1.German Management v.

CA, 177 SCRA 495

G.R. No. 76217 September 14, 1989
GERMAN MANAGEMENT & SERVICES, INC., petitioner,
vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ERNESTO VILLEZA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-76216 September 14, 1989
GERMAN MANAGEMENT & SERVICES, INC., petitioner,
vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ORLANDO GERNALE, respondents.

FERNAN, C.J.:
Spouses Cynthia Cuyegkeng Jose and Manuel Rene Jose, residents of Pennsylvania,
Philadelphia, USA are the owners of a parcel of land situated in Sitio Inarawan, San Isidro,
Antipolo, Rizal, with an area of 232,942 square meters and covered by TCT No. 50023 of the
Register of Deeds of the province of Rizal issued on September 11, 1980 which canceled TCT
No. 56762/ T-560. The land was originally registered on August 5, 1948 in the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Rizal as OCT No. 19, pursuant to a Homestead Patent granted by the
President of the Philippines on July 27, 1948, under Act No. 141.
On February 26, 1982, the spouses Jose executed a special power of attorney authorizing
petitioner German Management Services to develop their property covered by TCT No. 50023
into a residential subdivision. Consequently, petitioner on February 9,1983 obtained
Development Permit No. 00424 from the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission for said
development. Finding that part of the property was occupied by private respondents and twenty
other persons, petitioner advised the occupants to vacate the premises but the latter refused.
Nevertheless, petitioner proceeded with the development of the subject property which included
the portions occupied and cultivated by private respondents.
Private respondents filed an action for forcible entry against petitioner before the Municipal Trial
Court of Antipolo, Rizal, alleging that they are mountainside farmers of Sitio Inarawan, San
Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal and members of the Concerned Citizens of Farmer's Association; that they
have occupied and tilled their farmholdings some twelve to fifteen years prior to the
promulgation of P.D. No. 27; that during the first week of August 1983, petitioner, under a permit
from the Office of the Provincial Governor of Rizal, was allowed to improve the Barangay Road
at Sitio Inarawan, San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal at its expense, subject to the condition that it shag
secure the needed right of way from the owners of the lot to be affected; that on August 15,
1983 and thereafter, petitioner deprived private respondents of their property without due
process of law by: (1) forcibly removing and destroying the barbed wire fence enclosing their
farmholdings without notice; (2) bulldozing the rice, corn fruit bearing trees and other crops of
private respondents by means of force, violence and intimidation, in violation of P.D. 1038 and
1

(3) trespassing, coercing and threatening to harass, remove and eject private respondents from
their respective farmholdings in violation of P.D. Nos. 316, 583, 815, and 1028. 1
On January 7,1985, the Municipal Trial Court dismissed private respondents' complaint for
forcible entry. 2 On appeal, the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch LXXI sustained
the dismissal by the Municipal Trial Court. 3
Private respondents then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. On July 24,1986,
said court gave due course to their petition and reversed the decisions of the Municipal Trial
Court and the Regional Trial Court. 4
The Appellate Court held that since private respondents were in actual possession of the
property at the time they were forcibly ejected by petitioner, private respondents have a right to
commence an action for forcible entry regardless of the legality or illegality of
possession. 5 Petitioner moved to reconsider but the same was denied by the Appellate Court in
its resolution dated September 26, 1986. 6
Hence, this recourse.
The issue in this case is whether or not the Court of Appeals denied due process to petitioner
when it reversed the decision of the court a quo without giving petitioner the opportunity to file its
answer and whether or not private respondents are entitled to file a forcible entry case against
petitioner. 7
We affirm. The Court of Appeals need not require petitioner to file an answer for due process to
exist. The comment filed by petitioner on February 26, 1986 has sufficiently addressed the
issues presented in the petition for review filed by private respondents before the Court of
Appeals. Having heard both parties, the Appellate Court need not await or require any other
additional pleading. Moreover, the fact that petitioner was heard by the Court of Appeals on its
motion for reconsideration negates any violation of due process.
Notwithstanding petitioner's claim that it was duly authorized by the owners to develop the
subject property, private respondents, as actual possessors, can commence a forcible entry
case against petitioner because ownership is not in issue. Forcible entry is merely a quieting
process and never determines the actual title to an estate. Title is not involved. 8
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that at the time petitioner entered the property, private
respondents were already in possession thereof . There is no evidence that the spouses Jose
were ever in possession of the subject property. On the contrary, private respondents'
peaceable possession was manifested by the fact that they even planted rice, corn and fruit
bearing trees twelve to fifteen years prior to petitioner's act of destroying their crops.

Although admittedly petitioner may validly claim ownership based on the muniments of title it
presented, such evidence does not responsively address the issue of prior actual possession
raised in a forcible entry case. It must be stated that regardless of the actual condition of the title
to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by a strong
hand, violence or terror. 9 Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such
possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his prior
possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain
on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by accion publiciana
or accion reivindicatoria. 10
Both the Municipal Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court have rationalized petitioner's drastic
action of bulldozing and destroying the crops of private respondents on the basis of the doctrine
of self-help enunciated in Article 429 of the New Civil Code. 11 Such justification is unavailing
because the doctrine of self-help can only be exercised at the time of actual or threatened
dispossession which is absent in the case at bar. When possession has already been lost, the
owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of property. This is clear from Article 536
of the Civil Code which states, "(I)n no case may possession be acquired through force or
intimidation as long as there is a possessor who objects thereto. He who believes that he has an
action or right to deprive another of the holding of a thing, must invoke the aid of the competent
court, if the holder should refuse to deliver the thing."
WHEREFORE, the Court resolved to DENY the instant petition. The decision of the Court of
Appeals dated July 24,1986 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

2. Caisip v. People, 36 SCRA 17

G.R. No. L-28716 November 18, 1970
FELIX CAISIP, IGNACIO ROJALES and FEDERICO VILLADELREY, petitioners, vs. THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:
This case is before Us upon petition of defendants Felix Caisip, Ignacio Rojales and Federico
Villadelrey, for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed that of
the Court of First Instance of Batangas, convicting them of the crime of Grave Coercion, with
which they are charged, and sentencing each to four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto
mayor and to pay a fine of P200.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, not to
exceed one-third of the principal penalty, as well as one-third of the costs.
3

As set forth in the trial court's decision, the background of the present case is this:
The complainant Gloria Cabalag is the wife of Marcelino Guevarra who cultivated
a parcel of land known as Lot 105-A of Hacienda Palico situated in sitio Bote-bote,
barrio Tampisao, Nasugbu, Batangas. The said parcel of land used to be tenanted
by the deceased father of the complainant. Hacienda Palico is owned by Roxas y
Cia. and administered by Antonio Chuidian. The overseer of the said hacienda is
Felix Caisip, one of the accused herein. Even before the occurrence of the incident
presently involved, there had been a series of misunderstandings and litigations
involving the complainant and her husband, on one hand, and the men of
Hacienda Palico on the other.
It appears that on December 23, 1957, Marcelino Guevarra filed an action with the
Court of Agrarian Relations seeking recognition as a lawful tenant of Roxas y Cia.
over lot No. 105-A of Hacienda Palico. In a decision dated February 22, 1958, the
Court of Agrarian Relations declared it has no jurisdiction over the case, inasmuch
as Guevarra is not a tenant on the said parcel of land. An appeal was taken by
Guevarra to the Supreme Court, but the appeal was dismissed in a resolution
dated April 10, 1958.
On May 17, 1958, Roxas y Cia. filed an action against Marcelino Guevarra in the
justice of the peace court of Nasugbu, Batangas, for forcible entry, praying therein
that Guevarra be ejected from the premises of Lot No. 105-A. After due hearing,
the said Court in a decision dated May 2, 1959 ordered Guevarra to vacate the lot
and to pay damages and accrued rentals. A writ of execution was issued by
Justice of the Peace Rodolfo A. Castillo of Nasugbu, which was served on
Guevarra on June 6, 1959, and the return of which was made by Deputy Sheriff
Leonardo R. Aquino of this Court on June 23, 1959 (Exhibit "10"). The writ recites
among other things that the possession of the land was delivered to the Roxas y
Cia. thru Felix Caisip, the overseer, and Guevarra was given twenty days from
June 6, 1959 within which to leave the premises.
The record before Us does not explain why said decision was executed. According to the
complainant, her husband's counsel had appealed from said decision. The justice of the peace
who rendered it, Hon. Rodolfo Castillo, said that there really had been an attempt to appeal,
which was not given due course because the reglementary period therefor had expired; that a
motion to reconsider his order to this effect was denied by him; and that a second motion for
reconsideration was "still pending consideration," and it was October 19, 1959 when such
testimony was given.
Continuing the narration of the antecedent facts, His Honor, the Trial Judge, added:

On June 15, 1959, some trouble occurred between the complainant and Caisip
regarding the cutting of sugar cane on Lot 105-A. The following day June 16,
1959, the complainant allegedly again entered the premises of Lot 105-A and
refused to be driven out by Felix Caisip. Due to the aforementioned incidents,
Gloria Cabalag was charged in the justice of the peace court of Nasugbu,
Batangas, with grave coercion for the incident of June 15, 1959, docketed in the
said court as Criminal Case No. 968 (Exhibit "3"); and with the crime of unjust
vexation for the incident of June 16, 1959, docketed in the said court as Criminal
Case No. 970. Both cases, however, were filed only on June 25, 1959.
In other words, these criminal cases, Nos. 968 and 970, against Gloria Cabalag, were filed eight
(8) days after the incident involved in the case at bar. It is, also, noteworthy that both cases were
on motion of the prosecution, filed after a reinvestigation thereof provisionally dismissed,
on November 8, 1960, by the Court of First Instance of Batangas, upon the ground "that the
evidence of record ... are insufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt." The decision of said court, in the case at bar, goes on to say:
It further appears that due to the tenacious attitude of Gloria Cabalag to remain in
the premises, Caisip sought the help of the chief of police of Nasugbu who advised
him to see Deputy Sheriff Aquino about the matter. The latter, however, informed
Caisip that he could not act on the request to eject Gloria Cabalag and to stop her
from what she was doing without a proper court order. Caisip then consulted
Antonio Chuidian, the hacienda administrator, who, in turn, went to the chief of
police and requested for the detail of policemen in sitio Bote-bote. The chief of
police, acting on said request, assigned the accused Ignacio Rojales and Federico
Villadelrey, police sergeant and police corporal, respectively, of the Nasugbu
Police Force, to sitio Bote-bote. 1
On June 17, 1959, at about 5:00 p.m., Gloria Cabalag was seen weeding the portion of Lot 105A which was a ricefield. Appellant Caisip approached her and bade her to leave, but she refused
to do so, alleging that she and her husband had the right to stay there and that the crops
thereon belong to them. She having stuck to this attitude, even when he threatened to call the
police, Caisip went to his co-defendants, Sgt. Rojales and Cpl. Villadelrey, both of the local
police, who were some distance away, and brought them with him. Rojales told Gloria, who was
then in a squatting position, to stop weeding. As Gloria insisted on her right to stay in said lot,
Rojales grabbed her right hand and, twisting the same, wrested therefrom the trowel she was
holding. Thereupon, Villadelrey held her left hand and, together with Rojales, forcibly dragged
her northward towards a forested area, where there was a banana plantation as Caisip
stood nearby, with a drawn gun.
Inasmuch as Gloria shouted "Ina ko po! Ina ko po!" 2her neighbors, Librada Dulutan, followed,
soon later, by Francisca Andino, came and asked the policemen why they were dragging her.
5

