PONTIFICAL CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF RIO DE JANEIRO

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS INSTITUTE

International Relations Masters Program 2014.1

NATHALIA ROCHA CARNEIRO FERRAZ BRAGA

US Drone Strikes in Pakistan - the other as a total threat

Discipline: International Security

Professor: Kai Kenkel

RIO DE JANEIRO
November 3rd 2014

ABSTRACT
This article presents information on the development and use of Unmanned Aerial
Vehicle/drones with military objectives. More specifically it shows the current drone
projects of the United States and its uses in the North of Pakistan and is presented the
consequences of such uses for the civilian population of the Federally Administered
Tribal Area. Therefore, some questionings are raise on the possible meanings and
relations between the drone use and the political, legal and symbolic forms of modern
power.

LIST OF ACRONYMS
CIA

Central Intelligence Agency

FATA

Federally Administered Tribal Area

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

UAV

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

USSR

Union of Socialist Soviet Republics

US/USA

United States of America

INTRODUCTION
This short article it is not a work of definitive answers. There are many explicit
questions posed on the present work that might not be directly answered, and many
more implicit questions, behind those explicit here, that might not have an answer
either. The main topic, the US drone strikes in Pakistan, is a subject already surrounded
with secrecy by the US official data. The difficulty to access reliable information
regarding the North tribal area of Pakistan is also huge. Not only these difficulties of
access to information refrain me to give you, the reader, final answers to many of our
questions, but also the interpretative lens used here are not the ones that ought only to
organize and categorize the world and its events so we might get some understandable
answers with which we can live with. The lens and "theories" that I use here are those
that try hard to deconstruct and problematize our assumed knowledge regarding some
topic and maybe after this bring some modest contributions to the discussion.
Like I said before, the main topic is the US drone strikes in Pakistan, but not
only. My attempt is to discuss through the so called postmodern international relations
lens the relation between Self and Other that is involved in this attacks. According to
WAEVER (2012), these "radical" postmodern approaches are usually seen as very
academic and with little to contribute to policy. However, since the 9/11 and the begin
of the War on terror, these approaches might have more and more to contribute with
policy in the dealing with the difference in ways that do not totalizes the Other as a
threat.
In Waever words about these postmodern contribution: "The typically modern
longing for fixity and predictability should be overcome in order to face the 'other' and
what is truly different as an exciting challenge." And he continues regarding the War on
terror:
(...) to what extent we can learn to live with it (the terror)? Any strategy for erasing the
threat of terrorism and therefore any attempt to securitize terrorism as a totally
unacceptable risk that leaves us in mortal and intolerable danger until removed is
deemed to drive us all into a vicious circle of increased insecurity and counterproductive security strategies. Terror can only be deal with is it is not totalized as a
threat, and thus ultimately any promising strategy has to have an element of learning to
tame one's own worries. Ironically, this approach therefore has some immediate policy
relevance, but at least in the short term, it has usually been unable to forge ties with
policy research and has thus remained limited to 'high theory." (p. 55).

Besides this many possibilities of contribution to the policy, these postmodern

approaches continue under valued in areas like international security. The aim of the
present article is to offer some ways to reconcile security policy analysis with these
postmodern lenses by raising some points there are usually invisible to the mainstream
security analysts.
Some descriptive words are necessary, however, before beginning our analyses.

