The Campaign in Burma

Author(s): Horace S. Sewell

Source: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Apr., 1945), pp. 496-504
Published by: Council on Foreign Relations
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20029913
Accessed: 02/09/2009 14:45
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THE

IN BURMA

CAMPAIGN
By Horace

S. Sewell

the size and importance of the Burma campaign,

it has
in Burma have been overshad
had very little public attention. Events
CONSIDERING
owed by the climax of the war against Germany
in the
and the great advances
Pacific; and because of this the Allied forces in Burma, more than a quarter of a
million
strong, have not received their fair share of credit. These men have
in the largest and most
been engaged
important ground fighting yet under
on a front 700 miles
taken against the Japanese. They have been operating
to that in eastern Europe,
in
among the most
long, second in length only
?
disease-ridden
malarial,
swamps,
surroundings
impenetrable
hospitable
ranges.
jungle and immense mountain
are of great strategic
is the back door
These operations
importance. Burma
to the* courage of American
to China, which Japan has tried to shut. Thanks
and British pilots, flying from Assam over the most dangerous air route in the
to reach China; and now, thanks to the Allied
world, supplies have continued
who have done their duty so well in
forces of the South East Asia Command,
Assam and Burma, a land route to China has been opened up.
of the opening of the new road to China was
The official announcement
in South
Lord
Louis
made by Admiral
Mountbatten,
Supreme Commander
East Asia, on January 24, 1945, in the following Order of the Day:
The advance southwards of the American, British and Chinese forces formerly under
Sultan
the leadership of General Stilwell and now commanded by Lieutenant-General
with Lieutenant-General
Slim's Fourteenth Army, fresh from its victories at Imphal
and Kohima on the right flank, has inflicted a crushing defeat on the enemy and driven
him

north

from

Burma.
Sultan's

Lieutenant-General

and

forces

a Chinese

expeditionary

force

have

now

and Bhamo the new road

joined hands west ofWanting. From Ledo through Myitkyina
now sweeps south to join the old Burma Road and land communication to China is
open.

The first part of our mission therefore has been completed and it will not be long
before Brigadier-General Pick's United States Engineers will have the road ready for
tra?ne. This has been achieved through a truly inter-Allied, inter-service effort.
The air supply route to China is assured. With the rapid development of airfields

at Myitkyina,

the Allied
advance

this

route

is carrying

an

ever-increasing

air forces, by their magnificent

volume

of

traffic.

In

addition,

support of the army, contributed

to the

to Mandalay.

The advance of the Fifteenth Corps under Lieutenant General Christison, assisted
on the Arakan coast materially contributed to the overfall difficul
by the air and navy,
ties of the Japanese positions in Burma.
The fine fighting qualities and high morale of all the forces engaged in this great
?
I
the utter defeat of Japan ?
effort made victory certain. In the task still before us
am confident the same qualities will be shown by all and that final success will be
ours.

at
Slim's Fourteenth
William
of Lieutenant-General
victories
Army
under
and the advance of the Fifteenth
and
Kohima,
Army
Corps
Imphal
to which Admiral Mount
in Arakan,
Lieutenant-General
Philip Christison
The

