EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-5156. Marzo 11, 1954.]

CARMEN FESTEJO, demandante y apelante, contra ISAIAS
FERNANDO, Director de Obras Pblicas, demandado y apelado.
D. Eloy B. Bello en representacion de la apelante.
El Procurador General Sr. Pompeyo Daz y el Procurador Sr. Antonio A.
Torres en representacion del apelado.
SYLLABUS
PRACTICA FORENSE; ACCION CONTRA UN FUNCIONARIO PUBLICO
POR DAOS Y PERJUICIOS. La accin contra el demandado como Director de
Obras Pblicas encargado y responsable de la construccin de los sistemas de
irrigacin en Filipinas, por alegadas extralimitaciones en el desempeo de sus
funciones oficiales, es una dirigida personalmente contra l. "Ordinarily the officer or
employee committing the tort is personally liable therefor, and may be sued as any
other citizen and held answerable for whatever injury or damage results from his
tortious act." (49 Am. Jur. 28.) En ese caso, no procede el sobreseimiento de la
demanda por el fundamento de que la accin es una dirigida contra la Repblica de
Filipinas.

DECISION

DIOKNO, M :
p

Carmen Festejo, duea de unos terrenos azucareros, de un total de unas 9

hectreas y media de superfice, demand a "Isaas Fernando Director, Bureau of
Public Works, que como tal Director de Obras Pblicas tiene a su cargo los sistemas y
proyectos de irrigacin y es el funcionario responsable de la construccin de los
sistemas de irrigacin en el pas," alegando que .
"The defendant, as Director of the Bureau of Public Works, without
authority obtained first from the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, without
obtaining first a right of way, and without the consent and knowledge of the

plaintiff, and against her express objection, unlawfully took possession of

portions of the three parcels of land described above, and caused an irrigation
canal to be constructed on the portion of the three parcels of land on or about
the month of February 1951 the aggregate area being 24,179 square meters to
the damage and prejudice of the plaintiff." R. on A., p. 3.

causando a ella variados daos y perjuicios. Pidi, en su consecuencia, sentencia

condenando el demandado:
". . . to return or cause to be returned the possession of the portions of
land unlawfully occupied and appropriated in the aggregate area of 24,179
square meters and to return the land to its former condition

under the expenses of the defendant." . . .

"In the remote event that the portions of land unlawfully occupied and
appropriated can not be returned to the plaintiff, then to order the defendant to
pay to the plaintiff the sum of P19,343.20 as value of the portions totalling an
area of 24,179 square meters;" R. on A., p. 5.

y adems a pagar P9,756.19 de daos y P5,000 de honorarios de abogado, con las

costas R. on A., pp. 5-6.
El demandado, por medio del Procurador General, present mocin de
sobreseimiento de la demanda por el fundamento de que el Juzgado no tiene
jurisdiccin para dictar sentencia vlida contra l, toda vez que judicialmente la
reclamacin es contra la Repblica de Filipinas, y esta no ha presentado su
consentimiento a la demanda. El Juzgado inferior estim la mocin y sobresey la
demanda sin perjuicio y sin costas.
En apelacin, la demandante sostiene que fu un error considerar la demanda
como una contra la Repblica y sobreseer en su virtud la demanda.
La mocin contra "Isaas Fernando, Director de Obras Pblicas, encargado y
responsable de la construccin de los sistemas de irrigacin en Filipinas" es una
dirigida personalmente contra l, por actos que asumi ejecutar en su concepto oficial.
La ley no le exime de responsabilidad por las extralimitaciones que cometa o haga
cometer en el desempeo de sus funciones oficiales.
Un caso semejante es el de Nelson vs. Bobcock (1933) 18 minn. 584, 24 NW
49, 90 ALR 1472. All el Comisionado de Carreteras, al mejorar un trozo de la
carretera ocup o se apropi de terrenos contiguos al derecho de paso. El Tribunal
Supremo del Estado declar que es personalmente responsable al dueo de los daos
causados. Declar adems que la ratificacin de lo que hicieron sus subordinados era
equivalente a una orden a los mismos. He aqu lo dijo el Tribunal.
"We think the evidence and conceded facts permitted the jury in finding
that in the trespass on plaintiff's land defendant committed acts outside the
scope of his authority. When he went outside the boundaries of the right of way
upon plaintiff's land and damaged it or destroyed its former condition and
usefulness, he must be held to have designedly departed from the duties

