Bartolome vs SSS

G.R. No. 192531, November 12, 2014

In attempting to cure the glaring constitutional violation of the adverted rule, the ECC extended
illegitimate parents an opportunity to file claims for and receive death benefits by equating
dependency and legitimacy to the exercise of parental authority. Thus, as insinuated by the ECC
in its assailed Decision, had petitioner not given up John for adoption, she could have still
claimed death benefits under the law.
To begin with, nowhere in the law nor in the rules does it say that "legitimate parents" pertain to
those who exercise parental authority over the employee enrolled under the ECP. It was only in
the assailed Decision wherein such qualification was made. In addition, assuming arguendo that
the ECC did not overstep its boundaries in limiting the adverted Labor Code provision to the
deceased's legitimate parents, and that the commission properly equated legitimacy to parental
authority, petitioner can still qualify as John's secondary beneficiary.

Goodyear Philippines, Inc. and Remegio M. Ramos vs Marina L. Angus

G.R. No. 185449, November 12, 2014
Angus is entitled to both separation pay and early retirement benefit due to the absence of a
specific provision in the CBA prohibiting recovery of both.
It is worthy to mention at this point that retirement benefits and separation pay are not mutually
exclusive.38 Retirement benefits are a form of reward for an employee's loyalty and service to an
employer39 and are earned under existing laws, CBAs, employment contracts and company
policies.40 On the other hand, separation pay is that amount which an employee receives at the
time of his severance from employment, designed to provide the employee with the wherewithal
during the period that he is looking for another employment and is recoverable only in instances
enumerated under Articles 283 and 284 of the Labor Code or in illegal dismissal cases when
reinstatement is not feasible.41 In the case at bar, Article 283[42 clearly entitles Angus to
separation pay apart from the retirement benefits she received from petitioners.
Release and Quitclaim signed by Angus is invalid.
The release and quitclaim signed by Angus cannot be used by petitioners to legalize the denial
of Angus' rightful claims. As aptly observed by the CA, the terms of the quitclaim authorizes
Angus to receive less than what she is legally entitled to. "Under prevailing jurisprudence, x x x
a quitclaim cannot bar an employee from demanding benefits to which he is legally entitled."43 It
was held to be "ineffective in barring claims for the full measure of the worker's rights and the
acceptance of benefits therefrom does not amount to estoppel".44 Moreover, release and
quitclaims are often looked upon with disfavor when the waiver was not done voluntarily by
employees who were pressured into signing them by unscrupulous employers seeking to evade
their obligations.

Bahia Shipping Services, In., et al. vs Joel P. Hipe, Jr.

G.R. No. 204699, November 12, 2014

The issue of whether the seafarer can legally demand and claim disability benefits from the
employer/manning agency for an injury or illness suffered may be determined from the pertinent
provisions of Section 20 (B) of the 2000 POEA-SEC68 which enumerates the duties of an
employer to his employee who suffers a work-related injury or disease during the term of his
employment.
Pursuant to the afore-quoted provision, two (2) elements must concur for an injury or illness of a
seafarer to be compensable: (a) the injury or illness must be work-related; and (b) that the workrelated injury or illness must have existed during the term of the seafarers employment
contract.

Conchita J. Racelis vs United Philippine Lines, In. and/or Holland America Lines, Inc. and
Fernando T. Lising
G.R. No. 198408, November 12, 2014

The Principle of Work-relation

The 2000 POEA-SEC contract governs the claims for disability benefits by respondent as he
was employed by the petitioners in September of 2006.
Pursuant to the said contract, the injury or illness must be work related and must have existed
during the term of the seafarers employment in order for compensability to arise. Work-relation
must, therefore, be established.
As a general rule, the principle of work-relation requires that the disease in question must be
one of those listed as an occupational disease under Sec. 32-A of the POEA-SEC.
Nevertheless, should it be not classified as occupational in nature, Section 20 (B)
paragraph 4 of the POEA-SEC provides that such diseases are disputed are disputably
presumed as work-related.
In this case, it is undisputed that NPC afflicted respondent while on board the petitioners vessel.
As a non-occupational disease, it has the disputable presumption of being work-related. This
presumption obviously works in the seafarers favor. Hence, unless contrary evidence is
presented by the employers, the work-relatedness of the disease must be sustained.
While it is true that a medical repatriation has the effect of terminating the seafarers contract of
employment, it is, however, enough that the work-related illness, which eventually becomes the
proximate cause of death, occurred while the contract was effective for recovery to be had.