1. The Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) or Drones

The drones or Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are pilotless aircrafts with
many civil and military uses. Among the civil uses are remote electromagnetic sensors;
commercial aerial surveillance; motion picture filmmaking; sports photography and
cinematography (used at the Olympic Winter Games on 2014); domestic policing; oil,
gas and mineral exploration; disaster relief and many other scientific researches.
Besides all these uses the most commented are the military ones. The idea of an
aircraft without on board crew is not new. Since the mid 1800s similar ideas have been
used on the warfare. One example is the Austrian attack on Venice in August 22 nd 1849
with unmanned bomb-filled balloons.1
Since this first attempt much has changed in the military use of this aircrafts.
The USA interest for unmanned aircrafts has been intensified since the end of the fifties
and begins of the sixties. On 1959 the intensification of the use of UVAs was launched
as a way to avoid losing well trained pilots on hostile territories, like happened with
Francis Gary Powers and his secret U-2 that were shot down over USSR territory on
1960.2
There are two UAVs programs in the United States: one is military, overt and
only operates where US troops are stationed. The second one is a CIA (Central
Intelligence Agency) program that works under secrecy and started after the 9/11. Drone
used at the CIA program may occur anywhere and with no previous authorization. The
US stopped asking for previous local authorization to launch attacks since 2008 because
1

For more information on the attack: http://www.ctie.monash.edu.au/hargrave/rpav_home.html or

http://airminded.org/2009/08/22/the-first-air-bomb-venice-15-july-1849/. Last accessed on November 1st
2014.
2
Wagner, William. "Lightning Bugs and other Reconnaissance Drones; The can-do story of Ryan's
unmanned spy planes". 1982, Armed Forces Journal International, in cooperation with Aero Publishers,
Inc.

of concerns that some authorities members of allied countries could be passing

information to the targeted before the attacks, especially in Pakistan.3
The US drones are mainly operated from the Creech Air Force Base in Nevada. 4
However there are other US bases in many countries to assist in the drone use, for
surveillance and also for armed strikes. This is necessary because to be considered an
Unmanned Aircraft System and to be able to survey and strike it has to put together not
only the UAV, but also a control system, such as ground control station and control
links, a specialized data link connected to the aircraft.
At first drones were not armed, the decision to arm it was allegedly taken after
Predators, one of the most common drones used by the USA, sighted Osama Bin Laden
multiple times and could not do anything but send images back. After this the Predator
was equipped with Hellfire missiles that can terminate the targeted (CARAFANO &
GUDGEL, 2007). Besides this the Predator is also capable of orchestrate attacks by
pointing lasers at the targeted (SINGER, 2009).

The Predator MQ-1 was use at the first time in 2001 from bases in the Pakistan
and Uzbekistan. And it was first used outside the war theater on November 3 rd 2002 to
kill Al-Qaeda members on Yemen.
According to US intelligence information drone attacks have killed almost five
thousand people; more than ten of the most wanted Al-Qaeda terrorist suspects, and
3

Available at: http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/10/26/the-predator-war

"Drone bombings in Federally Administered Tribal Areas: Public Remote Sensing Applications for
Security Monitoring" (2012). Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/jgis.2012.42018.
5
Image of a Predator strike. Available at: http://www.fastcompany.com/1695219/inside-lawsuit-couldground-deadly-cia-predator-drones.
4

more than five hundred Al-Qaeda and Taliban militants. These last ones only in the
tribal areas of North Pakistan. Among these militants, the US official information claim
that only thirty civilians were killed, corresponding to less than 5% of the killings, most
of these civilians were family members and close associated that used to live and travel
with the terrorist suspects.6

The drone strikes in Pakistan

2.1 History and numbers
The place with the biggest recurrence of US drone strikes is Pakistan, more
specifically the northwest of it. The first strike in the country, back in 2004, was a joint
operation between American and Pakistani armed forces. In this operation one of the
chiefs of the Taliban was killed, Nek Mohammad, together with two children.7
The UAVs strikes during the Bush government (2004-2009) were used to eliminate
important targeted in a kill list. In the Obama administration, however, not only the
strikes are much more often, but they also obey a different logic, they are called
signature strikes. Signature strikes are the ones in which the identity of the targeted
does not need to be known and the profile behavior being considered suspect by the
surveillance authorities is enough to authorize a strike.8
The main targeted area in Pakistan is the North Tribal area or Federally
Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA). These territories are the main concern of American
counterterrorist units because they are in the border with Afghanistan and since 2001,
with the beginning of the American invasion, have been being a high migration flux
from one country to the other. Not only the proximity with Afghanistan in alarming
according to American authorities, but also the fact that the FATA is a loosely-governed
territory with little control of the Pakistani armed forces and with a tribal autonomous
system. In this Tribal area the most affected is called North Waziristan.

