The Muslim Brotherhoods Rise and Fall:

An Comparative Analysis of the Egyptian and Syrian Chapters

A Final Paper Submitted By:

Marianne Crielle G. Vitug

In partial fulfillment of the requirements of the course

POS 190

Submitted to:
Professor Hansley Juliano

Department of Political Science, School of Social Sciences

Ateneo de Manila University
Loyola Heights, Quezon City
27 March 2014

Introduction
In January of 2011, a group of liberal university students led a
revolt that ousted authoritarian leader Hosni

Mubarak and

continued the chain of the Arab Spring. While they were hopeful of
the changes that were supposed to follow, they instead encountered
political divisiveness and further chaos throughout the nation.
Taking advantage of the pandemonium, the Muslim Brotherhood,
the long-standing moderate Islam social movement and political
group, rose to power by filling half the seats of Egypts lower house
in the election following the ouster, just as Mohamed Morsi was
voted into the presidency (Laub 2014).
Morsis leadership did not prove to be genuinely democratic
as earlier promised. In November of 2012, he unilaterally decided
to accord himself more power, in the form of being exempt from
judicial review and disallowing the court to dissolve the upper and
lower houses of parliament regardless of circumstance. The lower
house rushed to create a new constitution that was approved with
63.8% of the vote, but with voter turnout low. These actions, among
many

others,

sparked

more

protests

involving

hundreds

of

thousands of Egyptians, with one of the worst being the one that
took place in January of this year, the 2-year anniversary of the
revolution against Mubarak. In June, the number of protesters was
pegged at the millions, all calling for Morsi to step down
(Henderson 2013).
In the beginning of July, the countrys powerful military
declares an ultimatum for both sides to settle their disputes within
48 hours, after which it will carry out its own solution. This plan
consisted of ousting Morsi and replacing him with an interim
government, nullifying the constitution, and holding elections after
a year. On July 3, this plan was executed, and Mohamed Morsi was
overthrown (Henderson 2013).

At the center of this is the Muslim Brotherhood, al-Ikhwan alMuslimeen in Arabic, whose participation in the Morsi regime has
been largely criticized and contested by the Egyptian people.
Despite this, the Brotherhoods relevance, though dwindling,
remains an issue in determining the future of the country and if
true democracy is to be established there. What is more is that
given its history of moderation, their presence in Egyptian politics
may be what is best for the fight against tyranny and extremism
(Laub 2014).
In another part of the Arab League, Syrian nationals continue
to live in a state of civil war, after having begun a call to democracy
in March of 2011, less than two months from the onset of Egypts
first ouster. By April of that year, soldiers in tanks were firing at
protesters in Daraa and two other sites, and house-to-house sweeps
were mandated. Checkpoints were established at strategic parts.
Utilities such as electricity and water, as well as cellphone service
were cut. This prompted the United States to impose sanctions on
Bashar al-Assad, the Syrian President, in May (Syrian uprising
2013).
Human rights violations, such as more unwarranted killings of
protesters, force the United States, the United Kingdom, France,
Germany, and the European Union to demand Assads resignation
in August, which landed on deaf ears. By early November, the death
toll stood at 3,500, and the Arab League voted to suspend Syrias
membership and approved sanctions against the nation.
By February 2012, however, China and Russia vetoed a motion
in the United Nations Security Council that involved the Arab
League making a move toward Assad stepping down. In March, on
the anniversary of the revolution, thousands of pro-Assad Syrians
marched in Daraa to show their support to the regime. At this

point, the death toll was at 8,000. By July, the Syrian government
announced a threat to use weapons of mass destruction, meaning
chemical and biological, should they face attacks from foreign
nations, which made United States President Barack Obama
reconsider the militarys involvement in the issue.
Despite numerous calls for his resignation, Assad announces
in January of this year that he will not step down as long as there
is one terrorist left in Syria (Assads speech 2013). Both the
European Union and the United States began sending weapons to
rebel groups after intelligence brings to light that chemical
weapons have been used in the civil war. By April, it was declared
that the death toll is pegged at 93,000. In August, Assad was once
again accused of using chemical weapons on innocent civilians,
which he denies, but prompted Obama to declare his support of
military force and intervention in Syria. However, he sought the
approval of congress before taking such a step (Syrian uprising
2013).
On a much smaller scale, present in Syria as well is the
Muslim Brotherhood, which announced the creation of a multicultural political party, the Syrian Waad Party, in early November
(Lefvre 2013). While the Party is evidently young, the question
now is whether the moderation and modernity that it brings to the
table can be a key factor in rebuilding the Syrian democracy when
the Assad regime comes to an end.
Given these facts, the problem statement then follows:
Despite

