Leibniz on the Indefinite as Infinite

Author(s): O. Bradley Bassler

Source: The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Jun., 1998), pp. 849-874
Published by: Philosophy Education Society Inc.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20130299 .
Accessed: 06/01/2015 16:50
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Philosophy Education Society Inc. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The
Review of Metaphysics.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 194.27.149.45 on Tue, 6 Jan 2015 16:50:35 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

LEIBNIZ
ON THE INDEFINITE
AS INFINITE
O. BRADLEY BASSLER

I
V>40NSider
take

ically

THE natural
there

to be

offer

might

something
natural
many

finitely
number.

numbers:

1, 2, 3,_Unreflectively,
natural numbers.
many

infinitely
like the following
reasoning.
then there would
numbers,

we

typ
we

If pressed,

If there were
only
be a largest natural
largest natural number

we denote
this supposed
If, however,
a natural number,
the
n+1
then
is
also
the
by
symbol
'n',
contradicting
to be the largest natural number.
fact that n is assumed
Consequently
are not

there

finitely

many,

but

rather

infinitely

many,

natural

num

bers.

It is not my intention
to assess
the status of this reasoning,
which
in any case
is only meant
to describe
I take to be (in the late
what
some of our informal preconceptions
twentieth
about
the na
century)
ture of the finite and the infinite.
I
would
like
to
set
the
Instead,
pic
an argument
ture suggested
above
uses
that Leibniz
to show
against

that the number of finite (whole) numbers cannot be infinite. The text
from which
this argument
is drawn,
or
"On the Secrets
of the Sublime,
on the Supreme
a
dates
from
of
tremendous
early 1676,
Being,"
period
intellectual
in the life of Leibniz.
Leibniz was
upheaval
living in Paris
and had just invented
the infinitesimal
calculus.1
He was
in
engaged
an intensive
of the Cartesians,
Descartes
and Male
reading
especially
to meet
and was
on
later
that
his
branche,
year
Spinoza
way back to
from
extended
of travel, he would
re
Hannover,
where,
apart
periods
side

for the rest of his

life. Here

is the argument

that Leibniz

gives:

to: Department
of Philosophy,
of Georgia,
Correspondence
University
107 Peabody Hall, Athens, GA 30602-1627.
1The term
"infinitesimal
calculus" is that most commonly
used by Leib
niz to refer to his invention, but it is unfortunately
since
the fun
misleading,
damental object of the Leibnizian calculus
is not the infinitesimal
but rather
the differential.
See the excellent presentation
in H. J. M. Bos, "Differentials,
Differentials
and the Derivative
in the Leibnizian Calculus," Ar
Higher-Order
chive for History
14 (1974): 1-90, especially
16.
of Exact Sciences
The Review

of Metaphysics

51

(June

1998):

849-874.

Copyright

1998

Metaphysics

This content downloaded from 194.27.149.45 on Tue, 6 Jan 2015 16:50:35 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

by The Review

of

0. BRADLEYBASSLER

850

to exceed each other continuously

If the numbers are assumed
by one,
cannot be infinite, for in that case
the number of such finite numbers
is equal to the greatest number, which
is as
the number of numbers
It has to be replied that there is no greatest number.
sumed to be finite.
But even if they were to increase in some way other than by ones, yet if
it is necessary
that the num
they always increase by finite differences,
ber of all numbers always has a finite ratio to the last number;2 further,
the last number will always be greater than the number of all numbers.
is not infinite; nei
it follows that the number of numbers
From which
is the number of units.3
ther, therefore,

A full analysis of this proof must wait for another time. The point I
want to make here is that Leibniz distinguishes between there being
no

number

greatest

and

That is, Leibniz distinguishes

nite

numbers,

which

of finite

the number

he here

between
takes

numbers

being

infinite.

the indefinite progression

to be

the case,

and

the finite

of fi
num

which
he here takes to be impossible.
in number,
infinite
being
clear
the passage
is made
This
when,
directly
following
particularly
on to add to the conclusion
he has just
Leibniz
cited
goes
above,
a
no
is
infinite number,
number
there is
"Therefore
reached:
or, such
bers

not possible."4

Leibniz discusses this distinction between the indefinitely pro

gressing and the infinite explicitly earlier in the same writing, before
reaching
focusing

the conclusion
on the

infinitely

that an
small,

infinite
Leibniz

number

is impossible.

Here,

remarks:

One must see if it can be proved that there exists something

infinitely
If this exists, wonderful
about
consequences
small, but not indivisible.
if one imagines creatures of another
the infinite would follow. Namely:
is infinitely small, we would be infinite in comparison with
world, which
indeed we
it is evident that the infinite is?as
them. . . . From which
the
other
than
unlimited.5
commonly
suppose?something
on

of infinites
to remark,
"the hypothesis
too, that since
consistent
and is successful
small things is admirably
and of infinitely
that they really exist."6
the probability
this also increases
in geometry,
of 1676
the metaphysical
As this last remark
indicates,
outpourings
Leibniz

goes

2Here Leibniz later added a note: "Rather

(N.B.) one proves by this only
that a series is endless."
3G. W.
1675-1676,
Papers,
Leibniz, De Summa Rerum: Metaphysical
trans. G. H. R. Parkinson
Press, 1992), 31-3.
(New Haven: Yale University
4
is
33. The end of this reading ("possible")
Leibniz, De Summa Rerum,
but in any case the point is clear from the first clause of the sen
conjectural,
tence.

5
Leibniz, De Summa
6 Ibid.

Rerum,

31.

This content downloaded from 194.27.149.45 on Tue, 6 Jan 2015 16:50:35 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

851

AS INFINITE
LEIBNIZ
ON INDEFINITE
should
success
washed

in large part be understood

invented
of the newly
over Leibniz's
metaphysics

as motivated
infinitesimal
the

with

by

the

antecedent
which

had
calculus,
force of a tidal wave.7

as these

from "On the Secrets

of the Sublime"
two passages
However,
to be drawn are far from clear.
Leibniz has not
the conclusions
attest,
we see his
a
rather
consistent
position;
metaphysical
yet developed
in flux.

views

At

least

throughout

the

course

of

these

reflections,

however, Leibniz retains the belief that the indefinite is to be distin

guished

from

any candidate

for an infinite

number.

The view that the indefinite is distinct from the infinite was not at
all uncommon

In Galileo's
Dialogues
to
in response
traditional
Two New Sciences,
Simplicio's
Concerning
are
of
the
continuum
declaration
that the quantified
Aristotelian
parts
Galileo's
and finitely many
repre
actually,
infinitely many
potentially
Salviati
sentative
responds:
in the

seventeenth

century.

7Leibniz's
notes from 1676 have been universally
recog
philosophical
in recent
The general tendency
difficult and perplexing.
nized as notoriously
to systematize
the views Leibniz
literature has been to attempt
secondary
in his paper
This
has
been
here.
by G. H. R. Parkinson
presents
attempted
Studia Leibnitiana
"Leibniz's De Summa Rerum: A Systematic Approach,"
in her joint article with R. C.
16 (1986): 132-51; and also by Christia Mercer
"
on Metaphysics,
to
The
the
Discourse
early period
Sleigh, Jr., "Metaphysics:
to Leibniz,
in The Cambridge
ed. Nicholas
Companion
Jolley (Cambridge:
See especially
84-107. Mercer, for ex
Press), 67-123.
Cambridge University
her investigation
of Leibniz's early philosophy
in terms of
ample, organizes
about which he is "rarely explicit,"
certain "basic metaphysical
assumptions"
but which are "discernible as the implicit premises and unstated assumptions
72. Yet, inmy opinion, this de
of his arguments
..."; Mercer,
"Metaphysics,"
a period in which a
sire to systematize
ill-chosen for understanding
is most
thinker's views are in such radical flux; what is needed
instead is an investi
concerns.
Indeed, Mercer's
gation taking as its point of departure motivating
drive to systematize
leads her so far as to declare at one point that "since
Leibniz maintains
his characteristic
silence about his deep motivations,
the
case for this proposal must be circumstantial,
based on clues that Leibniz
leaves along the way"; Mercer,
93. But at least one main mo
"Metaphysics,"
tivation behind Leibniz's metaphysical
reflections
is perfectly
clear: the ques
tions with which he has been presented
by the success of the infinitesimal
concern
calculus.
Another msgor motivating
is Leibniz's desire to come to
terms with Cartesianism.
Mercer has little to say about either of these in her
discussion
of the Paris period writings.
On Leibniz's 1675 De Cartessi
errori
see
the
excellent
article
Yvon
"Premi?res
Animadversions
bus,
by
Belaval,
sur les <Principes' de Descartes,"
leibniziennes
reprinted in his ?tudes
(Paris:
?ditions Gallimard,
1976), 57-85, especially p. 62 and the following pages for
a discussion
of the indefinite in Descartes's
thought.