THE CAMPAIGN

IN BURMA

497

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

498

batten refers in his Order of the Day, though only a part of the campaign, were
main factors in the liberation of northern Burma. Unless
the Japanese Army
the American,
had been fully engaged in other directions,
British and Chinese
Stilwell would not have been able to
forces under the leadership of General
move
into Burma from the north.
To appreciate how the battles that were fought by the Fourteenth
Army and
the Fifteenth
the situation of
Army Corps set the pattern for the campaign,
and the peculiarities
the opposing
forces in the winter of 1943-1944
of the
be
influenced
the
should
considered.
and
conduct
country
planning
Topography
of the campaign
in Burma to a greater extent than in any other theater of war.
in their central position,
The Japanese,
had good road, rail and river com
munications.
The Allies had to rely on the Assam railway for their main opera
18 miles
south of
tions, and on the railhead of the Eastern
railway
Bengal
in
Arakan.
for
for
the
General
Stilwell's
forces
Chittagong
Supplies
operations
also had to be sent by the Assam railway, which runs parallel to the front and
too close behind it for safety. This strategical weakness
in the Allied position
never
in
the
the
battle
necessi
Assam,
though
exploited by
during
Japanese,
r?le.
tated leaving some fighting troops along the railway in a defensive
of climate and rainfall affected the planning
Local and seasonal variations
and timing of operations. High mountains
covered with thick jungle separate
shores of the Bay of Bengal. For five
Burma
and the Arakan
from Assam
?
to September
the southwest monsoon
of the year ?'May
months
blows in
and during this period the
from the Indian Ocean across the Bay of Bengal,
rainfall is very heavy. In Arakan
the annual rainfall varies from 100 to 240
on the Assam
to locality;
in many places in the mountains
inches according
of this rain falls during the
Burma border it is more than 100 inches. Most
over the Japanese
monsoon
season. The Allies had one great advantage
in
and the greatest possible use was made of it.
Burma. They had air superiority,
All Allied plans were based on supplying
large forces from the air and on the
over long distances, whereas
reserve
air
of
the
formations
transfer
by
rapid
men.
were
use
and
the
of
this
method
of
denied
moving
Japanese
supplies
The plans for the 1943-1944 Burma campaign approved at the Ottawa Con
to the South East Asia
ference, when Admiral Mountbatten's
appointment
Command was announced,
included amphibious
These,
however,
operations.
intended for southeast Asia
had to be cancelled,
for the vessels and material
were wanted
in Europe and were actually used at Anzio and in Normandy.
New plans had to be framed on a less ambitious
scale, and to conform with
these the following tasks were laid down for the Fourteenth
Army by General
the Eleventh
Sir George GifFard, who was then commanding
Army Group,
which comprised all Allied
land forces of the South East Asia Command:
(1)
to the
in north Burma
Hold
the frontiers of Bengal and Assam.
(2) Advance
to the Buthidaung-Maung
in Arakan
line Mogaung-Myitkyina.
(3) Advance
daw

road.

in
the Fifteenth
these tasks General
Slim had available
Army Corps
the Fourth Corps in Assam, and General Stilwell's Chinese-American
Arakan,
forces in the Ledo area. These Chinese-American
troops had been placed under
the operational
command of the Fourteenth
Army and were to remain so until
was
that they would combine
when
it
had
they
planned
occupied Kamaing,
on the Salween River. General
StilwelPs
with
the Chinese
forces operating
forces (five Chinese divisions, one American
brigade and the British Fort Hertz
For

THE CAMPAIGN

IN BURMA

to the line Mogaung-Myitkyina.

would carry out the advance
detachment)
the Japanese Army had to be
To enable these forces to achieve their objective
some direct assistance
in the way of cutting the lines of
occupied elsewhere, and
at Myitkyina
was necessary.
to the Japanese
18th Division
communication
For this purpose three operations were set on foot:
the 17th, 20th and
(i) The Fourth Army Corps, composed of three divisions,
was ordered to operate offensively
to draw
from Assam
23rd Indian Divisions,
to achieve
its object,
forces. If necessary
off and occupy the main Japanese
the Fourth Corps offensive was to be carried on up to and beyond the Chindwin
River and the Chin Hills.
of two divisions,
the Fifteenth
(2) In Arakan,
Army Corps,
composed
and two brigades of the 8 ist West African
the 5th and 7th Indian Divisions
was ordered to advance with the 5th and 7th Divisions
direct on
Division,
ist
8
Division
flank
while
the
the
left
of the
Maungdaw-Buthidaung,
protected
a
the
counterattack
Kaladan
River.
up
against
Corps
possible Japanese
into the Indaw
Force, was to move
(3) The 3rd Indian Division, Wingate's
area and operate from there to cut the main
road and rail communications
area.
in the Myitkyina
behind the 18th Japanese Division
The Japanese had increased the size of their army in Burma during the
summer of 1943, and in November
enemy forces were distributed
approxi
as
two
in
with corps troops and other forma
follows:
divisions
Arakan,
mately
area in the north, one division; on the Sal
tions; in the Mogaung-Myitkyina
ween near the Chinese
in the Chindwin
area, three
frontier, one division;
in reserve.
divisions with corps and army troops, and two to three divisions
II
in Arakan
the
1943, the Fifteenth
against
Corps advanced
near
in
the
and
the
Kaladan
ele
coast,
55th Japanese Division,
valley against
ments of the 54th and 55th Divisions.
The 5th Indian Division
fought its way
down the Mayu
the coast,
running north and south parallel with
Range,
road is tunnelled.
It also fought
through which the Maungdaw-Buthidaung
its way down the Naaf River Valley, which empties
into the Bay of Bengal
at Maungdaw,
and secured the Nechadauk
north of the
Pass, five miles
road. The 7th Indian Division
moved
Maungdaw-Buthidaung
through the
Pass into the Kalapanzin
remained
valley, east of the range. The 5th Division
on the west of the range, between
was captured
it and the sea. Maungdaw
that the Japanese
8, 1944, and by that time there were indications
January
would counterattack
before the Maungdaw-Buthidaung
road could be reached.
were made for meeting
the Japanese counterattack
by arrang
Preparations
to
to
to any portion of the force that might
air
flown
have
be
ing
supplies ready
be cut off. Orders were issued that formations or units that might be isolated
would hold their ground. In addition, marine operations were started against
the coast line behind the enemy to pin down his reserves. The 26th Indian
to be ready to move up from Chitta
from army reserve was warned
Division
to
the
Fifteenth
gong
support
Corps.
On February 3, the Japanese made their attack with about 8,000 men from
an officer who
the 55th Division,
under the command of Colonel Tanahashi,
in the previous Arakan
first object
had distinguished
himself
The
campaign.
of the attack was to reoccupy
the Nechadauk
Pass and so separate the 5th
and 7th Divisions.
Another
detached
force went further north to block the
In December

