Archive for the TORTS AND DAMAGES Category

PANTRANCO vs. KIERULF and LEGASPI Leave a

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PANTRANCO vs. KIERULF and LEGASPI
G.R. No. 99343.
March 13, 1997
(consolidated case)
FACTS: The initial investigation conducted an disclosed that at about 7:45 p.m when the
accident happened, the Pantranco bus was traveling along EDSA from Congressional Avenue
towards Clover Leaf, Balintawak. Before it reached the corner of Oliveros Drive, the driver lost
control of the bus, causing it to swerve to the left, and then to fly over the center island
occupying the east-bound lane of EDSA. The front of the bus bumped the front portion of an
Isuzu pickup driven by Legaspi, which was moving along Congressional Avenue heading
towards Roosevelt Avenue. As a result, the points of contact of both vehicles were damaged and
physical injuries were inflicted on Legaspi and his passenger Lucila Kierulf, both of whom were
treated at the Quezon City General Hospital. The bus also hit and injured a pedestrian who was
then crossing EDSA.
Despite the impact, said bus continued to move forward and its front portion rammed against a
Caltex gasoline station, damaging its building and gasoline dispensing equipment.
As a consequence of the incident, Lucila suffered injuries, as stated in the medical reportof the
examining physicianl. The injuries sustained by Lucila required major and prolonged treatment
by specialists. Per medical report of another doctor, car driver Legaspi also suffered injuries.
The front portion of the pickup truck, owned by Spouses Kierulf was smashed to pieces. The
cost of repair was estimated at P107,583.50.
Pantranco, in its petition, adds that on said day, the abovementioned bus was driven by
Malanum. While cruising along EDSA, a used engine differential accidentally and suddenly
dropped from a junk truck in front of the bus. Said differential hit the underchassis of the bus,
throwing Malanum off his seat and making him lose control of said bus. The bus swerved to the
left, hit the center island, and bumped the pickup of the spouses.
ISSUE: WON the CAs decision is erroneous. Pantranco raises the following assignment of
errors:

1. in holding that the driver of Pantranco was negligent; andholding that the proximate cause of
the accident was the negligence of Pantranco and not a fortuitous event; and
2. in awarding excessive damages.
HELD: the petition for review in of Pantranco North Express, Inc., in G.R. No. 99343 is
DISMISSED.
The Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The award of moral
damages to Lucila and Legaspi is hereby INCREASEDto P400,000.00 and P50,000.00
respectively; exemplary damages to Lucila is INCREASED to P200,000.00. Legaspi is awarded
exemplary damages of P50,000.00. The amount of P16,500.00 as actual or compensatory
damages is also GRANTED to Legaspi. All other awards of Respondent CA are AFFIRMED.
Pantranco shall also PAY legal interest of 6% per annum on all sums awarded from the date of
promulgation of the decision of the trial court until actual payment to.
1. Even on appeal, Pantranco insists that its driver was not negligent and that the mishap was due
to a fortuitous event. It contends that the proximate cause was the accidental dropping of a used
engine differential by a junk truck immediately ahead of the bus.
As to what really caused the bus to careen to the opposite lane of EDSA and collide with the
pickup truck driven by Legaspi is a factual issue which this Court cannot pass upon. As a rule,
the jurisdiction of this Court is limited to the review of errors of law allegedly committed by the
appellate court. The fact that there is no conflict between the findings of the trial court and
respondent Court bolsters our position that a review of the facts found by respondent Court is not
necessary.
2.
a. moral damages

[To Mr. Kierulf] Complainants aver that the moral damages awarded by Respondent Court are
clearly and woefully not enough. The Kierulf spouses add that the Respondent Court should
have considered another factor: the loss of their conjugal fellowship and the impairment or
destruction of their sexual life.[
Pantranco rebuts that Victors claim of moral damages on alleged loss of consortium is without
legal basis. Article 2219 of the Civil Code provides that only the person suffering the injury may
claim moral damages. Additionally, no evidence was adduced to show that the consortium had
indeed been impaired and the Court cannot presume that marital relations disappeared with the
accident

Whether Rodriguez may be cited as authority to support the award of moral damages to Victor
and/or Lucila Kierulf for loss of consortium, however, cannot be properly considered in this
case.
Victors claim for deprivation of his right to consortium, although argued before Respondent
Court, is not supported by the evidence on record. His wife might have been badly disfigured,
but he had not testified that, in consequence thereof, his right to marital consortium was affected.
We emphasize that this claim is factual in origin and must find basis not only in the evidence
presented but also in the findings of the Respondent Court. For lack of factual basis, such claim
cannot be ruled upon by this Court at this time.
[To Mrs. Kierulf] The social and financial standing of Lucila cannot be considered in awarding
moral damages. The factual circumstances prior to the accident show that no rude and rough
reception, no menacing attitude, no supercilious manner, no abusive language and highly
scornful reference was given her. The social and financial standing of a claimant of moral
damages may be considered in awarding moral damages only if he or she was subjected to
contemptuous conduct despite the offenders knowledge of his or her social and financial
standing.
Be that as it may, it is still proper to award moral damages to Petitioner Lucila for her physical
sufferings, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety and wounded feelings. In this light and
considering further the length of time spent in prosecuting the complaint and this appeal, we find
the sum of P400,000.00 as moral damages for Petitioner Lucila to be fair and just under the
circumstances.
This Court cannot remind the bench and the bar often enough that in order that moral damages
may be awarded, there must be pleading and proof of moral suffering, mental anguish, fright and
the like. While no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages may be
awarded, the amount of indemnity being left to the discretion of the court,[39] it is nevertheless
essential that the claimant should satisfactorily show the existence of the factual basis of
damages[40] and its causal connection to defendants acts. This is so because moral damages,
though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in the category of an award designed to
compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer.
[41] In Francisco vs. GSIS,[42] the Court held that there must be clear testimony on the anguish
and other forms of mental suffering. Thus, if the plaintiff fails to take the witness stand and
testify as to his/her social humiliation, wounded feelings and anxiety, moral damages cannot be
awarded. In Cocoland Development Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Commission,[43]
the Court held that additional facts must be pleaded and proven to warrant the grant of moral
damages under the Civil Code, these being, x x x social humiliation, wounded feelings, grave
anxiety, etc., that resulted therefrom.
Moral damages are awarded to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversions or
amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he/she has undergone, by reason of
the defendants culpable action.[44] Its award is aimed at restoration, as much as possible, of the
spiritual status quo ante; thus, it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted

[To driver Legaspi ]

b. exemplary damages
Exemplary damages are designed to permit the courts to mould behavior that has socially
deleterious consequences, and its imposition is required by public policy to suppress the wanton
acts of an offender. However, it cannot be recovered as a matter of right. It is based entirely on
the discretion of the court. Jurisprudence sets certain requirements before exemplary damages
may be awarded, to wit:
(1) (T)hey may be imposed by way of example or correction only in addition, among others, to
compensatory damages, and cannot be recovered as a matter of right, their determination
depending upon the amount of compensatory damages that may be awarded to the claimant;
(2) the claimant must first establish his right to moral, temporate, liquidated or compensatory
damages; and
(3) the wrongful act must be accompanied by bad faith, and the award would be allowed only if
the guilty party acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.
The claim of Lucila has been favorably considered in view of the finding of gross negligence by
Respondent Court on the part of Pantranco. This is made clear by Respondent Court in granting
Lucilas claim of exemplary damages:
(P)ublic utility operators like the defendant, have made a mockery of our laws, rules and
regulations governing operations of motor vehicles and have ignored either deliberately or
through negligent disregard of their duties to exercise extraordinary degree of diligence for the
safety of the travelling public and their passengers. x x x .
To give teeth to this warning, the exemplary damages awarded to Petitioner Lucila is increased to
P200,000.00. The fact of gross negligence duly proven, we believe that Legaspi, being also a
victim of gross negligence, should also receive exemplary damages. Under the facts proven, the
Court awards him P25,000 as exemplary damages.
c. Loss of Earnings as a Component of Damages
[To Legaspi] Lost income in the amount of P16,500.00 is also claimed by Legaspi. This, in turn,
is not rebutted by Pantranco
We find, however, the claim of Legaspi to be duly substantiated. Pantranco failed to rebut the
claim of Porfirio that he had been incapacitated for ten (10) months and that during said period
he did not have any income. Considering that, prior to the accident, he was employed as a driver
and was earning P1,650.00 a month, his claim for P16,500.00 as compensation for loss of

earning capacity for said period is amply supported by the records[33] and is demandable under
Article 2205 of the Civil Code.[34]
[Mrs. Kierulf] Complainants contend that Lucila is also entitled to damages for loss or
impairment of earning capacity in cases of temporary or permanent personal injury under
Article 2205 of the Civil Code. Notably, both the trial court and public respondent denied this
prayer because of her failure to produce her income tax returns for the years 1985 and 1986,
notwithstanding the production of her 1983 and 1984 income tax returns.
Pantranco opposes the above claim for loss of earning capacity on the ground that there is no
proof that for the two years immediately preceding the accident Lucila was indeed deriving
income from some source which was cut off by the accident.
We agree with the findings of Respondent Court that Lucilas claim of loss of earning capacity
has not been duly proven. The alleged loss must be established by factual evidence for it
partakes of actual damages. A party is entitled to adequate compensation for such pecuniary loss
actually suffered and duly proved. Such damages, to be recoverable, must not only be capable of
proof, but must actually be shown with a reasonable degree of certainty. We have emphasized
that these damages cannot be presumed, and courts in making an award must point out specific
facts which can serve as basis for measuring whatever compensatory or actual damages are
borne. Mere proof of Lucilas earnings consisting of her 1983 and 1984 income tax returns
would not suffice to prove earnings for the years 1985 and 1986. The incident happened on
February 28, 1987. If indeed Lucila had been earning P50,000.00 every month prior to the
accident, as she alleged, there are evidentiary proofs for such earnings other than income tax
returns such as, but not limited to, payroll receipts, payments to the SSS, or withholding tax paid
every month. Sad to say, these other proofs have not been presented, and we cannot presume
that they exist on the strength of the word of Lucila alone.
d. Reduction of Actual Damages on the Pickup Based on an Estimate
Complainants contend that the reduction of 10% from the written estimate of the cost of repairs
by the trial court is pure speculation. Pantranco opposes this by pointing out that judicial notice
is made by respondent Court of the propensity of motor repair shops to exaggerate their
estimates
An estimate, as it is categorized, is not an actual expense incurred or to be incurred in the repair.
The reduction made by respondent court is reasonable considering that in this instance such
estimate was secured by the complainants themselves.
Posted March 26, 2011 by vbdiaz in TORTS AND DAMAGES

GLOBE MACKAY CABLE vs. CA and Tobias Leave a

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GLOBE MACKAY CABLE vs. CA and Tobias

G.R. No. 81262

August 25, 1989
FACTS: Respondent. Tobias was employed by petitioner Globe Mackay Cable and Radio
Corporation (GLOBE MACKAY) in a dual capacity as a purchasing agent and administrative
assistant to the engineering operations manager. In 1972, GLOBE MACKAY discovered
fictitious purchases and other fraudulent transactions for which it lost several thousands of pesos.
According to private respondent it was he who actually discovered the anomalies and reported
them his immediate superior Ferraren and to petitioner Hendry who was then the Executive VicePresident and General Manager of GLOBE MACKAY.
One day after Tobias made the report, petitioner Hendry confronted him by stating that he was
the number one suspect, and ordered him to take a one week forced leave, not to communicate
with the office, to leave his table drawers open, and to leave the office keys.
When private respondent Tobias returned to work after the forced leave, petitioner Hendry went
up to him and called him a crook and a swindler. Tobias was then ordered to take a lie
detector test. He was also instructed to submit specimen of his handwriting, signature, and
initials for examination by the police investigators to determine his complicity in the anomalies.
The Manila police investigators submitted a laboratory crime report clearing private respondent
of participation in the anomalies.
Not satisfied with the police report, petitioners hired a private investigator submitted a report
finding Tobias guilty. This report however expressly stated that further investigation was still to
be conducted.
Nevertheless Hendry issued a memorandum suspending Tobias from work preparatory to the
filing of criminal charges against him.
Tagle, Metro Manila Police Chief Document Examiner, after investigating other documents
pertaining to the alleged anomalous transactions, submitted a second laboratory crime report
reiterating his previous finding that the handwritings, signatures, and initials appearing in the
checks and other documents involved in the fraudulent transactions were not those of Tobias.
The lie detector tests conducted on Tobias also yielded negative results.
Notwithstanding the two police reports exculpating Tobias from the anomalies and the fact that
the report of the private investigator, was, by its own terms, not yet complete, petitioners filed
with the City Fiscal of Manila a complaint for estafa through falsification of commercial
documents, later amended to just estafa. Subsequently five other criminal complaints were filed
against Tobias, four of which were for estafa through Falsification of commercial document
while the fifth was for of Article 290 of the Revised Penal Code (Discovering Secrets Through
Seizure of Correspondence). All of the six criminal complaints were dismissed by the fiscal.

