[G.R. No. 70890. September 18, 1992.

]
CRESENCIO LIBI * and AMELIA YAP LIBI, Petitioners, v. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,
FELIPE GOTIONG and SHIRLEY GOTIONG, Respondents.
Alex Y. Tan, for Petitioners.
Mario D. Ortiz and Danilo V. Ortiz for Private Respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; QUASI DELICT; LIABILITY OF PARENTS FOR CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM CRIMINAL
OFFENSES COMMITTED BY THEIR MINOR CHILDREN; RULE. The parents are and should be held primarily
liable for the civil liability arising from criminal offenses committed by their minor children under their legal
authority or control, or who live in their company, unless it is proven that the former acted with the diligence
of a good father of a family to prevent such damages. That primary liability is premised on the provisions of
Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code with respect to damages ex delicto caused by their children 9 years of
age or under, or over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted without discernment; and, with regard to their
children over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted with discernment, or 15 years or over but under 21 years
of age, such primary liability shall be imposed pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Under said Article
2180, the enforcement of such liability shall be effected against the father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother. This was amplified by the Child and Youth Welfare Code which provides that the same
shall devolve upon the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, upon the mother or, in case of her death
or incapacity, upon the guardian, but the liability may also be voluntarily assumed by a relative or family
friend of the youthful offender. However, under the Family Code, this civil liability is now, without such
alternative qualification, the responsibility of the parents and those who exercise parental authority over the
minor offender. For civil liability arising from quasi-delicts committed by minors, the same rules shall apply in
accordance with Articles 2180 and 2182 of the Civil Code, as so modified.

DECISION

REGALADO, J.:

One of the ironic verities of life, it has been said, is that sorrow is sometimes a touchstone of love. A tragic
illustration is provided by the instant case, wherein two lovers died while still in the prime of their years, a
bitter episode for those whose lives they have touched. While we cannot expect to award complete
assuagement to their families through seemingly prosaic legal verbiage, this disposition should at least
terminate the acrimony and rancor of an extended judicial contest resulting from the unfortunate occurrence.
In this final denouement of the judicial recourse the stages whereof were alternately initiated by the parties,
petitioners are now before us seeking the reversal of the judgment of respondent court promulgated on
January 2, 1985 in AC-G.R. CV No. 69060 with the following decretal portion:

"WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court dismissing plaintiffs complaint is hereby reversed; and instead,
judgment is hereby rendered sentencing defendants, jointly and solidarily, to pay to plaintiffs the following
amounts:
1. Moral damages, P30,000.000;

2. Exemplary damages, P10,000.00;

3. Attorneys fees, P20,000.00, and costs.

However, denial of defendants-appellees counterclaims is affirmed."

Synthesized from the findings of the lower courts, it appears that respondent spouses are the legitimate
parents of Julie Ann Gotiong who, at the time of the deplorable incident which took place and from which she
died on January 14, 1979, was an 18-year old first year commerce student of the University of San Carlos,
Cebu City; while petitioners are the parents of Wendell Libi, then a minor between 18 and 19 years of age
living with his aforesaid parents, and who also died in the same event on the same date.
For more than two (2) years before their deaths, Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were sweethearts until
December, 1978 when Julie Ann broke up her relationship with Wendell after she supposedly found him to be
sadistic and irresponsible. During the first and second weeks of January, 1979, Wendell kept pestering Julie

Ann with demands for reconciliation but the latter persisted in her refusal, prompting the former to resort to
threats against her. In order to avoid him, Julie Ann stayed in the house of her best friend, Malou Alfonso, at
the corner of Maria Cristina and Juana Osmea Streets, Cebu City, from January 7 to 13, 1978.
On January 14, 1979, Julie Ann and Wendell died, each from a single gunshot wound inflicted with the same
firearm, a Smith and Wesson revolver licensed in the name of petitioner Cresencio Libi, which was recovered
from the scene of the crime inside the residence of private respondents at the corner of General Maxilom and
D. Jakosalem streets of the same city.

Due to the absence of an eyewitness account of the circumstances surrounding the death of both minors, their
parents, who are the contending parties herein, posited their respective theories drawn from their
interpretation of circumstantial evidence, available reports, documents and evidence of physical facts.
Private respondents, bereaved over the death of their daughter, submitted that Wendell caused her death by
shooting her with the aforesaid firearm and, thereafter, turning the gun on himself to commit suicide. On the
other hand, Petitioners, puzzled and likewise distressed over the death of their son, rejected the imputation
and contended that an unknown third party, whom Wendell may have displeased or antagonized by reason of
his work as a narcotics informer of the Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU), must have caused Wendells
death and then shot Julie Ann to eliminate any witness and thereby avoid identification.
As a result of the tragedy, the parents of Julie Ann filed Civil Case No. R-17774 in the then Court of First
Instance of Cebu against the parents of Wendell to recover damages arising from the latters vicarious liability
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. After trial, the court below rendered judgment on October 20, 1980 as
follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises duly considered, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing plaintiffs complaint for
insufficiency of the evidence. Defendants counterclaim is likewise denied for lack of sufficient merit."
On appeal to respondent court, said judgment of the lower court dismissing the complaint of therein plaintiffsappellants was set aside and another judgment was rendered against defendants-appellees who, as
petitioners in the present appeal by certiorari, now submit for resolution the following issues in this case:

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1. Whether or not respondent court correctly reversed the trial court in accordance with established decisional
laws; and

2. Whether or not Article 2180 of the Civil Code was correctly interpreted by respondent court to make
petitioners liable for vicarious liability.

In the proceedings before the trial court, Dr. Jesus P. Cerna, Police Medico-Legal Officer of Cebu, submitted his
findings and opinions on some postulates for determining whether or not the gunshot wound was inflicted on
Wendell Libi by his own suicidal act. However, undue emphasis was placed by the lower court on the absence
of gunpowder or tattooing around the wound at the point of entry of the bullet. It should be emphasized,
however, that this is not the only circumstance to be taken into account in the determination of whether it was
suicide or not.

It is true that said witness declared that he found no evidence of contact or close-contact of an explosive
discharge in the entrance wound. However, as pointed out by private respondents, the body of deceased
Wendell Libi must have been washed at the funeral parlor, considering the hasty interment thereof a little after
eight (8) hours from the occurrence wherein he died. Dr. Cerna himself could not categorically state that the
body of Wendell Libi was left untouched at the funeral parlor before he was able to conduct his autopsy. It will
also be noted that Dr. Cerna was negligent in not conducting a paraffin test on Wendell Libi, hence possible
evidence of gunpowder residue on Wendells hands was forever lost when Wendell was hastily buried.

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More specifically, Dr. Cerna testified that he conducted an autopsy on the body of Wendell Libi about eight (8)
hours after the incident or, to be exact, eight (8) hours and twenty (20) minutes based on the record of death;
that when he arrived at the Cosmopolitan Funeral Homes, the body of the deceased was already on the
autopsy table and in the stage of rigor mortis; and that said body was not washed, but it was dried. 4
However, on redirect examination, he admitted that during the 8-hour interval, he never saw the body nor did
he see whether said body was wiped or washed in the area of the wound on the head which he examined
because the deceased was inside the morgue. 5 In fact, on cross-examination, he had earlier admitted that as
far as the entrance of the wound, the trajectory of the bullet and the exit of the wound are concerned, it is
possible that Wendell Libi shot himself. 6

He further testified that the muzzle of the gun was not pressed on the head of the victim and that he found no
burning or singeing of the hair or extensive laceration on the gunshot wound of entrance which are general
characteristics of contact or near-contact fire. On direct examination, Dr. Cerna nonetheless made these
clarification:
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"Q Is it not a fact that there are certain guns which are so made that there would be no black residue or

tattooing

that

could

result

from

these

guns

because

they

are

what

we

call

clean?

A Yes, sir. I know that there are what we call smokeless powder.

ATTY. ORTIZ:

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Q Yes. So, in cases, therefore, of guns where the powder is smokeless, those indications that you said may
not rule out the possibility that the gun was closer than 24 inches, is that correct?
A If the . . . assuming that the gun used was .. the bullet used was a smokeless powder.

Q At any rate, doctor, from . . . disregarding those other matters that you have noticed, the singeing, etc.,
from the trajectory, based on the trajectory of the bullet as shown in your own sketch, is it not a fact that the
gun could have been fired by the person himself, the victim himself, Wendell Libi, because it shows a point of
entry a little above the right ear and point of exit a little above that, to be very fair and on your oath?
A As far as the point of entrance is concerned and as far as the trajectory of the bullet is concerned and as far
as the angle or the manner of fire is concerned, it could have been fired by the victim." 7
As shown by the evidence, there were only two used bullets 8 found at the scene of the crime, each of which
were the bullets that hit Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi, respectively. Also, the sketch prepared by the
Medico-Legal Division of the National Bureau of Investigation, 9 shows that there is only one gunshot wound
of entrance located at the right temple of Wendell Libi. The necropsy report prepared by Dr. Cerna states:

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"Gunshot wound, ENTRANCE, ovaloid, 0.5 x 0.4 cm., with contusion collar widest inferiorly by 0.2 cm., edges
inverted, oriented upward, located at the head, temporal region, right, 2.8 cms. behind and 5.5 cms. above
right external auditory meatus, directed slightly forward, upward and to the left, involving skin and soft
tissues, making a punch-in fracture on the temporal bone, right, penetrating cranial cavity, lacerating
extensively along its course the brain tissues, fracturing parietal bone, left, and finally making an EXIT wound,
irregular, 2.0 x 1.8 cms., edges (e)verted, parietal region, left, 2.0 cms. behind and 12.9 cms. above left
external auditory meatus.
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"Evidence of contact or close-contact fire, such as burning around the gunshot wound of entrance, gunpowder
tatooing (sic), smudging, singeing of hair, extensive laceration or bursting of the gunshot wound of entrance,
or
separation
of
the
skin
from
the
underlying
tissue,
are
absent."
10
On

cross-examination,

Dr.

Cerna

demonstrated

his

theory

which

was

made

of

record,

thus:

"Q Now, will you please use yourself as Wendell Libi, and following the entrance of the wound, the trajectory
of the bullet and the exit of the wound, and measuring yourself 24 inches, will you please indicate to the
Honorable Court how would it have been possible for Wendell Libi to kill himself? Will you please indicate the
24 inches?
WITNESS:

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A Actually, sir, the 24 inches is approximately one arms length.

ATTY. SENINING:

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I would like to make of record that the witness has demonstrated by extending his right arm almost straight
towards his head."
Private respondents assail the fact that the trial court gave credence to the testimonies of defendants
witnesses Lydia Ang and James Enrique Tan, the first being a resident of an apartment across the street from
the Gotiongs and the second, a resident of the house adjacent to the Gotiong residence, who declared having
seen a "shadow" of a person at the gate of the Gotiong house after hearing shots therefrom.
On cross-examination, Lydia Ang testified that the apartment where she was staying faces the gas station;
that it is the second apartment; that from her window she can see directly the gate of the Gotiongs and, that
there is a firewall between her apartment and the gas station. 12 After seeing a man jump from the gate of
the Gotiongs to the rooftop of the Tans, she called the police station but the telephone lines were busy. Later
on, she talked with James Enrique Tan and told him that she saw a man leap from the gate towards his
rooftop.
However, James Enrique Tan testified that he saw a "shadow" on top of the gate of the Gotiongs, but denied

having talked with anyone regarding what he saw. He explained that he lives in a duplex house with a garden
in front of it; that his house is next to Felipe Gotiongs house; and he further gave the following answers to
these
questions:
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"ATTY. ORTIZ: (TO WITNESS).

Q

What

WITNESS:

is

the

height

of

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wall

of

the

Gotiongs

in

relation

to

your

house?

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A It is about 8 feet.
ATTY. ORTIZ: (TO WITNESS)
Q And where were you looking from?
WITNESS:

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A From upstairs in my living room.

ATTY. ORTIZ (TO WITNESS)
Q From Your living room window, is that correct?
WITNESS:

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A Yes, but not very clear because the wall is high." 14

Analyzing the foregoing testimonies, we agree with respondent court that the same do not inspire credence as
to the reliability and accuracy of the witnesses observations, since the visual perceptions of both were
obstructed by high walls in their respective houses in relation to the house of herein private respondents. On
the other hand, witness Manolo Alfonso, testifying on rebuttal, attested without contradiction that he and his
sister, Malou Alfonso, were waiting for Julie Ann Gotiong when they heard her scream; that when Manolo
climbed the fence to see what was going on inside the Gotiong house, he heard the first shot; and, not more
than five (5) seconds later, he heard another shot. Consequently, he went down from the fence and drove to
the police station to report the incident. 15 Manolos direct and candid testimony establishes and explains the
fact that it was he whom Lydia Ang and James Enrique Tan saw as the "shadow" of a man at the gate of the
Gotiong
house.
We have perforce to reject petitioners effete and unsubstantiated pretension that it was another man who
shot Wendell and Julie Ann. It is significant that the Libi family did not even point to or present any suspect in
the crime nor did they file any case against any alleged "John Doe." Nor can we sustain the trial courts
dubious theory that Wendell Libi did not die by his own hand because of the overwhelming evidence
testimonial, documentary and pictorial the confluence of which point to Wendell as the assailant of Julie
Ann, his motive being revenge for her rejection of his persistent pleas for a reconciliation.

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Petitioners defense that they had exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family, hence they should
not be civilly liable for the crime committed by their minor son, is not borne out by the evidence on record
either.
Petitioner Amelita Yap Libi, mother of Wendell, testified that her husband, Cresencio Libi, owns a gun which he
kept in a safety deposit box inside a drawer in their bedroom. Each of these petitioners holds a key to the
safety deposit box and Amelitas key is always in her bag, all of which facts were known to Wendell. They have
never seen their son Wendell taking or using the gun. She admitted, however, that on that fateful night the
gun was no longer in the safety deposit box. 16 We, accordingly, cannot but entertain serious doubts that
petitioner spouses had really been exercising the diligence of a good father of a family by safely locking the
fatal gun away. Wendell could not have gotten hold thereof unless one of the keys to the safety deposit box
was negligently left lying around or he had free access to the bag of his mother where the other key was.
The diligence of a good father of a family required by law in a parent and child relationship consists, to a large
extent, of the instruction and supervision of the child. Petitioners were gravely remiss in their duties as
parents in not diligently supervising the activities of their son, despite his minority and immaturity, so much so
that it was only at the time of Wendells death that they allegedly discovered that he was a CANU agent and
that Cresencios gun was missing from the safety deposit box. Both parents were sadly wanting in their duty
and responsibility in monitoring and knowing the activities of their children who, for all they know, may be
engaged in dangerous work such as being drug informers, 17 or even drug users. Neither was a plausible
explanation given for the photograph of Wendell, with a handwritten dedication to Julie Ann at the back
thereof, 18 holding upright what clearly appears as a revolver and on how or why he was in possession of that
firearm.
In setting aside the judgment of the court a quo and holding petitioners civilly liable, as explained at the start
of this opinion, respondent court waved aside the protestations of diligence on the part of petitioners and had
this to say:
". . . It is still the duty of parents to know the activity of their children who may be engaged in this dangerous

activity involving the menace of drugs. Had the defendants-appellees been diligent in supervising the activities
of their son, Wendell, and in keeping said gun from his reach, they could have prevented Wendell from killing
Julie Ann Gotiong. Therefore, appellants are liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code which provides:

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The father, and in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by their
minor children who live in their company.
"Having been grossly negligent in preventing Wendell Libi from having access to said gun which was allegedly
kept in a safety deposit box, defendants-appellees are subsidiarily liable for the natural consequence of the
criminal act of said minor who was living in their company. This vicarious liability of herein defendantsappellees has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in many cases, prominent of which is the case of Fuellas
v. Cadano, et. al. (L-14409, Oct. 31, 1961, 3 SCRA 361-367), which held that:
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The subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor children imposed by Article 2180 of the
New Civil Code covers obligations arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses.
The subsidiary liability of parents arising from the criminal acts of their minor children who acted with
discernment is determined under the provisions of Article 2180, N.C.C. and under Article 101 of the Revised
Penal Code, because to hold that the former only covers obligations which arise from quasi-delicts and not
obligations which arise from criminal offenses, would result in the absurdity that while for an act where mere
negligence intervenes the father or mother may stand subsidiarily liable for the damages caused by his or her
son, no liability would attach if the damage is caused with criminal intent. (3 SCRA 361-362).
". . . In the instant case, minor son of herein defendants-appellees, Wendell Libi somehow got hold of the key
to the drawer where said gun was kept under lock without defendant-spouses ever knowing that said gun had
been missing from that safety box since 1978 when Wendell Libi had) a picture taken wherein he proudly
displayed said gun and dedicated this picture to his sweetheart, Julie Ann Gotiong; also since then, Wendell
Libi was said to have kept said gun in his car, in keeping up with his supposed role of a CANU agent . . ."

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"Based on the foregoing discussions of the assigned errors, this Court holds that the lower court was not
correct in dismissing herein plaintiffs-appellants complaint because as preponderantly shown by evidence,
defendants-appellees utterly failed to exercise all the diligence of a good father of the family in preventing
their minor son from committing this crime by means of the gun of defendants-appellees which was freely
accessible to Wendell Libi for they have not regularly checked whether said gun was still under lock, but
learned that it was missing from the safety deposit box only after the crime had been committed." (Emphases
ours.)

We agree with the conclusion of respondent court that petitioners should be held liable for the civil liability
based on what appears from all indications was a crime committed by their minor son. We take this
opportunity, however, to digress and discuss its ratiocination therefor on jurisprudential dicta which we feel
require clarification.

In imposing sanctions for the so-called vicarious liability of petitioners, respondent court cites Fuellas v.
Cadano, Et. Al. 20 which supposedly holds that" (t)he subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by
their minor children imposed by Article 2180 of the New Civil Code covers obligations arising from both quasidelicts and criminal offenses," followed by an extended quotation ostensibly from the same case explaining
why under Article 2180 of the Civil Code and Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code parents should assume
subsidiary liability for damages caused by their minor children. The quoted passages are set out two
paragraphs back, with pertinent underscoring for purposes of the discussion hereunder.

Now, we do not have any objection to the doctrinal rule holding, the parents liable, but the categorization of
their liability as being subsidiary, and not primary, in nature requires a hard second look considering previous
decisions of this court on the matter which warrant comparative analyses. Our concern stems from our
readings that if the liability of the parents for crimes or quasi-delicts of their minor children is subsidiary, then
the parents can neither invoke nor be absolved of civil liability on the defense that they acted with the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damages. On the other hand, if such liability imputed to the
parents is considered direct and primary, that diligence would constitute a valid and substantial defense.
We believe that the civil liability of parents for quasi-delicts of their minor children, as contemplated in Article
2180 of the Civil Code, is primary and not subsidiary. In fact, if we apply Article 2194 of said code which
provides for solidary liability of joint tortfeasors, the persons responsible for the act or omission, in this case
the minor and the father and, in case of his death of incapacity, the mother, are solidarily liable. Accordingly,
such parental liability is primary and not subsidiary, hence the last paragraph of Article 2180 provides that"
(t)he responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damages."
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We are also persuaded that the liability of the parents for felonies committed by their minor children is
likewise primary, not subsidiary. Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

"ARTICLE 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases.

x

First. In cases of subdivisions . . . 2, and 3 of Article 12, the civil liability for acts committed by . . . a person
under nine years of age, or by one over nine but under fifteen years of age, who has acted without
discernment, shall devolve upon those having such person under their legal authority or control, unless it
appears that there was no fault or negligence on their part." (Emphasis supplied.)
Accordingly, just like the rule in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, under the foregoing provision the civil liability of
the parents for crimes committed by their minor children is likewise direct and primary, and also subject to the
defense of lack of fault or negligence on their part, that is, the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a
family.
That in both quasi-delicts and crimes the parents primarily respond for such damages is buttressed by the
corresponding provisions in both codes that the minor transgressor shall be answerable or shall respond with
his own property only in the absence or in case of insolvency of the former. Thus, for civil liability ex quasi
delicto of minors, Article 2182 of the Civil Code states that" (i)f the minor causing damage has no parents or
guardian, the minor . . . shall be answerable with his own property in an action against him where a guardian
ad litem shall be appointed." For civil liability ex delicto of minors, an equivalent provision is found in the third
paragraph of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
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"Should there be no person having such . . . minor under his authority, legal guardianship or control, or if such
person be insolvent, said . . . minor shall respond with (his) own property, excepting property exempt from
execution, in accordance with civil law."
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The civil liability of parents for felonies committed by their minor children contemplated in the aforesaid rule in
Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code has, aside from the
aforecited case of Fuellas, been the subject of a number of cases adjudicated by this Court, viz.: Exconde v.
Capuno, Et Al., 22 Araneta v. Arreglado, 23 Salen, Et. Al. v. Balce, 24 Paleyan, etc., Et. Al. v. Bangkili, Et Al.,
25 and Elcano, et al, v. Hill, Et. Al. 26 Parenthetically, the aforesaid cases were basically on the issue of the
civil liability of parents for crimes committed by their minor children over 9 but under 15 years of age, who
acted with discernment, and also of minors 15 years of aye or over, since these situations are not covered by
Article 101, Revised Penal Code. In both instances, this Court held that the issue of parental civil liability
should be resolved in accordance with the provisions of Article 2180 of the Civil Code for the reasons well
expressed in Salen and adopted in the cases hereinbefore enumerated that to hold that the civil liability under
Article 2180 would apply only to quasi-delicts and not to criminal offenses would result in the absurdity that in
an act involving mere negligence the parents would be liable but not where the damage is caused with
criminal intent. In said cases, however, there are unfortunate variances resulting in a regrettable inconsistency
in the Courts determination of whether the liability of the parents, in cases involving either crimes or quasidelicts of their minor children, is primary or subsidiary.
In Exconde, where the 15-year old minor was convicted of double homicide through reckless imprudence, in a
separate civil action arising from the crime the minor and his father were held jointly and severally liable for
failure of the latter to prove the diligence of a good father of a family. The same liability in solidum and,
therefore, primary liability was imposed in a separate civil action in Araneta on the parents and their 14-year
old son who was found guilty of frustrated homicide, but on the authority of Article 2194 of the Civil Code
providing for solidary responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict.
However, in Salen, the father was declared subsidiarily liable for damages arising from the conviction of his
son, who was over 15 but less than 18 years of age, by applying Article 2180 but, this time, disregarding
Article 2194 of the Civil Code. In the present case, as already explained, the petitioners herein were also held
liable but supposedly in line with Fuellas which purportedly declared the parents subsidiarily liable for the civil
liability for serious physical injuries committed by their 13-year old son. On the other hand, in Paleyan, the
mother and her 19-year old son were adjudged solidarily liable for damages arising from his conviction for
homicide by the application of Article 2180 of the Civil Code since this is likewise not covered by Article 101 of
the Revised Penal Code. Finally, in Elcano, although the son was acquitted in a homicide charge due to "lack of
intent, coupled with mistake," it was ruled that while under Article 2180 of the Civil Code there should be
solidary liability for damages, since the son, "although married, was living with his father and getting
subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence," but "is now of age, as a matter of equity" the father was
only held subsidiarily liable.
It bears stressing, however, that the Revised Penal Code provides for subsidiary liability only for persons
causing damages under the compulsion of irresistible force or under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear; 27
innkeepers, tavernkeepers and proprietors of establishments; 28 employers, teachers, persons and
corporations engaged in industry; 29 and principals, accomplices and accessories for the unpaid civil liability of
their co-accused in the other classes. 30
Also, coming back to respondent courts reliance on Fuellas in its decision in the present case, it is not exactly
accurate to say that Fuellas provided for subsidiary liability of the parents therein. A careful scrutiny shows
that what respondent court quoted verbatim in its decision now on appeal in the present case, and which it

attributed to Fuellas, was the syllabus on the law report of said case which spoke of "subsidiary" liability.
However, such categorization does not specifically appear in the text of the decision in Fuellas. In fact, after
reviewing therein the cases of Exconde, Araneta and Salen and the discussions in said cases of Article 101 of
the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, this Court concluded its decision in this
wise:
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"Moreover, the case at bar was decided by the Court of Appeals on the basis of evidence submitted therein by
both parties, independent of the criminal case. And responsibility for fault or negligence under Article 2176
upon which the present action was instituted, is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising
from fault or negligence under the Penal Code (Art. 2177), and having in mind the reasons behind the law as
heretofore stated, any discussion as to the minors criminal responsibility is of no moment."
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Under the foregoing considerations, therefore, we hereby rule that the parents are and should be held
primarily liable for the civil liability arising from criminal offenses committed by their minor children under
their legal authority or control, or who live in their company, unless it is proven that the former acted with the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent such damages. That primary liability is premised on the
provisions of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code with respect to damages ex delicto caused by their children
9 years of age or under, or over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted without discernment; and, with regard
to their children over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted with discernment, or 15 years or over but under
21 years of age, such primary liability shall be imposed pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. 31
Under said Article 2180, the enforcement of such liability shall be effected against the father and, in case of
his death or incapacity, the mother. This was amplified by the Child and Youth Welfare Code which provides
that the same shall devolve upon the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, upon the mother or, in
case of her death or incapacity, upon the guardian, but the liability may also be voluntarily assumed by a
relative or family friend of the youthful offender. 32 However, under the Family Code, this civil liability is now,
without such alternative qualification, the responsibility of the parents and those who exercise parental
authority over the minor offender. 33 For civil liability arising from quasi-delicts committed by minors, the
same rules shall apply in accordance with Articles 2180 and 2182 of the Civil Code, as so modified.
In the case at bar, whether the death of the hapless Julie Ann Gotiong was caused by a felony or a quasi-delict
committed by Wendell Libi, respondent court did not err in holding petitioners liable for damages arising
therefrom. Subject to the preceding modifications of the premises relied upon by it therefor and on the bases
of the legal imperatives herein explained, we conjoin in its findings that said petitioners failed to duly exercise
the requisite diligentissimi patris familias to prevent such damages.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant Petition is DENIED and the assailed judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is
hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. L-24101. September 30, 1970.]
MARIA TERESA Y. CUADRA, minor represented by her father ULISES P. CUADRA, ET AL.,PlaintiffsAppellees, v. ALFONSO MONFORT, Defendant-Appellant.
Rodolfo J. Herman for Plaintiffs-Appellees.
Luis G. Torres & Abraham E. Tionko for defendant appellant.

