3.

PARTICULARITY OF THE PLACE TO BE SEARCHED AND

THINGS TO BE SEIZED
PLACE TO BE SEARCHED:

FRANK UY and UNIFISH PACKING CORPORATION, petitioners,

vs.
BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE and HON. MERCEDES GOZO-DADOLE, respondents.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
Petitioners assail the validity of the warrants issued for the search of the premises of the Unifish
Packing Corporation, and pray for the return of the items seized by virtue thereof.
On 30 September 1993, a certain Rodrigo Abos reported to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR)
that petitioners Unifish Packing Corporation and Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy were engaged in
activities constituting violations of the National Internal Revenue Code. Abos, who claimed to be a
former employee of Unifish, executed an Affidavit1stating:
1. He has personal knowledge that UNIFISH PACKING CORPORATION (hereinafter
referred to as UNIFISH), a canning factory located at Hernan Cortes Street, under the active
management of UY CHIN HO alias Frank Uy [,] is selling by the thousands of [sic] cartons of
canned sardines without issuing receipt. This is in violation of Sections 253 and 263 of the
Internal Revenue Code.
2. This grand scale tax fraud is perpetrated through the following scheme:
(1) Uy Chin Ho a director of UNIFISH buys in bulk from the company;
(2) Being a director, Uy Chin Ho has a lot of clout in the distribution of the canned
sardines processed by UNIFISH;
(3) Uy Chin Ho dictates the value of canned sardines that he orders and buys from
UNIFISH without any receipt of his purchases;
(4) The moment he has the quantity he wants, UNIFISH through Uy Chin Ho delivers
to the different supermarkets such as White Gold, Gaisano, etc.;
(5) Payments made by these tax evading establishments are made by checks drawn
payable to cash and delivered to Uy Chin Ho; These payments are also not receipted
(sic);
(6) Uy Chin Ho will then pay UNIFISH for the quantity of sardines he had withdrawn
from the corporation;

3. Another fraudulent practice perpetrated by UNIFISH through Uy Chin Hos direction is the
sale of imported oil locally to different customers. This is a case of smuggling in the sense
that UNIFISH, being an export company registered with the Board of Investments, is
enjoying certain exemptions in their importation of oil as one of the raw materials in its
processing of canned tuna for export. These tax exemptions are granted by the government
on the condition that the oil is to be used only in the processing of tuna for export and that it
is not to be sold unprocessed as is to local customers.
4. Another fraudulent practice involves the sales of unused cans; UNIFISH also enjoys tax
exemptions in its purchases of tin cans subject to the condition that these are to be used as
containers for its processed tuna for export. These cans are never intended to be sold locally
to other food processing companies.
5. Prior to 1990, that is from 1980 to 1990, the factory of the UNIFISH PACKING
CORPORATION was then run by the PREMIER INDUSTRIAL & DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION (hereinafter referred to as PREMIER) [,] which corporation was being
controlled by the same majority stockholders as those now running and controlling UNIFISH;
[a]t that time, PREMIER was also committing the same fraudulent acts as what is being
perpetrated by UNIFISH at present.
6. The records containing entries of actual volume of production and sales, of both UNIFISH
AND PREMIER, are found in the office of the corporation at its factory site at H. Cortes
Street, Mandaue City. The particular place or spot where these records [official receipts,
sales invoices, delivery receipts, sales records or sales books, stock cards, accounting
records (such as ledgers, journals, cash receipts books, and check disbursements books)]
are kept and may be found is best described in the herein attached sketch of the
arrangement of the offices furniture and fixture of the corporation which is made an integral
part hereof and marked as Annex "A",
7. He is executing this affidavit to attest under oath the veracity of the foregoing allegations
and he is reserving his right to claim for reward under the provisions of Republic Act No.
2338.
On 1 October 1993, Nestor N. Labaria, Assistant Chief of the Special Investigation Branch of the
BIR, applied for search warrants from Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. The application
sought permission to search the premises of Unifish.
After hearing the depositions of Labaria and Abos, Judge Mercedes Gozo-Dadole issued the
disputed search warrants. The first2 is docketed as "SEARCH WARRANT NO. 93-10-79 FOR:
VIOLATION OF SECTION 253" ("Search Warrant A-1"), and consists of two pages. A verbatim
reproduction of Search Warrant A-1 appears below:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CEBU
7th Judicial Region
Branch 28
Mandaue City

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Plaintiff,

SEARCH WARRANT NO. 93-10-79

FOR: VIOLATION OF SEC. 253

- versus UY CHIN HO alias FRANK UY,

Unifish Packing Corporation
Hernan Cortes St., Cebu City

x-------------------------x
(with sketch)
SEARCH WARRANT
TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:
G R E E T I N G S:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after examination underoath (sic), Nestor N.
Labaria, Asst. Chief, Special Investigation Branch, BIR and witness Rodrigo Abos that there is a (sic)
probable cause to believe that the crime of violation of Section 253 - attempt to evade or defeat the
tax has been committed and there is good and sufficient reason to believe that Uy Chin Ho c/o
Unifish Packing Corporation, Hernan Cortes St., Mandaue City has in his possession, care and
control, the following:
1. Multiple sets of Books of Accounts; Ledgers, Journals, Columnar Books, Cash
Register Books, Sales Books or Records; Provisional & Official Receipts;
2. Production Record Books/Inventory Lists [,] Stock Cards;
3. Unregistered Delivery Receipts;
4. Unregistered Purchase & Sales Invoices;
5. Sales Records, Job Order;
6. Corporate Financial Records; and
7. Bank Statements/Cancelled Checks
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time of day or night of said
premises and its immediate vicinity and to forthwith seize and take possession of the articles abovementioned and other properties relative to such violation and bring said properties to the
undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs.
WITNESS MY HAND this 1st day of October, 1993.
(sgd.)

MERCEDES GOZO-DADOLE
Judge
The second warrant3 is similarly docketed as "SEARCH WARRANT 93-10-79 FOR: VIOLATION OF
SEC. 253" ("Search Warrant A-2"). Search Warrant A-2, reproduced below, is almost identical in
content to Search Warrant A-1, save for the portions indicated in bold print. It consisted of only one
page.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CEBU
7th Judicial Region
Branch 28
Mandaue City

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Plaintiff,

SEARCH WARRANT NO. 93-10-79

FOR: VIOLATION OF SEC. 253

- versus UY CHIN HO alias FRANK UY, and

Unifish Packing Corporation
Hernan Cortes St., Mandaue City

x-------------------------/
(with sketch)
SEARCH WARRANT
TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:
G R E E T I N G S:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after examination underoath [sic], Nestor N.
Labaria, Asst. Chief, Special Investigation Branch, BIR and witness Rodrigo Abos that there is a [sic]
probable cause to believe that the crime of violation of Section 253 - attempt to evade or defeat the
tax has been committed and there is good and sufficient reason to believe that Uy Chin
Ho alias Frank Uy andUnifish Packing Corporation, Hernan Cortes St., Mandaue City has in his
possession, care and control, the following:
1. Multiple sets of Books of Accounts; Ledgers, Journals, Columnar Books, Cash
Register Books, Sales Books or Records; Provisional & Official Receipts;
2. Production Record Books/Inventory Lists [,] Stock Cards;
3. Unregistered Delivery Receipts;
4. Unregistered Purchase & Sales Invoices;

5. Sales Records, Job Order;

6. Corporate Financial Records; and
7. Bank Statements/Cancelled Checks
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time of day or night of said
premises and its immediate vicinity and to forthwith seize and take possession of the articles abovementioned and other properties relative to such violation and bring said properties to the
undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs.
WITNESS MY HAND this 1st day of October, 1993.
(sgd.)
MERCEDES GOZO-DADOLE
Judge
Judge Gozo-Dadole issued a third warrant,4 which was docketed as "SEARCH WARRANT 93-10-80
FOR: VIOLATION OF SEC. 238 in relation to SEC. 263" (hereinafter, "Search Warrant B"). Except
for the docket number and the designation of the crime in the body of the warrant ("Section 238 in
relation to Sec. 263 - non-issuance of sales invoice and use and possession of unregistered delivery
receipts and/or sales invoices"), Search Warrant B is a verbatim reproduction of Search Warrant A-2.
On the strength of these warrants, agents of the BIR, accompanied by members of the Philippine
National Police, on 2 October 1993, searched the premises of the Unifish Packing Corporation. They
seized, among other things, the records and documents of petitioner corporation. A return of said
search was duly made by Nestor Labaria with the RTC of Cebu , Branch 28.
On 8 February 1995, the BIR filed against petitioners a case before the Department of Justice. The
records, however, do not reveal the nature of this case.
On 31 March 1995, petitioners filed motions to quash the subject search warrants with Branch 28 of
the Cebu RTC.
The RTC, however, denied petitioners' motions to quash as well as their subsequent motion for
reconsideration, prompting petitioners to file a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA).
The CA dismissed their petition, holding that petitioners failed to comply with Section 2(a), Rule 6 of
the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (RIRCA), which states:
a. What Should be Filed. - The petition shall be filed in seven (7) legible copies and a copy thereof
shall be served on each of the respondents, and must be accompanied by a certified true copy of the
decision or order complained of and true copies of the pleadings and other pertinent documents and
papers. (As amended by S.Ct. Res., dated November 24, 1992).
The CA found that petitioners did not submit certified true copies of (1) the Motions to Quash, (2) the
Motion for Reconsideration, and (3) the Affidavit of Rodrigo Abos.
The CA also held that certiorari was not the proper remedy to question the resolution denying the
motion to quash.

In this case now before us, the available remedies to the petitioners, assuming that the Department
of Justice will eventually file the case, are: a petition for reinvestigation; the right to post bail; a
Motion to Quash the Information; and in case of denial, an appeal, after judgment on the merits, or
after the case shall have been tried. This brings us to the case of Lai vs.
Intermediate 220 SCRA 149 and the pronouncement, thus:
Criminal Procedure: Certiorari: Certiorari should not be allowed where petitioner has other remedies
available. -- Anent the remedy resorted to by petitioners (referring to the petition for certiorari) from
the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental presided by Judge Diez, the same should not have been
granted. Petitioners were not without plain, speedy and adequate remedies in the ordinary course of
law against Judge Lomeda's order for their arrest. These remedies are as enumerated by
respondent appellate court in its decision: "1. they can post bail for their provisional release; 2. They
can ask the Provincial Fiscal for a reinvestigation of the charge against them. If unsatisfied with the
fiscal's resolution they can ask for a review by the Minister of Justice; (Sec. 1(), RA 5180 as
amended by P.D. 911);
3. if their petition for review does not prosper, they can file a motion to quash the information in the tri
al court. (Rule 117, Rules of Court).
4. If the motion is denied, they can appeal the judgment of the court after the case shall havebeen tri
ed on the merits.
x x x Where motion to quash is denied, remedy is not certiorari, but to go to trial.-- Moreover, in the
case of Acharon vs. Purisima, this Court held
that when a motion to quash a criminal case is denied, the remedy is not certiorari butto go to trial wit
hout prejudice to reiterating the special defenses involved in said Motion. In the event that an
adverse decision is rendered after trial on the merits, an appeal therefrom should be the next legal
step.
xxx
In this case now before Us, there is no pretention [sic] that the Court issued the Search Warrants
without jurisdiction. On the contrary, it had jurisdiction. The argument therefore that the Court
committed an error in not describing the persons or things to be searched; that the Search Warrants
did not describe with particularity the things to be seized/taken; the absence of probable cause; and
for having allegedly condoned the discriminating manner in which the properties were taken, to us,
are merely errors in the Court's finding, certainly not correctible by certiorari, but instead thru an
appeal.5
In any event, the CA ruled, no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction was
committed by the RTC in the issuance of the warrants.
As petitioners' motion for reconsideration proved futile, petitioners filed the instant petition for review.
Petitioners claim that they did submit to the CA certified true copies of the pleadings and documents
listed above along with their Petition, as well as in their Motion for Reconsideration. An examination
of the CA Rollo, however, reveals that petitioners first submitted the same in their Reply, after
respondents, in their Comment, pointed out petitioners failure to attach them to the Petition.
Nevertheless, the CA should not have dismissed the petition on this ground although, to its credit, it
did touch upon the merits of the case. First, it appears that the case could have been decided
without these pleadings and documents. Second, even if the CA deemed them essential to the
resolution of the case, it could have asked for the records from the RTC. Third, in a similar case, 6 we
held that the submission of a document together with the motion for reconsideration constitutes

substantial compliance with Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court, requiring the submission of a
certified true copy of "material portions of the record as are referred to [in the petition], and other
documents relevant or pertinent thereto" along with the petition. So should it be in this case,
especially considering that it involves an alleged violation of a constitutionally guaranteed right. The
rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used
only to help secure substantial justice. If a technical and rigid enforcement of the rules is made, their
aim could be defeated.7
The CA likewise erred in holding that petitioners cannot avail of certiorari to question the resolution
denying their motions to quash the subject search warrants. We note that the case of "Lai vs.
Intermediate," cited by the appellate court as authority for its ruling does not appear in "220
SCRA 149." The excerpt of the syllabus quoted by the court, as observed by petitioners, 8 appears to
have been taken from the case of Yap vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 220 SCRA 245 (1993). Yap,
however, is inapplicable since that case involved a motion to quash a complaint for qualified theft,
not a motion to quash a search warrant.
The applicable case is Marcelo vs. De Guzman,9 where we held that the issuing judges disregard of
the requirements for the issuance of a search warrant constitutes grave abuse of discretion, which
may be remedied bycertiorari:
Expressly announced in Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the general rule that certiorari is
available where a tribunal or officer exercising judicial functions "has acted without or in excess of its
or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."
In the light of the findings of the lower court, herein above quoted, it is indisputable that Judge de
Guzman gravely abused his discretion in issuing the said search warrant. Indeed, he acted
whimsically and capriciously when he ignored the explicit mandate of Section 3, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court that "a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one
specific offense to be determined by the municipal or city judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized; and that "no search warrant shall issue
for more than one specific offense."
The utter disregard by Judge de Guzman of the requirements laid down by the said rule renders the
warrant in question absolutely null and void. It has been held that where the order complained of is a
patent nullity, a petition for certiorari and mandamus may properly be entertained despite the
existence of the remedy of appeal.
Moreover, an appeal from the order of Judge de Guzman would neither be an adequate nor speedy
remedy to relieve appellee of the injurious effects of the warrant. The seizure of her personal
property had resulted in the total paralization of the articles and documents which had been
improperly seized. Where the remedy of appeal cannot afford an adequate and expeditious relief,
certiorari can be allowed as a mode of redress to prevent irreparable damage and injury to a party.
This Court had occasion to reiterate the above pronouncement in Silva vs. Presiding Judge, RTC of
Negros Oriental, Br. XXXIII,10 which also involved a special civil action for certiorari:11
Thus, in issuing a search warrant, the judge must strictly comply with the constitutional requirement
that he must determine the existence of probable cause by examining the applicant and his
witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers. His failure to comply with this
requirement constitutes grave abuse of discretion. As declared in Marcelo vs. De Guzman, G.R. No.

L-29077, June 29, 1982, 114 SCRA 657, "the capricious disregard by the judge in not complying with
the requirements before issuance of search warrants constitutes grave abuse of discretion".
In this case, petitioners alleged in their petition before the CA that the issuing judge violated the
pertinent provisions of the Constitution and the Rules of Court in issuing the disputed search
warrants, which, if true, would have constituted grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners also alleged
that the enforcers of the warrants seized almost all the records and documents of the corporation
thus resulting in the paralysis of its business. Appeal, therefore, would not be an adequate remedy
that would afford petitioners expeditious relief.
We now proceed to the merits of the case.
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution guarantees the right of the people against unreasonable
searches and seizures:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
In relation to the above provision, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 3. Requisite for issuing search warrant. - A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable
cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
SEC. 4. Examination of complainant; record. - The judge must, before issuing the warrant,
personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath the
complainant and any witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the
record their sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted.
A search warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of the foregoing constitutional and
statutory provisions. These requirements, in outline form, are:
(1) the warrant must be issued upon probable cause;
(2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or
any other person;
(3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or
affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and
(4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or
things to be seized.12
The absence of any of these requisites will cause the downright nullification of the search
warrants.13 The proceedings upon search warrants must be absolutely legal, "for there is not a
description of process known to the law, the execution of which is more distressing to the citizen.

Perhaps there is none which excites such intense feeling in consequence of its humiliating and
degrading effect." The warrants will always be construed strictly without, however, going the full
length of requiring technical accuracy. No presumptions of regularity are to be invoked in aid of the
process when an officer undertakes to justify under it.14
Petitioners contend that there are several defects in the subject warrants that command their
nullification. They point out inconsistencies in the description of the place to be searched in Search
Warrant A-1, as well as inconsistencies in the names of the persons against whom Search Warrants
A-1 and A-2 were issued. That two search warrants (Search Warrants A-1 and A-2) were issued for
the same crime, for the same place, at a single occasion is cited as another irregularity. Petitioners
also dispute the existence of probable cause that would justify the issuance of the warrants. Finally,
they claim that the things to be seized were not described with particularity. These defects, according
to petitioners, render the objects seized inadmissible in evidence.15
Inconsistencies in the description of the place to be searched
Petitioners observe that the caption of Search Warrant A-1 indicates the address of Uy Chin Ho alias
Frank Uy as "Hernan Cortes St., Cebu City" while the body of the same warrant states the address
as "Hernan Cortes St.,Mandaue City." Parenthetically, Search Warrants A-2 and B consistently state
the address of petitioner as "Hernan Cortes St., Mandaue City."
The Constitution requires, for the validity of a search warrant, that there be a particular description of
"the place to be searched and the persons of things to be seized."16 The rule is that a description of a
place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain
and identify the place intended17 and distinguish it from other places in the community.18 Any
designation or description known to the locality that points out the place to the exclusion of all others,
and on inquiry leads the officers unerringly to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement. 19 Thus,
in Castro vs. Pabalan,20 where the search warrant mistakenly identified the residence of the
petitioners therein as Barrio Padasil instead of the adjoining Barrio Maria Cristina, this Court
"admitted that the deficiency in the writ is not of sufficient gravity to call for its invalidation."
In this case, it was not shown that a street similarly named Hernan Cortes could be found in Cebu
City. Nor was it established that the enforcing officers had any difficulty in locating the premises of
petitioner corporation. That Search Warrant A-1, therefore, inconsistently identified the city where the
premises to be searched is not a defect that would spell the warrants invalidation in this case.
Inconsistencies in the description of the persons named in the two warrants
Petitioners also find fault in the description of the names of the persons in Search Warrants A-1 and
A-2. Search Warrant A-1 was issued solely against "Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy." Search Warrant A2, on the other hand, was directed against "UY CHIN HO alias FRANK UY, and Unifish Packing
Corporation."
These discrepancies are hardly relevant.
In Miller v. Sigler,21 it was held that the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, from
which Section 2, Article III of our own Constitution is historically derived, does not require the warrant
to name the person who occupies the described premises. Where the search warrant is issued for
the search of specifically described premises only and not for the search of a person, the failure to
name the owner or occupant of such property in the affidavit and search warrant does not invalidate
the warrant; and where the name of the owner of the premises sought to be searched is incorrectly
inserted in the search warrant, it is not a fatal defect if the legal description of the premises to be

searched is otherwise correct so that no discretion is left to the officer making the search as to the
place to be searched.22
Since, in the case at bar, the warrant was issued not for search of the persons owning or occupying
the premises, but only a search of the premises occupied by them, the search could not be declared
unlawful or in violation of the constitutional rights of the owner or occupants of the premises,
because of inconsistencies in stating their names.23
Two warrants issued at one time for one crime and one place
In any event, Search Warrant A-1 should be deemed superseded by Search Warrant A-2.
Two warrants, Search Warrants A-1 and A-2, were actually issued by the trial court for the same
crime (violation of "SEC. 253" of the National Internal Revenue Code). It appears, however, that
Search Warrant A-2 was issued merely to correct the inconsistencies in the address in Search
Warrant A-1, as well as to include Unifish Packing Corporation as a party against whom the warrant
was issued. Search Warrant A-2 was evidently an attempt by the issuing judge to be more precise in
the names of the persons against whom the warrant was issued and in the description of the place
to be searched. Indeed, it would be absurd for the judge to issue on a single occasion two warrants
authorizing the search of a single place for a single offense. Inasmuch as the apparent intent in
issuing Search Warrant A-2 was to supersede Search Warrant A-1, the latter should be deemed
revoked by the former.
The alleged absence of probable cause
Petitioners claim there was no probable cause for Judge Gozo-Dadole to issue the subject search
warrants.
Probable cause is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.24
In the determination of probable cause, the Constitution and the Rules of Court require an
examination of the witnesses under oath. The examination must be probing and exhaustive, not
merely routine or pro forma. The examining magistrate must not simply rehash the contents of the
affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of the application. 25 Asking of
leading questions to the deponent in an application for search warrant, and conducting of
examination in a general manner, would not satisfy the requirements for issuance of a valid search
warrant.26
The witnesses, in turn, must testify under oath to facts of their own personal knowledge. The oath
required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his
witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual
making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable
cause.27 Search warrants are not issued on loose, vague or doubtful basis of fact, nor on mere
suspicion or belief.28
It may be recalled that before issuing the warrants, the judge deposed two witnesses, namely,
Nestor Labaria of the BIR, and Rodrigo Abos, who claimed to be an old employee of Unifish.
Petitioners claim that the testimonies of Labaria and Abos are hearsay. We agree with this
contention, but only as to the testimony of Labaria, who stated during the examination:

Q. Do you know of a certain Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy?

A. No.
Q. Do you know his establishment known as Unifish Packing Corporation?
A. I have only heard of that thru the affidavit of our informer, Mr. Abos.
Q. Why are you applying for search warrant in the premises of Unifish Packing Corporation?
A. Because of that information we received that they are using only delivery receipts instead of the
legal sales invoices. It is highly indicative of fraud.
Q. From where did you get that information?
A. From our informer, the former employee of that establishment.29
The above portion of the transcript shows that Labarias knowledge of the alleged illegal activities of
petitioners was acquired not through his own perception but was merely supplied by Abos.
Therefore, the deposition of Labaria, which is based on hearsay, standing alone, cannot justify the
issuance of the search warrants.30
The application for the warrants, however, is not based solely on Labarias deposition but is
supported by that of Abos, whose knowledge of petitioners alleged illegal practices was apparently
obtained during his employment with Unifish. In his deposition, Abos detailed the schemes employed
by Frank Uy and Unifish to evade the payment of taxes, and described the place where the
documents supposedly evidencing these schemes were located:
Q Do you know Frank Uy?
A Yes.
Q Why do you know him?
A Because I were (sic) an employee of his from 1980 until August of 1993.
Q Where is this Unifish Packing Corporation located?
A Hernan Cortes St.
Q What is it being engaged of?
A It is engaged in canning of fish.
Q You have executed an affidavit here to the effect that it seems that in his business dealings that he
is actually doing something that perpetrated tax evasion. Is that correct?
A Yes.
Q How is it done?