Colegio De San Juan De Letran vs Isidra Dela-Rosa-Meris

G.R. No. 178837, September 1, 2014

In the termination of employment,the employer must (a) give the employee a written notice
specifying the ground or grounds of termination, giving to said employee reasonable opportunity
within which to explain his side; (b) conduct a hearing or conference during which the employee
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concerned, with the assistance of counsel if the employee so desires, is given the opportunity to
respond to the charge, present his evidence or rebut the evidence presented against him; and
(c) give the employee a written notice of termination indicating that upon dueconsideration of all
circumstances, grounds have been established to justify his termination.

Omni Hauling Services, Inc., et al. vs Bernardo Bon, et al.

G.R. No. 199388, September 3, 2014

A project employee is assigned to a project which begins and ends at determined or

determinable times. Unlike regular employees who may only be dismissed for just and/or
authorized causes under the Labor Code, the services of employees who are hired as project
employees may be lawfully terminated at the completion of the project.

According to jurisprudence, the principal test for determining whether particular employees are
properly characterized as project employees as distinguished from regular employees, is
whether or not the employees were assigned to carry out a specific project or undertaking, the
duration (and scope) of which were specified at the time they were engaged for that project. The
project could either be (1) a particular job or undertaking that is within the regular or usual
business of the employer company, but which is distinct and separate, and identifiable as such,
from the other undertakings of the company; or (2) a particular job or undertaking that is not
within the regular business of the corporation. In order to safeguard the rights of workers against
the arbitrary use of the word project to prevent employees from attaining a regular status,
employers claiming that their workers are project employees should not only prove that
the duration and scope of the employment was specified at the time they were engaged,
but also that there was indeed a project.

Philippine Touristers, Inc., vs Mas Transit Workers Union-Anglo KMU and its members
G.R. No. 201237, September 3, 2014

For an appeal from the LAs ruling to the NLRC to be perfected, Article 223 (now Article 229) of
the Labor Code requires the posting of a cash or surety bond in an amount equivalent to the
monetary award in the judgment appealed from.

While it has been settled that the posting of a cash or surety bond is indispensable to the
perfection of an appeal in cases involving monetary awards from the decision of the LA, the
Rules of Procedure of the NLRC (the Rules), particularly Section 6, Rule VI thereof, nonetheless
allows the reduction of the bond upon a showing of (a) the existence of a meritorious ground
for reduction, and (b) the posting of a bond in a reasonable amount in relation to the monetary
award.

In this regard, it bears stressing that the reduction of the bond provided thereunder is not a
matter of right on the part of the movant and its grant still lies within the sound discretion of the
NLRC upon a showing of meritorious grounds and the reasonableness of the bond tendered
under the circumstances.

Ricardo A. Dalusong vs Eagle Clarc Shipping Philippines, Inc., et al.

G.R. No. 204233, September 3, 2014

Just because the seafarer is unable to perform his job and is undergoing medical treatment for
more than 120 days does not automatically entitle the seafarer to total and permanent disability
compensation. In this case, petitioner's medical treatment lasted more than 120 days but less
than 240 days, after which the company-designated doctor gave petitioner a final disability
grading under the POEA schedule of disabilities of "grade 11 - complete immobility of an ankle
joint in normal position." Thus, before the maximum 240-day medical treatment period expired,
petitioner was issued a final disability grade 11 which is merely equivalent to a permanent partial
disability, since under Section 32 of the POEA-SEC, only those classified under grade 1 are
considered total and permanent disability. Clearly, petitioner is only entitled to permanent partial
disability compensation, since his condition cannot be considered as permanent total disability.

Northwest Airlines, Inc. vs Ma. Concepcion M. Del Rosario

G.R. No. 157633, September 10, 2014

Northwest argues that Del Rosario was dismissed on the grounds of serious misconduct and
willful disobedience. Misconduct refers to the improper or wrong conduct that transgresses
some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in
character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment. But misconduct or
improper behavior, to be a just cause for termination of employment, must: (a) be serious; (b)
relate to the performance of the employees duties; and (c) show that the employee has become
unfit to continue working for the employer.