DECISION

MAKALINTAL, J.:

This is an action for damages based on quasi-delict, decided by the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental favorably to the plaintiffs and appealed by the defendant to the Court of Appeals, which certified
the same to us since the facts are not in issue.
Maria Teresa Cuadra, 12, and Maria Teresa Monfort, 13, were classmates in Grade Six at the Mabini
Elementary School in Bacolod City. On July 9, 1962 their teacher assigned them, together with three other
classmates, to weed the grass in the school premises. While thus engaged Maria Teresa Monfort found a
plastic headband, an ornamental object commonly worn by young girls over their hair. Jokingly she said aloud
that she had found an earthworm and, evidently to frighten the Cuadra girl, tossed the object at her. At that
precise moment the latter turned around to face her friend, and the object hit her right eye. Smarting from
the pain, she rubbed the injured part and treated it with some powder. The next day, July 10, the eye became
swollen and it was then that the girl related the incident to her parents, who thereupon took her to a doctor
for treatment. She underwent surgical operation twice, first on July 20 and again on August 4, 1962, and
stayed in the hospital for a total of twenty-three days, for all of which the parents spent the sum of P1,703.75.
Despite the medical efforts, however, Maria Teresa Cuadra completely lost the sight of her right eye.
In the civil suit subsequently instituted by the parents in behalf of their minor daughter against Alfonso

Monfort, Maria Teresa Monforts father, the defendant was ordered to pay P1,703.00 as actual damages;
P20,000.00 as moral damages; and P2,000.00 as attorneys fees, plus the costs of the suit.
The legal issue posed in this appeal is the liability of a parent for an act of his minor child which causes
damage to another under the specific facts related above and the applicable provisions of the Civil Code,
particularly Articles 2176 and 2180 thereof, which read:
"ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged
to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter."
"ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions,
but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the
minor children who live in their company.
x

The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage."
library

The underlying basis of the liability imposed by Article 2176 is the fault or negligence accompanying the act or
the omission, there being no willfulness or intent to cause damage thereby. When the act or omission is that
of one person for whom another is responsible, the latter then becomes himself liable under Article 2180, in
the different cases enumerated therein, such as that of the father or the mother under the circumstances
above quoted. The basis of this vicarious, although primary, liability is, as in Article 2176, fault or negligence,
which is presumed from that which accompanied the causative act or omission. The presumption is merely
prima facie and may therefore be rebutted. This is the clear and logical inference that may be drawn from the
last paragraph of Article 2180, which states "that the responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when
the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage."
c

virtua1aw

library

Since the fact thus required to be proven is a matter of defense, the burden of proof necessarily rests on the
defendant. But what is the exact degree of diligence contemplated, and how does a parent prove it in
connection with a particular act or omission of a minor child, especially when it takes place in his absence or
outside his immediate company? Obviously there can be no meticulously calibrated measure applicable; and
when the law simply refers to "all the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damage," it implies a
consideration of the attendant circumstances in every individual case, to determine whether or not by the
exercise of such diligence the damage could have been prevented.
In the present case there is nothing from which it may be inferred that the defendant could have prevented
the damage by the observance of due care, or that he was in any way remiss in the exercise of his parental
authority in failing to foresee such damage, or the act which caused it. On the contrary, his child was at
school, where it was his duty to send her and where she was, as he had the right to expect her to be, under
the care and supervision of the teacher. And as far as the act which caused the injury was concerned, it was
an innocent prank not unusual among children at play and which no parent, however careful, would have any
special reason to anticipate much less guard against. Nor did it reveal any mischievous propensity, or indeed
any trait in the childs character which would reflect unfavorably on her upbringing and for which the blame
could be attributed to her parents.
The victim, no doubt, deserves no little commiseration and sympathy for the tragedy that befell her. But if the
defendant is at all obligated to compensate her suffering, the obligation has no legal sanction enforceable in
court, but only the moral compulsion of good conscience.
The decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint is dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs.
[G.R. No. 85044. June 3, 1992.]
MACARIO TAMARGO, CELSO TAMARGO and AURELIA TAMARGO, Petitioners, v. THE HON. COURT OF
APPEALS; THE HON. ARISTON L. RUBIO, RTC Judge, Branch 20, Vigan, Ilocos Sur; VICTOR
BUNDOC; and CLARA BUNDOC, Respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL ACTIONS; MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION; CONSIDERED PRO FORMA WHERE
NOTICE OF TIME AND PLACE OF HEARING NOT CONTAINED THEREIN. It will be recalled that petitioners
motion (and supplemental motion) for reconsideration filed before the trial court, not having complied with the
requirements of Section 13, Rule 41, and Section 4, Rule 15, of the Revised Rules of Court, were considered
pro forma and hence did not interrupt and suspend the reglementary period to appeal: the trial court held that
the motions, not having contained a notice of time and place of hearing, had become useless pieces of paper
which did not interrupt the reglementary period. As in fact repeatedly held by this Court, what is mandatory is

the

service

of

the motion

on

the

opposing counsel indicating the

time

and place of hearing.

2. ID.; SUPREME COURT; SUSPENSION OF APPLICATION OF TECHNICAL RULES EXERCISED IN CASE AT BAR.
In view, however, of the nature of the issue raised in the instant Petition, and in order that substantial
justice may be served, the Court, invoking its right to suspend the application of technical rules to prevent
manifest injustice, elects to treat the notice of appeal as having been seasonably filed before the trial court,
and the motion (and supplemental motion) for reconsideration filed by petitioner in the trial court as having
interrupted the reglementary period for appeal. (Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, 72 SCRA 120 [1978])
3. CIVIL LAW; TORTS; DOCTRINE OF "IMPUTED NEGLIGENCE" OR VICARIOUS LIABILITY, CONSTRUED. It is
not disputed that Adelberto Bundocs voluntary act of shooting Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle gave rise to a
cause of action on quasi-delict against him. (Article 2176 of the Civil Code) Upon the other hand, the law
imposes civil liability upon the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that
may be caused by a minor child who lives with them. (Article 2180 of the Civil Code) This principle of parental
liability is a species of what is frequently designated as vicarious liability, or the doctrine of "imputed
negligence" under Anglo-American tort law, where a person is not only liable for torts committed by himself,
but also for torts committed by others with whom he has a certain relationship and for whom he is
responsible. Thus, parental liability is made a natural or logical consequence of the duties and responsibilities
of parents their parental authority which includes the instructing, controlling and disciplining of the child.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; BASIS. The civil liability imposed upon parents for the torts of their minor children living
with them, may be seen to be based upon the parental authority vested by the Civil Code upon such parents.
The civil law assumes that when an unemancipated child living with its parents commits a tortious act, the
parents were negligent in the performance of their legal and natural duty closely to supervise the child who is
in their custody and control. Parental liability is, in other words, anchored upon parental authority coupled
with presumed parental dereliction in the discharge of the duties accompanying such authority. (Cangco v.
Manila Railroad Co., 36 Phil. 768 [1918])
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PARENTAL DERELICTION, ONLY A PRESUMPTION. The parental dereliction is, of
course, only presumed and the presumption can be overturned under Article 2180 of the Civil Code by proof
that the parents had exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.
6. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL ACTIONS; PARTIES; PARENTS WHO HAD ACTUAL CUSTODY OF MINOR,
INDISPENSABLE PARTIES TO ACTION FOR DAMAGES BASED ON TORT. In the instant case, the shooting of
Jennifer by Adelberto with an air rifle occurred when parental authority was still lodged in respondent Bundoc
spouses, the natural parents of the minor Adelberto. It would thus follow that the natural parents who had
then actual custody of the minor Adelberto, are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages.
7. CIVIL LAW; TORTS; DOCTRINE OF "IMPUTED NEGLIGENCE" OR VICARIOUS LIABILITY; EFFECT OF
ADOPTION THEREON; CASE AT BAR. We do not believe that parental authority is properly regarded as
having been retroactively transferred to and vested in the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, at the time
the air rifle shooting happened. We do not consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of
adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at a time when the adopting parents
had no actual or physical custody over the adopted child. Retroactive effect may perhaps be given to the
granting of the petition for adoption where such is essential to permit the accrual of some benefit or
advantage in favor of the adopted child. In the instant case, however, to hold that parental authority had been
retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with liability for a tortious act that they
could not have foreseen and which they could not have prevented (since they were at the time in the United
States and had no physical custody over the child Adelberto) would be unfair and unconscionable. Such a
result, moreover, would be inconsistent with the philosophical and policy basis underlying the doctrine of
vicarious liability. Put a little differently, no presumption of parental dereliction on the part of the adopting
parents, the Rapisura spouses, could have arisen since Adelberto was not in fact subject to their control at the
time the tort was committed.
8. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; CERTIORARI; DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT WHERE INDISPENSABLE
PARTIES ARE ALREADY BEFORE THE COURT CONSTITUTES GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. Under Article
35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, parental authority is provisionally vested in the adopting parents
during the period of trial custody, i.e., before the issuance of a decree of adoption, precisely because the
adopting parents are given actual custody of the child during such trial period. In the instant case, the trial
custody period either had not yet begun or had already been completed at the time of the air rifle shooting; in
any case, actual custody of Adelberto was then with his natural parents, not the adopting parents.
Accordingly, we conclude that respondent Bundoc spouses, Adelbertos natural parents, were indispensable
parties to the suit for damages brought by petitioners, and that the dismissal by the trial court of petitioners
complaint, the indispensable parties being already before the court, constituted grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

DECISION

FELICIANO, J.:

On 20 October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air
rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death. Accordingly, a civil complaint for damages was filed with the

Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Vigan, Ilocos Sur, docketed as Civil Case No. 3457-V, by Petitioner Macario
Tamargo, Jennifers adopting parent, and petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifers natural
parents, against respondent spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelbertos natural parents with whom he was
living at the time of the tragic incident. In addition to this case for damages, a criminal information for
Homicide through Reckless Imprudence was filed [Criminal Case No. 1722-V] against Adelberto Bundoc.
Adelberto, however, was acquitted and exempted from criminal liability on the ground that he had acted
without discernment.

Prior to the incident, or on 10 December 1981, the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had filed a petition to
adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc in Special Proceedings No. 0373-T before the then Court of First Instance of
Ilocos Sur. This petition for adoption was granted on 18 November 1982, that is, after Adelberto had shot and
killed Jennifer.

In their Answer, respondent spouses Bundoc, Adelbertos natural parents, reciting the result of the foregoing
petition for adoption, claimed that not they, but rather the adopting parents, namely the spouses Sabas and
Felisa Rapisura, were indispensable parties to the action since parental authority had shifted to the adopting
parents from the moment the successful petition for adoption was filed.

Petitioners in their Reply contended that since Adelberto Bundoc was then actually living with his natural
parents, parental authority had not ceased nor been relinquished by the mere filing and granting of a petition
for adoption.

The trial court on 3 December 1987 dismissed petitioners complaint, ruling that respondent natural parents of
Adelberto indeed were not indispensable parties to the action.

Petitioners received a copy of the trial courts Decision on 7 December 1987. Within the 15-day reglementary
period, or on 14 December 1987, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration followed by a supplemental
motion for reconsideration on 15 January 1988. It appearing, however, that the motions failed to comply with
Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court that notice of the motion shall be given to all
parties concerned at least three (3) days before the hearing of said motion; and that said notice shall state
the time and place of hearing both motions were denied by the trial court in an Order dated 18 April 1988.
On 28 April 1988, petitioners filed a notice of appeal. In its Order dated 6 June 1988, the trial court dismissed
the notice of appeal, this time ruling that the notice had been filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period
ending 22 December 1987.

Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for mandamus and certiorari questioning the trial courts
Decision dated 3 December 1987 and the Orders dated 18 April 1988 and 6 June 1988. The Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition, ruling that petitioners had lost their right to appeal.

In the present Petition for Review, petitioners once again contend that respondent spouses Bundoc are the
indispensible parties to the action for damages caused by the acts of their minor child, Adelberto Bundoc.
Resolution of this Petition hinges on the following issues: (1) whether or not petitioners, notwithstanding loss
of their right to appeal, may still file the instant Petition; conversely, whether the Court may still take
cognizance of the case even though petitioners appeal had been filed out of time; and (2) whether or not the
effects of adoption, insofar as parental authority is concerned, may be given retroactive effect so as to make
the adopting parents the indispensable parties in a damage case filed against their adopted child, for acts
committed by the latter when actual custody was yet lodged with the biological parents.
1. It will be recalled that petitioners motion (and supplemental motion) for reconsideration filed before the
trial court, not having complied with the requirements of Section 13, Rule 41, and Section 4, Rule 15, of the
Revised Rules of Court, were considered pro forma and hence did not interrupt and suspend the reglementary
period to appeal: the trial court held that the motions, not having contained a notice of time and place of
hearing, had become useless pieces of paper which did not interrupt the reglementary period. 1 As in fact
repeatedly held by this Court, what is mandatory is the service of the motion on the opposing counsel
indicating the time and place of hearing. 2

In view, however, of the nature of the issue raised in the instant Petition, and in order that substantial justice
may be served, the Court, invoking its right to suspend the application of technical rules to prevent manifest
injustice, elects to treat the notice of appeal as having been seasonably filed before the trial court, and the
motion (and supplemental motion) for reconsideration filed by petitioner in the trial court as having
interrupted the reglementary period for appeal. As the Court held in Gregorio v. Court of Appeals: 3
"Dismissal of appeal purely on technical grounds is frowned upon where the policy of the courts is to
encourage hearings of appeal on their merits. The rules of procedure ought not be applied in a very rigid
technical sense, rules of procedure are used only to help secure not override, substantial justice. If a technical
and rigid enforcement of the rules is made, their aim would be defeated." 4

2. It is not disputed that Adelberto Bundocs voluntary act of shooting Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle gave
rise to a cause of action on quasi-delict against him. As Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides:

"Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for
the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties,
is called a quasi-delict . . . ."
cralaw virtua1aw library

Upon the other hand, the law imposes civil liability upon the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the
mother, for any damages that may be caused by a minor child who lives with them. Article 2180 of the Civil
Code reads:

"The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also for
those of persons for whom one is responsible.

The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the
minor children who live in their company.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the person herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage." (Emphasis supplied)
This principle of parental liability is a species of what is frequently designated as vicarious liability, or the
doctrine of "imputed negligence" under Anglo-American tort law, where a person is not only liable for torts
committed by himself, but also for torts committed by others with whom he has a certain relationship and for
whom he is responsible. Thus, parental liability is made a natural or logical consequence of the duties and
responsibilities of parents their parental authority which includes the instructing, controlling and
disciplining of the child. 5 The basis for the doctrine of vicarious liability was explained by the Court in Cangco
v. Manila Railroad Co. 6 in the following terms:

"With respect to extra-contractual obligation arising from negligence, whether of act or omission, it is
competent for the legislature to elect and our Legislature has so elected to limit such liability to cases in
which the person upon whom such an obligation is imposed is morally culpable or, on the contrary, for reasons
of public policy, to extend that liability, without regard to the lack of moral culpability, so as to include
responsibility for the negligence of those persons whose acts or omissions are imputable, by a legal fiction, to
others who are in a position to exercise an absolute or limited control over them. The legislature which
adopted our Civil Code has elected to limit extra-contractual liability with certain well-defined exceptions
to cases in which moral culpability can be directly imputed to the persons to be charged. This moral
responsibility may consist in having failed to exercise due care in ones own acts, or in having failed to
exercise due care in the selection and control of ones agents or servants, or in the control of persons who, by
reasons of their status, occupy a position of dependency with respect to the person made liable for their
conduct." 7 (Emphasis supplied)

The civil liability imposed upon parents for the torts of their minor children living with them, may be seen to
be based upon the parental authority vested by the Civil Code upon such parents. The civil law assumes that
when an unemancipated child living with its parents commits a tortious act, the parents were negligent in the
performance of their legal and natural duty closely to supervise the child who is in their custody and control.
Parental liability is, in other words, anchored upon parental authority coupled with presumed parental
dereliction in the discharge of the duties accompanying such authority. The parental dereliction is, of course,
only presumed and the presumption can be overturned under Article 2180 of the Civil Code by proof that the
parents had exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.
In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with an air rifle occurred when parental authority
was still lodged in respondent Bundoc spouses, the natural parents of the minor Adelberto. It would thus
follow that the natural parents who had then actual custody of the minor Adelberto, are the indispensable
parties to the suit for damages.

The natural parents of Adelberto, however, stoutly maintain that because a decree of adoption was issued by
the adoption court in favor of the Rapisura spouses, parental authority was vested in the latter as adopting
parents as of the time of the filing the petition for adoption that is, before Adelberto had shot Jennifer with an
air rifle. The Bundoc spouses contend that they were therefore free of any parental responsibility for
Adelbertos allegedly tortious conduct.

Respondent Bundoc spouses rely on Article 36 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code 8 which reads as follows:

"Article 36. Decree of Adoption. If, after considering the report of the Department of Social Welfare or duly
licensed child placement agency and the evidence submitted before it, the court is satisfied that the petitioner
is qualified to maintain, care for, and educate the child, that the trial custody period has been completed, and
that the best interests of the child will be promoted by the adoption, a decree of adoption shall be entered,
which shall be effective as of the date the original petition was filed. The decree shall state the name by which
the child is thenceforth to be known." (Emphasis supplied).

The Bundoc spouses further argue that the above Article 36 should be read in relation to Article 39 of the
same Code:

"Art. 39. Effect of Adoption. The adoption shall:

x

(2) Dissolve the authority vested in the natural parents, except where the adopter is the spouse of the
surviving natural parent;"
x
(Emphasis

x
supplied)

and urge that their parental authority must be deemed to have been dissolved as of the time the petition for
adoption was filed.
The Court is not persuaded. As earlier noted, under the Civil Code, the basis of parental liability for the torts of
a minor child is the relationship existing between the parents and the minor child living with them and over
whom, the law presumes, the parents exercise supervision and control. Article 58 of the Child and Youth
Welfare Code, re-enacted this rule:
"Article 58. Torts Parents and guardians are responsible for the damage caused by the child under their
parental authority in accordance with the Civil Code." (Emphasis supplied).
Article 221 of the Family Code of the Philippines 9 has similarly insisted upon the requisite that the child, doer
of the tortious act, shall have been in the actual custody of the parents sought to be held liable for the ensuing
damage:
j

"Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and
damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company and under
their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law." (Emphasis supplied)
We do not believe that parental authority is properly regarded as having been retroactively transferred to and
vested in the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, at the time the air rifle shooting happened. We do not
consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of adoption so as to impose a liability upon the
adopting parents accruing at a time when the adopting parents had no actual or physical custody over the
adopted child. Retroactive effect may perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for adoption where such
is essential to permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child. In the instant
case, however, to hold that parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to
burden them with liability for a tortious act that they could not have foreseen and which they could not have
prevented (since they were at the time in the United States and had no physical custody over the child
Adelberto) would be unfair and unconscionable. Such a result, moreover, would be inconsistent with the
philosophical and policy basis underlying the doctrine of vicarious liability. Put a little differently, no
presumption of parental dereliction on the part of the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, could have
arisen since Adelberto was not in fact subject to their control at the time the tort was committed.
Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code fortifies the conclusion reached above. Article 35 provides as
follows:
jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Art. 35. Trial Custody. No Petition for adoption shall be finally granted unless and until the adopting
parents are given by the courts a supervised trial custody period of at least six months to assess their
adjustment and emotional readiness for the legal union. During the period of trial custody, parental authority
shall be vested in the adopting parents." (Emphasis supplied)
Under the above Article 35, parental authority is provisionally vested in the adopting parents during the period
of trial custody, i.e., before the issuance of a decree of adoption, precisely because the adopting parents are
given actual custody of the child during such trial period. In the instant case, the trial custody period either
had not yet begun or had already been completed at the time of the air rifle shooting; in any case, actual
custody of Adelberto was then with his natural parents, not the adopting parents.
Accordingly, we conclude that respondent Bundoc spouses, Adelbertos natural parents, were indispensable
parties to the suit for damages brought by petitioners, and that the dismissal by the trial court of petitioners

complaint, the indispensable parties being already before the court, constituted grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED DUE COURSE and the Decision
of the Court of Appeals dated 6 September 1988, in C.A.-G.R. No. SP-15016 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Petitioners complaint filed before the trial court is hereby REINSTATED and this case is REMANDED to
that court for further proceedings consistent with this Decision. Costs against respondent Bundoc spouses.
This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. L-47745. April 15, 1988.]
JOSE S. AMADORA, LORETA A. AMADORA, JOSE A. AMADORA JR., NORMA A. YLAYA, PANTALEON A.
AMADORA, JOSE A. AMADORA III, LUCY A. AMADORA, ROSALINDA A. AMADORA, PERFECTO A.
AMADORA, SERREC A. AMADORA, VICENTE A. AMADORA and MARIA TISCALINA A.
AMADORA, Petitioners, v. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE-RECOLETOS,
VICTOR LLUCH, SERGIO P. DAMASO, JR., CELESTINO DICON, ANIANO, ABELLANA, PABLITO
DAFFON, thru his parents and natural guardians, MR. and MRS. NICANOR GUMBAN, and ROLANDO
VALENCIA, thru his guardian, ATTY. FRANCISCO ALONSO,Respondents.
Jose S. Amadora & Associates, for Petitioners.
Padilla Law Office for Respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS; QUASI-DELICT; LIABILITY OF TEACHERS AND HEADS OF
ESTABLISHMENTS; APPLIES TO ALL SCHOOLS, WHETHER ACADEMIC OR NOT; RATIONAL. The provision in
Article 2180 of the Civil Code should apply to all schools, academic as well as non-academic. Where the school
is academic rather than technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort committed by the student
will attach to the teacher in charge of such student, following the first part of the provision. This is the general
rule. In other words, teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of their students except where the school
is technical in nature, in which case it is the head thereof who shall be answerable. There is really no
substantial distinction between the academic and the non-academic schools insofar as torts committed by
their students are concerned. The same vigilance is expected from the teacher over the students under his
control
and
supervision,
whatever
the
nature
of
the
school
where
he
is
teaching.
2. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION; REDDENDO SINGULA SINGULIS; APPLIED IN ARTICLE
2180 OF THE CIVIL CODE. Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides: "Lastly, teachers or heads of
establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or
apprentices so long as they remain in their custody." Following the canon of reddendo singula singulis,
"teachers should apply to the words "pupils and students and "heads of establishments of arts and trades" to
the word "apprentices."
3. CIVIL LAW; OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS; QUASI-DELICT; LIABILITY OF TEACHERS AND HEADS OF
ESTABLISHMENTS CO-EXTENSIVE WITH THE PERIOD THE STUDENT IS IN SCHOOL PREMISES IN PURSUANCE
OF LEGITIMATE OBJECTIVE. The student is in the custody of the school authorities as long as he is under
the control and influence of the school and within its premises, whether the semester has not yet begun or
has already ended. As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school premises in pursuance of a
legitimate student objective, in the exercise of a legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a
legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege, the responsibility of the
school authorities over the student continues.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; TEACHER-IN-CHARGE, DEFINED. The teacher-in-charge is the one designated by the
dean, principal, or other administrative superior to exercise supervision over the pupils in the specific classes
or sections to which they are assigned.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; LIABILITY FALLS DIRECTLY ON THE TEACHER OR HEAD OF SCHOOL. It should be
noted that the liability imposed by this article is supposed to fall directly on the teacher or the head of the
school of arts and trades and not on the school itself.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR, BASIS OF LIABILITY OF SCHOOL FOR NEGLIGENCE OF
TEACHERS AND HEADS. If at all, the school, whatever its nature, may be held to answer for the acts of its
teachers or even of the head thereof under the general principle of respondeat superior, but then it may
exculpate itself from liability by proof that it had exercised the diligence of a bonus paterfamilias.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DILIGENCE OF A GOOD FATHER OF A FAMILY, PROPER DEFENSE. Such defense of
bonus pater familias is also available to the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades directly held
to answer for the tort committed by the student. As long as the defendant can show that he had taken the
necessary precautions to prevent the injury complained of, he can exonerate himself from the liability imposed
by Article 2180.