This content downloaded from 194.27.149.45 on Tue, 6 Jan 2015 16:50:35 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

852

O. BRADLEY BASSLER
To the question which asks whether
the quantified parts in the contin
uum are finite or infinitely many,
I shall reply exactly the opposite
of
what Simplicio
replied; that is, [I shall say] "neither finite nor infinite."8

Salviati
there
nated

"that between
the finite
and the infinite
goes on to declare
or
a
to every desig
middle
is
term; it is that of answering
third,
On the basis of this term between
the finite
and the
number."
Salviati

infinite,

continues,
con
that the continuum
and I grant that it contains
and to the satisfaction
of

to the distinguished
I concede
philosophers
tains as many quantified parts as you please;
at the pleasure
them actually or potentially
those gentlemen.9
thus

insures

the indefinite

division

Galileo's

position

without

enlisting the traditional Aristotelian

and

actual

and also without

the potential,
either finite or infinite.10

of parts being
Likewise

we

In a letter

cerning

Descartes

adopting

to the number

committing
an

idea

the

of

indefinite

pro

is to be identified neither with the finite nor the infi

gression which
nite.

find

of the continuum

distinction between

the extent

of June

6, 1647, Descartes
of the world:

responds

to Chanut

con

In the first place I recollect

that the Cardinal of Cusa and many other
ever being cen
the world to be infinite without
Doctors have supposed
sured by the Church; on the contrary, to represent God's works as very
great is thought to be a way of doing him honour. And my opinion is not
so difficult to accept as theirs, because
I do not say that the world
is in
8Galileo
trans. Still
Two New Sciences,
Galilei, Dialogue
Concerning
man Drake (Madison: University
of Wisconsin
Press, 1974), 43. Imake use of
and felicity of the translation
this translation despite the greater availability
de Salvio (New York: Dover,
of Henry Crew and Alfonso
1954) due to the
to nuances of Galileo's
of the former translation
linguistic
greater sensitivity
Iwill refer to the Galileo Opera num
usage. For ease of reference, however,
the above reference
for example,
bers which are given in both translations;
will now be given as Galileo, Opera, 81.
9 Ibid.
10In his
or Compro
article, "Galileo's Theory of Indivisibles: Revolution
A.
Mark
Smith as
Ideas
37
the
Journal
of
(1976), 571-88,
mise,"
History
of
a
the
modified
continuum
serts that Galileo's position
represents
regarding
Smith
In a critical, but unfortunately
Aristotelianism.
obscure,
passage
seems to interpret Galileo's declaration
that the number of parts in the con
indefinite division of the con
tinuum is indefinite as indicating a potentially
Intermediate
that "an indefinite
term' (every assigned
tinuum, concluding
the Aristotelian
neither finite nor infinite, must serve to describe
number),
Here
Smith
of spatial and temporal processes"
continuum
omits, how
(577).
that the parts may be taken to be either
ever, Salviati's explicit declaration
so far as I can see this passage
actual or potential;
greatly vitiates his inter
pretation.

This content downloaded from 194.27.149.45 on Tue, 6 Jan 2015 16:50:35 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

AS INFINITE
LEIBNIZ
ON INDEFINITE

853

There is quite a notable difference

but only that it is indefinite.
finite,
a
is infinite without
the two: for we cannot say that something
between
reason to prove this such as we can give only in the case of God; but we
can say that a thing is indefinite
simply if we have no reason which
it
then no argument to prove, and not
has
that
proves
bounds-Having
even being able to conceive,
I call it indefi
that the world has bounds,
nite. But I cannot deny on that account that there may be some reasons
to me; that is why I
which are known to God though incomprehensible
do not say outright that it is infinite.11
seem
to imply
Descartes
does
position,
the world
is finite or infinite,
that there is a fact of the matter whether
the
limited
rational
indefinite
is reducible
but given man's
capacities
to the one nor the other.
neither
to Galileo's

In contrast

As we

will

that

like Galileo's,
What

distinguishes

modifying
Leibniz

Leibniz's

see,

there

are

Leibniz's

mature
indefinitely
position

many
parts
from Galileo's,

will be,
position
in the continuum.
however,

is that,

the position he took in "On the Secrets of the Sublime,"12

takes

this

to mean

that

of the difficulties

the end, with

an overview

are

num
infinitely many whole
as
That is, Leibniz
takes the indefinite
some of the steps along
is to indicate
there

bers, or parts in the continuum.

infinite.
My goal in this paper
in the
traversed
the path Leibniz
some

philosophical

exploration
caused.

this position
of the position

of
Iwill

Leibniz

this

position,

begin,

ultimately

11Ren?

and

at
however,
achieved.

in The Philosophical
Descartes,
Correspondence,
of
Writings
3 vols., trans. John Cottingham,
Robert Stoothoff,
Descartes,
Dugald Mur
doch, and Anthony Kenny (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press,
1991),
The original
letter may be found in Oeuvres
3:319-20.
de Descartes,
ed.
Charles Adam and Paul Tannery, new presentation
in 12 vols. (Paris: J. Vrin,
is briefly discussed with reference
to the doc
1964-76), 5:51-2. This passage
trine of Nicholas
of Cusa in Alexandre
the Closed World to the
Koyr?, From
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1957), 6. Des
Infinite Universe
of the indefinite is discussed
at length in the fifth chapter
cartes's conception
or Infinite Space," 110-24.
of Koyr?'s book, "Indefinite Extension
12There
a subtle, but critical, point to be made here. In "On
is, however,
the Secrets of the Sublime," Leibniz declares
that the number of finite num
is the possibility
bers cannot be infinite; what he does not consider
of none
theless admitting
that there is an (indefinite)
That
infinity of finite numbers.
the finite whole numbers as progressing
indef
is, although Leibniz recognizes
this indefinite progression
as infi
initely he does not consider understanding
nite. From the perspective
of the Leibniz of the late 1690's maintaining
that
there is an infinity of finite numbers
is weaker
than maintaining
that there is
an infinite number; as we will see, while
in the late 1690's Leibniz will accept
that there is an infinity of finite numbers he will remain agnostic on whether
there are infinite numbers.
These issues will be considered
inmore detail be
low in the context of Leibniz's correspondence
with Bernoulli.

This content downloaded from 194.27.149.45 on Tue, 6 Jan 2015 16:50:35 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

O. BRADLEY BASSLER

854
II
In the brief

"It is perfectly
is an infinity of things,

infinite:

the Leibnizian

of

"to say that there

reports,
more
than one can specify."13
always

identification

correct,"
Theophilus
that is, that there are
Leibniz
that
effects
exactly

Here

of the infinite and indefinite within

which

quantitative
sertion we

Galileo

see what

on Human

Essays

speaking for Leibniz, provides a

(1703-5), Theophilus,

Understanding
survey

in the New

"Of Infinity,"

chapter,

explicitly

leaves

unlike

Leibniz,

the realm of the

next
In Theophilus's
in a position
Galileo,

denies.

as
to

identify the indefinite with the infinite: "But it is easy to demonstrate

nor any infinite
line or other
infinite
number,
are
if these
taken to be genuine wholes."14
quantity,
an
amounts,
infinity of things, but not infinite wholes,
Accepting
is no

there

that

Leibniz
matic
ative

infinite

a syncategore
to accepting
goes on to say in the New Essays,
one.15 It is infinite only in a neg
infinite but not a categorematic
sense
it is unlim
of the word:
the original
sense,
etymological
not

ited, and consequently

with
is to be contrasted
only
formed
things

absolute,

taken

not

hence
The

indefinite

infinite,"

precedes
The
of parts."16

by the addition
is not the true

infinite,

syncategorematic
and our
speaking,

strictly
or an infinite

infinity

infinite,

truly

absolute,
from Leibniz's

to that which

however,

because
is perfect

is not

line or other
a confusion

between

syncategorematic

is
speaking,
and
is not

to
attempts
infinite quan

of the two.

In

to at
incorrectly
It is not absolute,
are limitations.
which

it has parts,
in its lack of limitation.

and

of

infinity

attempt
absolute.

with
the Jesuit
correspondence
des Bosses,
Bartholomew
of mathematics

guishing

infinite

quantitative

which,
"strictly
all composition

number,
seem to result from
as a whole,
we would
of such infinite wholes,

speaking
tribute a true

sor

the "true

This

which

of an infinite

speak
tity,

the

in

finite.

theologian
in addition

In a passage
and profes
to distin

infinites

categorematic

(the

latter again taken to be impossible), Leibniz adds that God as absolute

To take
infinite.17
is hypercategorematically
to treat a syncategorematic
is to attempt
whole

an

is only appropriate to the hypercategorematically

infinite

infinity

number
in a way

as a
which

infinite.

13G. W.
on Human
trans, and ed.
Understanding,
Leibniz, New Essays
and Jonathan Bennett
Peter Remnant
University
Cambridge
(Cambridge:
Press, 1981), 157.
14Ibid.

This content downloaded from 194.27.149.45 on Tue, 6 Jan 2015 16:50:35 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

LEIBNIZ
AS INFINITE
ON INDEFINITE

that to take the infinite

of
indeed,
plurality
reverse
to
true
for
the
order
of
prece
is,
Leibniz,
of infinity in fact derives
notion
the syncategorematic
from the

It becomes
things
dence:

855

clear,

as a whole

sense.

hypercategorematic

This

is made

clear when

Leibniz

derives

the thought of the syncategorematic infinite from the thought of like

ness. Beginning with a straight line, then doubling it, "it is clear that

15The distinction
is standard in the medieval
scholastic
tradition. Ock
terms have a definite and fixed signi
says: "Categorematic
ham, for example,
as for instance the word
'man' (since it signifies all men)
and the
fication,
word
'animal' (since it signifies all animals), and the word
'whiteness'
(since
of whiteness).
it signifies
all occurrences
terms, on the
Syncategorematic
other

hand,

as

'every',

'none',

'some',

'whole',

'besides',

'only',

'in so

far

as',

nor do they signify

and the like, do not have a fixed and definite meaning,
terms. Rather, just
things distinct from the things signified by categorematic
zero standing alone does not signify anything,
as, in the system of numbers,
so likewise a
but when added to another number gives it a new signification;
term does not signify anything, properly
but
syncategorematic
speaking,
or makes
when added to another term, itmakes
it signify something
it stand
for some thing or things in a definite manner, or has some other function with
regard to a categorematic
term"; William of Ockham, Philosophical
Writings:
A Selection,
trans. Philotheus
Boehner,
O.F.M., rev. Stephen Brown
(India
infinite is syncategore
indefinite
napolis: Hackett,
1990), 51. Thus Leibniz's
matic in the sense that the term "infinite" only signifies when applied to finite
that is, "more than any given finite number." Leibniz also aligns the
numbers,
between
distinction
and categorematic
with the distinction
syncategorematic
uses of the term "infinite": Leibniz's posi
and collective
between
distributive
tion is that there is no collective
infinite. See, for example, G. W.
quantitative
von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz,
ed. C.
Leibniz, Die Philosophische
Schriften
I. Gerhardt,
at
2:314.
The
(Berlin, 1875-90; reprint, Hildesheim:
Olms, 1961)
between
the syncategorematic
and the categore
tempt to use the distinction
to resolve sophismata
matic
to the infinite is traditional as well.
pertaining
An excellent
of one such account,
discussion
that of Albert of Saxony,
is
de l'infini," in
given in Jo?l Biard's article, "Albert de Saxe et les sophismes
in Medieval
ed. Stephen Read (Dordrecht:
Sophisms
Logic and Grammar,
Kluwer,
(hereafter cited as "Albert de Saxe"). Biard focuses
1993), 288-303
on the sophisma,
"Infinita sunt finita" ("Infinites are finite"), treated by Albert
of Saxony but going back at least to the De solutionibus
circa
sophismatum,
1200 (see Biard, "Albert de Saxe," 288). Henri de Gand proves this sophism
as follows:
"Infinita sunt finita. Probatio: duo sunt finita, tria sunt finita, et
sic in infinitum; ergo infinita sunt finita." ("Infinites are imites. Proof: two are
infinites are finite"): for
finite, three are finite, and thus to infinity; therefore
see
n.
"Albert
de
291
18.
A
close analogue
of this
references,
Biard,
Saxe,"
with Bernoulli,
and will be dis
proof recurs in Leibniz's
correspondence
cussed below.
16
157.
Leibniz, New Essays,
17Translated
in G. W. Leibniz, Philosophical
Papers and Letters, ed. and
trans. Leroy Loemker (Boston: Reidel, 1969), 31. The original passage may be
found in Leibniz, Die Philosophische
2:314. See also the discus
Schriften,
sion in Loemker's
to Philosophical
introduction
Papers,
31, and also 514 n. 2
and 541 n. 21.