A As an officer, he is an active member of the corporation who is at the same time making his
authority as appointing himself as the distributor of the company's products. He sells these products
thru supermarkets in Visayas and Mindanao, in fact, the whole Philippines. He makes it appear that
it is the company which is selling when actually it is him selling the goods and he does not issue any
invoices.
Q Since he does not issue any invoices, how is it done?
A Thru delivery receipts.
Q Is the delivery receipt official?
A No. It is unregistered.
Q For how long has this been going on?
A As far as I know, it is still in 1986 since we started producing the sardines.
Q When was the last time that you observed that that is what he is doing?
A August, 1993, last month.
Q How did you happen to know about this last month?
A Because he delivered to certain supermarkets and the payments of that supermarket did not go
directly to the company. It went to him and he is the one who paid the company for the goods that he
sold.
Q Can you tell this Court the name of that certain supermarkets?
A White Gold and Gaisano.
Q How did you know this fact?
A As a manager of the company I have access to all the records of that company for the last three
years. I was the Operating Chief.
Q Until now?
A No. I was separated already.
Q When?
A August, 1993.
Q How does he do this manipulation?
A He sells the goods to the supermarkets afterwhich the company, Unifish will deliver to his
customers, then his customers will pay directly to him and in turn, he pays to the company.

Q And these transactions, were they reflected in their books of account or ledger or whatever?
A It is written but it is supposed to be a secret transaction. It is not for the public, not for the BIR but
it is only for the purpose of keeping the transactions between the company and him. It is not made to
be shown to the BIR.
1wphi1

Q In that books of account, is it reflected that they have made some deliveries to certain
supermarkets?
A Yes.
Q For the consumption of the BIR what are the papers that they show?
A It is the private accounting firm that prepares everything.
Q Based on what?
A Based on some fictitious records just as they wish to declare.
Q In your affidavit you stated that there are sales invoices, official receipts, delivery receipts, sales
records, etc. These documents are records that you have stated, in your affidavit, which are only for
the consumption of the company?
A Yes, not for the BIR.
Q Where are they kept now?
A They are kept on the table which I have drawn in the sketch. This is the bird's eyeview (sic) of the
whole office. When you enter thru the door this Gina Tan is the one recording all the confidential
transactions of the company. In this table you can find all the ledgers and notebooks.
Q This sketch is a blow-up of this portion, Exh. "A"?
A Yes. Exh. "B" is the blow-up of Exh. "A" inside the office.
In this blow-up there are four personnel plus one new personnel. Gina Tan collects all the records
from this girl and this girl makes the statements. This first girl delivers the receipts. The second girl
prepares the bill of lading. The third girl keeps the inventory of all the stocks.
This sketch here is the bodega where the records are kept. The records from these people are
stored in this place which is marked as "C".
Q So what you want to impress on that now is that only current records are kept by Gina because
according to you the whole records are already placed in the bodega?
A Yes.
Q But how can you enter the bodega?

A Here, from the main entrance there is a door which will lead to this part here. If you go straight
there is a bodega there and there is also a guard from this exit right after opening the door.
Q The problem is that, when actually in August have you seen the current records kept by Gina?
A I cannot exactly recall but I have the xerox copies of the records.
Q Where are they now?
A They are in my possession (witness handling [sic] to the Court a bunch of records).
Q The transactions that are reflected in these xerox copies that you have given me, especially this
one which seems to be pages of a ledger, they show that these are for the months of January,
February, March, April and May. Are these transactions reflected in these xerox copies which appear
in the ledger being shown to the BIR?
A As far as I know, it did not appear.
Q What about this one which says Columnar Book Cash Receipt for the month of January, what
does it show?
A It shows that Frank Uy is the one purchasing from the company and these are his customers.
Q Do these entries appear in the columnar books which are the basis for the report to the BIR?
A As far as I know, it does not reflect.
Q What are these xerox copies of checks?
A I think we cannot trace it up. These ones are the memos received by Unifish for payment of
sardines. This is the statement of the company given to Uy Chin Ho for collection.
Q It is also stated in your affidavit that the company imported soya oil. How is it done?
A The company imports soya oil to be used as a component in the processing of canned tuna for
export. The company enjoys certain BOI privilege and so it is tax free. As far as I know, they profit
more to dispose the product locally. Whatever excess of this soya oil are sold to another company.
Q Is that fact reflected in the xerox copies?
A No. I have the actual delivery receipt.
Q In other words, the company imports soya oil supposedly to be used as a raw material but instead
they are selling it locally?
A Yes. ([W]itness showing DR No. 3053 dated November 13, 1991.) This delivery receipt was the
delivery receipt to Celebes Canning Corp. of the 90 grams soya oil.
Q In other words, this soya oil should have to be used by Unifish but instead they are seeling (sic) it?

A Yes, at a profit.
Q You also said that there is tax evasion in the selling of cans. What do you mean by this?
A There is another privileged [sic] by the BOI for a special price given to packaging materials. When
you export the product there is a 50% price difference. Now, taking that advantage of that exemption,
they sold it to certain company here, again to Virginia Farms.
Q Do you have proof to that effect?
A No, but we can get it there.
Q Will that fact be shown in any listed articles in the application for search warrant since according to
you, you have seen this manipulation reflected on the books of account kept by Gina? Are you sure
that these documents are still there?
A Yes. I have received information.
COURT: Alright.31
Abos stated that, as former Operating Chief of Unifish, he had access to the company records, and
even showed the issuing judge photocopies thereof. Thus, we reject the contention that this witness
did not have personal knowledge of the facts to which he testified. The contents of the deposition
clearly demonstrate otherwise.
The deposition also shows that, contrary to petitioners submission, the inquiries made by the judge
were far from leading or being a rehash of the witness affidavit. We find such inquiries to be
sufficiently probing.
Alleged lack of particularity in the description of the things seized
Petitioners note the similarities in the description of the things to be seized in the subject warrants
and those inStonehill vs. Diokno,32 Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc. vs. Ruiz,33 and Asian Surety & Insurance
Co., Inc. vs. Herrera.34
In Stonehill, the effects to be searched and seized were described as:
"Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals correspondence, receipts, ledgers,
portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business
transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss statements."
This Court found that the foregoing description failed to conform to the requirements set forth by the
Constitution since:
x x x the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business
transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The
warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned
corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of
Rights - that the things to be seized be particularly described - as well as tending to defeat its major
object: the elimination of general warrants.

In Bache & Co., this Court struck down a warrant containing a similar description as those
in Stonehill:
The documents, papers, and effects sought to be seized are described in Search Warrant No. 2-M70 in this manner:
"Unregistered and private books of accounts (ledgers, journals, columnars, receipts and
disbursements books, customers' ledgers); receipts for payments received; certificates of stocks and
securities; contracts, promissory notes and deeds of sale; telex and coded messages; business
communications; accounting and business records; checks and check stubs; records of bank
deposits and withdrawals; and records of foreign remittances, covering the years 1966 to 1970."
The description does not meet the requirement in Art. III, Sec. 1, of the Constitution, and of Sec. 3,
Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, that the warrant should particularly describe the things to be
seized.
xxx
In Uy Kheytin, et al. vs. Villareal, etc., et al., 42 Phil. 886, 896, this Court had occasion to explain the
purpose of the requirement that the warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched
and the things to be seized, to wit:
"x x x Both the Jones Law (sec. 3) and General Orders No. 68 (sec. 97) specifically require that a
search warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
The evident purpose and intent of this requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those, and
only those, particularly described in the search warrant - to leave the officers of the law with no
discretion regarding what articles they shall seize, to the end that unreasonable searches and
seizures may not be made, - that abuses may not be committed. That is the correct interpretation of
this constitutional provision borne out by the American authorities."
The purpose as thus explained could, surely and effectively, be defeated under the search warrant
issued in this case.
A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the description
therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow (People vs. Rubio, 57 Phil, 384); or
when the description expresses a conclusion of fact - not of law - by which the warrant officer may
be guided in making the search and seizure (idem., dissent of Abad Santos, J.,); or when the things
described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being
issued (Sec. 2, Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court). The herein search warrant does not conform to
any of the foregoing tests. If the articles desired to be seized have any direct relation to an offense
committed, the applicant must necessarily have some evidence, other than those articles, to prove
the said offense; and the articles subject of search and seizure should come in handy merely to
strengthen such evidence. In this event, the description contained in the herein disputed warrant
should have mentioned, at least, the dates, amounts, persons, and other pertinent data regarding
the receipts of payments, certificates of stocks and securities, contracts, promissory notes, deeds of
sale, messages and communications, checks, bank deposits and withdrawals, records of foreign
remittances, among others, enumerated in the warrant.
In Asian Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Herrera, the description of the things to be seized, i.e.,
"Fire Registers, Loss, Bordereau, Adjusters' Report, including subrogation receipts and proof of loss,
Loss Registers, Book of Accounts including cash receipts and disbursements and general ledger,
etc." was held to be "an omnibus description" and, therefore, invalid:

x x x Because of this all embracing description which includes all conceivable records of petitioner
corporation, which if seized x x x, could paralyze its business, petitioner in several motions filed for
early resolution of this case, manifested that the seizure of TWO carloads of their papers has
paralyzed their business to the grave prejudice of not only the company, its workers, agents,
employees but also of its numerous insured and beneficiaries of bonds issued by it, including the
government itself, and of the general public. And correlating the same to the charges for which the
warrant was issued, We have before Us the infamous general warrants of old.
In the case at bar, the things to be seized were described in the following manner:
1. Multiple sets of Books of Accounts; Ledgers, Journals, Columnar Books, Cash Register
Books, Sales Books or Records; Provisional & Official Receipts;
2. Production Record Books/Inventory Lists [,] Stock Cards;
3. Unregistered Delivery Receipts;
4. Unregistered Purchase & Sales Invoices;
5. Sales Records, Job Order;
6. Corporate Financial Records; and
7. Bank Statements/Cancelled Checks
We agree that most of the items listed in the warrants fail to meet the test of particularity, especially
since witness Abos had furnished the judge photocopies of the documents sought to be seized. The
issuing judge could have formed a more specific description of these documents from said
photocopies instead of merely employing a generic description thereof. The use of a generic term or
a general description in a warrant is acceptable only when a more specific description of the things
to be seized is unavailable. The failure to employ the specificity available will invalidate a general
description in a warrant.35 The use by the issuing judge of the terms "multiple sets of books of
accounts, ledgers, journals, columnar books, cash register books, sales books or records,
provisional & official receipts," "production record books/inventory lists, stock cards," "sales records,
job order," "corporate financial records," and "bank statements/cancelled checks" is therefore
unacceptable considering the circumstances of this case.
As regards the terms "unregistered delivery receipts" and "unregistered purchase & sales invoices,"
however, we hold otherwise. The Solicitor General correctly argues that the serial markings of these
documents need not be specified as it is not possible to do so precisely because they are
unregistered.36 Where, by the nature of the goods to be seized, their description must be rather
general, it is not required that a technical description be given, as this would mean that no warrant
could issue. Taking into consideration the nature of the articles so described, it is clear that no other
more adequate and detailed description could have been given, particularly because it is difficult to
give a particular description of the contents thereof.37 Although it appears that photocopies of these
unregistered documents were among those handed by Abos to the issuing judge, it would be
impractical to require the latter to specify each and every receipt and invoice, and the contents
thereof, to the minutest detail.
The general description of most of the documents listed in the warrants does not render the entire
warrant void. Insofar as the warrants authorize the search and seizure of unregistered delivery

receipts and unregistered purchase and sales invoices, the warrants remain valid. The search
warrant is severable, and those items not particularly described may be cut off without destroying the
whole warrant. In United States v. Cook,38 the United States Court of Appeals (Fifth Circuit) made the
following pronouncement:
x x x. The leading decision is Aday v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.2d 789, 362 P.2d 47, 13 Cal.Rptr. 415
(1961). In Aday, a warrant was issued authorizing the seizure of two particularly described books
and myriad other generally described items. On appeal, the California Supreme Court held that only
the books were particularly described in the warrant and lawfully seized. The court acknowledged
that the warrant was flawed, but rather than suppress everything seized, the court chose to sever the
defective portions of the warrant and suppress only those items that were not particularly described.
Although the warrant was defective x x x it does not follow that it was invalid as a whole. Such a
conclusion would mean that the seizure of certain articles, even though proper if viewed separately,
must be condemned merely because the warrant was defective with respect to other articles. The
invalid portions of the warrant are severable from the authorization relating to the named books x x
x. The search for and seizure of these books, if otherwise valid, were not rendered illegal by the
defects concerning other articles.
xxx
x x x We agree with the reasoning of the Supreme Court of California and the majority of state courts
that have considered this question and hold that in the usual case the district judge should sever the
infirm portion of the search warrant as passes constitutional muster. See United States v. Giresi, 488
F.Supp. 445, 459-60 (D.N.J.1980). Items that were not described with the requisite particularity in the
warrant should be suppressed, but suppression of all of the fruits of the search is hardly consistent
with the purposes underlying exclusion. Suppression of only the items improperly described prohibits
the Government from profiting from its own wrong and removes the court from considering illegally
obtained evidence. Moreover, suppression of only those items that were not particularly described
serves as an effective deterrent to those in the Government who would be tempted to secure a
warrant without the necessary description. As the leading commentator has observed, "it would be
harsh medicine indeed if a warrant which was issued on probable cause and which did particularly
describe certain items were to be invalidated in toto merely because the affiant and the magistrate
erred in seeking and permitting a search for other items as well." 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure:
A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment 4.6(f) (1978).
Accordingly, the items not particularly described in the warrants ought to be returned to petitioners.
Petitioners allege that the following articles, though not listed in the warrants, were also taken by the
enforcing officers:
1. One (1) composition notebook containing Chinese characters,
2. Two (2) pages writing with Chinese characters,
3. Two (2) pages Chinese character writing,
4. Two (2) packs of chemicals,
5. One (1) bound gate pass,

6. Surety Agreement.39
In addition, the searching party also seized items belonging to the Premier Industrial and
Development Corporation (PIDC), which shares an office with petitioner Unifish.
The things belonging to petitioner not specifically mentioned in the warrants, like those not
particularly described, must be ordered returned to petitioners. In order to comply with the
constitutional provisions regulating the issuance of search warrants, the property to be seized under
a warrant must be particularly described therein and no other property can be taken
thereunder.40 In Tambasen vs. People,41 it was held:
Moreover, by their seizure of articles not described in the search warrant, the police acted beyond
the parameters of their authority under the search warrant. Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Constitution requires that a search warrant should particularly describe the things to be seized. "The
evident purpose and intent of the requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those, and only
those, particularly described in the search warrant, to leave the officers of the law with no discretion
regarding what articles they should seize, to the end that unreasonable searches and seizures may
not be made and that abuses may not be committed" (Corro v. Lising, 137 SCRA 541, 547 [1985]);
Bache & Co. [Phil.], Inc. v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 [1971]; Uy Kheytin v. Villareal, 42 Phil. 886 [1920]).
The same constitutional provision is also aimed at preventing violations of security in person and
property and unlawful invasions of the sanctity of the home, and giving remedy against such
usurpations when attempted (People v. Damaso, 212 SCRA 547 [1992] citing Alvero v. Dizon, 76
Phil. 637, 646 [1946]).
Clearly then, the money which was not indicated in the search warrant, had been illegally seized
from petitioner. The fact that the members of the police team were doing their task of pursuing
subversives is not a valid excuse for the illegal seizure. The presumption juris tantum of regularity in
the performance of official duty cannot by itself prevail against the constitutionally protected right of
an individual (People v. Cruz, 231 SCRA 759 [1994]; People v. Veloso, 48 Phil. 169, 176 [1925]).
Although public welfare is the foundation of the power to search and seize, such power must be
exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens (People
v. Damaso, supra, citing Rodriguez v. Evangelista, 65 Phil. 230, 235 [1937]). As the Court aptly puts
it in Bagahilog v. Fernandez, 198 SCRA 614 (1991), "[z]eal in the pursuit of criminals cannot ennoble
the use of arbitrary methods that the Constitution itself abhors."
The seizure of the items not specified in the warrants cannot be justified by the directive in the
penultimate paragraph thereof to "seize and take possession of other properties relative to such
violation," which in no way can be characterized as a particular description of the things to be seized.
As regards the articles supposedly belonging to PIDC, we cannot order their return in the present
proceedings. The legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been
impaired thereby, and the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot
be availed of by third parties.42
WHEREFORE, the Resolutions of respondent Court of Appeals dated 27 June 1996 and 14 May
1987, affirming the Order of the Regional Trial Court dated 17 July 1995, are hereby AFFIRMED
insofar as said Resolutions upheld the validity of the subject Search Warrants authorizing the seizure
of the unregistered delivery receipts and unregistered purchase and sales invoices, but REVERSED
with respect to the rest of the articles subject of said warrants. The respondent Bureau of Internal
Revenue is hereby ordered to return to petitioners all items seized from the subject premises and
belonging to petitioners, except the unregistered delivery receipts and unregistered purchase and
sales invoices.

SO ORDERED
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by Provincial Prosecutor FAUSTINO T.
CHIONG, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE CAESAR CASANOVA, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 80, Malolos, Bulacan, AZFAR HUSSAIN, MOHAMMAD SAGED, MUJAHID KHAN,
MOHAMMAD ASLAM and MEHMOOD ALI, respondents.

NARVASA, C.J.:
In behalf of the People, the Solicitor General has perfected the appeal at bar under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court from the Decision promulgated on September 11, 1996 of the Fourteenth Division of
the Court of Appeals. 1 Said judgment dismissed the People's petition for certiorari to invalidate (i) the
Order of Judge Caesar A. Casanova of Branch 80 of the Regional Trial Court dated February 9,
1996. 2 as well (ii) that dated May 28, 1996 denying the People's motion for reconsideration. 3 Those
orders were handed down in Criminal Case No. 43-M-96, a case of illegal possession of explosives, after
the accused had been arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty to the charge. More particularly, the
Order of February 9, 1996:
1) quashed a search warrant (No. 1068 [95]) issued by Judge Marciano I. Bacalla of
Branch 216 of the Regional Trial Court at Quezon City on December 15, 1995, 4
2) declared inadmissible for any purpose the items seized under the warrant, and

3) directed the turnover of the amount of U.S. $5,750.00 to the Court within five (5)
days "to be released thereafter in favor of the lawful owner considering that said
amount was not mentioned in the Search Warrant."
The antecedents, "culled from the records" by the Appellate Court, are hereunder set out.
1. On December 14, 1995, S/Insp PNP James Brillantes applied for search warrant
before Branch 261, RTC of Quezon City against Mr. Azfar Hussain, who had
allegedly in his possession firearms and explosives at Abigail Variety Store, Apt.
1207 Area F, Bagong Buhay Avenue, Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan.
2. The following day, December 15, 1995, Search Warrant No. 1068 (95) against Mr.
Hussain was issued not at Abigail Variety Store but at Apt. No. 1, immediately
adjacent (to) Abigail Variety Store resulting in the arrest of four (4) Pakistani nationals
and in the seizure of their personal belongings, papers and effects such as wallet,
wrist watches, pair of shoes, jackets, t-shirts, belts, sunglasses and travelling bags
including cash amounting to $3,550.00 and P1,500.00 aside from US$5,175.00
(receipted) which were never mentioned in the warrant. The sum of $5,175.00 was
however returned to the respondents upon order of the court on respondents' motion
or request. Included allegedly are one piece of dynamite stick; two pieces of plastic
explosives C-4 type and one (1) fragmentation grenade. But without the items
described in the search warrant are; (a) three (3) Ingram machine pistols; (b) four (4)

gmm pistol; (c) blasting caps; (d) fuse; (e) assorted chemical ingredients for
explosives; and (f) assorted magazine assg and ammunitions.
3. On December 19, 1995, three days after the warrant was served, a return was
made without mentioning the personal belongings, papers and effects including cash
belonging to the private respondents. There was no showing that lawful occupants
were made to witness the search.
4. On January 22, 1996, private respondents upon arraignment, pleaded not guilty to
the offense charged; **" and on the same date, submitted their "Extremely Urgent
Motion (To Quash Search Warrant and to Declare Evidence Obtained Inadmissible),"
dated January 15, 1996;
5. ** According to the private respondents in their pleading (consolidated comment
on petition forcertiorari **): On January 29, 1996, an ocular inspection of the
premises searched was conducted by respondent Judge and the following facts had
been established as contained in the order dated January 30.1996 ** to wit:
1) That the residence of all the accused is at Apartment No. 1 which
is adjacent to the Abigail's Variety Store;
2) That there is no such number as "1207" found in the building as it
is correspondingly called only as "Apartment No. 1, 2, 3 and 4;"
3) That Apartment No. 1 is separate from the Abigail's Variety Store;
4) That there are no connecting doors that can pass from Abigail's
Variety Store to Apartment No. 1;
5) That Abigail's Variety Store and Apartment No. 1 have its own
respective doors used for ingress and egress.
There being no objection on the said observation of the Court, let the
same be reduced on the records.
SO ORDERED.
6. On February 9, 1996, respondent Judge **issued its order duly granting the motion
to quash search warrant**; 5
7. On February 12, 1996, private respondents filed the concomitant motion to dismiss** ;

8. On February 19, 1996, Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Rolando Bulan filed a motion
for reconsideration and supplemental motion on the order quashing the search
warrant**;

9. On February 27, 1996 and March 12, 1996, private respondents filed
opposition/comment and supplemental opposition/comment on the motion for
reconsideration** ;
10. On May 28, 1996, respondent Judge **issued its order denying the motion for
reconsideration**; (and on) June 11, 1996, private respondents filed extremely urgent
reiterated motion to dismiss**.
Chiefly to nullify Judge Casanova's quashal Order of February 9, 1996 above referred to, the
Solicitor General forthwith commenced a special civil action of certiorari in the Court of Appeals. The
action did not prosper, however. As earlier mentioned, the Fourteenth Division of the Appellate
Tribunal promulgated judgment on September 11, 1996, dismissing the case for lack of merit.
The judgment was grounded on the following propositions, to wit:

1. The place actually searched was different and distinct from the place described in
the search warrant. This fact was ascertained by the Trial Judge through an ocular
inspection, the findings wherein, not objected to by the People, were embodied in an
order dated January 30, 1996. The place searched, in which the accused (herein
petitioners) were then residing, was Apartment No. 1. It is a place other than and
separate from, and in no way connected with, albeit adjacent to, Abigail's Variety
Store, the place stated in the search warrant.
2. The public prosecutor's claim that the sketch submitted to Judge Bacalla
relative to the application for a search warrant, actually depicted the particular place
to be searched was effectively confuted by Judge Casanova who pointed out that
said "SKETCH was not dated, not signed by the person who made it and not even
mentioned in the Search Warrant by the Honorable Judge (Bacalla, who)
instead **directed them to search Abigail Variety Store Apartment 1207** in the
Order **dated December 15, 1995" this, too, being the address given "in the
Application for Search Warrant dated December 14, 1995 requested by P/SR INSP.
Roger James Brillantes, the Team Leader." The untenability of the claim is made
more patent by the People's admission, during the hearing of its petition
for certiorari in the Court of Appeals, that said sketch was in truth "not attached to the
application for search warrant ** (but) merely attached to the motion for
reconsideration." 7
Quoted with approval by the Appellate Court were the following observations of Judge
Casanova contained in his Order of May 28, 1996, viz.: 8

d) ** ** it is very clear that the place searched is different from the

place mentioned in the Search Warrant, that is the reason why even
P/SR. INSP Roger James Brillantes, SPO1 Prisco Bella and SPO4
Cesar D. Santiago, who were all EDUCATED CULTURED and
ADEPT to their tasks of being RAIDERS and who were all
STATIONED IN BULACAN were not even able to OPEN THEIR
MOUTH to say TAGALOG with Honorable Judge who issued the
Search Warrant the words "KATABI", or "KADIKIT" or "KASUNOD NG
ABIGAIL VARIETY STORE ang papasukin namin" or if they happen

to be an ENGLISH speaking POLICEMEN, they were not able to

open their mouth even to WHISPER the ENGLISH WORDS
"RESIDE" or "ADJACENT" or "BEHIND" or "NEXT to ABIGAIL
VARIETY STORE, the place they are going to raid."**.
3. The search was not accomplished in the presence of the lawful occupants of the
place (herein private respondents) or any member of the family, said occupants
being handcuffed and immobilized in the living room at the time. The search was
thus done in violation of the law. 9
4. The articles seized were not brought to the court within 48 hours as required by the
warrant itself; "(i)n fact the return was done after 3 days or 77 hours from service, in
violation of Section 11, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. 10
5. Judge Casanova "correctly took cognizance of the motion to quash search warrant,
pursuant to the doctrinal tenets laid down in Nolasco vs. Pao (139 SCRA 152) which
overhauled the previous ruling of the Supreme Court in Templo vs. de la Cruz (60 SCRA
295). It is now the prevailing rule that whenever a search warrant has been issued by one
court or branch thereof and a criminal case is initiated in another court or branch thereof
as a result of the search of the warrant, that search warrant is deemed consolidated with
the criminal case for orderly procedure. The criminal case is more substantial than the
search warrant proceedings, and the presiding Judge in the criminal case has the right to
rule on the search warrant and to exclude evidence unlawfully obtained (Nolasco & Sans
cases).

6. Grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to the respondent Judge, in light of

"Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution and Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
7. The proper remedy against the challenged Order is an appeal, not the special civil
action ofcertiorari.
The Solicitor General now seeks reversal of the foregoing verdict ascribing to the Court of Appeals
the following errors, to wit:
1) sanctioning "the lower Court's precipitate act of disregarding the proceedings
before the issuing Court and overturning the latter's determination of probable cause
and particularity of the place to be searched;"
2) sanctioning "the lower Court's conclusion that the sketch was not attached to the
application for warrant despite the clear evidence** to the contrary;"
3) ignoring "the very issues raised in the petition before it;"
4) "holding that the validity of an otherwise valid warrant could be diminished by the
tardiness by which the return is made;"
5) hastily applying "the general rule that certiorari cannot be made a substitute for
appeal although the circumstances attending the case at bar clearly fall within the
exceptions to that rule;" and

6) depriving petitioner of "the opportunity to present evidence to prove the validity of

the warrant when the petition before it was abruptly resolved without informing
petitioner thereof."
The whole case actually hinges on the question of whether or not a search warrant was validly
issued as regards the apartment in which private respondents were then actually residing, or more
explicitly, whether or not that particular apartment had been specifically described in the warrant.
The Government insists that the police officers who applied to the Quezon City RTC for the search
warrant had direct, personal knowledge of the place to be searched and the things to be seized. It
claims that one of said officers, in fact, had been able to surreptitiously enter the place to be
searched prior to the search: this being the first of four (4) separate apartments behind the Abigail
Variety Store; and they were also the same police officers who eventually effected the search and
seizure. They thus had personal knowledge of the place to be searched and had the competence to
make a sketch thereof; they knew exactly what objects should be taken therefrom; and they had
presented evidence sufficient to establish probable cause. That may be so; but unfortunately, the
place they had in mind the first of four (4) separate apartment units (No. 1) at the rear of
"Abigail Variety Store" was not what the Judge who issued warrant himself had in mind, and was
not what was ultimately described in the search warrant.
The discrepancy appears to have resulted from the officers' own faulty depiction of the premises to
be searched. For in their application and in the affidavit thereto appended, they wrote down a
description of the place to be searched, which is exactly what the Judge reproduced in the search
warrant: "premises located at Abigail Variety Store Apt 1207. Area-F, Bagong Buhay Avenue, Sapang
Palay, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan." And the scope of the search was made more particular and
more restrictive by the Judge's admonition in the warrant that the search be "limited only to the
premises herein described."
Now, at the time of the application for a search warrant, there were at least five (5) distinct places in
the area involved: the store known as "Abigail's Variety Store," and four (4) separate and
independent residential apartment units. These are housed in a single structure and are contiguous
to each other although there are no connecting doors through which a person could pass from the
interior of one to any of the others. Each of the five (5) places is independent of the others, and may
be entered only through its individual front door. Admittedly, the police officers did not intend a
search of all five (5) places, but of only one of the residential units at the rear of Abigail's Variety
Store: that immediately next to the store (Number 1).
However, despite having personal and direct knowledge of the physical configuration of the store
and the apartments behind the store, the police officers failed to make Judge Bacalla understand the
need to pinpoint Apartment No. 1 in the warrant. Even after having received the warrant which
directs that the search be "limited only to the premises herein described," "Abigail Variety Store Apt
1207" thus literally excluding the apartment units at the rear of the store they did not ask the
Judge to correct said description. They seem to have simply assumed that their own definite idea of
the place to be searched clearly indicated, according to them, in the sketch they claim to have
submitted to Judge Bacalla in support of their application was sufficient particularization of the
general identification of the place in the search warrant.
The Solicitor General argues that this assumption is sanctioned by Burgos, Sr. v. Chief of
Staff, AFP, 11 allegedly to the effect that the executing officer's prior knowledge as to the place intended in

the warrant is relevant, and he may, in case of any ambiguity in the warrant as to the place to be
searched, look to the affidavit in the official court file.

Burgos is inapplicable. That case concerned two (2) search warrants which, upon perusal,
immediately disclosed an obvious typographical error. The application in said case was for seizure of
subversive material allegedly concealed in two places: one at "No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon
City," and the other, at "784 Units C & D. RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City;" Two (2)
warrants issued No. 20-82 [a] and No. 20-83 [b]). Objection was made to the execution of Warrant
No. 20-82 (b) at "784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City" because both
search warrants apparently indicated the same address (No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City) as
the place where the supposedly subversive material was hidden. This was error, of course but, as
this Court there ruled, the error was obviously typographical, for it was absurd to suppose that the
Judge had issued two warrants for the search of only one place. Adverting to the fact that the
application for the search warrants specified two (2) distinct addresses, and that in fact the address,
"784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City" appeared in the opening paragraph
of Warrant 20-82 (b), this Court concluded that evidently, this was the address the Judge intended to
be searched when he issued the second warrant (No. 20-82[b]); and to clear up the ambiguity
caused by the "obviously typographical error," the officer executing the warrant could consult the
records in the official court file. 12
The case at bar, however, does not deal with the correction of an "obvious typographical error"
involving ambiguous descriptions of the place to be searched, as in Burgos, but the search of a
place different from that clearly and without ambiguity identified in the search warrant. In Burgos, the
inconsistency calling for clarification was immediately perceptible on the face of the warrants in
question. In the instant case there is no ambiguity at all in the warrant. The ambiguity lies outside the
instrument, arising from the absence of a meeting of minds as to the place to be searched between
the applicants for the warrant and the Judge issuing the same; and what was done was to substitute
for the place that the Judge had written down in the warrant, the premises that the executing officers
had in their mind. This should not have been done. It is neither fair nor licit to allow police officers to
search a place different from that stated in the warrant on the claim that the place actually searched
although not that specified in the warrant is exactly what they had in view when they applied
for the warrant and had demarcated in their supporting evidence. What is material in determining the
validity of a search is the place stated in the warrant itself, not what the applicants had in their
thoughts, or had represented in the proofs they submitted to the court issuing the warrant. Indeed,
following the officers' theory, in the context of the facts of this case, all four (4) apartment units at the
rear of Abigail's Variety Store would have been fair game for a search.
The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or modified by the officers'
own personal knowledge of the premises, or the evidence they adduced in support of their
application for the warrant. Such a change is proscribed by the Constitution which requires inter
alia the search warrant to particularly describe the place to be searched as well as the persons or
things to be seized. It would concede to police officers the power of choosing the place to be
searched, even if it not be that delineated in the warrant. It would open wide the door to abuse of the
search process, and grant to officers executing a search warrant that discretion which the
Constitution has precisely removed from them. The particularization of the description of the place to
be searched may properly be done only by the Judge, and only in the warrant itself; it cannot be left
to the discretion of the police officers conducting the search.

The Government faults Judge Casanova for having undertaken a review of Judge Bacalla's finding
of probable cause, "as if he were an appellate court." A perusal of the record however shows that all
that Judge Casanova did was merely to point out inconsistencies between Judge Bacalla's Order of
December 15, 1995 and the warrant itself, as regards the identities of the police officers examined
by Judge Bacalla. 13 In Judge Casanova's view, said inconsistencies, being quite apparent in the record,
put in doubt the sufficiency of the determination of the facts on which the search warrant was founded.
The Government alleges that the officers had satisfactorily established probable cause before Judge
Bacalla for the issuance of a search warrant. While this may be conceded, the trouble is, to repeat,
that the place described in the search warrant which, of course, is the only place that may be
legitimately searched in virtue thereof was not that which the police officers who applied for the
warrant had in mind, with the result that what they actually subjected to search-and-seizure
operations was a place other than that stated in the warrant. In fine, while there was a search
warrant more or less properly issued as regards Abigail's Variety Store, there was none for
Apartment No. 1 the first of the four (4) apartment units at the rear of said store, and precisely the
place in which the private respondents were then residing.
It bears stressing that under Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, providing that:

14

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the things to be seized.
it does not suffice, for a search warrant to be deemed valid, that it be based on probable
cause, personally determined by the judge after examination under oath, or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce; it is essential, too, that it particularly
describe the place to be searched, 15 the manifest intention being that the search be confined
strictly to the place so described.
There was therefore in this case an infringement of the constitutional requirement that a search
warrant particularly describe the place to be searched; and that infringement necessarily brought into
operation the concomitant provision that "(a)ny evidence obtained in violation ** (inter alia of the
search-and-seizure provision) shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. 16
In light of what has just been discussed, it is needless to discuss such other points sought to be
made by the Office of the Solicitor General as whether or not (1) the sketch of the building housing
the store and the residential apartment units the place to be searched being plainly marked
was in fact attached to the application for the search warrant; or (2) the search had been conducted
in the presence of the occupants of the place (herein petitioners), among others; or (3) the validity of
the search warrant was diminished by the tardiness by which the return was made, or (4) the Court
of Appeals had improperly refused to receive "evidence which ** (the People) had earlier been
denied opportunity to present before the trial court;" or (5) the remedy of the special civil action
ofcertiorari in the Court of Appeals had been erroneously availed of. The resolution of these issues
would not affect the correctness of the conclusion that the search and seizure proceedings are void
because the place set forth in the search warrant is different from that which the officers actually

searched, or the speciousness of their argument that anyway the premises searched were precisely
what they had described to the Judge, and originally and at all times had in mind.
Only one other matter merits treatment. The Solicitor General's Office opines that where a search
warrant has been "issued by a court other than the one trying the main criminal case," the "proper
recourse" of persons wishing to quash the warrant is to assail it before the issuing court and not
before that in which the criminal case involving the subject of the warrant is afterwards filed. 17 In
support, it cites the second of five (5) "policy guidelines" laid down by this Court in Malaloan v. Court of
Appeals 18 concerning "possible conflicts of jurisdiction (or, more accurately, in the exercise of jurisdiction)
where the criminal case is pending in one court and the search warrant is issued by another court for the
seizure of personal property intended to be used as evidence in said criminal case." Said second
guideline reads: 19
2. When the latter court (referring to the court which does not try the main criminal
case) issues the search warrant, a motion to quash the same may be filed in and
shall be resolved by said court, without prejudice to any proper recourse to the
appropriate higher court by the party aggrieved by the resolution of the issuing court.
All grounds and objections then available, existent or known shall be raised in the
original or subsequent proceedings for the quashal of the warrant, otherwise they
shall be deemed waived.
The guidelines have been misconstrued. Where a search warrant is issued by one court and the
criminal action based on the results of the search is afterwards commenced in another court, it is not
the rule that a motion to quash the warrant (or to retrieve things thereunder seized) may be filed only
with the issuing Court. Such a motion may be filed for the first time in either the issuing Court or that
in which the criminal action is pending. However, the remedy is alternative, not cumulative. The
Court first taking cognizance of the motion does so to the exclusion of the other, and the
proceedings thereon are subject to the Omnibus Motion Rule and the rule against forum-shopping.
This is clearly stated in the third policy guideline which indeed is what properly applies to the case at
bar, to wit:
3. Where no motion to quash the search warrant was filed in or resolved by the
issuing court, the interested party may move in the court where the criminal case is
pending for the suppression as evidence of the personal property seized under the
warrant if the same is offered therein for said purpose. Since two separate courts
with different participations are involved in this situation, a motion to quash a search
warrant and a motion to suppress evidence are alternative and not cumulative
remedies. In order to prevent forum shopping, a motion to quash shall consequently
be governed by the omnibus motion rule, provided, however, that objections not
available, existent or known during the proceedings for the quashal of the warrant
may be raised in the hearing of the motion to suppress. The resolution of the court on
the motion to suppress shall likewise be subject to any proper remedy in the
appropriate higher court.
In this case, the search warrant was applied for in, and issued by, Branch 216 of the Regional Trial
Court at Quezon City, and the return was made to said court. On the other hand, the criminal action
in connection with the explosives subject of the warrant was filed in Branch 80 of the Regional Trial
Court of Bulacan. In this situation, a motion to quash the search warrant, or for the return of the
personal property seized (not otherwise contraband) could have properly been presented in the QC

RTC. No such motion was ever filed. It was only after the criminal action had been commenced in
the Bulacan RTC that the motion to quash and to suppress evidence was submitted to the latter. The
case thus falls within guideline No. 3 above quoted in accordance with which the latter court must be
deemed to have acted within its competence.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals of September 11,
1996 which dismissed the Peoples petition for certiorari seeking nullification of the Orders of
Branch 80 of the Regional Trial Court dated February 9, 1996 and May 28, 1996 in Criminal Case
No. 43-M-96 is, for the reasons set out in the foregoing opinion, hereby AFFIRMED without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
ANDY QUELNAN y QUINO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This petition for review seeks the reversal of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
No. 22001 dated 12 November 2004, affirming the Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 138, Makati City, in Criminal Case No. 96-1498, that found Andy Quelnan y
Quino3 (petitioner) guilty of violating Section 16, Article III of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425, as
amended, otherwise known as The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
The accusatory portion of the Information against petitioner reads:
That on or about the 27th day of August, [sic] 1996, in the City of Makati, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being authorized by law, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control
27.7458 grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu), a regulated drug.
Contrary to law.4
During arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Trial on the merits ensued.
Witnesses5 for the prosecution testified as to the following set of facts:
On 27 August 1996, a team from the Police Assistance and Reaction Against Crime (PARAC) of the
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), composed of Chief Inspector Carlos Acosta,
SPO4 Isagani Ilas, SPO2 Manubay, SPO2 Sanggalang, SPO2 Teodoro Sinag, SPO2 Mario Magno,
SPO2 de Leon, SPO2 Cecil Fajardo, SPO3 Marcelo Alcancia, SPO3 Dennis Zarcal, and PO1 Eraldo
Lectura,6 was formed to implement a search warrant issued by the RTC of Manila on 26 August
1996.7
At around 3:00 p.m., the team proceeded to the Cityland Condominium in South Superhighway,
Makati. Upon arrival, they went directly to the Security Office of said building to seek assistance in

serving the warrant. Security Officer Celedonio Punsaran (Punsaran) accompanied the group and
they proceeded to Unit 615.
At their knocking, a male person naked from the waist up opened the door.8 He was later identified
as petitioner. SPO2 Sinag presented the search warrant to petitioner.9 Upon entry, the police
operatives searched the unit, which was composed of a small room with a plywood divider
separating the sala from the bedroom.10 In the presence of petitioner and Punsaran, the group
started searching the place and eventually found on top of the bedroom table three (3) pieces of
transparent plastic sachets containing white crystalline substances later confirmed by the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) forensic chemist as shabu, plastic tubings, weighing scales, an
improvised burner, and empty transparent plastic sachets.11 Thereafter, the group prepared a receipt
of the properties seized and an Affidavit of Orderly Search allegedly signed by petitioner in their
presence and that of Punsaran.12
Meanwhile, the group also went to Unit 418 of the same building to serve the warrant and search the
place. The police operatives did not find any occupant in the room.
Petitioner was then brought to the PARAC office for investigation. The pieces of evidence gathered
by the police operatives were brought to the NBI for examination. That same day, NBI Forensic
Chemist Loreto F. Bravo issued a certification stating that upon examination, the specimen submitted
yielded positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. 13 The following day, the Arrest Report and Joint
Affidavit of Apprehension were executed by the police operatives leading to the arrest and charging
of petitioner for violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. No. 6425.
In his defense, petitioner testified that he is a resident of 150 Legaspi Tower 300, 2600 Roxas
Boulevard, Manila.14He also happens to be the registered owner of Unit 615 of Cityland
Condominium in Makati City, which he leased to Sung Kok Lee (Lee) beginning May 1996. 15 On 27
August 1996, at around 3:00 p.m., petitioner went to Unit 615 to collect payment of rental from Lee.
Upon knocking at the door, petitioner was greeted by the maid. The maid told him to wait for Lee
inside the room while she went out to buy some refreshments. After a while, petitioner heard
somebody
knocking at the door and he opened it. He saw around 15 to 20 armed men who suddenly barged
into the room. The officer in charge asked for a certain Bernard Kim and petitioner introduced himself
as the owner of the condominium unit. The police operatives then proceeded to search the house for
the next half hour while petitioner was waiting in the sala. Petitioner was also forced to sign some
documents at gunpoint. Petitioner was then handcuffed and brought to the PARAC office. Two days
later, he was brought to the Makati Prosecutors Office for inquest and a case was subsequently filed
against him.16
In behalf of petitioner, Luis Alvarez, the administrator of Cityland Condominium, testified that Lee
was the actual occupant of Unit 615 at the time petitioner was arrested. 17 Celso Fiesta, petitioners
driver, also stated in court that petitioner resides at Legaspi Tower. On 27 August 1996, he dropped
petitioner off at Cityland Condominium between 1:00 and 2:00 p.m. Two and a half hours later, he
went back to pick him up. As he was about to park the car, somebody poked a gun at him and
introduced himself as PARAC. Fiesta was ordered to get out of the car and the PARAC team
searched the vehicle. They found a gun and brought Fiesta to the DILG. He was released the
following day.18
After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment of two (2) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to four (4) years, nine (9)
months and ten (10) days of prision correccional as maximum. 19 In convicting petitioner, the trial

court relied heavily on the clear, straightforward, and candid testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses:
They were all present when the search warrant was implemented at Unit 615 Cityland
Condominium. No infirmity or flaw affecting their credibility exists. Further, the Court considered that
they are public officers and there was no showing that they were motivated by ill-will testimonies or
bad faith to falsely testify against the accused. There was no evidence of intent to harass the
accused. The presumption of regularity in the performance of their functions can be fairly applied. 20
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts ruling, modifying however the penalty to be
imposed on petitioner in that he shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of six months of arresto mayor
as minimum to three (3) years and six (6) months of prision correccional as maximum. 21
Petitioner now seeks the reversal of said judgment. His conviction or acquittal rests on the validity of
the warrantless arrest. The prosecution proffers that petitioner was caught in flagrante delicto in
possession of the subject shabu justifying his warrantless arrest. Another crucial issue arises, that of
the validity of the enforcement of the search warrant as basis for the presence of the police
operatives in the Cityland Condominium unit. Therefore, these matters may be summarized into two
issues for our resolution: whether the search warrant was properly enforced and whether petitioner
was validly arrested without warrant.
The issue as to whether the search warrant was validly implemented necessitates a review of the
tenor of the search warrant, vis--vis the conduct of the police operatives enforcing such warrant.
Search Warrant No. 96-585 reads:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff
- versus BERNARD LIM22
Room 615 Cityland Condominium
South Superhighway, Makati City
Respondent.

SEARCH WARRANT NO. 96-585

FOR: VIOLATION OF R.A. 6425
(Dangerous Drug Act 1972)

SEARCH WARRANT
TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:
GREETINGS:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned under examining under oath PNP SPO4 ISAGANI
J. ILAS and his witness, that there are [sic] reasonable ground to believe that VIOLATION OF R.A.
[No.] 6425 has been committed or is about to be committed and there are good and sufficient
reasons to believe that still undetermined Quantity of Met[h]amphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu)
has [sic] in his possession and control.
You are commanded to make an immediate search anytime of the day or night of the premises
abovementioned and forthwith seize and take possession of the abovementioned

MET[H]AMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (SHABU) subject of the offense and bring to this Court
said drugs and persons to be dealt with as the law may direct. You are further directed to submit
return within ten (10) days from today.
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND AND SEAL OF THIS COURT, this 26[th] day of August 1996 in Manila,
Philippines.
HON. WILLIAM M. BAYHON
Executive Judge, RTC
Branch XXIII, Manila
NOTE: This Search Warrant shall be valid for ten (10) days from date of issue. 23
Petitioner assails the improper enforcement of the search warrant in that despite the knowledge that
petitioner was not the subject of such warrant, the police operatives proceeded anyway with the
search and his resulting arrest. According to him, the Court of Appeals erred in declaring that where
a search warrant is issued for the search of specifically described premises and not of a person, the
omission of the name of the owner or occupant of such property in the warrant does not invalidate
the same. Petitioner contends that this doctrine applies only if the search warrant does not indicate
with all certainty the owner or occupant of the premises sought to be searched; on the contrary, the
subject search warrant indicated with absolute clarity that the person subject thereof is Kim.
This argument is misplaced. Section 4, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides for the requisites for the issuance of search warrant, to wit:
SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue except upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be
anywhere in the Philippines.
Nowhere in said rule or any other provision in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is it required
that the search warrant must name the person who occupies the described premises. In Uy v.
Bureau of Internal Revenue,24 the Court has definitively ruled that where the search warrant is issued
for the search of specifically described premises only and not for the search of a person, the failure
to name the owner or occupant of such property in the affidavit and search warrant does not
invalidate the warrant; and where the name of the owner of the premises sought to be searched is
incorrectly inserted in the search warrant, it is not a fatal defect if the legal description of the
premises to be searched is otherwise correct so that no discretion is left to the officer making the
search as to the place to be searched.
A cursory reading of the search warrant reveals that the police officers were ordered to make an
immediate search of the premises mentioned and to seize and take possession of shabu.
Furthermore, they were directed to bring "persons to be dealt with as the law may direct." While
petitioner may not be the person subject of the search, the fact that he was caught in flagrante
delicto necessitated his valid warrantless arrest. Therefore, the fact that petitioners name was not
indicated in the search warrant is immaterial.
Turning to the second issue, petitioner insists that his apprehension cannot be considered in
flagrante delicto because he was not in possession of the forbidden drug.