5oo

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Tanahashi
road behind
the 5th Division.
Bawli-Maungdaw
accomplished
and at the same time the main Japanese forces launched
both these objectives,
a frontal assault against the 7th Division
to force it back on the Nechadauk
in the
this succeeded,
the division would have been annihilated
Pass. Had
on
to
with
the
Division
the
would
then
have
deal
and
Pass,
enemy
gone
5th
inmuch the same way by forcing it back onto the road-block,
south of Bawli.
on Chittagong;
to march
and when British
then intended
The Japanese
reserves had been drawn to that area, their main attack from the Chindwin
the 7th Division
stood firm and even
against Assam was to start. However,
with minimum
its
front
and the 5th Division,
took the offensive,
holding
this action both divi
with the 7th. During
forces, reopened communications
sions were supplied from the air.
if needed,
The 26th Division moved
up to Bawli ready to counterattack,
from India replaced the 26th in army reserve.
and the 36th British Division
force was caught between
the
the attacking
As a result of these movements,
in the
in the south and the 26th and 36th Divisions
5th and 7th Divisions
in the
north. After bitter fighting, much of which was with bomb and bayonet
was
into
and
broken
the
force
defeated,
hills,
enemy
up
dispersed
completely
than 5,000 dead were
small parties trying to escape through the jungle. More
once passed
to the offensive
counted on the ground. The Fifteenth
Corps at
was
area
which
of
the
defended
and took the tunnel
by the enemy
Mayu Range
to
to the last. The capture of Buthidaung
and the task allotted
followed
was
General Christison's
completed.
Corps
took part in the fighting which went on for many days during the
Everyone
in and around the area occupied by the 5th and 7th
counterattack,
Japanese
the rear organization with
and
Divisions.
Transport
supply personnel defended
in
the same tenacity that British and Indian infantry held the "box" defenses
consists of three British and six Indian
front. (Each Indian Infantry Division
or Gurkha
is largely
of the divisional
The personnel
battalions.
artillery
were
of
cold-blooded
this
there
deliberate,
British.) During
examples
period,
and non-combatants
by the Japanese. A 7th Division
slaughter of wounded
field dressing station, containing more than 80 wounded, was overrun at night
hours later, a senior Japanese
and occupied
Forty-eight
by the Japanese.
orderlies and
of the doctors, medical
officer arrived and ordered the massacre
Six doctors were lined up and dispatched with a bullet through the
wounded.
and Japanese soldiers went from stretcher to
ear, the orderlies were butchered,
the wounded.
stretcher bayoneting
Ill
of the Ledo
forces covering the construction
In the north, General Stilwell's
and reached the Hukawng
road had crossed the mountains
valley early in
led the
Divisions
Chinese
and
22nd
American-trained
The
38th
1944.
January
Frank Merrill's Marauders.
advance, their flanks covered by Brigadier-General
inflicted very heavy losses on the 18th
In their first action the Chinese divisions
a
to
back
which
fell
strong position astride the Hukawng
Japanese Division,
near Kamaing. The Fort Hertz detachment
which advanced on a parallel
valley
was
route further to the east
also opposed by elements of the 18th Division.
was moved
into
Division
Indian
in
the 3rd
March,
(Wingate's Force)
Early
behind the 18th Japanese Divi
the Indaw area, 100 miles south of Kamaing,
to Indaw from Ledo and
sion. One of Wingate's
brigades had started its march