The policemen having answered that they would take Gloria to town which was on the west
Francisca Andino pleaded that Gloria be released, saying that, if their purpose was as stated by
them, she (Gloria) would willingly go with them. By this time, Gloria had already been dragged
about eight meters and her dress, as well as her blouse 3were torn. She then agreed to proceed
westward to the municipal building, and asked to be allowed to pass by her house, within Lot
105-A, in order to breast-feed her nursing infant, but, the request was turned down. As they
passed, soon later, near the house of Zoilo Rivera, head of the tenant organization to which she
was affiliated, in the barrio of Camachilihan, Gloria called out for him, whereupon, he went down
the house and accompanied them to the municipal building. Upon arrival thereat, Rojales and
Villadelrey turned her over to the policeman on duty, and then departed. After being interrogated
by the chief of police, Gloria was, upon representations made by Zoilo Rivera, released and
allowed to go home.
The foregoing is the prosecution's version. That of the defense is to the effect that, upon being
asked by the policemen to stop weeding and leave the premises, Gloria, not only refused to do
so, but, also, insulted them, as well as Caisip. According to the defense, she was arrested
because of the crime of slander then committed by her. Appellants Rojales and Villadelrey,
moreover, testified that, as they were heading towards the barrio of Camachilihan, Gloria
proceeded to tear her clothes.
His Honor, the Trial Judge, accepted, however, the version of the prosecution and found that of
the defense unworthy of credence. The findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, which fully
concurred in this view, are "final," and our authority to review on certiorari its appealed decision
is limited to questions purely of law. 4Appellants maintain that the Court of Appeals has erred: (1)
in not finding their acts "justified under Article 429 of the New Civil Code"; (2) in holding that the
20-day period of grace given to Marcelino Guevarra and his wife, Gloria Cabalag, by the sheriff,
to vacate Lot 105-A, was valid and lawful; (3) in finding that the elements of the crime of grave
coercion are present in the case at bar; and (4) in finding appellants guilty as charged. This
pretense is clearly untenable.
Art. 429 of our Civil Code, reading:
The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any person from
the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may use such force as
may be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful
physical invasion or usurpation of his property.
upon which appellants rely is obviously inapplicable to the case at bar, for, having
been given 20 days from June 6, 1959, within which to vacate Lot 105-A,
complainant did not, on June 17, 1959 or within said period invade or usurp
said lot. She had merely remained in possession thereof, even though the
hacienda owner may have become its co-possessor. Appellants did not
"repel or prevent in actual or threatened ... physical invasion or usurpation."
6

They expelled Gloria from a property of which she and her husband were in
possession even before the action for forcible entry was filed against them on May
17, 1958, despite the fact that the Sheriff had explicitly authorized them to stay in
said property up to June 26, 1959, and had expressed the view that he could not
oust them therefrom on June 17, 1959, without a judicial order therefor.
It is urged, that, by weeding and refusing to leave Lot 105-A, Gloria had committed a crime in
the presence of the policemen, despite the aforementioned 20-day period, which, appellants
claim, the sheriff had no authority to grant. This contention is manifestly untenable, because: (1)
said period was granted in the presence of the hacienda owner's representative, appellant
Caisip, who, by not objecting thereto, had impliedly consented to or ratified the act performed by
the sheriff; (2) Gloria and her husband were thereby allowed to remain, and had, in fact,
remained, in possession of the premises, perhaps together with the owner of the hacienda or his
representative, Caisip; (3) the act of removing weeds from the ricefield was beneficial to its
owner and to whomsoever the crops belonged, and, even if they had not authorized it, does not
constitute a criminal offense; and (4) although Gloria and her husband had been sentenced to
vacate the land, the judgment against them did not necessarily imply that they, as the parties
who had tilled it and planted thereon, had no rights, of any kind whatsoever, in or to the standing
crops, inasmuch as "necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor," 5 and the cost
of cultivation, production and upkeep has been held to partake of the nature of necessary
expenses. 6
It is, accordingly, clear that appellants herein had, by means of violence, and without legal
authority therefor, prevented the complainant from "doing something not prohibited by law,"
(weeding and being in Lot 105-A), and compelled her "to do something against" her will
(stopping the weeding and leaving said lot), "whether it be right or wrong," thereby taking the
law into their hands, in violation of Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code. 7
Appellant Caisip argues that, not having used violence against the complaining witness, he
should be acquitted of the charge. In this connection, His Honor, the Trial Judge, correctly
observed:
... While it is true that the accused Caisip did not lay hands on the complainant,
unlike the accused Rojales and Villadelrey who were the ones who used force
against Gloria, and while the Court is also inclined to discredit the claim of the
complainant that Felix Caisip drew a gun during the incident, it sufficiently appears
from the record that the motivation and inducement for the coercion perpetrated on
the complainant came from the accused Caisip. It was his undisguised and
particular purpose to prevent Gloria from entering the land and working on the
same. He was the one who first approached Gloria with this objective in mind, and
tried to prevent her from weeding the land. He had tried to stop Gloria from doing
the same act even the day previous to the present incident. It was Caisip who
7

fetched the policemen in order to accomplish his purpose of preventing Gloria from
weeding the land and making her leave the premises. The policemen obeyed his
bidding, and even when the said policemen were already over-asserting their
authority as peace officers, Caisip simply stood by without attempting to stop their
abuses. He could be hardly said to have disapproved an act which he himself
induced and initiated. 8
In other words, there was community of purpose between the policemen and Caisip, so that the
latter is guilty of grave coercion, as a co-conspirator, apart from being a principal by induction. 9
In the commission of the offense, the aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior
strength 10 and disregard of the respect due the offended party, by reason of her sex, 11 were
present, insofar as the three appellants herein are concerned. As regards appellants Rojales
and Villadelrey, there was the additional aggravating circumstance of having taken advantage of
their positions as members of the local police force. Hence, the penalty of imprisonment meted
out to appellants herein, which is the minimum of the maximum prescribed in said Art.
286, 12 and the fine imposed upon them, are in accordance with law.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
defendants-appellants. It is so ordered.

3. Custodio v. CA, 253 SCRA 483

[G.R. No. 116100. February 9, 1996]
SPOUSES CRISTINO and BRIGIDA CUSTODIO and SPOUSES LITO and MARIA CRISTINA
SANTOS, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF PACIFICO C. MABASA and
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, METRO MANILA, BRANCH 181, respondents.
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the decision of respondent Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 29115, promulgated on November 10, 1993, which affirmed with modification
the decision of the trial court, as well as its resolution dated July 8, 1994 denying petitioners
motion for reconsideration.[1]
On August 26, 1982, Civil Case No. 47466 for the grant of an easement of right of way was
filed by Pacifico Mabasa against Cristino Custodio, Brigida R. Custodio, Rosalina R. Morato,
Lito Santos and Maria Cristina C. Santos before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig and assigned
to Branch 22 thereof.[2]
The generative facts of the case, as synthesized by the trial court and adopted by the Court
of Appeals, are as follows:
8

Perusing the record, this Court finds that the original plaintiff Pacifico Mabasa died during the
pendency of this case and was substituted by Ofelia Mabasa, his surviving spouse [and
children].
The plaintiff owns a parcel of land with a two-door apartment erected thereon situated at Interior
P. Burgos St., Palingon, Tipas, Taguig, Metro Manila. The plaintiff was able to acquire said
property through a contract of sale with spouses Mamerto Rayos and Teodora Quintero as
vendors last September 1981. Said property may be described to be surrounded by other
immovables pertaining to defendants herein. Taking P. Burgos Street as the point of reference,
on the left side, going to plaintiffs property, the row of houses will be as follows: That of
defendants Cristino and Brigido Custodio, then that of Lito and Maria Cristina Santos and then
that of Ofelia Mabasa. On the right side (is) that of defendant Rosalina Morato and then a Septic
Tank (Exhibit D). As an access to P. Burgos Street from plaintiffs property, there are two
possible passageways. The first passageway is approximately one meter wide and is about 20
meters distan(t) from Mabasas residence to P. Burgos Street. Such path is passing in between
the previously mentioned row of houses. The second passageway is about 3 meters in width
and length from plaintiff Mabasas residence to P. Burgos Street; it is about 26 meters. In
passing thru said passageway, a less than a meter wide path through the septic tank and
with 5-6 meters in length has to be traversed.
When said property was purchased by Mabasa, there were tenants occupying the premises and
who were acknowledged by plaintiff Mabasa as tenants. However, sometime in February, 1982.
one of said tenants vacated the apartment and when plaintiff Mabasa went to see the premises,
he saw that there had been built an adobe fence in the first passageway making it narrower in
width. Said adobe fence was first constructed by defendants Santoses along their property
which is also along the first passageway. Defendant Morato constructed her adobe fence and
even extended said fence in such a way that the entire passageway was enclosed (Exhibit 1Santoses and Custodios, Exh. D for plaintiff, Exhs. 1-C, 1-D and I -E) And it was then that
the remaining tenants of said apartment vacated the area. Defendant Ma. Cristina Santos
testified that she constructed said fence because there was an incident when her daughter was
dragged by a bicycle pedalled by a son of one of the tenants in said apartment along the first
passageway. She also mentioned some other inconveniences of having (at) the front of her
house a pathway such as when some of the tenants were drunk and would bang their doors and
windows. Some of their footwear were even lost. x x x [3] (Italics in original text; corrections in
parentheses supplied)
On February 27, 1990, a decision was rendered by the trial court, with this dispositive part:
Accordingly, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) Ordering defendants Custodios and Santoses to give plaintiff permanent access - ingress and
egress, to the public street;
9

