DULALIA, JR. vs.

CRUZ
A.C. No. 6854, April 25, 2007
SECOND DIVISION; CARPIO MORALES, J.
Mandatory continuing legal education
FACTS: Herein respondent is the municipal legal officer of Meycauayan. Susan Dulalia applied for building
permit for the construction of a warehouse. Despite compliance to requirements, the application was
denied. This was, according to Dulalai was due to the opposition of respondent because of his personal
grudge against the applicant who objected to respondents marrying her first cousin Imelda Soriano. They
then filed to the office of Ombudsman for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility.
ISSUE: Whether or not, Atty. Cruz violated Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility?
RULING: It is the duty of a lawyer to be well informed of the existing laws and to keep abreast with legal
development, recent enactment and jurisprudence. The respondents contention that the civil code
provision applies at the time he contracted his second marriage is untenable. The purpose of MCLE is to
ensure that lawyers, throughout their career, they keep abreast with law and jurisprudence, maintain the
ethics of the profession and enhance the standards of the practice of law.
DE ROY vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 80718 January 29, 1988
THIRD DIVISION; CORTES, J.
Mandatory continuing legal education
FACTS: De Roy was the owner of a burnt building. The firewall of said building collapsed on the house of
Luis Bernal thereby killing his daughter. Bernal sued De Roy. Bernal won in the trial court. Eventually, De
Roy appealed and the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. De Roy received a copy of
the decision on August 25, 1987. Under the Rules, they have 15 days to file a motion for reconsideration.
On September 9, 1987, the last day for them to file said MFR, De Roys counsel filed a motion for extension
of time to file a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
ruled that pursuant to the case of Habaluyas Enterprises vs Japzon (August 1985), the fifteen-day period
for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended.
De Roy assailed the denial as she alleged that her counsel was ignorant of the rule laid down in the
Habaluyas Case; that said rule should not be made to apply to the case at bar owing to the non-publication
of the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette.
ISSUE: Whether or not De Roys contention is correct?
RULING: No. It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions
of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated, and published
in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions (G.R.s) and in such publications as the Supreme Court
Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.
PEOPLE vs. GACOTT
G.R. No. 116049, March 20, 1995
SECOND DIVISION; BIDIN, J.
Mandatory continuing legal education
FACTS: On February 2, 1994, a complaint for violation of the Anti-Dummy Law (C.A. No. 108) was filed by
Asst. City Prosecutor Perfecto E. Pe against respondents Strom and Reyes. The accused filed a Motion to
Quash/Dismiss the criminal case contending that since the power to prosecute is vested exclusively in the
Anti-Dummy Board under Republic Act No. 1130, the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa has no power or
authority to file the same. The prosecution filed an opposition pointing out that the Anti-Dummy Board has
already been abolished by Letter of Implementation No. 2, Series of 1972. Despite such opposition,
however, respondent judge granted the motion espousing the position that the Letter Of Implementation
relied upon by the City Fiscal is not the law contemplated in Article 7 of the New Civil Code which can
repeal another law such as R.A. 1130. Thus, respondent judge in the assailed order of March 18, 1994 held
that the City Prosecutor has no power or authority to file and prosecute the case and ordered that the case
be quashed.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge in granting the Motion to Quash gravely abused his discretion as
to warrant the issuance of a writ of certiorari?
RULING: Yes. The error committed by respondent judge in dismissing the case is quite obvious in the light
of P.D. No. 1, LOI No. 2 and P.D. No. 1275 aforementioned. The intent to abolish the Anti-Dummy Board

could not have been expressed more clearly than in the aforequoted LOI. Even assuming that the City
Fiscal of Puerto Princesa failed to cite P.D. No. 1 in his opposition to the Motion to Quash, a mere perusal of
the text of LOI No. 2 would have immediately apprised the respondent judge of the fact that LOI No. 2 was
issued in implementation of P.D. No. 1. Paragraph 1 of LOI