Rosalie L. Gargoles vs Reylita S. Del Rosario

G.R. No. 158583, September 10, 2014

Under our Labor laws, two (2) written notices are required before termination of employment
can be legally effected which are: (1) notice which apprises the employee of the particular acts
or omissions for which his dismissal is sought; and, (2) the subsequent notice to which informs
the employee of the employer's decision to dismiss him; not to mention the opportunity to
answer and rebut the charges against him, in between such notices (Legahi vs. National Labor
Relations Commission, 318 SCRA 446 [1999]; Masagana Concrete Products vs. NLRC, 313
SCRA 576 [1999]).
[However], The bottom of the letter contained the handwritten annotation refused to sign, an
indication of the refusal to receive and sign for the letter on the part of the petitioner. Such
refusal to receive the letter containing the notice for her to explain, coupled with her failure to
submit her explanation within the time given in the letter, implied that she waived her right to
contest the contents of the letter, thereby forfeiting her right to respond to the charge against her
and to rebut the evidence thereon. It further appears that on March 28, 1998 the respondent
sent another letter to the petitioner informing her of the termination of her services,17 but the
latter again refused to sign in acknowledgment of the letter. Under the circumstances, the twonotice rule was evidently complied with by the respondent, thereby negating any denial of due
process to the petitioner.
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Jebsen Maritime Inc., et al. vs Wilfredo E. Ravena

G.R. No. 200566, September 17, 2014

Section 20-B of the POEA-SEC governs the compensation and benefits for the work-related
injury or illness that a seafarer on board sea-going vessels may have suffered during the term of
his employment contract. This section should be read together with Section 32-A of the POEASEC that enumerates the various diseases deemed occupational and therefore compensable.
Thus, for a seafarer to be entitled to the compensation and benefits under Section 20-B, the
disability causing illness or injury must be one of those listed under Section 32-A.
Of course, the law recognizes that under certain circumstances, certain diseases not otherwise
considered as an occupational disease under the POEA-SEC may nevertheless have been
caused or aggravated by the seafarer's working conditions. In these situations, the law
recognizes the inherent paucity of the list and the difficulty, if not the outright improbability, of
accounting for all the known and unknown diseases that may be associated with, caused or
aggravated by such working conditions.
Hence, the POEA-SEC provides for a disputable presumption of work-relatedness for nonPOEA-SEC-listed occupational disease and the resulting illness or injury which he may have
suffered during the term of his employment contract.
Thus, in situations where the seafarer seeks to claim the compensation and benefits that
Section 20-B grants to him, the law requires the seafarer to prove that: (1) he suffered an
illness; (2) he suffered this illness during the term of his employment contract; (3) he complied
with the procedures prescribed under Section 20-B; (4) his illness is one of the enumerated
occupational disease or that his illness or injury is otherwise work-related; and (5) he complied
with the four conditions enumerated under Section 32-A for an occupational disease or a
disputably-presumed work-related disease to be compensable.

Hacienda Leddy/Ricardo Gambo, Jr. vs Paquito Villegas

G.R. No. 179654, September 22, 2014

Regular employee
In Integrated Contractor and Plumbing Works, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,17
we held that the test to determine whether employment is regular or not is the reasonable
connection between the particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual
business or trade of the employer. If the employee has been performing the job for at least one
year, even if the performance is not continuous or merely intermittent, the law deems the
repeated and continuing need for its performance as sufficient evidence of the necessity, if not
indispensability of that activity to the business. Clearly, with more than 20 years of service,
Villegas, without doubt, passed this test to attain employment regularity.
Abandonment
To justify a finding of abandonment of work, there must be proof of a deliberate and unjustified
refusal on the part of an employee to resume his employment. The burden of proof is on the
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employer to show an unequivocal intent on the part of the employee to discontinue employment.
Mere absence is not sufficient. It must be accompanied by manifest acts unerringly pointing to
the fact that the employee simply does not want to work anymore.

Effects of illegal dismissal

An illegally dismissed employee should be entitled to either reinstatement if viable, or
separation pay if reinstatement is no longer viable, plus backwages in either instance.24
Considering that reinstatement is no longer feasible because of strained relations between the
employee and the employer, separation pay should be granted. The basis for computing
separation pay is usually the length of the employees past service, while that for backwages is
the actual period when the employee was unlawfully prevented from working.25 It should be
emphasized, however, that the finality of the illegal dismissal decision becomes the reckoning
point. In allowing separation pay, the final decision effectively declares that the employment
relationship ended so that separation pay and backwages are to be computed up to that point.
The decision also becomes a judgment for money from which another consequence flows the
payment of interest in case of delay.

Robert Kua, et al. vs Gregorio Sacupayo and Maximiano R. Panerio

G.R. No. 191237, September 24, 2014

The elements of criminal liability under Section 22 (a) are:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

1

The employer fails to register its employees with the SSS;

The employer fails to deduct monthly contributions from the salaries and/or wages of its
employees; and

Having deducted the SSS contributions and/or loan payments to SSS, the employer fails
to remit these to the SSS.