2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay defendants Custodios and Santoses the sum of Eight Thousand
Pesos (P8,000) as indemnity for the permanent use of the passageway.
The parties to shoulder their respective litigation expenses. [4]
Not satisfied therewith, therein plaintiff represented by his heirs, herein private respondents,
went to the Court of Appeals raising the sole issue of whether or not the lower court erred in not
awarding damages in their favor. On November 10, 1993, as earlier stated, the Court of
Appeals rendered its decision affirming the judgment of the trial court with modification, the
decretal portion of which disposes as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the lower court is hereby AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION only insofar as the herein grant of damages to plaintiffs-appellants. The Court
hereby orders defendants-appellees to pay plaintiffs-appellants the sum of Sixty Five
Thousand (P65,000) Pesos as Actual Damages, Thirty Thousand (P30,000) Pesos as Moral
Damages, and Ten Thousand (P10,000) Pesos as Exemplary Damages. The rest of the
appealed decision is affirmed to all respects. [5]
On July 8, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Petitioners then took the present recourse to us, raising two issues, namely, whether or not
the grant of right of way to herein private respondents is proper, and whether or not the award of
damages is in order.
[6]

With respect to the first issue, herein petitioners are already barred from raising the same.
Petitioners did not appeal from the decision of the court a quo granting private respondents the
right of way, hence they are presumed to be satisfied with the adjudication therein. With the
finality of the judgment of the trial court as to petitioners, the issue of propriety of the grant of
right of way has already been laid to rest.
For failure to appeal the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals, petitioners cannot
obtain any affirmative relief other than those granted in the decision of the trial court. That
decision of the court below has become final as against them and can no longer be reviewed,
much less reversed, by this Court. The rule in this jurisdiction is that whenever an appeal is
taken in a civil case, an appellee who has not himself appealed may not obtain from the
appellate court any affirmative relief other than what was granted in the decision of the lower
court. The appellee can only advance any argument that he may deem necessary to defeat the
appellants claim or to uphold the decision that is being disputed, and he can assign errors in his
brief if such is required to strengthen the views expressed by the court a quo. These assigned
errors, in turn, may be considered by the appellate court solely to maintain the appealed
decision on other grounds, but not for the purpose of reversing or modifying the judgment in the
appellees favor and giving him other affirmative reliefs. [7]

10

However, with respect to the second issue, we agree with petitioners that the Court of
Appeals erred in awarding damages in favor of private respondents. The award of damages
has no substantial legal basis. A reading of the decision of the Court of Appeals will show that
the award of damages was based solely on the fact that the original plaintiff, Pacifico Mabasa,
incurred losses in the form of unrealized rentals when the tenants vacated the leased premises
by reason of the closure of the passageway.
However, the mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses does not give rise to a right to
recover damages. To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action for
a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong
without damage, or damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action, since
damages are merely part of the remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong. [8]
There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a
legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the
recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage
without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a
legal duty. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria.[9] in order that a plaintiff
may maintain an action for the injuries of which he complains, he must establish that such
injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff - a concurrence
of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it. [10] The underlying basis
for the award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of
law. Thus, there must first be the breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for that
breach before damages may be awarded; it is not sufficient to state that there should be tort
liability merely because the plaintiff suffered some pain and suffering) [11]
Many accidents occur and many injuries are inflicted by acts or omissions which cause
damage or loss to another but which violate no legal duty to such other person, and
consequently create no cause of action in his favor. In such cases, the consequences must be
borne by the injured person alone. The law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an
act which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong. [12]
In other words, in order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage, that act
must be not only hurtful, but wrongful. There must be damnum et injuria.[13] If, as may happen in
many cases, a person sustains actual damage, that is, harm or loss to his person or property,
without sustaining any legal injury, that is, an act or omission which the law does not deem an
injury, the damage is regarded as damnum absque injuria.[14]
In the case at bar, although there was damage, there was no legal injury. Contrary to the
claim of private respondents, petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of abuse
of right. In order that the principle of abuse of right provided in Article 21 of the Civil Code can be
applied, it is essential that the following requisites concur: (1) The defendant should have acted
11

in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy; (2) The acts should be
willful; and (3) There was damage or injury to the plaintiff. [15]
The act of petitioners in constructing a fence within their lot is a valid exercise of their right
as owners, hence not contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. The law recognizes in
the owner the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those
established by law.[16] It is within the right of petitioners, as owners, to enclose and fence their
property. Article 430 of the Civil Code provides that (e)very owner may enclose or fence his
land or tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or dead hedges, or by any other means
without detriment to servitudes constituted thereon.
At the time of the construction of the fence, the lot was not subject to any servitudes. There
was no easement of way existing in favor of private respondents, either by law or by
contract. The fact that private respondents had no existing right over the said passageway is
confirmed by the very decision of the trial court granting a compulsory right of way in their favor
after payment of just compensation. It was only that decision which gave private respondents
the right to use the said passageway after payment of the compensation and imposed a
corresponding duty on petitioners not to interfere in the exercise of said right.
Hence, prior to said decision, petitioners had an absolute right over their property and their
act of fencing and enclosing the same was an act which they may lawfully perform in the
employment and exercise of said right. To repeat, whatever injury or damage may have been
sustained by private respondents by reason of the rightful use of the said land by petitioners
is damnum absque injuria.[17]
A person has a right to the natural use and enjoyment of his own property, according to his
pleasure, for all the purposes to which such property is usually applied. As a general rule,
therefore, there is no cause of action for acts done by one person upon his own property in a
lawful and proper manner, although such acts incidentally cause damage or an unavoidable loss
to another, as such damage or loss is damnum absque injuria.[18] When the owner of property
makes use thereof in the general and ordinary manner in which the property is used, such as
fencing or enclosing the same as in this case, nobody can complain of having been injured,
because the inconvenience arising from said use can be considered as a mere consequence of
community life.[19]
The proper exercise of a lawful right cannot constitute a legal wrong for which an action will
lie, although the act may result in damage to another, for no legal right has been
invaded[21] One may use any lawful means to accomplish a lawful purpose and though the
means adopted may cause damage to another, no cause of action arises in the latters
favor. Any injury or damage occasioned thereby is damnum absque injuria. The courts can give
no redress for hardship to an individual resulting from action reasonably calculated to achieve a
lawful end by lawful means.[22]
[20]

12

WHEREFORE, under the compulsion of the foregoing premises, the appealed decision of
respondent Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the judgment of the
trial court is correspondingly REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

4. Andamo v. IAC, 191 SCRA 195

G.R. No. 74761 November 6, 1990
NATIVIDAD V. ANDAMO and EMMANUEL R. ANDAMO, petitioners,
vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (First Civil Cases Division) and MISSIONARIES
OF OUR LADY OF LA SALETTE, INC., respondents.
FERNAN, C.J.:
The pivotal issue in this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is whether a
corporation, which has built through its agents, waterpaths, water conductors and contrivances
within its land, thereby causing inundation and damage to an adjacent land, can be held civilly
liable for damages under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts such that the
resulting civil case can proceed independently of the criminal case.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are the owners of a parcel of land situated
in Biga (Biluso) Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of private respondent, Missionaries of
Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious corporation.
Within the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths and contrivances, including an artificial
lake, were constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners' land, caused a young
man to drown, damaged petitioners' crops and plants, washed away costly fences, endangered
the lives of petitioners and their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and exposed plants
and other improvements to destruction.
In July 1982, petitioners instituted a criminal action, docketed as Criminal Case No. TG-907-82,
before the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 4 (Tagaytay City), against Efren Musngi,
Orlando Sapuay and Rutillo Mallillin, officers and directors of herein respondent corporation, for
destruction by means of inundation under Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code.
Subsequently, on February 22, 1983, petitioners filed another action against respondent
corporation, this time a civil case, docketed as Civil Case No. TG-748, for damages with prayer
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction before the same court. 1
13

On March 11, 1983, respondent corporation filed its answer to the complaint and opposition to
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Hearings were conducted including ocular
inspections on the land. However, on April 26, 1984, the trial court, acting on respondent
corporation's motion to dismiss or suspend the civil action, issued an order suspending further
hearings in Civil Case No, TG-748 until after judgment in the related Criminal Case No. TG-90782.
Resolving respondent corporation's motion to dismiss filed on June 22, 1984, the trial court
issued on August 27, 1984 the disputed order dismissing Civil Case No. TG-748 for lack of
jurisdiction, as the criminal case which was instituted ahead of the civil case was still
unresolved. Said order was anchored on the provision of Section 3 (a), Rule III of the Rules of
Court which provides that "criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be
instituted separately, but after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action cannot
be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action." 2
Petitioners appealed from that order to the Intermediate Appellate Court.

