Professional Documents
Culture Documents
of the UPC. They seized, among other things, the records and documents of
UPC. A return of said search was duly made by Labaria with the RTC of
Cebu. UPC filed a motion to quash the warrants which was denied by the
RTC. They appealed before the CA via certiorari. The CA dismissed the
appeal for a certiorari is not the proper remedy.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid search warrant issued.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of UPC and Uy in a way for it ordered the return
of the seized items but sustained the validity of the warrant. The SC ruled
that the search warrant issued has not met some basic requisites of validity.
A search warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of the foregoing
constitutional and statutory provisions. These requirements, in outline form,
are:
(1) the warrant must be issued upon probable cause;
(2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by
the applicant or any other person;
(3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under
oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may
produce; and
(4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched
and persons or things to be seized.
The SC noted that there has been inconsistencies in the description of the
place to be searched as indicated in the said warrants. Also the thing to be
seized was not clearly defined by the judge. He used generic itineraries. The
warrants were also inconsistent as to who should be searched. One warrant
was directed only against Uy and the other was against Uy and UPC. The SC
however noted that the inconsistencies wered cured by the issuance of the
latter warrant as it has revoked the two others.
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution guarantees the right of the people
against unreasonable searches and seizures:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and
for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
NOTES
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 3. Requisite for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not
issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
wide the door to abuse of the search process, and grant to officers executing
a search warrant that discretion which the Constitution has precisely
removed from them. The particularization of the description of the place to be
searched may properly be done only by the Judge, and only in the warrant
itself; it cannot be left to the discretion of the police officers conducting the
search.
In applying for a search warrant, the police officers had in their mind
the first four (4) separate apartment units at the rear of ABIGAIL
VARIETY STORE in Quezon City to be the subject of their search. The
same was not, however, what the Judge who issued the warrant had in
mind, AND WAS NOT WHAT WAS ULTIMATELY DESCRIBED IN THE
SEARCH WARRANT. As such, any evidence obtained from the place
searched which is different from that indicated in the search warrant is
inadmissible in evidence for any purpose and in any proceeding.
This is so because it is neither licit nor fair to allow police officers to
search a place different from that stated in the warrant on the claim
that the place actually searchedalthough not that specified in the
search warrantis exactly what they had in view when they applied for
the warrant and had demarcated in their supporting evidence. WHAT IS
MATERIAL IN DETERMINING THE VALIDITY OF A SEARCH IS THE
PLACE STATED IN THE WARRANT ITSELF, NOT WHAT THE APPLICANTS
HAD IN THEIR THOUGHTS, OR HAD REPRESENTED IN THE PROOFS
THEY SUBMITTED TO THE COURT ISSUING THE WARRANT. As such, it
was not just a case of obvious typographical error, but a clear case of
a search of a place different from that clearly and without ambiguity
identified in the search warrant.
NOTE: Very Important: Where a search warrant is issued by one court
and the criminal action based on the results of the search is afterwards
commenced in another court, IT IS NOT THE RULE THAT A MOTION TO
QUASH THE WARRANT (or to retrieve the things seized) MAY BE FILED
ONLY IN THE ISSUING COURTSUCH A MOTION MAY BE FILED FOR
THE FIRST TIME IN EITHER THE ISSUING COURT OR THAT IN WHICH
THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDING IS PENDING.
b. Validity of a warrantless search and seizure as a result of an
informers tip
1. People of the Philippines vs Rosa Aruta y Menguin
Search and Seizure Informers Tip
In the morning of 13 Dec 1988, the law enforcement officers received
information from an informant named Benjie that a certain Aling Rosa
would be leaving for Baguio City on 14 Dec 1988 and would be back in the
afternoon of the same day carrying with her a large volume of marijuana; At
6:30 in the evening of 14 Dec 1988, Aruta alighted from a Victory Liner Bus
carrying a travelling bag even as the informant pointed her out to the law
enforcement officers; NARCOM officers approached her and introduced
themselves as NARCOM agents; When asked by Lt. Abello about the
contents of her travelling bag, she gave the same to him; When they opened
the same, they found dried marijuana leaves; Aruta was then brought to the
NARCOM office for investigation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the conducted search and seizure is constitutional.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Aruta and has noted that some drug
traffickers are being freed due to technicalities. Aruta cannot be said to be
committing a crime. Neither was she about to commit one nor had she just
committed a crime. Aruta was merely crossing the street and was not acting
in any manner that would engender a reasonable ground for the NARCOM
agents to suspect and conclude that she was committing a crime. It was only
when the informant pointed to Aruta and identified her to the agents as the
carrier of the marijuana that she was singled out as the suspect. The
NARCOM agents would not have apprehended Aruta were it not for the
furtive finger of the informant because, as clearly illustrated by the evidence
on record, there was no reason whatsoever for them to suspect that accusedappellant was committing a crime, except for the pointing finger of the
informant. The SC could neither sanction nor tolerate as it is a clear violation
of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure.
Neither was there any semblance of any compliance with the rigid
requirements of probable cause and warrantless arrests. Consequently, there
was no legal basis for the NARCOM agents to effect a warrantless search of
Arutas bag, there being no probable cause and the accused-appellant not
having been lawfully arrested. Stated otherwise, the arrest being incipiently
illegal, it logically follows that the subsequent search was similarly illegal, it
being not incidental to a lawful arrest. The constitutional guarantee against
unreasonable search and seizure must perforce operate in favor of accusedappellant. As such, the articles seized could not be used as evidence against
accused-appellant for these are fruits of a poisoned tree and, therefore,
must be rejected, pursuant to Article III, Sec. 3(2) of the Constitution.
NOTES:
When is a warrantless search allowed?