Available at: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/21/lindsey-graham-drone-strikes_n_2734133.html

International Amnesty Report Will I be next? from October 2013. Available at:
http://www.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/asa330132013en.pdf
8
International Amnesty Report Will I be next? from October 2013.
7

There are international pressures from the US, NATO (especially from the ISAF,
International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan) and Afghanistan asking for
biggest presence of the Pakistani armed forces in the FATA area. However, the Pakistani
military authorities claim that the local troops are already too small to handle the
country and that military tactics showed little effect against the terrorist cells. The
international common response is to question whether the Pakistani government has
strings attached to these armed groups and that is why they would not fight it properly.10
Even thought the information regarding the Pakistani provision of intelligence
and other contributions to the US drone program is not clear, it is reasonable to believe
that the two countries cooperate in this area. Besides Pakistan, other countries also
collaborate with the American counterterrorist measures in the FATA region, like
Germany, United Kingdom and Australia.11
Collecting reliable information about the UAVs strikes in Pakistan is extremely
difficult, not only the US does not has any accountability of public information
program, but also the field researches in Pakistan are extremely difficult, dangerous and

Image available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_in_North-West_Pakistan

International Amnesty Report Will I be next? from October 2013.
11
International Amnesty Report Will I be next? from October 2013, p. 9/73.
10

avoided by the local armed groups and Pakistani authorities. Anyone considered a spy
might be arrested or even killed.

2.2 The consequences of the US drone program on the civil population

of FATA
The population of the FATA is something around 840.000 people. The
relationship between the population and the armed groups are uncertain. So it is the real
picture of the damage caused to the local population by the current conflict between
armed groups, local armed forces and the US drones. The little US data available on
civilian casualties in the FATA region is very different from the numbers of independent
research groups, like the Bureau of Investigative Journalism12.

American authorities claim that its drone operation are based on reliable
intelligence, are extremely accurate and that the vast majority of people killed in such
strikes are members of armed groups 13. On the other hand, many critics affirm that the
drones are not so discriminating and that they create a number of problems:
1) The kind of behavior they considered suspect in the surveillance is not
distinctive enough to justify the signature strikes; for example, many local
witnesses claimed that anyone carrying a gun, driving a car, with white and
plain clothes and long beard can be the a targeted of a drone strike, and all
these features are very common in the local male population. Are also
12

Table taken from the International Amnesty Report Will I be next? from October 2013, p. 13.
Reference to figures provided by the Government of Pakistan in Statement of the Special Rapporteur
Following Meetings in Pakistan, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 14 March 2013
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=13146&LangID=E
13

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considered suspect any reunion of people, which can be either a tribal

meeting or a family occasion.
2) This erratic strikes lead to hundreds of civilians killed, including many
children, as noted by the numbers in the table of the Bureau of Investigative
Journalism.
3) Even when the strikes amount to the death of real suspects of terrorist acts,
these killings can be seen as extrajudicial executions, war crimes, violations
of the humanitarian law and/or human rights law. In the case of an armed
conflict the humanitarian law applies and in this case individuals are
entitled to a presumption of civilian status, which the practice of signature
strikes may effectively deny, leading to direct attacks on civilians and
disproportionate civilians casualties.14 The Pakistani government does not
recognize the existence of an armed conflict in its territory, if this is the case
the human rights law would continue to apply.
4) The constant presence of drones causes a constant fear in the population,
especially children and women that are not usually allowed to go out alone
and often. This permanent fear of eminent strike leads to psychological
problems such as anxiety and insomnia; reduction of productiveness in
family work, like small plantations; and changes in social and religious
practices, like the avoidance of any large meetings.
5) The fear and constant presence of the US drones increases the animosity and
the hate towards US, viewed by locals as the enemy, and facilitates the
recruitment of the armed and terrorist groups among the locals, especially
among young men.

