Rule 13 (Outline, Case Digest & Fulltext)

Outline: Rule 13 Filing and Service of Pleadings
CIVIL PROCEDURE
Lesson for September 2, 2014

Tuesday
Filing and Service of Pleadings
1. Coverage - Sec. 1, Rule 13
2. Payment of docket fees
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Manchester Development Corp. v. CA, G.R. No. 75919, May 7, 1987
Sun Insurance Office Ltd. v. Hon. Asuncion, G.R. No. 79937-38, February 13, 1989
Ballatan v. CA, G.R. No. 125683, March 2, 1999
Rivera v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 144934, January 15, 2004
Enriquez v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 139303, August 25, 2005
3. Filing versus service of pleadings - Sec. 2, Rule 13

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Elli v. Ditan, G.R. No. L-17444, June 30, 1962
PHHC v. Tiongco, G.R. No. L-18891, November 29, 1964
4. Periods of filing of pleadings - Rule 11

5. How to compute time - Rule 22
6. Manner of filing - Secs. 3 & 4, Rule 13
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Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 89070, May 18, 1992
7. Modes of service - Sec. 5, Rule 13

i.
Personal service - Sec. 6, Rule 13
ii. Service by mail - Sec. 7, Rule 13

iii. Substituted service - Sec. 8, Rule 13
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Cubar v. Mendoza, G.R. No. L-55035, February 23, 1983
iv. Service of judgments, final orders or resolutions v. Priorities in modes of service and filing - Sec. 9, Rule
13
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Feraren v. Santos, G.R. No. L-41323, April 27, 1982
Magno v. CA, G.R. No. L-58781, July 31, 1987
vi. When service is deemed complete - Sec. 10, Rule 13

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Isaac v. Mendoza, G.R. No. L-2820, June 21, 1951
vii. Proof of filing and service - Secs. 12 & 13, Rule 13

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Zulueta v. Asia Brewery, Inc., G.R. No. 138137, March 8, 2001
viii. Priorities in modes of service and filing - Sec. 11, Rule 13

8. Lis pendens - Sec. 14, Rule 13
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Tan v. Lantin, G.R. No. L-28526, July 7, 1986
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Case Digest: Rule 13 Filing and Service of Pleadings