imposed on him by law. There can be no claim that he thus invaded plaintiff's
land southeasterly of the right of way innocently. Surveys clearly marked the
limits of the land appropriated for the right of way of this trunk highway before
construction began. . . .
"'Ratification may be equivalent to command, and cooperation may be
inferred from acquiescence where there is power to restrain.' It is unnecessary to
consider other cases cited, . . ., for as before suggested, the jury could find or
infer that, in so far as there was actual trespass by appropriation of plaintiff's
land as a dumping place for the rock to be removed from the additional
appropriated right of way, defendant planned, approved, and ratified what was
done by his subordinates." Nelson vs. Bobcock, 90 A. L. R., 1472, 1476,
1477.

La doctrina sobre la responsabilidad civil de los funcionarios en casos

parecidos se resume como sigue:
"Ordinarily the officer or employee committing the tort is personally
liable therefor, and may be sued as any other citizen and held answerable for
whatever injury or damage results from his tortious act." 49 Am. Jur. 289. . .
If an officer, even while acting under color of his office, exceeds the power
conferred on him by law, he cannot shelter himself under the plea that he is a
public agent." 43 Am. Jur. 86.
"It is a general rule that an officer-executive, administrative quasijudicial, ministerial, or otherwise who acts outside the scope of his jurisdiction
and without authorization of law may thereby render himself amenable to
personal liability in a civil suit. If he exceeds the power conferred on him by
law, he cannot shelter himself by the plea that he is a public agent acting under
color of his office, and not personally. In the eye of the law, his acts then are
wholly without authority." 43 Am. Jur. 89-90.

El articulo 32 del Cdigo Civil dice, a su vez:

"ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual,
who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes
or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be
liable to the latter for damages:
xxx xxx xxx.
"(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of
law;
xxx xxx xxx.
"In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the
defendant's acts or omission constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved party
has a right to commence an entirely separate and distinct civil action for
damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall proceed independently of
any criminal prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and may be proved by a
preponderance of evidence.

"The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may

also be adjudicated."
Veanse tambien Lung vs. Aldanese, 45 Phil., 784; Syquia vs. Almeda,
No. L-1648, Agosto 17, 1947; Marquez vs. Nelson, No. L-2412, Septiembre
1950.

Se revoca la orden apelada y se ordena la continuacin de la tramitacin de la

demanda conforme proveen los reglamentos. Sin especial pronunciamiento en cuanto
a las costas. As se ordena.
Padilla, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo y Labrador, MM., estan conformes.

Separate Opinions
CONCEPCION, J., dissenting:
To my mind, the allegations of the complaint lead to no other conclusion than
that appellee Isaias Fernando is a party in this case, not in his personal capacity, but as
an officer of the Government. According to said pleading the defendant is "Isaias
Fernando, Director, Bureau of Public Works." Moreover, in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the
complaint, it is alleged:
"4. That the defendant as Director of the Bureau of Public Works is in
charge of irrigation projects and systems, and the official responsible for the
construction of irrigation system in the Philippines:
5. That the defendant, as Director of the Bureau of Public Works,
without authority obtained first from the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur,
without obtaining first a right of way and without the consent and knowledge of
the plaintiff, and against her express objection, unlawfully took possession of
portions of the three parcels of land described above, and caused an irrigation
canal to be constructed on the portion of the three parcels of land on or about
the month of February 1951 the aggregate area being 24,179 square meters to
the damage and prejudice of the plaintiff." (Italics supplied.)