8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; LIABILITY ATTACHES REGARDLESS OF AGE OF STUDENT. It should be observed that
the teacher will be held liable not only when he is acting in loco parentis for the law does not require that the
offending student be of minority age. Unlike the parent, who will be liable only if his child is still a minor, the
teacher is held answerable by the law for the act of the student under him regardless of the students age.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring and dissenting:

cha

1. CIVIL LAW; OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS; QUASI-DELICT; LIABILITY OF TEACHERS AND HEADS OF
ESTABLISHMENTS; TERM NOT LIMITED TO TEACHER-IN-CHARGE; EMBRACES ONE THAT STANDS IN LOCO
PARENTIS. I concur, except with respect to the restricted meaning given the term "teacher" in Article 2180
of the Civil Code as "teacher-in-charge." This would limit liability to occasions where there are classes under
the immediate charge of a teacher, which does not seem to be the intendment of the law. The philosophy of
the law is that whoever stands in loco parentis will have the same duties and obligations as parents whenever
in such a standing. Those persons are mandatorily held liable for the tortious acts of pupils and students so
long as the latter remain in their custody, meaning their protective and supervisory custody.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RATIONAL OF LIABILITY. "The protective custody of the school heads and teachers is
mandatorily substituted for that of the parents, and hence, it becomes their obligation as well as that of the
school itself to provide proper supervision of the students activities during the whole time that they are at
attendance in the school, including recess time, as well as to take the necessary precautions to protect the
students in their custody from dangers and hazards that would reasonably be anticipated, including injuries
that some students themselves may inflict wilfully or through negligence on their fellow students. (Palisoc vs,
Brillantes, 41 SCRA 548)
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DEFENSE AGAINST LIABILITY. As provided for in the same Article 2180, the
responsibility treated of shall cease when the persons mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of
a good father of a family to prevent damage.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; LIABILITY OF SCHOOLS, EXPLAINED; DEFENSE AVAILABLE. And while a school is,
admittedly, not directly liable since Article 2180 speaks only of teachers and schools heads, yet, by virtue of
the same provision, the school, as their employer, may be held liable for the failure of its teachers or school
heads to perform their mandatory legal duties as substitute parents (Sangco, Philippine Law on Torts &
Damages, 1978 ed., p. 201). Again, the school may exculpate itself from liability by proving that it had
exercised the diligence of a good father of the family.

DECISION

CRUZ, J.:

Like any prospective graduate, Alfredo Amadora was looking forward to the commencement exercises where
he would ascend the stage and in the presence of his relatives and friends receive his high school diploma.
These ceremonies were scheduled on April 16, 1972. As it turned out, though, fate would intervene and deny
him that awaited experience. On April 13, 1972, while they were in the auditorium of their school, the Colegio
de San Jose-Recoletes, a classmate, Pablito Daffon, fired a gun that mortally hit Alfredo, ending all his
expectations and his life as well. The victim was only seventeen years old.

Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence. 2 Additionally, the herein petitioners, as the
victims parents, filed a civil action for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code against the Colegio de
San Jose-Recoletos, its rector, the high school principal, the dean of boys, and the physics teacher, together
with Daffon and two other students, through their respective parents. The complaint against the students was
later dropped. After trial, the Court of First Instance of Cebu held the remaining defendants liable to the
plaintiffs in the sum of P294,984.00, representing death compensation, loss of earning capacity, costs of
litigation, funeral expenses, moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorneys fees. 3 On appeal to the
respondent court, however, the decision was reversed and all the defendants were completely absolved.
In its decision, which is now the subject of this petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the
respondent court found that Article 2180 was not applicable as the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos was not a
school of arts and trades but an academic institution of learning. It also held that the students were not in the
custody of the school at the time of the incident as the semester had already ended, that there was no clear
identification of the fatal gun, and that in any event the defendants had exercised the necessary diligence in
preventing the injury.

The basic undisputed facts are that Alfredo Amadora went to the San Jose-Recoletos on April 13, 1972, and
while in its auditorium was shot to death by Pablito Daffon, a classmate. On the implications and
consequences of these facts, the parties sharply disagree.
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The petitioners contend that their son was in the school to finish his physics experiment as a prerequisite to
his graduation; hence, he was then under the custody of the private respondents. The private respondents

submit that Alfredo Amadora had gone to the school only for the purpose of submitting his physics report and
that
he
was
no
longer
in
their
custody
because
the
semester
had
already
ended.
There is also the question of the identity of the gun used which the petitioners consider important because of
an earlier incident which they claim underscores the negligence of the school and at least one of the private
respondents. It is not denied by the respondents that on April 7, 1972, Sergio Damaso, Jr., the dean of boys,
confiscated from Jose Gumban an unlicensed pistol but later returned it to him without making a report to the
principal or taking any further action. 6 As Gumban was one of the companions of Daffon when the latter fired
the gun that killed Alfredo, the petitioners contend that this was the same pistol that had been confiscated
from Gumban and that their son would not have been killed if it had not been returned by Damaso. The
respondents say, however, that there is no proof that the gun was the same firearm that killed Alfredo.
Resolution of all these disagreements will depend on the interpretation of Article 2180 which, as it happens, is
invoked by both parties in support of their conflicting positions. The pertinent part of this article reads as
follows:
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"Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their
pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody."
c

Three cases have so far been decided by the Court in connection with the above-quoted provision, to wit:
Exconde v. Capuno, 7 Mercado v. Court of Appeals, 8 and Palisoc v. Brillantes. 9 These will be briefly reviewed
in this opinion for a better resolution of the case at bar.

In the Exconde Case, Dante Capuno, a student of the Balintawak Elementary School and a Boy Scout,
attended a Rizal Day parade on instructions of the city school supervisor. After the parade, the boy boarded a
jeep, took over its wheel and drove it so recklessly that it turned turtle, resulting in the death of two of its
passengers. Dante was found guilty of double homicide with reckless imprudence. In the separate civil action
filed against them, his father was held solidarily liable with him in damages under Article 1903 (now Article
2180) of the Civil Code for the tort committed by the 15-year old boy.

This decision, which was penned by Justice Bautista Angelo on June 29, 1957, exculpated the school in an
obiter dictum (as it was not a party to the case) on the ground that it was not a school of arts and trades.
Justice J.B.L. Reyes, with whom Justices Sabino Padilla and Alex Reyes concurred, dissented, arguing that it
was the school authorities who should be held liable. Liability under this role, he said, was imposed on (1)
teachers in general; and (2) heads of schools of arts and trades in particular. The modifying clause "of
establishments of arts and trades" should apply only to "heads" and not "teachers."
Exconde was reiterated in the Mercado Case, and with an elaboration. A student cut a classmate with a razor
blade during recess time at the Lourdes Catholic School in Quezon City, and the parents of the victim sued the
culprits parents for damages. Through Justice Labrador, the Court declared in another obiter (as the school
itself had also not been sued) that the school was not liable because it was not an establishment of arts and
trades. Morever, the custody requirement had not been proved as this "contemplates a situation where the
student lives and boards with the teacher, such that the control, direction and influences on the pupil
supersede those of the parents." Justice J.B.L. Reyes did not take part but the other members of the court
concurred in this decision promulgated on May 30, 1960.

In Palisoc v. Brillantes, decided on October 4, 1971, a 16-year old student was killed by a classmate with fist
blows in the laboratory of the Manila Technical Institute. Although the wrongdoer who was already of age
was not boarding in the school, the head thereof and the teacher in charge were held solidarily liable with him.
The Court declared through Justice Teehankee:

"The phrase used in the cited article so long as (the students) remain in their custody means the
protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and
students for as long as they are at attendance in the school, including recess time. There is nothing in the law
that requires that for such liability to attach, the pupil or student who commits the tortious act must live and
board in the school, as erroneously held by the lower court, and the dicta in Mercado (as well as in Exconde)
on which it relied, must now be deemed to have been set aside by the present decision."
This decision was concurred in by five other members, 10 including Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who stressed, in
answer to the dissenting opinion, that even students already of age were covered by the provision since they
were equally in the custody of the school and subject to its discipline. Dissenting with three others, 11 Justice
Makalintal was for retaining the custody interpretation in Mercado and submitted that the rule should apply
only to torts committed by students not yet of age as the school would be acting only in loco parentis.
In a footnote, Justice Teehankee said he agreed with Justice Reyes dissent in the Exconde Case but added
that "since the school involved at bar is a non-academic school, the question as to the applicability of the cited
codal provision to academic institutions will have to await another case wherein it may properly be raised."
cr

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This is the case.

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Unlike in Exconde and Mercado, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos has been directly impleaded and is sought
to be held liable under Article 2180; and unlike in Palisoc, it is not a school of arts and trades but an academic
institution of learning. The parties herein have also directly raised the question of whether or not Article 2180
covers even establishments which are technically not schools of arts and trades, and, if so, when the offending
student is supposed to be "in its custody."
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After an exhaustive examination of the problem, the Court has come to the conclusion that the provision in
question should apply to all schools, academic as well as non-academic. Where the school is academic rather
than technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the
teacher in charge of such student, following the first part of the provision. This is the general rule. In the case
of establishments of arts and trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, who shall be held liable as an
exception to the general rule. In other words, teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of their students
except where the school is technical in nature, in which case it is the head thereof who shall be answerable.
Following the canon of reddendo singula singulis, "teachers" should apply to the words "pupils and students"
and "heads of establishments of arts and trades" to the word "apprentices."

The Court thus conforms to the dissenting opinion expressed by Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Exconde where he said
in part:

"I can see no sound reason for limiting Art. 1903 of the Old Civil Code to teachers of arts and trades and not
to academic ones. What substantial difference is there between them insofar as concerns the proper
supervision and vigilance over their pupils? It cannot be seriously contended that an academic teacher is
exempt from the duty of watching that his pupils do not commit a tort to the detriment of third persons, so
long as they are in a position to exercise authority and supervision over the pupil. In my opinion, in the phrase
teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades used in Art. 1903 of the old Civil Code, the words arts
and trades does not qualify teachers but only heads of establishments. The phrase is only an updated
version of the equivalent terms `preceptores y artesanos used in the Italian and French Civil Codes.

"If, as conceded by all commentators, the basis of the presumption of negligence of Art. 1903 in some culpa in
vigilando that the parents, teachers, etc. are supposed to have incurred in the exercise of their authority, it
would seem clear that where the parent places the child under the effective authority of the teacher, the latter,
and not the parent, should be the one answerable for the torts committed while under his custody, for the
very reason that the parent is not supposed to interfere with the discipline of the school nor with the authority
and supervision of the teacher while the child is under instruction. And if there is no authority, there can be no
responsibility.

There is really no substantial distinction between the academic and the non-academic schools insofar as torts
committed by their students are concerned. The same vigilance is expected from the teacher over the
students under his control and supervision, whatever the nature of the school where he is teaching. The
suggestion in the Exconde and Mercado Cases is that the provision would make the teacher or even the head
of the school of arts and trades liable for an injury caused by any student in its custody but if that same tort
were committed in an academic school, no liability would attach to the teacher or the school head. All other
circumstances being the same, the teacher or the head of the academic school would be absolved whereas the
teacher and the head of the non-academic school would be held liable, and simply because the latter is a
school of arts and trades.

The Court cannot see why different degrees of vigilance should be exercised by the school authorities on the
basis only of the nature of their respective schools. There does not seem to be any plausible reason for
relaxing that vigilance simply because the school is academic in nature and for increasing such vigilance where
the school is non-academic. Notably, the injury subject of liability is caused by the student and not by the
school itself nor is it a result of the operations of the school or its equipment. The injury contemplated may be
caused by any student regardless of the school where he is registered. The teacher certainly should not be
able to excuse himself by simply showing that he is teaching in an academic school where, on the other hand,
the head would be held liable if the school were non-academic.

These questions, though, may be asked: If the teacher of the academic school is to be held answerable for the
torts committed by his students, why is it the head of the school only who is held liable where the injury is
caused in a school of arts and trades? And in the case of the academic or non-technical school, why not apply
the rule also to the head thereof instead of imposing the liability only on the teacher?
The reason for the disparity can be traced to the fact that historically the head of the school of arts and trades
exercised a closer tutelage over his pupils than the head of the academic school. The old schools of arts and
trades were engaged in the training of artisans apprenticed to their master who personally and directly
instructed them on the technique and secrets of their craft. The head of the school of arts and trades was such
a master and so was personally involved in the task of teaching his students, who usually even boarded with
him and so came under his constant control, supervision and influence. By contrast, the head of the academic
school was not as involved with his students and exercised only administrative duties over the teachers who

were the persons directly dealing with the students. The head of the academic school had then (as now) only
a vicarious relationship with the students. Consequently, while he could not be directly faulted for the acts of
the students, the head of the school of arts and trades, because of his closer ties with them, could be so
blamed.
It is conceded that the distinction no longer obtains at present in view of the expansion of the schools of arts
and trades, the consequent increase in their enrollment, and the corresponding diminution of the direct and
personal contract of their heads with the students. Article 2180, however, remains unchanged. In its present
state, the provision must be interpreted by the Court according to its clear and original mandate until the
legislature, taking into account the changes in the situation subject to be regulated, sees fit to enact the
necessary amendment.

The other matter to be resolved is the duration of the responsibility of the teacher or the head of the school of
arts and trades over the students. Is such responsibility co-extensive with the period when the student is
actually undergoing studies during the school term, as contended by the respondents and impliedly admitted
by the petitioners themselves?

From a reading of the provision under examination, it is clear that while the custody requirement, to repeat
Palisoc v. Brillantes, does not mean that the student must be boarding with the school authorities, it does
signify that the student should be within the control and under the influence of the school authorities at the
time of the occurrence of the injury. This does not necessarily mean that such, custody be co-terminous with
the semester, beginning with the start of classes and ending upon the close thereof, and excluding the time
before or after such period, such as the period of registration, and in the case of graduating students, the
period before the commencement exercises. In the view of the Court, the student is in the custody of the
school authorities as long as he is under the control and influence of the school and within its premises,
whether the semester has not yet begun or has already ended.

It is too tenuous to argue that the student comes under the discipline of the school only upon the start of
classes notwithstanding that before that day he has already registered and thus placed himself under its rules.
Neither should such discipline be deemed ended upon the last day of classes notwithstanding that there may
still be certain requisites to be satisfied for completion of the course, such as submission of reports, term
papers, clearances and the like. During such periods, the student is still subject to the disciplinary authority of
the school and cannot consider himself released altogether from observance of its rules.
As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school premises in pursuance of a legitimate student
objective, in the exercise of a legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student
right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege, the responsibility of the school authorities
over the student continues. Indeed, even if the student should be doing nothing more than relaxing in the
campus in the company of his classmates and friends and enjoying the ambience and atmosphere of the
school, he is still within the custody and subject to the discipline of the school authorities under the provisions
of Article 2180.

During all these occasions, it is obviously the teacher-in-charge who must answer for his students torts, in
practically the same way that the parents are responsible for the child when he is in their custody. The
teacher-in-charge is the one designated by the dean, principal, or other administrative superior to exercise
supervision over the pupils in the specific classes or sections to which they are assigned. It is not necessary
that at the time of the injury, the teacher be physically present and in a position to prevent it. Custody does
not connote immediate and actual physical control but refers more to the influence exerted on the child and
the discipline instilled in him as a result of such influence. Thus, for the injuries caused by the student, the
teacher and not the parent shall be held responsible if the tort was committed within the premises of the
school at any time when its authority could be validly exercised over him.

In any event, it should be noted that the liability imposed by this article is supposed to fall directly on the
teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades and not on the school itself. If at all, the school, whatever
its nature, may be held to answer for the acts of its teachers or even of the head thereof under the general
principle of respondeat superior, but then it may exculpate itself from liability by proof that it had exercised
the diligence of a bonus paterfamilias.

Such defense is, of course, also available to the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades directly
held to answer for the tort committed by the student. As long as the defendant can show that he had taken
the necessary precautions to prevent the injury complained of, he can exonerate himself from the liability
imposed by Article 2180, which also states that:

"The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damages."

In this connection, it should be observed that the teacher will be held liable not only when he is acting in loco
parentis for the law does not require that the offending student be of minority age. Unlike the parent, who will
be liable only if his child is still a minor, the teacher is held answerable by the law for the act of the student
under him regardless of the students age. Thus, in the Palisoc Case, liability attached to the teacher and the
head of the technical school although the wrongdoer was already of age. In this sense, Article 2180 treats the
parent more favorably than the teacher.

The Court is not unmindful of the apprehensions expressed by Justice Makalintal in his dissenting opinion in
Palisoc that the school may be unduly exposed to liability under this article in view of the increasing activism
among the students that is likely to cause violence and resulting injuries in the school premises. That is a valid
fear, to be sure. Nevertheless, it should be repeated that, under the present ruling, it is not the school that will
be held directly liable. Moreover, the defense of due diligence is available to it in case it is sought to be held
answerable as principal for the acts or omission of its head or the teacher in its employ.
c

The school can show that it exercised proper measures in selecting the head or its teachers and the
appropriate supervision over them in the custody and instruction of the pupils pursuant to its rules and
regulations for the maintenance of discipline among them. In almost all cases now, in fact, these measures
are effected through the assistance of an adequate security force to help the teacher physically enforce those
rules upon the students. This should bolster the claim of the school that it has taken adequate steps to
prevent any injury that may be committed by its students.

A fortiori, the teacher himself may invoke this defense as it would otherwise be unfair to hold him directly
answerable for the damage caused by his students as long as they are in the school premises and presumably
under his influence. In this respect, the Court is disposed not to expect from the teacher the same measure of
responsibility imposed on the parent for their influence over the child is not equal in degree. Obviously, the
parent can expect more obedience from the child because the latters dependence on him is greater than on
the teacher. It need not be stressed that such dependence includes the childs support and sustenance
whereas submission to the teachers influence, besides being co-terminous with the period of custody, is
usually enforced only because of the students desire to pass the course. The parent can instill more lasting
discipline on the child than the teacher and so should be held to a greater accountability than the teacher for
the tort committed by the child.

And if it is also considered that under the article in question, the teacher or the head of the school of arts and
trades is responsible for the damage caused by the student or apprentice even if he is already of age and
therefore less tractable than the minor then there should all the more be justification to require from the
school authorities less accountability as long as they can prove reasonable diligence in preventing the injury.
After all, if the parent himself is no longer liable for the students acts because he has reached majority age
and so is no longer under the formers control, there is then all the more reason for leniency in assessing the
teachers responsibility for the acts of the student.

Applying the foregoing considerations, the Court has arrived at the following conclusions:

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1. At the time Alfredo Amadora was fatally shot, he was still in the custody of the authorities of Colegio de San
Jose-Recoletos notwithstanding that the fourth year classes had formally ended. It was immaterial if he was in
the school auditorium to finish his physics experiment or merely to submit his physics report for what is
important is that he was there for a legitimate purpose. As previously observed, even the mere savoring of the
company of his friends in the premises of the school is a legitimate purpose that would have also brought him
in the custody of the school authorities.

2. The rector, the high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be held liable because none of them was
the teacher-in-charge as previously defined. Each of them was exercising only a general authority over the
student body and not the direct control and influence exerted by the teacher placed in charge of particular
classes or sections and thus immediately involved in its discipline. The evidence of the parties does not
disclose who the teacher-in-charge of the offending student was. The mere fact that Alfredo Amadora had
gone to school that day in connection with his physics report did not necessarily make the physics teacher,
respondent Celestino Dicon, the teacher-in-charge of Alfredos killer.

3. At any rate, assuming that he was the teacher-in-charge, there is no showing that Dicon was negligent in
enforcing discipline upon Daffon or that he had waived observance of the rules and regulations of the school or
condoned their non-observance. His absence when the tragedy happened cannot be considered against him
because he was not supposed or required to report to school on that day. And while it is true that the
offending student was still in the custody of the teacher-in-charge even if the latter was physically absent
when the tort was committed, it has not been established that it was caused by his laxness in enforcing
discipline upon the student. On the contrary, the private respondents have proved that they had exercised due
diligence, through the enforcement of the school regulations, in maintaining that discipline.

4. In the absence of a teacher-in-charge, it is probably the dean of boys who should be held liable, especially
in view of the unrefuted evidence that he had earlier confiscated an unlicensed gun from one of the students
and returned the same later to him without taking disciplinary action or reporting the matter to higher
authorities. While this was clearly negligence on his part, for which he deserves sanctions from the school, it
does not necessarily link him to the shooting of Amador as it has not been shown that he confiscated and
returned pistol was the gun that killed the petitioners son.

5. Finally, as previously observed, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos cannot be held directly liable under the
article because only the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades is made responsible for the
damage caused by the student or apprentice. Neither can it be held to answer for the tort committed by any
of the other private respondents for none of them has been found to have been charged with the custody of
the offending student or has been remiss in the discharge of his duties in connection with such custody.
In sum, the Court finds under the facts as disclosed by the record and in the light of the principles herein
announced that none of the respondents is liable for the injury inflicted by Pablito Daffon on Alfredo Amadora
that resulted in the latters death at the auditorium of the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos on April 13, 1972.
While we deeply sympathize with the petitioners over the loss of their son under the tragic circumstances here
related, we nevertheless are unable to extend them the material relief they seek, as a balm to their grief,
under the law they have invoked.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, without any pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.