This content downloaded from 194.27.149.45 on Tue, 6 Jan 2015 16:50:35 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

856

O. BRADLEY BASSLER

the second line, being perfectly similar to the first, can be doubled

in

ones.
to the preceding
similar
line which
its turn to yield
.. ."18 Because
it is impos
that is, unlimited,
is perfect,
the similitude
ever
can
same
"the
is al
be hindered:
sible that the process
principle
see
on
to
the
of
Leibniz
."19
ways
goes
explicitly
thought
applicable...
a third

the

common

the

from

infinite

deriving
origin with

is also

thought

universal

necessary

of

a
likeness,
thereby
sharing
are
for Leibniz
truths, which

He then indicates
in the thought
of likeness.
grounded
an infinite quantity
as a whole
error in considering
would
be
limited:
and attribute
it to something
"The
absolute
to take something
to space,
is just the idea of the im
with
reference
idea of the absolute,
themselves
that our

of God and thus [my emphasis] of other things. But itwould

mensity

an absolute
is an infinite
to try to suppose
space which
of Newton's
whole made
up of parts."20 The implied criticism
descrip
con
as
in
this
Dei
here
is
sensorium
the
tion of space
unmistakable;
to the notion
of space as abso
text it is clear that Leibniz's
opposition
be a mistake

lute

fundamental
of the absolute

its

from

devolves

metaphysical
is internal

but the attributes

nothing
of ideas as God
the source

are
to us, as is that of being: these absolutes
of God; and they may be said to be as much

of God

attributes

absolute

most
with
Leibniz's
incompatibility
to God as absolute.
"The idea
commitment

himself
are

that

of beings."21
is the principle
The
our ideas derive
as
from which

God is that from which beings derive.

My concern
as
the absolute
Leibniz's
gorematic,
sue which
which

is not,

in this essay

metaphysics
infinite.22

is absolute

with

Leibniz's

notion

of

room

is left in
of what
the question
or syncate
for the distinct
idea of an indefinite,
an is
we
this
In
may begin by recognizing
regard

infinite,

Leibniz

however,

has

but with

not

addressed

is understood

to be

in Theophilus's
that which

report.
is perfect,

If that
hence

18
158.
Leibniz, New Essays,
19Ibid.
20Ibid.
21Ibid.
22For a fuller discussion
of Leibniz's chapter on infinity in the New Es
on
to Locke's account
of the infi
Leibniz's
and
opposition
says,
especially
in
"Leibniz on Locke on infinity," in LInfinito
Lamarra,
nite, see Antonio
Lamarra (Rome: Edizioni
e Terminologia,
ed. Antonio
Problemi
Leibniz:
of Leibniz on the indefi
dell'Ateneo,
1990), 173-91. For another discussion
und die Dinge.
Infinitum
"Die Idee des Unendlichen
nite, see Hans Poser,
in Leibniz,
225-33.
Poser's excel
und immensum bei Leibniz," in LInfinito
of the debates
is delimited, however, by his exclusion
lent discussion
regard
his
from
infinitesimals
purview.
ing

This content downloaded from 194.27.149.45 on Tue, 6 Jan 2015 16:50:35 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

AS INFINITE
LEIBNIZ
ON INDEFINITE
limitation

the

without
cannot

be

absolute.

cannot

be an infinite

of parts,
This does

it is clear

857
that a whole

made

not

of parts
there
why

yet explain,
however,
up of parts, unless we already have
or
that an infinite whole must
be absolute

whole

made

an argument
to show
that such
direct proof
else
Even though Leibniz
cannot
exist.
either

some

an

infinite

made

whole

up of parts
that it
above,

tells us, as mentioned

that there is no infinite number,
and so forth,
is easy to demonstrate
to a hypercategore
commitment
Leibniz's
he does not do this here.
the exclusion
of a categore
infinite does not by itself explain
matic
an indefinite

only

to understand

In order

infinite.

matic

in the realm

infinite

of

Leibniz's

gin by considering
infinite.
Leibniz
matic

such

it means

to be

left with

of quantity,
it would
help to be
the impossibility
of a categore
such an impossibil
us, however,

proof
not give
Iwould
like to turn now

does

in the New

ity proof
in which

what

to those

Essays;
a proof
is supplied.

contexts

Ill
at the position
arrived
that there is no largest
originally
or number
of all numbers,
in specific
to the posi
number,
opposition
an
intensive
tion of Galileo,
in
during
reading of the Two New Sciences
to his dec
1672 or 1673. As we will see, this position
is closely
related
Leibniz

in the New

laration

of

alogue

the first

Essays
day of

that there

are no

the Two New

infinite

Sciences,

that the infinite number of all (whole) numbers

subcollection

proper
numbers.

Since
and

numbers,
must
therefore
self.

The

the

the subcollection
itself, namely
same holds
for all other powers

so

forth),
be whatever
such

Galileo

number

concludes

that

In the di
recognizes

is equal in size to a

of

only
number
is generated,
to be one.23
all numbers

other

wholes.
Galileo

the

of all square
as well
infinite

number

contains
all its powers
is one, or unity,
from which
and so Galileo
takes the infinite

(cube
number

within

it

indeed

all

number

of

23
It is important to note that Galileo has Salviati
Galileo, Opera, 78-85.
a
of
disclaimers
deliver
series
repeatedly
along with his remarks about the in
finite.
idea of
says he is "going to produce a fantastic
Salviati, for example,
if it concludes
will at least by its novelty oc
mine which,
nothing necessarily,
casion some wonder"; Galileo, Opera, 73. In another passage Salviati speaks
of "marvels that surpass the bounds of our imagination,
and that must warn
us how gravely one errs in trying to reason about infinites by using the same
attributes
that we apply to unites; for the natures of these have no necessary
relation between
at Galileo, Op
them"; Galileo, Opera, 83. See also passages
era, 96 and 105.

This content downloaded from 194.27.149.45 on Tue, 6 Jan 2015 16:50:35 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

O. BRADLEY BASSLER

858

ity with
torum of

in detail

first

Leibniz

responds
one
the number

to Galileo's

in the Accessio

1673.24

identification

ad Arithmeticam
even

Galileo's

of

infin

Infini
no
Leibniz

further

By driving
point
of properties
of the infinite whole
which
it from
prevent
with
For
Leibniz
the
identified
number
unity.
example,
notices,
being
must
in size to the number
also be equal
of all even
of all numbers
tices

a host

or all multiples
numbers,
not shared by the number
all
ers, does not contain
fies
niz,
zero,

all these

requisites
zero.
the number
this means

are
properties
it contains
all its pow
These

Leibniz's

the infinite

one,

and so forth.

one, which,
although
The only number which
its multiples.
satis
is not the number
to Leib
one, but, according

Given

that

not
is impossible,
=
number
0."25

of three,

not

of the number
understanding
no
at all: "thus the infinite
is
number

the whole,

but nothing.

the

Thus

infinite

as a consequence
his impossibility
of
interpreted
proof
that the whole
is greater
than the part.
He re
axiom
the universal
as
a
demonstrable
in
axiom
itself
this
syllogism
taking as its
garded
an identical
a definition
and as its minor
proposi
(of greater)
major
Leibniz

(a part is equal
occurs
of this axiom
tion

to a part

of the whole);
in 1671, prior

the syllogistic
derivation
to Leibniz's
for
departure

already
that Leibniz's
It
is
Paris.26
here, specifically,
disagreement
For Galileo,
of greater,
"the attributes
leo rests.
lesser,

with
and

Gali

equal

do

24G. W.
und Briefe,
2d ser. (Berlin: Akade
Schriften
Leibniz, S?mtliche
1:226.
mie Verlag, ongoing),
25 Ibid. As
of
Leibniz's
interpretation
Margaret Baron has emphasized,
in the Accessio.
zero is critical to the mathematical
See
results he presents
Calculus
her The Origins
(New York: Dover,
1987),
of the Infinitesimal
of the mathematical
results of the Acces
270-2, for a readable presentation
ex
of this material
without
sio. There is also an elementary
presentation
in
to
the
C.
H.
The
Historical
Accessio
reference
Edwards,
Develop
plicit
ment
(New York: Springer Verlag, 1979), 234-9. For a more
of the Calculus
account
Leibniz
in
the reader may consult Joseph E. Hofmann,
detailed
toMathematical
Cam
His Growth
1672-1676:
Paris
Maturity
(Cambridge:
Press,
1974), 12-22. Finally, Leibniz himself gives an ac
bridge University
of 1714
count of these results in the "Historia et Origo calculi differentialis"
I.
ed.
C.
Gerhardt
W.
Mathematische
Leibniz,
Schriften,
[reprint,
(G.
is available
in English translation
in
Hildesheim:
Olms, 1971], 3:321-2), which
J. M. Child, The Early Mathematical
Manuscripts
of Leibniz
(Chicago: The
Company,
1920), 22-58.
Open Court Publishing
26
6th ser., 2:482-3.
For a discussion
of
Leibniz, S?mtliche
Schriften,
see Ezequiel
de
this proof in the Demonstratio
propositionum
primarum
in Leibniz,
and the infinite," in LInfinito
95-118, espe
"Scepticism
Olaso,
See also the footnote below regarding an
cially 107 and the following pages.
in the correspondence
with Ber
of this argument
presentation
analogous
noulli.