The emphasis thus placed upon the allegation that the acts complained of were
performed by said defendant "as Director of the Bureau of Public Works," clearly
shows that the designation of his office was included in the title of the case to indicate
that he was being sued in his official capacity. This conclusion is bolstered up by the
fact that, among other things, plaintiff prays, in the complaint, for a judgment.
"Ordering the defendant to return or caused to be returned the possession
of the portions of land unlawfully occupied and appropriated in the aggregate
area of 24,179 square meters and to return the land to its former condition under
the expense of the defendant". (Paragraph a, of the complaint).

We take judicial notice of the fact that the irrigation projects and system
referred to in the complaint of which the defendant, Isaias Fernando, according to

the same pleading, is "in charge" and for which he is "responsible" as Director of the
Bureau of Public Works are established and operated with public funds, which
pursuant to the Constitution, must be appropriated by law. Irrespective of the manner
in which the construction may have been undertaken by the Bureau of Public Works,
the system or canal is, therefore, a property of the Government. Consequently, in
praying that possession of the portions of land occupied by the irrigation canal
involved in the present case be returned to plaintiff herein, and that said land be
restored to its former condition, plaintiff seeks to divest the Government of its
possession of said irrigation canal, and, what is worse, to cause said property of the
Government to be removed or destroyed. As held in Syquia vs. Lopez * (47 Off. Gaz.,
665), the Government is, accordingly, "the real party in interest as defendant" in the
case at bar. In other words, the same partakes of the nature of a suit against the state
and may not be maintained without its consent.
Hence I am constrained to dissent.
Bengzon, J., concurs.
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(Festejo v. Fernando, G.R. No. L-5156, March 11, 1954)

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-26803. October 14, 1975.]
AMERICAN TOBACCO COMPANY, CARNATION COMPANY,
CURTISS CANDY COMPANY, CUDAHY PACKING CO.,
CLUETT, PEABODY & CO., INC., CANNON MILLS COMPANY,
FORMICA
CORPORATION,
GENERAL
MOTORS
CORPORATION, INTERNATIONAL LATEX CORPORATION,
KAYSER-ROTH CORPORATION, M & R DIETETIC
LABORATORIES, INC., OLIN MATHIESON, PARFUM CIRO,
INC., PROCTER & GAMBLE COMPANY, PROCTER &
GAMBLE PHILIPPINE MANUFACTURING CORPORATION,
PARFUMS PORVIL DENTRIFICES DU DOCTEUR PIERRE
REUNIS SOCIETE ANONYME, R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO
COMPANY, SWIFT AND COMPANY, STERLING PRODUCTS
INTERNATIONAL, THE CLOROX COMPANY, WARNER
LAMBERT PHARMACEUTICALS COMPANY and ZENITH
RADIO CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. THE DIRECTOR OF
PATENTS, ATTYS. AMANDO L. MARQUEZ, TEOFILO P.
VELASCO, RUSTICO A. CASIA and HECTOR D. BUENALUZ,
respondents.
Lichauco, Picazo & Agcaoili for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.

DECISION

ANTONIO, J :
p

In this petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction, petitioners

challenge the validity of Rule 168 of the "Revised Rules of Practice before the
Philippine Patent Office in Trademark Cases" as amended, authorizing the Director of
Patents to designate any ranking official of said office to hear "inter partes"
proceedings. Said Rule likewise provides that "all judgments determining the merits
of the case shall be personally and directly prepared by the Director and signed by
him." These proceedings refer to the hearing of opposition to the registration of a
mark or trade name, interference proceeding instituted for the purpose of determining
the question of priority of adoption and use of a trade-mark, trade name or service-

mark, and cancellation of registration of a trade-mark or trade name pending at the