2.2.1 The double strike or double-tap practice

Not only the signature strikes policy is accused of causing severe civilian
suffering, but also many news and studies 15 on the US strikes in Pakistan are reporting
many cases of one drone attack being followed by another around thirty minutes later.
This double-tap tactic was alleged to be created after the local intelligence informed
14

Reference to the joint letter to the president Barack Obama on the US drone strikes and targeted
killings from Human Rights Organizations. Available at http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/04/11/joint-letterpresident-obama-us-drone-strikes-and-targeted-killings
15
Living Under Drones. New York: NYU Law School and Stanford Law School. September 2012.

11

the US authorities that after strikes only members of the armed groups were authorized
to go in the scene and help the wounded and collect the deads body parts. According to
this information the US decided to frequently do the second strike aiming to kill more
Al-Qaeda and Taliban members.
However, many news and reports on the topic show that is hard to affirm any
typical behavior of the population after attacks. Human Rights agencies related that
even families during funerals were being targeted by the second strikes, including
children and any other people that tried to help the wounded. In the words of Christof
Heyns, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Extra-judicial Executions,
Allegations of repeat strikes coming back after half an hour when medical personnel
are on the ground are very worrying. To targeted civilians would be crimes of war.16
According to some scholars17 this can demonstrate two warning possibilities: i)
that the US personnel is aware of the nature of this killings and keep doing it; or, ii) that
the drones are not so precise as it is alleged by the US authorities. In the case of any of
these possibilities being proved right it would cast light on either the fragility or the
criminal aims of the CIA drone program.
Other studies18 argue that the Taliban has de facto control over most of the FATA
region, especially the North and South Waziristan. This, they say, means that only the
people who are authorize or that live with the Taliban members get close to the targeted
area after a strike. For this researches and policy man the proximity between these
civilians and the Taliban is evidence of their involvement with terrorist cells.
The nature and type of this involvement between the Taliban and the civil local
community, however, is not a consensus between the researchers. Many studies point to
the fact that many families are coerced to live with Taliban members in their homes or
to help them in some practical everyday activities, like helping the wounded. Following
this view, the civilians that live or are close to Taliban members are not directly or freely
involved in terrorist plans and activities, they are forced to do it by the Taliban, which is
the main power in the region.
According to human rights activists this fact shows that the civilian population
of the FATA are three times victimized: they are abused by the Taliban, Al-Qaeda and
16

UK Daily Mail, 25 September 2012. Americas deadly double tap drone attacks are killing 49 people
for every known terrorist in Pakistan.
17
Maya Zehfuss (2010), Targeting: Precision and the production of ethics. European Journal of
International Relations.
18
Brian Glyn Williams, New Light on CIA Double Tap Drone Strikes on Taliban First Responders in
Pakistans Tribal Areas. In Perspectives on Terrorism, Volume 7, Issue 3, June 2013.

12

other armed groups in the region, they are not reached by almost any of the Pakistani
official policies and when the armed forces intervened usually the population physically
suffers too and finally, they are targeted by the US drones.

2. Some possible questionings on the US drone policy

The use of UAVs is considered a type of targeted killing, which can be define as
the intentional selection, targeting and execution of an individual not held in physical
custody by a state for military, political or security purposes (MELZER, 2008, p. 34).
According to Kyle Grayson19:
Targeted killing might be considered a form of political violence. These explore the power
relations, lawfare, scopic regimes, forms of spatial management and symbolic communications
which suggest that the practice of targeted killing arise from the failures of the Western global
counter-insurgency campaign to achieve its aims. Therefore, rather than demonstrating
omniscience and omnipotence, targeted killing is indicative of the Western position of weakness
in the wars of the colonial present.