Payment of docket fees
MANCHESTER DEVELOPMENT CORP. vs CA
G.R. No. 75919, May 7, 1987
Facts:
Acting on the motion for reconsideration of the
resolution of the Second Division and another motion to
refer the case to and to be heard in oral argument by the
Court En Banc filed by petitioners, the motion to refer the
case to the Court en banc is granted but the motion to set
the case for oral argument is denied.
Petitioners in support of their contention that
the filing fee must be assessed on the basis of the
amended complaint cite the case of Magaspi v. Ramolete.
They contend that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling
that the filing fee should be levied by considering the
amount of damages sought in the original complaint.
The environmental facts of said case differ from
the present in that
1. The Magaspi case was an action for recovery
of ownership and possession of a parcel of land with
damages, while the present case is an action for torts and
damages and specific performance with prayer for
temporary restraining order, etc.
2. xxx (Present case) The amount of damages
sought is not specified in the prayer although the body of
the complaint alleges the total amount of over P78
Million as damages suffered by plaintiff.
3. Upon the filing of the complaint there was an
honest difference of opinion as to the nature of the
action in the Magaspi case. The complaint was considered
as primarily an action for recovery of ownership and
possession of a parcel of land. The damages stated were
treated as merely ancillary to the main cause of action.
Thus, the docket fee of only P60.00 and P10.00 for the
sheriffs fee were paid.
In the present, no honest difference. It is both an
action for damages and specific performance. The docket
fee paid upon filing of complaint in the amount only of
P410.00 by considering the action to be merely one for
specific performance where the amount involved is not
capable of pecuniary estimation is obviously erroneous.
Although the total amount of damages sought is not
stated in the prayer of the complaint yet it is spelled out
in the body of the complaint totalling in the amount of
P78,750,000.00 which should be the basis of assessment
of the filing fee.
4. Plaintiff through another counsel with leave of
court filed an amended complaint for the inclusion of
Philips Wire and Cable Corporation as co-plaintiff and by
eliminating any mention of the amount of damages in the
body of the complaint. The prayer in the original
complaint was maintained. After the SC issued an order
CIVIL PROCEDURE
ordering the re-assessment of the docket fee in the
present case and other cases that were investigated, the
trial court directed plaintiffs to rectify the amended
complaint by stating the amounts which they are asking
for. It was only then that plaintiffs specified the amount
of damages in the body of the complaint in the reduced
amount of P10,000,000.00. Still no amount of damages
was specified in the prayer. Said amended complaint was
admitted.
On the other hand, in the Magaspi case, the trial
court ordered the plaintiffs to pay the amount of
P3,104.00 as filing fee covering the damages alleged in
the original complaint as it did not consider the damages
to be merely ancillary or incidental to the action for
recovery of ownership and possession of real property.
An amended complaint was filed by plaintiff with leave of
court to include the government of the Republic as
defendant and reducing the amount of damages, and
attorneys fees prayed for to P100,000.00. Said amended
complaint was also admitted.
In the Magaspi case, the action was considered
for recovery of ownership and damages, so that the filing
fee for the damages should be the basis of assessment.
Although the payment of the docketing fee of P60.00 was
found to be insufficient, nevertheless, it was held that
since the payment was the result of an "honest difference
of opinion as to the correct amount to be paid as docket
fee" the court "had acquired jurisdiction over the case
and the proceedings thereafter had were proper and
regular." Hence, as the amended complaint superseded
the original complaint, the allegations of damages in the
amended complaint should be the basis of the
computation of the filing fee.
In the present case no such honest difference of
opinion was possible as the allegations of the complaint,
the designation and the prayer show that it is an action
for damages and specific performance. The docketing fee
should be assessed by considering the amount of
damages as alleged in the original complaint.
Issue:
Whether or not the amended complaint should
be admitted. No!
Held:
The rule is well-settled "that a case is deemed
filed only upon payment of the docket fee regardless of
the actual date of filing in court." Thus, in the present
case the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
case by the payment of only P410.00 as docket fee.
Neither can the amendment of the complaint thereby
vest jurisdiction upon the Court. For all legal purposes
there is no such original complaint that was duly filed
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which could be amended. Consequently, the order
admitting the amended complaint and all subsequent
proceedings and actions taken by the trial court are null
and void.
The CA aptly ruled in the present case that the
basis of assessment of the docket fee should be the
amount of damages sought in the original complaint and
not in the amended complaint.
The Court cannot close this case without making
the observation that it frowns at the practice of counsel
who filed the original complaint in this case of omitting
any specification of the amount of damages in the prayer
although the amount of over P78 million is alleged in the
body of the complaint. This is clearly intended for no
other purpose than to evade the payment of the correct
filing fees if not to mislead the docket clerk in the
assessment of the filing fee. This fraudulent practice was
compounded when, even as the SC had taken cognizance
of the anomaly and ordered an investigation, petitioner
through another counsel filed an amended complaint,
deleting all mention of the amount of damages being
asked for in the body of the complaint. It was only when
in obedience to the SCs order of October 18, 1985, the
trial court directed that the amount of damages be
specified in the amended complaint, that petitioners
counsel wrote the damages sought in the much reduced
amount of P10,000,000.00 in the body of the complaint
but not in the prayer thereof. The design to avoid
payment of the required docket fee is obvious.
To put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth all
complaints, petitions, answers and other similar
pleadings should specify the amount of damages being
prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also
in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in
the assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any
pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall
not be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be
expunged from the record.
The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case
only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. An
amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not
thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the
payment of the docket fee based on the amounts sought
in the amended pleading. The ruling in the Magaspi case
in so far as it is inconsistent with this pronouncement is
overturned and reversed.
The motion for reconsideration is denied for lack
of merit.
CIVIL PROCEDURE
SUN INSURANCE OFFICE LTD. vs HON. ASUNCION
G.R. No. 79937-38, February 13, 1989
Facts:
Petitioner Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) filed a
complaint with the Regional Trial Court for the
consignation of a premium refund on a fire insurance
policy with a prayer for the judicial declaration of its
nullity against private respondent Manuel Uy Po Tiong.
Private respondent was declared in default for failure to
file the required answer within the reglementary period.
On the other hand, private respondent filed a
complaint in the Regional Trial Court for the refund of
premiums and the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment initially against petitioner SIOL, and
thereafter including E.B. Philipps and D.J. Warby as
additional defendants. The complaint sought, among
others, the payment of actual, compensatory, moral,
exemplary and liquidated damages, attorneys fees,
expenses of litigation and costs of the suit. Although the
prayer in the complaint did not quantify the amount of
damages sought said amount may be inferred from the
body of the complaint to be about Fifty Million Pesos
(P50,000,000.00).
Only the amount of P210.00 was paid by private
respondent as docket fee which prompted petitioners
counsel to raise his objection. Said objection was
disregarded by respondent Judge Jose P. Castro who was
then presiding over said case.
Upon the order of the Supreme Court, the
records of said case together with twenty-two other
cases assigned to different branches of the Regional Trial
Court which were under investigation for underassessment of docket fees were transmitted to the
Supreme Court. The Court thereafter returned the said
records to the trial court with the directive that they be
re-raffled to the other judges. The present civil case was
re-raffled to Branch 104, a sala which was then vacant.
The Court en banc issued a Resolution directing
the judges in said cases to reassess the docket fees and
that in case of deficiency, to order its payment. The
Resolution also requires all clerks of court to issue
certificates of re-assessment of docket fees. All litigants
were likewise required to specify in their pleadings the
amount sought to be recovered in their complaints.
Judge Antonio P. Solano, to whose sala the
present case was temporarily assigned, issued an order to
the Clerk of Court instructing him to issue a certificate of
assessment of the docket fee paid by private respondent
and, in case of deficiency, to include the same in said
certificate.
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A cautionary answer was filed by petitioners. An
amended complaint was filed by private respondent
including the two additional defendants aforestated.
Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion, to whom the
present case was thereafter assigned, after his
assumption into office, issued a Supplemental Order
requiring the parties in the case to comment on the Clerk
of Courts letter-report signifying her difficulty in
complying with the Resolution of the Supreme Court
since the pleadings filed by private respondent did not
indicate the exact amount sought to be recovered.
Private respondent filed a "Compliance" and a "ReAmended Complaint" stating therein a claim of "not less
than P10,000,000.00 as actual compensatory damages" in
the prayer. In the body of the said second amended
complaint however, private respondent alleges actual and
compensatory damages and attorneys fees in the total
amount of about P44,601,623.70.
Judge Asuncion issued another Order admitting
the second amended complaint and stating therein that
the same constituted proper compliance with the
Resolution of this Court and that a copy thereof should be
furnished the Clerk of Court for the reassessment of the
docket fees. The reassessment by the Clerk of Court bases
on private respondents claim of "not less than
P10,000,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages"
amounted to P39,786.00 as docket fee. This was
subsequently paid by private Respondent.
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the
CA questioning the said order of Judge Asuncion.
Respondent filed a supplemental complaint
alleging an additional claim of P20,000,000.00 as
damages so the total claim amounts to about
P64,601,623.70. Months after filing the supplemental
complaint, the private respondent paid the additional
docket fee of P80,396.00.
The Court of Appeals rendered a decision
denying the petition insofar as it seeks annulment of the
order, denying petitioners motion to dismiss the
complaint, as amended, and granting the writ of
preliminary attachment, but giving due course to the
portion thereof questioning the reassessment of the
docketing fee, and requiring the Honorable respondent
Court to reassess the docketing fee to be paid by private
respondent on the basis of the amount of
P25,401,707.00."
Issue:
Whether or not a court acquires jurisdiction over
a case when the correct and proper docket fee has not
been paid.
CIVIL PROCEDURE
Held:
During the pendency of this petition and in
conformity with the said judgment of respondent court,
private respondent paid the additional docket fee of
P62,432.90 on April 28, 1988.
The main thrust of the petition is that the Court
of Appeals erred in not finding that the lower court did
not acquire jurisdiction over Civil Case No. Q-41177 on
the ground of non-payment of the correct and proper
docket fee. Petitioners allege that while it may be true
that private respondent had paid the amount of
P182,824.90 as docket fee as herein-above related, and
considering that the total amount sought to be recovered
in the amended and supplemental complaint is
P64,601,623.70 the docket fee that should be paid by
private respondent is P257,810.49, more or less. Not
having paid the same, petitioners contend that the
complaint should be dismissed and all incidents arising
therefrom should be annulled. In support of their theory,
petitioner cite the latest ruling of the Court in
Manchester Development Corporation v. CA, 4 as follows:
"The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon
the payment of the prescribed docket fee. An
amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not
thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the
payment of the docket fee based on the amounts sought
in the amended pleading. The ruling in the Magaspi Case
in so far it is inconsistent with this pronouncement is
overturned and reversed."
On the other hand, private respondent claims
that the ruling in Manchester cannot apply retroactively
to the present civil case for at the time said civil case was
filed in court there was no such Manchester ruling as yet.
Further, private respondent avers that what is applicable
is the ruling of this Court in Magaspi v. Ramolete, 5
wherein the SC held that the trial court acquired
jurisdiction over the case even if the docket fee paid was
insufficient. The contention that Manchester cannot
apply retroactively to this case is untenable. Statutes
regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed
as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the
time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective
in that sense and to that extent.
The payment of the full amount of the docket
fee is an indispensable step for the perfection of an
appeal.
The docket fee must be paid before a court will
act on a petition or complaint. However, said rule is not
applicable when petitioner seeks the probate of several
wills of the same decedent as he is not required to file a
separate action for each will but instead he may have
other wills probated in the same special proceeding then
pending before the same court.
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The case is deemed filed only upon payment of
the docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in
court.
The present case is among the several cases of
under-assessment of docket fee which were investigated
by this Court together with Manchester. The facts and
circumstances of this case are similar to Manchester. In
the body of the original complaint, the total amount of
damages sought amounted to about P50 Million. In the
prayer, the amount of damages asked for was not stated.
The action was for the refund of the premium and the
issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment with
damages. The amount of only P210.00 was paid for the
docket fee. Private respondent filed an amended
complaint wherein in the prayer it is asked that he be
awarded no less than P10,000,000.00 as actual and
exemplary damages but in the body of the complaint the
amount of his pecuniary claim is approximately
P44,601,623.70. Said amended complaint was admitted
and the private respondent was reassessed the additional
docket fee of P39,786.00 based on his prayer of not less
than P10,000,000.00 in damages, which he paid.
Private respondent filed a supplemental
complaint alleging an additional claim of P20,000,000.00
in damages so that his total claim is approximately
P64,601,620.70. Private respondent paid an additional
docket fee of P80,396.00. After the promulgation of the
decision of the respondent court wherein private
respondent was ordered to be reassessed for additional
docket fee, and during the pendency of this petition, and
after the promulgation of Manchester, private
respondent paid an additional docket fee on P62,132.92.
Although private respondent appears to have paid a total
amount of P182,824.90 for the docket fee considering the
total amount of this claim in the amended and
supplemental
complaint
amounting
to
about
P64,601,620.70, petitioner insists that private respondent
must pay a docket fee of P257,810.49.
The principle in Manchester could very well be
applied in the present case. The pattern and the intent to
defraud the government of the docket fee due it is
obvious not only in the filing of the original complaint but
also in the filing of the second amended complaint.
However, in Manchester, petitioner did not pay
any additional docket fee until the case was decided by
SC. Thus, in Manchester, due to the fraud committed on
the government, it is held that the court a quo did not
acquire jurisdiction over the case and that the amended
complaint could not have been admitted inasmuch as the
original complaint was null and void.
In the present case, private respondent
demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by
paying the additional docket fees as required. The
CIVIL PROCEDURE
promulgation of the decision in Manchester must have
had that sobering influence on private respondent who
thus paid the additional docket fee as ordered by the
respondent court. It triggered his change for stance by
manifesting his willingness to pay such additional docket
fee as may be ordered.
Nevertheless, petitioners contend that the
docket fee that was paid is still insufficient considering
the total amount of the claim. This is a matter which the
clerk of court of the lower court and/or his duly
authorized docket clerk or clerk in-charge should
determine and, thereafter, it any amount is found due, he
must require the private respondent to pay the same.
Thus, the Court rules as follows:
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or
appropriate initiatory pleading, but the
payment of the prescribed docket fee, that
vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the
subject matter or nature of the action.
Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is
not accompanied by payment of the docket
fee, the court may allow payment of the fee
within a reasonable time but in no case
beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive
counterclaims, third-party claims and similar
pleadings, which shall not be considered
filed until and unless the filing fee
prescribed therefor is paid. The court may
also allow payment of said fee within a
reasonable time but also in no case beyond
its applicable prescriptive or reglementary
period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction
over a claim by the filing of the appropriate
pleading and payment of the prescribed
filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment
awards a claim not specified in the pleading,
or if specified the same has been left for
determination by the court, the additional
filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on
the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of
the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized
deputy to enforce said lien and assess and
collect the additional fee.
The petition is DISMISSED. The Clerk of Court of
the court a quo is hereby instructed to reassess and
determine the additional filing fee that should be paid by
private respondent considering the total amount of the
claim sought in the original complaint and the
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supplemental complaint as may be gleaned from the
allegations and the prayer thereof and to require private
respondent to pay the deficiency, if any, without
pronouncement as to costs.