In the meantime Tobias received a notice from petitioners that his employment has been
terminated effective December 13, 1972. Whereupon, Tobias filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal. The labor arbiter dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the labor
arbiters decision. However, the Secretary of Labor, acting on petitioners appeal from the NLRC
ruling, reinstated the labor arbiters decision. Tobias appealed the Secretary of Labors order with
the Office of the President. During the pendency of the appeal with said office, petitioners and
private respondent Tobias entered into a compromise agreement regarding the latters complaint
for illegal dismissal.
Unemployed, Tobias sought employment with the RETELCO. However, petitioner Hendry,
without being asked by RETELCO, wrote a letter to the latter stating that Tobias was dismissed
by GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty.
Private respondent Tobias filed a civil case for damages anchored on alleged unlawful,
malicious, oppressive, and abusive acts of petitioners. The RTC of Manila rendered judgment in
favor of private respondent by ordering petitioners to pay actual damages, moral damages,
exemplary damages, attorneys fees, and costs. Petitioners appealed the RTC decision to the CA.
On the other hand, Tobias appealed as to the amount of damages.
The CA affirmed the RTC decision in toto. Petitioners motion for reconsideration having been
denied, the instant petition for review on certiorari was filed.
ISSUE: WON petitioners are liable for damages to private respondent.
HELD: The petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.
YES
Petitioners contend that they could not be made liable for damages in the lawful exercise of their
right to dismiss private respondent.
On the other hand, private respondent contends that because of petitioners abusive manner in
dismissing him as well as for the inhuman treatment he got from them, the Petitioners must
indemnify him for the damage that he had suffered.
One of the more notable innovations of the New Civil Code is the codification of some basic
principles that are to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the
stability of the social order. Foremost among these principles is that pronounced in Article 19
which provides:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights,
sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of ones rights but also in
the performance of ones duties.

The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the
norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal
because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some
illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms
enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for
which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct
for the government of human relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not
provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or
Article 21 would be proper.
Article 20, which pertains to damage arising from a violation of law, provides that:
Art. 20. Every person who contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another,
shall indemnify the latter for the same.
However, in the case at bar, petitioners claim that they did not violate any provision of law since
they were merely exercising their legal right to dismiss private respondent. This does not,
however, leave private respondent with no relief because Article 21 of the Civil Code provides
that:
Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
In determining whether or not the principle of abuse of rights may be invoked, there is no rigid
test which can be applied. While the Court has not hesitated to apply Article 19 whether the legal
and factual circumstances called for its application, the question of whether or not the principle
of abuse of rights has been violated resulting in damages under Article 20 or Article 21 or other
applicable provision of law, depends on the circumstances of each case. And in the instant case,
the Court, after examining the record and considering certain significant circumstances, finds
that all petitioners have indeed abused the right that they invoke, causing damage to private
respondent and for which the latter must now be indemnified.
XX
The trial court made a finding that notwithstanding the fact that it was private respondent Tobias
who reported the possible existence of anomalous transactions, petitioner Hendry showed
belligerence.. This, petitioners do not dispute. But regardless of whether or not it was private
respondent Tobias who reported the anomalies to petitioners, the latters reaction towards the
former upon uncovering the anomalies was less than civil. An employer who harbors suspicions
that an employee has committed dishonesty might be justified in taking the appropriate action
such as ordering an investigation and directing the employee to go on a leave. Firmness and the
resolve to uncover the truth would also be expected from such employer. But the high-handed
treatment accorded Tobias by petitioners was certainly uncalled for. And this reprehensible
attitude of petitioners was to continue when private respondent returned to work on after his one
week forced leave. Upon reporting for work, Tobias was confronted by Hendry who said.
Tobby, you are the crook and swindler in this company.

Considering that the first report made by the police investigators was submitted some time later,
the statement made by petitioner Hendry was baseless. The imputation of guilt without basis and
the pattern of harassment during the investigations of Tobias transgress the standards of human
conduct set forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code. If the dismissal is done abusively, then the
employer is liable for damages to the employee. Under the circumstances of the instant case, the
petitioners clearly failed to exercise in a legitimate manner their right to dismiss Tobias, giving
the latter the right to recover damages under Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of the Civil Code.
But petitioners were not content with just dismissing Tobias. Several other tortious acts were
committed by petitioners against Tobias after the latters termination from work. after the filing
of the first of six criminal complaints against Tobias, the latter talked to Hendry to protest the
actions taken against him. In response, Hendry cut short Tobias protestations by telling him to
just confess or else the company would file a hundred more cases against him until he landed in
jail. Hendry added that, You Filipinos cannot be trusted. The threat unmasked petitioners bad
faith in the various actions taken against Tobias. On the other hand, the scornful remark about
Filipinos as well as Hendrys earlier statements about Tobias being a crook and swindler are
clear violations of Tobias personal dignity
The next tortious act committed by petitioners was the writing of a letter to RETELCO .Because
of the letter, Tobias failed to gain employment with RETELCO and as a result of which, Tobias
remained unemployed for a longer period of time. For this further damage suffered by Tobias,
petitioners must likewise be held liable for damages consistent with Article 2176 of the Civil
Code. Petitioners, however, contend that they have a moral, if not legal, duty to forewarn other
employers of the kind of employee the plaintiff (private respondent herein) was. Petitioners
further claim that it is the accepted moral and societal obligation of every man to advise or warn
his fellowmen of any threat or danger to the latters life, honor or property. And this includes
warning ones brethren of the possible dangers involved in dealing with, or accepting into
confidence, a man whose honesty and integrity is suspect These arguments, rather than justify
petitioners act, reveal a seeming obsession to prevent Tobias from getting a job, even after
almost two years from the time Tobias was dismissed.
Finally, there is the matter of the filing by petitioners of six criminal complaints against Tobias.
Petitioners contend that there is no case against them for malicious prosecution and that they
cannot be penalized for exercising their right and prerogative of seeking justice by filing
criminal complaints against an employee who was their principal suspect in the commission of
forgeries and in the perpetration of anomalous transactions which defrauded them of substantial
sums of money
While sound principles of justice and public policy dictate that persons shall have free resort to
the courts for redress of wrongs and vindication of their rights, the right to institute criminal
prosecutions can not be exercised maliciously and in bad faith.
To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a
design to vex and humiliate a person and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant
knowing that the charges were false and groundless

In fine, considering the haste in which the criminal complaints were filed, the fact that they were
filed during the pendency of the illegal dismissal case against petitioners, the threat made by
Hendry, the fact that the cases were filed notwithstanding the two police reports exculpating
Tobias from involvement in the anomalies committed against GLOBE MACKAY, coupled by the
eventual dismissal of all the cases, the Court is led into no other conclusion than that petitioners
were motivated by malicious intent in filing the six criminal complaints against Tobias.
XX (on damages)
Petitioners next contend that the award of damages was excessive.
It must be underscored that petitioners have been guilty of committing several actionable tortious
acts, i.e., the abusive manner in which they dismissed Tobias from work including the baseless
imputation of guilt and the harassment during the investigations; the defamatory language
heaped on Tobias as well as the scornful remark on Filipinos; the poison letter sent to RETELCO
which resulted in Tobias loss of possible employment; and, the malicious filing of the criminal
complaints. Considering the extent of the damage wrought on Tobias, the Court finds that,
contrary to petitioners contention, the amount of damages awarded to Tobias was reasonable
under the circumstances.
NOTES:
Yet, petitioners still insist that the award of damages was improper, invoking the principle of
damnum absque injuria. It is argued that [t]he only probable actual damage that plaintiff
(private respondent herein) could have suffered was a direct result of his having been dismissed
from his employment, which was a valid and legal act of the defendants-appellants (petitioners
herein).
According to the principle of damnum absque injuria, damage or loss which does not constitute a
violation of a legal right or amount to a legal wrong is not actionable. This principle finds no
application in this case. It bears repeating that even granting that petitioners might have had the
right to dismiss Tobias from work, the abusive manner in which that right was exercised
amounted to a legal wrong for which petitioners must now be held liable. Moreover, the damage
incurred by Tobias was not only in connection with the abusive manner in which he was
dismissed but was also the result of several other quasi-delictual acts committed by petitioners.
Petitioners next question the award of moral damages. However, the Court has already ruled in a
case that [p]er express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral damages are
recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code. Hence, the CA committed no
error in awarding moral damages to Tobias.
Lastly, the award of exemplary damages is impugned by petitioners. Although Article 2231 of
the Civil Code provides that [i]n quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the
defendant acted with gross negligence, the Court, in Zulueta v. Pan American World Airways,
Inc., ruled that if gross negligence warrants the award of exemplary damages, with more reason
is its imposition justified when the act performed is deliberate, malicious and tainted with bad

faith. As in the Zulueta case, the nature of the wrongful acts shown to have been committed by
petitioners against Tobias is sufficient basis for the award of exemplary damages to the latter.
Posted March 26, 2011 by vbdiaz in TORTS AND DAMAGES

CULION ICE, FISH AND ELECTRIC CO., INC vs.

PHILIPPINE MOTORS CORPORATION Leave a
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CULION ICE, FISH AND ELECTRIC CO., INC vs. PHILIPPINE MOTORS
CORPORATION
G.R. No. L-32611
November 3, 1930
FACTS: The Culion Ice, Fish & Electric Co Inc (CIFECI) and Philippine Motors Corporation
(PMC) are domestic corporations. Cranston was the representative of CIFECI in the City of
Manila and the latter was the registered owner of the motor schooner Gwendoline, which was
used in the fishing trade in the Philippine Islands.
Cranston decided to have the engine on the Gwendoline changed from a gasoline consumer to a
crude oil burner. He accordingly repaired to the office of the PMC and had a conference with
Quest, its manager, who agreed to do the job. As a result of the aforesaid interview, Quest, in
company with Cranston, visited the Gwendoline while it lay at anchor in the Pasig River, and the
work of effecting the change in the engine was begun and conducted under the supervision of
Quest.
Upon preliminary inspection of the engine, Quest came to the conclusion that the principal thing
necessary to accomplish the end in view was to install a new carburetor. After this appliance had
been installed, the engine was tried with gasoline as a fuel. The next problem was to introduce
into the carburetor the baser fuel, consisting of a low grade of oil mixed with distillate. For this
purpose a temporary tank to contain the mixture was placed on deck above and at a short
distance from the compartment covering the engine. This tank was connected with the carburetor
by a piece of tubing, which was apparently not well fitted at the point where it was connected
with the tank. Owing to this fact the fuel mixture leaked from the tank and dripped sown into the
engine compartment.
In the course of the preliminary work upon the carburetor and its connections, it was observed
that the carburetor was flooding, and that the gasoline, or other fuel, was trickling freely from the
lower part to the carburetor to the floor. This fact was called to Quests attention, but he appeared
to think lightly of the matter.
After preliminary experiments and adjustments had been made the boat was taken out into the
bay for a trial run. As the boat was coming in from this run, the engine stopped, and connection

again had to be made with the gasoline line to get a new start. A moment later a back fire
occurred in the cylinder chamber. This caused a flame to shoot back into the carburetor, and
instantly the carburetor and adjacent parts were covered with a mass of flames, which the
members of the crew were unable to subdue. They were therefore compelled, as the fire spread,
to take to a boat, and their escape was safely effected, but the Gwendoline was reduced to a mere
hulk.
An action was instituted in the CFI of Manila by CIFECI for the purpose of recovering from the
PMC the sum of P11,350, with interest and costs.
Upon hearing the cause the trial court gave judgment in favor of CIFECI to recover the sum of
P9,850, with interest.. From this judgment PMC appealed.
ISSUE:
1. WON the lower court erred in its decision
2. WON the action should be considered stale
HELD: The judgment appealed from, awarding damages to CIFECI must be affirmed
1. NO
A study of the testimony lead us to the conclusion that the loss of this boat was chargeable to the
negligence and lack of skill of Quest. The back fire may have been due either to the fact that the
spark was too advanced or the fuel improperly mixed.
In this connection it must be remembered that when a person holds himself out as being
competent to do things requiring professional skill, he will be held liable for negligence if he
fails to exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he
attempts to do. The proof shows that Quest had had ample experience in fixing the engines of
automobiles and tractors, but it does not appear that he was experienced in the doing of similar
work on boats. For this reason, possibly the dripping of the mixture form the tank on deck and
the flooding of the carburetor did not convey to his mind an adequate impression of the danger of
fire. But a person skilled in that particular sort of work would, we think have been sufficiently
warned from those circumstances to cause him to take greater and adequate precautions against
the danger. In other words Quest did not use the skill that would have been exhibited by one
ordinarily expert in repairing gasoline engines on boats. There was here, in our opinion, on the
part of Quest, a blameworthy antecedent inadvertence to possible harm, and this constitutes
negligence. The burning of the Gwendoline may be said to have resulted from accident, but this
accident was in no sense an unavoidable accident. It would not have occured but for Quests
carelessness or lack of skill. The test of liability is not whether the injury was accidental in a
sense, but whether Quest was free from blame.
2. NO

