EMINENT DOMAIN

1 Case Title: REPUBLIC v VDA. DE CASTELLVI (58 SCRA 336)

FACTS:
A parcel of land owned by Castellvi had been occupied by the Philippine Air Force since
1947 under contract lease. Before the expiration of the contract of lease on June 30, 1956, the
Republic sough to renew the same but Castellvi refused. Notices to vacate were sent demanding
the return and delivery of the property but AFP Chief-of-Staff answered that it was difficult for the
Army to vacate in view permanent installations and other facilities that had been erected and
already established on the property and that there being no recourse, the acquisition of the
property by means of expropriation proceedings would recommend by the President of the
Republic. The Republic was placed in possession of the land on August 10, 1959. The Republic
urged that the taking of Castellvis property should be deemed as of the year 1947, the start of
the contract and not during the filing of the action for expropriation as the lower court held. The
Republic argued that by virtue of a valid agreement between the Republic and the appellee, the
former was granted right and privilege to buy the property, should the lessor wish to terminate
the lease and that , in the event of such sale, it was stipulated that the fair market value should
be as of the time of occupancy and that the permanent improvement amounting to more than
half a million pesos constructed during the period of 12 years on the land were indicative of an
agreed pattern of permanency and stability of occupancy by the AFP in the interest of national
security.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the taking of the property under expropriation commend with the filing of
the action.
HELD:
The Court set guidelines in order to determine whether there was taking. First, the
expropriator must enter a private property. This was present in the case at bar. Second, it must
be for more than a momentary period. The court said that this was not present because the lease
was only a temporary entry. Third, the entry must be under a color of legal authority. Fourth, the
property must be devoted to a public use. This was present because the land was used by the Air
Force. Fifth, the entry must deprive the owner of the beneficial use of the property. This was
present because the owners still considered as such and still collected rent.
Taking the property, therefore, should not be reckoned as of the year 1947 when the
Republic first occupied the same pursuant to the contract of lease, and that the just
compensation of lease to be paid for the Castellvi property should not be determined on the
basis of the value of the property as of that year. The lower court did not commit an error when it
held that the taking of the property commenced with the filing of the case.

EMINENT DOMAIN
2 Case Title: ABC-CBN V Philippine Multi-Media System Inc. (PMSI)
FACTS:
On April 25, 2001, petitioner demanded for respondent to cease and desist from
rebroadcasting Channels 2 and 23. Two days after, respondent replied that the rebroadcasting
was in accordance with the must carry rule stated in NTC Memorandum Circular 4-888. Negotiations ensued between the parties in an effort to settle the matter; however, it was
terminated due to respondents inability to ensure the prevention of the illegal transmission.
Petitioner filed a complaint with the Bureau of Legal Affairs (BLA) of the IPO against the
respondent for allegedly violating the Property Rights Law, and applied for a temporary
restraining order. IPO granted the application and ordered respondent to suspend the
transmission of said channels. Respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals,
and
a
Manifestation,
reiterating
its
duty
to
comply
with
the
mustcarry rule, with the BLA. Respondent also submitted a letter dated December 20, 2002 to then
NTC Commissioner Borje requesting the latter to provide regulating guidelines for application and
coverage of Memorandum Circular 04-8-88. On August 26, 2003, respondent filed another
Manifestation with the BLA informing the latter that it has received a letter from the NTC
enjoining it to strictly and immediately comply with the Memorandum. On December 22, 2003,
BLA rendered a decision in favor of petitioner ABS-CBN. Respondent filed an appeal with the
Office of the Director-General of the IPO on February 6, 2004. On December 20, 2004, the
Director-General of IPO rendered its decision in favor of PMSI. Then, respondent filed with the CA
a Motion to Withdraw Petition; Alternatively, Memorandum of the Petition for Certiorari which
was later granted in a resolution dated February 17, 2005.Petitioner filed a petition for review
with certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and writ of
preliminary injunction with the Court of Appeals. On July, 18, 2005, the Court of Appeals issued a
temporary restraining order. Afterwards, petitioner filed a Petition for Contempt against PMSI for
its continued transmission of the channels mentioned above. On July 12, 2006, the Court of
Appeals dismissed the petitions of ABS-CBN. Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was still denied by the same court; hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PSMIs transmission of ABS-CBNs channels is a violation of Section 9,
Article 3of the Constitution.
HELD:
After a careful review of the facts and records of this case, the Supreme Court affirmed
the findings of the Director-General of the IPO and the Court of Appeals. The SC sees no merit in
ABS-CBNs contention that PMSI violated its broadcasters rights under Section 211 of the IP
Code. ABS-CBN and PSMI were granted a legislative franchise under Republic Act 7966 and
Republic Act 8630 respectively, which requires both to provide public service time to enable the
government, through the said broadcasting stations, to reach the population on important public
issues; provide at all times sound and balanced programming; promote public participation such
as in community programming; assist in the functions of public information and educationA
franchise is thus a privilege subject, among other things, to amendment by Congress in