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section
12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court 8 and by prevailing jurisprudence;
2. Seizure of evidence in plain view, the elements of which are:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the
police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right
to be where they are;
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and
(d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;
indication that the informant knew the courier, the records do not reveal that
he knew him by name.
On such bare information, the police authorities could not have properly
applied for a warrant, assuming that they could readily have access to a
judge or a court that was still open by the time they could make preparations
for applying therefor, and on which there is no evidence presented by the
defense. In determining the opportunity for obtaining warrants, not only the
intervening time is controlling but all the coincident and ambient
circumstances should be considered, especially in rural areas.
A legitimate warrantless arrest, as above contemplated, necessarily cloaks
the arresting police officer with authority to validly search and seize from the
offender
(1) dangerous weapons, and
(2) those that may be used as proof of the commission of an offense.
3. People V Racho
On appeal is the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision 1 dated May 22, 2008 in CAG.R. CR-H.C. No. 00425 affirming the Regional Trial Court 2 (RTC) Joint
Decision3 dated July 8, 2004 finding appellant Jack Racho y Raquero guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9165.
The case stemmed from the following facts:
On May 19, 2003, a confidential agent of the police transacted through
cellular phone with appellant for the purchase of shabu. The agent later
reported the transaction to the police authorities who immediately formed a
team composed of member of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
(PDEA), the Intelligence group of the Philippine Army and the local police
force to apprehend the appellant. 4 The agent gave the police appellants
name, together with his physical description. He also assured them that
appellant would arrive in Baler, Aurora the following day.
On May 20, 2003, at 11:00 a.m., appellant called up the agent and informed
him that he was on board a Genesis bus and would arrive in Baler, Aurora,
anytime of the day wearing a red and white striped T-shirt. The team
members then posted themselves along the national highway in Baler,
Aurora. At around 3:00 p.m. of the same day, a Genesis bus arrived in Baler.
When appellant alighted from the bus, the confidential agent pointed to him
as the person he transacted with earlier. Having alighted from the bus,
appellant stood near the highway and waited for a tricycle that would bring
him to his final destination. As appellant was about to board a tricycle, the
team approached him and invited him to the police station on suspicion of
carrying shabu. Appellant immediately denied the accusation, but as he
pulled out his hands from his pants pocket, a white envelope slipped
therefrom which, when opened, yielded a small sachet containing the
suspected drug.5
The team then brought appellant to the police station for investigation. The
confiscated specimen was turned over to Police Inspector Rogelio Sarenas De
Vera who marked it with his initials and with appellants name. The field test
and laboratory examinations on the contents of the confiscated sachet
yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride. 6
Appellant was charged in two separate Informations, one for violation of
Section 5 of R.A. 9165, for transporting or delivering; and the second, of
Section 11 of the same law for possessing, dangerous drugs, the accusatory
portions of which read:
"That at about 3:00 oclock (sic) in the afternoon on May 20, 2003 in Baler,
Aurora and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
did then and there, unlawfully, feloniously and willfully have in his
possession five point zero one (5.01) [or 4.54] grams of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride commonly known as "Shabu", a regulated drug without any
permit or license from the proper authorities to possess the same.
CONTRARY TO LAW."7
"That at about 3:00 oclock (sic) in the afternoon on May 20, 2003 in Baler,
Aurora, the said accused did then and there, unlawfully, feloniously and
willfully transporting or delivering dangerous drug of 5.01 [or 4.54] grams of
shabu without any permit or license from the proper authorities to transport
the same.
CONTRARY TO LAW."8
During the arraignment, appellant pleaded "Not Guilty" to both charges.
At the trial, appellant denied liability and claimed that he went to Baler,
Aurora to visit his brother to inform him about their ailing father. He
maintained that the charges against him were false and that no shabu was
taken from him. As to the circumstances of his arrest, he explained that the
police officers, through their van, blocked the tricycle he was riding in; forced
him to alight; brought him to Sea Breeze Lodge; stripped his clothes and
underwear; then brought him to the police station for investigation. 9
On July 8, 2004, the RTC rendered a Joint Judgment 10 convicting appellant
of Violation of Section 5, Article II, R.A. 9165 and sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00; but
acquitted him of the charge of Violation of Section 11, Article II, R.A. 9165.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision. 11
Hence, the present appeal.
In his brief,12 appellant attacks the credibility of the witnesses for the
prosecution. He likewise avers that the prosecution failed to establish the
identity of the confiscated drug because of the teams failure to mark the
specimen immediately after seizure. In his supplemental brief, appellant
assails, for the first time, the legality of his arrest and the validity of the
subsequent warrantless search. He questions the admissibility of the
confiscated sachet on the ground that it was the fruit of the poisonous tree.
The appeal is meritorious.
We have repeatedly held that the trial courts evaluation of the credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies is entitled to great respect and will not be
disturbed on appeal. However, this is not a hard and fast rule. We have
reviewed such factual findings when there is a showing that the trial judge
overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some fact or circumstance of
weight and substance that would have affected the case. 13
Appellant focuses his appeal on the validity of his arrest and the search and
seizure of the sachet of shabu and, consequently, the admissibility of the
sachet. It is noteworthy that although the circumstances of his arrest were
briefly discussed by the RTC, the validity of the arrest and search and the
admissibility of the evidence against appellant were not squarely raised by
the latter and thus, were not ruled upon by the trial and appellate courts.
It is well-settled that an appeal in a criminal case opens the whole case for
review.1avvphi1 This Court is clothed with ample authority to review matters,
even those not raised on appeal, if we find them necessary in arriving at a
just disposition of the case. Every circumstance in favor of the accused shall
be considered. This is in keeping with the constitutional mandate that every
accused shall be presumed innocent unless his guilt is proven beyond
reasonable doubt.14
After a thorough review of the records of the case and for reasons that will be
discussed below, we find that appellant can no longer question the validity of
his arrest, but the sachet of shabu seized from him during the warrantless
search is inadmissible in evidence against him.
