37. CRESCENT PETROLEUM, LTD., Petitioner, vs.

M/V "LOK MAHESHWARI," THE SHIPPING

CORPORATION OF INDIA, and PORTSERV LIMITED G.R. No. 155014 November 11, 2005
FACTS:
Respondent M/V "Lok Maheshwari" (Vessel) is an oceangoing vessel of Indian registry that is owned by respondent
Shipping Corporation of India (SCI), a corporation organized and existing under the laws of India and principally owned
by the Government of India. It was time-chartered by respondent SCI to Halla Merchant Marine Co. Ltd. (Halla), a South
Korean company. Halla, in turn, sub-chartered the Vessel through a time charter to Transmar Shipping, Inc. (Transmar).
Transmar further sub-chartered the Vessel to Portserv Limited (Portserv). Both Transmar and Portserv are corporations
organized and existing under the laws of Canada.
On or about November 1, 1995, Portserv requested petitioner Crescent Petroleum, Ltd. (Crescent), a corporation
organized and existing under the laws of Canada that is engaged in the business of selling petroleum and oil products for
the use and operation of oceangoing vessels, to deliver marine fuel oils (bunker fuels) to the Vessel. Petitioner Crescent
granted and confirmed the request through an advice via facsimile dated November 2, 1995. As security for the payment
of the bunker fuels and related services, petitioner Crescent received two (2) checks in the amounts of US$100,000.00 and
US$200,000.00. Thus, petitioner Crescent contracted with its supplier, Marine Petrobulk Limited (Marine Petrobulk),
another Canadian corporation, for the physical delivery of the bunker fuels to the Vessel.
On or about November 4, 1995, Marine Petrobulk delivered the bunker fuels amounting to US$103,544 inclusive of
barging and demurrage charges to the Vessel at the port of Pioneer Grain, Vancouver, Canada. The Chief Engineer Officer
of the Vessel duly acknowledged and received the delivery receipt. Marine Petrobulk issued an invoice to petitioner
Crescent for the US$101,400.00 worth of the bunker fuels. Petitioner Crescent issued a check for the same amount in
favor of Marine Petrobulk, which check was duly encashed.
Having paid Marine Petrobulk, petitioner Crescent issued a revised invoice dated November 21, 1995 to "Portserv
Limited, and/or the Master, and/or Owners, and/or Operators, and/or Charterers of M/V Lok Maheshwari" in the amount
of US$103,544.00 with instruction to remit the amount on or before December 1, 1995. The period lapsed and several
demands were made but no payment was received. Also, the checks issued to petitioner Crescent as security for the
payment of the bunker fuels were dishonored for insufficiency of funds. As a consequence, petitioner Crescent incurred
additional expenses of US$8,572.61 for interest, tracking fees, and legal fees.
On May 2, 1996, while the Vessel was docked at the port of Cebu City, petitioner Crescent instituted before the RTC of
Cebu City an action "for a sum of money with prayer for temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary attachment"
against respondents Vessel and SCI, Portserv and/or Transmar.
On May 3, 1996, the trial court issued a writ of attachment against the Vessel with bond at P2,710,000.00. Petitioner
Crescent withdrew its prayer for a temporary restraining order and posted the required bond.
On May 18, 1996, summonses were served to respondents Vessel and SCI, and Portserv and/or Transmar through the
Master of the Vessel. On May 28, 1996, respondents Vessel and SCI, through Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation
(Pioneer), filed an urgent ex-parte motion to approve Pioneers letter of undertaking, to consider it as counter-bond and to
discharge the attachment. On May 29, 1996, the trial court granted the motion; thus, the letter of undertaking was
approved as counter-bond to discharge the attachment.
ISSUE:
Whether the Philippine court has or will exercise jurisdiction and entitled to maritime lien under our laws on foreign
vessel docked on Philippine port and supplies furnished to a vessel in a foreign port?
RULING:
In a suit to establish and enforce a maritime lien for supplies furnished to a vessel in a foreign port, whether such lien
exists, or whether the court has or will exercise jurisdiction, depends on the law of the country where the supplies were
furnished, which must be pleaded and proved.