BALLATAN vs CA
G.R. No. 125683, March 2, 1999
Facts:
The instant case arose from a dispute over fortytwo (42) square meters of residential land belonging to
petitioners. The parties herein are owners of adjacent lots
located at Block No. 3, Poinsettia Street, Araneta
University Village, Malabon, Metro Manila. Lot No. 24 is
registered in the name of petitioners Eden Ballatan and
spouses Betty Martinez and Chong Chy Ling. Lots Nos. 25
and 26 are registered in the name of respondent Gonzalo
Go, Sr. On Lot No. 25, respondent Winston Go, son of
Gonzalo Go, Sr., constructed his house. Adjacent to Lot
No. 26 is Lot No. 27 is registered in the name of
respondent Li Ching Yao.
Petitioner Ballatan constructed her house on Lot
No. 24. During the construction, she noticed that the
concrete fence and side pathway of the adjoining house
of respondent Winston Go encroached on the entire
length of the eastern side of her property. Her building
contractor formed her that the area of her lot was
actually less than that described in the title. Forthwith,
Ballatan informed respondent Go of this discrepancy and
his encroachment on her property. Respondent Go,
however, claimed that his house, including its fence and
pathway, were built within the parameters of his father's
lot; and that this lot was surveyed by Engineer Jose
Quedding, the authorized surveyor of the Araneta
Institute of Agriculture (AIA), the owner-developer of the
subdivision project.
Petitioner Ballatan called the attention of the IAI
to the discrepancy of the land area in her title and the
actual land area received from them. The AIA authorized
another survey of the land by Engineer Jose N. Quedding.
Engineer Quedding found that the lot area of
petitioner Ballatan was less by few meters and that of
respondent Li Ching Yao, which was three lots away,
increased by two (2) meters. Engineer Quedding declared
that he made a verification survey of Lots Nos. 25 and 26
of respondents Go in 1983 and allegedly found the
boundaries to have been in their proper position. He,
CIVIL PROCEDURE
however, could not explain the reduction in Ballatan's
area since he was not present at the time respondents Go
constructed their boundary walls.
Engineer Quedding made a third relocation
survey upon request of the parties. He found that Lot No.
24 lost approximately 25 square meters on its eastern
boundary that Lot No. 25, although found to have
encroached on Lot No. 24, did not lose nor gain any area;
that Lot No. 26 lost some three (3) square meters which,
however, were gained by Lot No. 27 on its western
boundary. In short, Lots Nos. 25, 26 and 27 moved
westward to the eastern boundary of Lot No. 24.
On the basis of this survey, petitioner Ballatan
made a written demand on respondents Go to remove
and dismantle their improvements on Lot No. 24.
Respondents Go refused. The parties including Li Ching
Yao, however, met several times to reach an agreement
one matter.
Failing to agree amicably, petitioner Ballatan
brought the issue before the barangay. Respondents Go
did not appear. Thus, petitioner Ballatan instituted
against respondents Go a civil case for recovery of
possession before the Regional Trial Court, Malabon. The
Go's filed their "Answer with Third-Party Complaint"
impleading as third-party defendants respondents Li
Ching Yao, the AIA and Engineer Quedding.
The trial court decided in favor of petitioners. It
ordered the Go's to vacate the subject portion of Lot No.
24, demolish their improvements and pay petitioner
Ballatan actual damages, attorney's fees and the costs of
the suit. It dismissed the third-party complaint.
The Court of Appeals modified the decision of
the trial court. It affirmed the dismissal of the third-party
complaint against the AIA but reinstated the complaint
against Li Ching Yao and Jose Quedding. It ordered
respondents Go to pay petitioner Ballatan instead of
demolishing the improvements, and respondent Li Ching
Yao to pay respondents Go, a reasonable amount for that
portion of the lot which they encroached, the value to be
fixed at the time of taking.
Petitioners question the admission by
respondent Court of Appeals of the third-party complaint
by respondents Go against the AIA, Jose Quedding and Li
Ching Yao. Petitioners claim that the third-party
complaint should not have been considered by the Court
of Appeals for lack of jurisdiction due to third-party
plaintiffs' failure to pay the docket and filing fees before
the trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not a third party complaint should
be accompanied by payment of the docket fees.
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Held:
The third-party complaint in the instant case
arose from the complaint of petitioners against
respondents Go. The complaint filed was for accion
publiciana.
When an action is filed in court, the complaint
must be accompanied the payment of the requisite
docket and filing fees. In real actions, the docket and
filing fees are based on the value of the property and
the amount of damages claimed, if any. If the complaint
is filed but the fees are not paid at the time of filing, the
court acquires jurisdiction upon full payment of the fees
within a reasonable time as the court may grant, barring
prescription. Where the fees prescribed for the real
action have been paid but the fees of certain related
damages are not, the court, although having jurisdiction
over the real action, may not have acquired jurisdiction
over the accompanying claim for damages. Accordingly,
the court may expunge those claims for damages, or
allow, on motion, a reasonable time for amendment of
the complaint so as to allege the precise amount of
damages and accept payment of the requisite legal fee. If
there are unspecified claims, the determination of which
may arise after the filing of the complaint or similar
pleading, the additional filing fee thereon shall constitute
a lien on the judgment award. The same rule also applies
to third-party claims and other similar pleadings.
In the case at bar, the third-party complaint filed
by respondents Go was incorporated in their answer to
the complaint. The third-party complaint sought the same
remedy as the principal complaint but added a prayer for
attorney's fees and costs without specifying their
amounts.
The Court of Appeal did not err in awarding
damages despite the Go's failure to specify the amount
prayed for and pay the corresponding additional filing
fees thereon. The claim for attorney's fees refers to
damages arising after the filing of the complaint against
the Go's. The additional filing fee on this claim is deemed
to constitute a lien on the judgment award.
CIVIL PROCEDURE
RIVERA vs DEL ROSARIO
G.R. No. 144934, January 15, 2004
Facts:
Respondents Fidela (now deceased), Oscar,
Rosita, Violeta, Enrique Jr., Carlos, Juanito and Eloisa, all
surnamed Del Rosario, were the registered owners of Lot
No. 1083-C, a parcel of land situated at Lolomboy,
Bulacan.
Oscar, Rosita, Violeta, Enrique Jr., Juanito, and
Eloisa, executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor of
their mother and co-respondent, Fidela, authorizing her
to sell, lease, mortgage, transfer and convey their rights
over Lot No. 1083-C. Subsequently, Fidela borrowed
P250,000 from Mariano Rivera in the early part of 1987.
To secure the loan, she and Mariano Rivera agreed to
execute a deed of real estate mortgage and an agreement
to sell the land.
The Kasunduan (Agreement to Sell) provided
that the children of Mariano Rivera, herein petitioners
Adelfa, Cynthia and Jose, would purchase Lot No. 1083-C
for a consideration of P2,141,622.50. This purchase price
was to be paid in three installments: P250,000 upon the
signing of the Kasunduan, P750,000, and P1,141,622.50.
It also provided that the Deed of Absolute Sale would be
executed only after the second installment is paid and a
postdated check for the last installment is deposited with
Fidela. As previously stated, however, Mariano had
already caused the drafting of the Deed of Absolute Sale.
But unlike the Kasunduan, the said deed stipulated a