THE CAMPAIGN

IN BURMA

501

suitable
the rest of the division was flown in. Indaw was selected as the most
a force to land and cut
Three
communications.
for
landing
locality
Japanese
and Chowringhee.
places for gliders had been chosen: Piccadilly,
Broadway
in 1943, during his first
Their suitability had been noted by General Wingate
March
in
and
the
behind
lines,
1944 it was uncertain what
expedition
Japanese
state they were in. If Allied planes had visited the area enemy suspicions would
have been aroused; one plane was sent to reconnoitre, however, just before the
obstructed
division was to be flown in, and found Piccadilly
by large logs.
towed by
The whole of the advance glider force of Wingate's
Division,
was
was
to
that
site
neither
then
directed
Dakotas,
Fortunately
Broadway.

blocked nor guarded by the Japanese,

though the ground surface, which looked
was found to be intersected with
level in reconnaissance
photographs,
large
trenches overgrown with elephant grass. Many
gliders crashed and almost all
were damaged or destroyed,
but sufficient men and material were landed to
a good
guard and prepare
landing
place, and during the following days the rest
?
of the division
less Brigadier-General
Mike Calvert's
brigade which was
from
to the north ?
miles
Ledo, 250
country
marching
through enemy-held
was landed in the Indaw area.
at once; the
started operations
and
Wingate
railway and road to Mogaung
to Myitkyina
were cut and
the road from Bhamo
some
cut
for
time.
The
kept
Japanese at first did not perceive how strong a force had been landed behind
them and it was some time before they brought a portion of the 53rd Division

$oi

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

to reinforce the lines-of-communication

in
troops who had lost very heavily
to interfere with the 3rd Division.
their attempts
In Assam
the Fourth Army Corps, under the command
of Lieutenant
General Geoffrey
advanced
in
Scoones, acting on General Sum's instructions,
area and the Kabaw valley to occupy
the Tiddim
the main Japanese
forces.
But when
that the Japanese
it became obvious
in spite of their
themselves,
in the Indaw
in Arakan
and the presence of the 3rd Indian Division
defeat
for a large-scale offensive
Slim
area, were preparing
against Assam, General
decided to withdraw
the Fourth Corps toward Imphal and fight the decisive
battle in that area. By retiring to Imphal he shortened his own communications
to lengthen
with
the Japanese
theirs, an important consideration
and|fbrced
Plans were made for the 20th and 23rd Indian
the approach of the monsoon.
to cover Imphal on the east and south, and for the 17th Indian
Divisions
to Imphal. The Kohima
to withdraw
from Tiddim
Division
garrison was
of
evacuation
non-combatants
from
and
the
strengthened
Imphal commenced.
was moved
back from Arakan
into army reserve at
The 5th Indian Division
were made
for the air transport and supply
and arrangements
Chittagong,
an
such
which
later
service,
important part in the defense of Imphal.
played
divisions
of General Mutaguchi's
On March
three
Fifteenth
the
16,
leading
on a broad front.
sent
columns
and
forward
River
crossed
the
Chindwin
Army
silently and swiftly, hidden by
They were very lightly equipped and marched
before Allied re
the jungle. Their intention was to reach Imphal and Kohima
could arrive, and then to break into the Brahmaputra
inforcements
valley, cut
to General Stilwell's forces and overrun the airfields from
the communications
on the
were being flown to China. Success depended
which
rapid
supplies
to capture before March
of Imphal, which Mutaguchi
27.
expected
occupation
reached the Kohima
On the right of the attack the 31st Japanese Division
area. It was not expected that the enemy would be able to move so large a force
was a surprise.
through such country and the strength of the attack at Kohima
was forced back gradually
toward
the town and
The outnumbered
garrison
suffered
the situation was serious. In the center the 15th Japanese Division
out
at
until
where
the
held
casualties
Ukhrul,
very heavy
garrison
greatly
in
reduced in numbers before drawing back toward Imphal. The Japanese
tention in the center was to break through by Palel with guns and armor for
the attack on Imphal, but the 20th Indian Division
any such move
prevented
in the Tamu-Palel
ment by a series of counterattacks
area, though the enemy
did succeed in cutting the road between
Imphal and Kohima, with columns
was isolated except by air.
moving
through the jungle. Imphal thus
which had moved
the 33rd Japanese Division,
On the left of the attack,
road
before
the
the
reached
very fast,
17th Indian Division
Tiddim-Imphal
was to annihilate
to Imphal. The Japanese
the
had been withdrawn
object
on the mountain
had to be
road. The 23rd Indian Division
17th Division while
sent from its position
the 17th and help it in its
in reserve at Imphal to meet
The 17th fought its way up to Imphal with great skill and courage
withdrawal.
and brought all its guns, transport and wounded with it, but the fighting on
this side of Imphal had occupied nearly the whole strength of two divisions
and there was no reserve left on the Imphal Plain.
was flown up from Chittagong
and two brigades
The 5th Indian Division
were landed at Imphal, where they provided
the needed reserve. One brigade
was able to get
reached Dimapur
and, after fighting its way up the mountains,