This content downloaded from 194.27.149.45 on Tue, 6 Jan 2015 16:50:35 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

AS INFINITE
ON INDEFINITE
LEIBNIZ

859

or less
it cannot be said that one is greater,
of which
infinities,
or
draws
while
Leibniz
the
conclusion
Yet
than,
equal to, another."27
of all numbers
is absurd
since
its existence
that an infinite number

not

suit

a universal

contradict

would

an axiom

such

axiom,

Galileo

concludes

instead

that

not pertain
universally.
to show
the ab
Leibniz
contexts,
gives other arguments
we have seen one such argument
at the be
of infinite wholes;
does

In other
surdity

seems
to
Yet the demonstration
of this paper.28
given above
behind
Leibniz's
assertion
to be the predominant
argument
as
all
numbers
is
an
the
number
of
such
infinite whole
that
impossible.
is that it is this argument
which
of this predominance
One indication
ginning
continue

Leibniz

sketches

in the context

of one

of his most

intensive

regarding the nature of the infinite in his correspondence

mathematical

prot?g?,

Johann

Bernoulli.29

This

debate

focuses

debates

with his
on the

itself is delimited
but the debate
of infinitesimals,
by the impos
a
or
In
letter from August/Sep
minimal
quantity.
sibility of a maximal
his
to the opin
to
Bernoulli
Leibniz
tember
reports
opposition
1698,
of St. Vincent
that the axiom
that the
and Gregory
ions of de Voider
status

whole
Leibniz

than
is greater
continues:

the part does

not hold

for the

infinite.30

Instead,

27
Galileo, Opera, 78.
28In those contexts
to suppress the more subtle,
inwhich Leibniz wishes
the consideration
of the infinite, he often
issues surrounding
and technical,
for the proof that there is no greatest number a proof that a fast
substitutes
on Knowledge,
in the Meditations
est motion
is absurd. For example,
Truth,
as follows:
"For
and Ideas, Leibniz proves the absurdity of a fastest motion
can see
let us suppose some wheel turning with the fastest motion.
Everyone
the edge would move
extended
faster
that any spoke of the wheel
beyond
the nail's motion
Therefore
is not the fast
than a nail on the rim of the wheel.
trans.
G. W. Leibniz, Philosophical
est, contrary to the hypothesis";
Essays,
25.
The
Daniel
Garber
Ariew
and
Hackett,
(Indianapolis:
origi
1989),
Roger
nal text may be found in Leibniz, Die Philosophische
?Schriften, 4:424. This
proof is closely related to debates about what would happen were space to
see Koyr?,
in a variety of early modern
be limited. For a discussion
contexts,
The Infinite Universe.
29For an alternative account of Leibniz's debate with
centered
Bernoulli,
see George MacDonald
on the question
of infinitesimals,
of the existence
in Leibniz's Metaphysics?"
in LInfinito
Ross, "Are There Real Infinitesimals
in Leibniz,
125-41.
30Leibniz
presents Bernoulli with a proof of this axiom in a part of the
here. See Leibniz's let
earlier than that under consideration
correspondence
ter of 23 August
1696 in Leibniz, Mathematische
3:321-2. This pre
Schriften,
sentation
largely follows the argument given in 1671 cited above. For a logi
see H. G.
in this letter to Bernoulli,
cal analysis of the argument as presented
on
a
Remarks
Proof
"Some
12
Ratio
by Leibniz,"
Knapp,
Logical
(1970): 125
37.

This content downloaded from 194.27.149.45 on Tue, 6 Jan 2015 16:50:35 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

O. BRADLEY BASSLER

860

it appears to me that we must say either that the infinite is not truly one
or else that if the infinite is a whole,
and yet is not greater than
whole,
absurd.
Indeed I demonstrated
its part, then it is something
many years
of all numbers
ago that the number of the multitude
implies a contradic
num
The same [holds] for a maximum
tion if it is taken together whole.
ber and a minimum
This
number, or fraction smaller than all others.
must also be said about a fastest motion
and all similar things.31
goes on to confess
of infinitesimals
the possibility
from the
is different
maximum
Leibniz

small."32
nitely
such
whether
and

so he will

assert,
possible,

He
infinite
"allow

their

infinitesimals

gument

because

to Bernoulli

t?at

out,

he

asserts

parts.
infinitely many
of his contention:
in support

He

cannot

magnitudes
in the middle."33
can

that
offers

however,
"since

infi

the

determine
are

small

be demonstrated

that Leibniz is committed

Leibniz

rule

infinitely
large things,
infinite and a minimum
from

infinitely
to remain
the matter

into

Consider
any
this geometric
as the number
nite; but if all
and all of the

not

and

if these magnitudes
will follow.34
existence

Bernoulli believes
divided

this does

that

however,
then

reports
and

that

possible,
He does
to be

to the existence

of

the continuum
Leibniz

is actually
ar
the following

to
into parts according
divided
magnitude
1/2 + 1/4 + 1/8 + 1/16 + and so forth. As long
progression:
the singular terms will be fi
of terms is finite, I confess
exist there will surely be infinitesimals
the terms actually
infinitely small magnitudes.35
following
determinate

are (ac
all such divisions
goes on to point out that in bodies
so
Bernoulli
to
argues,
actual,
that,
infinitesimals,
Leibniz)
cording
would
be necessary.
small magnitudes,
that is, infinitely

Bernoulli

31
otherwise
3:535. Unless
noted,
Leibniz, Mathematische
Schriften,
from this source are my own.
translations
32
3:536.
Schriften,
Leibniz, Mathematische
33 Ibid.
34The situation
of infinitesimals
bears consider
regarding the existence
the ontological
able structural analogy to the situation concerning
proof of
the Cartesian ontological
of God. Leibniz criticized
the existence
argument
then
on the grounds that itmerely proves that if God's existence
is possible,
of God's existence.
it is actual, but it does not give a proof of the possibility
of God's
with such a proof of the possibility
Leibniz was much preoccupied
of 1678, the mid
existence
during 1676, and returns to it later in writings
of such a proof are ex
1680's, and 1714. The issues involved in the provision
of this paper.
and
well
bounds
the
intricate
beyond
consequently
tremely
of these issues in Robert
The reader is referred to the detailed discussion
Idealist
Adams's Leibniz:
Merrihew
Theist,
Determinist,
(Oxford: Oxford
the
141
and
See
pages.
Press,
especially
following
University
1994).
35
3:529.
Leibniz, Mathematische
Schriften,

This content downloaded from 194.27.149.45 on Tue, 6 Jan 2015 16:50:35 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

AS INFINITE
LEIBNIZ
ON INDEFINITE

861

Like the position Leibniz took in 1676, Bernoulli's position

that there are not
parently
ries 1/2 + 1/4 + 1/8 +_He

an infinite
reaches

number

terms

of finite

this conclusion

is ap

in the se

on the basis

of an

the force of the "surely" in the passage

quoted
argument
(from which
runs
as
a
which
finite
of
follows:
that
above
suppose
portion
derives)
divided
into an infinite number
of parts and
matter
is already
actually

yet none are forced to be infinite (by which Bernoulli presumably

understands
"infinitely
small;" this is at any rate how Leibniz
are
Then the single parts
finite, and "if the single parts are finite,
all of them together make
to
up an infinite magnitude,
contrary

means
him).
then

hypothesis."36
Bernoulli
of the infin
Despite
practitioner
being an accomplished
to dismiss
it may
be tempting
itesimal
this as a
calculus,
perhaps
by an archaic
quaint
fallacy generated
I believe
infinite.
the mathematical
noulli's

position
ern discussions
lileo's

Two New

Leibniz
were

a finite

was
of the

expressive
infinite;

understanding
this would
be

of the nature
a mistake.

concern
of a pervasive
an almost
identical
proof

of
Ber

in early mod
occurs
in Ga

Sciences?1

to Bernoulli's
that if there
responds
example
by admitting
term no smaller
than every term in the infinite series
then

36
3:529.
Leibniz, Mathematische
Schriften,
37This
is in fact precisely
the one that Galileo uses to motivate
argument
his position
that the number of parts in the continuum
is neither finite nor in
or actu
finite: "... the quantified parts in the continuum, whether
potentially
or
do
not
make
its
it
is
less.
But
clear
that
ally there,
quantity greater
quanti
fied parts actually contained
in their whole,
if they are infinitely many, make
it of infinite magnitude;
whence
infinitely many quantified
parts cannot be
even potentially
contained
Thus in the finite,
except in an infinite magnitude.
either actually or poten
infinitely many quantified parts cannot be contained
to
80-1.
Galileo
commits
existence
the
of infinite mag
tially"; Galileo, Opera,
in a way that Leibniz will not, but he cannot see any way to account
nitudes
for the number of parts in the continuum
in terms of such an infinite magni
tude. Consequently
he assigns to them a magnitude
intermediate
between
the finite and the infinite, analogous
to what Leibniz refers to as the indefi
I suggest might more appropriately
be referred to in Galileo's
nite, but which
case as the parafinite.
Leibniz, on the one hand, cannot accept the Galilean
infinite, since it fails the axiom of identity, but on the other hand understands
the indefinite as infinite. Why though, we may ask, would Galileo believe that
or ac
infinitely many quantified parts cannot be contained
(either potentially
for example,
the case of a
tually) except in an infinite magnitude?
Consider,
line segment one unit long divided into successive
parts, disjoint except for
their endpoints,
of successive
Is this not a perfectly
lengths 1/2,1/4, 1/8,....
an infinite number of quanti
good example of a finite magnitude
containing
fied parts? The answer, presumably,
is "no," because
the number of parts
nor
in
neither
finite
given is,
fact,
infinite, but indefinite.