accordance with the constitutional provision that any such franchise or right granted . . . shall
be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the Congress when the common good so
requires.

EMINENT DOMAIN
3 Case Title: Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority and Air Transportation
Office v.
Bernardo L.Lozada, Sr.et. al
FACTS:
Subject of this case is a lot (Lot No. 88) located in Lahug, Cebu City. Its original owner was
Anastacio Deiparine when the same was subject to expropriation proceedings, initiated by
Republic, represented by the then Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA), for the expansion and
improvement of the Lahug Airport. During the pendency of the expropriation proceedings,
respondent Bernardo L. Lozada, Sr. acquired Lot No. 88 from Deiparine. The trial court ruled for
the Republic and ordered the latter to pay Lozada the fair market value of the lot. However, the
projected improvement and expansion plan of the old Lahug Airport, however, was not pursued.
The plaintiff-respondents initiated a complaint for the recovery of possession and reconveyance
of ownership the subject lot. On the other hand, the petitioners asked for the immediate
dismissal of the complaint. They specifically denied that the Government had made assurances
to reconvey Lot No. 88 to respondents in the event that the property would no longer be needed
for airport operations. Petitioners instead asserted that the judgment of condemnation was
unconditional, and respondents were, therefore, not entitled to recover the expropriated property
notwithstanding non-use or abandonment thereof. The lower court ruled for herein plaintiffrespondents, which decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. In this petition, the petitioners
argued that the judgment in Civil Case No. R-1881 was absolute and unconditional, giving title in
fee
simple
to
the
Republic.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a constructive trust was constituted in this case, and as such, the
respondents herein are entitled to the restitution of the expropriated property which was not
used
for
a
public
purpose.
HELD:
YES. Art. 1454 of the Civil Code provides: If an absolute conveyance of property is made
in order to secure the performance of an obligation of the grantor toward the grantee, a trust by
virtue of law is established. If the fulfilment of the obligation is offered by the grantor when it
becomes due, he may demand the reconveyance of the property to him.
Constructive trusts are fictions of equity which are bound by no unyielding formula when they
are used by courts as devices to remedy any situation in which the holder of legal title may not
in
good
conscience
retain
the
beneficial
interest.
In constructive trusts, the arrangement is temporary and passive in which the trustees sole duty
is to transfer the title and possession over the property to the plaintiff-beneficiary. Of course, the