Some main relations can be observed between the current counter-insurgency and
counterterrorist policies, within the broader Western political logic, and the way targeted
killings are used and what they produce. The main relations will be presented here in the
form of topics; however, they are parts of the same process and can be addressed as a
whole, I chose to show than separately just for didactic purposes.
2.1 Targeted killing as the reproduction of the modern/western political
discrimination
The first possible relation pointed out here is the power and structural political
relations reinforced and reproduced in the targeted UAVs killings in Pakistan. The
people targeted, does not matter if they are considered civilians or terrorist suspects, are
outside the forms of legitimate political activities that constitute contemporary modern
politics. One of the reasons this occurs is because of the local political system based on
tribal authority not on a sovereign state authority in the FATA region, since it is not
considered politically as an equal by the American state and the Pakistani state does not
19

Kyle Grayson, Six Theses on Targeted Killing. Newcastle University, Political Studies Association,
Politics: 2012 Vol. 32(2), 120-128. Special Edition Politics and War: Ethics, Opinion and Logic.

13

claim the total responsibility for the area, nor speaks for the citizenship rights of that
population, they are outside the modern state political logic.
They are identified by a profile of danger that is calculated through perceptions of race,
religion and nationality which are fused to notions of political affiliation, capabilities and intent.
Extermination evokes the spectacle of sovereign punishment, the ordering conformity of the
disciplinary norm, the biopolitical eschatology of killing to make it live and the desire to
expressed through mechanisms of control to immediately locate, position and track persons of
interest across a governmental environment that is being conceived on a planetary scale. 20

The killings perpetrated by the American aircrafts are based on this political
discrimination and on the symbolic power it presents for these populations as means to
reproduce this asymmetries. The killings try to transpose the shame connotations, the
dishonor of the killer to the killed. The targets are not supposed to be seen as martyrs,
heroes or symbols of resistance:
Targeted killing is, in part, an attempt to transpose the dishonorable connotations
associated with the assassins on to the one who is assassinated. Targeted killing thus
becomes a means of de-politicizing the potential political and symbolic meanings (e.g.,
martyrdom, honor, public significance, heroism, bravery, resistance) that could be
cultivated from the death of an individual. This is done through the decontextualization
of the killing from the broader conflict by focusing attention upon the claimed
characteristics of the specific person targeted. 21

However, the targeted killings and the counter-insurgence policies as a whole,

have not managed to control these people, areas and movements it aimed to control. In
this context, the need to resort to the targeted killings and the drones shows the failure
to deliver what they promise: imperial aggrandizement, docile bodies, governable
populations, and/or security through the tempering of flows of people, ideas and
capabilities said to pose risk (BOUSQUET, 2009). Despite the increased number of
drone attacks and targeted killings, the terrorist organizations like Al-Qaeda and Taliban
continue to exist, proliferate and expand. Some analysts 22 would even affirm that these
attacks are facilitating this survival and proliferation.
2.2 The use of International Law and the potential de-politicize debate

20

GRAYSON, 2012, p. 121. Highlight done by the author.

GRAYSON, 2012, p. 125.
22
Krishna Mungur, (2009), Islamist Distortions: Hizb ut-Tahrir a Breeding Ground for Al-Qaida
Recruitment. Journal of Strategic Security Vol. 2 Number 4, November/December 2009.
21

14

Another relevant questioning in the current practice of targeted killing and UAVs
strikes is the correlation with international law. There are many legal arguments against
and pro these attacks some have even been used in this work. However, the strong
emphasis given by the authorities to the legal discussions is also used as means to depoliticize the debate. So the legal debate is treated only by legal experts and takes a long
time to reach any consensus, if ever does; meanwhile the policy and practice continue
with apparent legal legitimization.
Framed as a preemptive strike against imminent threats or, more controversially, those with the
capabilities to pose a threat, targeted killing has been identified as an appropriate tactical
response to the strategic problem of facing as adversary with dangerous intentions who cannot be
deterred. Officially, the goals of targeted killings are not punishment, retribution or
deterrence but prevention within what is presented as an armed conflict without precedent.
This framing then takes targeted killing outside the areas of international human rights law where
one might be able to make a case that it indeed constitutes extrajudicial killing and places it
squarely within jus ad bellum (right to war) and jus in bello (right in war) considerations.23