On February 17, 1986, respondent Appellate Court, First Civil Cases Division, promulgated a
decision 4 affirming the questioned order of the trial court. 5 A motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioners was denied by the Appellate Court in its resolution dated May 19, 1986. 6
Directly at issue is the propriety of the dismissal of Civil Case No. TG-748 in accordance with
Section 3 (a) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners contend that the trial court and the
Appellate Court erred in dismissing Civil Case No. TG-748 since it is predicated on a quasidelict. Petitioners have raised a valid point.
It is axiomatic that the nature of an action filed in court is determined by the facts alleged in the
complaint as constituting the cause of action. 7 The purpose of an action or suit and the law to
govern it, including the period of prescription, is to be determined not by the claim of the party
filing the action, made in his argument or brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its allegations
and prayer for relief. 8 The nature of an action is not necessarily determined or controlled by its
title or heading but the body of the pleading or complaint itself. To avoid possible denial of
substantial justice due to legal technicalities, pleadings as well as remedial laws should be
liberally construed so that the litigants may have ample opportunity to prove their respective
claims. 9
Quoted hereunder are the pertinent portions of petitioners' complaint in Civil Case No. TG-748:
4) That within defendant's land, likewise located at Biga (Biluso), Silang, Cavite,
adjacent on the right side of the aforesaid land of plaintiffs, defendant constructed
waterpaths starting from the middle-right portion thereof leading to a big hole or
opening, also constructed by defendant, thru the lower portion of its concrete
hollow-blocks fence situated on the right side of its cemented gate fronting the
14

provincial highway, and connected by defendant to a man height inter-connected

cement culverts which were also constructed and lain by defendant cross-wise
beneath the tip of the said cemented gate, the left-end of the said inter-connected
culverts again connected by defendant to a big hole or opening thru the lower
portion of the same concrete hollowblocks fence on the left side of the said
cemented gate, which hole or opening is likewise connected by defendant to the
cemented mouth of a big canal, also constructed by defendant, which runs
northward towards a big hole or opening which was also built by defendant thru
the lower portion of its concrete hollow-blocks fence which separates the land of
plaintiffs from that of defendant (and which serves as the exit-point of the
floodwater coming from the land of defendant, and at the same time, the entrancepoint of the same floodwater to the land of plaintiffs, year after year, during rainy or
stormy seasons.
5) That moreover, on the middle-left portion of its land just beside the land of
plaintiffs, defendant also constructed an artificial lake, the base of which is soil,
which utilizes the water being channeled thereto from its water system thru interconnected galvanized iron pipes (No. 2) and complimented by rain water during
rainy or stormy seasons, so much so that the water below it seeps into, and the
excess water above it inundates, portions of the adjoining land of plaintiffs.
6) That as a result of the inundation brought about by defendant's aforementioned
water conductors, contrivances and manipulators, a young man was drowned to
death, while herein plaintiffs suffered and will continue to suffer, as follows:
a) Portions of the land of plaintiffs were eroded and converted to
deep, wide and long canals, such that the same can no longer be
planted to any crop or plant.
b) Costly fences constructed by plaintiffs were, on several occasions,
washed away.
c) During rainy and stormy seasons the lives of plaintiffs and their
laborers are always in danger.
d) Plants and other improvements on other portions of the land of
plaintiffs are exposed to destruction. ... 10
A careful examination of the aforequoted complaint shows that the civil action is one under
Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the elements of a quasi-delict are
present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or
some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect
between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. 11
15

Clearly, from petitioner's complaint, the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent
corporation are alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners. There is therefore, an
assertion of a causal connection between the act of building these waterpaths and the damage
sustained by petitioners. Such action if proven constitutes fault or negligence which may be the
basis for the recovery of damages.
In the case of Samson vs. Dionisio, 12 the Court applied Article 1902, now Article 2176 of the
Civil Code and held that "any person who without due authority constructs a bank or dike,
stopping the flow or communication between a creek or a lake and a river, thereby causing loss
and damages to a third party who, like the rest of the residents, is entitled to the use and
enjoyment of the stream or lake, shall be liable to the payment of an indemnity for loss and
damages to the injured party.
While the property involved in the cited case belonged to the public domain and the property
subject of the instant case is privately owned, the fact remains that petitioners' complaint
sufficiently alleges that petitioners have sustained and will continue to sustain damage due to
the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation. Indeed, the recitals of the
complaint, the alleged presence of damage to the petitioners, the act or omission of respondent
corporation supposedly constituting fault or negligence, and the causal connection between the
act and the damage, with no pre-existing contractual obligation between the parties make a
clear case of a quasi delict or culpa aquiliana.
It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without limitations. Article 431 of the
Civil Code provides that "the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to
injure the rights of a third person." SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Moreover,
adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each must use his
own land in a reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and interests of others.
Although we recognize the right of an owner to build structures on his land, such structures must
be so constructed and maintained using all reasonable care so that they cannot be dangerous
to adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and expected forces of nature. If the
structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person, the latter can
claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code imposes a civil liability on a person for damage caused by his act
or omission constituting fault or negligence, thus:
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is
called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this chapter.
Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence", covers not only acts "not punishable by
law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent.
16

Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not
he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not
allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually charged also criminally), to recover damages on both
scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming
the awards made in the two cases vary. 13
The distinctness of quasi-delicta is shown in Article 2177 of the Civil Code, which states:
Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under
the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant.
According to the Report of the Code Commission "the foregoing provision though at first sight
startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil
negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and
independent negligence, which is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having
always had its own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such
distinction between criminal negligence and "culpa extra-contractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been
sustained by decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain ... 14
In the case of Castillo vs. Court of Appeals, 15 this Court held that a quasi-delict or culpa
aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and
individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime a distinction exists
between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa
extra-contractual. The same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from
a crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual
under the Civil Code. Therefore, the acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely
irrelevant in the civil case, unless, of course, in the event of an acquittal where the court has
declared that the fact from which the civil action arose did not exist, in which case the extinction
of the criminal liability would carry with it the extinction of the civil liability.
In Azucena vs. Potenciano, 16 the Court declared that in quasi-delicts, "(t)he civil action is
entirely independent of the criminal case according to Articles 33 and 2177 of the Civil Code.
There can be no logical conclusion than this, for to subordinate the civil action contemplated in
the said articles to the result of the criminal prosecution whether it be conviction or acquittal
would render meaningless the independent character of the civil action and the clear
injunction in Article 31, that his action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings
and regardless of the result of the latter."
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated February 17, 1986 of the then Intermediate
Appellate Court affirming the order of dismissal of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 18
(Tagaytay City) dated August 17, 1984 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The trial court is
17

ordered to reinstate Civil Case No. TG-748 entitled "Natividad V. Andamo and Emmanuel R.
Andamo vs. Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette Inc." and to proceed with the hearing of the
case with dispatch. This decision is immediately executory. Costs against respondent
corporation.
SO ORDERED.

5. Republic v. CA, 160 SCRA 228

G.R. No. L-43938 April 15, 1988
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (DIRECTOR OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT), petitioner,
vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION) and JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-44081 April 15, 1988
BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, INC., petitioner,
vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, VICTORIA, BENJAMIN and
EDUARDO, all surnamed DE LA ROSA, represented by their father JOSE Y. DE LA
ROSA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-44092 April 15, 1988
ATOK-BIG WEDGE MINING COMPANY, petitioner,
vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, VICTORlA, BENJAMIN and
EDUARDO, all surnamed DE LA ROSA, represented by their father, JOSE Y. DE LA
ROSA, respondents.

CRUZ, J.:
The Regalian doctrine reserves to the State all natural wealth that may be found in the bowels of
the earth even if the land where the discovery is made be private. 1 In the cases at bar, which
have been consolidated because they pose a common issue, this doctrine was not correctly
applied.
These cases arose from the application for registration of a parcel of land filed on February 11,
1965, by Jose de la Rosa on his own behalf and on behalf of his three children, Victoria,
Benjamin and Eduardo. The land, situated in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet Province, was divided into
9 lots and covered by plan Psu-225009. According to the application, Lots 1-5 were sold to Jose
de la Rosa and Lots 6-9 to his children by Mamaya Balbalio and Jaime Alberto, respectively, in
1964. 2

18

The application was separately opposed by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. as to Lots 1-5, Atok Big
Wedge Corporation, as to Portions of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9, and by the Republic of the
Philippines, through the Bureau of Forestry Development, as to lots 1-9. 3
In support of the application, both Balbalio and Alberto testified that they had acquired the
subject land by virtue of prescription Balbalio claimed to have received Lots 1-5 from her father
shortly after the Liberation. She testified she was born in the land, which was possessed by her
parents under claim of ownership. 4 Alberto said he received Lots 6-9 in 1961 from his mother,
Bella Alberto, who declared that the land was planted by Jaime and his predecessors-in-interest
to bananas, avocado, nangka and camote, and was enclosed with a barbed-wire fence. She
was corroborated by Felix Marcos, 67 years old at the time, who recalled the earlier possession
of the land by Alberto's father. 5 Balbalio presented her tax declaration in 1956 and the realty tax
receipts from that year to 1964, 6 Alberto his tax declaration in 1961 and the realty tax receipts
from that year to 1964. 7
Benguet opposed on the ground that the June Bug mineral claim covering Lots 1-5 was sold to it
on September 22, 1934, by the successors-in-interest of James Kelly, who located the claim in
September 1909 and recorded it on October 14, 1909. From the date of its purchase, Benguet
had been in actual, continuous and exclusive possession of the land in concept of owner, as
evidenced by its construction of adits, its affidavits of annual assessment, its geological
mappings, geological samplings and trench side cuts, and its payment of taxes on the land. 8
For its part, Atok alleged that a portion of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9 were covered by the Emma
and Fredia mineral claims located by Harrison and Reynolds on December 25, 1930, and
recorded on January 2, 1931, in the office of the mining recorder of Baguio. These claims were
purchased from these locators on November 2, 1931, by Atok, which has since then been in
open, continuous and exclusive possession of the said lots as evidenced by its annual
assessment work on the claims, such as the boring of tunnels, and its payment of annual taxes
thereon. 9
The location of the mineral claims was made in accordance with Section 21 of the Philippine Bill
of 1902 which provided that:
SEC. 21. All valuable mineral deposits in public lands in the philippine Islands both
surveyed and unsurveyed are hereby declared to be free and open to exploration,
occupation and purchase and the land in which they are found to occupation and
purchase by the citizens of the United States, or of said islands.
The Bureau of Forestry Development also interposed its objection, arguing that the land sought
to be registered was covered by the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve under Proclamation No.
217 dated February 16, 1929. Moreover, by reason of its nature, it was not subject to alienation
under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973. 10
19