Separate Opinions

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.,
dissenting:
chanrob1es

concurring
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and
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I concur, except with respect to the restricted

meaning given the term "teacher" in Article 2180
of the Civil Code as "teacher-in-charge." This
would limit liability to occasions where there are
classes under the immediate charge of a teacher,
which does not seem to be the intendment of the
law.

regulations
institution.

and
.

those
.

of

."

each
cralaw

school

or

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But even such rules and regulations as may be

fixed can not contravene the concept of substitute
parental
authority.
chanrobles

virtualawlibrary

chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

The rationale of liability of school heads and

teachers for the tortious acts of their pupils was
explained in Palisoc v. Brillantes (41 SCRA 548),
thus:
jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

As I understand it, the philosophy of the law is that

whoever stands in loco parentis will have the same
duties and obligations as parents whenever in such
a standing. Those persons are mandatorily held
liable for the tortious acts of pupils and students so
long as the latter remain in their custody, meaning
their
protective
and
supervisory
custody.
Thus, Article 349 of the Civil Code enumerates the
persons who stand in loco parentis and thereby
exercise substitute parental authority:

jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Art. 349. The following persons shall exercise

substitute parental authority:
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x
Of course, as provided for in the same Article
2180, the responsibility treated of shall cease
when the persons mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent damage.

(2) Teachers and professors;

x

"The protective custody of the school heads and

teachers is mandatorily substituted for that of the
parents, and hence, it becomes their obligation as
well as that of the school itself to provide proper
supervision of the students activities during the
whole time that they are at attendance in the
school, including recess time, as well as to take the
necessary precautions to protect the students in
their custody from dangers and hazards that would
reasonably be anticipated, including injuries that
some students themselves may inflict wilfully or
through negligence on their fellow students.
(Italics supplied)

(4) Directors of trade establishments, with regard

to
apprentices;"
Article
352
provides:

of

the

Civil

Code

further

jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Art. 352. The relations between teacher and pupil,

professor and student, are fixed by government

And while a school is, admittedly, not directly liable

since Article 2180 speaks only of teachers and
schools heads, yet, by virtue of the same
provision, the school, as their employer, may be
held liable for the failure of its teachers or school
heads to perform their mandatory legal duties as
substitute parents (Sangco, Philippine Law on Torts
& Damages, 1978 ed., p. 201). Again, the school

may exculpate itself from liability by proving that it

had exercised the diligence of a good father of the
family.
"Art. 2180. . . .

"Employers shall be liable for the damages caused

by their employees and household helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks, even
though the former are not engaged in any business
or industry.
x

Parenthetically, from the enumeration in Article

349 of the Civil Code, supra, it is apparent that the
Code Commission had already segregated the
classification of "teachers and professors" vis-a-vis
their
pupils,
from
"directors
of
trade
establishments,
with
regard
to
their
apprentices."
cralaw

GUTIERREZ,

JR., J.,

virtua1aw

concurring:

library

chanrob1es

virtual

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library

I concur in the Courts opinion so carefully

analyzed and crafted by Justice Isagani A. Cruz.
However, I would like to stress the need for a
major amendment to, if not a complete scrapping
of, Article 2180 of the Civil Code insofar as it refers
to teachers or heads of establishments of arts and
trades in relation to pupils and students or
apprentices. The seventh paragraph of Art. 2180 is
a relic of the past and contemplates a situation
long gone and out of date. In a Palisoc v. Brillantes
(41 SCRA 548) situation, it is bound to result in
mischief and injustice.

First, we no longer have masters and apprentices

toiling in schools of arts and trades. Students in
"technological colleges and universities are no
different from students in liberal arts or
professional schools. Apprentices now work in
regular shops and factories and their relationship
to the employer is covered by laws governing the
employment relationship and not by laws
governing the teacher student relationship.
Second, except for kindergarten, elementary, and
perhaps early high school students, teachers are
often no longer objects of veneration who are
given the respect due to substitute parents. Many
students in their late teens or early adult years
view some teachers as part of a bourgeois or
reactionary group whose advice on behaviour,
deportment, and other non-academic matters is
not only resented but actively rejected. It seems
most unfair to hold teachers liable on a
presumption juris tantum of negligence for acts of
students even under circumstances where strictly
speaking there could be no in loco parentis
relationship. Why do teachers have to prove the
contrary of negligence to be freed from solidary
liability for the acts of bomb-throwing or pistol
packing students who would just as soon hurt
them as they would other members of the socalled establishment.
The ordinary rules on quasi-delicts should apply to
teachers and schools of whatever nature insofar as
grown up students are concerned. The provision of
Art. 2180 of the Civil Code involved in this case
has outlived its purpose. The Court cannot make
law. It can only apply the law with its
imperfections. However, the Court can suggest that
such a law should be amended or repealed.

[G.R. No. 143363. February 6, 2002.]

ST. MARYS ACADEMY, Petitioner, v. WILLIAM CARPITANOS and LUCIA S. CARPITANOS, GUADA DANIEL, JAMES DANIEL II,
JAMES DANIEL, SR., and VIVENCIO VILLANUEVA,Respondents.
DECISION

PARDO, J.:

The Case
The case is an appeal via certiorari from the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals as well as the resolution denying reconsideration, holding
petitioner liable for damages arising from an accident that resulted in the death of a student who had joined a campaign to visit the public
schools in Dipolog City to solicit enrollment.
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The Facts
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:

jgc:chanroble s.com.ph

"Claiming damages for the death of their only son, Sherwin Carpitanos, spouses William Carpitanos and Lucia Carpitanos filed on June 9, 1995
a case against James Daniel II and his parents, James Daniel Sr. and Guada Daniel, the vehicle owner, Vivencio Villanueva and St. Marys
Academy before the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City.
"On 20 February 1997, Branch 6 of the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City rendered its decision the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
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"WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered in the following manner:

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1. Defendant St. Marys Academy of Dipolog City, is hereby ordered to pay plaintiffs William Carpitanos and Luisa Carpitanos, the following
sums of money:
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a. FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) indemnity for the loss of life of Sherwin S. Carpitanos;
b. FORTY THOUSAND PESOS (P40,000.00) actual damages incurred by plaintiffs for burial and related expenses;
c. TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) for attorneys fees;
d. FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00) for moral damages; and to pay costs.
2. Their liability being only subsidiary, defendants James Daniel, Sr. and Guada Daniel are hereby ordered to pay herein plaintiffs the amount
of damages above-stated in the event of insolvency of principal obligor St. Marys Academy of Dipolog City;
3. Defendant James Daniel II, being a minor at the time of the commission of the tort and who was under special parental authority of
defendant St. Marys Academy, is ABSOLVED from paying the above-stated damages, same being adjudged against defendants St. Marys
Academy, and subsidiarily, against his parents;
4. Defendant Vivencio Villanueva is hereby ABSOLVED of any liability. His counterclaim not being in order as earlier discussed in this decision,
is hereby DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED." (Decision, pp. 32-33; Records, pp. 205-206)."

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"From the records it appears that from 13 to 20 February 1995, Defendant-Appellant St. Marys Academy of Dipolog City conducted an
enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996. A facet of the enrollment campaign was the visitation of schools from where prospective
enrollees were studying. As a student of St. Marys Academy, Sherwin Carpitanos was part of the campaigning group. Accordingly, on the
fateful day, Sherwin, along with other high school students were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by defendant Vivencio Villanueva on their
way to Larayan Elementary School, Larayan, Dapitan City. The jeep was driven by James Daniel II then 15 years old and a student of the
same school. Allegedly, the latter drove the jeep in a reckless manner and as a result the jeep turned turtle.
"Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of the injuries he sustained from the accident." 2
In due time, petitioner St. Marys Academy appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. 3
On February 29, 2000, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision reducing the actual damages to P25,000.00 but otherwise affirming the
decision a quo, in toto. 4
On February 29, 2000, petitioner St. Marys Academy filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision. However, on May 22, 2000, the Court
of Appeals denied the motion. 5
Hence, this appeal. 6
The Issues
1) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding the petitioner liable for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.
2) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the award of moral damages against the petitioner.
The Courts Ruling
We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals held petitioner St. Marys Academy liable for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos under Articles 218 7 and 219 8 of the
Family Code, pointing out that petitioner was negligent in allowing a minor to drive and in not having a teacher accompany the minor students
in the jeep.
Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have special parental authority over a minor child while under their supervision,
instruction or custody: (1) the school, its administrators and teachers; or (2) the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care. This

special parental authority and responsibility applies to all authorized activities, whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or
institution. Thus, such authority and responsibility applies to field trips, excursions and other affairs of the pupils and students outside the
school premises whenever authorized by the school or its teachers. 9
Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under custody is a minor, those exercising special parental authority are principally and
solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor while under their supervision, instruction, or
custody. 10
However, for petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the
injury caused because the negligence, must have a causal connection to the accident. 11
In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it must be shown that the injury for which recovery is sought must be the
legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural sequence of
events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes. In other words, the negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury. For, negligence,
no matter in what it consists, cannot create a right of action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury complained of. And the proximate
cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury,
and without which the result would not have occurred. 12
In this case, the respondents failed to show that the negligence of petitioner was the proximate cause of the death of the victim.
Respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted that the immediate cause of the accident was not the negligence of petitioner or the
reckless driving of James Daniel II, but the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep.
In their comment to the petition, respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted the documentary exhibits, establishing that the cause
of the accident was the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. Hence, the cause of the accident was not the recklessness of
James Daniel II but the mechanical defect in the jeep of Vivencio Villanueva. Respondents, including the spouses Carpitanos, parents of the
deceased Sherwin Carpitanos, did not dispute the report and testimony of the traffic investigator who stated that the cause of the accident
was the detachment of the steering wheel guide that caused the jeep to turn turtle.
Significantly, respondents did not present any evidence to show that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the school
authorities, or the reckless driving of James Daniel II. Hence, the respondents reliance on Article 219 of the Family Code that those given
the authority and responsibility under the preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by acts or omissions of
the unemancipated minor was unfounded.
Further, there was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor James Daniel II to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva. It
was Ched Villanueva, grandson of respondent Vivencio Villanueva, who had possession and control of the jeep. He was driving the vehicle and
he allowed James Daniel II, a minor, to drive the jeep at the time of the accident.
Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of the minor driver or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide
of the jeep, must be pinned on the minors parents primarily. The negligence of petitioner St. Marys Academy was only a remote cause of the
accident. Between the remote cause and the injury, there intervened the negligence of the minors parents or the detachment of the steering
wheel guide of the jeep.
"The proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred." 13
Considering that the negligence of the minor driver or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep owned by respondent Villanueva
was an event over which petitioner St. Marys Academy had no control, and which was the proximate cause of the accident, petitioner may
not be held liable for the death resulting from such accident.
Consequently, we find that petitioner likewise cannot be held liable for moral damages in the amount of P500,000.00 awarded by the trial
court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendants wrongful
act or omission. 14 In this case, the proximate cause of the accident was not attributable to petitioner.
For the reason that petitioner was not directly liable for the accident, the decision of the Court of Appeals ordering petitioner to pay death
indemnity to respondent Carpitanos must be deleted. Moreover, the grant of attorneys fees as part of damages is the exception rather than
the rule. 15 The power of the court to award attorneys fees under Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands factual, legal and equitable
justification. 16 Thus, the grant of attorneys fees against the petitioner is likewise deleted.
Incidentally, there was no question that the registered owner of the vehicle was respondent Villanueva. He never denied and in fact admitted
this fact. We have held that the registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily be responsible to the
public or to third persons for injuries caused the latter while the vehicle was being driven on the highways or streets." 17 Hence, with the
overwhelming evidence presented by petitioner and the respondent Daniel spouses that the accident occurred because of the detachment of
the steering wheel guide of the jeep, it is not the school, but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for
the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals 18 and that of the trial court. 19 The Court remands
the case to the trial court for determination of the liability of defendants, excluding petitioner St. Marys Academy, Dipolog City.
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No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 84698 February 4, 1992

PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, JUAN D. LIM, BENJAMIN P. PAULINO, ANTONIO M.
MAGTALAS, COL. PEDRO SACRO and LT. M. SORIANO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. REGINA ORDOEZ-BENITEZ, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 47, Regional
Trial Court, Manila, SEGUNDA R. BAUTISTA and ARSENIA D. BAUTISTA, respondents.
Balgos and Perez for petitioners.
Collantes, Ramirez & Associates for private respondents.

PADILLA, J.:
A stabbing incident on 30 August 1985 which caused the death of Carlitos Bautista while on the second-floor premises of the
Philippine School of Business Administration (PSBA) prompted the parents of the deceased to file suit in the Regional Trial
Court of Manila (Branch 47) presided over by Judge (now Court of Appeals justice) Regina Ordoez-Benitez, for damages
against the said PSBA and its corporate officers. At the time of his death, Carlitos was enrolled in the third year commerce
course at the PSBA. It was established that his assailants were not members of the school's academic community but were
elements from outside the school.
Specifically, the suit impleaded the PSBA and the following school authorities: Juan D. Lim (President), Benjamin P. Paulino
(Vice-President), Antonio M. Magtalas (Treasurer/Cashier), Col. Pedro Sacro (Chief of Security) and a Lt. M. Soriano
(Assistant Chief of Security). Substantially, the plaintiffs (now private respondents) sought to adjudge them liable for the
victim's untimely demise due to their alleged negligence, recklessness and lack of security precautions, means and methods
before, during and after the attack on the victim. During the proceedings a quo, Lt. M. Soriano terminated his relationship with
the other petitioners by resigning from his position in the school.
Defendants a quo (now petitioners) sought to have the suit dismissed, alleging that since they are presumably sued under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the complaint states no cause of action against them, as jurisprudence on the subject is to the
effect that academic institutions, such as the PSBA, are beyond the ambit of the rule in the afore-stated article.
The respondent trial court, however, overruled petitioners' contention and thru an order dated 8 December 1987, denied their
motion to dismiss. A subsequent motion for reconsideration was similarly dealt with by an order dated 25 January 1988.
Petitioners then assailed the trial court's disposition before the respondent appellate court which, in a decision * promulgated
on 10 June 1988, affirmed the trial court's orders. On 22 August 1988, the respondent appellate court resolved to deny the
petitioners' motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
At the outset, it is to be observed that the respondent appellate court primarily anchored its decision on the law ofquasi-delicts,
as enunciated in Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. 1 Pertinent portions of the appellate court's now assailed

ruling state:
Article 2180 (formerly Article 1903) of the Civil Code is an adoption from the old Spanish Civil Code. The
comments of Manresa and learned authorities on its meaning should give way to present day changes. The
law is not fixed and flexible (sic); it must be dynamic. In fact, the greatest value and significance of law as a
rule of conduct in (sic) its flexibility to adopt to changing social conditions and its capacity to meet the new
challenges of progress.
Construed in the light of modern day educational system, Article 2180 cannot be construed in its narrow
concept as held in the old case of Exconde vs. Capuno 2 and Mercado vs. Court of Appeals; 3hence,

the ruling in the Palisoc 4 case that it should apply to all kinds of educational institutions,
academic or vocational.
At any rate, the law holds the teachers and heads of the school staff liable unless they relieve themselves of
such liability pursuant to the last paragraph of Article 2180 by "proving that they observed all the diligence to
prevent damage." This can only be done at a trial on the merits of the case. 5
While we agree with the respondent appellate court that the motion to dismiss the complaint was correctly denied and the
complaint should be tried on the merits, we do not however agree with the premises of the appellate court's ruling.
Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the rule of in loco parentis. This Court discussed
this doctrine in the afore-cited cases of Exconde, Mendoza, Palisoc and, more recently, in Amadora vs.Court of Appeals. 6 In

all such cases, it had been stressed that the law (Article 2180) plainly provides that the damage should have been
caused or inflicted by pupils or students of he educational institution sought to be held liable for the acts of its
pupils or students while in its custody. However, this material situation does not exist in the present case for, as
earlier indicated, the assailants of Carlitos were not students of the PSBA, for whose acts the school could be
made liable.
However, does the appellate court's failure to consider such material facts mean the exculpation of the petitioners from
liability? It does not necessarily follow.
When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a contract between them, resulting in
bilateral obligations which both parties are bound to comply with. 7 For its part, the school undertakes to provide the

student with an education that would presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue
higher education or a profession. On the other hand, the student covenants to abide by the school's academic
requirements and observe its rules and regulations.

Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit or "built-in" obligation of providing their students with an atmosphere that
promotes or assists in attaining its primary undertaking of imparting knowledge. Certainly, no student can absorb the
intricacies of physics or higher mathematics or explore the realm of the arts and other sciences when bullets are flying or
grenades exploding in the air or where there looms around the school premises a constant threat to life and limb. Necessarily,
the school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to maintain peace and order within the campus premises and to prevent
the breakdown thereof.
Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between the PSBA and Carlitos Bautista, the
rules on quasi-delict do not really govern. 8 A perusal of Article 2176 shows that obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as
extra-contractual obligations, arise only between parties not otherwise bound by contract, whether express or implied. However, this impression has not
prevented this Court from determining the existence of a tort even when there obtains a contract. In Air France vs. Carrascoso (124 Phil. 722), the
private respondent was awarded damages for his unwarranted expulsion from a first-class seat aboard the petitioner airline. It is noted, however, that
the Court referred to the petitioner-airline's liability as one arising from tort, not one arising from a contract of carriage. In effect, Air France is authority
for the view that liability from tort may exist even if there is a contract, for the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort. (Austro-America S.S. Co.
vs. Thomas, 248 Fed. 231).

This view was not all that revolutionary, for even as early as 1918, this Court was already of a similar mind. InCangco
vs. Manila Railroad (38 Phil. 780), Mr. Justice Fisher elucidated thus:
The field of non-contractual obligation is much broader than that of contractual obligation, comprising, as it
does, the whole extent of juridical human relations. These two fields, figuratively speaking, concentric; that is
to say, the mere fact that a person is bound to another by contract does not relieve him from extracontractual liability to such person. When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may break the
contract under such conditions that the same act which constitutes a breach of the contract would have
constituted the source of an extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed between the parties.
Immediately what comes to mind is the chapter of the Civil Code on Human Relations, particularly Article 21, which provides:
Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good custom
or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. (emphasis supplied).
Air France penalized the racist policy of the airline which emboldened the petitioner's employee to forcibly oust the private
respondent to cater to the comfort of a white man who allegedly "had a better right to the seat." InAustro-American, supra, the
public embarrassment caused to the passenger was the justification for the Circuit Court of Appeals, (Second Circuit), to
award damages to the latter. From the foregoing, it can be concluded that should the act which breaches a contract be done in
bad faith and be violative of Article 21, then there is a cause to view the act as constituting a quasi-delict.
In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however, there is, as yet, no finding that the contract between the school and
Bautista had been breached thru the former's negligence in providing proper security measures. This would be for the trial
court to determine. And, even if there be a finding of negligence, the same could give rise generally to a breach of contractual
obligation only. Using the test of Cangco, supra, the negligence of the school would not be relevant absent a contract. In fact,
that negligence becomes material only because of the contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista. In other words, a
contractual relation is a condition sine qua nonto the school's liability. The negligence of the school cannot exist independently
of the contract, unless the negligence occurs under the circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code.
This Court is not unmindful of the attendant difficulties posed by the obligation of schools, above-mentioned, for conceptually a
school, like a common carrier, cannot be an insurer of its students against all risks. This is specially true in the populous
student communities of the so-called "university belt" in Manila where there have been reported several incidents ranging from
gang wars to other forms of hooliganism. It would not be equitable to expect of schools to anticipate all types of violent
trespass upon their premises, for notwithstanding the security measures installed, the same may still fail against an individual
or group determined to carry out a nefarious deed inside school premises and environs. Should this be the case, the school
may still avoid liability by proving that the breach of its contractual obligation to the students was not due to its negligence,
here statutorily defined to be the omission of that degree of diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and
corresponding to the circumstances of persons, time and place. 9
As the proceedings a quo have yet to commence on the substance of the private respondents' complaint, the record is bereft
of all the material facts. Obviously, at this stage, only the trial court can make such a determination from the evidence still to
unfold.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The court of origin (RTC, Manila, Br. 47) is hereby
ordered to continue proceedings consistent with this ruling of the Court. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. L-25142. March 25, 1975.]

PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC. and FELIX PANGALANGAN, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. PHIL-AMERICAN FORWARDERS, INC.,
ARCHIMEDES J. BALINGIT and FERNANDO PINEDA,Defendants-Appellees.

Angel A. Sison, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Fidel Zosimo U. Canilao for Defendants-Appellees.
SYNOPSIS
As a result of a vehicular accident, complaint for damages based on culpa-aquitiana was filed against the Phil-American Forwarders, Inc.,
Fernando Pineda, and Balingit as manager of the company. The trial court dismissed the complaint against Balingit on the ground that he is
not the manager of an establishment contemplated in Article 2180 of the Civil Code making owners and managers of an establishment
responsible for damages caused by their employees, since Balingit himself may be regarded as an employee of the Phil-American Forwarders,
Inc. On appeal, plaintiffs urged that the veil of corporate fiction should be pierced, the Phil-American Forwarders Inc. being merely a business
conduit of Balingit, since he and his wife are the controlling stockholders. The Supreme Court held that this issue cannot be entertained on
appeal, because it was not raised in the lower court.
Order of dismissal affirmed.

SYLLABUS

1. QUASI-DELICT; EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEES; "EMPLOYER" AND "OWNER AND MANAGER OF ESTABLISHMENT OF ENTERPRISE" DO NOT
INCLUDE MANAGER OF CORPORATION. The terms "employer" and "owner and manager of establishment or enterprise" as used in Article
2180 of the Civil Code do not include the manager of a corporation owning a truck the reckless operation of which allegedly resulted in the
vehicular accident from which the damage arose.
2. WORDS AND PHRASES; "MANAGER" UNDER SEC. 2180 OF CIVIL CODE USED IN THE SENSE OF "EMPLOYER." Under Article 2180 the
term "manager" is used in the sense of "employer" and does not embrace a "manager" who may himself be regarded as an employee or
dependiente of his employer.
3. APPEAL; ISSUES NOT RAISED IN THE LOWER COURT CANNOT BE ENTERTAINED ON APPEAL. A new factual issue injected in the brief
which was not alleged in the complaint or raised in the trial court cannot be entertained on appeal. An appeal has to be decided on the basis
of the pleadings filed in the trial court, and appellants can ventilate on appeal only those legal issues raised in the lower court and those
within the issues framed by the parties.
4. ID.; ID.; CHANGE OF THEORY; PARTY-LITIGANT CANNOT BE ALLOWED TO CHANGE THEORY OF CASE ON APPEAL. When a party
deliberately adopts a certain theory and the case is decided upon that theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to change his theory
on appeal because that would be unfair to the adverse party.

DECISION

AQUINO, J.:

Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and Felix Pangalangan appealed on pure questions of law from the order of the Court of First Instance of
Tarlac, dismissing their complaint against Archimedes J. Balingit.
The dismissal was based on the ground that Balingit as the manager of Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., which together with Fernando Pineda
and Balingit, was sued for damages in an action based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is not the manager of an establishment contemplated
in article 2180 of the Civil Code (Civil Case No. 3865).
In the complaint for damages filed by the bus company and Pangalangan against Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., Balingit and Pineda, it was
alleged that on November 24, 1962, Pineda drove recklessly a freight truck, owned by Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., along the national
highway at Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. The truck bumped the bus driven by Pangalangan, which was owned by Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc.
As a result of the bumping, Pangalangan suffered injuries and the bus was damaged and could not be used for seventy-nine days, thus
depriving the company of earnings amounting to P8,665.51. Balingit was the manager of Phil-American Forwarders, Inc.
Among the defenses interposed by the defendants in their answer was that Balingit was not Pinedas employer.
Balingit moved that the complaint against him be dismissed on the ground that the bus company and the bus driver had no cause of action
against him. As already stated, the lower court dismissed the action as to Balingit. The bus company and its driver appealed.
The Civil Code provides:

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"ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.
"ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible.
x

"The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service
of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.
"Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks,
even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
x

"The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent damage. (1903a)"
The novel and unprecedented legal issue in this appeal is whether the terms "employers" and "owners and managers of an establishment or
enterprise" (dueos o directores de un establicimiento o empresa) used in article 2180 of the Civil Code, formerly article 1903 of the old
Code, embrace the manager of a corporation owning a truck, the reckless operation of which allegedly resulted in the vehicular accident from
which the damage arose.