This content downloaded from 194.27.149.45 on Tue, 6 Jan 2015 16:50:35 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

862

O. BRADLEY BASSLER
sum would

the

be infinite,38 but Leibniz

does not grant Ber
in general.
Leibniz
replies
that, even if we take all
in the progression
to exist,
"I do not
1/2,1/4,1/8,...
actually

the terms
hold

anything

nite

assignable
recourse

niz's

indeed

conclusion

noulli's

to follow

hence
of any

fractions

is to a notion

are actually
given fi
Here
smallness."39
again Leib

that

except

there

given
the indefinite

of

not

infinite

conflicting

with the infinitude of parts actually being given.

Since Bernoulli goes on in a later letter (December 6,1698)
the

between

that

seem

would

finite

that he

terms

in the series

noulli

asserts

the

and

is committed
1/2, 1/4, 1/8,
either
all the

that

to say

no third term
is given,40
it
to saying
that the number
of finite
...
is finite.
In the same
letter Ber
infinite

terms

in the

are not

series

actually
are
more
and
could
be
many
finitely
only
given
given,
given,
or else all the terms are actually
given, and there is an infinite number
case
infinitesimals.
In the former
it is clear that the
of them, hence
and

then

is finite;
terms must

of finite

the number

the series

Bernoulli,
is contrary

would

it some

but

sum

case

latter

number

as well,

it seems,

For

to an

to
otherwise,
according
infinite magnitude,
which

then, in this
What,
Is it some determinate

finite

(indeterminate)

in the

be finite.

then

to hypothesis.41
of finite terms be?

number

we

terms

of finite

number

larger

latter

finite

than

could

case,

any

this

or is
number,
finite number

can

supply?42
In the correspondence

that

to
Bernoulli's
follows,
opposition
of infinity as indefinite
and the in

concurrent
understanding
of (physical)
unabated.
Af
parts as actually
given continues
to this combination
in his
ter reiterating
his opposition
of positions
more
some objections
next
letter and offering
directed
to
specifically
Leibniz's
finitude

end of Leibniz's
say, dynamical)
po
(or as Leibniz would
a
in
out
which
Leibniz
his
reply
lays
position
receiving
to
but with
little supporting
Bernoulli
argument,
replies
systematically
"are much
too laconic,
and are defini
Leibniz
that Leibniz's
responses
the physical
and
sition,43

tions

rather

than

Leibniz's

explications."44

charge in his subsequent reply ismost

tions

might

always

be

given,

for

they

response

to Bernoulli's

telling: "Butwould
virtually

contain

that defini
the

explana

tions."45 So it is for Leibniz in general, and with regard to the infinite

beginning already with the writings of 1672-3: the nature of the infi
38This is of course a
as Leibniz
sufficient, but not a necessary
condition,
was well aware. Already
in 1673 Leibniz took the series 1/1 + 1/2 + 1/3 + 1/4 +
... to diverge.
see Hofmann, Leibniz
For a discussion
in Paris,
21.
39
Mathematische
3:536.
Leibniz,
Schriften,
40
3:555.
Leibniz, Mathematische
Schriften,

This content downloaded from 194.27.149.45 on Tue, 6 Jan 2015 16:50:35 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

863

AS INFINITE
LEIBNIZ
ON INDEFINITE

nite is delimited by the proof of the impossibility of a largest magni

tude, and
the whole

this proof
is greater

is but
than

an application
the part.46

of the universal

41The other

axiom

that

in
is to assume that Bernoulli
choice
changes his position
indica
does not give any explicit
Bernoulli
this particular
regard. However,
tion that he concedes Leibniz's point that an infinitude of finite parts need not
As I point out in a later note, there
sum to an infinite magnitude.
necessarily
does seem to shift?specifi
are other regards in which Bernoulli's
position
exist. But itwould do him
infinitesimals
that
the
probability
cally, regarding
little good to shift in this regard, for if he were to admit that an infinite num
then there would be
ber of finite magnitudes
may sum to a finite magnitude,
little reason to insist that an infinity of terms being given requires that infini
tesimals exist. This, of course, is precisely what Leibniz is trying to get Ber
noulli to agree to. Since he does not do it, this should serve as indirect confir
mation
that Bernoulli would take the number of finite terms to be finite. One
in his letter of 1698 that "if there are no
assertion
might also cite Bernoulli's
the number of terms will be finitely
in nature, then certainly
infinitesimals
.
in
Leibniz, Mathematische
Schriften,
many
Bernoulli,
.";
[tantum finitus].
it does not tell us
this could be taken as supporting evidence,
3:555. Although
directly what the situation would be with the finite terms were there indeed
A
conclusive.
in nature. As such, it is not thoroughly
to exist infinitesimals
to Ber
more serious objection,
I believe,
is that it may not have occurred
after all, is on the
noulli to ask how many finite terms there are: the emphasis,
terms.
I
believe
this latter asser
of
actual
out
the
infinitesimals
infinity
filling
con
the question
did not consciously
consider
tion is true; yet if Bernoulli
to
is
the
surface
nonetheless
close
it
of
finite
number
the
terms,
quite
cerning
I am not suggesting
that itmakes no difference
of the issues being debated.
this question
Bernoulli
whether
fact, I think it
explicitly?in
recognized
a great deal of difference,
that he
and it is probably quite significant
makes
But on the other hand, posing the ques
does not broach this issue explicitly.
of
tion explicitly may help us to focus more clearly on Bernoulli's
conception
in a way that
the infinite, and at worst we are filling out Bernoulli's
position
would not have occurred to him.
42This latter would be close in certain
regards to the Galilean notion of
could appropriately
be
in a note above I have suggested
the indefinite, which
as parafinite.
is unwilling
Yet as I point out below, Bernoulli
characterized
the finite and the infinite. On this basis I
to admit any tertium quid between
to countenance
such an inde
find it unlikely that Bernoulli would be willing
terminate finite number.
43The article
these dy
considers
by Ross, "Are there real infinitesimals?"
namical issues in detail.
44
3:545.
in Leibniz, Mathematische
Bernoulli,
Schriften,
45
3:551.
Schriften,
Leibniz, Mathematische
46As Hofmann
failed to see the ef
points out, Leibniz's correspondents
to whom Leib
of this axiom, and "not one of the correspondents
fectiveness
niz sent his demonstration
[of this axiom] approved of it; in particular Johann
it clear in his reply of September
Bernoulli made
22,1696 that he considered
14 n. 13). Since it depends
in Paris,
to be circular" (Leibniz
the conclusion
on the use of this axiom, it is small wonder,
that
then, that Leibniz's assertion
a largest magnitude
is impossible
is so infrequently
accompanied
by an ex
plicit proof.

This content downloaded from 194.27.149.45 on Tue, 6 Jan 2015 16:50:35 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

O. BRADLEY BASSLER

864

that such a number

of the multitude
agrees with Leibniz
and yet he nonetheless
of all numbers
is impossible,
believes
that if
to an actual division
is committed
of magnitude
into an infin
Leibniz
Bernoulli

to the existence
be committed
of infini
ity of parts then Leibniz must
one final, and his most
makes
Bernoulli
to
tesimals.
direct,
attempt
that an actual
Leibniz
the existence
convince
infinity of terms implies

of infinitesimals:
If there are ten terms there certainly exists a tenth; if there are a hun
if there are a thousand
dred terms there certainly exists a hundredth,
thus if there are an in
terms there certainly exists at least a thousandth;
finite number of terms there exists an infinitesimal.47
If we

are

the essential
analogical
In response

to reason

to the infinite,
from the finite
by analogy
must
of
the
be
Of
this
course,
point
argument
granted.
what
in his reply.
is precisely
Leibniz
strictures
reasoning
were
out that if such argumentation
he points
allowed,

allowed

of a last term in a series of

could as easily argue from the existence
there is a last, which
ten to the conclusion
that "among all numbers
is
Yet from Bernoulli's
of all numbers."48
also the greatest
perspective
must
such
arbi
stricture
Leibniz's
appear
analogical
reasoning
against

we

trary.

If Leibniz

admits

an infinite

differently

admits

than

an actual

that you

to Leibniz
refuse

in his
to admit

you

more
anything
that
Leibniz's
simply

deed

this number

of February
11, 1699: "I am astonished
small
when
you are
infinitely
magnitude
an infinite number,
I recall
which
indeed

letter
an

to admit
however,
At
elsewhere."49
deny

forced,

of matter,
then he
be treated any
does not make
Bernoulli

division

I take this to be the spirit of his (final) re

his objection so explicitly,

sponse

infinite

and why should

number,
other numbers?
Although

this point

Bernoulli's

if it is in

position,

an expression
of frustration,50
to an actual
commitment
infinity

seems

than

of parts

to be
is in

conflict with his impossibility proof.

47
3:563.
Leibniz, Mathematische
Schriften,
48
3:566.
Schriften,
Leibniz, Mathematische
49
3:571.
Leibniz, Mathematische
Schriften,
50The shortness
is indeed a likely indication of
of Bernoulli's
response
In his previous
frustration.
letter, Leibniz defers his response
regarding the
in which
cited in the text above until a postscript,
of Bernoulli
argument
that he "almost forgot" to respond to Bernoulli!
Leibniz begins by declaring
brief response
After Bernoulli's
just cited in the text), Leibniz
(the passage
to Bernoulli,
does not continue
the discussion.
but Bernoulli
again responds
the discussion,
but without
Leibniz attempts a second time to rejuvenate
any
success.