wronged party seeking the aid of a court of equity in establishing a constructive trust must
himself do equity. Accordingly, the court will exercise its discretion in deciding what acts are
required of the plaintiff-beneficiary as conditions precedent to obtaining such decree and has the
obligation to reimburse the trustee the consideration received from the latter just as the plaintiffbeneficiary would if he proceeded on the theory of rescission. In the good judgment of the court,
the trustee may also be paid the necessary expenses he may have incurred in sustaining the
property, his fixed costs for improvements thereon, and the monetary value of his services in
managing the property to the extent that plaintiff-beneficiary will secure a benefit from his acts.
The rights and obligations between the constructive trustee and the beneficiary, in this case,
respondent MCIAA and petitioners over Lots Nos. 916 and 920, are echoed in Art. 1190 of the
Civil Code, When the conditions have for their purpose the extinguishment of an obligation to
give, the parties, upon the fulfilment of said conditions, shall return to each other what they have
received x x x In case of the loss, deterioration or improvement of the thing, the provisions
which, with respect to the debtor, are laid down in the preceding article shall be applied to the
party who is bound to return x x x.

EMINENT DOMAIN
4 Case Title: MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI v CA
Facts :
An expropriation proceeding was filed by the Municipality of Makati, herein petitioner,
against the private property of Arceli Jo. In compliance to PD 42, the petitioner opened an
account under its name at PNB depositing an amount of P417, 510.00. The court fixed the
appraised value of the expropriated property at P5, 291,666.00 and an advanced payment was
made in the amount of P338, 160 leaving a balance of P4,953,506. After the decision becomes
final and executory, the private respondent moved for the issuance of a writ of execution. A
notice of garnishment was thereafter issued by the court to the PNB account. A manifestation
was filed by the petitioner informing the court that the private respondent was no longer the true
owner of the expropriated property. The court consolidated the ownership of the property to PSB
as a mortgagee/purchaser. The private respondent and PSB agreed to divide the compensation
due from the expropriation proceeding. The judge ordered PNB to immediately release to them
the sum of P4, 953.506 corresponding to the balance of the appraised value of the expropriated
property. The PNB bank manager refused as he is waiting for the approval of their head office.
TheMunicipality of Makati contends that its fund with DBP could neither be be garnished or levied
upon execution for to do so would result to the disbursement of public funds without the proper
appropriation required under the law. The lower court denied the motion for reconsideration of
the petitioner ruling that the account with DBP of the petitioner was an account specifically
opened for the expropriation proceeding. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari to the Court of
Appeals which affirmed the lower courts decision. A petition for review with a prayer for
preliminary injunction was filed to the S.C. A temporary restraining order was issued by the S.C.
Issue :
Whether or not the PNB funds may be levied in the expropriation proceeding ?
Held :
The petitioner belatedly informed the court that there are two existing accounts with PNB.
Account A was the one intended for the expropriation proceeding and account B is primarily
intended for financing governmental functions and activities. Because account A has a fund that
is insufficient to meet the remaining amount of its balance for the expropriation proceeding, it is

unlawful to get the remaining balance from Account B without an ordinance appropriating said
funds for expropriation purpose. Thus the court ruled that account A maybe levied but not
account B. The respondents are without recourse however should the petitioner refuse to pay its
remaining obligation. Where a municipality refuses without justifiable reason to effect payment
of a final money judgment rendered against it, the claimant may avail the remedy of mandamus
in order to compel the enactment and approval of the necessary appropriation ordinance and the
corresponding disbursement of municipal funds for such purpose.

EMINENT DOMAIN
5 Case Title: PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE INC. v COMELEC (244 SCRA 272)
Facts:
In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order, PPI, a non-stock, non-profit organization of newspaper and magazine
publishers, asks us to declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the
ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government, and
any of its agencies, against the taking of private property for public use without just
compensation. Petitioner also contends that the 22 March 1995 letter directives of Comelec
requiring publishers to give free "Comelec Space" and at the same time process raw data to
make it camera-ready, constitute impositions of involuntary servitude, contrary to the provisions
of Section 18 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Finally, PPI argues that Section 8 of Comelec
Resolution No. 2772 is violative of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech, of the
press and of expression.
On the other hand, The Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment on behalf of respondent
Comelec alleging that Comelec Resolution No. 2772 does not impose upon the publishers any
obligation to provide free print space in the newspapers as it does not provide any criminal or
administrative sanction for non-compliance with that Resolution. According to the Solicitor
General, the questioned Resolution merely established guidelines to be followed in connection
with the procurement of "Comelec space," the procedure for and mode of allocation of such
space to candidates and the conditions or requirements for the candidate's utilization of the
"Comelec space" procured. At the same time, however, the Solicitor General argues that even if
the questioned Resolution and its implementing letter directives are viewed as mandatory, the
same would nevertheless be valid as an exercise of the police power of the State. The Solicitor
General also maintains that Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772 is a permissible exercise of the