We are of the opinion that those terms do not include the manager of a corporation. It may be gathered from the context of article 2180 that
the term "manager" ("director" in the Spanish version) is used in the sense of "employer."
Hence, under the allegations of the complaint, no tortious or quasi-delictual liability can be fastened on Balingit as manager of Phil-American
Forwarders, Inc., in connection with the vehicular accident already mentioned because he himself may be regarded as an employee or
dependiente of his employer, Phil-American Forwarders, Inc.
Thus, it was held "que es dependiente, a los efectos de la responsabilidad subsidiaria establecida en el num. 3.x del (art.) 1903, el director de
un periodico explotado por una sociedad, porque cualquiera que sea su jerarqu!a, y aunque lleve la direccin de determinadas convicciones
politicas, no por eso deja de estar subordinado a la superior autoridad de la Empresa" (Decision of Spanish Supreme Court dated December 6,
1912 cited in 12 Manresa, Codigo Civil Espaol, 5th Ed. 662; 1913 Enciclopedia Juridica Espaola 992).
The bus company and its driver, in their appellants brief, injected a new factual issue which was not alleged in their complaint. They argue
that Phil-American Forwarders, Inc. is merely a business conduit of Balingit because out of its capital stock with a par value of P41,200,
Balingit and his wife had subscribed P40,000 and they paid P10,000 on their subscription, while the other incorporators, namely, Rodolfo
Limjuco, Ponciano Caparas and Rafael Suntay paid P250.25 and P25, respectively.
That argument implies that the veil of corporate fiction should be pierced and that Phil-American Forwarders, Inc. and Balingit and his wife
should be treated as one and the same civil personality.
We cannot countenance that argument in this appeal. It was not raised in the lower court. The case has to be decided on the basis of the
pleadings filed in the trial court where it was assumed that Phil-American Forwarders, Inc. has a personality separate and distinct from that of
the Balingit spouses.
The legal issue, which the plaintiffs-appellants can ventilate in this appeal, is one which was raised in the lower court and which is within the
issues framed by the parties (Sec. 18, Rule 46, Rules of Court).
When a party deliberately adopts a certain theory and the case is decided upon that theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to
change his theory on appeal because, to permit him to do so, would be unfair to the adverse party (2 Morans Comments on the Rules of
Court, 1970 Ed. p. 505).
WHEREFORE, the lower courts order of dismissal is affirmed. Costs against the plaintiffs-appellants.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 145804. February 6, 2003.]

LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY & RODOLFO ROMAN, Petitioners, v. MARJORIE NAVIDAD, Heirs of the Late NICANOR
NAVIDAD & PRUDENT SECURITY AGENCY, Respondents.
DECISION

VITUG, J.:

The case before the Court is an appeal from the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on 27 April 2000 and 10
October 2000, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 60720, entitled "Marjorie Navidad and Heirs of the Late Nicanor Navidad v. Rodolfo Roman, et.
al.," which has modified the decision of 11 August 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 266, Pasig City, exonerating Prudent Security
Agency (Prudent) from liability and finding Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA) and Rodolfo Roman liable for damages on account of the death
of Nicanor Navidad.
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On 14 October 1993, about half an hour past seven oclock in the evening, Nicanor Navidad, then drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station after
purchasing a "token" (representing payment of the fare). While Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin,
the security guard assigned to the area approached Navidad. A misunderstanding or an altercation between the two apparently ensued that
led to a fist fight. No evidence, however, was adduced to indicate how the fight started or who, between the two, delivered the first blow or
how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks. At the exact moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman, was
coming in. Navidad was struck by the moving train, and he was killed instantaneously.
On 08 December 1994, the widow of Nicanor, herein respondent Marjorie Navidad, along with her children, filed a complaint for damages
against Junelito Escartin, Rodolfo Roman, the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization, Inc. (Metro Transit), and Prudent for the death of her
husband. LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim against Navidad and a cross-claim against Escartin and Prudent. Prudent, in its answer, denied
liability and averred that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its security guards.
The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence while Prudent and Escartin, instead of presenting evidence, filed a demurrer contending that
Navidad had failed to prove that Escartin was negligent in his assigned task. On 11 August 1998, the trial court rendered its decision; it
adjudged:
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"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants Prudent Security and Junelito Escartin
ordering the latter to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs the following:
jgc:chanroble s.com.ph

"a) 1) Actual damages of P44,830.00;

2) Compensatory damages of P443,520.00;
3) Indemnity for the death of Nicanor Navidad in the sum of P50,000.00;
"b) Moral damages of P50,000.00;
"c) Attorneys fees of P20,000;
"d) Costs of suit.
"The complaint against defendants LRTA and Rodolfo Roman are dismissed for lack of merit.
"The compulsory counterclaim of LRTA and Roman are likewise dismissed." 1
Prudent appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 27 August 2000, the appellate court promulgated its now assailed decision exonerating Prudent
from any liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad and, instead, holding the LRTA and Roman jointly and severally liable thusly:
jgc:chanroble s.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment is hereby MODIFIED, by exonerating the appellants from any liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad,
Jr. Instead, appellees Rodolfo Roman and the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA) are held liable for his death and are hereby directed to pay
jointly and severally to the plaintiffs-appellees, the following amounts:
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a) P44,830.00 as actual damages;

b) P50,000.00 as nominal damages;

c) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
d) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of the deceased; and
e) P20,000.00 as and for attorneys fees." 2
The appellate court ratiocinated that while the deceased might not have then as yet boarded the train, a contract of carriage theretofore had
already existed when the victim entered the place where passengers were supposed to be after paying the fare and getting the corresponding
token therefor. In exempting Prudent from liability, the court stressed that there was nothing to link the security agency to the death of
Navidad. It said that Navidad failed to show that Escartin inflicted fist blows upon the victim and the evidence merely established the fact of
death of Navidad by reason of his having been hit by the train owned and managed by the LRTA and operated at the time by Roman. The
appellate court faulted petitioners for their failure to present expert evidence to establish the fact that the application of emergency brakes
could not have stopped the train.
The appellate court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration in its resolution of 10 October 2000.
In their present recourse, petitioners recite alleged errors on the part of the appellate court; viz:

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"I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED BY DISREGARDING THE FINDINGS OF FACTS BY THE TRIAL COURT
"II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT PETITIONERS ARE LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NICANOR NAVIDAD,
JR.
"III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT RODOLFO ROMAN IS AN EMPLOYEE OF LRTA." 3
Petitioners would contend that the appellate court ignored the evidence and the factual findings of the trial court by holding them liable on the
basis of a sweeping conclusion that the presumption of negligence on the part of a common carrier was not overcome. Petitioners would insist
that Escartins assault upon Navidad, which caused the latter to fall on the tracks, was an act of a stranger that could not have been foreseen
or prevented. The LRTA would add that the appellate courts conclusion on the existence of an employer-employee relationship between
Roman and LRTA lacked basis because Roman himself had testified being an employee of Metro Transit and not of the LRTA.
Respondents, supporting the decision of the appellate court, contended that a contract of carriage was deemed created from the moment
Navidad paid the fare at the LRT station and entered the premises of the latter, entitling Navidad to all the rights and protection under a
contractual relation, and that the appellate court had correctly held LRTA and Roman liable for the death of Navidad in failing to exercise
extraordinary diligence imposed upon a common carrier.
Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier, both from the nature of its business and for reasons of public policy, is burdened with
the duty of exercising utmost diligence in ensuring the safety of passengers. 4 The Civil Code, governing the liability of a common carrier for
death of or injury to its passengers, provides:
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"Article 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.
"Article 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently,
unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755."
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"Article 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the formers
employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers.
"This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of their employees."
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"Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the willful acts or negligence of other
passengers or of strangers, if the common carriers employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could have
prevented or stopped the act or omission."
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The law requires common carriers to carry passengers safely using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all
circumstances. 5 Such duty of a common carrier to provide safety to its passengers so obligates it not only during the course of the trip but
for so long as the passengers are within its premises and where they ought to be in pursuance to the contract of carriage. 6 The statutory
provisions render a common carrier liable for death of or injury to passengers (a) through the negligence or wilful acts of its employees or b)
on account of wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers if the common carriers employees through the exercise of due
diligence could have prevented or stopped the act or omission. 7 In case of such death or injury, a carrier is presumed to have been at fault
or been negligent, and 8 by simple proof of injury, the passenger is relieved of the duty to still establish the fault or negligence of the carrier
or of its employees and the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the injury is due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure. 9 In the
absence of satisfactory explanation by the carrier on how the accident occurred, which petitioners, according to the appellate court, have
failed to show, the presumption would be that it has been at fault, 10 an exception from the general rule that negligence must be proved. 11
The foundation of LRTAs liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract by
reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier. In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of
passengers, a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake
the task. In either case, the common carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage.
Should Prudent be made likewise liable? If at all, that liability could only be for tort under the provisions of Article 2176 12 and related
provisions, in conjunction with Article 2180, 13 of the Civil Code. The premise, however, for the employers liability is negligence or fault on
the part of the employee. Once such fault is established, the employer can then be made liable on the basis of the presumption juris tantum
that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection and supervision of its employees. The liability is primary and
can only be negated by showing due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee, a factual matter that has not been shown.
Absent such a showing, one might ask further, how then must the liability of the common carrier, on the one hand, and an independent
contractor, on the other hand, be described? It would be solidary. A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or
omission causes the injury, one resulting in culpa contractual and the other in culpa aquiliana, Article 2194 14 of the Civil Code can well apply.
15 In fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the contract. 16 Stated differently, when an
act which constitutes a breach of contract would have itself constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability had no contract existed
between the parties, the contract can be said to have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply. 17

Regrettably for LRT, as well as perhaps the surviving spouse and heirs of the late Nicanor Navidad, this Court is concluded by the factual
finding of the Court of Appeals that "there is nothing to link (Prudent) to the death of Nicanor (Navidad), for the reason that the negligence of
its employee, Escartin, has not been duly proven . . . ." This finding of the appellate court is not without substantial justification in our own
review of the records of the case.
There being, similarly, no showing that petitioner Rodolfo Roman himself is guilty of any culpable act or omission, he must also be absolved
from liability. Needless to say, the contractual tie between the LRT and Navidad is not itself a juridical relation between the latter and Roman;
thus, Roman can be made liable only for his own fault or negligence.
The award of nominal damages in addition to actual damages is untenable. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the
plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the
plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. 18 It is an established rule that nominal damages cannot co-exist with compensatory damages. 19
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the appellate court is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION but only in that (a) the award of nominal damages
is DELETED and (b) petitioner Rodolfo Roman is absolved from liability. No costs.
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SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 56378. June 22, 1984.]
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS; B.E. SAN DIEGO, INC., Respondents.
The Solicitor General for Petitioner.
Sison, Sison, Resurreccion & Associates for Respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; EMINENT DOMAIN; JUST COMPENSATION; PRICE OR VALUE OF THE PROPERTY AT THE TIME OF
TAKING, BASIS FOR JUST COMPENSATION. It is now settled doctrine, following the leading case of Alfonso v. Pasay (106
Phil. 1017 [1960]), that to determine due compensation for lands appropriated by the Government, the basis should be the
price or value at the time it was taken from the owner and appropriated by the Government.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; NATURE OF THE LAND AT THE TIME OF TAKING, PRINCIPAL CRITERION FOR DETERMINING VALUE. The
convertibility of the property into a subdivision, the criterion relied upon by respondent Court, is not Controlling. The case of
Manila electric Company v. Tuason, 60 Phil. 663, 668, cited in Municipal Govt. of Sagay v. Jison (104 Phil. 1026 [1958]), has
categorically ruled that it is the time of taking and not as "potential building" site that is the determining factor. The
doctrines in the cases of City v. Corrales, 32 Phil. 85 (1915) and Republic v. Venturanza, 17 SCRA 322 (1966) relied upon by
respondent Court must be deemed to have been superseded not only by the Alfonso, Carlota and Sagay cases but also by
Republic v. Narciso, 99 Phil. 1031 (1956); Republic v. Philippine National Bank, 1 SCRA 957 (1961); and Republic v. Juan,
92 SCRA 26 (1979), all of which held that the nature of the land at the time of the taking by the Government is the principal
criterion for awarding compensation to the landowner. The subdivision was not in existence when NPC entered the land.
DECISION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of the then Court of Appeals, promulgated on December 24, 1980,
in CA-G.R. No. 55959-R, entitled "National Power Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus B. E. San Diego, Inc., DefendantAppellant."
cralawnad

In 1961, petitioner National Power Corporation (NPC, for short), commenced negotiations with the spouses Esteban Sadang
and Maria Lachica, then the registered owners, for the purchase of a portion of 8,746 sq. ms. of the latters parcel of land of
62,285 sq. ms., situated in Barrio San Mateo, Norzagaray, Bulacan, for the purpose of constructing an access road to its
Angat River Hydroelectric Project. Although the negotiations were not yet concluded, NPC nevertheless obtained permission
from said spouses to begin construction of the access road, which it did in November 1961.

On December 7, 1962, B. E. San Diego, Inc. a realty firm and private respondent herein (SAN DIEGO, for short), acquired
the parcel of land at a public auction sale and was issued a title.

On February 14, 1963, NPC instituted proceedings for eminent domain against the spouses Sadang in the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan (Civil Case No. 2725), later amended on June 20, 1963, with leave of Court, to implead SAN DIEGO.
The Motion to Amend was only granted on June 21, 1968. On March 19, 1969, the Trial Court appointed three
Commissioners, one for each of the parties and another for the Court, to receive the evidence and determine the just
compensation to be paid for the property sought to be expropriated. After the Commissioners had submitted their individual
Reports and after evaluating the evidence adduced, the Trial Court rendered a Decision on March 28, 1973, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered:

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a) Declaring to plaintiff the full and legal right to acquire by eminent domain the absolute ownership over the portion of the

land referred to in Paragraphs 4 and 9 of the Amended Complaint, consisting of 8,746 square meters, access road of the
plaintiff to its Angat River Hydroelectric Project;

b) Authorizing the payment by plaintiff to defendant of the amount of P31,922.00 as full indemnity for the property at the
rate of P3.75 per square meter, with interest at 12% per annum from March 11, 1963 until fully paid;

c) A final Order of Condemnation over the property and improvements therein is entered, for the purpose set forth, free
from all liens and encumbrances;

d) Ordering the registration of this Act of Expropriation, at plaintiffs expense, with the Register of Deeds of Bulacan at the
back of defendants title to the whole property.

SO ORDERED."

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Both parties appealed to the then Court of Appeals, which rendered a Decision on December 24, 1980, decreeing:

"Considering the peculiar facts and circumstances obtaining in the present case, it is our considered view that the just and
reasonable compensation for the property in question is P7.00 per square meter.

ACCORDINGLY,
SO ORDERED."

the

judgment

appealed

from

is

hereby

modified

as

indicated

above.

No

costs.

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Reconsideration having been denied, NPC availed of the present recourse, to which due course was given. SAN DIEGO did
not appeal from the Appellate Court judgment although it filed a Brief.
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The issues presented are whether or not respondent Court erred (1) in fixing the amount of P7.00 per square meter as just
compensation for the portion of land sought to be expropriated based on its planned convertibility into a residential
subdivision; and (2) in not reducing the rate of interest payable by NPC from twelve (12%) per cent to six (6%) per cent
per annum.

The Trial Court and respondent Court assessed the conflicting evidence in different lights. Reproduced below are partial
findings of the Trial Court:
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"The plaintiffs commissioner, to begin with, recommended a price of P0.50 per square meter; defendants commissioner
indicated P20.00 per square meter, while the commissioner of the Court pegged the value at P4.00 per square meter. The
total road area consists of 8,746 square meters (Exhibits 4-4-c, inclusive). Against the sketch (Exhibit D-1) presented by
plaintiff, the former should prevail.

There is competent testimony, too, that the land was cogonales at the time of the occupancy. During rainy season,
according to Celedonio Juarez, Instrumentman of Survey Team of the plaintiff, the proposed road could only he passable by
animal drawn sledges; that in contrast, the access-way under its present condition is fully paved. Shaped to a curve, the
thoroughfare should provide a marked improvement to the flourishing housing subdivision managed by the defendant.
Also, the prevailing market price of residential lots in the area, according to the reputable C. M. Montano Realty, is P20.00
per square meter. Even taking the face value of the appraisal made, it would be unfair to compel plaintiff to pay the same
price after constructing a 30-meter wide road through the property a decade ago which enhanced its commercial value, not
to mention the aesthetic gain. Safe to say, therefore, except for the cost of the land area encompassed by the road, there is
negligible, if any, consequential damage to speak of.

Defendants contention, on the other hand, that the location of the road is burdensome appears to be more idealistic than
meritorious. The right of way as now built is more beneficial to the adjoining subdivision owner (defendant) in the sense
that the residential lot on both flanks of the road could command a higher price. This may not hold true if the access road
were to be built on the east side boundary as proposed by the defendant because only one side of the rood may be devoted
to the housing area. . . . Related is evidence from defendant that the plaintiff had once negotiated to purchase the property
at P5.00 per square meter. At first glance, this would appear significant and in keeping with the fair market value. But
noticeably, the offer was made some nine (9) years after actual taking. It is pertinent to point out, the spouses Sadang
when first contacted by the plaintiff in 1961, offered to part with the piece of property at P4.00 per square meter. The
difference in the price could be reasonably traced to the fact that the couple then may not have any concrete plan to
develop the area into a subdivision until the defendant came into the picture. But the Sadangs were the registered owners
at the time of actual occupancy, defendants mortgage lien notwithstanding. Being so, they were clothed with legal
personality to enter into any transaction with the plaintiff. The property was agricultural, in use as well as for taxation
purposes. (Exhibits A and B). Privy to this fact, the spouses were presumably aware of the reasonabless of their offer to
sell.
"Thus, the fair market value of the land sought to be expropriated, according to the Supreme Court, should be determined
either at the time of actual taking or at the time of the filing of the complaint, whichever is earlier. The future convertibility

of the property into some other classification does not affect the nature of property. (Alfonso v. Pasay City, G.R. No. L12754, January 30, 1960).
x
"ALL

CONSIDERED,

P3.75

square

meter

is

and

represents

the

fair

market

value"

(Emphasis

supplied).

On the other hand, respondent Court reasoned thus:

"It has been amply shown that the defendant purchased the land for the purpose of converting the same into a first class
residential subdivision. The courts commissioner and the trial court itself took cognizance of such project of the defendant
(pp. 130-131, 163, Record on Appeal). It is worthwhile to note that, before the access road was constructed on the
property, plaintiff had already known of the defendants plan of converting the land into a subdivision, since plaintiff had in
his custody a copy of defendants subdivision plan, Exhibit 7. In point of fact, Exhibit 7 was produced in court by the plaintiff
from its own record (p. 97, Record on Appeal). Evidence has also been adduced to show that, as appraised by C.M. Montano
Realty, the prevailing market price of residential lots in the vicinity of defendants land was P20.00 per square meter (p.
163, Ibid).

"Defendant further maintains that because the access road was not constructed in a straight line, the property was
unnecessarily divided into three separate and irregular segments (Exhibit 4). According to the courts commissioner, the
road, as actually laid out, had rendered the owners plan of converting the land into a subdivision futile.
x

"Needless to state, plaintiff should have given heed to the above legal prescription (Art. 650, Civil Code) by having
constructed the road in a straight line in order to cover the shortest distance, and thus cause the least prejudice to the
defendant. Plaintiff failed to observe this rule, and no explanation has been offered for such neglect. These facts contradict
the conclusion of the lower court that except for the cost of the land encompassed by the road, there is neglible, if any,
consequential damage to speak of . (p. 164, Record on Appeal).
"It is noted that the only basis of the court a quo in assessing the just compensation of the property at the price of P3.75
per square meter is that at the time of actual occupancy by the plaintiff, the property was agricultural in use as well as for
taxation purposes (Exhibits A and D p. 165, Record on Appeal). But such posture is hardly in accord with the settled rule
that in determining the value of the land appropriated for public purposes, the same considerations are to be regarded as in
a sale of property between private parties. The inquiry, in such cases, must always be not what the property is worth in the
market, viewed not merely as to the uses to which it is at the time applied, but with reference to the uses to which it is
plainly adopted; that is to say, what is its worth from its availability for valuable uses? (City of Manila v. Corrales, 32 Phil.
85, 98). It has also been held that the owner has a right to its value for the use for which it would bring the most in the
market (City of Manila v. Corrales, supra; Republic v. Venturanza, Et. Al. 17 SCRA 322, 327).
Indeed, we cannot lightly brush aside the evidence showing that plaintiffs failure to observe the rule for laying out the right
of way easement in a straight line had prevented the defendant from carrying out its plan of converting the property into a
housing subdivision. This consequential damage must be taken into account in the assessment of the just compensation of
the property" (Emphasis supplied).
After a review of the records, we are of the considered opinion that the findings of the Trial Court merit our approval for
several reasons:
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(1) Both documentary and oral evidence indicate that the land in question, at the time of taking by NPC in 1961, was
agricultural in use as well as for taxation purposes. In fact, it was described as "cogonales."
(2) SAN DIEGOs contention that the location and direction of the access road is burdensome is not borne out by the
evidence. The Report of the Commissioner of the Court revealed that NPC merely improved a pre-existing mining road on
the premises, which was only accessible by carabao-drawn sledge during the rainy season. 1 As concluded by the Trial
Court, which had the benefit of autoptic observation:
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"Defendants contention, on the other hand, that the location of the road is burdensome appears to be more idealistic than
meritorious. The right of way as now built is more beneficial to the adjoining subdivision owner (defendant) in the sense
that the residential lot on both flanks of the road could command a higher price. This may not hold true if the access road
were to be built on the east side boundary as proposed by the defendant because only one side of the road may be devoted
to the housing area.
(3) The finding of the Trial Court that "there is negligible, if any, consequential damage to speak of" thus becomes readily
tenable. SAN DIEGO was not, as was the belief of respondent Court, "prevented from carrying out the plan of converting the
property into a housing subdivision." On the contrary, the Trial Court observed that "the thoroughfare should provide a
marked improvement to the flourishing housing subdivision managed by defendant (private Respondent.)"
(4) The appraisal by a realty firm of P20.00 per square meter, the price that SAN DIEGO stresses the property should
command, is not, to our minds, a fair market value. The former owners, the Sadang spouses, offered to part with the
property at P4.00 per square meter. SAN DIEGO had purchased the entire property of 62,285 square meters at public
auction for P10,000.00, or at P0.16 per square meter. Previous to that, or in 1957, the property was mortgaged to the
Development Bank of the Philippines for P20,000.00 and subsequently in 1958 to SAN DIEGO, by way of second mortgage,
for
P30,000.00.
The
observation
of
the
Trial
Court,
on
this
point,
is
decidedly
apropos:

