Cause of Action is the fact or combination of facts that gives a person the right to seek judicial

redress or relief against another, as defined in Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court it is the act
or omission by which a party violates a right of another.
In Sps. Expedito Zepeda and Alice D. Zepeda vs China Banking Corporation the court explained
that cause of action is a formal statement of the operative facts that give rise to a remedial right.
The question of whether the complaint states a cause of action is determined by its averments
regarding the acts committed by the defendant. Thus it "must contain a concise statement of the
ultimate or essential facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of action." Failure to make a sufficient
allegation of a cause of action in the complaint "warrants its dismissal."
The cause of action is the heart of the complaint, which is the Pleading that initiates a lawsuit.
Without an adequately stated cause of action the plaintiff's case can be dismissed at the outset. It
is not sufficient merely to state that certain events occurred that entitle the plaintiff to relief. All
the elements of each cause of action must be detailed in the complaint. The claims must be
supported by the facts, the law, and a conclusion that flows from the application of the law to
those facts.
In the case of Paraaque Kings Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals where the principal legal
issue presented for resolution is whether the complaint alleging breach of the contractual right of
first option or priority to buy states a valid cause of action. The court reiterated the well settled
jurisprudence that a cause of action exists if the following elements are present: (1) a right in
favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an
obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right, and (3) an
act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of plaintiff or constituting a
breach of the obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action
for recovery of damages.
In determining whether allegations of a complaint are sufficient to support a cause of action, it
must be borne in mind that the complaint does not have to establish or allege facts proving the
existence of a cause of action at the outset; this will have to be done at the trial on the merits of
the case. To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaint must show that

the claim for relief does not exist, rather than that a claim has been defectively stated, or is
ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain.
Equally important, a defendant moving to dismiss a complaint on the ground of lack of cause of
action is regarded as having hypothetically admitted all the averments thereof.
As stated in the case of Sps. Expedito Zepeda and Alice D. Zepeda vs China Banking
Corporation it is, thus, only upon the occurrence of the last element that a cause of action arises,
giving the plaintiff the right to maintain an action in court for recovery of damages or other
appropriate relief. In determining whether an initiatory pleading states a cause of action, "the test
is as follows: admitting the truth of the facts alleged, can the court render a valid judgment in
accordance with the prayer?" To be taken into account are only the material allegations in the
complaint; extraneous facts and circumstances or other matters aliunde are not considered. The
court may consider in addition to the complaint the appended annexes or documents, other
pleadings of the plaintiff, or admissions in the records.
The cause of action is often stated in the form of a syllogism, a form of deductive reasoning that
begins with a major premise (the applicable Rule of Law), proceeds to a minor premise (the facts
that gave rise to the claim), and ends with a conclusion. In a cause of action for Battery, the rule
of law is that any intentional, unpermitted act that causes a harmful or offensive touching of
another is a battery. This is the major premise and is stated first. Supporting facts, constituting
the minor premise, appear after the rule of law. For example, a statement of facts for a case of
battery might be "The plaintiff, while walking through ABC Store on the afternoon of March 11,
1998, was tackled by the defendant, a security guard for the store, who knocked the plaintiff to
the floor and held her there by kneeling on her back and holding her arms behind her, while
screaming in her ear to open her shopping bag. These actions caused the plaintiff to suffer
injuries to her head, chest, shoulders, neck, and back." The cause of action concludes with a
statement that the defendant is responsible for the plaintiff's injuries and that the plaintiff is
entitled to compensation from the defendant.
The facts or circumstances that entitle a person to seek judicial relief may create more than one
cause of action. For example, in the preceding example, the plaintiff might assert claims for
assault, battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violation of Civil Rights. She