The need to legitimize the counterterrorist movement is based on a fear of the

future, like the passage above shows. The interpretation and generalized ideas
propagated throughout the world about the terrorist attacks that justify the
counterterrorist strategy are central to this legitimization.
In the words of the French philosopher Jacques Derrida 24, the importance and
interpretation given to terrorist attacks in American and European territories is not only
attributed to the number of deaths generated by them, or because of the novelty of the
means used to attack, like airplanes and bombs. The importance and world
interpretation is given by a system formed by the brute fact, the 9/11 bombing for
example, and the informed impression caused by it. This informed impression is formed
collectively and by all the set of information and interpretations (language,
communication, rhetoric, images) given about the event.
More importantly for the current work, Derrida affirms that what makes these
events so important and tragic is not the past or the present suffering, but the future
possibilities of suffering that they open. He proposes a rhetorical exercise in which he
affirms: Imagine that after all that happened to the Americans with the 9/11 we could
affirm to them with all the certainty that all that would never happen again. The
mourning would be shorter and life would probably go back to normal faster than we
23

GRAYSON, 2012, p. 122. Highlight done by the author.

Interview with Derrida by Giovanna Borradori. In: Filosophy in a Time of Terror: Dialogs with Jurgen
Habermas and Jacques Derrida. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003.
24

15

can imagine, because what really provokes the trauma is the future, the coming, the
threat of something worst. All these are even worse than the past suffering.25
The use of extreme means to achieve security, like targeted killings, are seen and
justified by these fear of the future and by the vision of the other as a total threat, as a
threat with which we cannot live with.
See targeted killing as a form of lawfare is a way to take advantage of the current
ambiguities of the contemporary security environment, like the ones surrounding
imminence, proportionality, combatant status, named target ding and last resort and use
these ambiguities to justify a war against a future threat (SAVAGE, 2011).
At the margins of (il)legality where interpretations of international humanitarian law can be
invoked, targeted killing is productive of a selective and suitably enabling set of malleable legal
conventions that legitimate the unleashing of military violence. () The challenge is not that
targeted killing violates the law at first principles but rather that it can work within legal
frameworks.26

2.3 Targeted killing as a visual and tecnoscientific practice

Target killings can be considered a visual practice in two spheres: i) the
exemplary effect caused by the strikes on the populations affected is based on the high
visibility of the drone killings; ii) the US drone policy is based on a total faith on vision
through technological enhancement as a infallible sense that can capture the world
with total rightness and independently of any subjective perception27.
This total trust in the sense of vision and on the tecnoscientific modern
productions, like the drones, demonstrates how the modern warfare is surrounded and
justified by the precision myth. 28 The drone is seeing by the Americans, and western
military, as a neutral observer that allows them to see without being seen, something
that posses a detached and disembodied vision which enables clinical precision when
circumstances justify its deployment..
At the same time the drone it is seen and heard by the locals, only his operator is
kept at a distance, and this constant monitoring and potential targeting generates an
anxiety and makes the observed follow the preferred norms and behaviors of the
observer. This means that this situation is based on huge power asymmetry between the
25

This is a free translation done by the author.