The records show that appellant never objected to the irregularity of his
arrest before his arraignment. In fact, this is the first time that he raises the
issue. Considering this lapse, coupled with his active participation in the
trial of the case, we must abide with jurisprudence which dictates that
appellant, having voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court,
is deemed to have waived his right to question the validity of his arrest, thus
curing whatever defect may have attended his arrest. The legality of the
arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over his person. Appellants
warrantless arrest therefore cannot, in itself, be the basis of his acquittal. 15
As to the admissibility of the seized drug in evidence, it is necessary for us to
ascertain whether or not the search which yielded the alleged contraband
was lawful.16
The 1987 Constitution states that a search and consequent seizure must be
carried out with a judicial warrant; otherwise, it becomes unreasonable and
any evidence obtained therefrom shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.17 Said proscription, however, admits of exceptions, namely:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;
2. Search of evidence in "plain view;"
3. Search of a moving vehicle;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
inspection of the plastic bag carried by the accused, the bag contained
marijuana dried leaves and bricks wrapped in a blue cloth. In his bid to
escape charges, the accused disclosed where two other male persons would
make a delivery of marijuana leaves. Upon seeing the two male persons, later
identified as Reynaldo Din and Fernando Inocencio, the police approached
them, introduced themselves as police officers, then inspected the bag they
were carrying. Upon inspection, the contents of the bag turned out to be
marijuana leaves.30
In all of these cases, we refused to validate the warrantless search precisely
because there was no adequate probable cause. We required the showing of
some overt act indicative of the criminal design.
As in the above cases, appellant herein was not committing a crime in the
presence of the police officers. Neither did the arresting officers have
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had
committed, was committing, or about to commit an offense. At the time of
the arrest, appellant had just alighted from the Gemini bus and was waiting
for a tricycle. Appellant was not acting in any suspicious manner that would
engender a reasonable ground for the police officers to suspect and conclude
that he was committing or intending to commit a crime. Were it not for the
information given by the informant, appellant would not have been
apprehended and no search would have been made, and consequently, the
sachet of shabu would not have been confiscated.
We are not unaware of another set of jurisprudence that deems "reliable
information" sufficient to justify a search incident to a lawful warrantless
arrest. As cited in People v. Tudtud, these include People v.
Maspil,
Jr.,31 People
v.
Bagista,32 People
v.
Balingan,33 People
v.
34
35
36
Lising, People v. Montilla, People v. Valdez, and People v. Gonzales.37 In
these cases, the Court sustained the validity of the warrantless searches
notwithstanding the absence of overt acts or suspicious circumstances that
would indicate that the accused had committed, was actually committing, or
attempting to commit a crime. But as aptly observed by the Court, except in
Valdez and Gonzales, they were covered by the other exceptions to the rule
against warrantless searches.38
Neither were the arresting officers impelled by any urgency that would allow
them to do away with the requisite warrant. As testified to by Police Officer 1
Aurelio Iniwan, a member of the arresting team, their office received the
"tipped information" on May 19, 2003. They likewise learned from the
informant not only the appellants physical description but also his name.
Although it was not certain that appellant would arrive on the same day (May
19), there was an assurance that he would be there the following day (May
20). Clearly, the police had ample opportunity to apply for a warrant. 39
Obviously, this is an instance of seizure of the "fruit of the poisonous tree,"
hence, the confiscated item is inadmissible in evidence consonant with
Article III, Section 3(2) of the 1987 Constitution, "any evidence obtained in
warrant. And eventually the golden Buddha and some firearms were seized
from Roxass house. Santos assailed the warrant averring that the search
warrant was not limited to one offense covering both illegal possession of
firearms and violation of Central Bank rules and regulations; that it did not
particularly describe the property to be seized; that he did not carefully
examine under oath the applicant and his witnesses; that articles not
mentioned were taken; and that thereafter the return and the inventory
although appearing to have been prepared on said date were not actually
submitted to respondent Judge until April 13, 1971 and the objects seized
delivered only about a week later on April 19.
ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrant issued by Judge Marcos is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor Judge Marcos and had basically affirmed the
decision of appellate Judge Gatamaitan. Taking into consideration to nature
of the articles so described, it is clear that no other more adequate and
detailed description could be given, particularly because it is difficult to give
a particular description of the contents thereof, The description so made
substantially complies with the legal provisions because the officer of the law
who executed the warrant was thereby placed in a position enabling him to
Identify the articles in question, which he did, so that here, since
certainly, no one would be mistaken in Identifying the Buddha, whose image
is well known, and even the firearms and ammunition because these were
those without permit to possess, and all located at 47 Ledesma St., Baguio
City, so far as description was concerned, the search warrant perhaps could
not be said to have suffered fatal defects.
4. Castro v Pabalan
This Court is confronted anew in this certiorari proceeding with the claim
that a search warrant issued without complying with the requisites of the
Constitution 1 and the Rules of Court 2 should have been nullified, but was
not in the challenged order of respondent Judge Javier Pabalan. 3 More
specifically, it was the failure of the application for the search warrant as well
as the search warrant itself to specify the specific offense, to examine the
applicant as well as his witnesses on the part of respondent Judge, and to
describe with particularity the place to be searched and the things to be
seized, that were singled out to justify the assertion of illegality. When
required to answer, respondent Judge did not bother to refute specifically the
allegations of the petition for certiorari, but merely contented himself with
inviting attention to the challenged order as well as the resolutions denying
the motion for reconsideration and with the statement that he "has no
particular prayer to ask the Supreme Court," an assertion thereafter repeated
in the second paragraph of his two-paragraph answer that he "has no
request to make in this particular case leaving the issues entirely to the
discretion of the Supreme Court." 4 The tone of diffidence, almost of apology,
is easy to understand. It is difficult to resist the thought that respondent
Judge failed to pay heed to authoritative decisions of this Court. The most
cursory perusal of the application for search warrant 5 by respondent
Lumang and the search warrant itself, 6 yields no other conclusion.