This content downloaded from 194.27.149.45 on Tue, 6 Jan 2015 16:50:35 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

AS INFINITE 865
LEIBNIZ
ON INDEFINITE
infi
indefinite
there is no room to admit Leibniz's
For Bernoulli,
has the status of an impossi
from Bernoulli's
perspective,
nite, which,
the finite and the infinite.
On the other hand,
ble "third thing" between
Leibniz

since

rejects

Galileo's

absolute

conception
blocks
him,

of the
as

as a largest or
from rec
Galileo,

infinite

it does

nothing
magnitude,
as infinite; Leibniz
thus avoids
the indefinite
ognizing
an intermediate
the finite and the infinite.51
between

the gap left by Leibniz's

proof of the impossibility
sanction
in any positive
his declaration
nitude
way

the need
Yet neither

of an absolute

to posit
does
mag

the

indefinite

in the correspondence
with Bernoulli,
candidate
for the role played
by the

indefinite

that

is infinite.

IV
As we
potentially

have

seen,

competing

there

is a

infinite in both the realms of the infinitely large and small: although he
cannot

demonstrate

the existence

them

Leibniz

of infinitesimal

also

cannot

find

(but not minimal)

a way

to rule

out

and infinitely large

51In

to the number of parts in

fact, Leibniz first shifted to a commitment
an
intensive
the continuum
indefinite
being
during
reading of Galileo's Two
in 1672 or 1673. That he made this shift due to his reading of
New Sciences
is clear from the notes Leibniz made regarding the "First Day" of Gali
Galileo
Here Leibniz notes that to the question whether
leo's Two New Sciences.
the
are finite or infinite, Galileo responds
that they are
parts of the continuum
To this resume of Gali
neither, but are rather more than any given number.
are greater than any given mag
that the parts of the continuum
leo's position
in parentheses:
nitude Leibniz appends
"or indefinite"; Leibniz, S?mtliche
6th ser., 3:168. Hence while Leibniz rejects as impossible what Ga
Schriften,
lileo takes to be infinite, he will nonetheless
"indefinite"
appropriate Galileo's
this as infinite. Previously,
understand
and eventually
in the Theoria Motus
Abstracti
of 1671 Leibniz had rejected the indefinite division of the contin
is not in the thing but in the
uum, saying that "the indefinite of Descartes
thinker"; Leibniz, Philosophical
Papers,
139; original text in Leibniz, S?mtli
I discuss
che Schriften,
6th ser., 2:264.
this transition
in Leibniz's position
and the subsequent
of his metaphysics
development
during the early Paris
in progress.
A brief discussion
is also given in
period in a paper currently
Herbert Breger's essay, "Das Kontinuum
bei Leibniz," in LInfinito
in Leib
See especially
60-1. Breger's penetrating
niz, 53-67.
analysis of Leibniz's
views on the nature of the continuum
in this and related articles has consid
in this paper.
In addition to the article
erable bearing on the issues I discuss
cited above, see also "Leibniz, Weyl und das Kontinuum,"
in Studia Leibniti
ana Supplementa
26 (1986): 316-30 and "Leibniz' Einf?hrung
des Transzen
14 (1986): 119-32.
Sonderheft
denten," in Studia Leibnitiana

This content downloaded from 194.27.149.45 on Tue, 6 Jan 2015 16:50:35 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

866
(but

O. BRADLEY BASSLER
not maximal)

were

If such

magnitudes.

to exist,

we

may

ask,

what would

the status of Leibniz's indefinite infinite be? Would it be

supplanted by these true infinitesimal and infinite magnitudes?
These questions point in the direction of the final issue Iwould
like to consider in this essay. By 1703-5, the period during which

Leibniz

wrote

any

infinite

says

he says,

the New Essays,

Leibniz
or infinitesimal
quantities

has moved

to the position
In the New
impossible.

are

is
suppose an absolute
space which
There is no such thing: it is a notion
these infinite wholes,
and their op
calcula
place except in geometrical
roots in algebra.52

Here Leibniz takes the opposite of infinite wholes

declares

his position

Es

for example:

But itwould be a mistake

to try to
an infinite whole made up of parts.
which
and
implies a contradiction;
the infinitesimals,
have no
posites,
tions, just like the use of imaginary

and

that

that neither

exist.53

in the period between

in debates

tinuing engagement
Yet what most
fundamentally
sense

Leibniz's

What

to be infinitesimals

motivates

Leibniz

to change

1699 and 1705 is, I believe, his con

the status

concerning

these

underlay
of his commitment

of infinitesimals.

is, I believe,
changes
to the indefinite
as infi

deepening
In order to point out some of these developments
Iwould
like to
turn to one of the central documents
the status of infinitesi
regarding
mals which
Leibniz
this
composed
during
period.
intervening
In the "Letter to Varignon,
with a Note on the 'Justification
of the
nite.

Infinitesimal
niz's

Calculus

position

rigorous
unnecessary

is that we

metaphysical
to make

of 1702,54 Leib
by That of Ordinary
Algebra'"
not
need
be committed
to infinitesimals
in any
sense.
In this letter, Leibniz
that
"it is
pleads

mathematical

or to make

controversies

sure

that

analysis
there are

on metaphysical
depend
are
lines in nature which

..
sense
in a rigorous
in contrast
to our ordinary
ones.
infinitely
"55
pjere Leibniz's
is on the lack of a logical
focus
from
implication
or minimal
an
the lack of a maximal
to
finite whole
infinitely
large or
small

52
158.
Leibniz, New Essays,
53 It
that what Leibniz refers to here is not infinitely
might be objected
small magnitudes,
but minimal magnitudes
in opposition
to maximal wholes.
I
This interpretation
because
is,
believe,
extremely
implausible,
however,
Leibniz goes on to speak of just these infinite wholes
and their infinitesimal
as what do have a place in geometrical
sub specie
calculations
counterparts
I believe
the conclusion
is inescapable
that Leibniz is here
imaginationis.
the impossibility
of the existence
of infinitesimals.
declaring
54
Leibniz, Philosophical
Papers,
542-6; original text in Leibniz, Mathe
matische
4:91-5 and 4:104-6.
Schriften,
55
Leibniz, Philosophical
Papers,
542-3; original text in Leibniz, Mathe
matische
4:91.
Schriften,

This content downloaded from 194.27.149.45 on Tue, 6 Jan 2015 16:50:35 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

LEIBNIZ
ON INDEFINITE
AS INFINITE

867

as he fails here to rule such an implication

out.
quantity?even
It is precisely
the unnecessariness
of such an implication
which
per
a prerequisite
mits
the free conduct
of mathematics
without
engage
small

ment
nite.

in metaphysical
Not

only

calculus,
equally
small quantities
ing support
necessary
conduct

for

we
exist

to make

or not.56

the weaker

use

mathematical

do not need

(as are infinitely

of mathematics.

large nor
ically

do we
in order

contradictory

the existence
concerning
to have a proof
that infinite

disputes
not need

to decide

Here

Leibniz

of

is most

infi

wholes

of the

whether

the

are

infinitesimal

infinitely
interested

large and
in gain

are un
infinite wholes
position
for the proper
large and small magnitudes)
On this weaker
neither
position,
infinitely
that

such

are mathematically
small magnitudes
infinitely
for
with
infinite
requisite
dealing
pluralities.57

or metaphys

56This

of a given area
strategy of arguing for a relative independence
from metaphysical
intrusion while maintaining
nonetheless
the fundamental
need for a proper metaphysical
is a pervasive
one in Leibniz's phi
foundation
on
with
the
losophy,
emphasis
independence
generally
increasing during his
later years.
On this issue, see my 1995 University
of Chicago
dissertation,
Continue: The Origins of Leibniz' Solution
to
"Labyrinthus de Compositione
the Continuum
of Chicago,
149-51.
Problem,"
(Ph.D diss., University
1995),
57Even in
the New Essays, Leibniz often emphasizes
pieces postdating
this weaker
more defi
position; but even in such contexts he demonstrates
nite commitments
than he does in the passages
considered
above from the
with Bernoulli
in the late 1690's. Here I consider
correspondence
only one
In the "Conversation
such instance.
of Philarete
and Ariste" (1712), Philar
for Leibniz, says: "Itmay be said that we can conceive,
for ex
ete, speaking
or that there is always a
ample, that every straight line can be lengthened,
straight line greater than any given one; but however, we do not have any
idea of an infinite straight line, or of one greater than all other lines that can
be given"; Leibniz, Philosophical
267; original text in Leibniz, Die
Essays,
6:592. Here, to begin with, the force of the passage
Philosophische
Schriften,
'an infinite straight line' and 'one greater than all other
depends on whether
on either reading it is important to note
lines' are to be equated.
However,
that what Leibniz says here is simply that we do not have any such idea; this
is important because
the dialogue
a response
constitutes
to the Cartesian
and the Cartesian
of the indefinite depends
criti
Malebranche,
conception
cally on the limitations of our ability to conceive when the infinite is at issue.
In any case, the weakest way we can construe what Leibniz says here is that
we cannot conceive
of such lines. This would mean that their possibility
re
to us, and so we can not conclude
mains unavailable
their existence.
This is
"in the middle,"
as Leibniz did in the
stronger than simply leaving the matter
with
because
here
Leibniz
is
to their
correspondence
Bernoulli,
committing
the two phrases are to be identified, then Leib
If, however,
inconceivability.
niz is effectively
is conceiv
saying that the only infinite straight line which
able is one greater than all other lines, and this would
conform
effectively
with his position
in the New Essays, where he (also) refuses to make any dis
tinction.
It is important to note that in general in the context of
to
responding
Leibniz is less likely to underline
the outright denial of the exist
Cartesians,
ence of infinitesimals
for the reasons indicated above: to do so requires us to

This content downloaded from 194.27.149.45 on Tue, 6 Jan 2015 16:50:35 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