The Lauritzen-Romero-Rhoditis trilogy of cases, which replaced such single-factor methodologies as the law of the place
of supply. The multiple-contact test to determine, in the absence of a specific Congressional directive as to the statutes
reach, which jurisdictions law should be applied. The following factors were considered: (1) place of the wrongful act;
(2) law of the flag; (3) allegiance or domicile of the injured; (4) allegiance of the defendant shipowner; (5) place of
contract; (6) inaccessibility of foreign forum; and (7) law of the forum. This is applicable not only to personal injury
claims arising under the Jones Act but to all matters arising under maritime law in general
The Court cannot sustain petitioner Crescents insistence on the application of P.D. No. 1521 or the Ship Mortgage Decree
of 1978 and hold that a maritime lien exists. Out of the seven basic factors listed in the case of Lauritzen, Philippine law
only falls under one the law of the forum. All other elements are foreign Canada is the place of the wrongful act, of the
allegiance or domicile of the injured and the place of contract; India is the law of the flag and the allegiance of the
defendant shipowner. Applying P.D. No. 1521,a maritime lien exists would not promote the public policy behind the
enactment of the law to develop the domestic shipping industry. Opening up our courts to foreign suppliers by granting
them a maritime lien under our laws even if they are not entitled to a maritime lien under their laws will encourage forum
shopping. In light of the interests of the various foreign elements involved, it is clear that Canada has the most significant
interest in this dispute. The injured party is a Canadian corporation, the sub-charterer which placed the orders for the
supplies is also Canadian, the entity which physically delivered the bunker fuels is in Canada, the place of contracting and
negotiation is in Canada, and the supplies were delivered in Canada.
38. CORPUZ vs. STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010
FACTS:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking a direct appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag
City. Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpus is a naturalized Canadian citizen who married respondent Daisylyn Tirol Sto. Tomas
but subsequently left for Canada due to work and other professional commitments. When he returned to the Philippines,
he discovered that Sto. Tomas was already romantically involved with another man. This brought about the filing of a
petition for divorce by Corpuz in Canada which was eventually granted by the Court Justice of Windsor, Ontario, Canada.
A month later, the divorce decree took effect. Two years later, Corpuz has fallen in love with another Filipina and wished
to marry her. He went to Civil Registry Office of Pasig City to register the Canadian divorce decree of his marriage
certificate with Sto. Tomas. However, despite the registration, an official of National Statistics Office informed Corpuz
that the former marriage still subsists under the Philippine law until there has been a judicial recognition of the Canadian
divorce by a competent judicial court in view of NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982. Consequently, he filed a petition for
judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of dissolution of marriage with the RTC. However, the RTC
denied the petition reasoning out that Corpuz cannot institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce
decree because he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It was provided further that Sto. Tomas was the proper party who can
institute an action under the principle of Article 26 of the Family Code which capacitates a Filipino citizen to remarry in
case the alien spouse obtains a foreign divorce decree.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code grants aliens like Corpuz the right to institute a
petition for judicial recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
HELD:
Petition GRANTED. RTC Decision REVERSED.
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with legal interest to petition for its
recognition in this jurisdiction
We qualify our above conclusion i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in
favor of aliens with the complementary statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerberts petition
before the RTC.In other words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does
not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The
foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the aliens national law have been duly proven
according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments.
A remand, at the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a petitioners
presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a
recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata between the parties, as
provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
39. Mathews vs Taylor
Facts: On June 30, 1988, respondent Benjamin A. Taylor (Benjamin), a British subject, married Joselyn C. Taylor
(Joselyn), a 17-year old Filipina. On June 9, 1989, while their marriage was subsisting, Joselyn bought from Diosa M.
Martin a 1,294 square-meter lot (Boracay property) situated at Manoc-Manoc, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan, for and in
consideration of P129,000.00. The sale was allegedly financed by Benjamin. Joselyn and Benjamin, also using the latters
funds, constructed improvements thereon and eventually converted the property to a vacation and tourist resort known as
the Admiral Ben Bow Inn. All required permits and licenses for the operation of the resort were obtained in the name of
Ginna Celestino, Joselyns sister. However, Benjamin and Joselyn had a falling out, and Joselyn ran away with Kim
Philippsen. On June 8, 1992, Joselyn executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of Benjamin, authorizing the
latter to maintain, sell, lease, and sub-lease and otherwise enter into contract with third parties with respect to their
Boracay property. On July 20, 1992, Joselyn as lessor and petitioner Philip Matthews as lessee, entered into an Agreement
of Lease (Agreement) involving the Boracay property for a period of 25 years, with an annual rental of P12,000.00. The
agreement was signed by the parties and executed before a Notary Public. Petitioner thereafter took possession of the
property and renamed the resort as Music Garden Resort. Claiming that the Agreement was null and void since it was
entered into by Joselyn without his (Benjamins) consent, Benjamin instituted an action for Declaration of Nullity of
Agreement of Lease with Damages against Joselyn and the petitioner. Benjamin claimed that his funds were used in the
acquisition and improvement of the Boracay property, and coupled with the fact that he was Joselyns husband, any
transaction involving said property required his consent.
Issue: Can an alien husband nullify a lease contract entered into by his Filipina wifebought during their marriage?