purchase price of only P601,160, and covered a certain
Lot No. 1083-A in addition to Lot No. 1083-C. This deed,
as well as the Kasunduan and the Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage, was signed by Marianos children, petitioners
Adelfa, Cynthia and Jose, as buyers and mortgagees.
Although Fidela intended to sign only the
Kasunduan and the Real Estate Mortgage, she
inadvertently affixed her signature on all the three
documents in the office of Atty. Barangan (Mariano
lawyer). Mariano then gave Fidela the amount of
P250,000. He also gave Fidela a check for P200,000. In the
ensuing months, also, Mariano gave Oscar del Rosario
several amounts totaling P67,800 upon the latters
demand for the payment of the balance despite Oscars
lack of authority to receive payments under the
Kasunduan. While Mariano was making payments to
Oscar, Fidela entrusted the owners copy of TCT No. T50.668 (M) to Mariano to guarantee compliance with the
Kasunduan.
When Mariano unreasonably refused to return
the TCT, one of the respondents, Carlos del Rosario,
caused the annotation on TCT No. T-50.668 (M) of an
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Affidavit of Loss of the owners duplicate copy of the title.
This annotation was offset, however, when Mariano
registered the Deed of Absolute Sale on October 13,
1992, and afterwards caused the annotation of an
Affidavit of Recovery of Title on October 14, 1992. Thus,
TCT No. T-50.668 (M) was cancelled, and in its place was
issued TCT No. 158443 (M) in the name of petitioners
Adelfa, Cynthia and Jose Rivera.
Meanwhile,
the
Riveras,
representing
themselves to be the new owners of Lot No. 1083-C, were
also negotiating with the tenant, Feliciano Nieto, to rid
the land of the latters tenurial right. When Nieto refused
to relinquish his tenurial right over 9,000 sq. m. of the
land, the Riveras offered to give 4,500 sq. m. in exchange
for the surrender. Nieto could not resist and he accepted.
Subdivision Plan No. Psd-031404-052505 was then made.
Later, it was inscribed on TCT No. 158443 (M), and Lot
No. 1083-C was divided into Lots 1083 C-1 and 1083 C-2.
To document their agreement with Feliciano
Nieto, the Riveras executed a Kasulatan sa Pagtatakwil
ng Karapatansa Pagmamay-ari ng Bahagi ng
IsangLagaynaLupa (Written Abdication of Rights over a
Portion of a Parcel of Land). Four days later, they
registered the document with the Registry of Deeds. Two
titles were then issued: TCT No. T-161784 (M) in the
name of Nieto, for 4,500 sq. m. of land, and TCT No. T161785 (M) in the name of petitioners Adelfa, Cynthia
and Jose Rivera, over the remaining 10,529 sq. m. of land.
Respondents filed a complaint in the Regional
Trial Court of Malolos, asking that the Kasunduan be
rescinded for failure of the Riveras to comply with its
conditions, with damages. They also sought the
annulment of the Deed of Absolute Sale on the ground of
fraud, the cancellation of TCT No. T-161784 (M) and TCT
No. T-161785 (M), and the reconveyance to them of the
entire property with TCT No. T-50.668 (M) restored.
Respondents claimed that Fidela never intended
to enter into a deed of sale at the time of its execution
and that she signed the said deed on the mistaken belief
that she was merely signing copies of the Kasunduan.
According to respondents, the position where Fidelas
name was typed and where she was supposed to sign her
name in the Kasunduan was roughly in the same location
where it was typed in the Deed of Absolute Sale. They
argued that given Fidelas advanced age (she was then
around 72 at the time) and the fact that the documents
were stacked one on top of the other at the time of
signing, Fidela could have easily and mistakenly presumed
that she was merely signing additional copies of the
Kasunduan. They also alleged that petitioners acquired
possession of the TCT through fraud and machination.
In their defense, petitioners denied the
allegations and averred that the Deed of Absolute Sale
CIVIL PROCEDURE
was validly entered into by both parties. According to
petitioners, Fidela del Rosario mortgaged Lot No. 1083-C
to their predecessor in interest, Mariano Rivera, on
March 9, 1987. But on the following day Fidela decided to
sell the lot to petitioners for P2,161,622.50. When
Mariano agreed (on the condition that Lot No. 1083-C will
be delivered free from all liens and encumbrances), the
Kasunduan was consequently drawn up and signed. After
that, however, Fidela informed Mariano of the existence
of Feliciano Nietos tenancy right over the lot to the
extent of 9,000 sq. m. When Mariano continued to want
the land, albeit on a much lower price of only P601,160,
as he had still to deal with Feliciano Nieto, the parties
drafted the Deed of Absolute Sale on March 10, 1987, to
supersede the Kasunduan.
After trial, the RTC ruled in favor of respondents.
The trial court ruled that Fidelas signature in the Deed of
Absolute Sale was genuine, but found that Fidela never
intended to sign the said deed. Noting the peculiar
differences between the Kasunduan and the Deed of
Absolute Sale, the trial court concluded that the Riveras
were guilty of fraud in securing the execution of the deed
and its registration in the Registry of Deeds. It rescinded
the Kasunduan but ruled that the P450,000 paid by
petitioners be retained by respondents as payment for
the 4,500 sq. m. portion of Lot No. 1083-C that
petitioners gave to Nieto.
The Court of Appeals, the trial courts judgment
was modified. The Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 10,
1987 is declared null and void only insofar as Lot No.
1083-C is concerned, but valid insofar as it conveyed Lot
No. 1083-A, that TCT No. 158443 (M) is valid insofar as
Lot No. 1083-A is concerned and should not be annulled,
and increasing the amount to be paid by the defendantsappellants to the plaintiffs-appellees for the 4,500 square
meters of land given to Feliciano Nieto.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court acquire
jurisdiction over the case, despite an alleged deficiency in
the amount of filing fees paid by respondents.
Held:
Petitioners contend that jurisdiction was not
validly acquired because the filing fees respondents paid
was only P1,554.45 when the relief sought was
reconveyance of land that was worth P2,141,622.50
under the Kasunduan. They contend that respondents
should have paid filing fees amounting to P12,183.70.
Respondents counter that it is beyond dispute
that they paid the correct amount of docket fees when
they filed the complaint. If the assessment was
inadequate, they could not be faulted because the clerk
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of court made no notice of demand or reassessment,
respondents argue. Respondents also add that since
petitioners failed to contest the alleged underpayment of
docket fees in the lower court, they cannot raise the
same on appeal.
Jurisdiction was validly acquired over the
complaint.
The filing of the complaint or appropriate
initiatory pleading and the payment of the prescribed
docket fee vest a trial court with jurisdiction over the
subject matter or nature of the action. If the amount of
docket fees paid is insufficient considering the amount of
the claim, the clerk of court of the lower court involved or
his duly authorized deputy has the responsibility of
making a deficiency assessment. The party filing the case
will be required to pay the deficiency, but jurisdiction is
not automatically lost.
Respondents paid the full amount of docket fees
as assessed by the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial
Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 17, where they filed
the complaint. If petitioners believed that the assessment
was incorrect, they should have questioned it before the
trial court. Instead, petitioners belatedly question the
alleged underpayment of docket fees through this
petition, attempting to support their position with the
opinion and certification of the Clerk of Court of another
judicial region. Needless to state, such certification has no
bearing on the instant case.