their

history

of

political

moderation

and

modern

interpretations of Islamic tenets, why has the Muslim Brotherhood

been antagonized into seeming like a fundamentalist sect in the
Egyptian and Syrian contexts especially when it may prove to be a
key actor to consolidating democracy in both nations?

While the Brotherhoods failings and even violations are

undeniable, so too is their historical relevance in bringing Islam to
reconciliation with Western democracy. In the age of the Arab
Spring, perhaps it is time to inspect how the Brotherhood can
reform in order to be the real representatives of the people, not
only

to

their

respective

administrations,

but

also

to

the

international community that is yet to figure out how to handle

these crises and their aftermaths.
Theoretical Framework
The problem statement shall be approached through a
sociological institutionalist framework, which takes a look at
organizations and how they take on certain processes and forms as
a result of culture and yet do so in a transnational manner, meaning
an institution present in several countries may often have several
similarities in terms of organizational design and practice (Hall &
Taylor 1996:13). This perspective allows the Muslim Brotherhood,
which started in Egypt, to be inspected in terms of how similar it is
in the context of the two nations, and how it is a key democratic
player for both administrations.
Moreover, sociological institutionalism, unlike the historical
and rational choice variants, does not rigidly separate institutions
from culture. This key factor is crucial, as the Muslim Brotherhood
draws heavily from Islamic teachings, with its political facets rooted
heavily in religion. While it may come as a surprise to some, this is
what drew many Egyptians to them decades back, and continues to
be one of the most relatable aspects of the group. This branch also
acknowledges the mutual relationship between the organization
and the individual in terms of how one shapes the others character.
This aspect will contribute to analyzing the Muslim Brotherhoods
impact on the Egyptian and Syrian nationals themselves, and vice

versa.

Since

sociological

institutionalism

also

posits

that

organizations take on new practices to increase social legitimacy,

this will be used to critique the ways in which religion has been
used by the Muslim Brotherhood in order to gain followers and
attain power in both regions, and whether or not these have been
contributory to the democratic process.
As can be expected for a highly controversial and complex
organization, there are many conflicting theories and analyses as to
how the Muslim Brotherhood is really like and what its relevance is
in Egyptian and Syrian politics. Much of the available literature
often depicts the group as an extremist organization, this being the
seemingly prevalent perspective from Western media. This paper,
however, intends to debunk the image of the Muslim Brotherhood
as

fundamentalists,

and

instead

present

its

moderate

and

democratic nature. In line with the aforementioned theoretical

framework, this will be done through analyzing the various
institutions that have been relevant to the democratic consolidation
and respective revolutions of Egypt and Syria with respect to the
Muslim Brotherhood as the key actor.
As such, a brief history of each country will be given, while
giving emphasis on points relevant to the recent crises. After
which, the key actors in each country will be discussed, paying
attention to the various views that are held by experts on each one.
Lastly, using the literature, analysis will be provided as to what role
the Muslim Brotherhood, as the central actor, will play in future
democratic proceedings in each country.
Methodology
The researcher will delve into the context of the two chapters
of