might also bring claims for negligent hiring (if the guard had a history of violent behavior which
the store failed to discover) or negligent supervision. (When damages are caused by an employee
it is common to sue both the employee and the employer.) All these causes of action arise from
the same set of facts and circumstances but are supported by different rules of law and constitute
separate claims for relief.
A cause of action can arise from an act, a failure to perform a legal obligation, a breach of duty,
or a violation or invasion of a right. The importance of the act, failure, breach, or violation lies in
its legal effect or characterization and in how the facts and circumstances, considered as a whole,
relate to applicable law. A set of facts may have no legal effect in one situation, whereas the same
or similar facts may have significant legal implications in another situation. For example,
tackling a shoplifting suspect who is brandishing a gun is a legitimate action by a security guard
and probably would not support a claim for relief if the suspect were injured in the fracas. On the
other hand, tackling a shopper who merely acts in a suspicious manner while carrying a shopping
bag is a questionable exercise of a guard's duty and may well give rise to Justiciable causes of
action.
G.R. No. L-57642 March 16, 1989
BALIWAG TRANSIT, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. BLAS F. OPLE, Minister of Labor and Employment, and ROMEO
HUGHES, respondents.
Facts: Private respondent Hughes was hired as a bus driver by Baliwag when it met an accident
on August 10, 1974 with an onrushing train of the Philippine National Railway (PNR). The
petitioner filed a complaint for damages against PNR, which was held liable for its negligence.
Hughes then sought reinstatement claiming that soon after the decision against PNR he had his
drivers license renewed. Baliwag, however, ignored his requests several times. On May 10,
1980, the petitioner replied to say he could not be reinstated because his drivers license had
already been revoked and his driving was extremely dangerous to the riding public.
Issue:

(1) What are the elements of cause of action?

(2) Did the cause of action of Hughes in seeking reinstatement accrue? Or, when does Hughes
cause of action accrue?
Held:
(1) It is settled jurisprudence that a cause of action has three elements, to wit, (1) a right in favor
of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an
obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an
act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting
a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff.
(2) The Court agreed with Hughes that May 10, 1980, is the date when his cause of action
accrued, and not on August 10, 1974 when the mishap occurred, for it was then that the petitioner
denied his demand for reinstatement and so committed the act or omission constituting a breach
of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff. Hence, as the private respondents complaint
was filed not later than three months only after such rejection, there is no question that his action
has not prescribed.
(2)
G.R. No. L-83524 October 13, 1989
ERNESTO KRAMER, JR. and MARIA KRAMER, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and TRANS-ASIA SHIPPING LINES, INC.,respondents.
Facts: On April 8, 1976, the F/B Marjolea, a fishing boat owned by petitioners Ernesto Kramer,
Jr. and Marta Kramer collided with an inter-island vessel, the M/V Asia Philippines owned by the
private respondent Trans-Asia Shipping Lines, Inc. As a consequence of the collision, the F/B
Marjolea sank, taking with it its fish catch.
The Board of Marine Inquiry concluded that the loss of the F/B Marjolea and its fish catch was
attributable to the negligence of the employees of the private respondent who were on board the
M/V Asia Philippines during the collision. The findings made by the Board served as the basis of

a subsequent Decision of the Commandant of the Philippine Coast Guard dated April 29, 1982
wherein the second mate of the M/V Asia Philippines was suspended from pursuing his
profession as a marine officer.
Issue: When does the cause of action for the recovery of damages by petitioners Kramer accrue?
Held:
Under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, an action based upon a quasi-delict must be instituted
within four (4) years. The prescriptive period begins from the day the quasi-delict is committed.
From the foregoing ruling, it is clear that the prescriptive period must be counted when the last
element occurs or takes place, that is, the time of the commission of an act or omission violative
of the right of the plaintiff, which is the time when the cause of action arises.
It is therefore clear that in this action for damages arising from the collision of two (2) vessels
the four (4) year prescriptive period must be counted from the day of the collision. The aggrieved
party need not wait for a determination by an administrative body like a Board of Marine
Inquiry, that the collision was caused by the fault or negligence of the other party before he can
file an action for damages.
The collision occurred on April 8, 1976. The complaint for damages was filed in court only on
May 30, 1985, was beyond the four (4) year prescriptive period.
(3)
G.R. No. 151866