THE CAMPAIGN

IN BURMA

503

reinforcements
garrison at Kohima. Headquarters
through to the hard-pressed
to take
was moved
to Dimapur
from
India
of the Thirty-Third
Army Corps
area under the direction
over control of
in
the
Dimapur-Kohima
operations
the
Slim. Lieutenant-General
of General
commanding
Montagu
Stopford,
India.
Division
from
2nd
British
with
him
the
had
Thirty-Third
Corps,
had
Sum's strategical
From the start of the campaign, General
objective
but he was
Stilwell advanced;
been to draw off the Japanese while General
and when the
the frontier of Bengal and Assam,
also responsible for holding
were
of
communications
for
the
line
first
attacked
his
by the
thoughts
Japanese
Assam railway to General Stilwell's forces. The two generals met, and Stilwell
to protect the railway, pointing
offered one of his two best Chinese divisions
of this division from the Ledo road exten
that the withdrawal
out, however,
in the Hukawng
sion would compel him to abandon or postpone his operations
was refused by Slim who was reluctant to give up operations
offer
This
valley.
in the north at the moment when the whole of the Japanese Army was com
to battle. Slim took the responsibility
of directing Stilwell to continue
mitted
to Myitkyina
that the
with all possible vigor. He guaranteed
his advance
than ten days.
for more
lines of communication
would not be interrupted
Stilwell willingly
this and continued his advance with characteristic
accepted
energy.

to
Slim also decided that the 3rd Indian Division
should continue
rear
that
it
and
in
the
of
the
18th
the
Division
north,
operate against
Japanese
should come directly under General Stilwell's
command as soon as it had ad
Slim made this decision during the crisis of the battle
vanced north of Hopin.
in Assam, when the 3rd Division was in a good position to strike at the rear of
the Fifteenth Japanese Army.
of
the three divisions
The battle round Imphal was fought out between
and the
the Fourth Corps reinforced by the two brigades of the 5th Division
reinforced by elements of two more Japa
15th and 33rd Japanese Divisions,
nese and one Indian National
Kohima was relieved after bitter
Army Division.
and two brigades of the 7th
the British 2nd Division
fighting during which
the
stormed the Kohima Hills and defeated
Indian Division
and destroyed
This division attacked bravely but showed very little
31st Japanese Division.
to send a detachment
to cut the Assam
It had made no attempt
enterprise.
a
was
so.
to
it
do
when
in
railway
position
the final stages of the Japanese
attack on Imphal, General Muta
During
to carry out the last desperate
ordered
the
Division
reinforced
33rd
guchi
assault. "The fate of the Empire depends on the results of this battle," he said.
of the 33rd Division
"Imphal will be taken at all costs." The commander
on
to
his
"You
will
this
take
troops, adding:
passed
Imphal, but the division
a
will be annihilated." With
its accustomed
fierceness this division delivered
series of fanatical attacks, all of which, after bloody fighting, were held and
smashed by the 17th Division,
reinforced by a brigade of the 20th Division.
There was no pause after the defeat of the Japanese at Kohima
and Imphal;
the pursuit was kept up through the worst of the monsoon
rains. The 33rd
was driven south, first by the 17th Division
Division
and then by the 5th
while the Lushai Brigade,
Division,
supplied from the air, operated against the
enemy's flanks and rear and inflicted heavy casualties. The remnants of the
were driven back across the Chindwin
31st and 15th Divisions
by the Thirty
Third Corps.
General