the

Muslim

Brotherhood

by

examining

the

history

and

establishment of each one in its respective countries. Such perusal

will show how the Brotherhood adapted to the culture and
traditions of each nation, and how it came to find itself in the
sensitive position it is in right now.
The analysis will be done by looking at how the Muslim
Brotherhood has developed its various relationships with other
relevant parties concerned with democratic consolidation in both
Egypt and Syria. Many of these actors have shown to be hostile
towards the organization, and such antagonistic relations may yet
push the Brotherhood out of relevance, both politically and
violently. Despite the vast differences in cultural nuances between
the two chapters, they may possibly share the same fate.
Findings
Egypt
The Arab Republic of Egypt spans about 1 million square
kilometers of land, and is home to about 83.9 million citizens. Its
major language is Arabic, and the two dominant religions are Islam
and Christianity. The capital of the nation is Cairo, where much of
the revolution has taken place (Egypt profile 2014). Its current
interim president is Adly Mahmoud Mansour, who took over after
the ouster of Morsi. He has announced that presidential and
parliamentary elections are to take place within 2014, and that he
will not be running as a candidate.
The Muslim Brotherhood
At the epicenter of this revolution is the Muslim Brotherhood.
It is the oldest Sunni Islamist organization founded in Egypt, as
well as the biggest. Its founder was Hasan al-Banna, who
established the organization in the hopes of putting Islam at the
center of Egyptian politics. Once a practitioner of violent means to
achieve its political agenda, it reformed in the 1970s by focusing

instead on social welfare. Doing so made it popular amongst

Egyptians, who badly needed the pharmacies, hospitals, and
schools that the Brotherhood provided. The government during that
time could not provide such services, and this allowed the
organization to cultivate the loyalties of the people (Laub 2014).
The height of the Brotherhoods success was arguably in
2012, after the ouster of Mubarak. The organizations Freedom and
Justice Party won practically half of the seats in the nations lower
house

or

Peoples

Assembly,

in

tandem

with

Morsi,

their

presidential candidate, winning the election and a subsequent

runoff. In fear of a Brotherhood takeover, the Supreme Court
abolished the lower house, which backfired and gave Morsi both
executive and legislative powers. His regime was marked with
ineffective economic policies, the effects of which were severely felt
by the lower classes. Such abuses of power led to the downfall of
Morsi, along with the Brotherhood. What followed was a crackdown
on their supporters, and it is estimated that the government has
killed about one thousand of them. The Brotherhood has been
banned in the country, and has now labeled as a terrorist group by
Saudi Arabia (Kirkpatrick 2014).
Gamaa
While the Muslim Brotherhood has been largely construed as
an extremist organization blindly loyal to and, to an extent,
misguided by the tenets of Islam, at the real end of the spectrum is
the al-Gamaa al-Islamiyaa. It is the largest Islamist militant
organization in Egypt, and its sole mission has been to dethrone the
secular and democratic Egyptian government in order to implement
a new administration based on sharia (Islamic) law. They were
responsible for several terrorist attacks in the 1990s (Fletcher
2008).

The radical group supposedly denounced violence in the

2000s after the Mubarak regime staged a crackdown on their
members, but other sources have stated that they actually split into
two factions. One was led by Mustafa Hamza, and this faction
agreed to a ceasefire. Rifai Taha Musas faction, on the other hand,
continued the groups original militant goals and merged with alQaeda. Several other terrorist groups based in Afghanistan have
also been reported to support Gamaas remaining violent faction.
The Egyptian Military
In a nation that has faced two ousters within a span of five
years, it is inevitable that the military be a guiding force in
implementing the peace and maintaining order in the nation. The
military has been the forceful actor in ensuring that the ultimatum
against Morsi was followed, and thereby committed the ouster
itself. Since then, it has risen to power, and has therefore been
under the watchful eye of the international community. This is due
to the fact that the propensity for abuse rises greatly when the
military is given so much power. How the planned election is to
take place within the year is yet to be seen, but procedures have
been smooth thus far. The general who was at the forefront of the
ouster, Abdul-Fattah el-Sisi, has recently resigned from the military
in order to announce his intent on running for president (Tawfeeq
2014). He is expected by many to win easily.
This actor has also been in charge of the aforementioned
crackdown on Brotherhood members and supporters, which has
been its way of achieving order in the chaotic landscape that is
Egypt.
Civil Society
Although