power of supervision or regulation of the Comelec over the communication and information
operations of print media enterprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure a fair,
impartial and credible election.
Issue:
Whether or not Resolution No. 2772 issued by respondent Commission on Elections is valid.
Held:
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is GRANTED in part
and Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 in its present form and the related letter-directives dated 22
March 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE as null and void, and the Temporary Restraining Order is
hereby MADE PERMANENT. The Petition is DISMISSED in part, to the extent it relates to Section 8
of Resolution No. 2772. No pronouncement as to costs.

EMINENT DOMAIN
6 Case Title: DE KNECHT v BAUTISTA (100 SCRA 660 (1980))
FACTS:
The plan to extend EDSA to Roxas Boulevard to be ultimately linked to the Cavite Coastal
Road Project, originally called for the expropriation of properties along Cuneta Avenue in Pasay
City. Later on, however, the Ministry of Public Highways decided to make the proposed extension
pass through Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets. Because of the protests of residents of the
latter, the Commission on Human Settlements recommended the reversion to the original plan,
but the Ministry argued the new route which save the government P2 million. The government
filed expropriation proceedings against the owners of Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets, among
whom was petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a genuine need to expropriate the properties owned by De Knecht
and others similarly situated on the ground that the choice of properties to be expropriated
seemed arbitrarily made by the DPWH.
HELD:

The choice of Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets is arbitrary and should not receive judicial
approval. The Human Settlements Commission concluded that the cost factor is so minimal that
it can be disregarded in making a choice between the two lines. The factor of functionality
strongly militates against the choice of Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets, while the factor of
social and economic impact bears grievously on the residents of Cuneta Avenue. While the issue
would seem to boil down to a choice between people, on one hand, and progress and
development, on the other, it is to be remembered that progress and development are carried
out for the benefit of the people.

EMINENT DOMAIN
7 Case Title: CITY OF MANILA v CHINESE COMMUNITY OF MANILA (40 PHIL 349)
FACTS:
The important question presented by this appeal is: In expropriation proceedings by the
city of Manila, may the courts inquire into, and hear proof upon, the necessity of the
expropriation?
The City of Manila presented a petition in the Court of First Instance of said city, praying
that certain lands, therein particularly described, be expropriated for the purpose of constructing
a public improvement. The petitioner alleged that for the purpose of constructing an extension
of Rizal Avenue, Manila, it is necessary for the plaintiff to acquire ownership of certain parcels
of land situated in the district of Binondo. The defendants the Chinese Community of Manila,
Ildefonso Tambunting, and Feliza Concepcion de Delgado alleged in their Answer (a) that no
necessity existed for said expropriation and (b) that the land in question was a cemetery, which
had been used as such for many years, and was covered with sepulchres and monuments, and
that the same should not be converted into a street for public purposes. One of the defendants,
Ildefonso Tampbunting, offered to grant a right of way for the said extension over other land,
without cost to the plaintiff, in order that the sepulchers, chapels and graves of his ancestors
may not be disturbed. The Honorable Simplicio del Rosario, decided that there was no necessity
for the expropriation of the particular strip of land in question, and absolved each and all of the