September 9, 2004

SOLEDAD CARPIO, petitioner,

vs.
LEONORA A. VALMONTE, respondent.
Facts: Mrs. Valmonte, while hired as wedding coordinator, was accused by Mrs. Carpio (brides
aunt) to have stolen her pieces of jewelry (crime of theft). Allegedly, Valmonte was bodily
searched, interrogated and trailed by a security guard throughout the evening. A few days after
the incident, petitioner received a letter from Valmonte demanding a formal letter of apology, but

was ignored by the latter. Hence, Valmote filed a complaint for damages (moral damages,
among others) against Carpio.
Issue: WON Valmonte has a right of action to recover damages? Or, does Valmonte has a right of
action that would warrant recovery of damages?
Held:
Yes.
To warrant recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action, for a wrong inflicted by the
defendant, and the damage resulting therefrom to the plaintiff. Wrong without damage, or
damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action (Damnum Absque Injuria). In the
case at bar, petitioners verbal reproach against respondent was certainly uncalled for considering
that by her own account nobody knew that she brought such kind and amount of jewelry inside
the paper bag. This being the case, she had no right to attack respondent with her innuendos
which were not merely inquisitive but outrightly accusatory Certainly, petitioner transgressed
the provisions of Article 19 in relation to Article 21 for which she should be held accountable.
Respondent is clearly entitled to an award of moral damages.
(4)
G.R. No. L-13159

February 28, 1962

REMEDIOS QUIOGUE, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.
JACINTO BAUTISTA, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Facts: This is an action to foreclose two deeds of mortgage executed to secure the payment of
two loans. But prior to the filing of the present complaint plaintiffs had instituted before the
Court of First Instance of Manila an action to foreclose a first mortgage on the same properties
and that on the date said action was filed the two loans covered by the second and third
mortgages which are herein foreclosed had already matured (Civil Case No. 11969). It likewise
appears that judgment was duly entered in the first case and when a writ of execution was issued
to enforce it, it was fully satisfied by defendants.

Issue: WON Section 3, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court apply.

Held:
No.
The contention that his action is already barred by the filing of Civil Case No. 11969 for the
simple reason that the two loans herein involved could have been included in said action because
at the time it was filed they had already matured, is likewise untenable, considering that the first
case refers to a transaction different from those covered in the present case. Section 3, Rule 2, of
our Rules of Court, invoked by appellants, which provides that a single cause of action cannot be
split up into two or more parts so as to be made the subject of different complaints, does not
apply, for here there is not a single cause of action that was split up, but several causes that refer
to different transactions. And it was held that a contract embraces only one cause of action
because it may be violated only once even if it contains several stipulations. Thus, non-payment
of a loan secured by mortgage constitutes a single cause of action. The creditor cannot split up
this single cause of action into two separate complaints, one for payment of the debt and another
for the foreclosure of the mortgage. If he does so, the filing of the first complaint will bar the
second complaint. In other words, the complaint filed for the payment of certain debt shall be
considered as a waiver of the right to foreclose the mortgage executed thereon.
(5)
ANDRES LAPITAN, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
SCANDIA, INC., and GENERAL ENGINEERING CO., defendants-appellees.
Facts: Lapitan purchased from Scandia thru its sub-dealer in Cebu a diesel engine but one of its
parts after more than two months from its purchase, broke. Its replacement also broke after six
days. Hence, Lapitan demanded for rescission of the contract, plus damages. Scandia, however,
did not pay the price and damages sought for.
Issue: WON a prayer for damages may be joined in an action for rescission of contract.
Held:

Yes.
Issues of the same nature may be raised by a party against whom an action for rescission has
been brought, or by the plaintiff himself. It is, therefore, difficult to see why a prayer for
damages in an action for rescission should be taken as the basis for concluding such action as
one capable of pecuniary estimation a prayer which must be included in the main action if
plaintiff is to be compensated for what he may have suffered as a result of the breach committed
by defendant, and not later on precluded from recovering damages by the rule against splitting a
cause of action and discouraging multiplicity of suits.