Respondent Judge ignored what the Constitution requires on two points, the
existence of a probable cause and the particular description of the things to
be seized. The limitation as to the specific offense as mandated by the Rules
of Court was not observed either. Even on the assumption then that he could
not
relevant According to the former: "A search warrant shall not issue but upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined by
the municipal or city judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
No search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense." Section 4
provides: "The municipal or city judge must, before issuing the warrant,
personally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any
witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in writing, and attach
them to the record, in addition to any affidavits presented to him." be held
chargeable with knowledge of the leading Stonehill decision, 7 announced
barely twenty days before the search warrant in question was issued, still
from Alverez v. Court of First Instance 8 the first to be decided under the
1935 Constitution, promulgated in 1937, to Oca v. Marquez, 9 that came out
in 1965, this Court had adhered firmly to the view that for a search warrant
to escape the imputation of being unreasonable, there should be strict
conformity with the requirements of the Constitution and the applicable
procedural rules. The finding then should have been against the validity of
the search warrant. Nonetheless, insofar as such order limited itself to
requiring the return solely of the liquor, the pack of playing cards, the bottle
of distilled water and five bottles of Streptomycin, all of which may be
considered as personal effects of petitioners, with the rest of the goods taken
falling under the category of things forbidden by law and therefore need not
be restored, 10 it can be sustained. So we rule.
In the opening paragraph of the application for search warrant, respondent
Ernesto I. Lumang admitted that "he has been informed" and therefore was of
the belief that petitioners Maria Castro and Co Ling, whose place of residence
was not even indicated, although subsequently mention was made of their
being at Barrio Padasil, Bangar, La Union, "have in possession narcotics and
other contraband." 11 There is a claim that he had verified the report and that
therefore he had "reasons to believe that a Search Warrant should be issued
to enable the undersigned to take possession" of such narcotics and other
contraband. 12 The application was accompanied by the joint affidavit of a
Sergeant Francisco C. Molina and a Corporal Lorenzo G. Apilado of the
Philippine Constabulary. 13 Again, mention was merely made of their
decision of Boyd v. United States: 27 "It is the duty of courts to be watchful for
the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy
encroachments thereon. Their motto should be obsta principis." 28
3. Another infirmity was the failure to comply with the basic procedural
requisite that a search warrant "shall not issue but upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offense." 29 Here reference was made to "an
illegal traffic of narcotics and contraband." The latter is a generic term
covering all goods exported from or imported into the country contrary to
applicable statutes. Necessarily then, more than one offense could arise from
the activity designated as illegal traffic of narcotics and contraband. As a
matter of fact, in the challenged order, reference was made to at least three
charges having been filed, the violation of Section 203 of the Internal
Revenue Code, its Section 1039 on tax evasion, as well as illegal possession
of opium. It would seem that once again what was correctly pointed out
by Chief Justice Concepcion in Stonehill v. Diokno as unjustified and
unwarranted finds application. Nor can there be any plausibility to the
possible excuse, to repeat what was said before, that the Stonehill opinion
having been rendered only twenty days previous to the issuance of the search
warrant, respondent Judge could not be held chargeable with a knowledge
thereof, considering that as far back as July 30, 1965, two years earlier,
in Oca v. Marquez, 30 this Court, through the then Justice J. P. Bengzon,
enunciated: "The decision herein has applied the provisions of th Old Rules
of Court since this case arose under said Rules. Attention of the Bench and
Bar is however called to the fact that effective January 1, 1964 the issuance
of search warrants is governed by Section 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of
Court which among other things requires that a search warrant must be in
connection with one specific offense." 31
4. As was made clear at the outset, though, the illegality of the search
warrant does not call for the return of the things seized, the possession of
which is prohibited by law. This is the established doctrine in this
jurisdiction. As far back as Uy Kheytin v. Villareal, 32 a 1920 decision, it was
held: "That although in the issuance of the search warrant in question the
judge did not comply with the requirements of section 98 of General Orders
No. 58, the petitioners are not entitled to the return of the opium. and its
paraphernalia which were found and seized under said warrant, and much
less are they entitled to be exonerated because of such omission of the
judge." 33 Among the authorities cited is Cooley: "'Search-warrants have
heretofore been allowed to search for stolen goods, for goods supposed to
have been smuggled into the country in violation of the revenue laws, for
implements of gaming or counterfeiting, for lottery tickets or Prohibited
liquors kept for sale contrary to law, for obscene books and papers kept for
sale or circulation, and for powder or other explosive and dangerous material
so kept as to endanger the public safety.'" 34 So, also, in Yee Sue Koy v.