The trial court * denied the application, holding that the applicants had failed to prove their claim
of possession and ownership of the land sought to be registered. 11 The applicants appealed to
the respondent court, * which reversed the trial court and recognized the claims of the applicant,
but subject to the rights of Benguet and Atok respecting their mining claims. 12 In other words,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the surface rights of the de la Rosas over the land while at the
same time reserving the sub-surface rights of Benguet and Atok by virtue of their mining claims.
Both Benguet and Atok have appealed to this Court, invoking their superior right of ownership.
The Republic has filed its own petition for review and reiterates its argument that neither the
private respondents nor the two mining companies have any valid claim to the land because it is
not alienable and registerable.
It is true that the subject property was considered forest land and included in the Central
Cordillera Forest Reserve, but this did not impair the rights already vested in Benguet and Atok
at that time. The Court of Appeals correctly declared that:
There is no question that the 9 lots applied for are within the June Bug mineral
claims of Benguet and the "Fredia and Emma" mineral claims of Atok. The June
Bug mineral claim of plaintiff Benguet was one of the 16 mining claims of James E.
Kelly, American and mining locator. He filed his declaration of the location of the
June Bug mineral and the same was recorded in the Mining Recorder's Office on
October 14, 1909. All of the Kelly claims ha subsequently been acquired by
Benguet Consolidated, Inc. Benguet's evidence is that it had made improvements
on the June Bug mineral claim consisting of mine tunnels prior to 1935. It had
submitted the required affidavit of annual assessment. After World War II, Benguet
introduced improvements on mineral claim June Bug, and also conducted
geological mappings, geological sampling and trench side cuts. In 1948, Benguet
redeclared the "June Bug" for taxation and had religiously paid the taxes.
The Emma and Fredia claims were two of the several claims of Harrison
registered in 1931, and which Atok representatives acquired. Portions of Lots 1 to
5 and all of Lots 6 to 9 are within the Emma and Fredia mineral claims of Atok Big
Wedge Mining Company.
The June Bug mineral claim of Benguet and the Fredia and Emma mineral claims
of Atok having been perfected prior to the approval of the Constitution of the
Philippines of 1935, they were removed from the public domain and had become
private properties of Benguet and Atok.
It is not disputed that the location of the mining claim under
consideration was perfected prior to November 15, 1935, when the
Government of the Commonwealth was inaugurated; and according
to the laws existing at that time, as construed and applied by this
20

court in McDaniel v. Apacible and Cuisia (42 Phil. 749), a valid

location of a mining claim segregated the area from the public
domain. Said the court in that case: The moment the locator
discovered a valuable mineral deposit on the lands located, and
perfected his location in accordance with law, the power of the
United States Government to deprive him of the exclusive right to the
possession and enjoyment of the located claim was gone, the lands
had become mineral lands and they were exempted from lands that
could be granted to any other person. The reservations of public
lands cannot be made so as to include prior mineral perfected
locations; and, of course, if a valid mining location is made upon
public lands afterwards included in a reservation, such inclusion or
reservation does not affect the validity of the former location. By such
location and perfection, the land located is segregated from the
public domain even as against the Government. (Union Oil Co. v.
Smith, 249 U.S. 337; Van Mess v. Roonet, 160 Cal. 131; 27 Cyc.
546).
"The legal effect of a valid location of a mining claim is not only to
segregate the area from the public domain, but to grant to the locator
the beneficial ownership of the claim and the right to a patent
therefor upon compliance with the terms and conditions prescribed
by law. Where there is a valid location of a mining claim, the area
becomes segregated from the public domain and the property of the
locator." (St. Louis Mining & Milling Co. v. Montana Mining Co., 171
U.S. 650; 655; 43 Law ed., 320, 322.) "When a location of a mining
claim is perfected it has the effect of a grant by the United States of
the right of present and exclusive possession, with the right to the
exclusive enjoyment of all the surface ground as well as of all the
minerals within the lines of the claim, except as limited by the
extralateral right of adjoining locators; and this is the locator's right
before as well as after the issuance of the patent. While a lode
locator acquires a vested property right by virtue of his location made
in compliance with the mining laws, the fee remains in the
government until patent issues."(18 R.C.L. 1152) (Gold Creek Mining
Corporation v. Hon. Eulogio Rodriguez, Sec. of Agriculture and
Commerce, and Quirico Abadilla, Director of the Bureau of Mines, 66
Phil. 259, 265-266)
It is of no importance whether Benguet and Atok had secured a patent for as held
in the Gold Creek Mining Corp. Case, for all physical purposes of ownership, the
owner is not required to secure a patent as long as he complies with the provisions
21

of the mining laws; his possessory right, for all practical purposes of ownership, is
as good as though secured by patent.
We agree likewise with the oppositors that having complied with all the
requirements of the mining laws, the claims were removed from the public domain,
and not even the government of the Philippines can take away this right from
them. The reason is obvious. Having become the private properties of the
oppositors, they cannot be deprived thereof without due process of law. 13
Such rights were not affected either by the stricture in the Commonwealth Constitution against
the alienation of all lands of the public domain except those agricultural in nature for this was
made subject to existing rights. Thus, in its Article XIII, Section 1, it was categorically provided
that:
SEC. 1. All agricultural, timber and mineral lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy and
other natural resources of the Philipppines belong to the State, and their
disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of
the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least 60% of the capital of
which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease or
concession at the time of the inauguration of the government established under
this Constitution. Natural resources with the exception of public agricultural lands,
shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation,
development or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a
period exceeding 25 years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply,
fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which
case beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant.
Implementing this provision, Act No. 4268, approved on November 8, 1935, declared:
Any provision of existing laws, executive order, proclamation to the contrary
notwithstanding, all locations of mining claim made prior to February 8, 1935 within
lands set apart as forest reserve under Sec. 1826 of the Revised Administrative
Code which would be valid and subsisting location except to the existence of said
reserve are hereby declared to be valid and subsisting locations as of the date of
their respective locations.
The perfection of the mining claim converted the property to mineral land and under the laws
then in force removed it from the public domain. 14 By such act, the locators acquired exclusive
rights over the land, against even the government, without need of any further act such as the
purchase of the land or the obtention of a patent over it. 15 As the land had become the private
property of the locators, they had the right to transfer the same, as they did, to Benguet and
Atok.
22

It is true, as the Court of Appeals observed, that such private property was subject to the
"vicissitudes of ownership," or even to forfeiture by non-user or abandonment or, as the private
respondents aver, by acquisitive prescription. However, the method invoked by the de la Rosas
is not available in the case at bar, for two reasons.
First, the trial court found that the evidence of open, continuous, adverse and exclusive
possession submitted by the applicants was insufficient to support their claim of ownership.
They themselves had acquired the land only in 1964 and applied for its registration in 1965,
relying on the earlier alleged possession of their predecessors-in-interest. 16The trial judge, who
had the opportunity to consider the evidence first-hand and observe the demeanor of the
witnesses and test their credibility was not convinced. We defer to his judgment in the absence
of a showing that it was reached with grave abuse of discretion or without sufficient basis. 17
Second, even if it be assumed that the predecessors-in-interest of the de la Rosas had really
been in possession of the subject property, their possession was not in the concept of owner of
the mining claim but of the property asagricultural land, which it was not. The property was
mineral land, and they were claiming it as agricultural land. They were not disputing the lights of
the mining locators nor were they seeking to oust them as such and to replace them in the
mining of the land. In fact, Balbalio testified that she was aware of the diggings being
undertaken "down below" 18 but she did not mind, much less protest, the same although she
claimed to be the owner of the said land.
The Court of Appeals justified this by saying there is "no conflict of interest" between the owners
of the surface rights and the owners of the sub-surface rights. This is rather doctrine, for it is a
well-known principle that the owner of piece of land has rights not only to its surface but also to
everything underneath and the airspace above it up to a reasonable height. 19 Under the
aforesaid ruling, the land is classified as mineral underneath and agricultural on the surface,
subject to separate claims of title. This is also difficult to understand, especially in its practical
application.
Under the theory of the respondent court, the surface owner will be planting on the land while
the mining locator will be boring tunnels underneath. The farmer cannot dig a well because he
may interfere with the operations below and the miner cannot blast a tunnel lest he destroy the
crops above. How deep can the farmer, and how high can the miner, go without encroaching on
each other's rights? Where is the dividing line between the surface and the sub-surface rights?
The Court feels that the rights over the land are indivisible and that the land itself cannot be half
agricultural and half mineral. The classification must be categorical; the land must be either
completely mineral or completely agricultural. In the instant case, as already observed, the land
which was originally classified as forest land ceased to be so and became mineral and
completely mineral once the mining claims were perfected. 20 As long as mining operations
were being undertaken thereon, or underneath, it did not cease to be so and become
23

agricultural, even if only partly so, because it was enclosed with a fence and was cultivated by
those who were unlawfully occupying the surface.
What must have misled the respondent court is Commonwealth Act No. 137, providing as
follows:
Sec. 3. All mineral lands of the public domain and minerals belong to the State,
and their disposition, exploitation, development or utilization, shall be limited to
citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations, or associations, at least 60% of the
capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant,
lease or concession at the time of the inauguration of government established
under the Constitution.
SEC. 4. The ownership of, and the right to the use of land for agricultural,
industrial, commercial, residential, or for any purpose other than mining does not
include the ownership of, nor the right to extract or utilize, the minerals which may
be found on or under the surface.
SEC. 5. The ownership of, and the right to extract and utilize, the minerals
included within all areas for which public agricultural land patents are granted are
excluded and excepted from all such patents.
SEC. 6. The ownership of, and the right to extract and utilize, the minerals
included within all areas for which Torrens titles are granted are excluded and
excepted from all such titles.
This is an application of the Regalian doctrine which, as its name implies, is intended for the
benefit of the State, not of private persons. The rule simply reserves to the State all minerals
that may be found in public and even private land devoted to "agricultural, industrial,
commercial, residential or (for) any purpose other than mining." Thus, if a person is the owner of
agricultural land in which minerals are discovered, his ownership of such land does not give him
the right to extract or utilize the said minerals without the permission of the State to which such
minerals belong.
The flaw in the reasoning of the respondent court is in supposing that the rights over the land
could be used for both mining and non-mining purposes simultaneously. The correct
interpretation is that once minerals are discovered in the land, whatever the use to which it is
being devoted at the time, such use may be discontinued by the State to enable it to extract the
minerals therein in the exercise of its sovereign prerogative. The land is thus converted to
mineral land and may not be used by any private party, including the registered owner thereof,
for any other purpose that will impede the mining operations to be undertaken therein, For the
loss sustained by such owner, he is of course entitled to just compensation under the Mining
Laws or in appropriate expropriation proceedings. 21
24

Our holding is that Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property in question by virtue
of their respective mining claims which they validly acquired before the Constitution of 1935
prohibited the alienation of all lands of the public domain except agricultural lands, subject to
vested rights existing at the time of its adoption. The land was not and could not have been
transferred to the private respondents by virtue of acquisitive prescription, nor could its use be
shared simultaneously by them and the mining companies for agricultural and mineral purposes.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent court dated April 30, 1976, is SET ASIDE and
that of the trial court dated March 11, 1969, is REINSTATED, without any pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.

