Potot vs.

People
Facts:
Petitioner Potot was charged with homicide. Upon arraignment, he pleaded guilty to
thecharge. Thereupon, the trial court convicted Potot of homicide. The petitioner
filed a manifestation with motion that he is not appealing from the Decision.
However, the wife of the victim, filed a motion for reconsideration/retrial praying
that the Decision be set aside and that the case be heard again because there
were irregularities committed before and during the trial which caused miscarriage
of justice. The trial court granted private complainant's motion and set aside its
Decision and ordered that the records of the case be remanded to the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor for re-evaluation of the evidence and to file the corresponding
charge". Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the trial court
has no jurisdiction toissue the order as the Decision had become final, and that the
said order would place the accused in double jeopardy. This was denied for the
reason that the State is not bound by the error or negligence of its prosecuting
officers, hence, jeopardy does not attach.
Issue:
Whether or not the judgment has become final that the accused right against
double jeopardy will be violated upon re-trial of the same case.
Ruling:
Affirmative. A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified
or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the
death penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes final after the lapse of the period for
perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or
served, or when the accused has waived in writing his right to appeal, or has
applied for probation. Only the accused may ask for a modification or setting aside
of a judgment of conviction. And this he must do before the said judgment becomes
final or before he perfects his appeal. Such judgment becomes final in any of the
following ways: (a) when no appeal is seasonably filed by the accused, except in
case of automatic review of the decision imposing the capital penalty; (b)when he
has partially or totally served his sentence; (c) when he expressly waives his right to
appeal the judgment, except when the death penalty is imposed; or (d) when he
applies for probation. When one of these circumstances is present, the trial court
which rendered the judgment of conviction loses jurisdiction to alter, modify or
revoke it. In this case, petitioner filed a manifestation expressly waiving his right to
appeal there from. Such waiver has the effect of causing the judgment to become
final and unalterable.
Thus, it was beyond the authority of the trial court to issue the order setting aside
its Decision which had attained finality. A judgment which has acquired the status of
finality becomes immutable. Any error, assuming one was committed in the
judgment, will not justify its amendment except only to correct clerical errors or
mistakes. The assailed orders would violate the constitutional right of the petitioner
against double jeopardy.
Such right prohibits any subsequent prosecution of any person for a crime of which
he has previously been acquitted or convicted. The objective is to set the effects of
the first prosecution forever at rest, assuring the accused that he shall not
thereafter be subjected to the peril and anxiety of a second charge against him for
the same offense. To invoke the defense of double jeopardy, the following requisites
must be present: (1) a valid complaint or information; (2) the court has jurisdiction
to try the case; (3) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and (4) he has been
convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent.

GEORGE MANANTAN VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:
The Regional Trial Court of Santiago, Isabela, Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. 066
acquitted the petitioner George Manantan of homicide through reckless imprudence
without a ruling on his civil liability. On appeal from the civil aspect of the judgment
in Criminal Case No. 066, the CA found petitioner Manantan civilly liable and
ordered him to indemnify private respondents Marcelino Nicolas and Maria Nicolas
P104, 400.00representing loss of support, P50, 000.00 as death indemnity, and
moral damages of P20,000.00 or a total of P174,400.00 for the death of their son,
Ruben Nicolas.Petitioner opines that the Court of Appeals should not have disturbed
the findings of the trial court on thelack of negligence or reckless imprudence under
the guise of determining his civil liability. He argues that the trial courts finding that
he was neither imprudent nor negligent was the basis for his acquittal, and not
reasonable doubt.He submits that in finding him liable for indemnity and damages,
the appellate court not only placed his acquittal in suspicion, but also put him in
double jeopardy. Private respondents contend that while the trial court found that
petitioners guilt had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt, it did not state in
clear and unequivocal terms that petitioner was not recklessly imprudent or
negligent. Hence, impliedly the trial court acquitted him on reasonable doubt. Since
civil liability is not extinguished in criminal cases, if the acquittal is based on
reasonable doubt, the Court of Appeals had to review the findings of the trial court
to determine if there was a basis for awarding indemnity and damages.
Issue:
Whether or not decision of the trial court acquitting the petitioner of the crime of
reckless imprudence resulting to homicide foreclosed any further inquiry on the
accuseds (petitioners) negligence or reckless imprudence because by then he will
be placed in double jeopardy
Ruling:
The court ruled that petitioners claim that the decision of the appellate court
awarding indemnity placed him in double jeopardy is misplaced. The constitution
provides that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. If an
act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall
constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.[10] When a person is
charged with an offense and the case is terminated either by acquittal or conviction
or in any other manner without the consent of the accused, the latter cannot again
becharged with the same or identical offense. This is double jeopardy. For double
jeopardy to exist, the followingelements must be established: (a) a first jeopardy
must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy musthave terminated;
and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as the first.[12] In the
instant case, petitioner had once been placed in jeopardy by the filing of Criminal
Case No. 066 and the jeopardy was terminated by his discharge. The judgment of
acquittal became immediately final. Note, however, that what was elevated to the
Court of Appeals by private respondents was the civil aspect of Criminal Case No.
066. Petitioner was not charged anew in CA-G.R. CV No. 19240 with a second
criminal offense identical to the first offense. The records clearly show that no
second criminal offense was being imputed to petitioner on appeal. In modifying the

lower courts judgment, the appellate court did not modify the judgment of
acquittal. Nor did it order the filing of a second criminal case against petitioner for
the same offense. Obviously, therefore, there was no second jeopardy to speak of.
Petitioners claim of having been placed in double jeopardy is incorrect.