defendants from all liability under the complaint, without any finding as to costs. On appeal,
the plaintiff contended that the city of Manila has authority to expropriate private lands for public
purposes. Section 2429 of Act No. 2711 (Charter of the city of Manila) provides that "the city
(Manila) . . . may condemn private property for public use."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the City of Manila can condemn private property for public use.
HELD:
No. It is true that Section 2429 of Act No. 2711, or the Charter of the City of Manila states
that "the city (Manila) . . . may condemn private property for public use." But when the statute
does not designate the property to be taken nor how it may be taken, the necessity of taking
particular property is a question for the courts. When the application to condemn or appropriate
property is made directly to the court, the question of necessity should be raised. The taking of
land in the exercise of power of eminent domain of the state is not a judicial question but the
court is bound to interfere to prevent an abuse of the discretion delegated by the legislature. The
very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity, and that
necessity must be of a public character. The ascertainment of the necessity must precede or
accompany, and not follow, the taking of the land. The court ruled that the cemetery is a public
property and it found no great necessity to allow the expropriation of the land by the City
of Manila thus thereby affirmed the decision of the lower court.

TAXATION
1 Case Title: LLADOC v CIR (14 SCRA 292)
Facts:
In 1957, the MB Estate Inc. of Bacolod City donated P10, 000 in cash to the parish priest of
Victorias, Negros Occidental; the amount spent for the construction of a new Catholic Church in
the locality, as intended. In1958, MB Estate filed the donors gift tax return. In 1960, the
Commissioner issued an assessment for donees gift tax against the parish. The priest lodged a
protest to the assessment claiming that assessment of gift tax against the Catholic Church is
against the law; that when the donation was made. He was not yet the parish priest and
requested the withdrawal thereof.
Issue:
Whether the Catholic Parish is tax exempt.
Held:

The phrase exempt from taxation should not be interpreted to mean exemption from all
kinds of taxes. The exemption is only from the payment of taxes assessed on such properties as
property taxes as contradistinguished from excise taxes. A donees gift tax is not a property tax
but an excise tax imposed on the transfer of property by way of gift inter vivos. It does not rest
upon general ownership, but an excise upon the use made of the properties, upon the exercise of
the privilege of receiving the properties. The imposition of such excise tax on property used for
religious purpose do not constitute an impairment of the Constitution.
The tax exemption of the parish, thus, does not extend to excise taxes.

TAXATION
2 Case Title: PHILEX MINING v CIR (294 SCRA 689)
FACTS:
Petitioner Philex Mining Corp. assails the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the
Court of Tax
Appeals decision ordering it to pay the amount of P110.7 M as excise tax liability for the period
from the 2nd quarter of 1991 to the 2nd quarter of 1992 plus 20% annual interest from 1994 until
fully paid pursuant to Sections 248 and 249 of the Tax Code of 1977. Philex protested the
demand for payment of the tax liabilities stating that it has pending claims for VAT input
credit/refund for the taxes it paid for the years 1989 to 1991 in the amount of P120 M plus
interest. Therefore these claims for tax credit/refund should be applied against the tax liabilities.
ISSUE:
Can there be an off-setting between the tax liabilities vis-a-vis claims of tax refund of the
petitioner?

HELD:
No. Philex's claim is an outright disregard of the basic principle in tax law that taxes are
the lifeblood of the government and so should be collected without unnecessary hindrance.
Evidently, to countenance Philex's whimsical reason would render ineffective our tax collection
system.
Too
simplistic,
it
finds
no
support
in
law
or
in
jurisprudence.
To be sure, Philex cannot be allowed to refuse the payment of its tax liabilities on the
ground that it has a pending tax claim for refund or credit against the government which has not
yet been granted. Taxes cannot be subject to compensation for the simple reason that the
government and the taxpayer are not creditors and debtors of each other. There is a material
distinction between a tax and debt. Debts are due to the Government in its corporate capacity,
while taxes are due to the Government in its sovereign capacity. xxx There can be no off-setting
of taxes against the claims that the taxpayer may have against the government. A person cannot
refuse to pay a tax on the ground that the government owes him an amount equal to or greater
than the tax being collected. The collection of a tax cannot await the results of a lawsuit against
the government.