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FACTS: Benedicto Ernesto R. Bitonio Jr.

, petitioner, was appointed Director IV of the Bureau of


Labor Relations in the Department of Labor and Employment. He was designated by Acting
Secretary Jose S. Brillantes of the Department of Labor and Employment to be the DOLE
representative to the Board of Directors of Philippine Economic Zone Authority. Due to his
designation, he receives per diems from PEZA for every meeting he attended. On July 31, 1998,
COA, the respondent, disallowed the payment due to the principle established in Civil Liberties
case stating that Cabinet members, their deputies and assistants holding other offices in
addition to their primary office and to receive compensation therefore is unconstitutional.
On November 24, 1998, the petitioner filed his motion for reconsideration to the COA on the
following grounds:
1. The SC Resolution dated August 2, 1991 on the motion for clarification 1 filed by the
Solicitor General modified its earlier ruling in the Civil Liberties Union case which limits
the prohibition to Cabinet Secretaries, Undersecretaries and their assistants. Officials
given the rank equivalent to a Secretary, Undersecretary or Assistant Secretary and
other appointive officials below the rank of Assistant Secretary are not covered by the
prohibition;
2. Section 11 of RA No. 7916 provides the legal basis for the movant to receive per diem.
Said law was enacted in 1995, 4 years after the Civil Liberties Union case became final.
In expressly authorizing per diems, Congress should be conclusively presumed to have
been aware of the parameters of the constitutional prohibition as interpreted in the Civil
Liberties Union case.
The motion was denied by COA, hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COA correctly disallowed the per diems received by the petitioner for
his attendance in the PEZA Board of Directors meetings as representative of the Secretary of
Labor.
RULING: YES. The petitioners presence in the PEZA Board meetings is solely by virtue of his
capacity as representative of the Secretary of Labor. Since the Secretary is prohibited from
receiving compensation for his additional office or employment, such prohibition likewise applies
to the petitioner who sat on behalf of the Secretary. We cannot allow the petitioner who sat as
representative of the Secretary of Labor in PEZA to have a better right than his principal. The
contention that RA 7916 as a legal basis has no merit since such law was amended by RA 8748
where provisions in conflict with the law, specifically the payment of per diem, was deleted.

1 The clarification was the Courts action on the motion for clarification filed in Civil Liberties Union v.The
Executive Secretary, and revises the main opinion promulgated on February 22, 1991 (194 SCRA 317)
totally invalidating Executive Order No. 284 dated July 25, 1987 (whose questioned Section 1 states:
Even if allowed by law or by the ordinary functions of his position, a member of the Cabinet,
undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive Department may, in
addition to his primary position, hold not more than two positions in the government and government
corporations and receive the corresponding compensation therefor; Provided, that this limitation shall not
apply to ad hoc bodies or committees, or to boards, councils or bodies of which the President is the
Chairman.). The clarifying dictum now considered Executive Order No. 284 partly valid to the extent that
it included in its coverage other appointive officials aside from the members of the Cabinet, their
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries, with the dispositive part of the clarificatory resolution of
August1, 1991 stating: WHEREFORE, subject to the qualification above-stated, the petitions are
GRANTED. Executive Order No. 284 is hereby declared null and void insofar as it allows a member of the
Cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary to hold other positions in the government and governmentowned and controlled corporations.

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