This action was instituted about two years after the accident in question had occured, and after
Quest had ceased to be manager of the defendant corporation and had gone back to the United
States. Upon these facts, the defendant bases the contention that the action should be considered
stale. It is sufficient reply to say that the action was brought within the period limited by the
statute of limitations and the situation is not one where the defense of laches can be properly
invoked.
NOTES:
The trial judge seems to have proceeded on the idea that, inasmuch as Quest had control of the
Gwendoline during the experimental run, the defendant corporation was in the position of a
bailee and that, as a consequence, the burden of proof was on the defendant to exculpate itself
from responsibility by proving that the accident was not due to the fault of Quest. We are unable
to accede to this point of view. Certainly, Quest was not in charge of the navigation of the boat
on this trial run. His employment contemplated the installation of new parts in the engine only,
and it seems rather strained to hold that the defendant corporation had thereby become bailee of
the boat. As a rule workmen who make repairs on a ship in its owners yard, or a mechanic who
repairs a coach without taking it to his shop, are not bailees, and their rights and liabilities are
determined by the general rules of law, under their contract. The true bailee acquires possession
and what is usually spoken of as special property in the chattel bailed. As a consequence of such
possession and special property, the bailee is given a lien for his compensation. These ideas seem
to be incompatible with the situation now under consideration. But though defendant cannot be
held liable in the supposition that the burden of proof had not been sustained by it in disproving
the negligence of its manager, we are nevertheless of the opinion that the proof shows by a clear
preponderance that the accident to the Gwendoline and the damages resulting therefrom are
chargeable to the negligence or lack of skill of Quest.
Posted March 26, 2011 by vbdiaz in TORTS AND DAMAGES

PRECIOLITA V. CORLISS vs. THE MANILA

RAILROAD COMPANY Leave a comment
PRECIOLITA V. CORLISS vs. THE MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY
G.R. No. L-21291
March 28, 1969
FACTS: Ralph Corliss Jr. was an air police of the Clark Air Force Base. The jeep he was driving
while accompanied with a P.C. soldier, collided with a locomotive of Manila Railroad Company
(MRC) close to midnight at the railroad crossing in Balibago, Angeles, Pampanga, in front of the
Clark Air Force Base. Corliss Jr. died of serious burns at the hospital the next day, while the
soldier sustained serious physical injuries and burns.

In the decision appealed from, the lower court, after summarizing the evidence, concluded that
the deceased in his eagerness to beat, so to speak, the oncoming locomotive, took the risk and
attempted to reach the other side, but unfortunately he became the victim of his own
miscalculation.
The negligence imputed to MRC was thus ruled out by the lower court, satisfactory proof to that
effect, in its opinion, being lacking. Hence this appeal direct to us, the amount sought in the
concept of damages reaching the sum of P282,065.40.
ISSUE: WON the lower courts decision is erroneous
HELD: The decision of the lower court dismissing the complaint, is affirmed.
NO
The lower court judgment has in its favor the presumption of correctness. It is entitled to great
respect. In the absence of compelling reasons, [the factual] determination is best left to the trial
judge why had the advantage of hearing the parties testify and observing their demeanor on the
witness stand.
But more importantly, this action is predicated on negligence, the Civil Code making clear that
whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being negligence, is under
obligation to pay for the damage done. Unless it could be satisfactorily shown, therefore, that
MRC was guilty of negligence then it could not be held liable. The crucial question, therefore, is
the existence of negligence.
Negligence was defined by us in two 1912 decisions, United States v. Juanillo and United States
v. Barias. Cooley formulation was quoted with approval in both the Juanillo and Barias
decisions. Thus: Judge Cooley in his work on Torts (3d ed.), Sec. 1324, defines negligence to
be:
The failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of care,
precaution and vigilance which the circumstance justly demand whereby such other person
suffers injury.
There was likewise a reliance on Ahern v. Oregon Telephone Co. Thus:
Negligence is want of the care required by the circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not
an absolute term and its application depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree of
care and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require. Where the danger is great, a high
degree of care is necessary, and the failure to observe it is a want of ordinary care under the
circumstances.
To repeat, by such a test, no negligence could be imputed to MRC and the action of Corliss must
necessarily fail. The facts being what they are, compel the conclusion that the liability sought to
be fastened on MRC had not arisen.

Finally, each and every case on questions of negligence is to be decided in accordance with the
peculiar circumstances that present themselves. There can be no hard and fast rule. There must
be that observance of that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the situation demands.
Posted March 26, 2011 by vbdiaz in TORTS AND DAMAGES

LILIUS, ET AL. vs. THE MANILA

RAILROAD COMPANY Leave a comment
LILIUS, ET AL. vs. THE MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY
G.R. No. L-39587
March 24, 1934
FACTS: Lilius was driving with his wife and daughter for sightseeing in Pagsanjan Laguna. It
was his first time in the area and he was entirely unacquainted with the conditions of the road
and had no knowledge of the existence of a railroad crossing. Before reaching the crossing in
question, there was nothing to indicate its existence and, it was impossible to see an approaching
train. At about seven or eight meters from the crossing the plaintiff saw an autotruck parked on
the left side of the road. Several people, who seemed to have alighted from the said truck, were
walking on the opposite side. He slowed down and sounded his horn for the people to get out of
the way. With his attention thus occupied, he did not see the crossing but he heard two short
whistles. Immediately afterwards, he saw a huge black mass fling itself upon him, which turned
out to be locomotive No. 713 of the MRCs train. The locomotive struck the plaintiffs car right
in the center. The 3 victims were injured and were hospitalized.
Lilus filed a case against MRC in the CFI. Answering the complaint, it denies each and every
allegation thereof and, by way of special defense, alleges that the Lilius, with the cooperation of
his wife and coplaintiff, negligently and recklessly drove his car, and prays that it be absolved
from the complaint.
The CFI decided in favor of Lilius. The 2 parties appealed said decision, each assigning errors on
said judgement.
ISSUE:
1. WON Manila Railroad Company is liable for damages
2. WON the sums of money fixed by the court a quo as indemnities for damages proper

1. Injuries sutained by Lilius

2. for injuries sustained by wife and child

3. for loss of domestic service of wife to husband
HELD: The judgment appealed from is affirmed in toto, with the sole modification on interest to
be added on the indemnity in favor of Lilius.

1. YES
Upon examination of the oral as well as of the documentary evidence, this court is of the opinion
that the accident was due to negligence on the part of the defendant-appellant company alone, for
not having had on that occasion any semaphore at the crossing to serve as a warning to passersby of its existence in order that they might take the necessary precautions before crossing the
railroad; and, on the part of its employees the flagman and switchman, for not having
remained at his post at the crossing in question to warn passers-by of the approaching train
Although it is probable that the defendant-appellant entity employed the diligence of a good
father of a family in selecting its aforesaid employees, however, it did not employ such diligence
in supervising their work and the discharge of their duties. The diligence of a good father of a
family, which the law requires in order to avoid damage, is not confined to the careful and
prudent selection of subordinates or employees but includes inspection of their work and
supervision of the discharge of their duties.
2.
a. With respect to the plaintiffs appeal, the first question to be decided is that raised by Lilius
relative to the insufficiency of the sum of P5,000 which the trial court adjudicated to him by way
of indemnity for damages consisting in the loss of his income as journalist and author as a result
of his illness. As to the amount of P10,000 claimed by Lilius as damages for the loss of his wifes
services in his business, which services consisted in going over his writings, translating them into
foreign languages and acting as his secretary, in addition to the fact that such services formed
part of the work whereby he realized a net monthly income of P1,500, there is no sufficient
evidence of the true value of said services nor to the effect that he needed them during her illness
and had to employ a translator to act in her stead.
b. Taking into consideration the fact that the wife in the language of the court, which saw her
at the trial young and beautiful and the big scar, which she has on her forehead caused by the
lacerated wound received by her from the accident, disfigures her face and that the fracture of
her left leg has caused a permanent deformity which renders it very difficult for her to walk, and
taking into further consideration her social standing, neither is the sum adjudicated to her for
patrimonial and moral damages, excessive.
As to the indemnity in favor of the child neither is the same excessive, taking into consideration
the fact that the lacerations received by her have left deep scars that permanently disfigure her

face and that the fractures of both her legs permanently render it difficult for her to walk freely,
continuous extreme care being necessary in order to keep her balance in addition to the fact that
all of this unfavorably and to a great extent affect her matrimonial future.
c. Lilius also seeks to recover the sum of P2,500 for the loss of what is called Anglo-Saxon
common law consortium of his wife, that is, her services, society and conjugal
companionship, as a result of personal injuries which she had received from the accident now
under consideration.
Under the law and the doctrine of this court, one of the husbands rights is to count on his wifes
assistance. This assistance comprises the management of the home and the performance of
household duties. However, nowadays when women, in their desire to be more useful to society
and to the nation, are demanding greater civil rights and are aspiring to become mans equal in
all the activities of life, marriage has ceased to create the presumption that a woman complies
with the duties to her husband and children, which the law imposes upon her, and he who seeks
to collect indemnity for damages resulting from deprivation of her domestic services must prove
such services. In the case under consideration, apart from the services of his wife as translator
and secretary, the value of which has not been proven, Lilius has not presented any evidence
showing the existence of domestic services and their nature, rendered by her prior to the
accident, in order that it may serve as a basis in estimating their value.
Furthermore, inasmuch as a wifes domestic assistance and conjugal companionship are purely
personal and voluntary acts which neither of the spouses may be compelled to render, it is
necessary for the party claiming indemnity for the loss of such services to prove that the person
obliged to render them had done so before he was injured and that he would be willing to
continue rendering them had he not been prevented from so doing
NOTES:
However, in order that a victim of an accident may recover indemnity for damages from the
person liable therefor, it is not enough that the latter has been guilty of negligence, but it is also
necessary that the said victim has not, through his own negligence, , contributed to the accident.
It appears that Lilius took all precautions which his skill and the presence of his wife and child,
driving his car at a speed which prudence demanded according to the circumstances and
conditions of the road, slackening his speed in the face of an obstacle and blowing his horn upon
seeing persons on the road. If he failed to stop, look and listen before going over the crossing, in
spite of the fact that he was driving at 12 miles per hour after having been free from obstacles, it
was because, his attention having been occupied in attempting to go ahead, he did not see the
crossing in question, nor anything, nor anybody indicating its existence, as he knew nothing
about it beforehand. The first and only warning, which he received of the impending danger, was
two short blows from the whistle of the locomotive immediately preceding the collision and
when the accident had already become inevitable.
Posted March 26, 2011 by vbdiaz in TORTS AND DAMAGES

spouses ONG vs. METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT

Leave a comment
spouses ONG vs. METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT
G.R. No. L-7664
August 29, 1958
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
FACTS: Defendant owns and operates three recreational swimming pools at its Balara filters,
Diliman, Quezon City, to which people are invited and for which a nominal fee is charged . 14
year old Dominador Ong drowned while swimming in one of those pools.
Defendant admits the fact that plaintiffs son was drowned in one of its swimming pools but
avers that his death was caused by his own negligence or by unavoidable accident. Defendant
also avers that it had exercised due diligence in the selection of, and supervision over, its
employees and that it had observed the diligence required by law under the circumstances.
After trial, the lower court found that the action of plaintiffs is untenable and dismissed the
complaint without pronouncement as to costs. Plaintiffs took the case on appeal directly to this
Court because the amount involved exceeds the sum of P50,000.
ISSUE:
1. WON the death of minor Dominador Ong can be attributed to the negligence of defendant
and/or its employees so as to entitle plaintiffs to recover damages.
2. WON the doctrine of last clear chance could be used against the respondent
HELD: decision is affirmed
The present action is governed by Article 2176 in relation to Article 2080 of the new Civil Code.
The first article provides that whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damages done. Such fault or negligence is called
quasi-delict. Under the second article, this obligation is demandable not only for ones own acts
or omissions but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
Since the present action is one for damages founded on culpable negligence, the principle to be
observed is that the person claiming damages has the burden of proving that the damage is
caused by the fault or negligence of the person from whom the damage is claimed, or of one of
his employees.
NO

There is sufficient evidence to show that appellee has taken all necessary precautions to avoid
danger to the lives of its patrons or prevent accident which may cause their death. Thus, it has
been shown that the swimming pools of appellee are provided with a ring buoy, toy roof, towing
line, oxygen resuscitator and a first aid medicine kit. The bottom of the pools is painted with
black colors so as to insure clear visibility. There is on display in a conspicuous place within the
area certain rules and regulations governing the use of the pools. Appellee employs six lifeguards
who are all trained as they had taken a course for that purpose and were issued certificates of
proficiency. There is a male nurse and a sanitary inspector with a clinic provided with oxygen
resuscitator. And there are security guards who are available always in case of emergency.
The record also shows that when the body of minor Ong was retrieved from the bottom of the
pool, the employees of appellee did everything possible to bring him back to life, from manual
resuscitation to calling for a doctor. All of the foregoing shows that appellee has done what is
humanly possible under the circumstances to restore life to minor Ong and for that reason it is
unfair to hold it liable for his death.
2. We do not see how this doctrine may apply considering that the record does not show how
minor Ong came into the big swimming pool. The only thing the record discloses is that minor
Ong informed his elder brothers that he was going to the locker room to drink a bottle of coke
but that from that time on nobody knew what happened to him until his lifeless body was
retrieved. The doctrine of last clear chance simply means that the negligence of a claimant does
not preclude a recovery for the negligence of defendant where it appears that the latter, by
exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to claimant
notwithstanding his negligence. Or, As the doctrine usually is stated, a person who has the last
clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his
opponent or the negligence of a third person which is imputed to his opponent, is considered in
law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident.
Since it is not known how minor Ong came into the big swimming pool and it being apparent
that he went there without any companion in violation of one of the regulations of appellee as
regards the use of the pools, and it appearing that the lifeguard responded to the call for help as
soon as his attention was called to it and immediately after retrieving the body all efforts at the
disposal of appellee had been put into play in order to bring him back to life, it is clear that there
is no room for the application of the doctrine now invoked by appellants to impute liability to
appellee..
The last clear chance doctrine can never apply where the party charged is required to act
instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after
the peril is or should have been discovered; at least in cases in which any previous negligence of
the party charged cannot be said to have contributed to the injury.
Before closing, we wish to quote the following observation of the trial court, which we find
supported by the evidence: There is (also) a strong suggestion coming from the expert evidence
presented by both parties that Dominador Ong might have dived where the water was only 5.5
feet deep, and in so doing he might have hit or bumped his forehead against the bottom of the
pool, as a consequence of which he was stunned, and which to his drowning.