Held: The rule is clear and inflexible: aliens are absolutely not allowed to acquire public or private lands in the
Philippines, save only in constitutionally recognized exceptions. There is no rule more settled than this constitutional
prohibition, as more and more aliens attempt to circumvent the provision by trying to own lands through another. In a long
line of cases, we have settled issues that directly or indirectly involve the above constitutional provision. We had cases
where aliens wanted that a particular property be declared as part of their fathers estate; that they be reimbursed the funds
used in purchasing a property titled in the name of another; that an implied trust be declared in their (aliens) favor; and
that a contract of sale be nullified for their lack of consent. Benjamin has no right to nullify the Agreement of Lease
between Joselyn and petitioner. Benjamin, being an alien, is absolutely prohibited from acquiring private and public lands
in the Philippines. Considering that Joselyn appeared to be the designated vendee in the Deed of Sale of said property,
she acquired sole ownership thereto. This is true even if we sustain Benjamins claim that he provided the funds for such
acquisition. By entering into such contract knowing that it was illegal, no implied trust was created in his favor; no
reimbursement for his expenses can be allowed; and no declaration can be made that the subject property was part of the

conjugal/community property of the spouses. In any event, he had and has no capacity or personality to question the
subsequent lease of the Boracay property by his wife on the theory that in so doing, he was merely exercising the
prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property. To sustain such a theory would countenance indirect
controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If the property were to be declared conjugal, this would accord the alien
husband a substantial interest and right over the land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or
disposition. This is a right that the Constitution does not permit him to have.
40. LWV CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. MARCELO B. DUPO, RESPONDENT.
[ G.R. No. 172342, July 13, 2009 ]
FACTS:
Petitioner, a domestic corporation which recruits Filipino workers, hired respondent as Civil Structural Superintendent to
work in Saudi Arabia for its principal, Mohammad Al-Mojil Group/Establishment (MMG). On February 26, 1992,
respondent signed his first overseas employment contract, renewable after one year. It was renewed five times on the
following dates: May 10, 1993, November 16, 1994, January 22, 1996, April 14, 1997, and March 26, 1998. All were
fixed-period contracts for one year. The sixth and last contract stated that respondent's employment starts upon reporting
to work and ends when he leaves the work site. Respondent left Saudi Arabia on April 30, 1999 and arrived in the
Philippines on May 1, 1999.
On May 28, 1999, respondent informed MMG, through the petitioner, that he needs to extend his vacation because his son
was hospitalized. He also sought a promotion with salary adjustment.[3] In reply, MMG informed respondent that his
promotion is subject to management's review; that his services are still needed; that he was issued a plane ticket for his
return flight to Saudi Arabia on May 31, 1999; and that his decision regarding his employment must be made within seven
days, otherwise, MMG "will be compelled to cancel [his] slot." On July 6, 1999, respondent resigned.
Under the Law of Saudi Arabia, an employee who rendered at least five (5) years in a company within the jurisdiction of
Saudi Arabia, is entitled to the so-called long service award which is known to others as longevity pay of at least one half
month pay for every year of service. In excess of five years an employee is entitled to one month pay for every year of
service. In both cases inclusive of all benefits and allowances.
ISSUE:
1.
WON respondent is entitled to a service award or longevity pay of US$12,640.33 under the provisions of the Saudi
Labor Law; and
2.
WON prescription barred respondent's claim for service award as the complaint was filed one year and seven
months after the sixth contract ended.
RULING:
1.
Respondent's service award under Article 87 of the Saudi Labor Law has already been paid.
Article 87 clearly grants a service award. It reads:
Article 87
Where the term of a labor contract concluded for a specified period comes to an end or where the employer cancels a
contract of unspecified period, the employer shall pay to the workman an award for the period of his service to be
computed on the basis of half a month's pay for each of the first five years and one month's pay for each of the subsequent
years. The last rate of pay shall be taken as basis for the computation of the award. For fractions of a year, the workman
shall be entitled to an award which is proportionate to his service period during that year. Furthermore, the workman shall
be entitled to the service award provided for at the beginning of this article in the following cases:
A. If he is called to military service.
B. If a workman resigns because of marriage or childbirth.
C. If the workman is leaving the work as a result of a force majeure beyond his control.(Emphasis supplied.)
2.
On the matter of prescription, however, we cannot agree with petitioner that respondent's action has prescribed under
Article 13 of the Saudi Labor Law. What applies is Article 291 of our Labor Code which reads:
ART. 291. Money claims. -- All money claims arising from employer-employee relations accruing during the effectivity of
this Code shall be filed within three (3) years from the time the cause of action accrued; otherwise they shall be forever
barred.
xxxx
In Cadalin v. POEA's Administrator,[27] we held that Article 291 covers all money claims from employer-employee
relationship and is broader in scope than claims arising from a specific law. It is not limited to money claims recoverable
under the Labor Code, but applies also to claims of overseas contract workers.
Thus, in our considered view, respondent's complaint was filed well within the three-year prescriptive period under Article
291 of our Labor Code. This point, however, has already been mooted by our finding that respondent's service award had
been paid, albeit the payroll termed such payment as severance pay.