Patent Office.
Petitioners are parties, respectively, in the following opposition, interference
and cancellation proceedings in said Office: Inter Partes Cases Nos. 157, 392, 896,
282, 247, 354, 246, 332, 398, 325, 374, 175, 297, 256, 267, 111, 400, 324, 114, 159,
346, and 404.
Under the Trade-mark Law (Republic Act No. 166), the Director of Patents is
vested with jurisdiction over the above-mentioned cases. Likewise, the Rules of
Practice in Trade-mark Cases contains a similar provision, thus:
"168. Original jurisdiction over inter partes proceedings. The Director of
Patents shall have original jurisdiction over inter partes proceedings. In the
event that the Patent Office should be provided with an Examiner of
Interferences, this Examiner shall have the original jurisdiction over these cases,
instead of the Director. In the case that the Examiner of Interferences takes over
the original jurisdiction over inter partes proceedings, his final decision shall be
subject to appeal to the Director of Patents within three months of the receipt of
notice of decisions. Such appeals shall be governed by sections 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8,
10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 22 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court insofar as said
sections are applicable and appropriate and the appeal fee shall be P25.00."

The Rules of Practice in Trade-mark Cases were drafted and promulgated by

the Director of Patents and approved by the then Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce. 1
Subsequently, the Director of Patents, with the approval of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce, amended the aforequoted Rule 168 to read as follows:.
"168. Original jurisdictional inter partes proceedings. The Director of
Patents shall have original jurisdiction over inter partes proceedings. [In the
event that the Patent Office is provided with an Examiner of Interferences, this
Examiner shall then have the original jurisdiction over these cases, instead of
the Director. In the case that the Examiner of Interferences taxes over the
original jurisdiction over inter partes proceedings, his final decisions shall be
subject to appeal to the Director of Patents within three months of the receipt of
notice of decision. Such appeals shall be governed by Sections 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8,
10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 22 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court insofar as said
sections are applicable and appropriate, and the appeal fee shall be P25.00.]
Such inter partes proceedings in the Philippine Patent Office under this Title
shall be heard before the Director of Patents, any hearing officer, or any ranking
official of the office designated by the Director but all judgments determining
the merits of the case shall be personally and directly prepared by the Director
and signed by him. (Emphasis supplied.).

In accordance with the amended Rule, the Director of Patents delegated the
hearing of petitioners' cases to hearing officers, specifically, Attys. Amando Marquez,
Teofilo Velasco, Rustice Casia and Hector Buenaluz, the other respondents herein.
Petitioners filed their objections to the authority of the hearing officers to hear
their cases, alleging that the amendment of the Rule is illegal and void because under
the law the Director must personally hear and decide inter partes case. Said
objections were overruled by the Director of Patents, hence, the present petition for
mandamus, to compel the Director of Patents to personally hear the cases of
petitioners, in lieu of the hearing officers.
It would take an extremely narrow reading of the powers of the Director of
Patents under the general law 2 and Republic Acts Nos. 165 3 and 166 to sustain the
contention of petitioners. Under section 3 of RA 165, the Director of Patents is
"empowered to obtain the assistance of technical, scientific or other qualified officers
or employees of other departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and instrumentalities of
the Government, including corporations owned, controlled or operated by the
Government, when deemed necessary in the consideration of any matter submitted to
the Office relative to the enforcement of the provisions" of said Act. Section 78 of the
same Act also empowers "the Director, subject to the approval of the Department
Head," to "promulgate the necessary rules and regulations, not inconsistent with law,
for the conduct of all business in the Patent Office." The aforecited statutory authority
undoubtedly also applies to the administration and enforcement of the Trade-mark
Law (Republic Act No. 166).
3*