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"x

"A very important point: On the basis of a recognized policy of lending institutions to grant a maximum mortgage loan
corresponding to 60% of the appraised value of the real estate collaterals, the twenty thousand mortgage loan extended by
the Development Bank of the Philippines to the spouses Sadang would roughly place the approximate value of the property
at P33,330 or roughly P0.51 per square meter. And at this ratio, by granting a second mortgage of P30,000, the defendant

impliedly placed the recoverable value of the property within P83,333.33 for the area of 62,285 square meters or about
P1.33 per square meter. That was in 1958, the year of the second mortgage (Exhibit 12), or an annual increase in price at
the rate of P0.81 per square meter. From 1958 to 1961 (date of actual taking) represents three years, or an aggregate
increase of P2.43 per square meter. Add P1.32 to this thus making a total of P3.75 per square meter."
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The price of P12.00 to P15.00, which respondent Court observed as the just compensation awarded in two civil suits for
lands condemned in the immediate vicinity, cannot be a fair gauge since said Court neither adopted the same, and specially
considering that the property was "cogonal" at the time NPC constructed its access road in 1961. Moreover, NPC also
presented contrary evidence indicating prices of P.05 and P.06 per square meter at around the time it had entered the
property. In fact, in respect of sales within the locality, the Trial Court had this to say:
"While sales of properties within the locality in the same year or there about may serve as a guiding factor in ascertaining a
fair market value yet there appears want of proof to show that the alluded sales (Exhibits I-1, J, K, and L) referred to
properties of similar nature nor was proximity to the land in question properly shown."
(5) And most importantly, on the issue of just compensation, it is now settled doctrine, following the leading case of Alfonso
v. Pasay 2 , that to determine due compensation for lands appropriated by the Government, the basis should be the price or
value at the time it was taken from the owner and appropriated by the Government.
"The owner of property expropriated by the State is entitled to how much it was worth at the time of the taking. This has
been clarified in Republic v. PNB (1 SCRA 957) thus: It is apparent from the foregoing that, when plaintiff takes possession
before the institution of the condemnation proceedings, the value should be fixed as of the time of the taking of said
possession, not of filing of the complaint, and that the latter should be the basis for the determination of the value, when
the taking of the property involved coincides with or is subsequent to, the commencement of the proceedings. Indeed,
otherwise, the provision of Rule 69, section 3, directing that compensation be determined as of the date of the filing of the
complaint would never be operative." 3
In the case at bar, the taking by NPC occurred in November 1961, when it constructed the access road on the expropriated
property at time when it was still "cogonal" and owned by the spouses Sadang. The Complaint was filed only in 1963.
The convertibility of the property into a subdivision, the criterion relied upon by respondent Court, is not controlling. The
case of Manila Electric Co. v. Tuason, 60 Phil. 663, 668, cited in Municipal Govt. of Sagay v. Jison, 4 has categorically ruled
that it is the time of taking and not as "potential building" site that is the determining factor,
". . . if the property to be expropriated was agricultural, the adaptability thereof for conversion in the future into a
residential site does not affect its nature when plaintiff assumed possession of the property, although it is a circumstance
that should be considered in determining its value at that time, as an agricultural land." 5
The doctrines in the cases of City v. Corrales, 32 Phil. 85 (1915) and Republic v. Venturanza, 17 SCRA 322 (1966) relied
upon by respondent Court must be deemed to have been superseded not only by the Alfonso, Carlota and Sagay cases but
also by Republic v. Narciso, 99 Phil. 1031 (1956); Republic v. Philippine National Bank, 1 SCRA 957 (1961); and Republic v.
Juan, 92 SCRA 26 (1979), all of which held that the nature of the land at the time of taking by the Government is the
principal criterion for awarding compensation to the landowner. The subdivision was not in existence when NPC entered the
land.
Since SAN DIEGO bought the land in question in the interim and was issued a title only on December 7, 1962, the "taking"
as to it should commence only from said date.
On the issue of legal interest in expropriation proceedings, we held in Amigable v. Cuenca, 43 SCRA 360 (1972), that:

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"As regards the claim for damages, the plaintiff is entitled thereto in the form of legal interest on the price of the land from
the time it was taken up to the time that payment is made by the government. In addition, the government should pay for
attorneys fees, the amount of which should be fixed by the trial court after hearing."
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In the case at bar, legal interest should accrue from December 7, 1962, the time of taking as far as SAN DIEGO is
concerned, at six per cent (6%) per annum, up to the time that payment is made by NPC.
Not having appealed from the Decision of respondent Court, SAN DIEGO cannot ask for its modification by way of increasing
the amount of compensation and including an award for attorneys fees. 6
WHEREFORE, the judgment of respondent Appellate Court, dated December 24, 1980, is hereby set aside, and the Decision
of the then Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch I, in Civil Case No. 2725, authorizing payment of P31,922.00 as full
indemnity for the property at the rate of P3.75 per square meter is reinstated. Petitioner is directed to pay interest at six
per cent (6%) per annum on the amount adjudged from December 7, 1962, until fully paid. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 11154. March 21, 1916. ]
E. MERRITT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Defendant-Appellant.
Crossfield & OBrien for plaintiff.
Attorney-General Avancea for defendant.
SYLLABUS
1. DAMAGES; MEASURE OF. Where the evidence shows that the plaintiff was wholly incapacitated for six months it is an error to restrict the
damages to a shorter period during which he was confined in the hospital.
2. SPECIAL STATUTES; CONSENT OF THE STATE TO BE SUED; CONSTRUCTION. The Government of the Philippine Islands having been
"modeled after the federal and state governments of the United States the decisions of the high courts of that country may be used in
determining the scope and purpose of a special statute.
3. ID.; ID.; ID. The state not being liable to suit except by its express consent, an act abrogating that immunity will be strictly construed.

4. ID.; ID.; ID. An act permitting a suit against the state gives rise to no liability not previously existing unless it is clearly expressed in the
act.
5. GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS; LIABILITY FOR THE NEGLIGENT ACTS OF ITS OFFICERS, AGENTS, AND EMPLOYEES. The
Government of the Philippine Islands in only liable for the negligent acts of its officers, agents, and employees when they are acting as special
agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil code, and a chauffeur of the General Hospital is not such a special agent.

DECISION

TRENT, J. :

This is an appeal by both partied from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of
P14,741, together with the costs of the cause.
Counsel for the plaintiff insist that the trial court erred (1) "in limiting the general damages which the plaintiff suffered to P5,000, instead of
P25,000 as claimed in the complaint," and (2) "in limiting the time when plaintiff was entirely disabled to two months and twenty-one days
and fixing the damage accordingly in the sum of P2,666, instead of P6,000 as claimed by plaintiff in his complaint."
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The Attorney-General on behalf of the defendant urges that the trial court erred: (a) in finding that the collision between the plaintiffs
motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital was due to the negligence of the chauffeur; (b) in holding that the Government of the
Philippine Islands is liable for the damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the collision, even if it be true that collision was due to the
negligence of the chauffeur; and (c) in rendering judgment against the defendant for the sum of P14,741.
The trial courts findings of fact, which are fully supported by the record, are as follows:

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"It is a fact not disputed by counsel for the defendant that when the plaintiff, riding on a motorcycle, was going toward the western part of
Calle Padre Faura, passing along the west side thereof at a speed of ten to twelve miles and hour, upon crossing Taft Avenue and when he was
ten feet from the southwestern intersection of said streets, the General Hospital ambulance, upon reaching said avenue, instead of turning
toward the south, after passing the center thereof, so that it would be on the left side of said avenue, as is prescribed by the ordinance and
the Motor Vehicle Act, turned suddenly and unexpectedly and long before reaching the center of the street, into the right side of Taft Avenue,
without having sounded any whistle or horn, by which movement it struck the plaintiff, who was already six feet from the southwestern point
or from the post placed there.
"By reason of the resulting collision, the plaintiff was so severely injured that, according to Dr. Saleeby, who examined him on the very same
day that he was taken to the General Hospital, he was suffering from a depression in the left parietal region, a wound in the same place and
in beck part of his head, while blood issued from his nose and he was entirely unconscious.
"The marks revealed that he had one or more fractures of the skull and that the grey matter and brain mass had suffered material injury. At
ten oclock of the night in question, which was the time set for performing the operation, his pulse was so weak and so irregular that, in his
opinion, there was little hope that he would live. His right leg was broken in such a way that the fracture extended to the outer skin in such
manner that it might be regarded as double and the wound would be expose to infection, for which reason it was of the most serious nature.
"At another examination six days before the day of the trial, Dr. Saleeby notice that the plaintiffs leg showed a contraction of an inch and a
half and a curvature that made his leg very weak and painful at the point of the fracture. Examination of his head revealed a notable readjustment of the functions of the brain and nerves. The patient apparently was slightly deaf, had a slight weakness in his eyes and in his
mental condition. This latter weakness was always noticed when the plaintiff had to do any difficult mental labor, especially when he
attempted to use his memory for mathematical calculations.
"According to the various merchants who testified as witnesses, the plaintiffs mental and physical condition prior to the accident was
excellent, and that after having received the injuries that have been discussed, his physical condition had undergone a noticeable
depreciation, for he had lost the agility, energy, and ability that he had constantly displayed before the accident as one of the best
constructors of wooden buildings and he could not now earn even a half of the income that he had secured for his work because he had lost
50 per cent of his efficiency. As a contractor, he could no longer, as he had before done, climb up ladders and scaffoldings to reach the highest
parts of the building.
"As a consequence of the loss the plaintiff suffered in the efficiency of his work as a contractor, he had to dissolve the partnership he had
formed with the engineer, Wilson, because he was incapacitated from making mathematical calculations on account of the condition of his leg
and of his mental faculties, and he had to give up a contract he had for the construction of the Uy Chaco building."
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We may say at the outset that we are in full accord with the trial court to the effect that the collision between the plaintiffs motorcycle and
the ambulance of the General Hospital was due solely to the negligence of the chauffeur.
The two items which constitute a part of the P14,741 and which are drawn in question by the plaintiff are (a) P5,000, the amount awarded for
permanent injuries, and (b) the P2,666, the amount allowed for the loss of wages during the time the plaintiff was incapacitated from
pursuing his occupation. We fund nothing in the record which would justify us in increasing the amount of the first. as to the second, the
record shows, and the trial court so found, that the plaintiffs services as a contractor were worth P1,000 per month. The court, however,
limited the time to two months and twenty-one days, which the plaintiff was actually confined in the hospital. In this we think there was error,
because it was clearly established that the plaintiff was wholly incapacitated for a period of sex months. The mere fact that he remained in the
hospital only two months and twenty-one days while the remainder of the six months was spent in his home, would not prevent recovery for
the whole time. We, therefore, find that the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff, without any fault on his part, is P18,075.
As the negligence which caused the collision is a tort committed by an agent or employee of the Government, the inquiry at once arises
whether the Government is legally liable for the damages resulting therefrom.
Act No. 2457, effective February 3, 1915, reads:

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"An act authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit against the Government of the Philippine Islands and authorizing the Attorney-General of said
Islands to appear in said suit.
"Whereas a claim has been filed against the Government of the Philippine Islands by Mr. E. Merritt, of Manila, for damages resulting from a
collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital on March twenty-fifth, nineteen hundred and thirteen;
"Whereas it is not known who is responsible for the accident nor is it possible to determine the amount of damages, if any , to which the
claimant is entitled; and
"Whereas the Director of Public Works and the Attorney-General recommend that an act be passed by the Legislature authorizing Mr. E.
Merritt to bring suit in the courts against the Government, in order that said questions may be decided: Now, therefore,
"By authority of the United States, be it enacted by the Philippine Legislature, that:

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"SECTION 1. E. Merritt is hereby authorized to bring suit in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila against the Government of the
Philippine Islands in order to fix the responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital, and to

determine the amount of the damages, if any, to which Mr. E. Merritt is entitled on account of said collision, and the attorney-General of the
Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and directed to appear at the trial on the behalf of the Government of said Islands, to defend said
Government at the same.
"SEC. 2. This Act shall take effect on its passage.
"Enacted, February 3, 1915."

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Did the defendant, in enacting the above quoted act, simply waive its immunity from suit or did it also concede its liability to the plaintiff? If
only the former, then it cannot be held that the Act created any new cause of action in favor of the plaintiff or extended the defendants
liability to any case not previously recognized.
All admit that the Insular Government (the defendant) cannot be sued by an individual without its consent. It is also admitted that the instant
case is one against the Government. As the consent of the Government to be sued by the plaintiff was entirely voluntary on its part, it is our
duty to look carefully into the terms of the consent, and render judgment accordingly.
The plaintiff was authorized to bring this action against the Government "in order to fix the responsibility for the collision between his
motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital and to determine the amount of the damages, if any, to which Mr. E. Merritt is entitled
on account of said collision, . . . ." These were the two questions submitted to the court for determination. The Act was passed "in order that
said questions may be decided." We have "decided" that the accident was due solely to the negligence of the chauffeur, who was at the time
an employee of the defendant, and we have also fixed the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the collision. Does the
Act authorize us to hold that the Government is legally liable for that amount? If not, we must look elsewhere for such authority, if it exists.
The Government of the Philippine Islands having been "modeled after the Federal and state Governments in the United States," we may look
to the decisions of the high courts of that country for aid in determining the purpose and scope of Act No. 2457.
In the United States the rule that the state is not liable for the torts committed by its officers or agents whom it employs, except when
expressly made so by legislative enactment, is well settled. "The Government," says Justice Story, "does not undertake to guarantee to any
person the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs, since that would involve it in all its operations in endless embarrassments,
difficulties and losses, which would be subversive of the public interest." (Claussen v. City of Luverne, 103 Minn., 491, citing U.S. v.
Kirkpatrick, 9 Wheat, 720; 6 L. Ed., 199; and Beers v. State, 20 How., 527; 15 L. Ed., 991.)
In the case of Melvin v. State (121 Cal., 16), the plaintiff sought to recover damages from the state for personal injuries received on account
of the negligence of the state officers at the state fair, a state institution created by the legislature for the purpose of improving agricultural
and kindred industries; to disseminate information calculated to educate and benefit the industrial classes; and to advance to educate and
benefit the industrial classes; and to advance by such means the material interests of the state, being objects similar to those sought by the
public school system. In passing upon the question of the states liability for the negligent acts of its officers or agents, the court said:
jgc:chanroble s.com.ph

"No claim arises against any government in favor of an individual, by reason of the misfeasance, laces, or unauthorized exercise of powers by
its officers or agents." (Citing Gibbons v. U.S., 8 Wall., 269; Clodfelter v. State, 86 N.C., 51, 53; 41 Am. Rep., 440; Chapman v. State, 104
Cal., 690; 43 Am. St. Rep., 158; Green v. State, 73 Cal., 29; Bourn v. Hart, 93 Cal., 321; 27 Am. St. Rep., 203; Story on Agency, sec. 319.)
As to the scope of legislative enactments permitting individuals to sue the state where the cause of action arises out of either tort or contract,
the rule is stated in 36 Cyc., 915, thus:
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"By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any
cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting
liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense."
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In Apfelbacher v. State (152 N. W., 144, advanced sheets), decided April 16, 1915, the Act of 1913, which authorized the bringing of this suit,
read:
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"SECTION 1. Authority is hereby given to George Apfelbacher, of the town of Summit, Waukesha County, Wisconsin, to bring suit in such court
or courts and in such form or forms as he may be advised for the purpose of settling and determining all controversies which he may now
have with the State of Wisconsin, or its duly authorizes officers and agents, relative to the mill property of said George Apfelbacher, the fish
hatchery of the State Wisconsin on the Bark River, and the mill property of Evan Humphrey at the lower end of Nagawicka Lake, and relative
to the use of the waters of said Bark River and Nagawicka Lake, all in the county of Waukesha, Wisconsin."
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In determining the scope of this act, the court said;

"Plaintiff claims that by the enactment of this law the legislature admitted liability on the part of the state for the acts of its officers, and that
the suit now stands just as it would stand between private parties. It is difficult to see how the act does, or was intended to do, more than
remove the states immunity from suit. It simply gives authority commence suit for the purpose of settling plaintiffs controversies with the
state. Nowhere in the act is there a whisper or suggestion that the court or courts in the disposition of the suit shall depart from well
established principles of law, or that the amount of damages is the only question to be settled. The act opened the door of the court to the
plaintiff. It did not pass upon the question of liability, but left the suit just where it would be in the absence of the states immunity from suit.
If the Legislature had intended to change the rule that obtained in this state so long and to declare liability on the part of the state, it would
not have left so important a matter to mere inference but would have done so in express terms. (Murdoc Grate Co. v. Commonwealth, 152
Mass., 28; 24 N. E., 854; 8 L. R.A., 399)"
In Denning v. state (123 Cal., 316), the provisions of the Act of 1893, relied upon and considered, are as follows:

jgc:chanroble s.com.ph

"All persons who have, or shall hereafter have claims on contract or for negligence against the state not allowed by the state board of
examiners, are hereby authorized, on the terms and conditions herein contained, to bring suit thereon against the state in any of the courts of
this state of competent jurisdiction, and prosecute the same to final judgment. The rules of practice in civil cases shall apply to such suits,
except as herein otherwise provided."
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And the court said:

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"This statute has been considered by this court in at least two cases, arising under different facts, and in both it was held that said statute did
not create any liability or cause of action against the state where none existed before, but merely gave an additional remedy to enforce such
liability as would have existed if the statute had not been enacted. (Chapman v. State, 104 Cal., 690; 43 Am. St. Rep., 158; Melvin v. State,
121 Cal., 16.)"
A statute of Massachusetts enacted in 1887 gave to the superior court "jurisdiction of all claims against the commonwealth, whether at law or
in equity," with an exception not necessary to be here mentioned. In construing this statute the court, in Murdock Grate Co. v. Commonwealth
(152 Mass., 28), said:
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"The statute we are discussing discloses no intention to create against the state a new and heretofore unrecognized class of liabilities, but
only an intention to provide a judicial tribunal where well recognized existing liabilities can be adjudicated."
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In Sipple v. State (99 N. Y., 284), where the board of the canal claims had, by the terms of the statute of New York, jurisdiction of claims for
damages for injuries in the management of the canals such as the plaintiff had sustained, Chief Justice Ruger remarks; "It must be conceded
that the state can be made liable for injuries arising from the negligence of its agents or servants, only by force of some positive statute
assuming such liability."
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It being quite clear that Act No. 2457 does not operate to extend the Governments liability to any cause not previously recognized, we will
now examine the substantive law touching the defendants liability for the negligent acts of its officers, agents, and employees. Paragraph 5 of
article 1903 of the civil Code reads:
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"The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damage should have been caused by the official to
whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in which case the provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable."
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The supreme court of Spain in defining the scope of this paragraph said:

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"That the obligation to indemnify for damages which a third person causes another by his fault or negligence is based, as is evidenced by the
same Law 3, Title 15, Partida 7, on that the person obligated, by his own fault or negligence, takes part in the act or omission of the third
party who caused the damage. It follows therefrom that the state by virtue of such provision of law, is not responsible for the damages
suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their office,
because neither fault nor even negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the organization of branches of the public service and
in the appointment of its agents; on the contrary, we must presuppose all foresight humanly possible on its part in order that each branch of
service serves the general weal and that of private persons interested in its operation. Between these latter and the state therefore, no
relations of a private nature governed by the civil law can arise except in a case where the state acts as a judicial person capable of acquiring
rights and contracting obligations." (Supreme Court of Spain, January 7, 1898; 83 Jur. Civ., 24.)
"That the Civil Code in chapter 2, title 16, book 4, regulates the obligations which arise out of fault or negligence; and whereas in the first
articles thereof, No. 1902, where the general principle is laid down that where a person who by an act or omission causes damage to another
through fault or negligence, shall be obliged to repair the damage so done, reference is made to acts or omissions of the persons who directly
or indirectly cause the damage, the following article refers to third persons and imposes an identical obligation upon those who maintain fixed
relations of authority and superiority over the authors of the damage, because the law presumes that in consequence of such relations the
evil caused by their own fault or negligence is imputable to them. This legal presumption gives way to proof, however, because, as held in the
last paragraph of article 1903, responsibility for acts of third persons ceases when the persons mentioned in said article prove that they
employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage, and among these persons, called up[on to answer in a direct and
not a subsidiary manner, are found, in addition to the mother or the father in a proper case, guardians and owners or director of an
establishment or enterprise, the state, but not always, except when it acts through the agency of a special agent, doubtless because and only
in this case, the fault or negligence, which is the original basis of this kind of objections, must be presumed to lie with the state.
"That although in some cases the state might by virtue of the general principle set forth in article 1902 respond for all the damage that is
occasioned to private parties by orders or resolutions which by fault or negligence are made by branches of the central administration acting
in the name and representation of the state itself and as an external expression of its sovereignty in the exercise of its executive powers, yet
said article is not applicable in the case of damages said to have been occasioned to the petitioners by an executive official, acting in the
exercise of his powers, in proceedings to enforce the collections of certain property taxes owing by the owner of the property which they hold
in sublease.
"That the responsibility of the state is limited by article 1903 to the case wherein it acts through a special agent (and a special agent, in the
sense in which these words are employed, is one who receives a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties
of his office if he is a special official) so that in representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof he executed the trust
confided to him. this concept does not apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the active administration and who in his own
responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and which are regulated by law and the
regulations." (Supreme Court of Spain, May 18, 1904; 98 Jur. Civ., 389, 390.)
"That according to paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code and the principle laid down in a decision, among others, of the 18th of May,
1904, in a damage case, the responsibility of the state is limited to that which it contracts through a special agent, duly empowered by a
definite order or commission to perform some act or charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to the claim, and not where the
claim is based on acts or omissions imputable to a public official charge with some administrative or technical office who can be held to the
proper responsibility in the manner laid down by the law of civil responsibility. Consequently, the trial court in not so deciding and in
sentencing the said entity to the payment of damages, caused by an official of the second class referred to, has by erroneous interpretation
infringed the provisions of articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code." (Supreme Court of Spain, July 30, 1911; 122 Jur. Civ., 146)
It is, therefore, evident that the State (the Government of the Philippine Islands) is only liable, according to the above quoted decisions of the
Supreme Court of Spain, for the acts of its agents, officers and employees when they act as special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5
of article 1903, supra, and that the chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not such an agent.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from must be reversed, without costs in this instance. Whether the Government intends to
make itself legally liable for the amount of damages above set forth, which the plaintiff has sustained by reason of the negligent acts of one of
its employees, by legislative enactment and by appropriating sufficient funds therefor, we are not called upon to determine. This matter rests
solely with the Legislature and not with the courts.

[G.R. No. 55963. December 1, 1989.]

SPOUSES JOSE FONTANILLA AND VIRGINIA FONTANILLA, Petitioners, v. HONORABLE INOCENCIO D. MALIAMAN and
NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION, Respondents.
[G.R. No. 61045. December 1, 1989.]
NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION, appellant, v. SPOUSES JOSE FONTANILLA and VIRGINIA FONTANILLA, Appellees.
Cecilio V. Suarez, Jr. for Spouses Fontanilla.
Felicisimo C. Villaflor for NIA.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; TORTS AND DAMAGES; ASPECTS OF THE LIABILITY OF STATE FOR DAMAGES. The liability of the State has two aspects,
namely: 1. Its public or governmental aspects where it is liable for the tortious acts of special agents only. 2. Its private or business aspects
(as when it engages in private enterprises) where it becomes liable as an ordinary employer. (p. 961, Civil Code of the Philippines; Annotated,
Paras, 1986 Ed.). In this jurisdiction, the State assumes a limited liability for the damage caused by the tortious acts or conduct of its special
agent.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; INSTANCES WHEN THE GOVERNMENT ASSUMES LIABILITY FOR ACTS DONE THROUGH ITS SPECIAL AGENTS. Under
paragraph 6 of Art. 2180, the State has voluntarily assumed liability for acts done through special agents. The States agent, if a public
official, must not only be specially commissioned to do a particular task but that such task must be foreign to said officials usual
governmental functions. If the States agent is not a public official, and is commissioned to perform non-govern mental functions, then the
State assumes the role of an ordinary employer and will be held liable as such for its agents tort. Where the government commissions a
private individual for a special governmental task, it is acting through a special agent within the meaning of the provision. (Torts and
Damages, Sangco, p. 347, 1984 Ed.).
3. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; GOVERNMENTAL AND PROPRIETARY FUNCTIONS DINSTINGUISHED. Certain functions and activities, which can
be performed only by the government, are more or less generally agreed to be "governmental" in character, and so the State is immune from

tort liability. On the other hand, a service which might as well be provided by a private corporation, and particularly when it collects revenues
from it, the function is considered a "proprietary" one, as to which there may be liability for the torts of agents within the scope of their
employment.
4. ID.; NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION; A GOVERNMENT CORPORATION WITH JURIDICAL PERSONALITY WHICH CAN BE HELD
ANSWERABLE FOR DAMAGES. The National Irrigation Administration is an agency of the government exercising proprietary functions, by
express provision of Rep. Act No. 3601. It is a government corporation with juridical personality and not a mere agency of the government.
Since it is a corporate body performing non-governmental functions, it now becomes liable for the damage caused by the accident resulting
from the tortious act of its driver-employee. In this particular case, the NIA assumes the responsibility of an ordinary employer and as such, it
becomes answerable for damages.
5. CIVIL LAW; TORTS AND DAMAGES; NEGLIGENCE IN THE SELECTION AND SUPERVISION OF EMPLOYEE; CASE OF. It should be
emphasized that the accident happened along the Maharlika National Road within the city limits of San Jose City, an urban area. Considering
the fact that the victim was thrown 50 meters away from the point of impact, there is a strong indication that driver Garcia was driving at a
high speed. This is confirmed by the fact that the pick-up suffered substantial and heavy damage as above-described and the fact that the
NIA group was then "in a hurry to reach the campsite as early as possible", as shown by their not stopping to find out what they bumped as
would have been their normal and initial reaction. Evidently, there was negligence in the supervision of the driver for the reason that they
were travelling at a high speed within the city limits and yet the supervisor of the group, Ely Salonga, failed to caution and make the driver
observe the proper and allowed speed limit within the city. Under the situation, such negligence is further aggravated by their desire to reach
their destination without even checking whether or not the vehicle suffered damage from the object it bumped, thus showing imprudence and
recklessness on the part of both the driver and the supervisor in the group.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; INSTANCES WHEN EMPLOYER WOULD STILL BE LIABLE EVEN IN THE ABSENCE THEREOF. This Court has ruled that even if
the employer can prove the diligence in the selection and supervision (the latter aspect has not been established herein) of the employee, still
if he ratifies the wrongful acts, or take no step to avert further damage, the employer would still be liable. (Maxion v. Manila Railroad Co., 44
Phil. 597).
7. ID.; ID.; FAILURE OF DRIVER TO KEEP A PROPER LOOK OUT IN THE LINE TO BE TRAVERSED CONSTITUTES NEGLIGENCE. In the case of
Vda. de Bonifacio v. B.L.T. Bus Co. (L-26810, August 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 618), this Court held that a driver should be especially watchful in
anticipation of others who may be using the highway, and his failure to keep a proper look out for reasons and objects in the line to be
traversed constitutes negligence.