868

O. BRADLEY BASSLER
In the

on

to Varignon
in considerable

letter

to present

the infinite without

he

just how weak

in the mathematical

calculus.
is that

What
instead

that

the accompanying
detail
the "mechanics"

is perhaps
of relying

is, quantities
bearing
some
to
fixed
ratio
(finite)

a commitment
realm,
most

tion

to each

to the infinite
in the case

involved

other, but stops short of saying

sense.
in any positive
other
to ask
it is necessary
(although

quantities
speak of them

Yet in doing so,

of the

is required
to
infinitesimal

Leibniz
instead
opts to consider
quantity,
to have no finite relation: we take them, in
or smaller
than ours."58 This is ef
greater

to each

of proportion

even

goes
with

in Leibniz's
here
interesting
strategy
on quantities
as large or small as we wish,
as small or large as we wish
a
respectively

are taken
which
quantities
to
be
"incomparably
stead,
to
that the quantities
say
fectively
ratio

note, Leibniz
of working

appealing to infinite magnitudes.

indicates

work

and

as quantities)
which
with
the quantities

are not

in any finite
rela
an
are
in
that they
infinite
Leibniz
is working
with

what
it means
to
exactly
are stipulated
not to have relations
that we usually
These
employ.59

But
simpliciter.
identify what we can conceive with what can be conceived
from the Cartesian
this is clearly repugnant
it is
perspective.
Nonetheless,
in the
infinitesimals
also important to point out that the debate concerning
inways which cannot be understood
involved factionalization
Paris Academy
of the disputants.
affiliations
solely on the basis of the intellectual
Douglas
of Leibniz in
Jesseph makes much of the points at issue here in his discussion
in the Seventeenth
his "Philosophical
Practice
Cen
Theory and Mathematical
in History
and Philosophy
20 (1989): 215-44.
See
of Science
tury," Studies
is right to stress Leibniz's
to
desire
238-43.
Jesseph
Although
especially
of the infinitesimal
achieve rigor in his presentation
calculus, his suggestion
the segregation
of metaphysical
that we can use Leibniz's attitude concerning
as a resolution
of the "ambiguity" in Leibniz's
from mathematical
problems
use of infinitesimals
to the article of Earman, for
(he refers here specifically
see footnote below) seems to me hand-waving
at best and circular
references
true mathematical
"In the Leibnizian
at worst.
scheme,
See, for example,
on any resolution
of the metaphysical
will be found acceptable
principles
of rigor leads
of the infinite. Thus, Leibniz's concern with matters
problems
a very strong thesis indeed, namely no matter how the sym
him to propound
can
the basic procedures
of the calculus
bols "dx" and "dy" are interpreted,
243.
The
of
be vindicated";
"Philosophical
Jesseph,
Theory,"
problem,
is that such a "radical thesis" itself requires a metaphysical
course,
justifica
"no matter how the sym
tion. In the last clause Jesseph presumably means
For a discussion
bols 'dx' and 'dy' are interpreted metaphysically."
empha
involved at the mathematical
already
level, see Bos,
sizing the problems
"L'infinie dans les math?
53-66, and also Eberhard Knobloch,
"Differentials,"
m
in
33-51.
de
Leibniz,
Leibniz,"
LInfinito
matiques
543; original text in Leibniz, Mathema
Papers,
58Leibniz, Philosophical
4:91.
tische Schriften,
John Earman proposes
that Leibniz is in
590n the basis of such passages
sorts of infinitesimals,
and that his denial of
fact speaking
of two different
one sort is in fact a "cover" for his commitment
to the other. See his "Infini
in Studia
The
Indivisibles:
Leibnizian
and
Labyrinth,"
ties, Infinitesimals,

This content downloaded from 194.27.149.45 on Tue, 6 Jan 2015 16:50:35 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

AS INFINITE
ON INDEFINITE
LEIBNIZ

869

of the fact that the failure of a fi

then, are representatives
to obtain need not imply that an infinite ratio positively
does
so
one
to speak, half way between
the
and
they stand,
obtain;
logically
no
are
in
of
the
fact
that
such
the other.
they
Further,
representatives

quantities,
nite ratio

finite

ratio

or at

least

mal

to conduct

is needed
be, no

need

the

infinitesimal

or

infinitesimal

in the

"Note"

infinite

calculus:
ratios

in the

there

are,

infinitesi

calculus.
Leibniz

quantities

goes
which

on to show
stand

are always
finite
to each other as those

that there

in the same

proportions
so that
in relation
among
themselves,
so to speak,
serve as proxies
for the incom

stand

quantities
incomparable
the finite quantities
may,
ones.
Leibniz's
Thus
parable

recourse

to these

incomparable
quanti
whose
symbols
they are mathematical
in terms of their replacement,60
be given
true interpretation
more
in any given context,
by other,
relatively
symbols.
freestanding
as
in
advertised
the title to the note,
is justi
infinitesimal
The
calculus,
ties

is exclusively

symbolic:
can only

the use of certain

sym
Beyond
auxiliary
by "ordinary
algebra."
no
to
in
infinite
the
to be
commitment
the
infinites
bols, there appears
never
but
This makes
the title of Leibniz's
imal calculus.
proposed,
summa
De Scientia
of the infinitesimal
calculus,
drafted,
Infinita,

fied

calculus
irony.61 The infinitesimal
ring with a certain
as
a
the business
of
infinitesimals
variety
little, about
will
Leibniz
later
declare
that
rieties.
Consequently
are

infinitely
dovetails

large magnitudes
with Leibniz's
general

domains

(mathematics,

dynamics,

or as
is as much,
shop is to sell va
infinitesimals

and

"convenient
strategy
and

fictions."62
This position
of separating
the operation
of
a
extent
to
lesser
logic) from

I disagree with many of the details of

7 (1975): 236-51. Although
Leibnitiana
I ultimately
and although
he at
Earman's
reject the distinction
analysis,
seems to me that the point of his distinction
it nonetheless
is
tempts to make,
I am attempting
to discuss
in this
closely related to many of the issues which
paper.

exist.
60Failing, that is, a proof that infinite magnitudes
61Pierre Costabel has tried to explain why this project was never drafted
in his "De Scientia Infiniti," in Leibniz
1646-1716,
aspects de l'homme et de
105-17.
Voeuvre (Paris: Aubier-Montagne,
I would
tend to
1966),
Although
that the greatest barriers to this project were of a practi
agree with Costabel
as Costabel
cal (and perhaps,
also suggests,
nature, I would
psychological)
reasons why this project
suggest that there may also have been metaphysical
was never pursued past the preliminary
stages, much less completed.
in a letter from 1716 to Samuel Masson:
62For example,
"The infinitesi
is useftd with respect to the application
mal calculus
of mathematics
to phys
that is not how I claim to account for the nature of things. For I
ics; however,
to be useful fictions"; Leibniz, Philosophical
consider
infinitesimal
quantities
6:629.
Essays,
230; original text in Leibniz, Die Philosophische
Schriften,

This content downloaded from 194.27.149.45 on Tue, 6 Jan 2015 16:50:35 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

870

O. BRADLEY BASSLER

What we see here

is an instance
foundations.
of
their metaphysical
in
to
the
infinite
the
realm
of
mathematical
and
commitment
Leibniz's
sufficient

in the weakest

quantity

physical
also
wish
rate,

is at least how
position.63
be sure, Leibniz

To
the terms
on

of an infinite
the

Scholastic

of Leibniz's

is committed
series.64

Such

so weak

it is in

that we may
at all; at any
understood

to the infinite

commitment

one

and

required,

is in fact

commitment

it as no

to understand
this

Leibniz's

back

This

be understood.

sense

to the indefinite infinite should

this light that Leibniz's commitment

contemporaries
to infinite

infinities

are

to which

pluralities,
indefinite

Leibniz

has

such

as

or, to fall
recourse,

terminology
terms there are in an infi
if we ask how many
is not: an infinite number
(if we take this either
which
is infinitely
larger than a finite magnitude

So
syncategorematic.
the answer
nite series,

a magnitude
to mean
or a largest magnitude)
than any given finite magni
but rather: more
in the realm
is to restrict
the infinite,
tude. The force of this maneuver
an
to
and consequently
of the quantitative
limited,
adjectival
role, and

this will be precisely Leibniz's point in the chapter on infinity in the

to space,
with
reference
is just
"The idea of the absolute,
Essays:
of God and thus of other things."65
The im
the idea of the immensity
we
can
to
the idea
be
God
of
space;
thereby
acquire
referred
mensity
Infinite
is
in the sense of being unending.
of space as infinite,
space

New

unlimited
from
nitely

on

space;

an adjectival
large magnitude,

the other

hand,
to a substantival
if indeed

to elevate
level would

this were

the unlimited
be

to have

directly
an infi

to be possible.

"He
writes:
63In his Eloge de M. Leibnitz
(1716, edited 1718), Fontenelle
infi
of
orders
of
small
this
the
understood
infinitely
always
infinity
[Leibniz]
rigor, and the
nitely smaller the one than the other, and that in geometrical
this idea in all its rigor.
It seems however
have adopted
greatest geometers
that these different orders
that he then scared himself, and that he believed
due to their ex
of the infinitely small were only incomparable
magnitudes
treme inequality, as are a grain of sand and the globe of the earth, the earth
and the sphere including the planets, and so forth. But this would only be a
in this system
..."
great inequality, but not infinite, such as one establishes
in
of
Michel
this
I
used
the
citation
have
passage
given
mine).
(translation
au fondement
de la sci
du calcul diff?rentiel
Blay's article, "Du fondement
de l'infini? de Fon
ence du mouvement
dans les ?El?mens de la g?om?trie
The quotation
17 (1989): 99-122.
Sonderheft
tenelle," in Studia Leibnitiana
translated above is given at 100 n. 6.
from Fontenelle
as a
^In the letter to Varignon, Leibniz uses this to defend his calculus
de
of the infinite: "Yet we must not imagine that this explanation
calculus
for there always re
bases the science of the infinite and reduces it to fictions,
a 'syncategorematic'
mains
infinite, as the Scholastics
say"; Leibniz, Philo
4:93.
Schriften,
542; original in Leibniz, Mathematische
sophical Papers,

This content downloaded from 194.27.149.45 on Tue, 6 Jan 2015 16:50:35 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

AS INFINITE 871
LEIBNIZ
ON INDEFINITE
Not

only

the passages

from

the New

in fact not possible.