In every prosecution for the illegal possession of shabu, the following essential elements must be
established: (a) the accused is found in possession of a regulated drug; (b) the person is not
authorized by law or by duly constituted authorities; and (c) the accused has knowledge that the said
drug is a regulated drug.25
More importantly, the prosecution must prove that the accused had the intent to possess the drug.
Possession, under the law, includes not only actual possession, but also constructive possession.
Actual possession exists when the drug is in the immediate physical possession or control of the
accused. On the other hand, constructive possession exists when the drug is under the dominion
and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place
where it is found. Exclusive possession or control is not necessary. The fact of possession may be
proved by direct or circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inference drawn therefrom.
However, the prosecution must prove that the accused had knowledge of the existence and
presence of the drug in the place under his control and dominion, as well as the character of the
drug. Since knowledge by the accused of the existence and character of the drug in the place where
he exercises dominion and control is an internal act, the same may be presumed from the fact that
the dangerous drug is in the house or place over which the accused has control or dominion, or
within such premises in the absence of any satisfactory explanation. 26
For the trial court, the fact of possession was clearly and convincingly established by the
prosecution, to wit:
Prosecution has presented in Court the three (3) plastic sachet[s] containing 27.7458 grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride as well as all paraphernalia seized from the accused consisting of
an improvised burner, two (2) pieces of weighing scale, plastic tubing, aluminum foil, empty
transparent plastic sachets, Icom radio, Calculator, Cellular phone, disposable lighters, and two (2)
pieces [of] blank cartridge. SPO4 Ilas and SPO2 Sinag clearly testified that they were found on top
of a table in a room of [sic] Unit 615 in the afternoon of August 27, 1996 at a time when only the
accused was inside the premises. Thus, the fact of possession was clearly and convincingly
established.27
The Court of Appeals pointed out that possession necessary for conviction of the offense of
possession of controlled substances may be actual or constructive:
Although the shabu was not found by the searching team on his person but in the bedroom of the
subject premises, appellant is deemed in possession thereof since he was the only person in said
premises. Moreover, at the time of entry of the searching team in the subject premises, appellant
was half-naked from the waist up which, as the trial court correctly concluded, only "indicates
extreme familiarity and gives the impression of he being at home" in the premises, of which he was
the registered owner.28
Petitioner counters that he was in all his right to be in the leased premises because he had to collect
the rentals due him from his tenant. He further argues that the shabu was allegedly found on top of
the table inside the bedroom and not within the immediate location where he was positioned. When
he was found half-naked by police operatives in another persons house, petitioner defends his act
by invoking his "long bond of friendship" with Lee which made the former treat Lees home like his
own.29
In support of the appellate courts ruling, the Solicitor General maintained that petitioner was in
constructive possession of the subject shabu by citing several circumstances showing petitioners
control and dominion over the same. First, the shabu was found on top of a table in Unit 615 of
Cityland Condominium when and where only petitioner was present inside the premises. Second,

petitioner introduced himself as the owner of the condominium. Third, petitioner admitted that he was
at the subject premises allegedly to collect rentals from the lessee. Fourth, petitioner was found
naked from the waist up by the police operatives upon entering Unit 615. The Solicitor General
stresses that petitioners actuation of being naked from the waist up while opening the door to greet
visitors is natural only to someone who owns the premises.30 Fifth, Unit 615 is a studio unit with a
divider and a sala. There was no room with a door to be closed and locked which can prevent
petitioner from having free access to the shabu found on the table.
This Court is convinced that petitioners control and dominion over the shabu found on top of the
table were sufficiently established by his questionable presence in Unit 615. Petitioners explanation
that he went to Lees unit to collect rentals and was left by the maid to fend for himself while the
latter went out to buy refreshments is highly suspicious. The maid never came back. The maids
testimony would have corroborated that of petitioners.
Despite the presentation of the testimonies of Cityland Condominium Administrator Luis Alvarez and
other witnesses tending to prove that petitioner is the owner and lessor of Unit 615 and his actual
place of residence is in Legaspi Tower, such pieces of evidence do not necessarily prove that
petitioner did not have access and control over the subject premises. In fact, petitioners overt act of
getting half-naked while opening the door establishes intimate familiarity with and over his
surroundings. Petitioner seeks to justify such act by invoking his "long bond of friendship" with Lee.
This was, however, belied by the testimony of the building administrator which showed that Lee was
a mere walk-in applicant and he began renting Unit 615 only on 1 May 1996, barely three (3) months
before petitioner was apprehended.31
Petitioner, in fact, affirmed this fact in his earlier testimony that he allowed Lee, whom he barely
knew, to occupy the unit with only one month rental deposit:
Q: Is it your practice to go personally to that unit to receive the rental?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Thats your practice?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How much is the lease price?
A: P6,500.00.
Q: Payable monthly?
A: At the second week of the month.
Q: For what month was that rental where [sic] you were suppose to collect?
A: June and July[,] your Honor.
Q: Is it not a practice[,] Mr. Witness[,] that now lessee should pay the deposit and a few
months in advance?
A: Yes, but he promise he does not have any money and to produce later on.[sic]

Q: Which rental he is going to pay?

A: The deposit and the monthly rental.
Q: What you are saying [sic] when he entered the premises of this property he does not paid
[sic] anything?
A: He just paid for the month of May.
Q: What you are saying you entered into a lease contract with a person you do not know
during the said month, that he entered the unit he was not able to pay you even the deposit
[sic]?
A: He paid me just one month.
Q: And you agreed?
A: Yes, sir. [H]e promised to pay later on.32
Equally doubtful is the existence of the lease contract allegedly executed between petitioner and Lee
which purportedly validates the presence of the former in Unit 615, which was to collect rentals from
the latter. As the Solicitor General correctly observed, the lease agreement is undated and
unnotarized.33 During cross-examination, the building administrator who presented a copy of the
lease agreement could not even remember when the contract was executed. 34 Petitioner also
testified that the rentals are payable at the second week of each month. 35His statement is
inconsistent with his avowed effort to collect payment in the last week of the month, particularly on
27 August 1996.
We further find the Solicitor Generals conclusion that petitioner was privy to the existence of the
shabu on top of the table credible because the unit was a small room with a piece of plywood
dividing the sala and the bedroom. With petitioner seemingly comfortable in moving about the unit,
the shabu and other paraphernalia could not have escaped his vision.
Even more telling are the testimonies of the police operatives who conducted the search and
subsequent arrest of petitioner. Inspector Acosta testified that his team conducted a search on Unit
615 and found petitioner inside the room alone and that the search resulted in the discovery of the
shabu, to wit:
Q: In connection with your duties then as the member of the PARAC[,] do you recall if there
was any occasion if you meet a certain person whose name [was] Andy Quelman?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: During what occasion did you meet this person?
A: During [sic] when we conducted the search of the Cityland Condominium[,] South
Superhighway[,] Makati City.
Q: If this person Andy Quelman is present in this Courtroom[,] can you point him out in the
Court?

COURT:
Will you step down on the witness stand and tap on his shoulder?
A: Yes, your Honor.
COURT:
Make of record that the witness stepped down on the witness stand and tapped the shoulder
of a person seated on the gallery who when asked of his name answered his name as Andy
Quelman.
Q: You said that you conducted a search, when was this?
A: August 27, 1996.
Q: What time?
A: 3:00 oclock in the afternoon.
Q: Where did you conduct the search?
A: At room 615 Cityland Condominium[,] South Superhighway[,] Makati City.
xxxx
Q: By what authority did you conduct your search at room or [U]nit 615 Cityland
Condominium[,] South Superhighway[,] Makati City.
A: We are armed with [a] search warrant.
Q: Issued by whom?
A: The RTC Judge Hon. Bayhon, City of Manila.
xxxx
Q: So upon arriving at the 6th floor what did you do, or what did you do?
A: We knocked at the door of [R]oom 615.
Q: And what happened next?
A: Somebody opened the door.
Q: And after the door was opened[,] what did you and your team do next?
A: We presented our search warrant.

Q: To whom?
COURT:
Would you know who open[ed] the door?
A: Yes, sir.
PROSECUTOR GARVIDA:
Q: Who?
A: Andy Quelman.
PROSECUTOR GARVIDA:
Q: Can you describe[,] Mr. Witness[,] the appearance of Mr. Andy Quelman when he opened
the door?
A: He is half[-]naked wearing pants.
Q: What about the upper body?
A: Naked.
Q: Upon presenting the search warrant[,] what did you do next?
A: We proceeded to the room to conduct the search.
xxxx
Q: You said you proceeded to conduct the search. [W]hat was Mr. Quelman doing while you
are conducting the search?
A: He was sitting at the table inside the room.
xxxx
Q: Now can you describe to this Court how you conducted the search[,] Mr. Witness?
A: First we proceeded to his room and I saw Mr. Quelman sitting at his table. Later on we
found at his table all the paraphernalia.
Q: Can you enumerate to this Court what[,] if any[,] did you find [sic] during the search?
A: We found 3 transparent plastic containing white crystalline substance.
Q: Where did you find [sic]?

A: Atop the table.

xxxx
Q: What did you do with Mr. Quelman after you found these items which you [have] just
enumerated?
A: We bring [sic] Andy Quelman to our office.36
The foregoing testimony was substantially corroborated by SPO4 Isagani Ilas and SPO1 Teodoro
Sinag who were both part of the arresting team. These witnesses positively identified petitioner as
the occupant of Unit 615 at the time the search was conducted and that he was caught in flagrante
delicto when the shabu was found in his constructive possession.
The trial court placed great weight on the testimonies of these police officers and accorded them the
presumption of regularity in the performance of their functions.37 The prosecution of drug cases
largely depends on the credibility of the police officers. The factual findings of the trial court
especially those which revolve on matters of credibility of witnesses deserve to be respected when
no glaring errors bordering on a gross misapprehension of the facts or no speculative, arbitrary, and
unsupported conclusions can be gleaned from such findings. The evaluation of the credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies is best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique
opportunity to observe the witnesses' deportment, demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grilling
examination.38 In this case, the RTC was upheld by the Court of Appeals. Petitioner has not
convinced this Court of the existence of any of the recognized exceptions 39 to the conclusiveness of
the findings of fact of the trial and appellate courts.
In sum, petitioners unlawful possession, as exhibited by his control and dominion over the shabu
found on top of the table, was duly established by the following evidence: his presence in Unit 615 at
the time of his arrest;40 his representation to the police that he was the owner of the unit;41 his halfnaked state when he opened the door, strongly implying that he had stayed in the house longer than
he claimed to be; and finally, the fact that the shabu was found on top of a table beside the bed
which appears to be within sight of petitioner as there was a mere divider between the sala and
bedroom.42
1avvphil

Having caught petitioner in flagrante delicto, the police operatives are obligated to apprehend him
even without a warrant of arrest.
We shall now determine the imposable penalty. Both the lower courts erred as to the respective
penalties they imposed. Section 16, Article III of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, provides that if the
quantity of the regulated drug involved, in this case, shabu, is less than 200 grams, the penalty to be
imposed shall range from prision correccional to reclusion perpetua. Since petitioner was charged
with the possession of 27.7458 grams of shabu, the imposable penalty is prision
correccional.43 Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the petitioner is sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty ranging from four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor in its medium
period as minimum, to three (3) years of prision correccional in its medium period as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed Court of Appeals Decision in CAG.R. CR No. 22001 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that petitioner ANDY QUELNAN y QUINO
is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from Four (4) Months and

One (1) Day of arresto mayor in its medium period as minimum to Three (3) Years of prision
correccional in its medium period as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANNABELLE FRANCISCO y DAVID, @ ANNABELLE TABLAN, accused-appellant.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Federico Verona and his live-in girlfriend, accused-appellant Annabelle Francisco, were placed
under surveillance after the police confirmed, through a test-buy operation, that they were engaged
in selling shabu or methamphetamine hydrochloride. SPO2 Teneros and SPO4 Alberto San Juan of
OADDI-WPDC, U.N. Avenue, Manila applied for a search warrant before Branch 23 of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila to authorize them to search the premises at 122 M. Hizon St., Caloocan City.
Attached to the application was the After-Surveillance Report 1 of SPO2 Teneros. It stated that Dante
Baradilla, of 1726 Lallana St., corner Sta. Catalina St., Tondo, Manila, who claimed to be one of
Federico Veronas runners in the illegal drugs operations, allegedly sought the assistance of SPO2
Teneros for the arrest of Verona.2 The search warrant3 was subsequently issued by Judge Bayhon
authorizing the search of shabu and paraphernalia at No. 122 M. Hizon Street, Caloocan City.
Accused-appellant Annabelle Francisco, who was then nine months pregnant, was resting inside the
second floor masters bedroom of their two- storey apartment at No. 120 M. Hizon Street, Caloocan
City, when she heard a loud bang downstairs as if somebody forcibly opened the front door. Eight
policemen suddenly entered her bedroom and conducted a search for about an hour. Accusedappellant inquired about their identities but they refused to answer. It was only at the police station
where she found out that the team of searchers was led by SPO2 Teneros. The police team, along
with Barangay Chairwoman Miguelita Limpo and Kagawad Bernie de Jesus, both of Barangay 64,
Zone-6, District 2, Caloocan City, enforced the warrant and seized the following: 4
1. One (1) Salad Set marked Pyrex wrapped in a plastic containing white crysthalline (sic)
substance or methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu with markings by the undersigned
inside the house of subjects residence weighing (230) two hundred thirty (sic) grams of
methampetamine hydrochloride or shabu by Aida Abear-Pascual of NBI Forensic Chemist;
2. Several plastics in different sizes;
3. Two (2) roll of strip aluminum foil;
4. Five (5) tooter water pipe and improvised and two burner improvised;
5. Two (2) pantakal or measuring weight in shabu;
6. Two (2) cellular phone motorola with markings;

7. One (1) monitoring device with cord and with markings;

8. Several pcs. with strip aluminum foil;
9. Two (2) masking tip (sic) with markings;
10. Twentee (sic) two thousand nine hundred ninetee (sic) pesos.
The police team also allegedly seized the amount of P180,000.00, a Fiat car, jewelry, set of keys, an
ATM card, bank books and car documents.
Consequently, accused-appellant was charged with violation of Section 16, Article III, Republic Act
No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, in an information 5 which reads:
That about 10:30 oclock in the morning of 30 March 1996 at No. 122 SCL M. Hizon St., Kalookan
City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable court, the above-named accused grouping herself
together with some other persons whose liabilities are still being determined in a preliminary
investigation, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in their possession, custody and/or control,
methamphetamine hydrochloride popularly known as "shabu", a regulated drug, with a total weight
of 230 grams, without the corresponding license and/or prescription to possess, have custody and/or
control over the aforesaid regulated drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Accused-appellant filed a motion to quash the search warrant6 asserting that she and her live-in
partner Federico Verona had been leasing an apartment unit at No. 120 M. Hizon Street, District
2, Caloocan City, Metro Manila, since 1995 up to the present as certified by the owner of the
apartment unit.
On arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty,7 after which, trial on the merits ensued.
The trial court denied the motion to quash and upheld the validity of the search warrant. It rendered
a decision finding accused-appellant guilty as charged, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE premises considered, and the prosecution having established beyond an iota of
doubt the guilt of the Accused for Violation of Sec. 16, Art. III, RA 6425 as amended by RA 7659 and
considering that the total net weight of subject drugs consists of 230 grams, this Court in the
absence of any modifying circumstance hereby imposes upon the Accused the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and a fine of P1,000,000.00 pesos, and to pay the costs.
The period of Accuseds preventive imprisonment shall be credited in full in the service of her
sentence pursuant to Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
Subject drugs and paraphernalia are hereby declared confiscated and forfeited in favor of the
government to be dealt with in accordance with law.

The return to the Accused of the two (2) cellular phones, (Motorola Micro Fac) (sic) Nos. S-2968A
and S-3123A, which were turned over by the Acting Branch Clerk of Court of Manila RTC, Br. 3 to
her counterpart in this sala (Exh. "30") as well as the deposit of cash money in the amount of
P22,990.00 with the Manila RTC Clerk of Court JESUS MANINGAS as evidenced by
acknowledgment receipt dated 21 May 1996, are hereby ordered.
SO ORDERED.8
On appeal, accused-appellant raised the following assignment of errors: 9
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF THE CRIME OF
ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF SHABU;
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE EVIDENCE AGAINST THE
ACCUSED;
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE SEARCH CONDUCTED
WAS ILLEGAL AND VIOLATIVE OF ACCUSEDS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS;
IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED AFTER FINDING
THAT THE SEARCH WAS INDEED CONDUCTED AT A PLACE DIFFERENT FROM THAT
DESCRIBED IN THE SEARCH WARRANT.
The appeal is impressed with merit.
Plainly, the basic issue submitted for resolution is the reasonableness of the search conducted by
the police officers at accused-appellants residence.
The trial court, in upholding the validity of the search, stated that: 10
Re 3rd argument - the fact that the search warrant in question was served at apartment No. 120 and
not at the specific address stated therein which is 122 M. Hizon St., Caloocan City will not by itself
render as illegal the search and seizure of subject stuff seized by the operatives pursuant thereto.
While it is true that the rationale behind the constitutional and procedural requirements that the
search warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched is to the end that no
unreasonable search warrant and seizure may not be made (sic) and abuses may not be committed,
however, this requirement is not without exception. It is the prevailing rule in our jurisdiction that
even a description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can with
reasonable effort ascertain and identify the place intended (People vs. Veloso, G.R. No. L-23051,
Oct. 20, 1925).
Significantly in the case at bar the implementing officer SPO2 Teneros was principally the concerned
official who conducted an active surveillance on the Accused and subject house (Surveillance
Report, Exh. "9") and pursued this case by filing the corresponding application for the issuance of a
search warrant. Perforce, SPO2 TENEROS was thereby placed in a position enabling him to have
prior and personal knowledge of particular house intended in the warrant which definitely refer to no
other than the very place where the same was accordingly served.

Accused-appellant, on the other hand, maintains that the search was grossly infirm as the subject
search warrant authorized the police authorities to search only No. 122 M. Hizon St., Caloocan City.
However, the actual search was conducted at No. 120 M. Hizon St., Caloocan City.
The basic guarantee to the protection of the privacy and sanctity of a person, his home and his
possessions against unreasonable intrusions of the State is articulated in Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution, which reads:
THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO BE SECURE IN THEIR PERSONS, HOUSES, PAPERS, AND
EFFECTS AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES OF WHATEVER NATURE
AND FOR ANY PURPOSE SHALL BE INVIOLABLE, AND NO SEARCH WARRANT OR WARRANT
OF ARREST SHALL ISSUE EXCEPT UPON PROBABLE CAUSE TO BE DETERMINED
PERSONALLY BY THE JUDGE AFTER EXAMINATION UNDER OATH OR AFFIRMATION OF THE
COMPLAINANT AND THE WITNESSES HE MAY PRODUCE, AND PARTICULARLY DESCRIBING
THE PLACE TO BE SEARCHED AND THE PERSONS OR THINGS TO BE SEIZED.
For the validity of a search warrant, the Constitution requires that there be a particular description of
"the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized." The rule is that a description of a
place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain
and identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places in the community. Any
designation or description known to the locality that leads the officer unerringly to it satisfies the
constitutional requirement.11
Specifically, the requisites for the issuance of a valid search warrant are: (1) probable cause is
present; (2) such presence is determined personally by the judge; (3) the complainant and the
witnesses he or she may produce are personally examined by the judge, in writing and under oath or
affirmation; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts personally known to them; and (5)
the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized. 12
The absence of any of these requisites will cause the downright nullification of the search warrants.
The proceedings upon search warrants must be absolutely legal, for there is not a description of
process known to the law, the execution of which is more distressing to the citizen. Perhaps there is
none which excites such intense feeling in consequence of its humiliating and degrading effect. The
warrants will always be construed strictly without, however, going the full length of requiring technical
accuracy. No presumptions of regularity are to be invoked in aid of the process when an officer
undertakes to justify it.13
The application for search warrant filed by SPO2 Teneros requested for authority to search
specifically the premises of No. 122 M. Hizon St., Caloocan City. The application was accompanied
by a sketch14 of the area which bears two parallel lines indicated as 10th Avenue drawn vertically on
the left-hand side of the paper. Intersecting these lines are two other parallel lines drawn horizontally
and indicated as M. Hizon. Above and on the left-hand side of the upper parallel line of the lines
identified as M. Hizon, is a square marked as "Basketball Court." A similar drawing placed near the
right-hand side of the upper parallel line is another square marked as "PNR Compound". Beneath
the lower parallel line of the lines marked as "M. Hizon" and right at the center is also a square
enclosing an "X" sign marked as "122", presumably No. 122 M. Hizon St., Caloocan City.
During the hearing for the application of the search warrant, police asset Dante Baradilla described
the house to be searched as:

Bale dalawang palapag po, semi concrete, color cream na ang mga bintana ay may rehas na bakal
at sliding at sa harap ay may terrace at may sasakyan sila na ginagamit sa pagdeliver ng shabu. 15
The trial court then conducted an ocular inspection of the area. It turned out that No. 122 M. Hizon
St., Caloocan City was a concrete two-storey residential building with steel-barred windows and a
terrace. It was owned by a certain Mr. Joseph Ching. The house, however, bore no house number.
The house marked No. 122 M. Hizon St., Caloocan City was actually two houses away from
accused-appellants house at No. 120 M. Hizon St.
On the other hand, No. 120 Hizon St. was a compound consisting of three apartments enclosed by
only one gate marked on the outside as No. 120. The different units within No. 120 Hizon St. were
not numbered separately. Accused-appellant rented the third unit from the entrance which was
supposedly the subject of the search. The entire compound had an area of approximately ninety (90)
square meters. The second unit was located at the back of the first unit and the third unit was at the
rear end of the compound. Hence, access to the third unit from M. Hizon Street was only through the
first two units and the common gate indicated as No. 120. The occupants of the premises stated that
they commonly use No. 120 to designate their residence.
In People v. Veloso, this Court declared that "even a description of the place to be searched is
sufficient if the officer with the warrant can with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place
intended."16 The description of the building in the application for a search warrant in Veloso as well
as in the search warrant itself refer to "the building No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila,
Philippine Islands" which was considered "sufficient designation of the premises to be searched." 17
The prevailing circumstances in the case at bar are definitely different from those in Veloso. At first
glance, the description of the place to be searched in the warrant seems to be sufficient. However,
from the application for a search warrant as well as the search warrant itself, the police officer
serving the warrant cannot, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended
precisely because it was wrongly described as No. 122, although it may have been located on the
same street as No. 120. Even the description of the house by police asset Baradilla referred to that
house located at No. 122 M. Hizon St., not at No. 120 M. Hizon St.
The particularity of the place described is essential in the issuance of search warrants to avoid the
exercise by the enforcing officers of discretion. Hence, the trial court erred in refusing to nullify the
actions of the police officers who were perhaps swayed by their alleged knowledge of the place. The
controlling subject of search warrants is the place indicated in the warrant itself and not the place
identified by the police.18
It may well be that the police officer identified No. 120 M. Hizon St. as the subject of the actual
search. However, as indicated in the witness affidavit19 in support of the application for a search
warrant,20 No. 122 M. Hizon St. was unmistakably indicated. Inexplicably, a few days after the search
warrant was issued by the court and served at No. 120 M. Hizon St., SPO2 Teneros informed Judge
Bayhon in the return of search warrant21 that the warrant "was properly served at 122 M. Hizon St.,
Caloocan City, Metro Manila as indicated in the search warrant itself."
SPO2 Teneros attempted to explain the error by saying that he thought the house to be searched
bore the address 122 M. Hizon St., Caloocan City instead of No. 120 M. Hizon St. 22 But as this Court
ruled in Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines v. Asuncion,23 thus:

The police had no authority to search the apartment behind the store, which was the place indicated
in the warrant, even if they really intended it to be the subject of their application. Indeed, the place
to be searched cannot be changed, enlarged or amplified by the police, viz.:
"x x x. In the instant case, there is no ambiguity at all in the warrant. The ambiguity lies outside the
instrument, arising from the absence of a meeting of the minds as to the place to be searched
between the applicants for the warrant and the Judge issuing the same; and what was done was to
substitute for the place that the Judge had written down in the warrant, the premises that the
executing officers had in their mind. This should not have been done. It [was] neither fair nor licit to
allow police officers to search a place different from that stated in the warrant on the claim that the
place actually searchedalthough not that specified in the warrant[was] exactly what they had in
view when they applied for the warrant and had demarcated in their supporting evidence. What is
material in determining the validity of a search is the place stated in the warrant itself, not what the
applicants had in their thoughts, or had represented in the proofs they submitted to the court issuing
the warrant. Indeed, following the officers theory, in the context of the facts of the case, all four (4)
apartment units at the rear of Abigails Variety Store would have been fair game for a search.
The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or modified by the officers
own personal knowledge of the premises, or the evidence they adduced in support of their
application for the warrant. Such a change is proscribed by the Constitution which requires inter
alia the search warrant to particularly describe the place to be searched as well as the persons or
things to be seized. It would concede to police officers the power of choosing the place to be
searched, even if it not be delineated in the warrant. It would open wide the door to abuse of the
search process, and grant to officers executing a search warrant that discretion which the
Constitution has precisely removed from them. The particularization of the description of the place to
be searched may properly be done only by the Judge, and only in the warrant itself; it cannot be left
to the discretion of the police officers conducting the search."
All told, the exclusionary rule necessarily comes into play, to wit:
Art. III, Sec. 3 (2), 1987 Constitution. -- ANY EVIDENCE OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF THIS OR
THE PRECEDING SECTION SHALL BE INADMISSIBLE FOR ANY PURPOSE IN ANY
PROCEEDING.
Consequently, all the items seized during the illegal search are prohibited from being used in
evidence. Absent these items presented by the prosecution, the conviction of accused-appellant for
the crime charged loses its basis.
As the Court noted in an earlier case, the exclusion of unlawfully seized evidence was the only
practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and
seizures. Verily, they are the "fruits of the poisonous tree." Without this exclusionary rule, the
constitutional right would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the
freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence. 24
On another note, we find disturbing the variety of the items seized by the searching team in this
case. In the return of search warrant, they admitted the seizure of cellular phones, money and
television/monitoring device items that are not within the palest ambit of shabu paraphernalia,
which were the only items authorized to be seized. What is more disturbing is the suggestion that
some items seized were not reported in the return of search warrant, like the Fiat car, bankbooks,

and money. In an attempt to justify the presence of the car in the police station, SPO2 Teneros had
to concoct a most incredible story that the accused-appellant, whose pregnancy was already in the
third trimester, drove her car to the police station after the intrusion at her house even if the police
officers had with them several cars.
A search warrant is not a sweeping authority empowering a raiding party to undertake a fishing
expedition to seize and confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to a crime. 25
It need not be stressed anew that this Court is resolutely committed to the doctrine that this
constitutional provision is of a mandatory character and therefore must be strictly complied with. To
quote from the landmark American decision of Boyd v. United States: "It is the duty of courts to be
watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon.
Their motto should be obsta principiis."26
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the
individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price to pay for the loss of liberty. As Justice
Holmes declared: "I think it is less evil that some criminals escape than that the government should
play an ignoble part." It is simply not allowed in free society to violate a law to enforce another,
especially if the law violated is the Constitution itself. 27
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 127,
Caloocan City, convicting accused-appellant of violation of Section 16, Article III, Republic Act No.
6425 and sentencing her to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of
P1,000,000.00 as well as the costs, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack of evidence to
establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellant Annabelle Francisco y David @
Annabelle Tablan is ACQUITTED and is ordered immediately RELEASED from confinement, unless
she is lawfully held in custody for another cause.
SO ORDERED.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE JUDGE ESTRELLA T. ESTRADA, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, BRANCH 83,
QUEZON CITY; and AIDEN LANUZA, respondents.

MARTINEZ, J.:
The People of the Philippines, through this petition for review, seeks the reversal of the order of respondent Judge Estrella T. Estrada, dated
December 7, 1995, which granted private respondent Aiden Lanuza's motion to quash Search Warrant No. 958 (95), as well as the order
dated April 1, 1996 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the earlier order.

On June 27, 1995, Atty. Lorna Frances F. Cabanlas, Chief of the Legal, Information and Compliance
Division (LICD) of the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD), filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 83, an application for the issuance of a search warrant against "Aiden Lanuza
of 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Mabolo, Cebu City," for violation of Article 40 (k) of Republic
Act 7394 (The Consumer Act of the Philippines).

In her application for search warrant, Atty. Cabanlas alleged, among others, as follows:
1. On June 5, 1995, in my official capacity as Attorney V and Chief of LICD, I
received reports from SPO4 Manuel P. Cabiles of the Regional Intelligence Group IV,
Intelligence Command of the PNP that certain
1.a. Aiden Lanuza of 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Mabolo,
Cebu City sold to said Officer Cabiles various drug products
amounting to Seven Thousand Two Hundred Thirty Two Pesos
(P7,232.00) on May 29, 1995;
1.b. Said Aiden Lanuza or her address at 516 San Jose de la
Montana Street, Mabolo, Cebu City has no license to operate,
distribute, sell or transfer drug products from the BFAD;
1.c. Distribution, sale or offer for sale or transfer of drug products
without license to operate from BFAD is in violation of Art. 40 (k) of
RA 7394 (or "the Consumer Act").
2. In support of the report, the subscribed affidavit of Mr. Cabiles, his report and the
various drug products sold and purchased contained in a (sic) plastic bags marked
"Lanuza Bag 1 of 1" and "Lanuza Bag 2 of 2" were enclosed; and the same are
likewise submitted herewith.
xxx xxx xxx. 1 (Emphasis supplied)
The application, however, ended with the statement that the warrant is to search the premises of
another person at a different address:
3. This is executed to support affiant's application for a search warrant on the
premises of Belen Cabanero at New Frontier Village, Talisay Cebu. 2 (Emphasis supplied)
In support of the application, the affidavit of SPO4 Manuel P. Cabiles, a member of the Regional
Intelligence Group IV of the PNP Intelligence Command, Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Laguna,
was attached thereto, wherein he declared that:
1. Upon the request for assistance by BFAD, he conducted surveillance for persons
distributing, selling or transferring drug products without license to operate from
BFAD.
2. On May 29, 1995, a certain Aiden Lanuza of 516 San Jose de la Montana St.,
Mabolo, Cebu City sold to him various drug products amounting to P7,232.00 and
3 Upon further verification in the BFAD registry of licensed persons or premises, the
said person and place have in fact no license to operate.

4. Earlier than May 29, 1995, affiant saw a delivery of drug products from the
residence of Ms. Lanuza in 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City to
another person.
5. Accompanying this affidavit are the various products sold to/and purchased by the
affiant contained in two (2) plastic bags marked "Lanuza Bag 1 of 1" and "Lanuza
Bag 2 of 2."
This is executed in support of the affiant's report to BFAD and for whatever legitimate
purpose this may serve. 3 (Emphasis supplied)
The BFAD also submitted with the application a copy of the sketch 4 of the location of Aiden Lanuza's
residence at her stated address.
On the same day the application was filed, the respondent Judge issued Search Warrant No. 958
(95), which reads in full:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION
BRANCH 83 QUEZON CITY
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff,
-versus- SEARCH WARRANT NO. 958 (95)
AIDEN LANUZA,
Defendant.
X-------------------------------X
SEARCH WARRANT
It appears to the satisfaction of this Court, after examining under oath Atty. Lorna
Frances F. Cabanlas, Chief of the Legal Information and Compliance Division (LICD)
of the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD) and her witness. Manuel P. Cabiles,
member of the Intelligence Group IV, Intelligence Command, PNP, Camp Vicente
Lim, Canlubang, Laguna, that there are reasonable grounds to believe that a
violation of Article 40(k) in relation to Article 41 of Republic Act No. 7394 (Consumer
Act) has been committed or about to be committed and there are good and sufficient
reasons to believe that Ms. Aiden Lanuza of 516 San Jose dela Montana Street,

Cebu City has in her possession and control at said address the following described
properties:
medicines and drugs of undetermined quantity among which are
Bricanyl Tablet, Bisolvon Tablet, Buscopan Tablet, Buscopan
Ampoule, Mucosolvan Ampoule, Persantin Tablet, Tegretol Tablet,
PZA-Ciba Tablet, Voltaren Tablet, Zantac Ampoule, Ventolin Tablet,
Ventolin Inhaler, Dermovate Cream, Fortum Vial, Zinacef Vial,
Feldene 1M Ampoule, Norvasc Tablet, Bactrim Forte Tablet,
Rochephin Vial, Tilcotil Tablet, Librax Tablet, Methergin Tablet and
Tagamet Tablet
which she is selling, distributing and transferring without the necessary license from
the Department of Health.
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time of the DAY or
NIGHT of the premises above-described and forthwith seize and take possession of
the undetermined amount of drugs and medicines subject of the offense and to bring
the same to this Court to be dealt with as the law directs.
You are further directed to submit a return of this Search Warrant within ten (10) days
from today.
This Search Warrant is valid within a period of ten (10) days from the date of issue.
GIVEN UNDER THE HAND AND SEAL of this Court this 27th day of June 1995 at
Quezon City.
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On June 28, 1995, the search warrant was served at private respondent Lanuza's residence at the
indicated address by a composite team of policemen from the PNP 7th Criminal Investigation
Command, Camp Sotero Cabahug, Cebu City.
How the search warrant was implemented was briefly narrated in the Joint Affidavit, 6 dated June 29,
1995, of SPO2 Fructuoso Bete, Jr. and SPO2 Marckbilly Capalungan, both members of the search and
seizure team. They stated in their affidavit that their team, armed with the search warrant, "conducted a
raid at the premises of one AIDEN LANUZA of 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Cebu City . . .;" that
"the raid was witnessed by Luis Rivera, Demetrio Panimdim and Francisco Ojales, both (sic) Brgy. Tanod
of Kasambagan, Cebu City;" that "the service of the (search) warrant resulted in the confiscation of fiftytwo (52) cartoons (sic) of assorted medicines from the possession and control of AIDEN LANUZA;" and
that the "said items were brought to the 7CICRO office for detailed inventory headed by Atty. Lorna F.
Cabanlas, Chief of the Legal Information and Compliance Division of the BFAD, Manila." 7 (Emphasis
supplied)
The present petition, however, narrates a different account of what actually happened during the
implementation of the search warrant. Paragraph 5 of the petition states: "At the commencement of
the search, the members of the team discovered that the premises described as 516 San Jose de la
Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City was actually a five thousand (5,000) square meter compound
containing at least fifteen (15) structures which are either leased residences, offices, factories,
workshops or warehouse. The policemen proceeded to search the residence of private respondent
Lanuza at Lot No. 41 of said address. Finding no drug products thereat, they proceeded to search a
nearby warehouse at Lot No. 38 within the same compound and address above stated. This search
yielded fifty-two (52) cartons of assorted drug products which were then inventoried in due course. . .
. ." 8 (Emphasis supplied)
In an order 9 dated July 3, 1995, the respondent Judge noted the inventory of the seized drugs and
authorized the BFAD to retain custody of the same, to have samples of the drugs analyzed and be
brought to the registered drug manufacturers for parallel testing.
On August 22, 1995, private respondent Aiden Lanuza filed a verified motion 10 praying that Search
Warrant No. 958 (95) be quashed and that the seized articles be declared inadmissible in any proceeding
and ordered returned to the warehouse owned by Folk Arts Export & Import Company located at Lot No.
38 inside the compound at 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Cebu City. The motion is based on the
grounds that the search warrant is illegal and null and void because: (1) it was applied to search the
premises of one Belen Cabanero at New Frontier Village, Talisay, Cebu, but was issued to search the
residence of private respondent Aiden Lanuza at 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Cebu City; (2) it
was issued for a non-existing offense; (3) Atty. Lorna Frances F. Cabanlas was not duly authorized by
applicant BFAD to apply therefor; (4) it failed to particularly describe the place to be searched and the
things to be seized; (5) the applicant's witnesses had no personal knowledge of the facts upon which it
was issued; and (6) its implementation was unreasonable as it was enforced on a different or wrong place
which was lawfully occupied by a different or wrong person. 11

Atty. Lorna Frances Cabanlas, who appeared for the BFAD, opposed
warrant, to which the private respondent countered with a reply.

12

the motion to quash the search

After the contending parties had submitted their respective positions without further oral arguments,
the respondent Judge issued the assailed order 13 dated December 7, 1995, quashing Search Warrant
No. 958 (95). Accordingly, the order dated July 3, 1995 was revoked and all the articles seized were
declared inadmissible in any and all proceedings against private respondent Aiden Lanuza. Also, the
BFAD was ordered to return at its expense all the seized items to the warehouse of Folk Arts Import &
Export Company at Lot No. 38, 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City within a period of
fifteen (15) days from notice of the said order. 14
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the December 7, 1995 order was denied in an order 15 dated
April 1, 1996, impelling petitioner to file the present petition asserting that the respondent Judge erred:

a) In holding that the defect appearing in BFAD's application for a

search warrant is so "grave" in nature as to warrant quashal of the
search warrant issued thereunder, considering that such variance is
actually a harmless clerical error.
b) In holding that Atty. Cabanlas was not, authorized by the BFAD to
apply for a search warrant concerning the unlicensed distribution of
drugs, considering that the grant of BFAD authorization upon her to
investigate fake, misbranded adulterated or unregistered drugs
necessarily contemplates the authority to investigate the unlicensed
activities above noted.
c) In holding that applicant BFAD had failed to discharge the burden
of proving probable cause for issuance of a search warrant, by failing
to present documentary proof indicating that private respondent had
no license to sell or distribute drug products, considering that under
the authority of Carillo v. People (229 SCRA 386) the BFAD only had
the burden of proving the negative ingredient of the offense charged
on the basis of the best evidence procurable under the
circumstances.
d) In holding that the place sought to be searched had not been
described with sufficient particularity in SW No. 958 (95), considering
that Aiden Lanuza's residence at Lot No. 41, 516 San Jose de la
Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City was not so conspicuously or
notoriously represented to the public as such by her as to contradict
the investigating and serving officers' perception of the outward
appearance of her dwelling, which led them to believe that the more
general address of 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu
City referred to her dwelling.
e) In ordering the return of the things seized, the possession of which
is prohibited. 16

We granted, the petitioner's application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order in a
resolution 17 dated June 26, 1996 and restrained the implementation of the assailed orders, effective
immediately and until further orders from this Court.

Private respondent Aiden Lanuza later filed her comment 18 on the petition, but petitioner's reply thereto
was not admitted by this Court in a resolution 19 dated January 13, 1997, for failure by the Solicitor
General to file the same within his first extension of thirty (30) days, that was granted, but with a warning
that no further extension would be given. Instead of filing his reply, the Solicitor General asked for two (2)
more extensions of time, which were denied.
Now to the assigned errors of the respondent Judge raised by petitioner.
The requirements for the issuance of a search warrant are inscribed in Section 2, Article III of the
1987 Constitution, to wit:
Sec. 2. THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO BE SECURE IN THEIR PERSONS,
HOUSES, PAPERS, AND EFFECTS AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES,
SEIZURES OF WHATEVER NATURE AND FOR ANY PURPOSE SHALL BE
INVIOLABLE, AND NO SEARCH WARRANT OR WARRANT OF ARREST SHALL
ISSUE EXCEPT UPON PROBABLE CAUSE TO BE DETERMINED PERSONALLY
BY THE JUDGE AFTER EXAMINATION UNDER OATH OF AFFIRMATION OF THE
COMPLAINANT AND THE WITNESSES HE MAY PRODUCE, AND PARTICULARLY
DESCRIBING THE PLACE TO BE SEARCHED AND THE PERSONS OR THINGS
TO BE SEIZED. (Emphasis supplied)
In quashing the subject search warrant, it is the finding of the respondent Judge that the application
for its issuance suffered from a "grave" defect, "which escaped (her) attention," considering that it
was applied to search the premises of one Belen Cabanero at New Frontier Village, Talisay, Cebu,
but was issued to search the residence of herein private respondent Aiden Lanuza at 516 San Jose
de la Montana St., Cebu City. 20
We nonetheless find such error in the application for search warrant a negligible defect.

The title of the questioned application, which reads:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff,
-versus- SEARCH WARRANT NO. 958 (95)
AIDEN LANUZA, For: Violation of Article
516 San Jose de la 40 (k) in relation to
Montana Street, Mabolo, Article 41 of Republic
Cebu City, Act No. 7394 (or the

Defendant. Consumer Act)

x---------------------------------------------------------------------------x 21
(Emphasis supplied)
and the allegations contained therein, pertinent portions of which we quote:
1. On June 5, 1995, in my official capacity as Attorney V and Chief of LICD, I
received reports from SPO4 Manuel P. Cabiles of the Regional Intelligence Group IV,
Intelligence Command of the PNP that certain
1.a. Aiden Lanuza of 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Mabolo,
Cebu City sold to said Officer Cabiles various drug products
amounting to Seven Thousand Two Hundred Thirty Two Pesos
(P7,232.00) on May 29, 1995;
1.b. Said Aiden Lanuza or her address at 516 San Jose de la
Montana Street, Mabolo, Cebu City has no license to operate,
distribute, sell or transfer drug products from the BFAD.
xxx xxx xxx
2. In support of the report, the subscribed affidavit of Mr. Cabiles, his report and the
various drug products sold and purchased contained in a (sic) plastic bags marked
"Lanuza Bag 1 of 1" and "Lanuza Bag 2 of 2" were enclosed, and the same are
likewise submitted herewith.
xxx xxx xxx. 22 (Emphasis supplied)
unmistakably reveal that the said application was specifically intended against private
respondent Aiden Lanuza of 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Mabolo, Cebu City. She
has been the only one identified in the application, as well as in the aforequoted affidavit of
SPO4 Manuel Cabiles upon which the application was based, as having allegedly sold to
said SPO4 Cabiles various drugs amounting to P7,232.00 on May 29, 1995, without any
license to do so, in alleged violation of Article 40 (k) of R.A. 7394. It is noteworthy that, as
stated in the above-quoted paragraph 2 of the application, the plastic bags which contained
the seized drugs and which were submitted together with the application, were marked as
"Lanuza Bag 1 of 1" and "Lanuza Bag 2 of 2." These markings with the name "Lanuza"
obviously refer to no other than the herein private respondent. And when the respondent
Judge issued the search warrant, it was directed solely against private respondent Aiden
Lanuza at her address: 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Mabolo, Cebu City.
The Solicitor General explained the error in the application by saying that on the same day applicant
Atty. Lorna Frances Cabanlas filed the questioned application on June 27, 1995, another application
for search warrant was also filed against one Belen Cabanero at her residence at New Frontier
Village, Talisay, Cebu City. This can be deduced from the following examination conducted by
respondent Judge on Atty. Cabanlas:

(COURT)
Q. And who is your respondent?
A. Mrs. Aiden Lanuza and the other one is Belen
Cabanero.
Q. Where are they situated?
A. Mrs. Lanuza is situated in No. 516 San Jose de la
Montana Street, Mabolo, Cebu City.
Q. About the other?
A. New Frontier Village, Talisay, Cebu.
Q. Do you have any specific address at New Frontier
Village?
A. It was reported by Mr. Manuel Cabiles.
Q. Will he be testifying?
A. Yes Ma'am. Your Honor, this is the vicinity of the
New Frontier Village, Cebu (witness presenting a
sketch) (sic)
Q How about this San Jose de la Montana. This is just
in Cebu City?
A At 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Mabolo,
Cebu
City. 23
From the foregoing discussion, it is obvious that the name and address of one Belen Cabanero were
erroneously copied in paragraph 3 of the application in question. Such defect, as intimated earlier, is not
of such a gravity as to call for the invalidation of the search warrant.