DECISION

PARAS, J.:

In G.R. No. 55963, the petition for review on certiorari seeks the affirmance of the decision dated March 20, 1980 of the then Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch VIII, at San Jose City, and its modification with respect to the denial of petitioners claim for moral and
exemplary damages and attorneys fees.
In G.R. No. 61045, respondent National Irrigation Administration seeks the reversal of the aforesaid decision of the lower court. The original
appeal of this case before the Court of Appeals was certified to this Court and in the resolution of July 7, 1982, it was docketed with the
aforecited number. And in the resolution of April 3, this case was consolidated with G.R. No. 55963.
It appears that on August 21, 1976 at about 6:30 P.M., a pick-up owned and operated by respondent National Irrigation Administration, a
government agency bearing Plate No. IN-651, then driven officially by Hugo Garcia, an employee of said agency as its regular driver, bumped
a bicycle ridden by Francisco Fontanilla, son of herein petitioners, and Restituto Deligo, at Maasin, San Jose City along the Maharlika Highway.
As a result of the impact, Francisco Fontanilla and Restituto Deligo were injured and brought to the San Jose City Emergency Hospital for
treatment. Fontanilla was later transferred to the Cabanatuan Provincial Hospital where he died.
Garcia was then a regular driver of respondent National Irrigation Administration who, at the time of the accident, was a licensed professional
driver and who qualified for employment as such regular driver of respondent after having passed the written and oral examinations on traffic
rules and maintenance of vehicles given by National Irrigation Administration authorities.
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The within petition is thus an offshot of the action (Civil Case No. SJC-56) instituted by petitioners-spouses on April 17, 1978 against
respondent NIA before the then Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch VIII at San Jose City, for damages in connection with the death
of their son resulting from the aforestated accident.
After trial, the trial court rendered judgment on March 20, 1980 which directed respondent National Irrigation Administration to pay damages
(death benefits) and actual expenses to petitioners. The dispositive portion of the decision reads thus.
". . . Judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant National Irrigation Administration to pay to the heirs of the deceased P12,000.00
for the death of Francisco Fontanilla; P3,389.00 which the parents of the deceased had spent for the hospitalization and burial of the deceased
Francisco Fontanilla; and to pay the costs." (Brief for the petitioners spouses Fontanilla, p. 4; Rollo, p. 132).
Respondent National Irrigation Administration filed on April 21, 1980, its motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid decision which
respondent trial court denied in its Order of June 13, 1980. Respondent National Irrigation Administration thus appealed said decision to the
Court of Appeals (C.A.-G.R. No. 67237-R) where it filed its brief for appellant in support of its position.
Instead of filing the required brief in the aforecited Court of Appeals case, petitioners filed the instant petition with this Court.
The sole issue for the resolution of the Court is: Whether or not the award of moral damages, exemplary damages and attorneys fees is
legally proper in a complaint for damages based on quasi-delict which resulted in the death of the son of herein petitioners.
Petitioners allege:

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1. The award of moral damages is specifically allowable under paragraph 3 of Article 2206 of the New Civil Code which provides that the
spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of
the death of the deceased. Should moral damages be granted, the award should be made to each of petitioners-spouses individually and in
varying amounts depending upon proof of mental and depth of intensity of the same, which should not be less than P50,000.00 for each of
them.
2. The decision of the trial court had made an impression that respondent National Irrigation Administration acted with gross negligence
because of the accident and the subsequent failure of the National Irrigation Administration personnel including the driver to stop in order to
give assistance to the victims. Thus, by reason of the gross negligence of respondent, petitioners become entitled to exemplary damages
under Arts. 2231 and 2229 of the New Civil Code.
3. Petitioners are entitled to an award of attorneys fees, the amount of which (20%) had been sufficiently established in the hearing of May
23, 1979.
4. This petition has been filed only for the purpose of reviewing the findings of the lower court upon which the disallowance of moral damages,
exemplary damages and attorneys fees was based and not for the purpose of disturbing the other findings of fact and conclusions of law.

The Solicitor General, taking up the cudgels for public respondent National Irrigation Administration, contends thus:

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1. The filing of the instant petition is not proper in view of the appeal taken by respondent National Irrigation Administration to the Court of
Appeals against the judgment sought to be reviewed. The focal issue raised in respondents appeal to the Court of Appeals involves the
question as to whether or not the driver of the vehicle that bumped the victims was negligent in his operation of said vehicle. It thus becomes
necessary that before petitioners claim for moral and exemplary damages could be resolved, there should first be a finding of negligence on
the part of respondents employee-driver. In this regard, the Solicitor General alleges that the trial court decision does not categorically
contain such finding.
2. The filing of the "Appearance and Urgent Motion For Leave to File Plaintiff-Appellees Brief dated December 28, 1981 by petitioners in the
appeal (CA-G.R. No. 67237-R; and G.R. No. 61045) of the respondent National Irrigation Administration before the Court of Appeals, is an
explicit admission of said petitioners that the herein petition, is not proper. Inconsistent procedures are manifest because while petitioners
question the findings of fact in the Court of Appeals, they present only the questions of law before this Court which posture confirms their
admission of the facts.
3. The fact that the parties failed to agree on whether or not negligence caused the vehicular accident involves a question of fact which
petitioners should have brought to the Court of Appeals within the reglementary period. Hence, the decision of the trial court has become final
as to the petitioners and for this reason alone, the petition should be dismissed.
4. Respondent Judge acted within his jurisdiction, sound discretion and in conformity with the law.
5. Respondents do not assail petitioners claim to moral and exemplary damages by reason of the shock and subsequent illness they suffered
because of the death of their son. Respondent National Irrigation Administration, however, avers that it cannot be held liable for the damages
because it is an agency of the State performing governmental functions and driver Hugo Garcia was a regular driver of the vehicle, not a
special agent who was performing a job or act foreign to his usual duties. Hence, the liability for the tortious act should not be borne by
respondent government agency but by driver Garcia who should answer for the consequences of his act.
6. Even as the trial court touched on the failure or laxity of respondent National Irrigation Administration in exercising due diligence in the
selection and supervision of its employee, the matter of due diligence is not an issue in this case since driver Garcia was not its special agent
but a regular driver of the vehicle.
The sole legal question on whether or not petitioners may be entitled to an award of moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees can
very well be answered with the application of Arts. 2176 and 2180 of the New Civil Code.
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Art. 2176 thus provides:

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"Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter."
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Paragraphs 5 and 6 of Art. 2180 read as follows:

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"Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks,
even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry."
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"The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to
whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in Art. 2176 shall be applicable."
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The liability of the State has two aspects, namely:

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1. Its public or governmental aspects where it is liable for the tortious acts of special agents only.
2 Its private or business aspects (as when it engages in private enterprises) where it becomes liable as an ordinary employer. (p. 961, Civil
Code of the Philippines; Annotated, Paras, 1986 Ed.).
In this jurisdiction, the State assumes a limited liability for the damage caused by the tortious acts or conduct of its special agent.
Under the aforequoted paragraph 6 of Art. 2180, the State has voluntarily assumed liability for acts done through special agents. The States
agent, if a public official, must not only be specially commissioned to do a particular task but that such task must be foreign to said officials
usual governmental functions. If the States agent is not a public official, and is commissioned to perform non-govern mental functions, then
the State assumes the role of an ordinary employer and will be held liable as such for its agents tort. Where the government commissions a
private individual for a special governmental task, it is acting through a special agent within the meaning of the provision. (Torts and
Damages, Sangco, p. 347, 1984 Ed.).
Certain functions and activities, which can be performed only by the government, are more or less generally agreed to be "governmental" in
character, and so the State is immune from tort liability. On the other hand, a service which might as well be provided by a private
corporation, and particularly when it collects revenues from it, the function is considered a "proprietary" one, as to which there may be
liability for the torts of agents within the scope of their employment.
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The National Irrigation Administration is an agency of the government exercising proprietary functions, by express provision of Rep. Act No.
3601. Section 1 of said Act provides:
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"Section 1. Name and domicile. A body corporate is hereby created which shall be known as the National Irrigation Administration,
hereinafter called the NIA for short, which shall be organized immediately after the approval of this Act. It shall have its principal seat of
business in the City of Manila and shall have representatives in all provinces for the proper conduct of its business.
Section 2 of said law spells out some of the NIAs proprietary functions. Thus
"Sec. 2. Powers and objectives. The NIA shall have the following powers and objectives:

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"(a) . . .
"(b) . . .
"(c) To collect from the users of each irrigation system constructed by it such fees as may be necessary to finance the continuous operation of
the system and reimburse within a certain period not less than twenty-five years cost of construction thereof; and
"(d) To do all such other things and to transact all such business as are directly or indirectly necessary, incidental or conducive to the
attainment of the above objectives."
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Indubitably, the NIA is a government corporation with juridical personality and not a mere agency of the government. Since it is a corporate
body performing non-governmental functions, it now becomes liable for the damage caused by the accident resulting from the tortious act of
its driver-employee. In this particular case, the NIA assumes the responsibility of an ordinary employer and as such, it becomes answerable
for damages.
This assumption of liability, however, is predicated upon the existence of negligence on the part of respondent NIA. The negligence referred to

here is the negligence of supervision.

At this juncture, the matter of due diligence on the part of respondent NIA becomes a crucial issue in determining its liability since it has been
established that respondent is a government agency performing proprietary functions and as such, it assumes the posture of an ordinary
employer which, under Par. 5 of Art. 2180, is responsible for the damages caused by its employees provided that it has failed to observe or
exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of the driver.
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It will be noted from the assailed decision of the trial court that "as a result of the impact, Francisco Fontanilla was thrown to a distance 50
meters away from the point of impact while Restituto Deligo was thrown a little bit further away. The impact took place almost at the edge of
the cemented portion of the road." (Italics supplied) [page 26, Rollo].
The lower court further declared that "a speeding vehicle coming in contact with a person causes force and impact upon the vehicle that
anyone in the vehicle cannot fail to notice. As a matter of fact, the impact was so strong as shown by the fact that the vehicle suffered dents
on the right side of the radiator guard, the hood, the fender and a crack on the radiator as shown by the investigation report (Exhibit "E").
(Emphasis supplied) [page 29, Rollo].
It should be emphasized that the accident happened along the Maharlika National Road within the city limits of San Jose City, an urban area.
Considering the fact that the victim was thrown 50 meters away from the point of impact, there is a strong indication that driver Garcia was
driving at a high speed. This is confirmed by the fact that the pick-up suffered substantial and heavy damage as above-described and the fact
that the NIA group was then "in a hurry to reach the campsite as early as possible", as shown by their not stopping to find out what they
bumped as would have been their normal and initial reaction.
Evidently, there was negligence in the supervision of the driver for the reason that they were travelling at a high speed within the city limits
and yet the supervisor of the group, Ely Salonga, failed to caution and make the driver observe the proper and allowed speed limit within the
city. Under the situation, such negligence is further aggravated by their desire to reach their destination without even checking whether or not
the vehicle suffered damage from the object it bumped, thus showing imprudence and recklessness on the part of both the driver and the
supervisor in the group.
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Significantly, this Court has ruled that even if the employer can prove the diligence in the selection and supervision (the latter aspect has not
been established herein) of the employee, still if he ratifies the wrongful acts, or take no step to avert further damage, the employer would
still be liable. (Maxion v. Manila Railroad Co., 44 Phil. 597).
Thus, too, in the case of Vda. de Bonifacio v. B.L.T. Bus Co. (L-26810, August 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 618), this Court held that a driver should be
especially watchful in anticipation of others who may be using the highway, and his failure to keep a proper look out for reasons and objects in
the line to be traversed constitutes negligence.
Considering the foregoing, respondent NIA is hereby directed to pay herein petitioners-spouses the amounts of P12,000.00 for the death of
Francisco Fontanilla; P3,389.00 for hospitalization and burial expenses of the aforenamed deceased; P30,000.00 as moral damages;
P8,000.00 as exemplary damages and attorneys fees of 20% of the total award.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 104408. June 21, 1993.]

METRO MANILA TRANSIT CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS and NENITA CUSTODIO, Respondents.
Office of the Government Corporate Counsel for Petitioner.
Renato P. Decena and Restituto Abjero for Private Respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF FACT; BY THE TRIAL COURT; MAY BE REVIEWED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS. At this
juncture, it suffice to note that factual findings of the trial court may be reversed by the Court of Appeals, which is vested by law with the
power to review both legal and factual issues, if on the evidence of record, it appears that the trial court may have been mistaken particularly
in the appreciation of evidence, which is within the domain of the Court of Appeals.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; BY THE COURT OF APPEALS; RULE AND EXCEPTIONS; APPLICATION IN CASE AT BAR. The general rule laid down in a
plethora of cases is that such findings of fact by the Court of Appeals are conclusive upon and beyond the power of review of the Supreme
Court. However, it is now well-settled that while the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are entitled to great respect, and even finality at
times, that rule is not inflexible and is subject to well established exceptions, to wit: (1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises and conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) where there is grave
abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the
Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant
and appellee; (7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of the fact are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition, as well as in the
petitioners main and reply briefs, are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record. When, as in this case, the findings of the
Court of Appeals and the trial court are contrary to each other, this court may scrutinize the evidence on record, in order to arrive at a correct
finding based thereon.
3. ID.; ID.; BURDEN OF PROOF; REST UPON THE PARTY WHO MADE AN AFFIRMATIVE ASSERTION. It is procedurally required for each
party in a case to prove his own affirmative assertion by the degree of evidence required by law. In civil cases, the degree of evidence
required of a party in order to support his claim is preponderance of evidence, or that evidence adduced by one party which is more
conclusive and credible than that of the other party. It is, therefore, incumbent on the plaintiff who is claiming a right to prove his case.
Corollarily, defendant must likewise prove its own allegation to buttress its claim that it is not liable. (Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, Et Al., 173 SCRA 619 [1989]) In fine, the party, whether plaintiff or defendant, who asserts the affirmative of the issue has
the burden of presenting at the trial such amount of evidence required by law to obtain a favorable judgment. It is entirely within each of the
parties discretion, consonant with the theory of the case it or he seeks to advance and subject to such procedural strategy followed thereby,
to present all available evidence at its or his disposal in the manner which may be deemed necessary and beneficial to prove its or his
position, provided only that the same shall measure up to the quantum of evidence required by law. In making proof in its or his case, it is
paramount that the best and most complete evidence be formally entered.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; OBSERVANCE OF THE DILIGENCE OF A GOOD FATHER OF A FAMILY, AS A DEFENSE; NOT ESTABLISHED IN CASE AT BAR.
While there is no rule which requires that testimonial evidence, to hold sway, must be corroborated by documentary evidence, or even
object evidence for that matter, inasmuch as the witnesses testimonies dwelt on mere generalities, we cannot consider the same as
sufficiently persuasive proof that there was observance of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees. Petitioners attempt to
prove its diligentissimi patris familias in the selection and supervision of employees through oral evidence must fail as it was unable to
buttress the same with any other evidence, object or documentary, which might obviate the apparent biased nature of the testimony.
Whether or not the diligence of a good father of a family has been observed by petitioner is a matter of proof which under the circumstances
in the case at bar has not been clearly established. It is not felt by the Court that there is enough evidence on record as would overturn the
presumption of negligence, and for failure to submit all evidence within its control, assuming the putative existence thereof, petitioner MMTC
must suffer the consequences of its own inaction and indifference. Due diligence in the supervision of employees, includes the formulation of

suitable rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and the issuance of proper instructions intended for the protection of the public
and persons with whom the employer has relations through his or its employees and the imposition of necessary disciplinary measures upon
employees in case of breach or as may be warranted to ensure the performance of acts indispensable to the business of and beneficial to their
employer. (Filamer Christian Institute v. Intermediate Appellate Court, Et Al., 212 SCRA 637 [1992]) To this, we add that actual
implementation and monitoring of consistent compliance with said rules should be the constant concern of the employer, acting through
dependable supervisors who should regularly report on their supervisory functions. In order that the defense of due diligence in the selection
and supervision of employees may be deemed sufficient and plausible, it is not enough to emptily invoke the existence of said company
guidelines and policies on hiring and supervision. As the negligence of the employee gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of
the employer, the latter has the burden of proving that it has been diligent not only in the selection of employees but also in the actual
supervision of their work. The mere allegation of the existence of hiring procedures and supervisory policies, without anything more, is
decidedly not sufficient to overcome such presumption. We emphatically reiterate our holding, as a warning to all employees, that" (t)he mere
formulation of various company policies on safety without showing that they were being complied with is not sufficient to exempt petitioner
from liability arising from negligence of its employees. It is incumbent upon petitioner to show that in recruiting and employing the erring
driver the recruitment procedures and company policies on efficiency and safety were followed." (Pantranco North Express, Inc. v. Baesa, 179
384 [1989]. See also Franco, Et. Al. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, Et Al., 178 SCRA 31 [1989]) Paying lip-service to these injunctions or
merely going through the motions of compliance therewith will warrant stern sanctions from the Court.
5. CIVIL LAW; QUASI-DELICT; ELEMENTS. The case at bar is clearly within the coverage of Articles 2176 and 2177, in relation to Article
2180 of the Civil Code provisions on quasi-delicts, as all the elements thereof are present, to wit: (1) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (2)
fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person for whose act he must respond, and (3) the connection of cause and effect between
fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by plaintiff.
6. ID.; ID.; LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER; DEFENSE AVAILABLE; CASE AT BAR. Whether or not engaged in any business or industry, the
employer under Article 2180 is liable for torts committed by his employees within the scope of their assigned tasks. But, it is necessary first to
establish the employment relationship. Once this is done, the plaintiff must show, to hold the employer liable, that the employee was acting
within the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed. It is only then that the defendant, as employer, may find it
necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees. The diligence of a good father of a family
required to be observed by employers to prevent damages under Article 2180 refers to due diligence in the selection and supervision of
employees in order to protect the public. With the allegation and subsequent proof of negligence against the defendant driver and of an
employer-employee relation between him and his co-defendant MMTC in this instance, the case is undoubtedly based on a quasi-delict under
Article 2180. When the employee causes damage due to his own negligence while performing his own duties, there arises the juris tantum
presumption that the employer is negligent, rebuttable only by proof of observance of the diligence of a good father of a family. For failure to
rebut such legal presumption of negligence in the selection and supervision of employees, the employer is likewise responsible for damages,
the basis of the liability being the relationship of pater familias or on the employers own negligence. As early as the case of Gutierrez v.
Gutierrez, (56 Phil. 177 [1931]) and thereafter, we have consistently held that where the injury is due to the concurrent negligence of the
drivers of the colliding vehicles, the drivers and owners of the said vehicles shall be primarily, directly and solidarily liable for damages and it
is immaterial that one action is based on quasi-delict and the other on culpa contractual, as the solidarity of the obligation is justified by the
very nature thereof. (Art. 1207, Civil Code) It should be borne in mind that the legal obligation of employers to observe due diligence in the
selection and supervision of employees is not to be considered as an empty play of words or a mere formalism, as appears to be the fashion
of the times, since the non-observance thereof actually becomes the basis of their vicarious liability under Article 2180.