NOTES:
Cited jurisprudence:
The rule is well settled that the owners of resorts to which people generally are expressly or by
implication invited are legally bound to exercise ordinary care and prudence in the management
and maintenance of such resorts, to the end of making them reasonably safe for visitors (Larkin
vs. Saltair Beach Co., 30 Utah 86, 83 Pac. 686).
Although the proprietor of a natatorium is liable for injuries to a patron, resulting from lack of
ordinary care in providing for his safety, without the fault of the patron, he is not, however, in
any sense deemed to be the insurer of the safety of patrons. And the death of a patron within his
premises does not cast upon him the burden of excusing himself from any presumption of
negligence (Bertalot vs. Kinnare.)
Posted March 26, 2011 by vbdiaz in TORTS AND DAMAGES

YAKULT PHILIPPINES AND SALVADO vs. CA et al

Leave a comment
YAKULT PHILIPPINES AND SALVADO vs. CA et al
G.R. No. 91856
October 5, 1990
GANCAYCO, J.:
FACTS: a five-year old boy, Roy Camaso, while standing on the sidewalk of M. de la Fuente
Street, Sampaloc, Manila, was sideswiped by a Yamaha motorcycle owned by Yakult Philippines
and driven by its employee, Larry Salvado.
Salvado was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to slight physical injuries
in an information that was filed with the then City Court of Manila. Later on, a complaint for
damages was filed by Roy Camaso represented by his father, David Camaso, against Yakult
Philippines and Larry Salvado in the RTC of Manila.
In due course a decision was rendered in the civil case ordering defendants to pay jointly and
severally the plaintiff for actual expenses for medical services and hospital bills, attorneys fees
and the costs of the suit. Although said defendants appealed the judgment, they nevertheless filed
a petition for certiorari in the CA challenging the jurisdiction of the trial court over said civil
case.
Petitioners thesis is that the civil action for damages for injuries arising from alleged criminal
negligence of Salvado, being without malice, cannot be filed independently of the criminal

action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. Further, it is contended that under Section 1, Rule 111
of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure such a separate civil action may not be filed unless
reservation thereof is expressly made.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. A motion for reconsideration thereof filed by
petitioners was denied. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Can a civil action instituted after the criminal action was filed prosper even if there was
no reservation to file a separate civil action?
HELD: the petition is DENIED. The questioned decisions of the CA are hereby AFFIRMED
YES
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure provides as follows:
SEC. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the
offended party:
1. waives the civil action
2. reserves his right to institute it separately, or
3. institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
xxx
A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The institution of, or the reservation
of the right to file, any of said civil actions separately waives the others.
xx
The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be made before the
prosecution starts to present its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a
reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.
Although the incident in question and the actions arising therefrom were instituted before the
promulgation of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, its provisions which are procedural may
apply retrospectively to the present case.
In this case, the offended party has not waived the civil action, nor reserved the right to institute
it separately. Neither has the offended party instituted the civil action prior to the criminal action.
However, the civil action in this case was filed in court before the presentation of the evidence
for the prosecution in the criminal action of which the judge presiding on the criminal case was
duly informed, so that in the disposition of the criminal action no damages was awarded.

The civil liability sought arising from the act or omission of the accused in this case is a quasi
delict as defined under Article 2176 of the Civil Code as follows:
ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no preexisting contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.
The aforecited revised rule requiring such previous reservation also covers quasi-delict as
defined under Article 2176 of the Civil Code arising from the same act or omission of the
accused.
Although the separate civil action filed in this case was without previous reservation in the
criminal case, nevertheless since it was instituted before the prosecution presented evidence
in the criminal action, and the judge handling the criminal case was informed thereof, then
the actual filing of the civil action is even far better than a compliance with the requirement of an
express reservation that should be made by the offended party before the prosecution presents its
evidence.
The purpose of this rule requiring reservation is to prevent the offended party from recovering
damages twice for the same act or omission.
Thus, the Court finds and so holds that the trial court had jurisdiction over the separate civil
action brought before it.
NOTES:
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure (complete)
SEC. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the
civil action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages
under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act
or omission of the accused.
A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The institution of, or the reservation
of the right to file, any of said civil actions separately waives the others.
The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be made before the
prosecution starts to present its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a
reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.

In no case may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
accused.
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral,
nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the filing fees for such civil action as provided in
these Rules shall constitute a first lien on the judgment except in an award for actual damages.
In cases wherein the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the complaint or
information, the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing
thereof in court for trial. (1a)
Posted March 26, 2011 by vbdiaz in TORTS AND DAMAGES

RCPI vs.CA et al Leave a comment

RCPI vs.CA et al
G.R. No. 79578
March 13, 1991
Sarmiento, J:
FACTS: A social condolence telegram sent through the facilities of the RADIO
COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC (RCPI). The condolence telegram was
correctly transmitted as far as the written text was concerned. However, the condolence message
as communicated and delivered to the addressees was typewritten on a Happy Birthday card
and placed inside a Christmasgram envelope. The RCPIs defense is that it ran out of social
forms and envelope for condolence telegrams.

The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the respondents Timans which was affirmed in toto
by the CA. RCPI now submits assignment of errors regarding the award of damages and
attorneys fees against it.
ISSUE: WON RCPI is liable for breach of contract and negligence as decided by the 2 courts
HELD: , the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED in toto
YES
The SC fully agrees with the appellate courts endorsement of the trial courts conclusion that
RCPI, a corporation dealing in telecommunications and offering its services to the public, is
engaged in a business affected with public interest. As such, it is bound to exercise that degree of
diligence expected of it in the performance of its obligation.

One of RCPIs main arguments is that despite the fact that there was error in the social form
and envelope used, it asserts that there was no showing that it has any motive to cause harm or
damage on private respondents:
In the present case, it is self-evident that a telegram of condolence is intended and meant to
convey a message of sorrow and sympathy. It seems out of this world, therefore, to place that
message of condolence in a birthday card and deliver the same in a Christmas envelope for such
acts of carelessness and incompetence not only render violence to good taste and common sense,
they depict a bizarre presentation of the senders feelings.
The findings of the respondent court are persuasive.
. . . When plaintiffs placed an order for transmission of their social condolence telegram,
defendant did not inform the plaintiff of the exhaustion of such social condolence forms.
Defendant-appellant accepted through its authorized agent or agency the order and received the
corresponding compensation therefor. . Gross negligence or carelessness can be attributed to
defendant-appellant in not supplying its various stations with such sufficient and adequate social
condolence forms when it held out to the public the availability of such social condolence
forms and accepted for a fee the transmission of messages on said forms. Knowing that there are
no such forms as testified to by its Material Control Manager and entering into a contract for the
transmission of messages in such forms, defendant-appellant committed acts of bad faith, fraud
or malice. . . .
Anyone who avails of the facilities of a telegram company like RCPI can choose to send his
message in the ordinary form or in a social form. In the ordinary form, the text of the message is
typed on plain newsprint paper. On the other hand, a social telegram is placed in a special form
with the proper decorations and embellishments to suit the occasion and the message and
delivered in an envelope matching the purpose of the occasion and the words and intent of the
message. The sender pays a higher amount for the social telegram than for one in the ordinary
form.
It is clear, therefore, that when the message was being prepared, it committed a breach of
contract as well as gross negligence. It could not have been faulted had it delivered the message
in the ordinary form and reimbursed the difference in the cost to the private respondents.
NOTES:
It was not unexpected that because of this unusual incident, which caused much embarrassment
and distress to respondent Timan, he suffered nervousness and hypertension resulting in his
confinement for three days at a hospital.
The petitioner argues that a court cannot rely on speculation, conjectures or guess work as to the
fact and amount of damages, but must depend on the actual proof that damages had been suffered
and evidence of the actual
amount. In other words, RCPI insists that there is no causal relation of the illness suffered by Mr.
Timan with the foul-up caused by the petitioner. But that is a question of fact. The findings of

fact of the trial court and the respondent court concur in favor of the private respondents. We are
bound by such findingsthat is the general rule well-established by a long line of cases. Nothing
has been shown to convince us to justify the relaxation of this rule in the petitioners favor. On
the contrary, these factual findings are supported by substantial evidence on record.
Posted March 26, 2011 by vbdiaz in TORTS AND DAMAGES

GLAN PEOPLES LUMBER AND HARDWARE et al vs.

IAC et al Leave a comment
GLAN PEOPLES LUMBER AND HARDWARE et al vs. IAC et al
G.R. No. 70493
May 18, 1989
NARVASA, J:
FACTS: Engineer Calibo, Roranes, and Patos were on the jeep, with Calibo at the wheel, as it
approached a bridge going towards the direction of Davao City. At about that time, the cargo
truck, Zacarias coming from the opposite direction of Davao City had just crossed said bridge.
At about 59 yards after crossing the bridge, the cargo truck and the jeep collided as a
consequence of which Engineer Calibo died while Roranes and Patos sustained physical injuries.
Zacarias was unhurt. As a result of the impact, the left side of the truck was slightly damaged
while the left side of the jeep,\ was extensively damaged. After the impact, the jeep fell and
rested on its right side on the asphalted road a few meters to the rear of the truck, while the truck
stopped on its wheels on the road.
A case for damages was filed by the surviving spouse and children of the late Engineer Calibo
against the driver and owners of the cargo truck with the CFI of Bohol.
Accordingly, the Court dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence
The Court of Appeals saw things differently. It rendered judgment 9 on the plaintiffs appeal,
reversing the decision of the Trial Court. It found Zacarias to be negligent and his negligence
gave rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of his employer, and their liability is both
primary and solidary. It therefore ordered the defendants jointly and solidarily to indemnify the
plaintiffs
The defendants have appealed to this Court on certiorari and pray for a reversal of the judgment
of the IAC which, it is claimed, ignored or ran counter to the established facts
ISSUE:

1. WON the decision o fthe IAC was erroneous

2. WON the doctrine of last clear chance is applicable in this case
HELD: , the appealed judgment of the IAC is hereby REVERSED
1. YES
The SC found Calibo negligent instead, because of the following:
1. it is alleged that at the time of the collision, the truck was occupying 25 cm of the jeeps lane.
However it was found out that the center stripe of the road is misaligned and with the correct
calculation of the width of the road, the truck on still on its proper lane and it was actually the
jeep who is intruding the trucks lane.
2. Nor was the Appellate Court correct in finding that Zacarias had acted negligently in applying
his brakes instead of getting back inside his lane upon the coming of the approaching jeep. Being
well within his own lane, as has already been explained, he had no duty to swerve out of the
jeeps way as said Court would have had him do. And even supposing that he was in fact partly
inside the opposite lane, coming to a full stop with the jeep still 30 meters away cannot be
considered an unsafe or imprudent action.
3. Unlike Zacarias who readily submitted himself to investigation by the police, Calibos
companions, Roranes and Patos, who suffered injuries on account of the collision, refused to be
so investigated or give statements to the police officers is a telling indication that they did not
attribute the happening to defendant Zacarias negligence or fault. 7
The evidence not only acquits Zacarias of any negligence in the matter; there are also quite a few
significant indicators that it was rather Engineer Calibos negligence that was the proximate
cause of the accident. Zacarias had told Patrolman Dimaano at the scene of the collision and later
confirmed in his written statement at the police headquarters that the jeep had been
zigzagging, which is to say that it was travelling or being driven erratically at the time. The
other investigator also testified that eyewitnesses to the accident had remarked on the jeeps
zigzagging. There was also testimony that Calibo was drunk while driving the jeep.
2. YES
Even, however, ignoring these telltale indicia of negligence on the part of Calibo, and assuming
some antecedent negligence on the part of Zacarias in failing to keep within his designated lane,
incorrectly demarcated as it was, the physical facts would still absolve the latter of any
actionable responsibility for the accident under the rule of the last clear chance.
Both drivers, as the Appellate Court found, had had a full view of each others vehicle from a
distance of 150 meters. The truck had been brought to a stop while the jeep was still thirty meters
away. From these facts the logical conclusion emerges that the driver of the jeep had what
judicial doctrine has appropriately called the last clear chance to avoid the accident, while still at

that distance of thirty meters from the truck, by stopping in his turn or swerving his jeep away
from the truck, either of which he had sufficient time to do while running at a speed of only
thirty kilometers per hour. In those circumstances, his duty was to seize that opportunity of
avoidance, not merely rely on a supposed right to expect the truck to swerve and leave him a
clear path.
The doctrine of the last clear chance provides as valid and complete a defense to accident
liability today as it did when invoked and applied in the 1918 case of Picart vs. Smith, supra,
which involved a similar state of facts.
Since said ruling clearly applies to exonerate petitioner Zacarias and his employer (and copetitioner) George Lim, an inquiry into whether or not the evidence supports the latters
additional defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of said driver is no longer
necessary and wig not be undertaken. The fact is that there is such evidence in the record which
has not been controverted.
NOTES:
It must be pointed out, however, that IAC also seriously erred in holding the petitioners Agad
and Felix Lim solidarily liable for the damages awarded in its appealed decision, as alleged
owners, with petitioner George Lim, of Glan Peoples Lumber and Hardware, employer of
petitioner Zacarias. This manifestly disregarded, not only the certificate of registration issued by
the Bureau of Domestic Trade identifying Glan Peoples Lumber and Hardware as a business
name registered by George Lim, but also unimpugned allegations into the petitioners answer to
the complaint that Pablo S. Agad was only an employee of George Lim and that Felix Lim, then
a child of only eight (8) years, was in no way connected with the business.
In conclusion, it must also be stated that there is no doubt of this Courts power to review the
assailed decision of the IAC under the authority of precedents recognizing exceptions to the
familiar rule binding it to observe and respect the latters findings of fact. Many of those
exceptions may be cited to support the review here undertaken, but only the most obvious that
said findings directly conflict with those of the Trial Court will suffice. In the opinion of this
Court and after a careful review of the record, the evidence singularly fails to support the
findings of the IAC which, for all that appears, seem to have been prompted rather by sympathy
for the heirs of the deceased Engineer Calibo than by an objective appraisal of the proofs and a
correct application of the law to the established facts. Compassion for the plight of those whom
an accident has robbed of the love and support of a husband and father is an entirely natural and
understandable sentiment. It should not, however, be allowed to stand in the way of, much less to
influence, a just verdict in a suit at law.
Posted March 26, 2011 by vbdiaz in TORTS AND DAMAGES

THE SPOUSES AFRICA et al vs. CALTEX et al Leave a

comment

THE SPOUSES AFRICA et al vs. CALTEX et al

G.R. No. L-12986
March 31, 1966
MAKALINTAL., J.:
FACTS: A fire broke out at the Caltex service station at the corner of Antipolo street and Rizal
Avenue, Manila. It started while gasoline was being hosed from a tank truck into the
underground storage, right at the opening of the receiving tank where the nozzle of the hose was
inserted (a lighted matchstick was thrown by a stranger near the opening, causing the fire). The
fire spread to and burned several neighboring houses. Their owners, among them petitioners
here, sued respondents Caltex (Phil.), Inc. and Boquiren, the first as alleged owner of the station
and the second as its agent in charge of operation. Negligence on the part of both of them was
attributed as the cause of the fire.
The trial court and the CA found that petitioners failed to prove negligence and that respondents
had exercised due care in the premises and with respect to the supervision of their employees.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
1. WON, without proof as to the cause and origin of the fire, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
should apply so as to presume negligence on the part of appellees
HELD: the decision appealed from is reversed and respondents-appellees are held liable
solidarily to appellants,
Both the trial court and the appellate court refused to apply the doctrine in the instant case on the
grounds that as to (its) applicability in the Philippines, there seems to he nothing definite,
and that while the rules do not prohibit its adoption in appropriate cases, in the case at bar,
however, we find no practical use for such doctrine.
The question deserves more than such summary dismissal. The doctrine has actually been
applied in this jurisdiction, in the case of Espiritu vs. Philippine Power and Development Co
The principle enunciated in the aforequoted case applies with equal force here. The gasoline
station, with all its appliances, equipment and employees, was under the control of appellees. A
fire occurred therein and spread to and burned the neighboring houses. The persons who knew or
could have known how the fire started were appellees and their employees, but they gave no
explanation thereof whatsoever. It is a fair and reasonable inference that the incident happened
because of want of care.
Even then the fire possibly would not have spread to the neighboring houses were it not for
another negligent omission on the part of defendants, namely, their failure to provide a concrete

wall high enough to prevent the flames from leaping over it.. Defendants negligence, therefore,
was not only with respect to the cause of the fire but also with respect to the spread thereof to the
neighboring houses.
There is an admission on the part of Boquiren in his amended answer to the second amended
complaint that the fire was caused through the acts of a stranger who, without authority, or
permission of answering defendant, passed through the gasoline station and negligently threw a
lighted match in the premises. No evidence on this point was adduced, but assuming the
allegation to be true certainly any unfavorable inference from the admission may be taken
against Boquiren it does not extenuate his negligence. A decision of the Supreme Court of
Texas, upon facts analogous to those of the present case, states the rule which we find acceptable
here. It is the rule that those who distribute a dangerous article or agent, owe a degree of
protection to the public proportionate to and commensurate with a danger involved we think it
is the generally accepted rule as applied to torts that if the effects of the actors negligent
conduct actively and continuously operate to bring about harm to another, the fact that the active
and substantially simultaneous operation of the effects of a third persons innocent, tortious or
criminal act is also a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, does not protect the actor
from liability. Stated in another way, The intention of an unforeseen and unexpected cause, is
not sufficient to relieve a wrongdoer from consequences of negligence, if such negligence
directly and proximately cooperates with the independent cause in the resulting injury.
NOTES: additional issues
1. WON certain reports on the fire prepared by the Manila Police Departments are admissible
The foregoing reports were ruled out as double hearsay by the CA and hence inadmissible.
There are three requisites for admissibility under section 35, Rule 123, which provides that
entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the
Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated.:
(a) that the entry was made by a public officer, or by another person specially enjoined by law to
do so;
(b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other
person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and
(c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated,
which must have been acquired by him personally or through official information
Of the three requisites just stated, only the last need be considered here. Obviously the material
facts recited in the reports as to the cause and circumstances of the fire were not within the
personal knowledge of the officers who conducted the investigation. Was knowledge of such
facts, however, acquired by them through official information? As to some facts the sources
thereof are not even identified. To qualify their statements as official information acquired by

the officers who prepared the reports, the persons who made the statements not only must have
personal knowledge of the facts stated but must have the duty to give such statements for record.1
However, the foregoing report, having been submitted [by Captain Mariano of the Manila Police
Department] by a police officer in the performance of his duties on the basis of his own personal
observation of the facts reported, may properly be considered as an exception to the hearsay rule.
These facts, descriptive of the location and objective circumstances surrounding the operation of
the gasoline station in question, strengthen the presumption of negligence under the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur, since on their face they called for more stringent measures of caution than those
which would satisfy the standard of due diligence under ordinary circumstances. There is no
more eloquent demonstration of this than the statement of Leandro Flores before the police
investigator. Flores was the driver of the gasoline tank wagon who, alone and without assistance,
was transferring the contents thereof into the underground storage when the fire broke out.
2. WON Boquiron acts as an agent of Caltex, which therefore makes the latter liable for the
damages caused to appellants
Caltex admits that it owned the gasoline station as well as the equipment therein, but claims that
the business conducted at the service station in question was owned and operated by Boquiren.
But Caltex did not present any contract with Boquiren that would reveal the nature of their
relationship at the time of the fire. But there must have been one in existence at that time.
Instead, what was presented was a license agreement manifestly tailored for purposes of this
case, since it was entered into shortly before the expiration of the one-year period it was intended
to operate. This so-called license agreement was executed on November 29, 1948, but made
effective as of January 1, 1948 so as to cover the date of the fire, namely, March 18, 1948. This
retroactivity provision is quite significant, and gives rise to the conclusion that it was designed
precisely to free Caltex from any responsibility with respect to the fire, as shown by the clause
that Caltex shall not be liable for any injury to person or property while in the property herein
licensed, it being understood and agreed that LICENSEE (Boquiren) is not an employee,
representative or agent of LICENSOR (Caltex).
But even if the license agreement were to govern, Boquiren can hardly be considered an
independent contractor. Under that agreement Boquiren would pay Caltex the purely nominal
sum of P1.00 for the use of the premises and all the equipment therein. He could sell only Caltex
Products. Maintenance of the station and its equipment was subject to the approval, in other
words control, of Caltex. Boquiren could not assign or transfer his rights as licensee without the
consent of Caltex. The license agreement was supposed to be from January 1, 1948 to December
31, 1948, and thereafter until terminated by Caltex upon two days prior written notice. Caltex
could at any time cancel and terminate the agreement in case Boquiren ceased to sell Caltex
products, or did not conduct the business with due diligence, in the judgment of Caltex.
Termination of the contract was therefore a right granted only to Caltex but not to Boquiren.
These provisions of the contract show the extent of the control of Caltex over Boquiren. The
control was such that the latter was virtually an employee of the former.
Taking into consideration these facts, the finding of the CA that the operator was an agent of the
company and not an independent contractor should not be disturbed.

To determine the nature of a contract courts do not have or are not bound to rely upon the name
or title given it by the contracting parties, should thereby a controversy as to what they really had
intended to enter into, but the way the contracting parties do or perform their respective
obligations stipulated or agreed upon may be shown and inquired into, and should such
performance conflict with the name or title given the contract by the parties, the former must
prevail over the latter
3.. With respect to the claim of the heirs of Ong P7,500.00 was adjudged by the lower court on
the basis of the assessed value of the property destroyed, namely, P1,500.00, disregarding the
testimony of one of the Ong children that said property was worth P4,000.00. We agree that the
court erred, since it is of common knowledge that the assessment for taxation purposes is not an
accurate gauge of fair market value, and in this case should not prevail over positive evidence of
such value. The heirs of Ong are therefore entitled to P10,000.00.
Posted March 26, 2011 by vbdiaz in TORTS AND DAMAGES

CITY OF MANILA vs. TEOTICO and CA Leave a

comment
CITY OF MANILA vs. TEOTICO and CA
G.R. No. L-23052
January 29, 1968
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
FACTS: Teotico fell inside an uncovered and unlighted catch basin or manhole on P. Burgos
Avenue, Manila as he was trying to board a jeepney, causing injuries which required him to incur
medical expenses.
Teotico filed, with the CFI of Manila, a complaint for damages against the City of Manila, its
mayor, city engineer, city health officer, city treasurer and chief of police.
The CFI of Manila rendered a decision in favor of Teotico and dismissing the amended
complaint, without costs.
On appeal taken by plaintiff, this decision was affirmed by the CA, except insofar as the City of
Manila is concerned, which was sentenced to pay damages in the aggregate sum of P6,750.00.
Hence, this appeal for certiorari by the City of Manila.
ISSUE: WON the City of Manila should be held liable as the incident happened on a
NATIONAL highway
HELD: the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed

YES
The question to be determined is if present case is governed by Section 4 of Republic Act No.
409 (Charter of the City of Manila) reading:
The city shall not be liable or held for damages or injuries to persons or property arising from the
failure of the Mayor, the Municipal Board, or any other city officer, to enforce the provisions of
this chapter, or any other law or ordinance, or from negligence of said Mayor, Municipal Board,
or other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions.
or by Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides:
Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries
suffered by, any person by reason of defective conditions of road, streets, bridges, public
buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision.
Manila maintains that the former provision should prevail over the latter, because Republic Act
409, is a special law, intended exclusively for the City of Manila, whereas the Civil Code is a
general law, applicable to the entire Philippines.
The CA , however, applied the Civil Code, and, we think, correctly. It is true that, insofar as its
territorial application is concerned, Republic Act No. 409 is a special law and the Civil Code a
general legislation; but, as regards the subject-matter of the provisions above quoted, Section 4
of Republic Act 409 establishes a general rule regulating the liability of the City of Manila for:
damages or injury to persons or property Upon the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil
Code constitutes a particular prescription making provinces, cities and municipalities . . . liable
for damages for the death of, or injury suffered by any person by reason specifically of
the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other-public works under
their control or supervision.
In other words, said section 4 refers to liability arising from negligence, in general, regardless of
the object thereof, whereas Article 2189 governs liability due to defective streets, in
particular. Since the present action is based upon the alleged defective condition of a road, said
Article 2189 is decisive thereon.

xxxxx
Teotico alleged in his complaint his injuries were due to the defective condition of a street which
is under the supervision and control of the City. In its answer to the amended complaint, the
City, in turn, alleged that the streets aforementioned were and have been constantly kept in
good condition and regularly inspected and the storm drains and manholes thereof covered by
the defendant City and the officers concerned who have been ever vigilant and zealous in the
performance of their respective functions and duties as imposed upon them by law. Thus, the
City had, in effect, admitted that P. Burgos Avenue was and is under its control and supervision.