Almeda, 35 handed down in 1940, Justice Laurel, speaking for this Court,
stated: "If it be true, furthermore, without, however, deciding the point, that
as alleged by the respondents the articles in question constitute the corpus
delicti of the Usury Law, their return to the petitioners cannot be
ordered."36 Magoncia v. Palacios, 37 promulgated in 1948, reiterated such a
doctrine. Thus: "En el asunto de Uy Kheytincontra Villareal (42 Jur. Fil. 935),
los recurrentes pidieron la devolucion del opio de que se incautaron los
constabularies al registrar su casa armados con un mandamiento de registro
expedido sin cumplir las disposiciones de los articulos 96 y 98 de la Orden
General No. 58; sostenian que los requisites exigidos por dichos articulos no
se habian cumplido, y por tanto, el mandamiento de registro era ilegal, como
si no existiera; que al registro se ha hecho sin mandamiento de registro
debidamente expedido. Este Tribunal denego la peticion, declarando que la
irregularidad de la expedicion del mandamiento de registro ne era suficiente
causa para ordenar la devolucion del opio. El Hon. Juez recurrido no abuso
de su discrecion al denegar la devolucion al acusado del paltik, 42
municiones y una granada de mano, tampoco abuso de su sana discrecion al
denegar la peticion del acusado de que se prohiba al Fiscal Provincial y al
Jefe de Policia de Asingan, Pangasinan a presentar tales efectos como prueba
en la vista." 38
5. This decision leaves open the question of the legality of any possible use
that may be made by the prosecuting authorities of the articles seized under
an invalid search warrant. Here, again, the Yee Sue Koy opinion of Justice
Laurel is illuminating, especially in view of the inadmissibility of evidence
illegally seized under the present Constitution 39 At this stage, the question
does not have to be faced. The words of Justice Laurel follow: "While we
reiterate the rule that the seizure of books and documents by means of a
search warrant ' for the purpose of using them as evidence in a criminal case
against the person in whose possession they were found is unconstitutional
because it makes the warrant unreasonable, and it is equivalent to a
violation of the constitutional provision prohibiting the compulsion of an
accused to testify against himself ..., the said rule has no applicable force in
the present case. ... In the application for the issuance of the search warrant
in question, it was alleged that the articles seized were 'being used by it (Sam
Sing & Co.) in connection with its activities of lending money at usurious rate
of interest in violation of the Usury Law,' and it is now suggested (memoranda
of respondents) that the only object of the agents of the Anti-Usury Board in
keeping the articles is to prevent the petitioners from employing them as a
means of further violations of the Usury Law. In this state of the record,
without deciding the question whether the petitioners will in fact use the
articles in question, if returned, for illegal purposes, we are not prepared to
order the return prayed for by the petitioners. (Cf. People v. Rubio, 57 Phil.
384, 394-395.)" 40
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted and the order of September 12,
1967 denying the motion of petitioners to annul the search warrant as well
as the resolutions of October 26, 1967 and January 29, 1968 denying the
motions for reconsiderations are reversed, the decision of this Court being
that the search warrant in question is tainted by illegality for being violative
both of the Constitution and the Rules of Court. It is likewise the decision of
this Court that notwithstanding the illegality of such search warrant, the
challenged order of respondent Judge can be sustained only insofar as it
would limit the return of the articles seized to the liquor, the pack of playing
cards, the bottle of distilled water and five bottles of Streptomycin taken
under such search warrant. No costs.
Barred, Antonio, Aquino and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.
5. Asian Surety vs Herrera
Petition to quash and annul a search warrant issued by respondent Judge
Jose Herrera of the City Court of Manila, and to command respondents to
return immediately the documents, papers, receipts and records alleged to
have been illegally seized thereunder by agents of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) led by respondent Celso Zoleta, Jr.
On October 27, 1965, respondent Judge Herrera, upon the sworn application
of NBI agent Celso Zoleta, Jr. supported by the deposition of his witness,
Manuel Cuaresma, issued a search warrant in connection with an
undocketed criminal case for estafa, falsification, insurance fraud, and tax
evasion, against the Asian Surety and Insurance Co., a corporation duly
organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, with principal office
at Room 200 Republic Supermarket Bldg., Rizal Avenue, Manila. The search
warrant is couched in the following language:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after examining under
oath NBI Agent Celso J. Zoleta, Jr. and his witness Manuel Cuaresma that
there are good and sufficient reasons to believe thatMr. William Li Yao or his
employees has/have in his/their control in premises No. 2nd Floor Republic
Supermarket Building, in Rizal Avenue district of Sta. Cruz, Manila, property
(Subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the
offense used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense)
should be seized and brought to the undersigned.
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time in the
----- of the premises above-described and forthwith seize and take possession
of the following personal property to wit: Fire Registers, Loss Bordereau,
Adjusters Report including subrogation receipt and proof of loss, Loss
Registers, Books of Accounts, including cash receipts and disbursements and
general ledger, check vouchers, income tax returns, and other
papers connected therewith ... for the years 1961 to 1964 to be dealt with as
the law directs.
Armed with the search warrant Zoleta and other agents assigned to the Antigraft Division of the NBI entered the premises of the Republic Supermarket
Building and served the search warrant upon Atty. Alidio of the insurance
company, in the presence of Mr. William Li Yao, president and chairman of
the board of directors of the insurance firm. After the search they seized and
carried away two (2) carloads of documents, papers and receipts.
Petitioner assails the validity of the search warrant, claiming that it was
issued in contravention of the explicit provisions of the Constitution and the
Rules of Court, particularly Section 1, of Art. III of the 1935 Constitution,
now Section 3, of Art. IV of the new Constitution, and Sections 3, 5, 8 and 10
of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, hereunder quoted for convenience of
reference, viz:
Sec. 3 The rights of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated, and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause to be
determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnessed he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons, or things to be seized." (Art. IV,
Section 3, New Constitution)
Sec. 3 Requisites for issuing search warrant A search warrant shall not
issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be
determined by the judge or justice of the peace after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized.
No search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense. (Sec. 3,
Rule 126, Rules of Court)
Sec. 5 Issuance and form of search warrant If the judge or justice of the
peace is thereupon satisfied of the existence of facts upon which the
application is based, or that there is probable cause to believe that they exist,
he must issue the warrant in the form prescribed by these rules. (Sec. 5,
Rule 126)
Sec. 8 Time of making search The warrant must direct that it be served
in the day time, unless the affidavit asserts that the property is on the
person or in the place ordered to be searched, in which case a direction may
be inserted that it be served at any time of the night or day. (Sec. 8, Rule
126)
Sec. 10 Receipt for property seized. The officer seizing property under the
warrant must give a detailed receipt for the same to the person on whom or
in whose possession it was found, or in the absence of any person, must, in
the presence of at least one witness, leave a receipt in the place in which he
found the seized property. (Sec. 10, Rule 126) .