6. National Power Corp. v. Ibrahim, 526 SCRA 149

G.R. No. 168732
June 29, 2007
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs. LUCMAN G. IBRAHIM, OMAR G. MARUHOM, ELIAS G.MARUHOM, BUCAY G.
MARUHOM, FAROUK G. MARUHOM, HIDJARA G. MARUHOM, ROCANIA G. MARUHOM,
POTRISAM G. MARUHOM, LUMBA G. MARUHOM, SINAB G. MARUHOM, ACMAD G.
MARUHOM, SOLAYMAN G. MARUHOM, MOHAMAD M. IBRAHIM, and CAIRONESA M.
IBRAHIM, respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul
the Decision1 dated June 8, 2005 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. CV No.
57792.
The facts are as follows:
On November 23, 1994, respondent Lucman G. Ibrahim, in his personal capacity and in behalf
of his co-heirs Omar G. Maruhom, Elias G. Maruhom, Bucay G. Maruhom, Mamod G. Maruhom,
Farouk G. Maruhom, Hidjara G. Maruhom, Rocania G. Maruhom, Potrisam G. Maruhom, Lumba
G. Maruhom, Sinab G. Maruhom, Acmad G. Maruhom, Solayman G. Maruhom, Mohamad M.
Ibrahim and Caironesa M. Ibrahim, instituted an action against petitioner National Power
Corporation (NAPOCOR) for recovery of possession of land and damages before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Lanao del Sur.
In their complaint, Ibrahim and his co-heirs claimed that they were owners of several parcels of
land described in Survey Plan FP (VII-5) 2278 consisting of 70,000 square meters, divided into
25

three (3) lots, i.e. Lots 1, 2, and 3 consisting of 31,894, 14,915, and 23,191 square meters each
respectively. Sometime in 1978, NAPOCOR, through alleged stealth and without respondents
knowledge and prior consent, took possession of the sub-terrain area of their lands and
constructed therein underground tunnels. The existence of the tunnels was only discovered
sometime in July 1992 by respondents and then later confirmed on November 13, 1992 by
NAPOCOR itself through a memorandum issued by the latters Acting Assistant Project
Manager. The tunnels were apparently being used by NAPOCOR in siphoning the water of Lake
Lanao and in the operation of NAPOCORs Agus II, III, IV, V, VI, VII projects located in Saguiran,
Lanao del Sur; Nangca and Balo-i in Lanao del Norte; and Ditucalan and Fuentes in Iligan City.
On September 19, 1992, respondent Omar G. Maruhom requested the Marawi City Water
District for a permit to construct and/or install a motorized deep well in Lot 3 located in Saduc,
Marawi City but his request was turned down because the construction of the deep well would
cause danger to lives and property. On October 7, 1992, respondents demanded that
NAPOCOR pay damages and vacate the sub-terrain portion of their lands but the latter refused
to vacate much less pay damages. Respondents further averred that the construction of the
underground tunnels has endangered their lives and properties as Marawi City lies in an area of
local volcanic and tectonic activity. Further, these illegally constructed tunnels caused them
sleepless nights, serious anxiety and shock thereby entitling them to recover moral damages
and that by way of example for the public good, NAPOCOR must be held liable for exemplary
damages.
Disputing respondents claim, NAPOCOR filed an answer with counterclaim denying the
material allegations of the complaint and interposing affirmative and special defenses, namely
that (1) there is a failure to state a cause of action since respondents seek possession of the
sub-terrain portion when they were never in possession of the same, (2) respondents have no
cause of action because they failed to show proof that they were the owners of the property, and
(3) the tunnels are a government project for the benefit of all and all private lands are subject to
such easement as may be necessary for the same. 2
On August 7, 1996, the RTC rendered a Decision, the decretal portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Denying plaintiffs [private respondents] prayer for defendant [petitioner] National Power
Corporation to dismantle the underground tunnels constructed between the lands of plaintiffs in
Lots 1, 2, and 3 of Survey Plan FP (VII-5) 2278;
2. Ordering defendant to pay to plaintiffs the fair market value of said 70,000 square meters of
land covering Lots 1, 2, and 3 as described in Survey Plan FP (VII-5) 2278 less the area of
21,995 square meters at P1,000.00 per square meter or a total of P48,005,000.00 for the
remaining unpaid portion of 48,005 square meters; with 6% interest per annum from the filing of
this case until paid;
26

3. Ordering defendant to pay plaintiffs a reasonable monthly rental of P0.68 per square meter of
the total area of 48,005 square meters effective from its occupancy of the foregoing area in
1978 or a total of P7,050,974.40.
4. Ordering defendant to pay plaintiffs the sum of P200,000.00 as moral damages; and
5. Ordering defendant to pay the further sum of P200,000.00 as attorneys fees and the costs.
SO ORDERED.3
On August 15, 1996, Ibrahim, joined by his co-heirs, filed an Urgent Motion for Execution of
Judgment Pending Appeal. On the other hand, NAPOCOR filed a Notice of Appeal by registered
mail on August 19, 1996. Thereafter, NAPOCOR filed a vigorous opposition to the motion for
execution of judgment pending appeal with a motion for reconsideration of the Decision which it
had received on August 9, 1996.
On August 26, 1996, NAPOCOR filed a Manifestation and Motion withdrawing its Notice of
Appeal purposely to give way to the hearing of its motion for reconsideration.
On August 28, 1996, the RTC issued an Order granting execution pending appeal and denying
NAPOCORs motion for reconsideration, which Order was received by NAPOCOR on
September 6, 1996.
On September 9, 1996, NAPOCOR filed its Notice of Appeal by registered mail which was
denied by the RTC on the ground of having been filed out of time. Meanwhile, the Decision of
the RTC was executed pending appeal and funds of NAPOCOR were garnished by respondents
Ibrahim and his co-heirs.
On October 4, 1996, a Petition for Relief from Judgment was filed by respondents Omar G.
Maruhom, Elias G. Maruhom, Bucay G. Maruhom, Mamod G. Maruhom, Farouk G. Maruhom,
Hidjara G. Maruhom, Potrisam G. Maruhom and Lumba G. Maruhom asserting as follows:
1) they did not file a motion to reconsider or appeal the decision within the reglementary period
of fifteen (15) days from receipt of judgment because they believed in good faith that the
decision was for damages and rentals and attorneys fees only as prayed for in the complaint:
2) it was only on August 26, 1996 that they learned that the amounts awarded to the plaintiffs
represented not only rentals, damages and attorneys fees but the greatest portion of which was
payment of just compensation which in effect would make the defendant NPC the owner of the
parcels of land involved in the case;
3) when they learned of the nature of the judgment, the period of appeal has already expired;

27

4) they were prevented by fraud, mistake, accident, or excusable negligence from taking legal
steps to protect and preserve their rights over their parcels of land in so far as the part of the
decision decreeing just compensation for petitioners properties;
5) they would never have agreed to the alienation of their property in favor of anybody,
considering the fact that the parcels of land involved in this case were among the valuable
properties they inherited from their dear father and they would rather see their land crumble to
dust than sell it to anybody.4
The RTC granted the petition and rendered a modified judgment dated September 8, 1997,
thus:
WHEREFORE, a modified judgment is hereby rendered:
1) Reducing the judgment award of plaintiffs for the fair market value of P48,005,000.00 by
9,526,000.00 or for a difference by P38,479,000.00 and by the further sum of P33,603,500.00
subject of the execution pending appeal leaving a difference of 4,878,500.00 which may be the
subject of execution upon the finality of this modified judgment with 6% interest per annum from
the filing of the case until paid.
2) Awarding the sum of P1,476,911.00 to herein petitioners Omar G. Maruhom, Elias G.
Maruhom, Bucay G. Maruhom, Mahmod G. Maruhom, Farouk G. Maruhom, Hidjara G.
Maruhom, Portrisam G. Maruhom and Lumba G. Maruhom as reasonable rental deductible from
the awarded sum of P7,050,974.40 pertaining to plaintiffs.
3) Ordering defendant embodied in the August 7, 1996 decision to pay plaintiffs the sum
of P200,000.00 as moral damages; and further sum of P200,000.00 as attorneys fees and
costs.
SO ORDERED.5
Subsequently, both respondent Ibrahim and NAPOCOR appealed to the CA.
In the Decision dated June 8, 2005, the CA set aside the modified judgment and reinstated the
original Decision dated August 7, 1996, amending it further by deleting the award of moral
damages and reducing the amount of rentals and attorneys fees, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, herein Appeals are hereby partially GRANTED, the
Modified Judgment is ordered SET ASIDE and rendered of no force and effect and the original
Decision of the court a quo dated 7 August 1996 is hereby RESTORED with the
MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages is DELETED and the amounts of rentals and
attorneys fees are REDUCED to P6,888,757.40 and P50,000.00, respectively.