Moreover, the assertion to the effect that said Avenue is a national highway was made, for the
first time, in its MR of the decision of the CA . Such assertion raised, therefore, a question of
fact, which had not been put in issue in the trial court, and cannot be set up, for the first time, on
appeal, much less after the rendition of the decision of the appellate court, in a motion for the
reconsideration thereof.
At any rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the liability therein
established to attach that the defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or
municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is that the province,
city or municipality have either control or supervision over said street or road. Even if P.
Burgos Avenue were, therefore, a national highway, this circumstance would not necessarily
detract from its control or supervision by the City of Manila, under Republic Act 409. In fact
Section 18(x) thereof provides:
Sec. 18. Legislative powers. The Municipal Board shall have the following legislative powers:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(x) Subject to the provisions of existing law to provide for the laying out, construction and
improvement, and to regulate the use of streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks, wharves, piers, parks,
cemeteries, and other public places; to provide for lighting, cleaning, and sprinkling of streets
and public places; . . . the building and repair of tunnels, sewers, and drains, and all structures
in and under the same to provide for and regulate cross-works, curbs, and gutters therein, . .
and regulate the use, of bridges, viaducts and culverts; to regulate the lights used on all
vehicles, cars, and locomotives; . .
Then, again, the determination of whether or not P. Burgos Avenue is under the control or
supervision of the City of Manila and whether the latter is guilty of negligence, in connection
with the maintenance of said road, which were decided by the Court of Appeals in the
affirmative, is one of fact, and the findings of said Court thereon are not subject to our review.
Posted March 26, 2011 by vbdiaz in TORTS AND DAMAGES

OSMEA vs.COA Leave a comment

OSMEA vs.COA
G.R. No. 110045
November 29, 1994
NARVASA, C.J.:
FACTS: The controversy had its origin in the stabbing by an unknown assailant of Reynaldo de
la Cerna, the son of the de la Cerna Spouses. He was rushed to the Cebu City Medical Center,
but unfortunately died that night. His parents claimed that Reynaldo would not have died were it

not for the ineptitude, gross negligence, irresponsibility, stupidity and incompetence of the
medical staff of the Medical Center.
The de la Cerna Spouses accordingly instituted in the RTC of Cebu City a civil action, for
recovery of damages, based Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Named defendants were the city of
Cebu, the Sangguniang Panlungsod, and five physicians of the Cebu City Medical Center. The
City of Cebu which, according to the complaint, operates, maintains, and manages the Cebu
City Medical Center, was impleaded as defendant on the theory that as employer of the alleged
negligent doctors, it was vicariously responsible for the latters negligence since it failed to
exercise due care and vigilance over the doctors while acting within the scope of their assigned
tasks, to prevent them from causing the death of Reynaldo. The Civil Code provision relied upon
by plaintiffs, pertinently reads as follows:
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or
omissions, but also for those persons for whom one is responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.
xxx xxx xxx
After the action had been pending for some time, negotiations for an amicable settlement were
commenced, which culminated in an agreement designed to put an end to the controversy in a
manner acceptable to the parties.
Since the compromise agreement included a provision for the payment of the sum of P30,000.00
to the plaintiffs by defendant City of Cebu, the agreement was submitted to the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of the City. The sanggunian authorized the City Budget Officer to include in
Supplemental Budget of the City . . .the amount of P30,000.00 for financial assistance to the
parents of the late Reynaldo de la Cerna
The agreement was also submitted to the RTC which rendered a judgment (f)inding the same to
be in conformity with law, morals and public policy and enjoining the parties to comply
strictly with the terms and conditions thereof.
About 11 months later, however respondent COA disallowed the financial assistance thus
granted to the spouses de la Cerna, saying that no real or substantial relation to the public
health, morals, or general welfare of the community can be perceived from the act of giving such
financial assistance.
The City of Cebu filed an MR, and the same denied due course by respondent Commission.
Respondent ruled that the motion was filed more than a year after receipt by the City government
of notice of its Decision and therefore the decision had already become final and executory.

In behalf of the City of Cebu, Mayor Osmea has come to this Court ascribing grave abuse of
discretion to the COA and its Members in so disallowing the citys appropriation of P30,000.00
made conformably with the compromise agreement in the civil suit against the City, embodied in
due course in the Trial Courts judgment.
Hence this petition for certiorari
ISSUE: WON COA commited grave abuse of discretion in disallowing the payment of
P30,000.00 for the compromise agreement between the parties herein involved.
HELD: Petition granted. The assailed COA decisions are hereby nullified and set aside.
Respondent COA is ORDERED to approve and allow in audit the appropriation of P30,000.00 of
Cebu City approved in connection with the judicial compromise executed by it in the Civil
before the RTC of Cebu City
YES
There is to be sure no question that under the Constitution, respondent COA has the power,
authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to revenue and receipts
of, and expenditures, and uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to
the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including governmentowned or controlled corporations with original charters.
A compromise is a bilateral act or transaction that it expressly acknowledged as a juridical
agreement by the Civil Code and is therein dealt with in some detail. A compromise, declares
Article 2208 of said Code, is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions,
avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced. The Civil Code not only defines and
authorizes compromises, it in fact encourages them in civil actions.
The participation by the City in negotiations for an amicable settlement of a pending litigation
and its eventual execution of a compromise relative thereto, are indubitably within its authority
and capacity as a public corporation; and a compromise of a civil suit in which it is involved as a
party, is a perfectly legitimate transaction, not only recognized but even encouraged by law.
That the City of Cebu complied with the relevant formalities contemplated by law can hardly be
doubted. The compromise agreement was submitted to its legislative council, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod, which approved it conformably with its established rules and procedure,
particularly the stipulation for the payment of P30,000.00 to the de la Cerna family. Neither may
it be disputed that since, as a municipal corporation, Cebu City has the power to sue and be sued,
it has the authority to settle or compromise suits, as well as the obligation to pay just and valid
claims against it.
Obviously, respondent refused to take account of the foregoing legal principles in relation to the
antecedents of the provision in the supplemental budget of the City for payment of P30,000.00. It
failed to realize that payment thereof was part of the consideration, not merely for the

settlement of a claim, but for the settlement of an actual controversy, and constituted one of the
reciprocal concessions which the law considers the very heart and life of every compromise.
By making reciprocal concessions, the parties in the civil case before the trial court put an end to
the action in a manner acceptable to all of them. The City thus eliminated the contingency of
being made to assume heavier liability in said suit for damages instituted against it in connection
with its operation and management of the Cebu City Medical Center, activities being undertaken
by it in its proprietary (as distinguished from its government) functions and in accordance with
which it may be held liable ex contractu or ex delito, for the negligent performance of its
corporate, proprietary or business functions.
It is noteworthy that the compromise in question was approved by, and embodied in the
judgment of, the Court, which pronounced it to be in conformity with law, morals and public
policy and enjoined the parties to comply strictly with the terms and conditions thereof. 23
This judicial compromise is conclusive and binding on all the parties, including the City of Cebu.
It is enforceable by execution, as above stressed. There was no reason whatever to object to it,
much less disallow any disbursement therein stipulated. It should have been approved as a matter
of course.
NOTES:
Article 2029 of the Civil Code states:
The Court shall endeavor to persuade the litigants in a civil case to agree upon some fair
compromise. And in line with this policy, the Code directs
(a) the suspension, pursuant to the Rules of Court, of every civil action or proceeding:
(1) if willingness to discuss a possible compromise is expressed by one or both parties, or
(2) if it appears that one of the parties, before the commencement of the action or proceeding,
offered to discuss a possible compromise but the other party refused the offer, as well as
(b) the mitigation of the damages to be paid by the losing party who has shown a sincere desire
for a compromise.
The law regards compromises as standing on a higher plane than ordinary agreements, for it
declares them, once entered into, to constitute res judicata, although judicial execution thereof is
permitted only with respect to judicial compromises.
Posted March 26, 2011 by vbdiaz in TORTS AND DAMAGES

TAMARGO vs. CA et al Leave a comment

TAMARGO vs. CA et al

G.R. No. 85044

June 3, 1992
FELICIANO, J.:
FACTS: Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air
rifle which resulted in her death. Accordingly, a civil complaint for damages was filed with the
RTC of Vigan, Ilocos Sur by petitioners, parents of Jennifer, against respondent spouses,
Adelbertos natural parents with whom he was living at the time of the tragic incident. In
addition to this case for damages, a criminal information or Homicide through Reckless
Imprudence was filed against Adelberto, who was acquitted and exempted from criminal liability
on the ground that he bad acted without discernment.
Prior to the incident the spouses Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt the minor Adelberto before
the then CFI of Ilocos Sur. This petition for adoption was granted after Adelberto had shot and
killed Jennifer
In their Answer, respondent spouses, Adelbertos natural parents, claimed that not they, but rather
the adopting parents were indispensable parties to the action since parental authority had shifted
to the adopting parents from the moment the successful petition for adoption was filed.
The trial court ruled against the adopting parents, who filed an MR which was later denied for
being filed beyond the reglementary period. Petitioners went to the CA on a petition for
mandamus and certiorari questioning the trial courts decision. The CA dismissed the petition,
ruling that petitioners had lost their right to appeal. Hence this petition for review
ISSUE: Who should be responsible for the tortuous act of the minor Adelberto, his natural
parents or adopting parents?
HELD: Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED DUE COURSE and the Decision of the CA is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioners complaint filed before the trial court is hereby
REINSTATED and this case is REMANDED to that court for further proceedings
Natural parents.
It is not disputed that Adelbertos voluntary act of shooting Jennifer with an air rifle gave rise to
a cause of action on quasi-delict against him. As Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged
to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict . . .
Upon the other hand, the law imposes civil liability upon the father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be caused by a minor child who lives with
them. Article 2180 of the Civil Code reads:

The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions,
but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages
caused by the minor children who live in their company.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the person herein mentioned prove
that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (Emphasis
supplied)
The natural parent spouses rely on Article 36 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code 8 which reads
as follows:
Art. 36. Decree of Adoption. If, after considering the report of the Department of Social
Welfare or duly licensed child placement agency and the evidence submitted before it, the court
is satisfied that the petitioner is qualified to maintain, care for, and educate the child, that the trial
custody period has been completed, and that the best interests of the child will be promoted by
the adoption, a decree of adoption shall be entered, which shall be effective he date the original
petition was filed. The decree shall state the name by which the child is thenceforth to be known.
The Bundoc spouses further argue that the above Article 36 should be read in relation to Article
39 of the same Code:
Art. 39. Effect of Adoption. The adoption shall:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Dissolve the authority vested in the natural parents, except where the adopter is the spouse of
the surviving natural parent;
xxx xxx xxx
and urge that their Parental authority must be deemed to have been dissolved as of the time the
Petition for adoption was filed.
The Court is not persuaded. As earlier noted, under the Civil Code, the basis of parental liability
for the torts of a minor child is the relationship existing between the parents and the minor child
living with them and over whom, the law presumes, the parents exercise supervision and
control.
Article 221 of the Family Code of the Philippines insisted upon the requisite that the child, doer
of the tortious act, shall have been in the actual custody of the parents sought to be held liable for
the ensuing damage:

Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the
injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in
their company and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by
law.
In the instant case, however, to hold that parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the
Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with liability for a tortious act that they could not have
foreseen and which they could not have prevented (since they were at the time in the United
States and had no physical custody over the child Adelberto) would be unfair and
unconscionable. Such a result, moreover, would be inconsistent with the philosophical and policy
basis underlying the doctrine of vicarious liability. Put a little differently, no presumption of
parental dereliction on the part of the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, could have arisen
since Adelberto was not in fact subject to their control at the time the tort was committed.
NOTES:
(On why this petition was accepted by the SC) In view, however, of the nature of the issue raised
in the instant petition, and in order that substantial justice may be served, the Court, invoking its
right to suspend the application of technical rules to prevent manifest injustice, elects to treat the
notice of appeal as having been seasonably filed before the trial court, and the motion (and
supplemental motion) for reconsideration filed by petitioner in the trial court as having
interrupted the reglementary period for appeal.
Dismissal of appeal; purely on technical grounds is frowned upon where the policy of the courts
is to encourage hearings of appeal on their merits.
Posted March 26, 2011 by vbdiaz in TORTS AND DAMAGES

