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THE UNITED STATES OF INTERLOCUTORY

(A Corplaw7 Commentary)
by Barry J. Lipson

Interlocutory Orders are not supposed to finally resolve legal actions, though practically they may.
Such Orders are normally not appealable during the pendency of a legal action, and then not if the
action settles or if the subject matter of the Interlocutory Orders is or becomes moot at the time of final
judgment. Since the availability of the check and balance of appealability is most likely practically
non-existent with regard to Interlocutory Orders, some Judges may go gaga with the power of it all in
those and other situations. Of course, this would never happen in ones home jurisdiction, or would it?
The following, as for the most part reported in 1997 in the Pittsburgh Legal Journal, have all happened
somewhere; and if not in one of your home jurisdictions, in the United States of Interlocutory (a/k/a
United States of Interlocuta).
The United States Of Interlocuta
We the Jurists of the United States of Interlocuta/Interlocutory, in order to form a more perfect
Judiciary, establish Interlocutory Justice, insure Judicial Tranquility, provide for the Common Pleas,
promote generic Welfarism, and secure the Blessings of our personal Libertarianism to ourselves and our
Postulants, do hereby order, ordain, establish and decree that the Power and Glory of Interlocutorism shall
Constitute the law of the United States of Interlocutory, unsullied by Threat or Fear of Finality or Appellate
Intervention.
Sound familiar? Fear not! This is not a local excursion, but one that goes far afield to explore the
distant shores of Interlocutory, and delves into happenings that, of course, could never happen here, any
happenstances to the contrary not withstanding.
Thus, for example, no judge here, in our unaltered State, would in word or deed refuse to comply with
what he acknowledges to be a clear mandate of his Supreme Court. To the contrary, in the altered State of
Interlocutory, not only would a judge follow his own drummer - to hell with any Supreme Court mandate but if the other judges posted a rule in compliance with the Supreme Court mandate, he might well "rip it
from the wall," and chastise his colleagues for selling out. He might then apply pressure so that, instead,

his colleagues would adopt and adhere to a per se non-complying rule. Luckily this could only happen in
Interlocutory!
Furthermore, no sitting jurist in this jurisdiction would announce to a room full of lawyers, either
directly or through a fellow jurist, that the State of the Judiciary is such, that given the same question, each
judge is likely to decide differently, or that despite what the law clearly states, he will decide as he pleases.
On the other hand, in Interlocutory if there are three judges involved there are likely to be four different
opinions, and none of them will really know or care what the law says. Luckily this could only happen in
Interlocutory!
Moreover, no trier of law and fact in this judicial district would remove Justice's blindfold when a
friend approaches the bench. However, in Interlocutory jurists do not "hold their Offices during good
Behavior," but through "good benefactors," and, therefore, not having the job security of "good behavior"
or "retention elections," they have been know to modify their "good behavior" accordingly. Luckily this
could only happen in Interlocutory!
Then too, no neutral in this constitutionally mandated "neutral zone" would deny the parties the right
"to a speedy and public trial." In Interlocutory the parties are granted a speedy trial whether they want one
or not, for in Interlocutory the trains run on time and the Court Calendar never falls behind. Once a matter
is placed on the Calendar, it matters not that both parties make a common plea for an extension. Come
rain, come snow, come hail, come sleet, come anything short of settlement or non suit, nothing stays the
postings of the calls of the Calendar. Luckily this could only happen in Interlocutory!
To continue, no member of the bench in this borough would disregard the "law of the case" as
established by a fellow judge in the same case. Au contraire, in Interlocutory. There the "law of the case"
doctrine is honored in the breach. Indeed and in fact, in Interlocutory, one sitting jurist is known to have
blurted out, "I don't care what Judge Blank held in this case, I won't let that fact question go to the jury,"
and he didn't. Luckily this could only happen in Interlocutory!
And how about a Judge in a Settlement Conference torpedoing the possibility of settlement by
blurting out that defendants never settle these types of cases, not even realizing that it was not one of these
types of case?

Finally, at least for the moment, no Justice in this Commonwealth would dispense with justice, or
dispense justice in such a way as would bring discredit, dishonor or ridicule on the Court. Not so in
Interlocutory, where Justices go "supremely" to extreme lengths to air their wash in public, undercut their
colleagues, and - oh - kicky those who get in their way. Luckily this could only happen in Interlocutory!
Interlocuta Revisited
So in the United States of Interlocuta not only do some Judges follow their own drummers - to hell
with any Supreme Court mandates - but they also honor the "law of the case" doctrine in the breach.
Indeed and in fact, we reported, in Interlocuta, sitting jurists are known to have ignored both the rulings of
their Supreme Court and their colleagues.
However, at least one Jurist, Senior Judge Carson V. Brown, from the 25th Judicial District of
Pennsylvania, specially presiding in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, has
clearly demonstrated that we do not live in Interlocuta. He did so in his decision in a June 27, 1997
"Adjudication and Decree Nisi," which involved the right to practice law in Pennsylvania by a 10 year
Pennsylvania resident who, lacking a college education, had been graduated from a non-accredited law
school in his home state; and who had been admitted to practice law in his original home state and before
several federal courts, including the Western District of Pennsylvania, the Third Circuit and the United
States Supreme Court. His denial to be permitted to take the Pennsylvania Bar Examination, pursuant to
Pennsylvania Supreme Court Rules, because he graduated from a non-accredited law school in a State
which did not have a reciprocity agreement with Pennsylvania, was upheld both by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
Regardless of any empathetic feelings to the contrary, Senior Judge Brown, recognizing that he was
duty bound to follow the rulings of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, held that this defendant could not
perform in any way as a lawyer in Pennsylvania, except while physically appearing before a federal tribunal
to which he has been duly admitted to practice law. That is, when physically not before such a federal
tribunal he may not, while within the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, hold himself out as an attorney,
interview or advise clients, draft legal papers, etc. Judge Brown explained:

"One may logically inquire from a purely rhetorical standpoint about the interference with
Defendant's right to practice in a federal jurisdiction when he is estopped from maintaining
an office and meeting with clients because of not being admitted to practice law in
Pennsylvania. However, that matter was presumably considered by the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania in Ginsburg v. Kovrak, supra [392 Pa. 143, 139 A.2d 200(1958)], as
evidenced by the rather strong dissent in the case registering similar concerns. However,
dissenting opinions do not translate into legal principles; this

Court cannot consider a

dissenting opinion as any kind of authority in dealing with the issues before it. Perhaps
Defendant should invite the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to reconsider its position. Until
that position is modified or reversed, this Court is duty bound to carry out its mandates"
(emphasis added).
It is a relief to know that no Supreme edicts were ripped from the walls and here "interlocutorism" was
confined to Interlocutory. Imagine what the practice of law, livelihood and life would be like if
"interlocutorism" ruled supreme here. When I do, I wake up in a cold sweat.
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Please address your comments, questions and suggestions for future Corplaw7 Commentaries
Columns on marketing and business Law and other legal subjects to Barry J. Lipson, Esquire, at
bjlipson@gmail.com. This column has been adapted from a two columns originally published in 1997 in
the Pittsburgh Legal Journal, The United States Of Interlocuta, and Interlocuta Revisited. "Corplaw" is
the registered trademark of the author.
Copyright8 1997-2013 by Barry J. Lipson