There are, however, two (2) serious grounds to quash the search warrant.
Firstly, we cannot fault the respondent Judge for nullifying the search warrant as she was not
convinced that there was probable cause for its issuance due to the failure of the applicant to
present documentary proof indicating that private respondent Aiden Lanuza had no license to sell
drugs.
It must be noted that in the application for search warrant, private respondent is charged with the
specific offense of selling drugs without the required license from the Department of Health, which is
in violation of Article 40 (k) of R.A. 7394, and penalized under Article 41 thereof. The said application

was supported by the affidavit of SPO4 Manuel Cabiles where, in paragraph 3 thereof, he declared
that he made a "verification in the BFAD registry of licensed persons or premises" and discovered
that private respondent Aiden Lanuza had "no license" to sell drugs.
We agree with the respondent Judge that applicant Atty. Lorna Frances Cabanlas should have
submitted documentary proof that private respondent Aiden Lanuza had no such license. Although
no explanation was offered by respondent Judge to support her posture, we hold that to establish
the existence of probable cause sufficient to justify the issuance of a search warrant, the applicant
must show "facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the
offense are in the place sought to be searched." 24
The facts and circumstances that would show probable cause must be the best evidence that could be
obtained under the circumstances. The introduction of such evidence is necessary especially in cases
where the issue is the existence or the negative ingredient of the offense charged for instance, the
absence of a license required by law, as in the present case and such evidence is within the
knowledge and control of the applicant who could easily produce the same. But if the best evidence could
not be secured at the time of application, the applicant must show a justifiable reason therefor during the
examination by the judge. The necessity of requiring stringent procedural safeguards before a search
warrant can be issued is to give meaning to the constitutional right of a person to the privacy of his home
and personalties. As well stated by this Court through former Chief Justice Enrique Fernando
in Villanueva vs. Querubin: 25

It is deference to one's personality that lies at the core of this right; but it could be
also looked upon as a recognition of a constitutionally protected area, primarily one's
home but not necessarily thereto confined (Cf. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293
[1966]). What is sought to be guarded is a man's prerogative to choose who is
allowed entry to his residence. In that haven of refuge, his individuality can assert
itself not only in the choice of who shall be welcome but likewise in the kind of
objects he wants around him. There the state, however powerful, does not as such
have access except under the circumstances above noted, for in the traditional
formulation, his house, however humble, is his castle. Thus is outlawed any
unwarranted intrusion by government, which is called upon to refrain from any
invasion of his dwelling and to respect the privacies of his life (Cf. Schmerber v.
California, 384 US 757 Brennam, J. and Boyd v. United States, 116 US 616, 630). In
the same vein, Landynski in his authoritative work, Search and Seizure and the
Supreme Court (1966), could fitly characterize this constitutional right as the
embodiment of a spiritual concept: the belief that to value the privacy of home and
person and to afford its constitutional protection against the long reach of
government is no less, than to value human dignity, and that his privacy must not be
disturbed except in case of overriding social need, and then only under stringent
procedural safeguards (Ibid, p. 47). (Emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, the best evidence procurable under the circumstances to prove that private
respondent Aiden Lanuza had no license to sell drugs is the certification to that effect from the
Department of Health. SPO4 Manuel Cabiles could have easily procured such certification when he
went to the BFAD to verify from the registry of licensed persons or entity. No justifiable reason was
introduced why such certification could not be secured. Mere allegation as to the non-existence of a
license by private respondent is not sufficient to establish probable cause for a search warrant. The

presumption of regularity cannot be invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to
justify it. 26 We apply by analogy our ruling in 20th Century Fox Film Corporation vs. Court of Appeals,
et. al.: 27
The presentation of the master tapes of the copyrighted films from which the pirated
firms were allegedly copied, was necessary for the validity of search warrants against
those who have in their possession the pirated films. The petitioner's argument to the
effect that the presentation of the master tapes at the time of application may not be
necessary as these would be merely evidentiary in nature and not determinative of
whether or not a probable cause exists to justify the issuance of the search warrant is
not meritorious. The court cannot presume the duplicate or copied tapes were
necessarily reproduced from master tapes that it owns.
The application for search warrants was directed against video tape outlets which
allegedly were engaged in the unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted films
belonging to the petitioner pursuant to P.D. 49.
The essence of a copyright infringement is the similarity or at least substantial
similarity of the purported pirated works to the copyrighted work. Hence, the
applicant must present to the court the copyrighted films to compare the with the
purchased evidence of the video tapes allegedly pirated to determine whether the
latter is an unauthorized reproduction of the former. This linkage of the copyrighted
films to the pirated films must be established to satisfy the requirements of probable
cause. Mere allegations as to the existence of the copyrighted films cannot serve as
basis for the issuance of a search warrant. (Emphasis supplied)
Secondly, the place sought to be searched had not been described with sufficient particularity in the
questioned search warrant, considering that private respondent Aiden Lanuza's residence is actually
located at Lot No. 41, 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City, while the drugs sought to
be seized were found in a warehouse at Lot No. 38 within the same compound. The said warehouse
is owned by a different person. Again, the respondent Judge is correct on this point.
This Court has held that the applicant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the
person or things to be seized, wherever and whenever it is feasible. 28 In the present case, it must be
noted that the application for search warrant was accompanied by a sketch 29 of the compound at 516
San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City. The sketch indicated the 2-storey residential house of
private respondent with a large "X" enclosed in a square. Within the same compound are residences of
other people, workshops, offices, factories and warehouse. With this sketch as the guide, it could have
been very easy to describe the residential house of private respondent with sufficient particularity so as to
segregate it from the other buildings or structures inside the same compound. But the search warrant
merely indicated the address of the compound which is 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu
City. This description of the place to be searched is too general and does not pinpoint the specific house
of private respondent. Thus, the inadequacy of the description of the residence of private respondent
sought to be searched has characterized the questioned search warrant as a general warrant, which is
violative of the constitutional requirement.
While the questioned search warrant had all the characteristic of a general warrant, it was correctly
implemented. For, the searching team went directly to the house of private respondent Aiden Lanuza
located at Lot No. 41 inside the compound known as 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Mabolo,

Cebu City. However, the team did not find any of the drug products which were the object of the
search. Frustrated, and apparently disappointed, the team then proceeded to search a nearby
warehouse of Folk Arts Export & Import Company owned by one David Po located at Lot No. 38
within the same compound. It was in the warehouse that drug products were found and seized which
were duly receipted. In the Joint Affidavit of SPO2 Fructuoso Bete, Jr. and SPO2 Markbilly
Capalungan, members of the searching team, is a statement that the confiscated 52 cartons of
assorted medicines were found in the possession and control of private respondent Aiden Lanuza.
This is a blatant falsehood and is aggravated by the fact that this was committed by officers sworn to
uphold the law. In searching the warehouse of Folk Arts Export & Import Company owned by one
David Po, the searching team went beyond the scope of the search warrant. As the trial court aptly
observed:
. . . . The verified motion to quash and reply also show that the search at the house
of defendant-movant yielded negative result and the confiscated articles were taken
from another place which is the warehouse of Folk Arts Import and Export Company
owned by another person. In the return of the search warrant, it is stated that Search
Warrant No. 958 (95) was served at the premises of 516 San Jose dela Montana St.,
Cebu City and that during the search, drug products were found and seized
therefrom which were duly receipted. Accompanying, said return is the Joint Affidavit
of two (2) members of the searching team, namely: SPO2 Froctuoso Bete and SPO2
Markbilly Capalingan, both of the 7th Criminal Investigation Command, PNP, with
station at Camp Sotero Cabahug, Gerardo Avenue, Cebu City which also mentioned
only the address as 516 San Jose dela Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City and the
confiscation of 52 cartoons(sic) of assorted medicines purportedly from the
possession and control of defendant-movant. However, as indicated in the sketch
attached to the application for search warrant, said Folk Arts Import and Export
Company is owned by one David Po, which is a concrete proof that the searching
team exceeded their authority by conducting a search not only in the residence of
defendant-movant Lanuza but also in another place which the applicant itself has
identified as belonging to another person, David Po. The foregoing are strong
reasons to support the conclusion that there has been an unreasonable search and
seizure which would warrant the quashal of the search warrant. 30
The respondent Judge acted correctly in granting the motion to quash the search warrant.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued in a
resolution dated June 26, 1996 is hereby LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
PAPER INDUSTRIES CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, EVARISTO M. NARVAEZ JR.,
RICARDO G. SANTIAGO, ROBERTO A. DORMENDO, REYDANDE D. AZUCENA, NICEFORO V.
AVILA, FLORENTINO M. MULA, FELIX O. BAITO, HAROLD B. CELESTIAL, ELMEDENCIO C.
CALIXTRO, CARLITO S. LEGACION, ALBINO T. LUBANG, JEREMIAS I. ABAD and HERMINIO
V. VILLAMIL, petitioners,
vs.
JUDGE MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge, Branch 104, Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City; STATE PROSECUTOR LEO B. DACERA III; and the SPECIAL OPERATIONS UNIT
OF THE PNP TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT COMMAND, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
To preserve and to uphold the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures, the
requisites for the issuance of search warrant must be followed strictly. Where the judge fails to
personally examine the applicant for a search warrant and the latter's witnesses, or where the
witnesses testify on matters not of their own personal knowledge, the search warrant must be struck
down.
The Case
Before us is a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition 1 praying for (1) the nullification of Search Warrant
No. 799 (95) and the Orders dated March 23, 1993 and August 3, 1995, issued by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 104, of Quezon City; 2 and (2) the issuance of temporary restraining order (TRO) or
an injunction against State Prosecutor Leo B. Dacera III, ordering him to desist proceeding with IS No. 95167.
In its October 23, 1995 Resolution, 3 this Court issued the TRO prayed for and required the respondents
to comment on the said Petition. On December 20, 1995, Respondent PNP Traffic Management
Command filed its 31-page Opposition 4 to the Petition, together with 90 pages of annexes. 5 On February
22, 1996, the Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment 6 agreeing with petitioners that the writs
prayed for must be granted. After petitioners filed a Reply to the Opposition, the Court gave due course to
the Petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.
In view of the contrary opinion of the Office of the Solicitor General, the Court, in its February 5, 1997
Resolution, 7 required State Prosecutor Leo B. Dacera to prepare the memorandum for the public
respondents. After issuing a show-cause order to Dacera on June 23, 1997, 8 the Court in its September
24, 1997 Resolution gave him a non-extendible period ending on October 31, 1997 within which to file the
required memorandum. In view of Dacera's manifestation that he was only a nominal party and that he
had yet to receive the records of the case from the PNP, the Court, in its December 8, 1999 Resolution,
ordered the Special Operations Unit (SOU) of the PNP Traffic Management Command to file its
memorandum within thirty days from notice; "otherwise, the petition will be deemed submitted for
decision." 9 Even after the expiration of the said period, the required pleading was not yet received by this
Court.
Hence, this Court considered Respondent SOU's refusal/failure to submit its memorandum as a
waiver of its privilege to do so.
The Facts
On January 25, 1995, Police Chief Inspector Napoleon B. Pascua applied for a search warrant
before the said RTC of Quezon City, staring: 10
1. That the management of Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines, located
at PICOP compound, Barangay Tabon, Bislig, Surigao del Sur, represented by its Sr.
Vice President Ricardo G[.] Santiago, is in possession or ha[s] in [its] control high
powered firearms, ammunitions, explosives, which are the subject of the offense, or

used or intended to be used in committing the offense, and which . . . are [being kept]
and conceal[ed] in the premises herein described.
2. That a Search Warrant should be issued to enable any agent of the law to take
possession and bring to this Honorable Court the following described properties:
Seventy (70) M16 Armalite rifles cal. 5.56, ten (10) M16 US rifles, two
(2) AK-47 rifle[s], two (2) UZI submachinegun[s], two (2) M203
Grenade Launcher[s] cal. 40mm, ten (10) cal.45 pistol[s], ten (10)
cal.38 revolver[s], two (2) ammunition reloading machine[s], assorted
ammunitions for said calibers of firearms and ten (10) handgrenades.
Attached to the application 11 were the joint Deposition of SPO3 Cicero S. Bacolod and SPO2 Cecilio T.
Morito, 12 as well as a summary of the information and the supplementary statements of Mario Enad and
Felipe Moreno.
After propounding several questions to Bacolod, Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion issued the contested
search warrant, 13 the pertinent portion of which reads:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after examining under oath, SPO3
Cicero S. Bacolod, that there is probable cause to believe that the management of
Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines, located at PICOP Compound,
Barangay Tabon, Bislig, Surigao del Sur, represented by its Sr. Vice President
Ricardo G. Santiago, has in its possession or control the following:
Seventy (70) M16 Armalite rifles cal 5.56
Ten (10) M14 US rifles
Two (2) AK-47 rifle(s)
Two (2) UZI submachinegun[s]
Two (2) M203 Grenade Launcher[s] cal. 40mm.
Ten (10) cal 45 pistol[s]
Ten (10) cal. 38 revolver[s]
Two (2) ammunition reloading machine[s]
Assorted ammunitions for said calibers of firearms
Ten (l0) handgrenades
in violation of the Provisions of PD 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, Ammunition
and Explosives), and the same should be seized and brought before this Court.

NOW, THEREFORE, you are hereby authorized to make an immediate search

daytime between 8:00 a.m. [and] 4:00 p.m. of the aforementioned premises and to
seize and bring the articles above-described and make an immediate return
there[of] 14
On February 4, 1995, the police enforced the search warrant at the PICOP compound and seized
the following: 15
MAKE/TYPE CALIBER SERIAL NUMBER BRAND
01 M16 Rifle 5.56 RP 175636 Elisco
02 M16 Rifle 5.56 RP 175636 (Tampered) Elisco
03 M16Rifle 5.56 RP 171702 Elisco
04 M16Rilfe 5.56 Defaced Elisco
05 M16Rifle 5.56 RP174253 (Tampered) Elisco
06 M16Rifle 5.56 RP173627 (Tampered) Elisco
07 M16Rifle 5.56 RP171337 Elisco
08 M16Rifle 5.56 RP171114 Elisco
09 M16Rifle 5.56 RP171114 (Tampered) Elisco
10 M16Rifle 5.56 RP171167 (Tampered) Elisco
11 M16Rifle 5.56 170881 (Tampered) Elisco
12 M16Rifle 5.56 RP170897 Elisco
13 M16Rifle 5.56 RP171509 Elisco
(With pending
case-Casaway Case)
14 M16Rifle 5.56 RP171754 Elisco
15 M16Rifle 5.56 RP170881 (Tampered) Elisco
16 M16Rifle 5.56 RP174637 Elisco
17 M16Rifle 5.56 RP171366 Elisco

18 M16Rifle 5.56 RP1714637 (Tampered) Elisco

19 M16Rifle 5.56 RP174610 Elisco
20 M16Rifle 5.56 RP171367 (Tampered) Elisco
01 M14 7.62 1499694 Elisco
02 M14 7.62 889163 Elisco
01 BAR Cal. 30 865975 Royal
01 Carbine M1 Cal. 30 384181 US Carbin
02 Carbine M1 Cal. 30 998201 US Carbin
01 Garand M1 Cal. 30 1194008 Springfield
02 Garand M1 Cal. 30 3123784 Springfield
01 Shotgun 12 Gauge H359704 Omega
02 Shotgun 12 Gauge 9211 Homemade
(Paltik)
MAGAZINE ASSEMBLY QTY.
01 M16 (long) 29 pcs.
02 M16 (short) 48 pcs.
03 Carbine M1 171 pcs.
04 BAR 19 pcs.
LIVE AMMUNITION QTY.
01 M16 2,023 rounds
03 Carbine M1 276 rounds
04 M-60 Cal. 7.62 1,800 rounds
05 M1 Garand 1,278 rounds
06 Rifle Grenade 11 rounds

07 Hand Grenade 4 pcs.

AMMO DAM POST NO. 24
MAKE/TYPE CALIBER SERIAL NUMBER BRAND
01 M16 5.56 171425 (Tampered) Gyno Corp.
02 Machine Pistol .22 651 (Tampered) Landmann
MAGAZINE ASSEMBLY QTY.
01 M1 (short) 3 pcs.
02 M16 (long) 1 pc.
03 M14 8 pcs.
04 Clip M1 Garand 3 pcs.
05 Mag Assy Cal .22 1 pc.
LIVE AMMUNITION QTY.
01 M16 73 rounds
02 M14 160 rounds
03 M1 Garand Cal .30 30 rounds
04 Rifle Grenade 1 round
MANAGEMENT INTEL/INVEST UNIT
MAKE/TYPE CALIBER SERIAL NUMBER BRAND
01 M16Rifle 5.56 RP 171725 Elisco
02 M16Rifle 5.56 RP 170799 (Tampered) Elisco
03 M16 5.56 RP 132320 Elisco
04 Machine 9 MM 54887 Intratec
Pistol
05 Three (3) 12 Gauge Surit-Surit (H)

Shotguns
MAGAZINE ASSEMBLY QTY.
01 M16 (long) 3 pcs.
02 M16 (short) 4 pcs.
03 Intratec 1 pc.
04 US Carbine (defective) 2 pcs.
LIVE AMMUNITION QTY.
01 M16 147 rds.
02 Cal .30 5 rounds
03 12 gauge Shotgun 7 rounds
04 Carbine 5 rounds
05 Rifle grenade (AVA-0051-84/0056-84) 2 rounds
06 9 MM 30 rounds
NEW ARMORY POST NO. 16
MAKE/TYPE CALIBER SERIAL NUMBER BRAND
01 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359910 Armscor
02 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359716 Armscor
03 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359706 Armscor
04 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359707 Armscor
05 Shotgun 12 Gauge 1036847 Armscor
06 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359702 Armscor
07 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359732 Armscor
08 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359728 Armscor
09 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359708 Armscor

10 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359711 Armscor

11 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359723 Armscor
12 Shotgun 12 Gauge A359713 Armscor
13 Shotgun 12 Gauge 1031271 Armscor
14 Shotgun 12 Gauge A262338 SB
15 Shotgun 12 Gauge A261619 SB
16 Shotgun 12 Gauge Defaced Not
Indicated
LIVE AMMUNITION QTY.
01 12 GAUGE shotgun 306 rds.
02 M16 2,349 rds.
MAGAZINE ASSEMBLY QTY.
01 Carbine (defective) 76 pcs.
02 Cal. 22 -do- 16 pcs
03 M16 (long-defective) 2 pcs.
04 M16 (short-defective) 2 pcs.
05 Thompson (defective) 8 pcs.
06 Shotgun 12 Gauge (defective) 17 pcs.
07 BAR (defective) 2 pcs.
Believing that the warrant was invalid and the search unreasonable, the petitioners filed a "Motion to
Quash" 16 before the trial court. Subsequently, they also filed a "Supplemental Pleading to the Motion to
Quash" and a "Motion to Suppress Evidence." 17
On March 23, 1995, the RTC issued the first contested Order which denied petitioners'
motions. 18 On August 3, 1995, the trial court rendered its second contested Order 19 denying petitioners'
Motion for Reconsideration. 20
Hence, this recourse to this Court on pure questions of law.

Issues
In their Memorandum, petitioners submit the following grounds in support of their cause:

21

I
Petitioners respectfully submit that Judge Asuncion has committed grave abuse of
discretion or has exceeded his jurisdiction in refusing to quash Search Warrant No.
799(95). Probable cause [has] not . . . been sufficiently established and partaking as
it does of the nature of a general warrant.
II
Petitioners respectfully submit that Judge Asuncion has committed grave abuse of
discretion or has exceeded his jurisdiction in refusing to quash Search Warrant No.
799(95) on the ground that it was unlawfully served or implemented.
III
Petitioners respectfully submit that State Prosecutor Dacera is acting with grave
abuse of discretion his jurisdiction in continuing with the proceedings in IS No. 95167 on the basis of illegally seized evidence.
In the main, petitioners question the validity of the search warrant. As a preliminary matter, we shall
also discuss respondents' argument that the Petition should be dismissed for raising factual
questions.
This Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Preliminary Issue:
Alleged Factual Questions
In their Opposition, respondents argue that the Petition should be dismissed for raising questions of
fact, which are not proper in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. They maintain that the Petition
merely assails the "factual basis for the issuance of the warrant and regularity of its
implementation. 22
This argument is not convicting. It is settled that "there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as
to the truth or the falsity of alleged facts." 23 In the present case, petitioner do not question the truth of
the facts as found by the judge; rather, they are assailing the way in which those findings were arrived at,
a procedure which they contend was violative of the which those Constitution and the Rules of Court. We
agree that the Petition raises only question of law, which may be resolved in the present case.
Main Issue:

Validity of the Search Warrant

The fundamental right against unreasonable and searches and seizures and the basic conditions for
the issuance of a search warrant are laid down in Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, which
reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized. (Emphasis supplied)
Consistent with the foregoing constitutional provision, Section 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court, 24 detail the requisites for the issuance of a valid search warrant as follows:
Sec. 3. Requisite for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue but
upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the things to be seized.
Sec. 4. Examination of complainant; record. The judge must, before issuing the
warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in
writing and under oath the complainant and any witnesses he may produce on facts
personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements together
with any affidavits submitted.
More simply stated, the requisites of a valid search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2)
such presence is determined personally by the judge; (3) the complainant and the witnesses he or
she may produce are personally examined by the judge, in writing and under oath or affirmation; (4)
the applicant and the witnesses testify on facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant
specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized. 25
In the present case, the search warrant is invalid because (1) the trail court failed to examine
personally the complainant and the other deponents; (2) SPO3 Cicero Bacolod, who appeared
during the hearing for the issuance or the search warrant, had no personal knowledge that
petitioners were not licensed to possess the subject firearms; and (3) the place to be searched was
not described with particularity.
No Personal Examination
of the Witnesses
In his Order dated March 23, 1995, the trial judge insisted that the search warrant was valid, stating
that "before issuing the subject warrant, the court propounded searching questions to the applicant
and the witnesses in order to determined whether there was probable cause . . .." 26 (Emphasis
supplied.) This was supported by the Opposition to the Motion to Quash, which argued that "it is

erroneous for PICOP to allege that the Honorable Court did not propound searching questions upon
applicant P/Chief Inspector Napoleon Pascua and the witnesses he produced." 27 The records, however,
proclaim otherwise.

As earlier stated, Chief Inspector Pascua's application for a search warrant was supported by (1) the
joint Deposition of SPO3 Cicero S. Bacolod and SPO2 Cecilio T. Moriro, (2) a summary of
information and (3) supplementary statements of Mario Enad and Felipe Moreno. Except for Pascua
and Bacolod however, none of the aforementioned witnesses and policemen appeared before the
trial court. Moreover, the applicant's participation in the hearing for the issuance of the search
warrant consisted only of introducing Witness Bacolod: 28
COURT:
Where is the witness for this application for search warrant?
P/Chief Insp. NAPOLEON PASCUA:
SPO3 CICERO S. BACOLOD, Your Honor.
COURT:
Swear the witness.
STENOGRAPHER: (To the witness)
Please raise your right hand, sir. Do you swear to tell the truth, the
whole truth and nothing but the truth before this Court?
WITNESS:
Yes Ma'am.
STENOGRAPHER:
Please state your name, age, civil status, occupation, address and
other personal circumstances.
WITNESS:
SPO3 Cicero S. Bacolod, 42 years old, married, policeman, c/o Camp
Crame, Quezon City, SOU, TMC.
xxx xxx xxx
Chief Inspector Pascua was asked nothing else, and he said nothing more. In fact, he failed even to
affirm his application. Contrary to his statement, the trial judge failed to propound questions, let
alone probing questions, to the applicant and to his witnesses other than Bacolod (whose testimony,

as will later be shown, is also improper). Obviously, His Honor relied mainly on their affidavits. This
Court has frowned on this practice in this language:
Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The
examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the
witnesses he may procedure and attach them to the record. Such written deposition
is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the existence
or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if
it will be found later that his declarations are false.
xxx xxx xxx
It is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and exhaustive, not merely
routinary or pro-forma, if the claimed probable cause is to be established. The
examining magistrate must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but must
make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of the application. 29
Bacolod's Testimony Pertained Not to
Facts Personally Known to Him
Bacolod appeared during the hearing and was extensively examined by the judge. But his testimony
showed that he did not have personal knowledge that the petitioners, in violation of PD 1866, were
not licensed to possess firearms, ammunitions or explosives. In his Deposition, he stated:
Q How do you know that said the properties were subject of the
offense?
A Sir, as a result of our intensified surveillance and case build up for
several days, we gathered informations from reliable sources that
subject properties [which] are in their possession and control [are] the
herein described properties subject of the offense. (Summary of
Information dtd Oct. '94. SS's of Mario Enad and Felipe Moreno both
dtd 30 Nov '94 are hereto attached). 30
When questioned by the judge, Bacolod stated merely that he believed that the PICOP security
guards had no license to possess the subject firearms. This, however, does not meet the
requirement that a witness must testify on his personal knowledge, not belief. He declared:
Q This is an application for Search Warrant against Paper Industries
Corporation located at PICOP Compound Barangay Tabon, Bislig,
Surigao del Sur. How come that you have knowledge that there are
illegal firearms in that place?
A At Camp Crame, Quezon City, I was dispatched by our Commander
to investigate the alleged assassination plot of Congressman
Amante.

Q In the course of your investigation, what happened?

A We found out that some of the suspects in the alleged
assassination plot are employees of PICOP.
Q Know[ing] that the suspects are employees of PICOP, what did you
do?
A We conducted the surveillance in that area inside the compound of
PICOP in Tabon.
Q What did you find . . .?
A I found . . . several high-powered firearms.
Q How were you able to investigate the compound of PICOP?
A I exerted effort to enter the said compound.
Q By what means?
A By pretending to have some official business with the company.
Q So, in that aspect, you were able to investigate the compound of
PICOP?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did you f[i]nd . . .?
A I found . . . several high-powered firearms being kept in the
compound of PICOP.
Q Where are those located?
A Sir, there are firearms kept inside the ammo dam.
Q Inside the compound?
A Located inside the compound.
Q Then what?
A Others, sir, were kept in the security headquarters or office.
Q You mean to say that this Paper Industries Corporation has its own
security guards?