GRAYSON, 2012, p. 122.
27
GRAYSON, 2012, P.123.
28
Maya Zehfuss (2010). And Donna Haraway (1988).
26

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two parts, at the same time that shows the impotence and inability of the omnipresent
observer to do more than impose a fear of the future on their targets, like it was done to
them, the Americans, before by the terrorist attacks on their territory.
All these practices are enabled by the faith in the precision and superiority of the
American and western military. This faith is based on the advances made in twentieth
century, especially on the air forces, that created the possibilities to deal with
problematic areas of the world without direct occupation. More than that, the provision
of real time observation of the whole Earth by the satellites images and the surveillance
drones created a even bigger faith on the capability of the west to manage the
populations and their circulation and behavior on the ground on any place of the planet
without even needing to put a pilot on the aircraft.

CONCLUSIONS
Often seen as an act of disproportionate power of the so call potencies of the
west, like the United States, the use of targeted killings in general and specifically of
drone also shows the weakness and confusion of the current counterterrorist practices.
Of course the act of killing thousands of people with disproportionate weapons and
from thousands of kilometers it is an attempt not only to kill potential enemies, but also
to pass a message, a message of power. However from a closer analysis is possible to
see many more complex figures on this picture.
The idea behind the whole counterterrorist practices of the US is the Other as a
total threat, as the potential seen as certain future threat with which the US cannot
and will not be live. This leads to a security program that does not annihilates this Other
and can even facilitate its continuity and recruitment.
More than just a security practice, targeted killings reflect the Western belief that
technological developments can solve political and internal challenges. Internal
challenge because the turning of the Other in a threat is a internal process of the US and
of the western contemporary political culture. The so called terrorists groups have been
there for many and many years, many of them were not seen as threats in a near past.
The modest attempt of the present words is to show how this security practices lack
the long-term holistic view of these events and how different lens can bring a new way
of looking at them. Otherwise, we will continue to watch the reproduction and repetition

17

of the same modern political discourses of discrimination that justify aggressions

generation after generation.

REFERENCES
BORRADORI, G. (2003), Philosophy in a Time of Terror: Dialogs with Jurgen
Habermas and Jacques Derrida. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003.
BOUSQUET, A. (2009), The Scientific Way of Warfare: Order and Chaos on the
Battlefields of Modernity, London: Hurst and Company.
CARAFANO, J., & GUDGEL, A. (2007). The Pentagons robots: Arming the future
[Electronic version]. Backgrounder 2093, 1-6
GRAYSON, Kyle (2012), Six Theses on Targeted Killing. Newcastle University,
Political Studies Association, Politics: 2012 Vol. 32(2), 120-128. Special Edition
Politics and War: Ethics, Opinion and Logic.
HARAWAY, Donna (1988), Situated Know ledges: The Science Question in Feminism
and the Privilege of Partial Perspective, Feminist Studies 14(3), pp. 575-599.
Living Under Drones. New York: NYU Law School and Stanford Law School.
September 2012.
MELZER, N. (2008), Targeted Killing in International Law, Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
MUNGUR, K. (2009), Islamist Distortions: Hizb ut-Tahrir a Breeding Ground for AlQaida Recruitment. Journal of Strategic Security Vol. 2 Number 4,
November/December 2009.
SINGER, P. (2009b). Wired for war: The robotics revolution and conflict in the 21st
century. New York: Penguin Group.
WAEVER, O. (2012), Aberystwyth, Paris, Copenhagen: the Europeanness of new
schools of security theory in an American field. In: Thinking International Relations
Differently, Edited by Arlene B. Tickner and David L. Blaney. New York: Routledge.
WAGNER, William (1982). Lightning Bugs and other Reconnaissance Drones; The
can-do story of Ryan's unmanned spy planes. Armed Forces Journal International, in
cooperation with Aero Publishers, Inc.
WILLIANS, Brian Glyn (2013), New Light on CIA Double Tap Drone Strikes on
Taliban First Responders in Pakistans Tribal Areas. In Perspectives on Terrorism,
Volume 7, Issue 3, June 2013.

18

ZEHFUSS, Maya (2010), Targeting: Precision and the production of ethics. European
Journal of International Relations.