never

rigidly

divided,

civil

society

is

often

classifiable by ideology, and Egypt is no exception. First, there are

liberals who seek true secular democracy, and feel that this period
of time, wherein transitions are ongoing and citizens seek radical
reform, is the best opportunity Egypt has gotten in a very long
time. Many of these liberals are also thoroughly against the idea of
the Muslim Brotherhood coming back to power in any capacity, and
might even be supportive of the violent crackdown that is being
done to them right now. There has been the possibility of banning
religiously-affiliated political parties altogether, and those liberals
at the end of the spectrum might see this as a safeguard against
repeating history.
Second are the moderates. Given the characterization of the
Muslim Brotherhood, it can be said that their followers are still
moderates, in that they believe that a middle ground can be
achieved

between

the

countrys

innate

religiosity

and

the

democracy that was introduced to them by the West (Leiken &

Brooke 2007:107-108). Many of these individuals, however, are
unsurprisingly silent on their views, due to the antagonistic view
that the government has taken against the Brotherhood (Miles
2013).
Lastly, there remain to be the conservatives, who, in essence,
are radical fundamentalists more aligned with the ideals of Gamaa
than the Brotherhood. Some will continue to advocate for sharia
law to be one with Egyptian law, and still others might even justify
violent means in order to make this a reality.
The tense political situation in Egypt has certainly divided the
people, and how rigid such divisions are may be unclear until such
a time that the citizens no longer feel afraid to voice their political
beliefs once more. Those who are more vocal, however, have
evidently reacted differently to how the Muslim Brotherhood has
been treated following the Morsi ouster.

The International Community

The Egyptian crisis has been an international issue as much
as it is a local one. This has been due to the fact that it epitomizes
the battle for democracy in a non-Western nation against the
original ideals it once held, many of which were rooted in religion.
The United States, in particular, has been greatly supportive of the
efforts towards secularism and democratization.
In line with this, many Western analysts have framed the
Muslim Brotherhood as the new enemy and face of Islamic
fundamentalism

(Stakelbeck

2013:25-27).

Having

fielded

the

ineffective and corrupt Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood is now seen

as the perfect example of why religion cannot intertwine with
politics so closely, as it is more likely to yield to abusive practices
and be unable to properly govern a nation.
Syria
Home to 21.1 million people, the Syrian Arab Republic has
also been the center of one of the biggest humanitarian crises of
the century. It covers 185,180 square kilometers, and, like Egypt,
has Arabic as its main language, as well as Islam and Christianity
as its major religions (Syria profile 2014). Assad continues to be
the leader of the nation, despite the innumerable allegations
against him, both from citizens and leaders of the free world alike.
The situation in Syria is seemingly at a standstill, with international
actors immobilized from taking real action against Assad.
Assads Regime
Bashar al-Assad was once the promising son of Hafez alAssad, who was a dictator in his own time. The younger Assad, who
was once the president of the Syrian Computer Society, promised
modernization and reforms, particularly toward upgrading the
technological capacities of Syria. Over time, the abusiveness of the

regime escalated, and many of his crimes against humanity may yet
be undiscovered by the international community (Profile: Syrias
Bashar 2013).
The worst offense that he has committed thus far is the use of
sarin gas, which is a chemical weapon agreed upon by the global
civil society never to utilize. He specifically used this against
innocent civilians. This prompted United States President Barack
Obama to voice his support of a strike against Assad. This bold
move, however, did not amount to real action due to the limitations
of his power (Parsons 2013).
Assad continues to refuse to step down, and justifies his
actions by saying he leads in order to fight terrorism. No tangible
action is being done by the international community as of the
moment, but Assads downfall is seen by many to be inevitable.
Despite this, the situation in Syria continues to worsen, and
although Assads ouster would bring vast improvements to the
nation, it will continue to deal with several repercussions from his
regime.
Civil Society
Two forms of opposition against Assads regime have risen in
Syria, one that is political, and one that is armed (Syria crisis
2013). Political or ideological opposition against Assad is spread
throughout the spectrum. Despite this giving them more political
clout, this also means greater divisiveness among the leaders, who
come from various groups and will therefore prioritize different
goals. Many of them have attempted to form several coalitions for
better cooperation, and have achieved varying degrees of success.
Some of the most prominent coalitions have been the National
Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, the