"Of all the rights of a citizen, few are of greater importance or more essential
to his peace and happiness than the right of personal security, and that
involves the exemption of his private affairs, books, and papers from the
inspection and scrutiny of others. 1 While the power to search and seize is
necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law
enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for
the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify
indifference to the basic principles of government (People v. Elias, 147 N.E.
472)."
I.
In the case at bar, the search warrant was issued for four separate and
distinct offenses of : (1) estafa, (2) falsification, (3) tax evasion and (4)
insurance fraud, in contravention of the explicit command of Section 3, Rule
126, of the Rules providing that: "no search warrant shall issue for more
than one specific offense." The aforequoted provision, which is found in the
last paragraph of the same section, is something new. "There is no precedent
on this amendment prohibition against the issuance of a search warrant
for more than one specific offense either in the American books on
Criminal procedure or in American decisions." 2 It was applied in the
celebrated case of Harry S. Stonehill v. Secretary of Justice 3 where this Court
said:
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out
completely one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our
Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of
communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or
passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by
the constitutional provision abovequoted to outlaw the so-called general
warrants. It is not difficult to imagine what would happen in times of keen
political strife, when the party in power feels that the minority is likely to
wrest it, even though by legal means.
Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with
the disputed search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend section
3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court by providing in its counterpart,
under the Revised Rules of Court, that a search warrant shall not issue but
upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense. Not satisfied
with this qualification, the court added thereto a paragraph, directing that no
search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense.
II.
Petitioner likewise contests the validity of the search warrant on the ground
that it authorized the search and seizures of personal properties so vaguely
described and not particularized, thereby infringing the constitutional
mandate requiring particular description of the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized. It also assails the noncompliance with the
above-requirement as likewise openly violative of Section 2 of Rule 126 which
provides:
SEC. 2. A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of the
following personal property:
(a) Property subject of the offense;
(b) Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense;
and
(c) Property used or intended to be used as the means of committing an
offense.
The search warrant herein involved reads in part: "... property (Subject of the
offense, stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense used or
intended to be used as the means of committing the offense) should be seized
and brought to the undersigned." The claim of respondents that by not
cancelling the description of one or two of the classes of property contained
in the form when not applicable to the properties sought to be seized, the
respondent judge intended the search to apply to all the three classes of
property. This is a patent impossibility because the description of the
property to be searched and seized, viz: Fire Registers, Loss Bordereau,
Adjusters Report, including subrogation receipts and proof of loss, Loss
Registers, Books of Accounts including cash receipts and disbursements and
general ledger, etc. and the offenses alleged to have been committed by the
corporation to wit: estafa, falsification, tax evasion and insurance fraud,
render it impossible for Us to see how the above-described property can
simultaneously be contraband goods, stolen or embezzled and other proceeds
or fruits of one and the same offense. What is plain and clear is the fact that
the respondent Judge made no attempt to determine whether the property he
authorized to be searched and seized pertains specifically to any one of the
three classes of personal property that may be searched and seized under a
search warrant under Rule 126, Sec. 2 of the Rules. The respondent Judge
simply authorized search and seizure under an omnibus description of the
personal properties to be seized. Because of this all embracing description
which includes all conceivable records of petitioner corporation, which if
seized (as it was really seized in the case at bar), could possibly paralyze its
business, 4 petitioner in several motions, filed for early resolution of this case,
manifested that the seizure of TWO carloads of their papers has paralyzed
their business to the grave prejudice of not only the company, its workers,
agents, employees but also of its numerous insured and beneficiaries of
bonds issued by it, including the government itself, and of the general
public. 5 And correlating the same to the charges for which the warrant was
issued, We have before Us the infamous general warrants of old. In the case
of Uy Kheytin, et al., v. Villareal, 42 Phil. 896, cited with approval in the
Bache case, supra, We had occasion to explain the purpose of the
requirement that the warrant should particularly describe the place to be
searched and the things to be seized, to wit:
"... Both the Jones Law (sec. 3) and General Orders No. 58 (sec. 97)
specifically require that a search warrant should particularly describe the
place to be searched and the things to be seized. The evident purpose and
intent of this requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those, and only
those, particularly described in the search warrant to leave the officers of
the law with no discretion regarding what articles they shall seize, to the end
that "unreasonable searches and seizures" may not be made. That this is the
correct interpretation of this constitutional provision is borne out by
American authorities."
The purpose as thus explained could, surely and effectively, be defeated
under the search warrant issued in this case.
III.
Moreover, as contended by petitioner, respondents in like manner
transgressed Section 10 of Rule 126 of the Rules for failure to give a detailed
receipt of the things seized. Going over the receipts (Annexes "B", "B-1", B-2",
"B-3" and "B-4" of the Petition) issued, We found the following: one bordereau
of reinsurance, 8 fire registers, 1 marine register, four annual statements,
folders described only as Bundle gm-1 red folders; bundle 17-22 big carton
folders; folders of various sizes, etc., without stating therein the nature and
kind of documents contained in the folders of which there were about a
thousand of them that were seized. In the seizure of two carloads of
documents and other papers, the possibility that the respondents took away
private papers of the petitioner, in violation of his constitutional rights, is not
remote, for the NBI agents virtually had a field day with the broad and
unlimited search warrant issued by respondent Judge as their passport.
IV.
The search warrant violated the specific injunctions of Section 8 of Rule
126. 6 Annex "A" of the Petition which is the search warrant in question left
blank the "time" for making search, while actual search was conducted in the
evening of October 27, 1965, at 7:30 p.m., until the wee hours of the
morning of October 28, 1965, thus causing untold inconveniences to
petitioners herein. Authorities 7 are of the view that where a search is to be
made during the night time, the authority for executing the same at that
time should appear in the directive on the face of the warrant.