AMADORA et al vs. CA et al Leave a comment

AMADORA et al vs. CA et al
G.R. No. L-47745
April 15, 1988
Cruz, J:

FACTS: Alfredo Amadora was shot by a gun fired by his classmate Daffon while in the Colegio
de San Jose-Recoletos Auditorium at a date after the semester ended. He was there to submit a
graduation requirement in Physics.
Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence . Additionally, the herein petitioners,
as the victims parents, filed a civil action for damages under Article 2180 of the CC against the

Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector the high school principal, the dean of boys, and the
physics teacher, together with Daffon and two other students, through their respective parents.
The complaint against the students was later dropped. After trial, the CFI of Cebu held the
remaining defendants liable to the plaintiffs, representing death compensation, loss of earning
capacity, costs of litigation, funeral expenses, MD, ED and AF.
On appeal to the respondent court, however, the decision was reversed and all the defendants
were completely absolved. Hence this petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
In its decision the respondent court found that Article 2180 was not applicable as the Colegio de
San Jose-Recoletos was not a school of arts and trades but an academic institution of learning. It
also held that the students were not in the custody of the school at the time of the incident as the
semester had already ended.
ISSUE: how should Art. 2180 be applied in this case
HELD: the petition is DENIED. The rector, the high school principal and the dean of boys
cannot be held liable because none of them was the teacher-in-charge as previously defined.
Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos cannot be held directly liable under the article because only the
teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades is made responsible for the damage caused by
the student or apprentice

Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

xx
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages
caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove
that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
After an exhaustive examination of the problem, the Court has come to the conclusion that the
provision in question should apply to all schools, academic as well as non-academic. Where the
school is academic rather than technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort
committed by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of such student, following the first
part of the provision. This is the general rule. In the case of establishments of arts and trades, it is
the head thereof, and only he, who shall be held liable as an exception to the general rule.

As stated in the dissent of Justice J.B.L. Reyes in the Exconde Case, under Art. 2180, he said,
was imposed on (1) teachers in general; and (2) heads of schools of arts and trades in particular.
The modifying clause of establishments of arts and trades should apply only to heads and
not teachers.
But of course, as long as the defendant can show that he had taken the necessary precautions to
prevent the injury complained of, he can exonerate himself from the liability imposed by Article
2180, as stated in its last paragraph.
In this connection, it should be observed that the teacher will be held liable not only when he is
acting in loco parentis for the law does not require that the offending student be of minority age.
Unlike the parent, who wig be liable only if his child is still a minor, the teacher is held
answerable by the law for the act of the student under him regardless of the students age
In any event, it should be noted that the liability imposed by this article is supposed to fall
directly on the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades and not on the school itself. If
at all, the school, whatever its nature, may be held to answer for the acts of its teachers or even of
the head thereof under the general principle of respondeat superior, but then it may exculpate
itself from liability by proof that it had exercised the diligence of a bonus paterfamilias.The
school can show that it exercised proper measures in selecting the head or its teachers and the
appropriate supervision over them in the custody and instruction of the pupils pursuant to its
rules and regulations for the maintenance of discipline among them.
The other matter to be resolved is the duration of the responsibility of the teacher or the head of
the school of arts and trades over the students. Is such responsibility co-extensive with the period
when the student is actually undergoing studies during the school term, as contended by the
respondents and impliedly admitted by the petitioners themselves?
This does not necessarily mean that such, custody be co-terminous with the semester, beginning
with the start of classes and ending upon the close thereof, and excluding the time before or after
such period, such as the period of registration, and in the case of graduating students, the period
before the commencement exercises [During such periods, the student is still subject to the
disciplinary authority of the school and cannot consider himself released altogether from
observance of its rules.]In the view of the Court, the student is in the custody of the school
authorities as long as he is under the control and influence of the school and within its premises,
whether the semester has not yet begun or has already ended.
As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school premises in pursuance of a legitimate
student objective, in the exercise of a legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a
legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege, the
responsibility of the school authorities over the student continues. Indeed, even if the student
should be doing nothing more than relaxing in the campus in the company of his classmates and
friends and enjoying the ambience and atmosphere of the school, he is still within the custody
and subject to the discipline of the school authorities under the provisions of Article 2180.
NOTES:

The reason for the disparity [distinction of who should be responsible for students between
academic and arts and trades schools] can be traced to the fact that historically the head of the
school of arts and trades exercised a closer tutelage over his pupils than the head of the academic
school. The old schools of arts and trades were engaged in the training of artisans apprenticed to
their master who personally and directly instructed them on the technique and secrets of their
craft. By contrast, the head of the academic school was not as involved with his students and
exercised only administrative duties over the teachers who were the persons directly dealing with
the students. The head of the academic school had then (as now) only a vicarious relationship
with the students. Consequently, while he could not be directly faulted for the acts of the
students, the head of the school of arts and trades, because of his closer ties with them, could be
so blamed.
It is conceded that the distinction no longer obtains at present in view of the expansion of the
schools of arts and trades, the consequent increase in their enrollment, and the corresponding
diminution of the direct and personal contract of their heads with the students. Article 2180,
however, remains unchanged. In its present state, the provision must be interpreted by the Court
according to its clear and original mandate until the legislature, taking into account the charges in
the situation subject to be regulated, sees fit to enact the necessary amendment.
Posted March 26, 2011 by vbdiaz in TORTS AND DAMAGES

CANGCO vs .MRC Leave a comment

CANGCO vs .MRC
G.R. No. L-12191
October 14, 1918
FISHER, J.:
FACTS: Cangco, employee of MRC, was on his way to work, and as he was stepping off from
the train coming to a stop, one or both of his feet came in contact with a sack of watermelons
with the result that his feet slipped from under him and he fell violently on the platform. His
body at once rolled from the platform and was drawn under the moving car, where his right arm
was badly crushed and lacerated. The accident occurred between 7 and 8 oclock on a dark night,
and as the railroad station was lighted dimly by a single light located some distance away
He instituted this proceeding in the CFI of Manila to recover damages of the defendant company,
founding his action upon the negligence of the servants and employees of the defendant in
placing the sacks of melons upon the platform and leaving them so placed as to be a menace to
the security of passenger alighting from the companys trains.
At the hearing, his Honor, the trial judge, found the facts substantially as above stated, and drew
therefrom his conclusion to the effect that, although negligence was attributable to the defendant
company by reason of the fact that the sacks of melons were so placed as to obstruct passengers

passing to and from the cars, nevertheless, the plaintiff himself had failed to use due caution in
alighting from the coach and was therefore precluded form recovering. Judgment was
accordingly entered in favor of the defendant company, and the plaintiff appealed.
ISSUE: WON MRC is liable for the negligence of his servants in the placing of the watermelons
sacks
HELD: The decision of lower court is reversed, and judgment is hereby rendered to pay Cangco
for damages and costs of suit.
YES
It is important to note that the foundation of the legal liability of the defendant is the contract of
carriage, and that the obligation to respond for the damage which plaintiff has suffered arises, if
at all, from the breach of that contract by reason of the failure of defendant to exercise due care
in its performance. That is to say, its liability is direct and immediate, differing essentially, in
legal viewpoint from that presumptive responsibility for the negligence of its servants, imposed
by article 1903 of the Civil Code, which can be rebutted by proof of the exercise of due care in
their selection and supervision. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to obligations
arising ex contractu, but only to extra-contractual obligations or to use the technical form of
expression, that article relates only to culpa aquiliana and not to culpa contractual.
In the Rakes case the decision of this court was made to rest squarely upon the proposition that
article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to acts of negligence which constitute the breach
of a contract.
Upon this point the Court said:
The acts to which these articles [1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code] are applicable are understood
to be those not growing out of pre-existing duties of the parties to one another. But where
relations already formed give rise to duties, whether springing from contract or quasi-contract,
then breaches of those duties are subject to article 1101, 1103, and 1104 of the same code.
This distinction is of the utmost importance. The position of a natural or juridical person who has
undertaken by contract to render service to another, is wholly different from that to which article
1903 relates. When the sources of the obligation upon which plaintiffs cause of action depends
is a negligent act or omission, the burden of proof rests upon plaintiff to prove the negligence
if he does not his action fails. But when the facts averred show a contractual undertaking by
defendant for the benefit of plaintiff, and it is alleged that plaintiff has failed or refused to
perform the contract, it is not necessary for plaintiff to specify in his pleadings whether the
breach of the contract is due to willful fault or to negligence on the part of the defendant, or of
his servants or agents. Proof of the contract and of its nonperformance is sufficient prima
facie to warrant a recovery.
The contract of defendant to transport plaintiff carried with it, by implication, the duty to carry
him in safety and to provide safe means of entering and leaving its trains (civil code, article

1258). That duty, being contractual, was direct and immediate, and its non-performance could
not be excused by proof that the fault was morally imputable to defendants servants.
The railroad companys defense involves the assumption that even granting that the negligent
conduct of its servants in placing an obstruction upon the platform was a breach of its contractual
obligation to maintain safe means of approaching and leaving its trains, the direct and proximate
cause of the injury suffered by plaintiff was his own contributory negligence in failing to wait
until the train had come to a complete stop before alighting. Under the doctrine of comparative
negligence announced in the Rakes case (supra), if the accident was caused by plaintiffs own
negligence, no liability is imposed upon defendants negligence and plaintiffs negligence merely
contributed to his injury, the damages should be apportioned.
In this particular instance, that the train was barely moving when plaintiff alighted is shown
conclusively by the fact that it came to stop within six meters from the place where he stepped
from it. Thousands of person alight from trains under these conditions every day of the year, and
sustain no injury where the company has kept its platform free from dangerous obstructions.
There is no reason to believe that plaintiff would have suffered any injury whatever in alighting
as he did had it not been for defendants negligent failure to perform its duty to provide a safe
alighting place.
We prefer to adopt the mode of exposition used by this court in Picart vs. Smith. We may say that
the test is this; Was there anything in the circumstances surrounding the plaintiff at the time he
alighted from the train which would have admonished a person of average prudence that to get
off the train under the conditions then existing was dangerous? If so, the plaintiff should have
desisted from alighting; and his failure so to desist was contributory negligence.
As pertinent to the question of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff in this case,
the place was perfectly familiar to the plaintiff as it was his daily custom to get on and of the
train at this station. There could, therefore, be no uncertainty in his mind with regard either to the
length of the step which he was required to take or the character of the platform where he was
alighting. Our conclusion is that the conduct of the plaintiff in undertaking to alight while the
train was yet slightly under way was not characterized by imprudence and that therefore he was
not guilty of contributory negligence.
Posted March 26, 2011 by vbdiaz in TORTS AND DAMAGES

UMALI vs. BACANI and SAYNES Leave a comment

UMALI vs. BACANI and SAYNES
G.R. No. L-40570
January 30, 1976
ESGUERRA, J.:

FACTS: a storm with strong rain hit the Municipality of Alcala Pangasinan. During the storm,
the banana plants standing on an elevated ground along the barrio of said municipality and near
the transmission line of the Alcala Electric Plant were blown down and fell on the electric wire.
As a result, the live electric wire was cut, one end of which was left hanging on the electric post
and the other fell to the ground under the fallen banana plants.
On the following morning, the barrio captain who was passing by saw the broken electric wire
and so he warned the people in the place not to go near the wire for they might get hurt. He also
saw Baldomero, a laborer of the Alcala Electric Plant near the place and notified him right then
and there of the broken line and asked him to fix it, but the latter told the barrio captain that he
could not do it but that he was going to look for the lineman to fix it.
Sometime after the barrio captain and Baldomero had left the place, a small boy of 3 years and 8
months old whose house is just on the opposite side of the road, went to the place where the
broken line wire was and got in contact with it. The boy was electrocuted and he subsequently
died. It was only after the electrocution of the child that the broken wire was fixed on the same
morning by the lineman of the electric plant.
Petitioner claims that he could not be liable under the concept of quasi-delict or tort as owner and
manager of the Alcala Electric Plant because the proximate cause of the boys death electrocution
could not be due to any negligence on his part, but rather to a fortuitous event-the storm that
caused the banana plants to fall and cut the electric line-pointing out the absence of negligence
on the part of his employee Baldomero who tried to have the line repaired and the presence of
negligence of the parents of the child in allowing him to leave his house during that time.
HELD: WON petitioner is guilty of negligence for the death of the child
ISSUE: WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court is affirmed.
A careful examination of the record convinces Us that a series of negligence on the part of
defendants employees in the Alcala Electric Plant resulted in the death of the victim by
electrocution.
First, by the very evidence of the defendant, there were big and tall banana plants at the place of
the incident standing on an elevated ground and which were higher than the electric post
supporting the electric line, and yet the employees of the defendant who, with ordinary foresight,
could have easily seen that even in case of moderate winds the electric line would be endangered
by banana plants being blown down, did not even take the necessary precaution to eliminate that
source of danger to the electric line.
Second, even after the employees of the Alcala Electric Plant were already aware of the possible
damage the storm could have caused their electric lines, thus becoming a possible threat to life
and property, they did not cut off from the plant the flow of electricity along the lines, an act they
could have easily done pending inspection of the wires to see if they had been cut.