In this case, petitioners split hairs that they did not fail to remit the SSS contributions of
respondents; they fully paid the same, albeit belatedly.
We affirm the finding of a prima facie case of petitioners failure to remit the SSS contributions
and loan amortization of respondents for a period of approximately two (2) years, in 2003
and 2004. In October 2004, after respondents were successively dismissed from employment
by Vicmar in August 2004, they separately filed for SSS benefits, relating to sickness and
procurement of a loan, which were both denied outright for lack of contributions or payments
twelve months (12) prior to the semester of confinement and failure to pay a prior loan. After
respondents filed criminal complaints against petitioners, the latter then remitted their SSS wage
deductions and loan payments to the SSS.

Mount Carmel College Employees Union (MCCEU) vs Mount Carmel College, Inc.
G.R. No. 187621, September 24, 2014

The condition of posting a cash or surety bond is not a meaningless requirement it is meant to
assure the workers that if they prevail in the case, they will receive the money judgment in their
favor upon the dismissal of the formers appeal. Such aim is defeated If the bond issued turned
out to be invalid due to the surety companys expired accreditation. Much more in this case
where the bonding company was blacklisted at the time it issued the appeal bond. The
blacklisting of a bonding company is not a whimsical exercise. When a bonding company is
blacklisted, it meant that it committed certain prohibited acts and/or violations of law, prescribed
rules and regulations. Trivializing it would release a blacklisted bonding company from the
effects sought to be achieved by the blacklisting and would make the entire process
insignificant. Also, the lifting of CBICs blacklisting on January 24, 2005 does not render the
bond it issued on March 15, 2004 subsequently valid. It should be stressed that what the law
requires is that the appeal bond must be issued by a reputable bonding company duly
accredited by the NLRC or the Supreme Court at the time of the filing of the appeal. To rule
otherwise would make the requirement ineffective, and employers using "fly-by-night" and
untrustworthy bonding companies could easily manipulate their obligation to post a valid bond
by raising such justification.
On the foregoing point alone, it is clear that the CA committed a reversible error when it ruled
out any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in admitting the respondents appeal
and reversing the decision of the LA. It should be stressed that the requirement of the posting of
an appeal bond by a reputable company is jurisdictional. It cannot be subject to the NLRCs
discretion and there is a "little leeway for condoning a liberal interpretation of the rule." Even if
the Court were to relax the rules and consider the respondents appeal, the Court still finds that
the CA committed an error when it ruled that the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion
in finding that the petitioners retrenchment was valid under the circumstances of the case.

Temic Automotive (Phils), Inc. vs Renato

G.R. No. 200729, September 29, 2014

[W]e reiterate and emphasize that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in validating
the dismissal of Cantos as we find no substantial evidence in support of this pronouncement.
We thus find the due process question academic.
In conclusion, we quote with approval the following CA observation:
xxx [the petitioner] did not commit any act which was dishonest or deceitful. He did not
use his authority as the Purchasing Manager to misappropriate company property and
derive benefits therein nor did he abuse the trust reposed in him by respondent Temic
with respect to his responsibilities. There was no demonstration of moral perverseness
that would justify the claimed loss of trust and confidence attendant to [the] petitioner's
job. Temic failed to adduce any proof that [the] petitioner ever profited from the
transactions involved in the purchase orders. The supplies described in the purchase
orders are still with the company even up to the time when petitioner's services were
terminated. And neither was there evidence shown that the same deviates from the
specifications of the company or has no more use to the company.53 (Emphases supplied)

Exocet Security and Allied Services Corp. vs Armando D. Serrando

G.R. No. 198538, September 29, 2014

In cases involving security guards,a relief and transfer order in itself does not sever employment
relationship between a security guard and his agency. An employee has the right tosecurity of
tenure, but this does not give him such a vested right in his position as would deprive the
company of its prerogative to change his assignment or transfer him where his service, as
security guard, will be most beneficial to the client. Temporary "off-detail" or the period of time
security guards are made to wait until they are transferred or assigned to a new post or client
does not constitute constructive dismissal as their assignments primarily depend on the
contracts entered into by the security agencies with third parties.Indeed, the Court has
repeatedly recognized that "off-detailing" is not equivalent to dismissal, so long as such status
does not continue beyond a reasonable time; when such a "floating status" lasts for more than
six months, the employee may be considered to have beenconstructively dismissed.