28

In this connection, the Clerk of Court of RTC Lanao del Sur is hereby directed to reassess and
determine the additional filing fee that should be paid by Plaintiff-Appellant IBRAHIM taking into
consideration the total amount of damages sought in the complaint vis--vis the actual amount
of damages awarded by this Court. Such additional filing fee shall constitute a lien on the
judgment.
SO ORDERED.6
Hence, this petition ascribing the following errors to the CA:
(a) RESPONDENTS WERE NOT DENIED THE BENEFICIAL USE OF THEIR SUBJECT
PROPERTIES TO ENTITLE THEM TO JUST COMPENSATION BY WAY OF DAMAGES;
(b) ASSUMING THAT RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO JUST COMPENSATION BY WAY
OF DAMAGES, NO EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED ANENT THE VALUATION OF
RESPONDENTS PROPERTY AT THE TIME OF ITS TAKING IN THE YEAR 1978 TO JUSTIFY
THE AWARD OF ONE THOUSAND SQUARE METERS (P1000.00/SQ. M.) EVEN AS
PAYMENT OF BACK RENTALS IS ITSELF IMPROPER.
This case revolves around the propriety of paying just compensation to respondents, and, by
extension, the basis for computing the same. The threshold issue of whether respondents are
entitled to just compensation hinges upon who owns the sub-terrain area occupied by petitioner.
Petitioner maintains that the sub-terrain portion where the underground tunnels were
constructed does not belong to respondents because, even conceding the fact that respondents
owned the property, their right to the subsoil of the same does not extend beyond what is
necessary to enable them to obtain all the utility and convenience that such property can
normally give. In any case, petitioner asserts that respondents were still able to use the subject
property even with the existence of the tunnels, citing as an example the fact that one of the
respondents, Omar G. Maruhom, had established his residence on a part of the property.
Petitioner concludes that the underground tunnels 115 meters below respondents property
could not have caused damage or prejudice to respondents and their claim to this effect was,
therefore, purely conjectural and speculative. 7
The contention lacks merit.
Generally, in an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the Court does not
pass upon questions of fact. Absent any showing that the trial and appellate courts gravely
abused their discretion, the Court will not examine the evidence introduced by the parties below
to determine if they correctly assessed and evaluated the evidence on record. 8 The jurisdiction
of the Court in cases brought to it from the CA is limited to reviewing and revising the errors of
law imputed to it, its findings of fact being as a rule conclusive and binding on the Court.

29

In the present case, petitioner failed to point to any evidence demonstrating grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the CA or to any other circumstances which would call for the
application of the exceptions to the above rule. Consequently, the CAs findings which upheld
those of the trial court that respondents owned and possessed the property and that its
substrata was possessed by petitioner since 1978 for the underground tunnels, cannot be
disturbed. Moreover, the Court sustains the finding of the lower courts that the sub-terrain
portion of the property similarly belongs to respondents. This conclusion is drawn from Article
437 of the Civil Code which provides:
ART. 437. The owner of a parcel of land is the owner of its surface and of everything under it,
and he can construct thereon any works or make any plantations and excavations which he may
deem proper, without detriment to servitudes and subject to special laws and ordinances. He
cannot complain of the reasonable requirements of aerial navigation.
Thus, the ownership of land extends to the surface as well as to the subsoil under it. In Republic
of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,9 this principle was applied to show that rights over lands
are indivisible and, consequently, require a definitive and categorical classification, thus:
The Court of Appeals justified this by saying there is "no conflict of interest" between the owners
of the surface rights and the owners of the sub-surface rights. This is rather strange doctrine, for
it is a well-known principle that the owner of a piece of land has rights not only to its surface but
also to everything underneath and the airspace above it up to a reasonable height. Under the
aforesaid ruling, the land is classified as mineral underneath and agricultural on the surface,
subject to separate claims of title. This is also difficult to understand, especially in its practical
application.
Under the theory of the respondent court, the surface owner will be planting on the land while
the mining locator will be boring tunnels underneath. The farmer cannot dig a well because he
may interfere with the mining operations below and the miner cannot blast a tunnel lest he
destroy the crops above. How deep can the farmer, and how high can the miner go without
encroaching on each others rights? Where is the dividing line between the surface and the subsurface rights?
The Court feels that the rights over the land are indivisible and that the land itself cannot be half
agricultural and half mineral. The classification must be categorical; the land must be either
completely mineral or completely agricultural.
Registered landowners may even be ousted of ownership and possession of their properties in
the event the latter are reclassified as mineral lands because real properties are
characteristically indivisible. For the loss sustained by such owners, they are entitled to just
compensation under the Mining Laws or in appropriate expropriation proceedings. 10

30

Moreover, petitioners argument that the landowners right extends to the sub-soil insofar as
necessary for their practical interests serves only to further weaken its case. The theory would
limit the right to the sub-soil upon the economic utility which such area offers to the surface
owners. Presumably, the landowners right extends to such height or depth where it is possible
for them to obtain some benefit or enjoyment, and it is extinguished beyond such limit as there
would be no more interest protected by law.11
In this regard, the trial court found that respondents could have dug upon their property
motorized deep wells but were prevented from doing so by the authorities precisely because of
the construction and existence of the tunnels underneath the surface of their property.
Respondents, therefore, still had a legal interest in the sub-terrain portion insofar as they could
have excavated the same for the construction of the deep well. The fact that they could not was
appreciated by the RTC as proof that the tunnels interfered with respondents enjoyment of their
property and deprived them of its full use and enjoyment, thus:
Has it deprived the plaintiffs of the use of their lands when from the evidence they have already
existing residential houses over said tunnels and it was not shown that the tunnels either
destroyed said houses or disturb[ed] the possession thereof by plaintiffs? From the evidence, an
affirmative answer seems to be in order. The plaintiffs and [their] co-heirs discovered [these] big
underground tunnels in 1992. This was confirmed by the defendant on November 13, 1992 by
the Acting Assistant Project Manager, Agus 1 Hydro Electric Project (Exh. K). On September 16,
1992, Atty. Omar Maruhom (co-heir) requested the Marawi City Water District for permit to
construct a motorized deep well over Lot 3 for his residential house (Exh. Q). He was refused
the permit "because the construction of the deep well as (sic) the parcels of land will cause
danger to lives and property." He was informed that "beneath your lands are constructed the
Napocor underground tunnel in connection with Agua Hydroelectric plant" (Exh. Q-2). There in
fact exists ample evidence that this construction of the tunnel without the prior consent of
plaintiffs beneath the latters property endangered the lives and properties of said plaintiffs. It
has been proved indubitably that Marawi City lies in an area of local volcanic and tectonic
activity. Lake Lanao has been formed by extensive earth movements and is considered to be a
drowned basin of volcano/tectonic origin. In Marawi City, there are a number of former
volcanoes and an extensive amount of faulting. Some of these faults are still moving. (Feasibility
Report on Marawi City Water District by Kampsa-Kruger, Consulting Engineers, Architects and
Economists, Exh. R). Moreover, it has been shown that the underground tunnels [have] deprived
the plaintiffs of the lawful use of the land and considerably reduced its value. On March 6, 1995,
plaintiffs applied for a two-million peso loan with the Amanah Islamic Bank for the expansion of
the operation of the Ameer Construction and Integrated Services to be secured by said land
(Exh. N), but the application was disapproved by the bank in its letter of April 25, 1995 (Exh. O)
stating that:
"Apropos to this, we regret to inform you that we cannot consider your loan application due to
the following reasons, to wit:
31

That per my actual ocular inspection and verification, subject property offered as collateral has
an existing underground tunnel by the NPC for the Agus I Project, which tunnel is traversing
underneath your property, hence, an encumbrance. As a matter of bank policy, property with an
existing encumbrance cannot be considered neither accepted as collateral for a loan."
All the foregoing evidence and findings convince this Court that preponderantly plaintiffs have
established the condemnation of their land covering an area of 48,005 sq. meters located at
Saduc, Marawi City by the defendant National Power Corporation without even the benefit of
expropriation proceedings or the payment of any just compensation and/or reasonable monthly
rental since 1978.12
In the past, the Court has held that if the government takes property without expropriation and
devotes the property to public use, after many years, the property owner may demand payment
of just compensation in the event restoration of possession is neither convenient nor
feasible.13 This is in accordance with the principle that persons shall not be deprived of their
property except by competent authority and for public use and always upon payment of just
compensation.14
Petitioner contends that the underground tunnels in this case constitute an easement upon the
property of respondents which does not involve any loss of title or possession. The manner in
which the easement was created by petitioner, however, violates the due process rights of
respondents as it was without notice and indemnity to them and did not go through proper
expropriation proceedings. Petitioner could have, at any time, validly exercised the power of
eminent domain to acquire the easement over respondents property as this power
encompasses not only the taking or appropriation of title to and possession of the expropriated
property but likewise covers even the imposition of a mere burden upon the owner of the
condemned property.15 Significantly, though, landowners cannot be deprived of their right over
their land until expropriation proceedings are instituted in court. The court must then see to it
that the taking is for public use, that there is payment of just compensation and that there is due
process of law.16
In disregarding this procedure and failing to recognize respondents ownership of the sub-terrain
portion, petitioner took a risk and exposed itself to greater liability with the passage of time. It
must be emphasized that the acquisition of the easement is not without expense. The
underground tunnels impose limitations on respondents use of the property for an indefinite
period and deprive them of its ordinary use. Based upon the foregoing, respondents are clearly
entitled to the payment of just compensation. 17 Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner only
occupies the sub-terrain portion, it is liable to pay not merely an easement fee but rather the full
compensation for land. This is so because in this case, the nature of the easement practically
deprives the owners of its normal beneficial use. Respondents, as the owners of the property
thus expropriated, are entitled to a just compensation which should be neither more nor less,
whenever it is possible to make the assessment, than the money equivalent of said property.18
32