In their Memorandum 8 respondents, relying on the case of Moncado v.
Peoples Court (80 Phil. 1), argued:
Even assuming that the search warrant in question is null and void, the
illegality thereof would not render the incriminating documents inadmissible
in evidence.
This Court has reverted to the old rule and abandoned the Moncado ruling
(Stonehill case, supra). Most common law jurisdictions have already given up
this approach and eventually adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that
this is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction
against unreasonable searches and seizures. Thus the Supreme Court of the
United States declared: 9
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in
evidence against a citizen accused of an offense the protection of the 4th
Amendment, declaring his right to be secured against such searches and
seizures is of no value, and so far as those thus placed are concerned, might
as well be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their
officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praise-worthy as they are, are not
to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles established by years of
endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the
fundamental law of the land.
Moreover, the criminal charges filed by the NBI have all been dismissed
and/or dropped by the Court or by the office of the City Fiscal of Manila in
1968, as manifested in the petition filed by petitioner dated October 24,
1972, for early resolution of this case.
V.
It has likewise been observed that the offenses alleged took place from 1961
to 1964, and the application for search warrant was made on October 27,
1965. The time of the application is so far remote in time as to make the
probable cause of doubtful veracity and the warrant vitally defective. Thus
Mr. Joseph Varon, an eminent authority on Searches, Seizures and
Immunities, has this to say on this point:
From the examination of the several cases touching upon this subject, the
following general rules are said to apply to affidavits for search warrants:
(1) xxx xxx xxx
(2) Such statement as to the time of the alleged offense must be clear and
definite and must not be too remote from the time of the making of the affidavit
and issuance of the search warrant.
(3) There is no rigid rule for determining whether the stated time of
observation of the offense is too remote from the time when the affidavit is
made or the search warrant issued, but, generally speaking, a lapse of time
of more than three weeks will be held not to invalidate the search warrant
while a lapse of four weeks will be held to be so.
A good and practical rule of thumb to measure the nearness of time given in
the affidavit as to the date of the alleged offense, and the time of making the
affidavit is thus expressed: The nearer the time at which the observation of the
offense is alleged to have been made, the more reasonable the conclusion of
establishment of probable cause. [Emphasis Ours]
PREMISES CONSIDERED, petition is hereby granted; the search warrant of
October 27, 1965, is nullified and set aside, and the respondents are hereby
ordered to return immediately all documents, papers and other objects seized
or taken thereunder. Without costs.
6. Collecter vs Villaluz
7. Viduya vs. Berdiago, 73 SCRA 553
Post under case digests, Taxation at Monday, January 30, 2012 Posted by
Schizophrenic Mind
Facts: The search warrant issued by petitioner Viduya who was the former
Collector of Customs is quashed by the lower court upon motion by private
respondent Berdiago. The warrant of seizure and detention was issued on the
basis of reliable intelligence that fraudulent documents were used by
Berdiago in securing the release from the Bureau of Customs of a Rolls
Royce, it being made to appear that such car was a 1961 model instead of a
1966, thus enabling respondent to pay lower custom duties. There was a
demand for the correct amount due and Respondent expressed his
willingness to pay. Unfortunately, he was not able to live up to his promise so
a search warrant was issued, pursuant to Section 2099 of the Tariff and
Customs Code which requires a search warrant if such goods are located in a
dwelling house because the car was located in the Yabut Compound.
Moreover, it was not shown that Berdiago did not own the dwelling house
which was searched. Nonetheless, respondent judge quashed the warrant.
Issue: Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
judge in quashing the search warrant? Yes
Held: Petition is granted. As the car was kept in a dwelling house in Wakas,
Barrio San Dionisio, Paraaque, Rizal, petitioner through two of his officers
in the Customs Police Service applied for and was able to obtain the search
warrant. Had there been no such move on the part of petitioner, the duties
expressly enjoined on him by law namely to assess and collect all lawful
revenues, to prevent and suppress smuggling and other frauds, and to
enforce tariff and customs law would not have been performed.
8. Dizon v Castro
The facts before the Court in these Certiorari, Prohibition, and mandamus
proceedings will be briefly stated. The three petitioners will be referred to
through their surnames of NOLASCO, AGUILAR-ROQUE and TOLENTINO.
1. Prior to August 6, 1984 (hereinafter to be referred to without the year),
AGUILAR-ROQUE was one of the accused of Rebellion in Criminal Case No.
MC-25-113 of Military Commission No. 25, both cases being entitled "People
of the Philippines vs. Jose Ma. Sison, et al." She was then still at large.
2. At 11:30 A.M. on August 6th, AGUILAR-ROQUE and NOLASCO were
arrested by a Constabulary Security Group (CSG) at the intersection of
Mayon Street and P. Margall Street, Quezon City. The stated time is an
allegation of petitioners, not denied by respondents. The record does not
disclose that a warrant of arrest had previously beeen issued against
NOLASCO.
be entertained in this present petition without petitioners first moving for the
quashal of the disputed Search Warrant with the issuing Judge.
We find merit in the Petition.
Section 3, Article IV of the Constitution, guarantees the right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose. It also
specifically provides that no Search Warrant shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined by the Judge or such other responsible officer as may
be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
The disputed Search Warrant (No. 80-84) describes the personalities to be
seized as follows:
Documents, papers and other records of the Communist Party of the
Phihppines/New Peoples Army and/or the National Democratic Front, such
as Minutes of the Party Meetings, Plans of these groups, Programs, List of
possible supporters, subversive books and instructions, manuals not
otherwise available to the public, and support money from foreign or local
sources.