Syrian National Council, the National Coordination Committee, and

the Kurdish Supreme Committee.
On the other hand, armed opposition has been estimated to be
as large as 1,000 groups, with more than 100,000 fighters
altogether. Much like their political counterpart, they are disunited
due to several constraints that range from geographic to ideological
to political. This also makes them disorganized, as there is no
coordination between the 1,000 groups, seeing as this would be a
logistical impossibility. The lack of harmony among these groups,
and the possible lack of coordinated efforts with the political sector,
makes the armed opposition limited in its capacity to effect change
as well.
The International Community
Syria still has at least two allies, namely, Russia and Iran (Yan
2013). Russia aligns with the Assad regime supposedly due to the
naval base that it has in the country. Protecting the regime means
that the naval base can remain there to aid Russia in any future
attacks against it. There also seems to be a Cold War mentality
being utilized, in that Russia denounces interventionist mentality as
a form of imperialism. Iran, on the other hand, sees the United
States and Israel as threats to its own sovereignty, and Syria has
proven itself useful in protecting Irans interests.
Syria currently seems to be at a standstill, as there is a great
debate on intervention that is ongoing amongst the powers of the
world. Evidently, the military attack would be the quickest solution,
but it would also bring the most number of casualties. At this point,
given the 100,000 death toll, risking more lives would seem just as
inhumane. On the other hand, there is insistence that Assad cannot
go unpunished for using chemical weapons, as it was long ago
agreed upon that under no circumstances would such a crime be

permitted. Some have also posited the use of other sanctions, such
as economic ones, to freeze out Assad and drain his resources. This
will, however, take much longer, and might be just as risky as a
military intervention, given that Assad might lash out at the citizens
in his remaining time.
One argument that has been raised is to not intervene at all,
in order to make way for a necessary rebalancing of power (Zakaria
2012). This will allow a more natural progression to the democratic
process of the country, as intervention often skews the power and
makes the nation dependent on foreign rule. Allowing for a slow
and even painful rebalancing still risks lives, but gives the nations
citizens to assert their own interests and maintain the nations
sovereignty at the same time.
The Muslim Brotherhood
It was in 1945 that the chapter of the Muslim Brotherhood in
Syria was born. While it was independent from the Egyptian body, it
had similar grounds for development, and that was social welfare.
Like its mother organization, the Syrian arm was able to provide
services that the government could not. It also had a similar
organizational structure, and it entered into politics as a result of
its reformist goals. While largely moderate, it was seen as a threat
to the dictatorship of Hafez al-Assad, who ordered a massacre of
the Brotherhoods supporters in Hama (Lefvre 2013:20-21).
Unlike in Egypt, however, the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria is
merely at the periphery of the crisis due to the hostility of the
Assad regime toward the organization. Due to this, the Brotherhood
currently has five seats in the Syrian National Council in order to
actively oppose the regime on a political level. Its recently launched
political party, led by Dr. Mohammed Walid, insists that it will not

dominate, and therefore not follow the trajectory of its Egyptian

counterpart.
Analysis
Egypt
While

current

widespread

belief

is

that

the

Muslim

Brotherhood has become the epitome of Islamic fundamentalism

and therefore has no place in modern democracy, it can be argued
that the Brotherhood has historically served as the bridge between
democracy and Islam. This moderate ground allowed for many
Egyptians to be more deeply involved in politics, and use their
religious beliefs to demand for true social change from their
government. It made the newfound tenets of democracy more
relatable to a largely traditional audience, and gave them a unique
experience of what democracy can truly do for them as a people
(Abdo 2002: 7-12).
The

crimes

and

shortcomings

of

the

Brotherhood

are

undeniable and unforgiveable, but this does not mean they are
immediately a dispensable party. While recent actions have not
allowed for the party to show its capacity for good governance,
there is much room for necessary change that could allow for it to
still be a key player in the democratic process of Egypt. These
changes start with embracing plurality, and thereby acknowledging
that a secular state does not mean it has to be anti-Islam. They
must also separate completely from the ultra-conservatives, such as
the Salafis, which will allow them to be free from the image of
extremism. Another suggestion is to involve women and youth in
political processes, as they are severely underutilized sector in the
nation, and they clearly need all the support they can get at the
moment (Husain 2013).

