aircarrier must
answer
for
the
willful,
malevolent
act
of
its
manager.
14. ID.; ID.; ID.; LIABILITY FOR EXEMPLARY DAMAGES; POWER OF COURTS TO
GRANT; CASE AT BAR. The Civil Code gives the court ample power to grant
exemplary damages, the only condition being that defendant should have "acted in
a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner." As the manner
of ejectment of plaintiff from his first class seat fits into this legal precept,
exemplary damages are well awarded, in addition to moral damages.
15. ID.; ID.; LIABILITY FOR ATTORNEYS FEES; COURT DISCRETION WELL EXERCISED
SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED. The grant of exemplary damages justifies a similar
judgment for attorneys fees. The court below felt that it is but just and equitable
that attorneys fees be given and the Supreme Court does not intend to break faith
with the tradition that discretion well-exercised as it is here should not be
disturbed.