A Yes, they call it Blue Guards.

Q You mean to say that their own security guards guarded the
PICOP?
A Yes, sir.
Q So, it is possible that the firearms used by the security guards are
illegally obtained?
A I believe they have no license to possess high-powered firearms.
As far as the verification at FEU, Camp Crame, [is concerned,] they
have no license. (Emphasis supplied.)
Q Have you investigated the Blue Guards Security Agency?
A I conducted the inquiry.
Q What did you find out?
A They are using firearms owned by PICOP.
Q Using firearms owned by PICOP?
A Yes, sir.
Q You mean to say that this Blue Guard Security Agency has no
firearms of their own?
A No high-powered firearms.
Q By the way, Mr. Witness, what kind of firearms have you seen
inside the compound of PICOP?
A There are M-16 armalite rifles.
Q What else?
A AK-47, armalites, M-203 Grenade Launcher, M-14 US rifles, .38
caliber revolvers, .45 caliber pistols, several handgrenades and
ammos. 31 (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, Bacolod failed to affirm that none of the firearms seen inside the PICOP compound was
licensed. Bacolod merely declared that the security agency and its guard were not licensed. He also
said that some of the firearms were owned by PICOP. Yet, he made no statement before the trail
court PICOP, aside from the security agency, had no license to possess those firearms. Worse, the
applicant and his witnesses inexplicably failed to attach to the application a copy aforementioned "no
license" certification from the Firearms and Explosives Office (FEO) of the PNP or to present it

during the hearing. Such certification could have been easily obtained, considering that the FEO was
located in Camp Crame where the unit of Bacolod was also based. In People v. Judge Estrada, 32 the
Court held:
The facts and circumstances that would show probable cause must be the best
evidence that could be obtained under the circumstances. The introduction of such
evidence is necessary in cases where the issue is the existence of the negative
ingredient of the offense charged for instance, the absence of a license required
by law, as in the present case and such evidence is within the knowledge and
control of the applicant who could easily produce the same. But if the best evidence
could not be secured at the time of the application, the applicant must show a
justifiable reason therefor during the examination by the judge.
Particularity of the
Place to Be Searched
In view of the manifest objective of the against unreasonable search, the Constitution to be searched
only to those described in the warrant. 33 Thus, this Court has held that "this constitutional right [i]s the
embodiment of a spiritual concept: the belief that to value the privacy of home and person and to afford it
constitutional protection against the long reach of government is no less than to value human dignity, and
that his privacy must not be disturbed except in case of overriding social need, and then only under
stringent procedural
safeguards." 34 Additionally, the requisite of particularity is related to the probable cause requirement in
that, at least under some circumstances, the lack of a more specific description will make it apparent that
there has not been a sufficient showing to the magistrate that the described items are to be found in
particular place. 35
In the present case, the assailed search warrant failed to described the place with particularly. It
simply authorizes a search of "the aforementioned premises," but it did not specify such premises.
The warrant identifies only one place, and that is the "Paper Industries Corporation of the
Philippines, located at PICOP Compound, Barangay Tabon, Bislig[,] Surigao del Sur." The PICOP
compound, however, is made up of "200 offices/building, 15 plants, 84 staff houses, 1 airstrip, 3
piers/wharves, 23 warehouses, 6 POL depots/quick service outlets and some 800 miscellaneous
structures, all of which are spread out over some one hundred fifty-five hectares." 36Obviously, the
warrant gives the police officers unbridled and thus illegal authority to search all the structures found
inside the PICOP compound.37
In their Opposition, the police state that they complied with the constitutional requirement, because
they submitted sketches of the premises to be searched when they applied for the warrant. They add
that not one of the PICOP Compound housing units was searched, because they were not among
those identified during the hearing. 38
These arguments are not convincing. The sketches allegedly submitted by the police were not made
integral parts of the search warrant issued by Judge Asucion. Moreover, the fact that the raiding
police team knew which of the buildings or structures in the PICOP Compound housed firearms and
ammunitions did not justify the lack of particulars of the place to be searched. 39 Otherwise, confusion
would arise regarding the subject of the warrant the place indicated in the warrant or the place

identified by the police. Such conflict invites uncalled for mischief or abuse of discretion on the part of law
enforces.

Thus, in People v. Court of Appeals, 40 this Court ruled that the police had no authority to search the
apartment behind the store, which was the place indicated in the warrant, even if they intended it to be the
subject of their application. Indeed, the place to be searched cannot be changed, enlarged or amplified by
the police, viz.:
. . . In the instant case, there is no ambiguity at all in the warrant. The ambiguity lies
outside the instrument, arising from the absence of a meeting of the minds as to the
place to be searched between the applicants for the warrant and the Judge issuing
the same; and what was done was to substitute for the place that the Judge had
written down in the warrant, the premises that the executing officers had in their
mind. This should not have been done. It [was] neither fair nor licit to allow police
officers to search a place different from that stated in the warrant on the claim that
the place actually searched although not that specified in the warrant [was]
exactly what they had in view when they applied for the warrant and had demarcated
in the supporting evidence. What is material in determining the validity of a search is
the place stated in the warrant itself, not what the applicants had in their thoughts, or
had represented in the proofs they submitted to the court issuing the warrant. Indeed,
following the officers' theory, in the context of the facts of this case, all four (4)
apartment units at the rear of Abigail's Variety Store would have been fair game for a
search.
The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or modified
by the officers' own personal knowledge of the premises, or the evidence they
adduced in support of their application for the warrant. Such a change is proscribed
by the Constitution which requires inter alia the search warrant to particularly
describe the place to be searched as well as the persons or things to be seized. It
would concede to police officers the power of choosing the place to be searched,
even if it not be that delineated in the warrant. It would open wide the door to abuse
of the search process, and grant to officers executing a search warrant that
discretion which the Constitution has precisely removed from them. The
particularization of the description of the place to be searched may properly be done
only by the Judge, and only in the warrant itself; it cannot be left to the discretion of
the police officers conducting the search. (Emphasis supplied.)
Seized Firearms and Explosives
Inadmissible in Evidence
As a result of the seizure of the firearms, effected pursuant to Search Warrant No. 799 (95) issued
by the respondent judge, the PNP filed with the Department of Justice a complaint docketed as IS
No. 95-167 against herein petitioners for illegal possession of firearms. State Prosecutor Dacera, to
whom the Complaint was assigned for preliminary investigation, issued a subpoena requiring
petitioners to file their counter-affidavits.
Instead of complying with the subpoena, petitioners asked for the suspension of the preliminary
investigation, pending the resolution of their motion to quash the search warrant. They argued, as

they do now, that the illegal obtained firearms could not be the basis of the criminal Complaint. Their
motion was denied. A subsequent Motion for Reconsideration met the same fate. In the present
Petition forCertiorari and Prohibition, petitioners assert that "State Prosecutor Dacera cannot have
any tenable basis for continuing with the proceedings in IS No. 95-167." 41
Because the search warrant was procured in violation of the Constitution and the Rules of Court, all
the firearms, explosives and other materials seized were "inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding." 42 As the Court noted in an earlier case, the exclusion of unlawfully seized evidence was
"the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and
seizures." 43 Verily, they are the "fruits of the poisonous tree." Without this exclusionary rule, the
constitutional right "would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the
freedom from all brutish means evidence means of coercing evidence . . .." 44
In the present case, the complaint for illegal possession of firearms is based on the firearms and
other materials seized pursuant to Search Warrant No. 799 (95). Since these illegally obtained
pieces of evidence are inadmissible, the Complainant and the proceedings before State Prosecutor
Dacera have no more leg to stand on.
This Court sympathizes with the police effort to stamp out criminality and to maintain peace and
order in the country; however, it reminds the law enforcement authorities that they must do so only
upon strict observance of the constitutional and statutory rights of our people.
Indeed, "there is a right way to do the right thing at the right time for the right reason."

45

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby GRANTED and Search
Warrant No. 799 (95) accordingly declared NULL and VOID. The temporary restraining order issued
by this Court on October 23, 1995 is hereby MADE PERMANENT. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
WILLIAM C. YAO, SR., LUISA C. YAO, RICHARD C. YAO, WILLIAM C. YAO JR., and ROGER C.
YAO,petitioners,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETRON CORPORATION and PILIPINAS SHELL
PETROLEUM CORP., and its Principal, SHELL INTL PETROLEUM CO. LTD., respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioners William C.
Yao, Sr., Luisa C. Yao, Richard C. Yao, William C. Yao, Jr., and Roger C. Yao pray for the reversal of
the Decision dated 30 September 2004,2 and Resolution dated 1 June 2005, of the Court of Appeals
in CA G.R. SP No. 79256,3 affirming the two Orders, both dated 5 June 2003, of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 17, Cavite City, relative to Search Warrants No. 2-2003 and No. 3-2003. 4 In the
said Orders, the RTC denied the petitioners Motion to Quash Search Warrant 5 and Motion for the
Return of the Motor Compressor and Liquified Petroleum Gas (LPG) Refilling Machine. 6
The following are the facts:

Petitioners are incorporators and officers of MASAGANA GAS CORPORATION (MASAGANA), an

entity engaged in the refilling, sale and distribution of LPG products. Private respondents Petron
Corporation (Petron) and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Pilipinas Shell) are two of the
largest bulk suppliers and producers of LPG in the Philippines. Their LPG products are sold under
the marks "GASUL" and "SHELLANE," respectively. Petron is the registered owner in the Philippines
of the trademarks GASUL and GASUL cylinders used for its LPG products. It is the sole entity in the
Philippines authorized to allow refillers and distributors to refill, use, sell, and distribute GASUL LPG
containers, products and its trademarks. Pilipinas Shell, on the other hand, is the authorized user in
the Philippines of the tradename, trademarks, symbols, or designs of its principal, Shell International
Petroleum Company Limited (Shell International), including the marks SHELLANE and SHELL
device in connection with the production, sale and distribution of SHELLANE LPGs. It is the only
corporation in the Philippines authorized to allow refillers and distributors to refill, use, sell and
distribute SHELLANE LPG containers and products.7
On 3 April 2003, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) agent Ritche N. Oblanca (Oblanca) filed two
applications for search warrant with the RTC, Branch 17, Cavite City, against petitioners and other
occupants of the MASAGANA compound located at Governors Drive, Barangay Lapidario, Trece
Martires, Cavite City, for alleged violation of Section 155, in relation to Section 170 of Republic Act
No. 8293, otherwise known as "The Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines." 8 The two
applications for search warrant uniformly alleged that per information, belief, and personal
verification of Oblanca, the petitioners are actually producing, selling, offering for sale and/or
distributing LPG products using steel cylinders owned by, and bearing the tradenames, trademarks,
and devices of Petron and Pilipinas Shell, without authority and in violation of the rights of the said
entities.
In his two separate affidavits9 attached to the two applications for search warrant, Oblanca alleged:
1. [That] on 11 February 2003, the National Bureau of Investigation ("NBI") received a lettercomplaint from Atty. Bienvenido I. Somera Jr. of Villaraza and Angangco, on behalf of among others,
[Petron Corporation (PETRON)] and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (PSPC), the authorized
representative of Shell International Petroleum Company Limited ("Shell International"), requesting
assistance in the investigation and, if warranted, apprehension and prosecution of certain persons
and/or establishments suspected of violating the intellectual property rights [of PETRON] and of
PSPC and Shell International.
2. [That] on the basis of the letter-complaint, I, together with Agent Angelo Zarzoso, was assigned as
the NBI agent on the case.
3. [That] prior to conducting the investigation on the reported illegal activities, he reviewed the
certificates of trademark registrations issued in favor of [PETRON], PSPC and Shell International as
well as other documents and other evidence obtained by the investigative agency authorized by
[PETRON], PSPC and Shell International to investigate and cause the investigation of persons and
establishments violating the rights of [PETRON], PSPC and Shell International, represented by Mr.
Bernabe C. Alajar. Certified copies of the foregoing trademark registrations are attached hereto as
Annexes "A" to ":E".
4. [That] among the establishments alleged to be unlawfully refilling and unlawfully selling and
distributing [Gasul LPG and] Shellane products is Masagana Gas Corporation ("MASAGANA").
Based on Securities and Exchange Commission Records, MASAGANA has its principal office

address at 9775 Kamagong Street, San Antonio Village, Makati, Metro Manila. The incorporators
and directors of MASAGANA are William C. Yao, Sr., Luisa C. Yao, Richard C. Yao, William C. Yao,
Jr., and Roger C. Yao. x x x.
5. I confirmed that MASAGANA is not authorized to use [PETRON and] Shellane LPG cylinders and
its trademarks and tradenames or to be refillers or distributors of [PETRON and] Shellane LPGs.
6. I went to MASAGANAs refilling station located at Governors Drive, Barangay Lapidario, Trece
Martires City (sic), Cavite to investigate its activities. I confirmed that MASAGANA is indeed engaged
in the unauthorized refilling, sale and/or distribution of [Gasul and] Shellane LPG cylinders. I found
out that MASAGANA delivery trucks with Plate Nos. UMN-971, PEZ-612, WTE-527, XAM-970 and
WFC-603 coming in and out of the refilling plant located at the aforementioned address contained
multi-brand LPG cylinders including [Gasul and] Shellane. x x x.
7. [That] on 13 February 2003, I conducted a test-buy accompanied by Mr. Bernabe C. Alajar. After
asking the purpose of our visit, MASAGANAs guard allowed us to enter the MASAGANA refilling
plant to purchase GASUL and SHELLANE LPGs. x x x. We were issued an order slip which we
presented to the cashiers office located near the refilling station. After paying the amount x x x
covering the cost of the cylinders and their contents, they were issued Cash Invoice No. 56210
dated February 13, 2003. We were, thereafter, assisted by the plant attendant in choosing empty
GASUL and SHELLANE 11 kg. cylinders, x x x were brought to the refilling station [and filled in their
presence.] I noticed that no valve seals were placed on the cylinders.
[That] while inside the refilling plant doing the test-buy, I noticed that stockpiles of multi-branded
cylinders including GASUL and SHELLANE cylinders were stored near the refilling station. I also
noticed that the total land area of the refilling plant is about 7,000 to 10,000 square meters. At the
corner right side of the compound immediately upon entering the gate is a covered area where the
maintenance of the cylinders is taking place. Located at the back right corner of the compound are
two storage tanks while at the left side also at the corner portion is another storage tank. Several
meters and fronting the said storage tank is where the refilling station and the office are located. It is
also in this storage tank where the elevated blue water tank depicting MASAGANA CORP. is located.
About eleven (11) refilling pumps and stock piles of multi-branded cylinders including Shellane and
GASUL are stored in the refilling station. At the left side of the entrance gate is the guard house with
small door for the pedestrians and at the right is a blue steel gate used for incoming and outgoing
vehicles.
8. [That] on 27 February 2003, I conducted another test-buy accompanied by Mr. Bernabe C. Alajar.
x x x After choosing the cylinders, we were issued an order slip which we presented to the cashier.
Upon payment, Cash Invoice No. 56398 was issued covering the cost of both GASUL and
SHELLANE LPG cylinders and their contents. x x x Both cylinders were refilled in our presence and
no valve seals were placed on the cylinders.
Copies of the photographs of the delivery trucks, LPG cylinders and registration papers were also
attached to the aforementioned affidavits.10
Bernabe C. Alajar (Alajar), owner of Able Research and Consulting Services Inc., was hired by
Petron and Pilipinas Shell to assist them in carrying out their Brand Protection Program. Alajar
accompanied Oblanca during the surveillance of and test-buys at the refilling plant of MASAGANA.

He also executed two separate affidavits corroborating the statements of Oblanca. These were
annexed to the two applications for search warrant.11
After conducting the preliminary examination on Oblanca and Alajar, and upon reviewing their sworn
affidavits and other attached documents, Judge Melchor Q.C. Sadang (Judge Sadang), Presiding
Judge of the RTC, Branch 17, Cavite City, found probable cause and correspondingly issued Search
Warrants No. 2-2003 and No. 3-2003.12 The search warrants commanded any peace officer to make
an immediate search of the MASAGANA compound and to seize the following items:
Under Search Warrant No. 2-2003:
a. Empty/filled LPG cylinder tanks/containers, bearing the tradename "SHELLANE", "SHELL"
(Device) of Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation and the trademarks and other devices owned by
Shell International Petroleum Company, Ltd.;
b. Machinery and/or equipment being used or intended to be used for the purpose of illegally refilling
LPG cylinders belonging to Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation bearing the latters tradename as
well as the marks belonging to Shell International Petroleum Company, Ltd., enumerated hereunder:
1. Bulk/Bullet LPG storage tanks;
2. Compressor/s (for pneumatic refilling system);
3. LPG hydraulic pump/s;
4. LPG refilling heads/hoses and appurtenances or LPG filling assembly;
5. LPG pipeline gate valve or ball valve and handles and levers;
6. LPG weighing scales; and
7. Seals simulating the shell trademark.
c. Sales invoices, ledgers, journals, official receipts, purchase orders, and all other books of
accounts, inventories and documents pertaining to the production, sale and/or distribution of the
aforesaid goods/products.
d. Delivery truck bearing Plate Nos. WTE-527, XAM-970 and WFC-603, hauling trucks, and/or other
delivery trucks or vehicles or conveyances being used or intended to be used for the purpose of
selling and/or distributing the above-mentioned counterfeit products.
Under Search Warrant No. 3-2003:
a. Empty/filled LPG cylinder tanks/containers, bearing Petron Corporations (Petron) tradename and
its tradename "GASUL" and other devices owned and/or used exclusively by Petron;
b. Machinery and/or equipment being used or intended to be used for the purpose of illegally refilling
LPG cylinders belonging to Petron enumerated hereunder;

1. Bulk/Bullet LPG storage tanks;

2. Compressor/s (for pneumatic filling system);
3. LPG hydraulic pump/s;
4. LPG filling heads/hoses and appurtenances or LPG filling assembly;
5. LPG pipeline gate valve or ball valve and handles levers;
6. LPG weighing scales; and
7. Seals bearing the Petron mark;
c. Sales invoices, ledgers, journals, official receipts, purchase orders, and all other books of
accounts, inventories and documents pertaining to the production, sale and/or distribution of the
aforesaid goods/products; and
d. Delivery trucks bearing Plate Nos. UMN-971, PEZ-612 and WFC-603, hauling trucks, and/or other
delivery trucks or vehicles or conveyances being used for the purpose of selling and/or distributing
the above-mentioned counterfeit products.
Upon the issuance of the said search warrants, Oblanca and several NBI operatives immediately
proceeded to the MASAGANA compound and served the search warrants on petitioners. 13 After
searching the premises of MASAGANA, the following articles described in Search Warrant No. 22003 were seized:
a. Thirty-eight (38) filled 11 kg. LPG cylinders, bearing the tradename of Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation and the trademarks and other devices owned by Shell International Petroleum
Company, Ltd.;
b. Thirty-nine (39) empty 11 kg. LPG cylinders, bearing the tradename of Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation and the trademarks and other devices owned by Shell International Petroleum
Company, Ltd.;
c. Eight (8) filled 50 kg. LPG cylinders, bearing the tradename of Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation and the trademarks and other devices owned by Shell International Petroleum
Company, Ltd.;
d. Three (3) empty 50 kg. LPG cylinders, bearing the tradename of Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation and the trademarks and other devices owned by Shell International Petroleum
Company, Ltd.;
e. One (1) set of motor compressor for filling system.
Pursuant to Search Warrant No. 3-2003, the following articles were also seized:

a. Six (6) filled 11 kg. LPG cylinders without seal, bearing Petrons tradename and its trademark
"GASUL" and other devices owned and/or used exclusively by Petron;
b. Sixty-three (63) empty 11 kg. LPG cylinders, bearing Petrons tradename and its trademark
"GASUL" and other devices owned and/or used exclusively by Petron;
c. Seven (7) tampered 11 kg. LPG cylinders, bearing Petrons tradename and its trademark
"GASUL" and other devices owned and/or used exclusively by Petron;
d. Five (5) tampered 50 kg. LPG cylinders, bearing Petrons tradename and its trademark "GASUL"
and other devices owned and/or used exclusively by Petron with tampered "GASUL" logo;
e. One (1) set of motor compressor for filling system; and
f. One (1) set of LPG refilling machine.
On 22 April 2003, petitioners filed with the RTC a Motion to Quash Search Warrants No. 2-2003 and
No. 3-200314on the following grounds:
1. There is no probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant and the conditions for the
issuance of a search warrant were not complied with;
2. Applicant NBI Agent Ritchie N. Oblanca and his witness Bernabe C. Alajar do not have any
authority to apply for a search warrant. Furthermore, they committed perjury when they alleged in
their sworn statements that they conducted a test-buy on two occasions;
3. The place to be searched was not specified in the Search Warrant as the place has an area of
10,000 square meters (one hectare) more or less, for which reason the place to be searched must
be indicated with particularity;
4. The search warrant is characterized as a general warrant as the items to be seized as mentioned
in the search warrant are being used in the conduct of the lawful business of respondents and the
same are not being used in refilling Shellane and Gasul LPGs.
On 30 April 2003, MASAGANA, as third party claimant, filed with the RTC a Motion for the Return of
Motor Compressor and LPG Refilling Machine.15 It claimed that it is the owner of the said motor
compressor and LPG refilling machine; that these items were used in the operation of its legitimate
business; and that their seizure will jeopardize its business interests.
On 5 June 2003, the RTC issued two Orders, one of which denied the petitioners Motion to Quash
Search Warrants No. 2-2003 and No. 3-2003, and the other one also denied the Motion for the
Return of Motor Compressor and LPG Refilling Machine of MASAGANA, for lack of merit. 16
With respect to the Order denying the petitioners motion to quash Search Warrants No. 2-2003 and
No. 3-2003, the RTC held that based on the testimonies of Oblanca and Alajar, as well as the
documentary evidence consisting of receipts, photographs, intellectual property and corporate
registration papers, there is probable cause to believe that petitioners are engaged in the business
of refilling or using cylinders which bear the trademarks or devices of Petron and Pilipinas Shell in