Whether it is too late for such reforms to take place given that
the crackdown is happening remains to be the question. The
Brotherhood

still

has

followers

in

the

millions,

and

such

disbandment may force them to take up arms. Having characterized

many of these followers as moderates, it is a toss-up as to whether
they will choose to be more liberal or conservative in their beliefs.
It must be taken into consideration, however, that many of them
have felt displaced and threatened since the Morsi ouster. The
military takeover has antagonized many moderates, and may well
push them to the brink of extremism (Georgy & Perry 2013).
Even more compelling is the fact that many extremist groups
now feel affirmed that they have taken the right courses of action in
taking up arms in order to forward the Islamist cause. The decline
of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt proves to them that it is
impossible to peacefully negotiate with democratic powers in order
to elevate sharia law as national law. By showing that there is no
way but radicalism in order to achieve their goals, they are less
inclined to be open to negotiations or to renounce the use of arms
in the long run.
The absence of the Muslim Brotherhood from the political
process in Egypt may therefore mean a step back for democratic
consolidation, as more moderates feel threatened and more
conservatives feel affirmed. It removes the middle ground that was
more viable and open to debate, thereby making the rebalancing of
power less organic.
Syria
The very presence of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria shows
the capability of institutions to transcend national borders and
adapt to different cultures while still maintaining the same essence.
They were able to have the same principles of prioritizing Islamic

values and social welfare, as well as construct a similar hierarchical

structure. Despite this, the Syrian chapter has grown in its own
way, as an independent institution that is nuanced to the context of
this other nation. It has evolved as a response to the hostility of
both Assads, who similarly wanted to push the Brotherhood to the
periphery of the political scene.
Given the similarities between the two chapters, it might be
possible that the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood will be largely
affected by the downfall of its Egyptian counterpart in a negative
manner. Assad has blatantly stated that he celebrates the downfall
of the Brotherhood in Egypt, thereby possibly delegitimizing the
Syrian chapter in the process. Even the international community
and media seem to propagate the demonization of the Muslim
Brotherhood, which very likely scares possible supporters away
from the Syrian arm, in fear that it will follow the same pattern and
make the same unforgiveable mistakes (Al-Abdeh 2013).
This fear might be validated by the fact that the Brotherhoods
political party is following an eerily similar trajectory to the
Egyptian arm, in that it is now planning its rise to power after the
toppling

of

the

Assad

regime.

Once

the

Egyptian

Muslim

Brotherhood attained power in the Morsi regime, they exhibited

their lack of a capacity to properly govern and control their
officials. That type of behavior led to their biggest crisis in more
than eighty years. If the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood chooses to
make the same mistakes, then it wasted an opportunity to forward
the democratic process.
On the other hand, being more politically strategic may allow
them to be a key player in the eventual rebalancing of power that is
to come after the Assad regime. Considering the several coalitions
and parties that will continue on, learning to embrace plurality
while at the same time maintain ample power will allow for the

Syrian arm to live on much longer than the Egyptian one. Until
such a time that the Assad regime is toppled, however, it is unclear
as to how the Brotherhood will behave in a democratic setting
(Lefvre & Sayigh 2013).
Conclusion
The Egyptian and Syrian Muslim Brotherhoods have very
similar ideological

foundations

and organizational

structures.

Despite this, each one has crafted its own distinct identity and
function over time by adapting to the respective cultures of each
country. Both have had to deal with the question of how to reconcile
religious beliefs with democratic ideals, and have had to face
hostile governments and dictators.
Currently, the fate of both remain elusive to many. The
Egyptian arm is facing a hostile nation after having lost its power
so quickly. This has resulted in intense antagonization by various
institutions, despite the fact that it is likely a crucial factor in
shaping a more stable democracy for the country.
On the other hand, the Syrian arm is gaining political power
just as its mother organization is declining, but it may end up
following a similar trajectory. While it has been a politically
moderate and even liberal actor, what it will do with the power it is
accumulating remains to be a mystery.

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