ENRIQUEZ vs ENRIQUEZ
G.R. No. 139303, August 25, 2005
Facts:
Maximo Enriquez died and was substituted by
his heir. The latter filed with the RTC of Zambales, a
complaint for partitions against the petitioners. The
complaint involves a parcel of land located in Zambales.
He alleged that he owns 10/18 undivided portion of the
property, 9/18 by purchase and 1/18 by inheritance; and
that petitioners have been residing in the premises
without his knowledge and consent, thereby depriving
him of his undivided share of the property.
Petitioners, in their answer, averred that
Cipriano Enriquez, one of the petitioners, owns of the
property, while the others are in possession of the other
areas with his knowledge and consent.
CIVIL PROCEDURE
On June 4, 1998, the RTC rendered a Decision
ordering the petitioners to vacate the property and to
surrender possession thereof to respondents. they filed a
Notice of Appeal with the RTC. It was approved on July 7,
1998.
Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal of
petitioners for their failure to pay the appellate court
docket fee.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but
it was denied by the Appellate Court.
Issue:
Whether the Court of Appeals correctly
dismissed the petition for failure of the petitioners to pay
appellate court docket fee.
Held:
Prior to the effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, payment of appellate court
docket fee is not a prerequisite for the perfection of an
appeal.
However, the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, which took effect on July 1, 1997, now require
that appellate docket and other lawful fees must be paid
within the same period for taking an appeal. This is clear
from the opening sentence of Section 4, Rule 41 of the
same Rules that, (W)ithin the period for taking an
appeal, the appellant shall pay to the clerk of the court
which rendered the judgment or final order appealed
from, the full amount of the appellate court docket and
other lawful fees.
Petitioner contends that the trial court must first
send them a notice to pay the appellate court docket fee
and other lawful fees within the period for taking an
appeal. Hence, they waited for the notice for them to pay
the appellate court docket fee. When they did not receive
any, they paid the docket fee to the trial court. It is lack of
merit.
Also under Rule 41 of the same Rules, an appeal
to the Court of Appeals from a case decided by the RTC in
the exercise of the latters original jurisdiction, shall be
taken within fifteen (15) days from the notice of
judgment or final order appealed from. Such appeal is
made by filing a notice thereof with the court that
rendered the judgment or final order and by serving a
copy of that notice upon the adverse party. Furthermore,
within this same period, appellant shall pay to the clerk of
court which rendered the judgment or final order
appealed from, the full amount of the appellate court
docket and other lawful fees. The payment of docket fee
within this period is mandatory for the perfection of
appeal. Otherwise, the appellate court would not be able
to act on the subject matter of the action, and the
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decision sought to be appealed from becomes final and
executory.
Court has consistently held that payment of
docket fee within the prescribed period is mandatory for
the perfection of an appeal. Without such payment, the
appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the action and the decision sought to be
appealed from becomes final and executory.
The requirement of the law under Section 4, Rule
41 is clear. The payment of appellate docket fee is not a
mere technicality of law or procedure but an essential
requirement for the perfection of an appeal.
CIVIL PROCEDURE
an Order denying the motion, stating that there was no
need to send the notice to counsel, since in appeals from
the Justice of the Peace Courts, no summons is necessary
in order that defendant may have to file Answer, and that
the notice of receipt of appealed case may be either sent
to the attorney or the party.
This Order is now before Us on appeal,
defendants claiming that it was error on the part of the
lower court to consider that notice to them was
sufficient.
Issue:
Whether there was an error on the part of the
lower court to consider the notice to them was sufficient.
Held:
Filing versus service of pleadings - Sec. 2, Rule 13