Third, employee Baldomero was negligent on the morning of the incident because even if he was
already made aware of the live cut wire, he did not have the foresight to realize that the same
posed a danger to life and property, and that he should have taken the necessary precaution to
prevent anybody from approaching the live wire.
On defendants argument that the proximate cause of the victims death could be attributed to the
parents negligence in allowing a child of tender age to go out of the house alone, We could
readily see that because of the aforementioned series of negligence on the part of defendants
employees resulting in a live wire lying on the premises without any visible warning of its lethal
character, anybody, even a responsible grown up or not necessarily an innocent child, could have
met the same fate that befell the victim.. Stated otherwise, even if the child was allowed to leave
the house unattended due to the parents negligence, he would not have died that morning where
it not for the cut live wire he accidentally touched.
Art. 2179 of the Civil Code provides that if the negligence of the plaintiff (parents of the victim
in this case) was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the
defendants lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the
damages to be awarded. This law may be availed of by the petitioner but does not exempt him
from liability. Petitioners liability for injury caused by his employees negligence is well defined
in par. 4, of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, which states:
The owner and manager of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages
caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on
tile occasion of their functions.
The negligence of the employee is presumed to be the negligence of the employer because the
employer is supposed to exercise supervision over the work of the employees. This liability of
the employer is primary and direct. In fact the proper defense for the employer to raise so that he
may escape liability is to prove that he exercised, the diligence of the good father of the family to
prevent damage not only in the selection of his employees but also in adequately supervising
them over their work. This defense was not adequately proven as found by the trial Court.
Posted March 26, 2011 by vbdiaz in TORTS AND DAMAGES

PICART vs. SMITH, JR. Leave a comment

PICART vs. SMITH, JR.
G.R. No. L-12219
March 15, 1918
STREET, J.:
FACTS: On the Carlatan Bridge in La Union. Picart was riding on his pony over said bridge.
Before he had gotten half way across, Smith approached from the opposite direction in an

automobile. As the defendant neared the bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew his horn to
give warning of his approach. He continued his course and after he had taken the bridge he gave
two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the man on horseback before him was not
observing the rule of the road.
Picart saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals. However, being perturbed by
the novelty of the apparition or the rapidity of the approach, he pulled the pony closely up
against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead of going to the left. He says that the
reason he did this was that he thought he did not have sufficient time to get over to the other side.
As the automobile approached, Smith guided it toward his left, that being the proper side of the
road for the machine. In so doing the defendant assumed that the horseman would move to the
other side. Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet, the defendant, instead of veering to the
right while yet some distance away or slowing down, continued to approach directly toward the
horse without diminution of speed. When he had gotten quite near, there being then no
possibility of the horse getting across to the other side, the defendant quickly turned his car
sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse; but in so doing the automobile passed in such
close proximity to the animal that it became frightened and turned its body across the bridge, got
hit by the car and the limb was broken. The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some
violenceAs a result of its injuries the horse died. The plaintiff received contusions which caused
temporary unconsciousness and required medical attention for several days.
From a judgment of the CFI of La Union absolving Smith from liability Picart has appealed.
ISSUE: WON Smith was guilty of negligence such as gives rise to a civil obligation to repair the
damage done
HELD: the judgment of the lower court must be reversed, and judgment is here rendered that the
Picart recover of Smith damages
YES
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as
follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that person would have used in
the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The existence of negligence in a given
case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before
him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of
ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that. The question as to what
would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be always
determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular
case.
Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course
actually pursued? If so, it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against that harm.
Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is
always necessary before negligence can be held to exist. Stated in these terms, the proper
criterion for determining the existence of negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is said to be

negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect
harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing conduct or guarding
against its consequences.
Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case we think that negligence is
clearly established. A prudent man, placed in the position of the defendant, would in our opinion,
have recognized that the course which he was pursuing was fraught with risk, and would
therefore have foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as reasonable consequence of that course.
Under these circumstances the law imposed on the Smith the duty to guard against the threatened
harm.
It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of
antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But as we have already
stated, Smith was also negligent; and in such case the problem always is to discover which agent
is immediately and directly responsible. It will be noted that the negligent acts of the two parties
were not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence of
the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these circumstances the law is that the person who
has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the
consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party.
Posted March 26, 2011 by vbdiaz in TORTS AND DAMAGES

RODRIGUEZ et al vs.CA et al Leave a comment

RODRIGUEZ et al vs.CA et al
G.R. No. 121964
June 17, 1997
DAVIDE, JR. J.:
FACTS: A a fire broke out which razed two apartment buildings, owned by plaintiffs-appellants
Rodriguezes and partially destroying a commercial building. They filed a case for damages
against defendants-appellees Vilorias and Young. The complaint alleged that by reason of the
gross negligence and want of care of the construction workers and employees of the defendantsappellees, the bunkhouse or workers quarters in the construction site caught fire spreading
rapidly, burning the adjacent buildings owned by plaintiffs-appellants.
Defendant-appellee Young, the building contractor, contended that he can not be held responsible
even if there was negligence on the part of the employees for he had exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his workers. As counterclaim,
defendant-appellee Young sought for moral damages, exemplary damages and attorneys fees.
The Vilorias also alleged that plaintiffs-appellants had no cause of action against them. The fire
court not have been caused by gross negligence of their workers for they did not have any

worker in the construction of their building. The said construction was being undertaken by the
independent contractor, Young, who hired and supervised his own workers. As counterclaim,
they prayed for moral damages, exemplary damages and attorneys fees.
After trial and reception of evidence, the court a quo resolved that the fire was not caused by an
instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendants-appellants. The decision stated that
plaintiffs-appellants failed to establish that the fire was the result of defendants-appellees or
their workers negligence.
The CA affirmed the trial courts decision but the award of damages in favor of defendantsappellees including the award of attorneys fees are DELETED and SET ASIDE.
ISSUE:
1. 1. WON SECTION 44, RULE 130 OF THE RULES OF COURT IS NOT APPLICABLE
TO THE CASE AT BAR, therefore making the Fire Investigation Report inadmissible in
evidence
HELD: the instant petition is DENIED and the challenged decision of CA is AFFIRMED in toto.
1. NO, the rule is applicable; the Report admissible
Section 44 of Rule 130, which reads as follows:
Sec. 44. Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in the performance of his
duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially
enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
Petitioners assert that the Fire Investigation Report by an official of the Cebu City Fire Station
should have been admitted in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule [as stated in #2
above].] The trial and appellate courts rejected this applying Africa v. Caltex (Phil.) Inc., wherein
this Court laid down the three requisites for admissibility under the aforesaid section, viz.:
(1) that the entry was made by a police officer, or by another person especially enjoined by law
to do so;
(2) that it was made by the police officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other
person in the performance of a duty especially enjoined by law; and
(3) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated,
which must have been acquired by him personally or through official information.
Elaborating on the third requisite, this Court further stated that for the statements acquired by the
public officer under the third requisite to qualify as official information, it is necessary that the
persons who gave the statements not only must have personal knowledge of the facts stated but
must have the duty to give such statements for record.

Some confusion surrounds the issue of admissibility of the Fire Investigation Report. The record
discloses that the officer who signed the report, Fire Major Eduardo P. Enriquez, was subpoenaed
at the request of and testified in open court for petitioners.Private respondents objected said
report, for being hearsay and incompetent evidence. The trial court then denied their
admission for being hearsay.
In light of the purposes for which the exhibits in question were offered, the trial court erred in
rejecting all of them as hearsay. Since Major Enriquez himself took the witness stand and was
available for cross-examination, the portions of the report which were of his personal knowledge
or which consisted of his perceptions and conclusions were not hearsay. The rest of the report,
such as the summary of the statements of the parties based on their sworn statements (which
were annexed to the Report) as well as the latter, having been included in the first purpose of the
offer, may then be considered as independently relevant statements which were gathered in the
course of the investigation and may thus be admitted as such, but not necessarily to prove the
truth thereof. It has been said that:
Where, regardless of the truth or falsity of a statement, the fact that it has been made is relevant,
the hearsay rule does not apply, but the statement may be shown. Evidence as to the making of
such statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in
issue, or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact.
When Major Enriquez took the witness stand, testified for petitioners on his Report and made
himself available for cross-examination by the adverse party, the Report, insofar as it proved that
certain utterances were made (but not their truth), was effectively removed from the ambit of the
aforementioned Section 44 of Rule 130. Properly understood, this section does away with the
testimony in open court of the officer who made the official record, considers the matter as an
exception to the hearsay rule and makes the entries in said official record admissible in evidence
as prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. The underlying reasons for this exceptionary
rule are necessity and trustworthiness, as explained in Antillon v. Barcelon. 29
The litigation is unlimited in which testimony by officials is daily needed; the occasions in which
the officials would be summoned from his ordinary duties to declare as a witness are numberless.
The public officers are few in whose daily work something is not done in which testimony is not
needed from official sources. Were there no exception for official statements, hosts of officials
would be found devoting the greater part of their time to attending as witnesses in court or
delivering their deposition before an officer. The work of administration of government and the
interest of the public having business with officials would alike suffer in consequence. For these
reasons, and for many others, a certain verity is accorded such documents, which is not extended
to private documents. (3 Wigmore on Evidence, sec. 1631).
The law reposes a particular confidence in public officers that it presumes they will discharge
their several trusts with accuracy and fidelity; and, therefore, whatever acts they do in discharge
of their duty may be given in evidence and shall be taken to be true under such a degree of
caution as the nature and circumstances of each case may appear to require.

It would have been an entirely different matter if Major Enriquez was not presented to testify on
his report. In that case the applicability of Section 44 of Rule 130 would have been ripe for
determination, and this Court would have agreed with the CA that said report was inadmissible
since the aforementioned third requisite was not satisfied. The statements given by the sources of
information of Major Enriquez failed to qualify as official information, there being no showing
that, at the very least, they were under a duty to give the statements for record.
xxxxxxxxxxxx
What appears to us to be the underlying purpose of petitioners in soliciting affirmance of their
thesis that the Report of Major Enriquez should be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule,
is to shift the burden of evidence to private respondents under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in
negligence cases. They claim, as stated in their offer of Exhibits, that the fire started at the
generator. . . within the construction site. This quotation is based on the penultimate paragraph
of page 4 of the Report of Major Enriquez and is obviously misleading as there is nothing in said
paragraph that unequivocally asserts that the generator was located within the construction site.
The paragraph reads:
After analyzing the evidences [sic] and the circumstances underlying the situation, one can easily
came [sic] to the conclusion that the fire started at the generator and extended to the bunkhouse
and spread among the combustible stored materials within the construction site. Among the
combustible materials were the plastic (PVC) pipes and plywoods [sic].
Clearly, the phrase within the construction site could only refer to the immediately preceding
term combustible stored materials.
The trial court itself concluded that the fire could not have started at the generator and that the
bunkhouse was not burned, thus:
It then declared that the fire was not caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control
of defendants, which is one of the requisites for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur in the law of negligence. It may further be emphasized that this doctrine is not intended
to and does not dispense with the requirement of proof of culpable negligence on the party
charged. It merely determines and regulates what shall be prima facie evidence thereof and
facilitates the burden of plaintiff of proving a breach of the duty of due care. The doctrine can be
invoked when and only when, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent or not
readily available.
To summarize, the Fire investigation Report was not used as evidence against respondents not
because it is considered hearsay but because it was inaccurately relied upon and used by the
petitioners.
NOTES: Additional issues
THE CA ERRED IN MISAPPLYING FACTS OF WEIGHT AND SUBSTANCE AFFECTING
THE CASE AT BAR.

NO; Under the first assigned error petitioners want us to give full credit to the testimony of Noel
Villarin, their principal witness. The trial court, however, refused to believe Villarin, not only
because he had an ulterior motive to testify against private respondent Young (his tools were
burned, and Young neither had replenished those tools nor had visited him in the hospital) but
also on the impossibility of his statements [he said he saw Paner pour gasoline to the generator
(which caused the fire) through a hole in the wall which is located high above him, when the
generator was under the floor of the bunkhouse he was in and it was noted that said bunkhouse is
intact and did not burn] as rebuffed by the defendants witness.
One of the highly revered dicta in our jurisprudence is that this Court will not interfere with the
judgment of the trial court in passing on the credibility of opposing witnesses unless there
appears in the record some facts or circumstances of weight and influence which have been
overlooked, which, if considered, could affect the result of the case. The trial judge is in a better
position to decide the question of credibility since he personally heard the witnesses and
observed their deportment and manner of testifying. Petitioners have offered no convincing
arguments to accommodate their case within the exception; they did not even dare to refute the
above observations and findings of the trial court.