DECISION

REGALADO, J.:

This appeal calls for a review of the legal validity and sufficiency of petitioners invocation of due diligence in the selection and supervision of
employees as its defense against liability resulting from a vehicular collision. With the facility by which such a defense can be contrived and
our country having reputedly the highest traffic accident rate in its geographical region, it is indeed high time for us to once again address this
matter which poses not only a litigation issue for the courts but affects the very safety of our streets.
The facts of the case at bar are recounted for us by respondent court, thus
"At about six oclock in the morning of August 28, 1979, plaintiff-appellant Nenita Custodio boarded as a paying passenger a public utility
jeepney with plate No. D7 305 PUJ Pilipinas 1979, then driven by defendant Agudo Calebag and owned by his co-defendant Victorino Lamayo,
bound for her work at Dynetics Incorporated located in Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila, where she then worked as a machine operator earning
P16.25 a day. While the passenger jeepney was travelling at (a) fast clip along DBP Avenue, Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila another fast
moving vehicle, a Metro Manila Transit Corp. (MMTC, for short) bus bearing plate no. 3Z 307 PUB (Philippines) 79 driven by defendant
Godofredo C. Leonardo was negotiating Honeydew Road, Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila bound for its terminal at Bicutan. As both vehicles
approached the intersection of DBP Avenue and Honeydew Road they failed to slow down and slacken their speed; neither did they blow their
horns to warn approaching vehicles. As a consequence, a collision between them occurred, the passenger jeepney ramming the left side
portion of the MMTC bus. The collision impact caused plaintiff-appellant Nenita Custodio to hit the front windshield of the passenger jeepney
and (she) was thrown out therefrom, falling onto the pavement unconscious with serious physical injuries. She was brought to the Medical
City Hospital where she regained consciousness only after one (1) week. Thereat, she was confined for twenty-four (24) days, and as a
consequence, she was unable to work for three and one half months (3 1/2)." 1
A complaint for damages 2 was filed by herein private respondent, who being then a minor was assisted by her parents, against all of therein
named defendants following their refusal to pay the expenses incurred by the former as a result of the collision.
Said defendants denied all the material allegations in the complaint and pointed an accusing finger at each other as being the party at fault.
Further, herein petitioner Metro Manila Transit Corporation (MMTC), a government-owned corporation and one of the defendants in the court a
quo, along with its driver, Godofredo Leonardo, contrarily averred in its answer with cross-claim and counterclaim 3 that the MMTC bus was
driven in a prudent and careful manner by driver Leonardo and that it was the passenger jeepney which was driven recklessly considering
that it hit the left middle portion of the MMTC bus, and that it was defendant Lamayo, the owner of the jeepney and employer of driver
Calebag, who failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees and should thus be held solidarily liable for
damages caused to the MMTC bus through the fault and negligence of its employees.
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Defendant Victorino Lamayo, for his part, alleged in his answer with cross-claim and counterclaim 4 that the damages suffered by therein
plaintiff should be borne by defendants MMTC and its driver, Godofredo Leonardo, because the latters negligence was the sole and proximate
cause of the accident and that MMTC failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees.
By order of the trial court, defendant Calebag was declared in default for failure to file an answer. 5 Thereafter, as no amicable settlement was
reached during the pre-trial conference, 6 trial on the merits ensued with the opposing parties presenting their respective witnesses and
documentary evidence.
Herein private respondent Nenita Custodio, along with her parents, were presented as witnesses for the prosecution. In addition, Dr. Edgardo
del Mundo, the attending physician, testified on the cause, nature and extent of the injuries she sustained as a result of the vehicular mishap
7 On the other hand, defendant MMTC presented as witnesses Godofredo Leonardo, Christian Bautista and Milagros Garbo. Defendant
Lamayo, however, failed to present any witness.
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Milagros Garbo testified that, as a training officer of MMTC, she was in charge of the selection of the companys bus drivers, conducting for
this purpose a series of training programs and examinations. According to her, new applicants for job openings at MMTC are preliminarily
required to submit certain documents such as National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) clearance, birth or residence certificate, ID pictures,

certificate or diploma of highest educational attainment, professional drivers license, and work experience certification. Re-entry applicants,
aside from the foregoing requirements, are additionally supposed to submit company clearance for shortages and damages and revenue
performance for the preceding year. Upon satisfactory compliance with said requisites, applicants are recommended for and subjected to a
preliminary interview, followed by a record check to find out whether they are included in the list of undesirable employees given by other
companies.
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Thereafter, she continued, if an applicant is found to be acceptable, a final interview by the Chief Supervisor is scheduled and followed by a
training program which consists of seminars and actual driving and psycho-physical tests and X-ray examinations. The seminars, which last
for a total of eighteen (18) days, include familiarization with assigned routes, existing traffic rules and regulations, Constabulary Highway
Patrol Group (CHPG) seminar on defensive driving, preventive maintenance, proper vehicle handling, interpersonal relationship and
administrative rules on discipline and on-the-job training. Upon completion of all the seminars and tests, a final clearance is issued, an
employment contract is executed and the driver is ready to report for duty. 8
MMTCs Transport Supervisor, Christian Bautista, testified that it was his duty to monitor the daily operation of buses in the field, to
countercheck the dispatcher on duty prior to the operation of the buses in the morning and to see to it that the bus crew follow written
guidelines of the company, which include seeing to it that its employees are in proper uniform, briefed in traffic rules and regulations before
the start of duty, fit to drive and, in general, follow other rules and regulations of the Bureau of Land Transportation as well as of the
company. 9
The reorganized trial court, in its decision of August 1, 1989, 10 found both drivers of the colliding vehicles concurrently negligent for nonobservance of appropriate traffic rules and regulations and for failure to take the usual precautions when approaching an intersection. As joint
tortfeasors, both drivers, as well as defendant Lamayo, were held solidarily liable for damages sustained by plaintiff Custodio. Defendant
MMTC, on the bases of the evidence presented was, however, absolved from liability for the accident on the ground that it was not only careful
and diligent in choosing and screening applicants for job openings but was also strict and diligent in supervising its employees by seeing to it
that its employees were in proper uniforms, briefed in traffic rules and regulations before the start of duty, and that it checked its employees
to determine whether or not they were positive for alcohol and followed other rules and regulations and guidelines of the Bureau of Land
Transportation and of the company.
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The trial court accordingly ruled:

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"WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the complaint against the Metro Manila Transit Corporation
and ordering defendants Agudo P. Calebag, Victorino Lamayo and Godofredo C. Leonardo to pay plaintiffs, jointly and severally, the
following:
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a) the sum of P10,000.00 by way of medical expenses;

b) the sum of P5,000.00 by way of expenses of litigation;
c) the sum of P15,000.00 by way of moral damages;
d) the sum of P2,672.00 by way of loss of earnings;
e) the sum of P5,000.00 by way of exemplary damages;
f) the sum of P6,000.00 by way of attorneys fees; and
g) costs of suit.
SO ORDERED." 11
Plaintiffs motion to have that portion of the trial courts decision absolving MMTC from liability reconsidered 12 having been denied for lack of
merit, 13 an appeal was filed by her with respondent appellate court. After consideration of the appropriate pleadings on appeal and finding
the appeal meritorious, the Court of Appeals modified the trial courts decision by holding MMTC solidarily liable with the other defendants for
the damages awarded by the trial court because of their concurrent negligence, concluding that while there is no hard and fast rule as to what
constitutes sufficient evidence to prove that an employer has exercised the due diligence required of it in the selection and supervision of its
employees, based on the quantum of evidence adduced the said appellate court was not disposed to say that MMTC had exercised the
diligence required of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its driver, Godofredo Leonardo. 14
The Court of Appeals was resolute in its conclusion and denied the motions for reconsideration of appellee Custodio and appellant MMTC in a
resolution dated February 17, 1982, 15 thus prompting MMTC to file the instant petition invoking the review powers of this Court over the
decision of the Court of Appeals, raising as issues for resolution whether or not (1) the documentary evidence to support the positive
testimonies of witnesses Garbo and Bautista are still necessary; (2) the testimonies of witnesses Garbo and Bautista may still be disturbed on
appeal; and (3) the evidence presented during the trial with respect to the proof of due diligence of petitioner MMTC in the selection and
supervision of its employees, particularly driver Leonardo, is sufficient.
Prefatorily, private respondent questions the timeliness of the filing of the petition at bar in view of the procedural stricture that the timely
perfection of an appeal is both a mandatory and jurisdictional requirement. This is a legitimate concern on the part of private respondent and
presents an opportune occasion to once again clarify this point as there appears to be some confusion in the application of the rules and
interpretative rulings regarding the computation of reglementary periods at the stage of the proceedings.
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The records of this case reveal that the decision of respondent Court of Appeals, dated October 31, 1991, was received by MMTC on
November 18, 1991 16 and it seasonably filed a motion for the reconsideration thereof on November 28, 1991. 17 Said motion for
reconsideration was denied by respondent court in its resolution dated February 17, 1992, which in turn was received by MMTC on March 9,
1992. 18 Therefore, it had, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, fifteen (15) days therefrom or up to March 24, 1992 within
which to file a petition for review on certiorari. Anticipating, however, that it may not be able to file said petition before the lapse of the
reglementary period therefor, MMTC filed a motion on March 19, 1992 for an extension of thirty (30) days to file the present petition, with
proof of service of copies thereof to respondent court and the adverse parties. The Court granted said motion, with the extended period to be
counted from the expiration of the reglementary period. 19 Consequently, private respondent had thirty (30) days from March 24, 1992 within
which to file its petition, or up to April 23, 1992, and the eventual filing of said petition on April 14, 1992 was well within the period granted
by the Court.
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We digress to reiterate, in view of erroneous submissions that we continue to receive, that in the case of a petition for review
on certiorari from a decision rendered by the Court of Appeals, Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which has long since been clarified in
Lacsamana v. The Hon. Second Special Cases Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court, Et Al., 20 allows the same to be filed "within
fifteen (15) days from notice of judgment or of the denial of the motion for reconsideration filed in due time, and paying at the same time the
corresponding docket fee." In other words, in the event a motion for reconsideration is filed and denied, the period of fifteen (15) days begins
to run all over again from notice of the denial resolution. Otherwise put, if a motion for reconsideration is filed, the reglementary period within
which to appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court is reckoned from the date the party who intends to appeal received
the order denying the motion for reconsideration. 21 Furthermore, a motion for extension of time to file a petition for review may be filed with
this Court within said reglementary period, paying at the same time the corresponding docket fee.
1. The first two issues raised by petitioner shall be correlatively discussed in view of their interrelation.
In its present petition, MMTC insists that the oral testimonies of its employees who were presented as witnesses in its behalf sufficiently
prove, even without the presentation of documentary evidence, that driver Leonardo had complied with all the hiring and clearance
requirements and had undergone all trainings, tests and examinations preparatory to actual employment, and that said positive testimonies
spell out the rigid procedure for screening of job applicants and the supervision of its employees in the field. It underscored the fact that it

had indeed complied with the measure of diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees as enunciated in Campo, Et. Al. v.
Camarote, Et. Al. 22 requiring an employer, in the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family, to carefully examine the applicant for
employment as to his qualifications, experience and record service, and not merely be satisfied with the possession of a professional drivers
license.
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It goes on to say that since the testimonies of these witnesses were allegedly neither discredited nor impeached by the adverse party, they
should be believed and not arbitrarily disregarded or rejected nor disturbed on appeal. It assiduously argues that inasmuch as there is no law
requiring that facts alleged by petitioner be established by documentary evidence, the probative force and weight of their testimonies should
not be discredited with the further note that the lower court having passed upon the relevancy of the oral testimonies and considered the
same as unrebutted, its consideration should no longer be disturbed on appeal. 23
Private respondent, on the other hand, retorts that the factual findings of respondent court are conclusive upon the High Court which cannot
be burdened with the task of analyzing and weighing the evidence all over again. 24
At this juncture, it suffices to note that factual findings of the trial court may be reversed by the Court of Appeals, which is vested by law with
the power to review both legal and factual issues, if on the evidence of record, it appears that the trial court may have been mistaken, 25
particularly in the appreciation of evidence, which is within the domain of the Court of Appeals. 26 The general rule laid down in a plethora of
cases is that such findings of fact by the Court of Appeals are conclusive upon and beyond the power of review of the Supreme Court. 27
However, it is now well-settled that while the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are entitled to great respect, and even finality at times,
that rule is not inflexible and is subject to well established exceptions, to wit: (1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises and conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) where there is grave
abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the
Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant
and appellee; (7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition, as well as in the
petitioners main and reply briefs, are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record. 28
When, as in this case, the findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are contrary to each other, this court may scrutinize the
evidence on record, 29 in order to arrive at a correct finding based thereon. 30
A perusal of the same shows that since there is no dispute as to the finding of concurrent negligence on the part of the defendant Calebag,
the driver of the passenger jeepney, and co-defendant Leonardo, the bus driver of petitioner MMTC, both of whom were solidarily held liable
with defendant Lamayo, the owner of the jeepney, we are spared the necessity of determining the sufficiency of evidence establishing the fact
of negligence. 31 The contrariety is in the findings of the two lower courts, and which is the subject of this present controversy, with regard to
the liability of MMTC as employer of one the erring drivers.
The trial court, in absolving MMTC from liability ruled that
"On the question as to whether defendant MMTC was successful in proving its defense that indeed it had exercised the due diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of defendant Leonardo, this Court finds that based on the evidence presented during the
trial, defendant MMTC was able to prove that it was not only careful and diligent in choosing and screening applicants for job openings but
also strict (and) diligent in supervising its employees by seeing to it that its employees were in proper uniforms, briefed in traffic rules and
regulations before the start of duty, checked employees to determine whether they were positive for alcohol and followed other rules and
regulations and guidelines of the Bureau of Land Transportation as well as its company. Having successfully proven such defense, defendant
MMTC, therefore, cannot be held liable for the accident.
"Having reached this conclusion, the Court now holds that defendant MMTC be totally absolved from liability and that the complaint against it
be dismissed . . ." 32
whereas respondent court was of the opinion that
"It is surprising though that witness Milagros Garbo did not testify nor present any evidence that defendant-appellees driver, defendant
Godofredo Leonardo has complied with or has undergone all clearances and trainings she referred to. The clearances, result of seminars and
tests which Godofredo Leonardo submitted and complied with, if any, were not presented in court despite the fact that they are obviously in
the possession and control of defendant-appellee. Instead, it resorted to generalities. This Court has ruled that due diligence in (the) selection
and supervision of employee(s) are not proved by mere testimonies to the effect that its applicant has complied with all the company
requirements before one is admitted as an employee but without proof thereof. . . ..
"On the part of Christian Bautista, the transport supervisor of defendant-appellee, he testified that it is his duty to monitor the operation of
buses in the field; to countercheck the dispatchers duty prior to the operation of the buses in the morning; to see to it that bus crew follows
written guidelines of the company (t.s.n., April 29, 1988, 00 4-5), but when asked to present in court the alleged written guidelines of the
company he merely stated that he brought with him a wrong document and defendant-appellees counsel asked for reservation to present
such written guidelines in the next hearing but the same was (sic) never presented in court." 33
A thorough and scrupulous review of the records of this case reveals that the conclusion of respondent Court of Appeals is more firmly
grounded on jurisprudence and amply supported by the evidence of record than that of the court below.
It is procedurally required for each party in a case to prove his own affirmative assertion by the degree of evidence required by law. 34 In civil
cases, the degree of evidence required of a party in order to support his claim is preponderance of evidence, or that evidence adduced by one
party which is more conclusive and credible than that of the other party. It is therefore, incumbent on the plaintiff who is claiming a right to
prove his case. Corollarily, defendant must likewise prove its own allegation to buttress its claim that it is not liable. 35
In fine, the party, whether plaintiff or defendant, who asserts the affirmative of the issue has the burden of presenting at the trial such
amount of evidence required by law to obtain a favorable judgment. 36 It is entirely within each of the parties discretion, consonant with the
theory of the case it or he seeks to advance and subject to such procedural strategy followed thereby, to present all available evidence at its
or his disposal in the manner which may be deemed necessary and beneficial to prove its or his position, provided only that the same shall
measure up to the quantum of evidence required by law. In making proof in its or his case, it is paramount that the best and most complete
evidence be formally entered. 37
Coming now to the case at bar, while there is no rule which requires that testimonial evidence, to hold sway, must be corroborated by
documentary evidence, or even object evidence for that matter, inasmuch as the witnesses testimonies dwelt on mere generalities, we cannot
consider the same as sufficiently persuasive proof that there was observance of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees.
38 Petitioners attempt to prove its diligentissimi patris familias in the selection and supervision of employees through oral evidence must fail
as it was unable to buttress the same with any other evidence, object or documentary, which might obviate the apparent biased nature of the
testimony. 39
Our view that the evidence for petitioner MMTC falls short of the required evidentiary quantum as would convincingly and undoubtedly prove
its observance of the diligence of a good father of a family has its precursor in the underlying rationale pronounced in the earlier case of
Central Taxicab Corp. v. Ex-Meralco Employees Transportation Co., Et Al., 40 set amidst an almost identical factual setting, where we held
that:
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". . . This witness spoke of an affidavit of experience which a driver-applicant must accomplish before he is employed by the company, a
written time schedule for each bus, and a record of the inspections and thorough checks pertaining to each bus before it leaves the car barn;
yet no attempt was ever made to present in evidence any of these documents, despite the fact that they were obviously in the possession and
control of the defendant company.

"Albert also testified that he kept records of the preliminary and final tests given him as well as a record of the qualifications and experience
of each of the drivers of the company. It is rather strange, therefore, that he failed to produce in court the all important record of Roberto, the
driver involved in this case.
"The failure of the defendant company to produce in court any record or other documentary proof tending to establish that it had exercised
all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its drivers and buses, notwithstanding the calls therefor by
both the trial court and the opposing counsel, argues strongly against its pretensions.
"We are fully aware that there is no hard-and-fast rule on the quantum of evidence needed to prove due observance of all the diligence of a
good father of a family as would constitute a valid defense to the legal presumption of negligence on the part of an employer or master whose
employee has by his negligence, caused damage to another. xxx (R)educing the testimony of Albert to its proper proportions, we do not have
enough thrustworthy evidence left to go by. We are of the considered opinion, therefore, that the believable evidence on the degree of case
and diligence that has been exercised in the selection and supervision of Roberto Leon y Salazar, is not legally sufficient to overcome the
presumption of negligence against the defendant company."
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Whether or not the diligence of a good father of a family has been observed by petitioner is a matter of proof which under the circumstances
in the case at bar has not been clearly established. It is not felt by the Court that there is enough evidence on record as would overturn the
presumption of negligence, and for failure to submit all evidence within its control, assuming the putative existence thereof, petitioner MMTC
must suffer the consequences of its own inaction and indifference.
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2. In any event, we do not find the evidence presented by petitioner sufficiently convincing to prove the diligence of a good father of a family,
which for an employer doctrinally translates into its observance of due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees but which
mandate, to use an oft-quoted phrase, is more often honored in the breach than in the observance.
Petitioner attempted to essay in detail the companys procedure for screening job applicants and supervising its employees in the field,
through the testimonies of Milagros Garbo, as its training officer, and Christian Bautista, as its transport supervisor, both of whom naturally
and expectedly testified for MMTC. It then concluded with its sweeping pontifications that "thus, there is no doubt that considering the nature
of the business of petitioner, it would not let any applicant-drivers to be (sic) admitted without undergoing the rigid selection and training
process with the end (in) view of protecting the public in general and its passengers in particular; . . . thus, there is no doubt that applicant
had fully complied with the said requirements otherwise Garbo should not have allowed him to undertake the next set of requirements . . .
and the training conducted consisting of seminars and actual driving tests were satisfactory otherwise he should have not been allowed to
drive the subject vehicle." 41
These statements strike us as both presumptuous and in the nature of petitio principii, couched in generalities and shorn of any supporting
evidence to boost their verity. As earlier observed, respondent court could not but express surprise, and thereby its incredulity, that witness
Garbo neither testified nor presented any evidence that driver Leonardo had complied with or had undergone all the clearances and trainings
she took pains to recite and enumerate. The supposed clearances, results of seminars and tests which Leonardo allegedly submitted and
complied with were never presented in court despite the fact that, if true, then they were obviously in the possession and control of petitioner.
42
The case at bar is clearly within the coverage of Articles 2176 and 2177, in relation to Article 2180, of the Civil Code provisions on quasidelicts, as all the elements thereof are present, to wit: (1) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (2) fault or negligence of the defendant or some
other person for whose act he must respond, and (3) the connection of cause and effect between fault or negligence of the defendant and the
damages incurred by plaintiff. 43 It is to be noted that petitioner was originally sued as employer of driver Leonardo under Article 2180, the
pertinent parts of which provide that:
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"The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
x

"Employers shall be liable for damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even
though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
x

"The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent damage."
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The basis of the employers vicarious liability has been explained under this ratiocination:

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"The responsibility imposed by this article arises by virtue of a presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of the persons made
responsible under the article, derived from their failure to exercise due care and vigilance over the acts of subordinates to prevent them from
causing damage. Negligence is imputed to them by law, unless they prove the contrary. Thus, the last paragraph of the article says that such
responsibility ceases if it is proved that the persons who might be held responsible under it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family
(diligentissimi patris familias) to prevent damage. It is clear, therefore, that it is not representation, nor interest, nor even the necessity of
having somebody else answer for the damages caused by the persons devoid of personality, but it is the non-performance of certain duties of
precaution and prudence imposed upon the persons who become responsible by civil bond uniting the actor to them, which forms the
foundation of such responsibility." 44
The above rule is, of course, applicable only where there is an employer-employee relationship, although it is not necessary that the employer
be engaged in business or industry. Whether or not engaged in any business or industry, the employer under Article 2180 is liable for torts
committed by his employees within the scope of their assigned tasks. But, it is necessary first to establish the employment relationship. Once
this is done, the plaintiff must show, to hold the employer liable, that the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned task when the
tort complained of was committed. It is only then that the defendant, as employer, may find it necessary to interpose the defense of due
diligence in the selection and supervision of employees. 45 The diligence of a good father of a family required to be observed by employers to
prevent damages under Article 2180 refers to due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees in order to protect the public. 46
With the allegation and subsequent proof of negligence against the defendant driver and of an employer-employee relation between him and
his co-defendant MMTC in this instance, the case is undoubtedly based on a quasi-delict under Article 2180. 47 When the employee causes
damage due to his own negligence while performing his own duties, there arises the juris tantum presumption that the employer is negligent,
48 rebuttable only by proof of observance of the diligence of a good father of a family. For failure to rebut such legal presumption of
negligence in the selection and supervision of employees, the employer is likewise responsible for damages, 49 the basis of the liability being
the relationship of pater familias or on the employers own negligence. 50
As early as the case of Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 51 and thereafter, we have consistently held that where the injury is due to the concurrent
negligence of the drivers of the colliding vehicles, the drivers and owners of the said vehicles shall be primarily, directly and solidarily liable for
damages and it is immaterial that one action is based on quasi-delict and the other on culpa contractual, as the solidarity of the obligation is
justified by the very nature thereof. 52
It should be borne in mind that the legal obligation of employers to observe due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees is not

to be considered as an empty play of words or a mere formalism, as appears to be the fashion of the times, since the non-observance thereof
actually becomes the basis of their vicarious liability under Article 2180.
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On the matter of selection of employees, Cambo v. Camarote, supra, lays down this admonition.
". . .. In order that the owner of a vehicle may be considered as having exercised all diligence of a good father of a family, he should not have
been satisfied with the mere possession of a professional drivers license; he should have carefully examined the applicant for employment as
to his qualifications, his experience and record of service. These steps appellant failed to observe; he has therefore, failed to exercise all due
diligence required of a good father of a family in the choice or selection of driver."
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Due diligence in the supervision of employees, on the other hand, includes the formulation of suitable rules and regulations for the guidance
of employees and the issuance of proper instructions intended for the protection of the public and persons with whom the employer has
relations through his or its employees and the imposition of necessary disciplinary measures upon employees in case of breach or as may be
warranted to ensure the performance of acts indispensable to the business of and beneficial to their employer. 53 To this, we add that actual
implementation and monitoring of consistent compliance with said rules should be the constant concern of the employer, acting through
dependable supervisors who should regularly report on their supervisory functions.
In order that the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees may be deemed sufficient and plausible, it is not
enough to emptily invoke the existence of said company guidelines and policies on hiring and supervision. As the negligence of the employee
gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the employer, the latter has the burden of proving that it has been diligent not only
in the selection of employees but also in the actual supervision of their work. The mere allegation of the existence of hiring procedures and
supervisory policies, without anything more, is decidedly not sufficient to overcome such presumption.
|
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We emphatically reiterate our holding, as a warning to all employers, that" (t)he mere formulation of various company policies on safety
without showing that they were being complied with is not sufficient to exempt petitioner from liability arising from negligence of its
employees. It is incumbent upon petitioner to show that in recruiting and employing the erring driver the recruitment procedures and
company policies on efficiency and safety were followed." 54 Paying lip-service to these injunctions or merely going through the motions of
compliance therewith will warrant stern sanctions from the Court.
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These obligations, imposed by the law and public policy in the interests and for the safety of the commuting public, herein petitioner failed to
perform. Respondent court was definitely correct in ruling that." . . due diligence in the selection and supervision of employee (sic) not proved
by mere testimonies to the effect that its applicant has complied with all the company requirements before one is admitted as an employee
but without proof thereof." 55 It is further a distressing commentary on petitioner that it is a government-owned public utility, maintained by
public funds, and organized for the public welfare.
The Court feels it is necessary to once again stress the following rationale behind these all-important statutory and jurisprudential mandates,
for it has been observed that despite its pronouncement in Kapalaran Bus Line v. Coronado, Et Al., supra, there has been little improvement in
the transport situation in the country:
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"In requiring the highest possible degree of diligence from common carriers and creating a presumption of negligence against them, the law
compels them to curb the recklessness of their drivers. While the immediate beneficiaries of the standard of extraordinary diligence are, of
course, the passengers and owners of the cargo carried by a common carrier, they are not the only persons that the law seeks to benefit. For
if common carriers carefully observe the statutory standard of extraordinary diligence in respect of their own passengers, they cannot help
but simultaneously benefit pedestrians and the owners and passengers of other vehicles who are equally entitled to the safe and convenient
use of our roads and highways. The law seeks to stop and prevent the slaughter and maiming of people (whether passengers or not) and the
destruction of property (whether freight or not) on our highways by buses, the very size and power of which seem often to inflame the minds
of their drivers. . . .."
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Finally, we believe that respondent court acted in the exercise of sound discretion when it affirmed the trial courts award, without requiring
the payment of interest thereon as an item of damages just because of delay in the determination thereof, especially since private respondent
did not specifically pray therefor in her complaint. Article 2211 of the Civil Code provides that in quasi-delicts, interest as a part of the
damages may be awarded in the discretion of the court, and not as a matter of right. We do not perceive that there have been intentional
dilatory maneuvers or any special circumstances which would justify that additional award and, consequently, we find no reason to disturb
said ruling.
WHEREFORE, the impugned decision of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.