ELLI vs DITAN
G.R. No. L-17444, June 30, 1962
Facts:
This is a case of forcible entry which was filed by
Spouses Elli with the justice of peace court against juan
ditan and marcial bronola.
On July 28, 1959, the defendants, thru Atty.
Fernando Gerona, Jr., "Attorney for defendantsappellants", filed with the said Justice of the Peace Court,
a Notice of Appeal. The record of the case was received
by the CFI on August 6, same year. On August 11, 1959, a
Notice of Appealed Case was sent by the Clerk, Court of
First Instance, to the parties, which were received on
August 15 and 17, by Maria Elli and Juan Ditan,
respectively, and on September 18, 1959, by Marcial
Broola. In spite of receipt by the parties, the defendants
failed to file their Answer to the Complaint, which was
deemed reproduced. Under date of December 23, 1959,
the plaintiffs, thru counsel, presented a Motion to
Declare Defendants in Default and to set date for
presentation of Evidence. The CFI declared defendants in
default on January 7, 1960.
Copies of the decision were received by the
defendants, on April 5, 1960. On April 20, 1960,
defendants thru counsel, presented a pleading captioned
"Motion to Reconsider Decision dated March 10, 1960",
where, in the main, it was contended that the reason for
the failure to file Answer was due to lack of notice to
counsel. The defendants claim that inasmuch as they
were represented by counsel, notice should have been
sent to said counsel, and there being no notice to him,
there is no service in law and, therefore, they can not be
in default. On May 6, 1960, the court a quo handed down
The Order appealed from, is hereby set aside.