the place sought to be searched and that such activity is probably in violation of Section 155 in
relation to Section 170 of Republic Act No. 8293.
It also ruled that Oblanca and Alajar had personal knowledge of the acts complained of since they
were the ones who monitored the activities of and conducted test-buys on MASAGANA; that the
search warrants in question are not general warrants because the compound searched are solely
used and occupied by MASAGANA, and as such, there was no need to particularize the areas within
the compound that would be searched; and that the items to be seized in the subject search
warrants were sufficiently described with particularity as the same was limited to cylinder tanks
bearing the trademarks GASUL and SHELLANE.
As regards the Order denying the motion of MASAGANA for the return of its motor compressor and
LPG refilling machine, the RTC resolved that MASAGANA cannot be considered a third party
claimant whose rights were violated as a result of the seizure since the evidence disclosed that
petitioners are stockholders of MASAGANA and that they conduct their business through the same
juridical entity. It maintained that to rule otherwise would result in the misapplication and debasement
of the veil of corporate fiction. It also stated that the veil of corporate fiction cannot be used as a
refuge from liability.
Further, the RTC ratiocinated that ownership by another person or entity of the seized items is not a
ground to order its return; that in seizures pursuant to a search warrant, what is important is that the
seized items were used or intended to be used as means of committing the offense complained of;
that by its very nature, the properties sought to be returned in the instant case appear to be related
to and intended for the illegal activity for which the search warrants were applied for; and that the
items seized are instruments of an offense.
Petitioners filed Motions for Reconsideration of the assailed Orders, 17 but these were denied by the
RTC in its Order dated 21 July 2003 for lack of compelling reasons.18
Subsequently, petitioners appealed the two Orders of the RTC to the Court of Appeals via a special
civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. 19 On 30 September 2004, the Court of
Appeals promulgated its Decision affirming the Orders of the RTC.20 It adopted in essence the bases
and reasons of the RTC in its two Orders. The decretal portion thereof reads:
Based on the foregoing, this Court finds no reason to disturb the assailed Orders of the respondent
judge. Grave abuse of discretion has not been proven to exist in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed orders both dated
June 5, 2003 are hereby AFFIRMED.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration21 of the Decision of the Court of Appeals, but this was
denied in its Resolution dated 1 June 2005 for lack of merit. 22
Petitioners filed the instant petition on the following grounds:
I.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF
RTC CAVITE CITY HAD SUFFICIENT BASIS IN DECLARING THE EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE
CAUSE;
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT NBI AGENT (RITCHIE
OBLANCA) CAN APPLY FOR THE SEARCH WARRANTS NOTHWITHSTANDING HIS LACK OF
AUTHORITY;
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE REQUIREMENT OF
GIVING A PARTICULAR DESCRIPTION OF THE PLACE TO BE SEARCHED WAS COMPLIED
WITH;
IV.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE APPLICATIONS AND
THE SEARCH WARRANTS THEMSELVES SHOW NO AMBIGUITY OF THE ITEMS TO BE
SEIZED;
V.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE COMPLAINT IS
DIRECTED AGAINST MASAGANA GAS CORPORATION, ACTING THROUGH ITS OFFICERS
AND DIRECTORS, HENCE MASAGANA GAS CORPORATION MAY NOT BE CONSIDERED AS
THIRD PARTY CLAIMANT WHOSE RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED AS A RESULT OF THE SEIZURE.23
Apropos the first issue, petitioners allege that Oblanca and Alajar had no personal knowledge of the
matters on which they testified; that Oblanca and Alajar lied to Judge Sadang when they stated
under oath that they were the ones who conducted the test-buys on two different occasions; that the
truth of the matter is that Oblanca and Alajar never made the purchases personally; that the
transactions were undertaken by other persons namely, Nikko Javier and G. Villanueva as shown in
the Entry/Exit Slips of MASAGANA; and that even if it were true that Oblanca and Alajar asked Nikko
Javier and G. Villanueva to conduct the test-buys, the information relayed by the latter two to the
former was mere hearsay.24
Petitioners also contend that if Oblanca and Alajar had indeed used different names in purchasing
the LPG cylinders, they should have mentioned it in their applications for search warrants and in
their testimonies during the preliminary examination; that it was only after the petitioners had
submitted to the RTC the entry/exit slips showing different personalities who made the purchases
that Oblanca and Alajar explained that they had to use different names in order to avoid detection;
that Alajar is not connected with either of the private respondents; that Alajar was not in a position to
inform the RTC as to the distinguishing trademarks of SHELLANE and GASUL; that Oblanca was
not also competent to testify on the marks allegedly infringed by petitioners; that Judge Sadang
failed to ask probing questions on the distinguishing marks of SHELLANE and GASUL; that the
findings of the Brand Protection Committee of Pilipinas Shell were not submitted nor presented to
the RTC; that although Judge Sadang examined Oblanca and Alajar, the former did not ask

exhaustive questions; and that the questions Judge Sadang asked were merely rehash of the
contents of the affidavits of Oblanca and Alajar.25
These contentions are devoid of merit.
Article III, Section 2, of the present Constitution states the requirements before a search warrant
may be validly issued, to wit:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized. (emphasis supplied).
Section 4 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, provides with more particularity
the requisites in issuing a search warrant, viz:
SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue except upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be
anywhere in the Philippines.
According to the foregoing provisions, a search warrant can be issued only upon a finding of
probable cause. Probable cause for search warrant means such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed
and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place to be searched. 26
The facts and circumstances being referred thereto pertain to facts, data or information personally
known to the applicant and the witnesses he may present. 27 The applicant or his witnesses must
have personal knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense being
complained of. "Reliable information" is insufficient. Mere affidavits are not enough, and the judge
must depose in writing the complainant and his witnesses.28
Section 155 of Republic Act No. 8293 identifies the acts constituting trademark infringement, thus:
SEC. 155. Remedies; Infringement. Any person who shall, without the consent of the owner of the
registered mark:
155.1. Use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered
mark or the same container or a dominant feature thereof in connection with the sale, offering for
sale, distribution, advertising of any goods or services including other preparatory steps necessary to
carry out the sale of any goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive; or
155.2. Reproduce, counterfeit, copy or colorably imitate a registered mark or a dominant feature
thereof and apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy or colorable imitation to labels, signs, prints,

packages, wrappers, receptacles or advertisements intended to be used in commerce upon or in

connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of goods or services on or in
connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive, shall
be liable in a civil action for infringement by the registrant for the remedies hereinafter set forth:
Provided, That the infringement takes place at the moment any of the acts stated in Subsection
155.1 or this subsection are committed regardless of whether there is actual sale of goods or
services using the infringing material.
As can be gleaned in Section 155.1, mere unauthorized use of a container bearing a registered
trademark in connection with the sale, distribution or advertising of goods or services which is likely
to cause confusion, mistake or deception among the buyers/consumers can be considered as
trademark infringement.
In his sworn affidavits,29 Oblanca stated that before conducting an investigation on the alleged illegal
activities of MASAGANA, he reviewed the certificates of trademark registrations issued by the
Philippine Intellectual Property Office in favor of Petron and Pilipinas Shell; that he confirmed from
Petron and Pilipinas Shell that MASAGANA is not authorized to sell, use, refill or distribute GASUL
and SHELLANE LPG cylinder containers; that he and Alajar monitored the activities of MASAGANA
in its refilling plant station located within its compound at Governors Drive, Barangay Lapidario,
Trece Martires, Cavite City; that, using different names, they conducted two test-buys therein where
they purchased LPG cylinders bearing the trademarks GASUL and SHELLANE; that the said
GASUL and SHELLANE LPG cylinders were refilled in their presence by the MASAGANA
employees; that while they were inside the MASAGANA compound, he noticed stock piles of multibranded cylinders including GASUL and SHELLANE LPG cylinders; and that they observed delivery
trucks loaded with GASUL and SHELLANE LPG cylinders coming in and out of the MASAGANA
compound and making deliveries to various retail outlets. These allegations were corroborated by
Alajar in his separate affidavits.
In support of the foregoing statements, Oblanca also submitted the following documentary and
object evidence:
1. Certified true copy of the Certificate of Registration No. 44046 for "SHELL (DEVICE)" in the name
of Shell International;
2. Certified true copy of the Certificate of Registration No. 41789 for "SHELL (DEVICE) in the name
of Shell International;
3. Certified true copy of the Certificate of Registration No. 37525 for "SHELL (DEVICE) in the name
of Shell International;
4. Certified true copy of the Certificate of Registration No. R-2813 for "SHELL" in the name of Shell
International;
5. Certified true copy of the Certificate of Registration No. 31443 for "SHELLANE" in the name of
Shell International;
6. Certified true copy of the Certificate of Registration No. 57945 for the mark "GASUL" in the name
of Petron;

7. Certified true copy of the Certificate of Registration No. C-147 for "GASUL CYLINDER
CONTAINING LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM GAS" in the name of Petron;
8. Certified true copy of the Certificate of Registration No. 61920 for the mark "GASUL AND
DEVICE" in the name of Petron;
9. Certified true copy of the Articles of Incorporation of Masagana;
10. Certified true copy of the By-laws of Masagana;
11. Certified true copy of the latest General Information Sheet of Masagana on file with the Securities
and Exchange Commission;
12. Pictures of delivery trucks coming in and out of Masagana while it delivered Gasul and Shellane
LPG;
13. Cash Invoice No. 56210 dated 13 February 2003 issued by Masagana for the Gasul and
Shellane LPG purchased by Agent Oblanca and witness Alajar;
14. Pictures of the Shellane and Gasul LPGs covered by Cash Invoice No. 56210 purchased from
Masagana by Agent Oblanca and witness Alajar;
15. Cash Invoice No. 56398 dated 27 February 2003 issued by Masagana for the Gasul and
Shellane LPG purchased by Agent Oblanca and witness Alajar; and
16. Pictures of the Shellane and Gasul LPGs covered by Cash Invoice No. 56398 purchased from
Masagana by Agent Oblanca and witness Alajar.30
Extant from the foregoing testimonial, documentary and object evidence is that Oblanca and Alajar
have personal knowledge of the fact that petitioners, through MASAGANA, have been using the
LPG cylinders bearing the marks GASUL and SHELLANE without permission from Petron and
Pilipinas Shell, a probable cause for trademark infringement. Both Oblanca and Alajar were clear
and insistent that they were the very same persons who monitored the activities of MASAGANA; that
they conducted test-buys thereon; and that in order to avoid suspicion, they used different names
during the test-buys. They also personally witnessed the refilling of LPG cylinders bearing the marks
GASUL and SHELLANE inside the MASAGANA refilling plant station and the deliveries of these
refilled containers to some outlets using mini-trucks.
Indeed, the aforesaid facts and circumstances are sufficient to establish probable cause. It should be
borne in mind that the determination of probable cause does not call for the application of the rules
and standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits. As the term
implies, "probable cause" is concerned with probability, not absolute or even moral certainty. The
standards of judgment are those of a reasonably prudent man, not the exacting calibrations of a
judge after a full blown trial.31
The fact that Oblanca and Alajar used different names in the purchase receipts do not negate
personal knowledge on their part. It is a common practice of the law enforcers such as NBI agents
during covert investigations to use different names in order to conceal their true identities. This is

reasonable and understandable so as not to endanger the life of the undercover agents and to
facilitate the lawful arrest or apprehension of suspected violators of the law.
Petitioners contention that Oblanca and Alajar should have mentioned the fact that they used
different names in their respective affidavits and during the preliminary examination is puerile. The
argument is too vacuous to merit serious consideration. There is nothing in the provisions of law
concerning the issuance of a search warrant which directly or indirectly mandates that the applicant
of the search warrant or his witnesses should state in their affidavits the fact that they used different
names while conducting undercover investigations, or to divulge such fact during the preliminary
examination. In the light of other more material facts which needed to be established for a finding of
probable cause, it is not difficult to believe that Oblanca and Alajar failed to mention that they used
aliases in entering the MASAGANA compound due to mere oversight.
It cannot be gainfully said that Oblanca and Alajar are not competent to testify on the trademarks
infringed by the petitioners. As earlier discussed, Oblanca declared under oath that before
conducting an investigation on the alleged illegal activities of MASAGANA, he reviewed the
certificates of trademark registrations issued by the Philippine Intellectual Property Office in favor of
Petron and Pilipinas Shell. These certifications of trademark registrations were attached by Oblanca
in his applications for the search warrants. Alajar, on the other hand, works as a private investigator
and, in fact, owns a private investigation and research/consultation firm. His firm was hired and
authorized, pursuant to the Brand Protection Program of Petron and Pilipinas Shell, to verify reports
that MASAGANA is involved in the illegal sale and refill of GASUL and SHELLANE LPG
cylinders.32 As part of the job, he studied and familiarized himself with the registered trademarks of
GASUL and SHELLANE, and the distinct features of the LPG cylinders bearing the same trademarks
before conducting surveillance and test-buys on MASAGANA.33 He also submitted to Oblanca
several copies of the same registered trademark registrations and accompanied Oblanca during the
surveillance and test-buys.
As to whether the form and manner of questioning made by Judge Sadang complies with the
requirements of law, Section 5 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, prescribes
the rules in the examination of the complainant and his witnesses when applying for search warrant,
to wit:
SEC. 5. Examination of complainant; record.- The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally
examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing under oath, the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their
sworn statements, together with the affidavits submitted.
The searching questions propounded to the applicant and the witnesses depend largely on the
discretion of the judge. Although there is no hard-andfast rule governing how a judge should
conduct his investigation, it is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and exhaustive, not
merely routinary, general, peripheral, perfunctory or pro forma. The judge must not simply rehash the
contents of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of the
application.34
After perusing the Transcript of Stenographic Notes of the preliminary examination, we found the
questions of Judge Sadang to be sufficiently probing, not at all superficial and perfunctory.35 The
testimonies of Oblanca and Alajar were consistent with each other and their narration of facts was
credible. As correctly found by the Court of Appeals:

This Court is likewise not convinced that respondent Judge failed to ask probing questions in his
determination of the existence of probable cause. This Court has thoroughly examined the Transcript
of Stenographic Notes taken during the investigation conducted by the respondent Judge and found
that respondent Judge lengthily inquired into the circumstances of the case. For instance, he
required the NBI agent to confirm the contents of his affidavit, inquired as to where the "test-buys"
were conducted and by whom, verified whether PSPC and PETRON have registered trademarks or
tradenames, required the NBI witness to explain how the "test-buys" were conducted and to
describe the LPG cylinders purchased from Masagana Gas Corporation, inquired why the
applications for Search Warrant were filed in Cavite City considering that Masagana Gas
Corporation was located in Trece Martires, Cavite, inquired whether the NBI Agent has a sketch of
the place and if there was any distinguishing sign to identify the place to be searched, and inquired
about their alleged tailing and monitoring of the delivery trucks. x x x.36
Since probable cause is dependent largely on the opinion and findings of the judge who conducted
the examination and who had the opportunity to question the applicant and his witnesses, the
findings of the judge deserves great weight. The reviewing court can overturn such findings only
upon proof that the judge disregarded the facts before him or ignored the clear dictates of
reason.37 We find no compelling reason to disturb Judge Sadangs findings herein.
Anent the second issue, petitioners argue that Judge Sadang failed to require Oblanca to show his
authority to apply for search warrants; that Oblanca is a member of the Anti-Organized Crime and
not that of the Intellectual Property Division of the NBI; that all complaints for infringement should be
investigated by the Intellectual Property Division of the NBI; that it is highly irregular that an agent
not assigned to the Intellectual Property Division would apply for a search warrant and without
authority from the NBI Director; that the alleged letter-complaint of Atty. Bienvenido Somera, Jr. of
Villaraza and Angangco Law Office was not produced in court; that Judge Sadang did not require
Oblanca to produce the alleged letter-complaint which is material and relevant to the determination
of the existence of probable cause; and that Petron and Pilipinas Shell, being two different
corporations, should have issued a board resolution authorizing the Villaraza and Angangco Law
Office to apply for search warrant in their behalf.38
We reject these protestations.
The authority of Oblanca to apply for the search warrants in question is clearly discussed and
explained in his affidavit, viz:
[That] on 11 February 2003, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) received a letter-complaint
from Atty. Bienvenido I. Somera, Jr. of Villaraza and Angangco, on behalf of among others, Petron
Corporation (PETRON) [and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (PSPC), the authorized
representative of Shell International Petroleum Company Limited (SHELL INTERNATIONAL)]
requesting assistance in the investigation and, if warranted, apprehension and prosecution of certain
persons and/or establishments suspected of violating the intellectual property rights of PETRON
[and of PSPC and Shell International.]
11. [That] on the basis of the letter-complaint, I, together with Agent Angelo Zarzoso, was assigned
as the NBI agent on the case.39
The fact that Oblanca is a member of the Anti-Organized Crime Division and not that of the
Intellectual Property Division does not abrogate his authority to apply for search warrant. As aptly

stated by the RTC and the Court of Appeals, there is nothing in the provisions on search warrant
under Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which specifically commands that the
applicant law enforcer must be a member of a division that is assigned or related to the subject
crime or offense before the application for search warrant may be acted upon. The petitioners did not
also cite any law, rule or regulation mandating such requirement. At most, petitioners may only be
referring to the administrative organization and/or internal rule or practice of the NBI. However, not
only did petitioners failed to establish the existence thereof, but they also did not prove that such
administrative organization and/or internal rule or practice are inviolable.
Neither is the presentation of the letter-complaint of Atty. Somera and board resolutions from Petron
and Pilipinas Shell required or necessary in determining probable cause. As heretofore discussed,
the affidavits of Oblanca and Alajar, coupled with the object and documentary evidence they
presented, are sufficient to establish probable cause. It can also be presumed that Oblanca, as an
NBI agent, is a public officer who had regularly performed his official duty.40 He would not have
initiated an investigation on MASAGANA without a proper complaint. Furthermore, Atty. Somera did
not step up to deny his letter-complaint.
Regarding the third issue, petitioners posit that the applications for search warrants of Oblanca did
not specify the particular area to be searched, hence, giving the raiding team wide latitude in
determining what areas they can search. They aver that the search warrants were general warrants,
and are therefore violative of the Constitution. Petitioners also assert that since the MASAGANA
compound is about 10,000.00 square meters with several structures erected on the lot, the search
warrants should have defined the areas to be searched.
The long standing rule is that a description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with
the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it
from other places in the community. Any designation or description known to the locality that points
out the place to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry leads the officers unerringly to it, satisfies
the constitutional requirement.41
Moreover, in the determination of whether a search warrant describes the premises to be searched
with sufficient particularity, it has been held that the executing officers prior knowledge as to the
place intended in the warrant is relevant. This would seem to be especially true where the executing
officer is the affiant on whose affidavit the warrant had been issued, and when he knows that the
judge who issued the warrant intended the compound described in the affidavit. 42
The search warrants in question commanded any peace officer to make an immediate search on
MASAGANA compound located at Governors Drive, Barangay Lapidario, Trece Martires, Cavite
City. It appears that the raiding team had ascertained and reached MASAGANA compound without
difficulty since MASAGANA does not have any other offices/plants in Trece Martires, Cavite City.
Moreover, Oblanca, who was with the raiding team, was already familiar with the MASAGANA
compound as he and Alajar had monitored and conducted test-buys thereat.
Even if there are several structures inside the MASAGANA compound, there was no need to
particularize the areas to be searched because, as correctly stated by Petron and Pilipinas Shell,
these structures constitute the essential and necessary components of the petitioners business and
cannot be treated separately as they form part of one entire compound. The compound is owned
and used solely by MASAGANA. What the case law merely requires is that, the place to be

searched can be distinguished in relation to the other places in the community. Indubitably, this
requisite was complied with in the instant case.
As to the fourth issue, petitioners asseverate that the search warrants did not indicate with
particularity the items to be seized since the search warrants merely described the items to be
seized as LPG cylinders bearing the trademarks GASUL and SHELLANE without specifying their
sizes.
A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the description
therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow; or when the description expresses a
conclusion of fact not of law by which the warrant officer may be guided in making the search and
seizure; or when the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for
which the warrant is being issued.43
While it is true that the property to be seized under a warrant must be particularly described therein
and no other property can be taken thereunder, yet the description is required to be specific only in
so far as the circumstances will ordinarily allow. The law does not require that the things to be seized
must be described in precise and minute details as to leave no room for doubt on the part of the
searching authorities; otherwise it would be virtually impossible for the applicants to obtain a search
warrant as they would not know exactly what kind of things they are looking for. Once described,
however, the articles subject of the search and seizure need not be so invariant as to require
absolute concordance, in our view, between those seized and those described in the warrant.
Substantial similarity of those articles described as a class or specie would suffice. 44
Measured against this standard, we find that the items to be seized under the search warrants in
question were sufficiently described with particularity. The articles to be confiscated were restricted
to the following: (1) LPG cylinders bearing the trademarks GASUL and SHELLANE; (2) Machines
and equipments used or intended to be used in the illegal refilling of GASUL and SHELLANE
cylinders. These machines were also specifically enumerated and listed in the search warrants; (3)
Documents which pertain only to the production, sale and distribution of the GASUL and SHELLANE
LPG cylinders; and (4) Delivery trucks bearing Plate Nos. WTE-527, XAM-970 and WFC-603,
hauling trucks, and/or other delivery trucks or vehicles or conveyances being used or intended to be
used for the purpose of selling and/or distributing GASUL and SHELLANE LPG cylinders. 45
Additionally, since the described items are clearly limited only to those which bear direct relation to
the offense, i.e., violation of section 155 of Republic Act No. 8293, for which the warrant was issued,
the requirement of particularity of description is satisfied.
Given the foregoing, the indication of the accurate sizes of the GASUL and SHELLANE LPG
cylinders or tanks would be unnecessary.
Finally, petitioners claim that MASAGANA has the right to intervene and to move for the return of the
seized items; that the items seized by the raiding team were being used in the legitimate business of
MASAGANA; that the raiding team had no right to seize them under the guise that the same were
being used in refilling GASUL and SHELLANE LPG cylinders; and that there being no action for
infringement filed against them and/or MASAGANA from the seizure of the items up to the present, it
is only fair that the seized articles be returned to the lawful owner in accordance with Section 20 of
A.M. No. 02-1-06-SC.

It is an elementary and fundamental principle of corporation law that a corporation is an entity

separate and distinct from its stockholders, directors or officers. However, when the notion of legal
entity is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime, the law will
regard the corporation as an association of persons, or in the case of two corporations merge them
into one.46 In other words, the law will not recognize the separate corporate existence if the
corporation is being used pursuant to the foregoing unlawful objectives. This non-recognition is
sometimes referred to as the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate entity or disregarding the
fiction of corporate entity. Where the separate corporate entity is disregarded, the corporation will be
treated merely as an association of persons and the stockholders or members will be considered as
the corporation, that is, liability will attach personally or directly to the officers and stockholders. 47
As we now find, the petitioners, as directors/officers of MASAGANA, are utilizing the latter in
violating the intellectual property rights of Petron and Pilipinas Shell. Thus, petitioners collectively
and MASAGANA should be considered as one and the same person for liability purposes.
Consequently, MASAGANAs third party claim serves no refuge for petitioners.
Even if we were to sustain the separate personality of MASAGANA from that of the petitioners, the
effect will be the same. The law does not require that the property to be seized should be owned by
the person against whom the search warrants is directed. Ownership, therefore, is of no
consequence, and it is sufficient that the person against whom the warrant is directed has control or
possession of the property sought to be seized.48 Hence, even if, as petitioners claimed, the
properties seized belong to MASAGANA as a separate entity, their seizure pursuant to the search
warrants is still valid.
Further, it is apparent that the motor compressor, LPG refilling machine and the GASUL and SHELL
LPG cylinders seized were the corpus delicti, the body or substance of the crime, or the evidence of
the commission of trademark infringement. These were the very instruments used or intended to be
used by the petitioners in trademark infringement. It is possible that, if returned to MASAGANA,
these items will be used again in violating the intellectual property rights of Petron and Pilipinas
Shell.49 Thus, the RTC was justified in denying the petitioners motion for their return so as to prevent
the petitioners and/or MASAGANA from using them again in trademark infringement.
Petitioners reliance on Section 20 of A.M. No. 02-1-06-SC,50 is not tenable. As correctly observed by
the Solicitor General, A.M. 02-1-06-SC is not applicable in the present case because it governs only
searches and seizures in civil actions for infringement of intellectual property rights. 51 The offense
complained of herein is for criminal violation of Section 155 in relation to Section 170 52 of Republic
Act No. 8293.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 79256, dated 30 September 2004 and 1 June 2005, respectively, are hereby
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.