5o4

FOREIGN AFFAIRS
IV

In north Burma, meanwhile,

General Stilwell had planned a bold flank move
to slip past the 18th Japanese Division with three columns, each
composed of
one American
to seize the Myitkyina
and two Chinese
airfield.
battalions,
The operation was pushed with determination,
the force marching
by secret
17. Chinese reinforcements
paths and appearing on the field suddenly, on May
were flown in to occupy the town, and
though they just failed to do so, the
airfield was firmly held.
By June 1944, ?the Fourteenth
Army had carried ?out the tasks assigned to it.
In seven months
December
four Japanese divisions
1943 to June 1944
to more than a di
and
other
and
(the 15th, 31st, 33rd
troops amounting
55th)
as effective
vision in strength, were destroyed
formations.
Two more
fighting
A
divisions
suffered
fifth
had
the 18 th,
division,
considerably.
Japanese
Japanese
was destroyed
by the combined operations of Stilwell's force and the Fourteenth
Army. On the Fourteenth
Army front 50,000 Japanese dead had been counted,
not including enemy casualties on General Stilwell's
front. Most
of the guns,
tanks and vehicles that the enemy brought into Assam were lost and 600 Japa
nese prisoners were taken. Battle
in the Fourteenth
casualties
(not
Army
to 40,000.
and Chinese
amounted
casualties)
counting American
The success of the campaign was due to foresight and to good leadership
to the bold and confident
in the field, particularly
Slim
leadership of Generals
factor was the magnificent
and Stilwell. A great contributing
support which
the Commander-in-Chief
in India gave to the Fourteenth
through the
Army,
men
in India. The
of
material
and in the control of movements
and
provision
air forces and provided
Eastern Air Command
the Japanese
the
destroyed
on
were
all
which
the
and
and
based
without
transport
army's plans
supply
which success would have been impossible. The efficiency of the administra
tive, supply and health services made it possible for the troops to live and fight
in one of the worst malarial
countries of the world. Above all, the success of the
was
to
due
the courage and endurance of the troops engaged
Fourteenth
Army
?
British, American,
Indian, Gurkha, Burman, African and Chinese.
The Japanese Army has been given no time to recover from its defeat. The
into the Chindwin
valley and down the Irra
pursuit of the broken divisions
waddy has been followed by an Allied offensive along the whole front. On the
forces working down the shores of the Bay of Bengal have
right, amphibious
In the center, the
and
isolated
enemy units in the Arakan mountains.
by-passed
has
and
the
of
the
reached
and Mandalay
Chindwin
been
Irrawaddy
junction
in cooperation with
is threatened. On the left, General Sultan's forces, working
the First Chinese Army, are heading
toward the Mandalay-Lashio
road.
to resist with his customary
The enemy continues
ferocity and there is no
As long as there is a Japanese Army in Burma
its
sign of a general withdrawal.
of Admiral Mountbatten's
destruction must be the first consideration
forces.
Allied occupation
of Rangoon
is also desirable to make possible
increasing aid
to China by the use of the old Burma Road. It would, however, be pure specula
on these
tion to consider how and when Burma will be liberated. Decisions
matters must already have been made by the Allied leaders through their plan
to be taken in the next move by Admiral
ning staffs, and by now the direction
been settled. It is certain
that Admiral
Mountbatten's
forces has probably
veteran ground and air forces and his powerful East Indies Fleet
Mountbatten's
will participate
in the utter defeat of Japan.