It has been held that power conferred upon an administrative agency to which
the administration of a statute is entrusted to issue such regulations and orders as may
be deemed necessary or proper in order to carry out its purposes and provisions may
be an adequate source of authority to delegate a particular function, unless by express
provisions of the Act or by implication it has been withheld. 4 There is no provision
either in Republic Act No. 165 or 166 negativing the existence of such authority, so
far as the designation of hearing examiners by concerned. Nor can the absence of such
authority be fairly inferred from contemporaneous and consistent Executive
interpretation of the Act.
The nature of the power and authority entrusted to the Director of Patents
suggests that the aforecited laws (Republic Act No. 166, in relation to Republic Act
No. 165) should be construed so as to give the aforesaid official the administrative
flexibility necessary for the prompt and expeditious discharge of his duties in the
administration of said laws. As such officer, he is required, among others, to
determine the question of priority in patent interference proceedings, 5 decide
applications for reinstatement of a lapsed patent, 6 cancellations of patents under
Republic Act No. 165, 7 inter partes proceedings such as oppositions, 8 claims of
interference, 9 cancellation cases under the Trade-mark Law 10 and other matters in
connection with the enforcement of the aforesaid laws. It could hardly be expected, in
view of the magnitude of his responsibility, to require him to hear personally each and

every case pending in his Office. This would leave him little time to attend to his
other duties. 11 For him to do so and at the same time attend personally to the
discharge of every other duty or responsibility imposed upon his Office by law would
not further the development of orderly and responsible administration. The reduction
of existing delays in regulating agencies requires the elimination of needless work at
top levels. Unnecessary and unimportant details often occupy far too much of the time
and energy of the heads of these agencies and prevent full and expeditious
consideration of the more important issues. The remedy is a far wider range of
delegations to subordinate officers. This subdelegation of power has been justified by
"sound principles of organization" which demand that "those at the top be able to
concentrate their attention upon the larger and more important questions of policy and
practice, and their time be freed, so far as possible, from the consideration of the
smaller and far less important matters of detail." 12
Thus, it is well-settled that while the power to decide resides solely in the
administrative agency vested by law, this does not preclude a delegation of the power
to hold a hearing on the basis of which the decision of the administrative agency will
be made. 13
The rule that requires an administrative officer to exercise his own judgment
and discretion does not preclude him from utilizing, as a matter of practical
administrative procedure, the aid of subordinates to investigate and report to him the
facts, on the basis of which the officer makes his decisions. 14 It is sufficient that the
judgment and discretion finally exercised are those of the officer authorized by law.
Neither does due process of law nor the requirements of fair hearing require that the
actual taking of testimony be before the same officer who will make the decision in
the case. As long as a party is not deprived of his right to present his own case and
submit evidence in support thereof, and the decision is supported by the evidence in
the record, there is no question that the requirements of due process and fair trial are
fully met. 15 In short, there is no abnegation of responsibility on the part of the officer
concerned as the actual decision remains with and is made by said officer. 16 It is,
however, required that to "give the substance of a hearing, which is for the purpose of
making determinations upon evidence the officer who makes the determinations must
consider and appraise the evidence which justifies them." 17
In the case at bar, while the hearing officer may make preliminary rulings on
the myriad of questions raised at the hearings of these cases, the ultimate decision on
the merits of all the issues and questions involved is left to the Director of Patents.
Apart from the circumstance that the point involved is procedural and not
jurisdictional, petitioners have not shown in what manner they have been prejudiced
by the proceedings.
Moreover, as then Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, now a Member of this
Court, has correctly pointed out, the repeated appropriations by Congress for hearing

officers of the Philippine Patent Office from 1963 to 1968 18 not only confirms the
departmental construction of the statute, but also constitutes a ratification of the act of
the Director of Patents and the Department Head as agents of Congress in the
administration of the law. 19
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby dismissed, with costs against
petitioners.
Castro (Actg. C.J.), Muoz Palma, Aquino and Martin, JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., is on leave.
Barredo, J., did not take part.
Muoz Palma and Martin, JJ., were designated to sit in the Second Division.
|||

(American Tobacco Co. v. Director of Patents, G.R. No. L-26803, October 14, 1975)