It is at once evident that the foregoing Search Warrant authorizes the seizure
of personal properties vaguely described and not particularized. It is an allembracing description which includes everything conceivable regarding the
Communist Party of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front. It
does not specify what the subversive books and instructions are; what the
manuals not otherwise available to the public contain to make them
subversive or to enable them to be used for the crime of rebellion. There is
absent a definite guideline to the searching team as to what items might be
lawfully seized thus giving the officers of the law discretion regarding what
articles they should seize as, in fact, taken also were a portable typewriter
and 2 wooden boxes. It is thus in the nature of a general warrant and
infringes on the constitutional mandate requiring particular description of
the things to be seized. In the recent rulings of this Court, search warrants of
similar description were considered null and void for being too general. Thus:
Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other publications to
promote the objectives and purposes of the subversive organizations known
as Movement for Free Philippines. Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6
Movement. 6
The things to be seized under the warrant issued by respondent judge were
described as 'subversive documents, propaganda materials, FAs, printing
paraphernalia and all other subversive materials Such description hardly
provided a definite guideline to the search team as to what articles might be
lawfully seized thereunder. Said description is no different from if not worse
than, the description found in the search warrants in "Burgos, et al. v. the
Chief of Staff"which this Court declared null and void for being too general. 7
In the case at bar, the search warrant issued by respondent judge allowed
the seizure of printed copies of the Philippine Times, manuscripts/drafts of
articles for publication, newspaper dummies subversive documents, articles,
etc., and even typewriters, duplicating machines, mimeographing and tape
recording machines. Thus, the language used is so all embracing as to
include all conceivable records and equipment of petitioner regardless of
whether they are legal or illegal. The search warrant under consideration was
in the nature of a general warrant which is constitutionally objectionable. 8
The lack of particularization is also evident in the examination of the witness
presented by the applicant for Search Warrant.
Q Mr. Dionicio Lapus, there is an application for search warrant filed by Lt.
Col. Virgilio Saldajeno and the Court would like to know if you affirm the
truth of your answer in this deposition?
(The deposition instead)
A Yes, sir,
Q How long did it take you for the surveillance?
A Almost a month, sir.
Q Are you a lawyer, Mr. Lapus?
A No, Your Honor, but I was a student of law.
Q So, you are more or less familiar with the requisites of the application for
search warrant?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q How did you come to know of the person of Mila Aguilar-Roque?
A Because of our day and night surveillance, Your Honor, there were so many
suspicious persons with documents.
Q What kind of documents do you refer to?
A Documents related to the Communist Party of Philippines and New People's
Army.
Q What else?
A Conferences of the top ranking officials from the National Democratic
Front, Organization of the Communist Party of the Philippines ...
Q And may include what else?
A Other papers and documents like Minutes of the Party Meetings, Plans of
these groups, Programs, List of possible supporters, subversive books and
instructions, manuals not otherwise available to the public and support
money from foreign and local sources. 9
The foregoing questions propounded by respondent Executive Judge to the
applicant's witness are not sufficiently searching to establish probable cause.
The "probable cause" required to justify the issuance of a search warrant
comprehends such facts and circumstances as will induce a cautious man to
rely upon them and act in pursuant thereof. 10 Of the 8 questions asked, the
1st, 2nd and 4th pertain to Identity. The 3rd and 5th are leading not
searching questions. The 6th, 7th and 8th refer to the description of the
personalities to be seized, which is Identical to that in the Search Warrant
and suffers from the same lack of particularity. The examination conducted
was general in nature and merely repetitious of the deposition of said
witness. Mere generalization will not suffice and does not satisfy the
requirements of probable cause upon which a warrant may issue. 11
Respondents claim, however, that the proper forum for questioning the
illegality of a Search Warrant is with the Court that issued it instead of this
original, independent action to quash. The records show, however, that
petitioners did raise that issue in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE in their
Comment, dated October 18, 1984. In fact, they already questioned the
admissibility of the evidence obtained under the Search Warrant, even during
the inquest investigation on August 10, 1984. And in the SUBVERSIVE
DOCUMENTS CASE, they filed a Motion to Suppress on December 12, 1984
claiming that the proceedings under the Search Warrant were unlawful.
Substantially, therefore, while not denominated as a motion to quash,
petitioners had questioned the legality of the Search Warrant.
Parenthetically, it strikes the Court that the pendency of the SEARCH
WARRANT CASE and of the SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS CASE before two
different Courts is not conducive to an orderly administration of justice. It
should be advisable that, whenever a Search Warrant has been issued by one
Court, or Branch, and a criminal prosecution is initiated in another Court, or
Branch, as a result of the service of the Search Warrant, the SEARCH
WARRANT CASE should be consolidated with the criminal case for orderly
procedure. The later criminal case is more substantial than the Search
Warrant proceeding, and the Presiding Judge in the criminal case should
have the right to act on petitions to exclude evidence unlawfully obtained.
Notwithstanding the irregular issuance of the Search Warrant and although,
ordinarily, the articles seized under an invalid search warrant should be
returned, they cannot be ordered returned in the case at bar to AGUILARROQUE. Some searches may be made without a warrant. Thus, Section 12,
Rule 126, Rules of Court, explicitly provides:
Section 12. Search without warrant of person arrested.A person charged
with an offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which
may be used as proof of the commission of the offense.
The provision is declaratory in the sense that it is confined to the search,
without a search warrant, of a person who had been arrested. It is also a
general rule that, as an incident of an arrest, the place or premises where the
arrest was made can also be search without a search warrant. In this latter
case, "the extent and reasonableness of the search must be decided on its
own facts and circumstances, and it has been stated that, in the application
of general rules, there is some confusion in the decisions as to what
constitutes the extent of the place or premises which may be
searched. 12 "What must be considered is the balancing of the individual's
right to privacy and the public's interest in the prevention of crime and the
apprehension of criminals." 13