In the

nonetheless,
finitive;
the letter to Varignon

there

to Varignon

letter
are two

draft
In the

letter

as sent Leibniz

previously,

regards

Leibniz
in which

but

is not yet so de
the discussion
in

in the New Essays.

given
remark which
Leibniz makes

that

presages

is a revealing
parenthetical
of the letter, but which was

there

cited

Essays

there indicates that for Leibniz it is

the tenor of the entire discussion

removed

remarks

before

the

First,
in his

letter was

sent.

that

to make mathematical
it is unnecessary
analysis depend on metaphysi
or to make sure that there are lines in nature which
cal controversies
sense in contrast to our ordinary lines,
are infinitely small in a rigorous
or as a result that there are lines infinitely greater than our ordinary
ones.66

So ends
niz's

the sentence

copy,

however,

in the
there

letter

is added

as sent

the basis

to see why
finitesimals
rule
shortly
cate for the

of this parenthetical
Leibniz was
already

In Leib

parenthetically:

(yet with ends; this is important inasmuch

the infinite, taken in a rigorous
sense, must
I see no way of finding
otherwise
minated;
it from the finite).67
tinguishing
On

as published.

and

as it has seemed
to me that
have its source in the unter
an adequate ground for dis

declaration

it becomes

much

easier

about
the existence
of in
pessimistic
in the correspondence
with Bernoulli,68
and why he would
It is because
them impossible.
the only source we can lo
in the realm

of quantity
is the unlimited,
which
in
once the
the quantitative
realm is precisely
the indefinite.
Yet clearly,
are determined
to coincide,
infinite and the indefinite
it is a short step
are impossible.
that infinitesimals
To be
(if any) to the conclusion

sure,

Leibniz

infinite

does

not offer

any proof

here

that

the only

source

of the

158.
65Leibniz, New Essays,
Papers,
543; original text in Leibniz, Mathema
66Leibniz, Philosophical
4:91.
tische Schriften,
67Ibid.
^See, for example, Leibniz, Philosophical
511; original text in
Papers,
on the other hand, is in
3:551. Bernoulli,
Leibniz, Mathematische
Schriften,
clined to think that infinitesimals
do exist, although he agrees with Leibniz
to exist. See his letter of August/Sep
that they have not been demonstrated
tember 1698 in Leibniz, Mathematische
3:539. Bernoulli's
declara
Schriften,
tion in this letter that it is more probable
that infinitesimals
exist seems to
mark a shift from the position he took in his previous
letter of 16/26 August
1698. There he reports astonishment
at the fact that he takes Leibniz to sug
for such as act among us to be infinite and infinitely
gest that "it [is] possible
in Leibniz, Mathematische
3:529. Here too in
small...";
Bernoulli,
Schriften,
this earlier letter Bernoulli
grants neither a proof for or against such infinite
and infinitely small things, but here his attitude toward them seems, on the
whole,
skeptical.

This content downloaded from 194.27.149.45 on Tue, 6 Jan 2015 16:50:35 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

872

0. BRADLEY BASSLER

is in the unterminated,
infinite
but the passage
makes
quantitative
in that direction.
inclined
clear that he is strongly
a second
in the letter to Varignon
There
indication
is, I believe,

in the direction of denying infinitesimals out

that Leibniz is moving

right as well.
tion between
bears

Toward

it

the end of the

letter

Leibniz

describes

the rela

of the finite and the infinite

in a way which
the operation
to Leibniz's
resemblance
of
many
interesting
descriptions

an

the preestablished

harmony:

is something
Yet one can say in general that though continuity
ideal and
there is never anything in nature with perf?ctly uniform parts, the real,
in turn, never ceases to be governed perfectly
by the ideal and the ab
stract and that the rules of the finite are found to succeed
in the infi
nite?as
of an assignable
if there were atoms, that is, elements
size in
is actually
there are none because matter
divisible
nature, although
the rules of the infinite apply to the finite,
without
limit. And conversely
as if there were
infinitely small metaphysical
beings, although we have
no need of them, and the division of matter never does proceed
to infi
nitely small particles.69

to be said about this passage, but Iwill limit myself

There ismuch
one

remark

describes

the imminent
concerning
two
"counterfactuals":
here
if it were

as

denial
we

of infinitesimals.

have

rules which

to

Leibniz
allow

us to

and rules which

al
yet indivisible
were
if it
of infinitely
extension
low us to treat finite
composed
matter
In
the
fact
there is is
small extended
only
metaphysical
beings.
are
are in
there
and the only metaphysical
extended
divisibly
beings
treat matter

extended

as

This picture
unextended.
divisibly
effectively
could
mediate
third thing which
metaphysically

leaves

no ground
these

between

for a
two:

Leibniz
takes
the distinction
between
the extended
like Descartes,
to be categorical
and complete.
We are left with
the unextended
of "as if," which
is our way of un
than the phraseology
nothing more
of
the
ideal
and
the real. My
the
harmony
preestablished
derstanding
and

point

here

itesimals,

infin
existing
logical as it is "architectonic":
con
This is the ultimate
ideal or real, fit nowhere.
of quantity
that in the realm
Leibniz's
understanding
so much

is not

whether

of
sequence
no
are
infinite
there
identified

with

the

or infinitesimal
indefinite

the quantitative
The consequence

wholes:

or unlimited.

was first taken to prove

the proof which
or minimal
units may now be taken more

infinite

is

is that

the

of maximal
impossibility
to
the impos
show
broadly

In a letter to
sibility of all infinite or infinitesimal quantitative wholes.
one
in fact re
Leibniz
the
just discussed,
Varignon shortly following

69Leibniz, Philosophical
4:93-4.
Schriften,

Papers,

544; original

in Leibniz, Mathematische

This content downloaded from 194.27.149.45 on Tue, 6 Jan 2015 16:50:35 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

AS INFINITE
ON INDEFINITE
LEIBNIZ
ports

that he believes

he can prove

small things."70
be, any infinitely
As Leibniz
in a letter
declared
1696,
unity

"My fundamental
and infinity."71

meditations
Leibniz

873

"that there

are not,

to the Princess
circle

ultimately

around

accepted

nor

Electress
two
that

could

there

Sophie

in

things, namely
in the realm of

4:110 (translation mine).

This pas
Schriften,
70Leibniz, Mathematische
"Are
There
Real
Infinitesimals?"
is
discussed
by Ross,
127, although the
sage
the strength of
he gives of the above passage
translation
slightly obscures
is that the proof he thinks he can give is strong
what Leibniz says, which
No proof is indicated, how
enough to show that such beings are impossible.
ever: my conjecture
is that this is because Leibniz is in fact reassessing
the
and minima are impossible.
Admittedly
strength of his old proof that maxima
is based only on circumstantial
evidence.
al
my conjecture
(Curiously,
and the correspon
both the Bernoulli
correspondence
though Ross discusses
dence with Varignon, he does not explicitly discuss the shift in Leibniz's posi
In his book Architectonique
et
Automates
Disjonctive
tion.)
Syst?miques
dans VOeuvre de G. W. Leibniz
Id?cilit? Transcendantale
(Paris: J. Vrin,
the text of the sketch of a proof in which
1986), 292, Andr? Robinet provides
are impossible.
to show that infinitely small magnitudes
Leibniz attempted
crossed out and not resumed elsewhere.
The proof is, however,
Robinet says
that this proof is the proof referred to in the letter to Varignon, but he does
not give any indication why he thinks so. The proof involves attempting
to
mean proportionals
an infinitely small and a finite
take successive
between
In any case, the proof ap
quantity; the details are not entirely clear to me.
to the impos
Leibniz's commitment
pears to have been abandoned, whereas
sibility of infinitely small quantities appears to have grown. This indicates to
me that the ultimate
of Leibniz's position must be sought else
explanation
as I have attempted
to do in considering
Leibniz's views on the indefi
where,
nite as infinite. My view is that the fundamental
is what Leibniz
question
the indefinite and the infinite, on the one
takes to be the relation between
on the other. The author who comes
hand, and the actual and the potential
to recognizing
the relevance
of these issues (although proceeding
closest
in his book Philosophy
along a different route) is Paolo Mancosu,
of Mathe
and Mathematical
Practice
in the Seventeenth
matics
Century
(Oxford: Ox
ford University
asks whether
the limited infi
Press, 1996), 144-5. Mancosu
on both ends,
such as an infinitely
"must
nite,
long line terminated
as
an
read
actual
infinite."
be
Mancosu
then
"This
is a
necessarily
responds:
Leibniz does not address
difficult question
the issue di
and, unfortunately,
to handle these results in terms of
rectly. But I believe he has the resources
144-5. In the math
potential
infinity"; Mancosu, Philosophy
ofMathematics,
Iwould agree, but Iwould add that it is
ematical results Mancosu
considers
this conflict which
leads Leibniz to reject the existence
precisely
(and even
the possibility)
of the limited infinite. In his article, "Das Kontinuum
bei Leib
niz," Breger also tends to think Leibniz rejects a limited infinite, but declines
to pose the question what relation this bears to the distinction
the
between
infinite: "Whether the opposition
between
in
actually versus the potentially
terminatum
and infinitum
interminatum
has something
to do
finitum
with the opposition
between potential and actual infinity need not be decided
bei Leibniz," 65, my translation.
Iwould argue, how
here"; "Das Kontinuum
treatment of the indefinite as infinite stands or falls
ever, that the Leibnizian
with this question.
6:542.
71Leibniz, Die Philosophische
Schriften,

This content downloaded from 194.27.149.45 on Tue, 6 Jan 2015 16:50:35 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

874

O. BRADLEY BASSLER
infinity

quantity

could

in no way

we have seen, the cleft which

these

two most

them with

fundamental

a particularly

be construed

whole.

this impossibility established

of Leibnizian

delicate,

as a unified

if not

concerns
indeed

left at least one

problematic,

University

of

status.72

of Georgia

at the Department
72An earlier version of this paper was presented
Boston University,
like to thank
February
14, 1997. Iwould
Philosophy,
for their many helpful questions
and comments.
of the audience
members

This content downloaded from 194.27.149.45 on Tue, 6 Jan 2015 16:50:35 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

As

between

of
the