The entitlement of respondents to just compensation having been settled, the issue now is on
the manner of computing the same. In this regard, petitioner claims that the basis for the
computation of the just compensation should be the value of the property at the time it was
taken in 1978. Petitioner also impugns the reliance made by the CA upon National Power
Corporation v. Court of Appeals and Macapanton Mangondato 19 as the basis for computing the
amount of just compensation in this action. The CA found that "the award of damages is not
excessive because the P1000 per square meter as the fair market value was sustained in a
case involving a lot adjoining the property in question which case involved an expropriation by
[petitioner] of portion of Lot 1 of the subdivision plan (LRC) PSD 116159 which is adjacent to
Lots 2 and 3 of the same subdivision plan which is the subject of the instant controversy." 20
Just compensation has been understood to be the just and complete equivalent of the loss 21 and
is ordinarily determined by referring to the value of the land and its character at the time it was
taken by the expropriating authority.22 There is a "taking" in this sense when the owners are
actually deprived or dispossessed of their property, where there is a practical destruction or a
material impairment of the value of their property, or when they are deprived of the ordinary use
thereof. There is a "taking" in this context when the expropriator enters private property not only
for a momentary period but for more permanent duration, for the purpose of devoting the
property to a public use in such a manner as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial
enjoyment thereof.23Moreover, "taking" of the property for purposes of eminent domain entails
that the entry into the property must be under warrant or color of legal authority.24
Under the factual backdrop of this case, the last element of taking mentioned, i.e., that the entry
into the property is under warrant or color of legal authority, is patently lacking. Petitioner
justified its nonpayment of the indemnity due respondents upon its mistaken belief that the
property formed part of the public dominion.
This situation is on all fours with that in the Mangondato case. NAPOCOR in that case took the
property of therein respondents in 1979, using it to build its Aqua I Hydroelectric Plant Project,
without paying any compensation, allegedly under the mistaken belief that it was public land. It
was only in 1990, after more than a decade of beneficial use, that NAPOCOR recognized
therein respondents ownership and negotiated for the voluntary purchase of the property.
In Mangondato, this Court held:
The First Issue: Date of Taking or Date of Suit?
The general rule in determining "just compensation" in eminent domain is the value of the
property as of the date of the filing of the complaint, as follows:
"Sec. 4. Order of Condemnation. When such a motion is overruled or when any party fails to
defend as required by this rule, the court may enter an order of condemnation declaring that the
plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or
33

purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined
as of the date of the filing of the complaint. x x x" (Italics supplied).
Normally, the time of the taking coincides with the filing of the complaint for expropriation.
Hence, many ruling of this Court have equated just compensation with the value of the property
as of the time of filing of the complaint consistent with the above provision of the Rules. So too,
where the institution of the action precedes entry to the property, the just compensation is to be
ascertained as of the time of filing of the complaint.
The general rule, however, admits of an exception: where this Court fixed the value of the
property as of the date it was taken and not the date of the commencement of the expropriation
proceedings.
In the old case of Provincial Government of Rizal vs. Caro de Araullo, the Court ruled that "x x x
the owners of the land have no right to recover damages for this unearned increment resulting
from the construction of the public improvement (lengthening of Taft Avenue from Manila to
Pasay) from which the land was taken. To permit them to do so would be to allow them to
recover more than the value of the land at the time it was taken, which is the true measure of
the damages, or just compensation, and would discourage the construction of important public
improvements."
In subsequent cases, the Court, following the above doctrine, invariably held that the time of
taking is the critical date in determining lawful or just compensation. Justifying this stance, Mr.
Justice (later Chief Justice) Enrique Fernando, speaking for the Court in Municipality of La
Carlota vs. The Spouses Felicidad Baltazar and Vicente Gan, said, "x x x the owner as is the
constitutional intent, is paid what he is entitled to according to the value of the property so
devoted to public use as of the date of taking. From that time, he had been deprived thereof. He
had no choice but to submit. He is not, however, to be despoiled of such a right. No less than
the fundamental law guarantees just compensation. It would be injustice to him certainly if from
such a period, he could not recover the value of what was lost. There could be on the other
hand, injustice to the expropriator if by a delay in the collection, the increment in price would
accrue to the owner. The doctrine to which this Court has been committed is intended precisely
to avoid either contingency fraught with unfairness."
Simply stated, the exception finds the application where the owner would be given undue
incremental advantages arising from the use to which the government devotes the property
expropriated -- as for instance, the extension of a main thoroughfare as was in the case in Caro
de Araullo. In the instant case, however, it is difficult to conceive of how there could have been
an extra-ordinary increase in the value of the owners land arising from the expropriation, as
indeed the records do not show any evidence that the valuation of P1,000.00 reached in 1992
was due to increments directly caused by petitioners use of the land. Since the petitioner is
claiming an exception to Rule 67, Section 4, it has the burden in proving its claim that its
34

occupancy and use -- not ordinary inflation and increase in land values -- was the direct cause
of the increase in valuation from 1978 to 1992.
Side Issue: When is there "Taking" of Property?
But there is yet another cogent reason why this petition should be denied and why the
respondent Court should be sustained. An examination of the undisputed factual environment
would show that the "taking" was not really made in 1978.
This Court has defined the elements of "taking" as the main ingredient in the exercise of power
of eminent domain, in the following words:
"A number of circumstances must be present in "taking" of property for purposes of eminent
domain: (1) the expropriator must enter a private property; (2) the entrance into private property
must be for more than a momentary period; (3) the entry into the property should be under
warrant or color of legal authority; (4) the property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise
informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and (5) the utilization of the property for public
use must be in such a way to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the
property."(Italics supplied)
In this case, the petitioners entrance in 1978 was without intent to expropriate or was not made
under warrant or color of legal authority, for it believed the property was public land covered by
Proclamation No. 1354. When the private respondent raised his claim of ownership sometime in
1979, the petitioner flatly refused the claim for compensation, nakedly insisted that the property
was public land and wrongly justified its possession by alleging it had already paid "financial
assistance" to Marawi City in exchange for the rights over the property. Only in 1990, after more
than a decade of beneficial use, did the petitioner recognize private respondents ownership and
negotiate for the voluntary purchase of the property. A Deed of Sale with provisional payment
and subject to negotiations for the correct price was then executed. Clearly, this is not the intent
nor the expropriation contemplated by law. This is a simple attempt at a voluntary purchase and
sale. Obviously, the petitioner neglected and/or refused to exercise the power of eminent
domain.
Only in 1992, after the private respondent sued to recover possession and petitioner filed its
Complaint to expropriate, did petitioner manifest its intention to exercise the power of eminent
domain. Thus the respondent Court correctly held:
"If We decree that the fair market value of the land be determined as of 1978, then We would be
sanctioning a deceptive scheme whereby NAPOCOR, for any reason other than for eminent
domain would occupy anothers property and when later pressed for payment, first negotiate for
a low price and then conveniently expropriate the property when the land owner refuses to
accept its offer claiming that the taking of the property for the purpose of the eminent domain
should be reckoned as of the date when it started to occupy the property and that the value of
35

the property should be computed as of the date of the taking despite the increase in the
meantime in the value of the property."
In Noble vs. City of Manila, the City entered into a lease-purchase agreement of a building
constructed by the petitioners predecessor-in-interest in accordance with the specifications of
the former. The Court held that being bound by the said contract, the City could not expropriate
the building. Expropriation could be resorted to "only when it is made necessary by the
opposition of the owner to the sale or by the lack of any agreement as to the price." Said the
Court:
"The contract, therefore, in so far as it refers to the purchase of the building, as we have
interpreted it, is in force, not having been revoked by the parties or by judicial decision. This
being the case, the city being bound to buy the building at an agreed price, under a valid and
subsisting contract, and the plaintiff being agreeable to its sale, the expropriation thereof, as
sought by the defendant, is baseless. Expropriation lies only when it is made necessary by the
opposition of the owner to the sale or by the lack of any agreement as to the price. There being
in the present case a valid and subsisting contract, between the owner of the building and the
city, for the purchase thereof at an agreed price, there is no reason for the expropriation." (Italics
supplied)
In the instant case, petitioner effectively repudiated the deed of sale it entered into with the
private respondent when it passed Resolution No. 92-121 on May 25, 1992 authorizing its
president to negotiate, inter alia, that payment "shall be effective only after Agus I HE project
has been placed in operation." It was only then that petitioners intent to expropriate became
manifest as private respondent disagreed and, barely a month, filed suit. 25
In the present case, to allow petitioner to use the date it constructed the tunnels as the date of
valuation would be grossly unfair. First, it did not enter the land under warrant or color of legal
authority or with intent to expropriate the same. In fact, it did not bother to notify the owners and
wrongly assumed it had the right to dig those tunnels under their property. Secondly, the
"improvements" introduced by petitioner, namely, the tunnels, in no way contributed to an
increase in the value of the land. The trial court, therefore, as affirmed by the CA, rightly
computed the valuation of the property as of 1992, when respondents discovered the
construction of the huge underground tunnels beneath their lands and petitioner confirmed the
same and started negotiations for their purchase but no agreement could be reached. 26
As to the amount of the valuation, the RTC and the CA both used as basis the value of the
adjacent property, Lot 1 (the property involved herein being Lots 2 and 3 of the same
subdivision plan), which was valued at P1,000 per sq. meter as of 1990, as sustained by this
Court in Mangondato, thus:
The Second Issue: Valuation
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We now come to the issue of valuation.

The fair market value as held by the respondent Court, is the amount of P1,000.00 per square
meter. In an expropriation case where the principal issue is the determination of just
compensation, as is the case here, a trial before Commissioners is indispensable to allow the
parties to present evidence on the issue of just compensation. Inasmuch as the determination of
just compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial function and factual findings of the
Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and reviewable only when the case falls within
the recognized exceptions, which is not the situation obtaining in this petition, we see no reason
to disturb the factual findings as to valuation of the subject property. As can be gleaned from the
records, the court-and-the-parties-appointed commissioners did not abuse their authority in
evaluating the evidence submitted to them nor misappreciate the clear preponderance of
evidence. The amount fixed and agreed to by the respondent appellate Court is not grossly
exorbitant. To quote:
"Commissioner Ali comes from the Office of the Register of Deeds who may well be considered
an expert, with a general knowledge of the appraisal of real estate and the prevailing prices of
land in the vicinity of the land in question so that his opinion on the valuation of the property
cannot be lightly brushed aside.
"The prevailing market value of the land is only one of the determinants used by the
commissioners report the other being as herein shown:
xxx
xxx
"Commissioner Doromals report, recommending P300.00 per square meter, differs from the 2
commissioners only because his report was based on the valuation as of 1978 by the City
Appraisal Committee as clarified by the latters chairman in response to NAPOCORs general
counsels query."
In sum, we agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioner has failed to show why it should be
granted an exemption from the general rule in determining just compensation provided under
Section 4 of Rule 67. On the contrary, private respondent has convinced us that, indeed, such
general rule should in fact be observed in this case. 27
Petitioner has not shown any error on the part of the CA in reaching such a valuation.
Furthermore, these are factual matters that are not within the ambit of the present review.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV
No. 57792 dated June 8, 2005 is AFFIRMED.
No costs.
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SO ORDERED.

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