The case is remanded for further and appropriate
proceedings in the premises. No costs.
The provisions of the rules pertinent to the
issues raised by the parties the Sec. 2, of Rule 27, and Sec.
7, Rule 40, which are reproduced below:
Sec. 2. Every order required by its terms to be
served, every pleading subsequent to the complaint,
every written motion other than one which may be heard
ex-parte, and every written notice, appearance, demand,
offer of judgment or similar papers shall be filed with the
court, and served upon the parties affected thereby. If
any of such parties has appeared by an attorney or
attorneys, service upon him shall be made upon his
attorneys or one of them, unless service upon the party
himself is ordered by the court. Where one attorney
appears for several parties, he shall only be entitled to
one copy of any paper served upon him by the opposite
side. (Rule 27).
SEC. 7. Upon the docketing of the cause under
appeal, the complaint filed in the justice of the peace or
municipal court shall be considered reproduced in the
Court of First Instance and it shall be the duty of the clerk
of the court to notify the parties of that fact by registered
mail, and the period for making an answer shall begin
with the date of the receipt of such notice by the
defendant. (Rule 40).
Under the above provisions, therefore, it would
seem quite clear that service, notice, and the like, should
be made on the party, if not represented by counsel. The
moment a party appears by counsel, notice and other
processes should be made upon said counsel, service
upon the party himself not being considered service in
law. It is true that under Sec. 7, Rule 40, the Rule requires
that notification be made on the parties by registered
mail. The word parties as used in said provision, should
not, however, be interpreted to mean the parties
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themselves. The word "parties" is used because, more
often than not, in the Justice of the Peace Court, the
parties are not represented by a lawyer.
A party can appear in his own behalf, and notice
to him would be sufficient. The moment an attorney
appears for any party, notice should be given to the
former. ". . . where a party appears by attorney in an
action or proceeding in a court of record all notices
thereafter required to be given in the action or
proceeding must be given to the attorney and not to the
client; and a notice given to the client and not to his
attorney is not a notice in law." (Palad v. Cui, et al., 28
Phil. 44). In legal contemplation, therefore, and under the
facts of the present case, there was no legal service of the
notice, and the defendants could not be in default.
Filing versus service of pleadings - Sec. 2, Rule 13

PHHC vs TIONGCO
G.R. No. L-18891, November 29, 1964
Background of the case:
Tiongco and Escasa are the registered squatters
of a certain parcel of lot (Lot No. 23) and had been in
actual possession thereof since 1947, introduced
improvements thereon and had declared the property for
taxation purposes. Said parcel of lot is a portion of a
parcel of land declared by PHHC for subdivision purposes.
During that period, Tiongco and Escasa offered
to purchase the lot from PHHC, which they later found
out to have already been awarded to Enverga, a relative
of a Congressman, who had never been in possession
thereof nor introduced any improvements thereon. Upon
discovery, Tiongco and Escasa lodged a complaint with
PHHC, wherein the Chief of Investigation & Research
Section indorses the case to the Hon. Investigating
Committee for appropriate action. After the investigation,
it was found out that the two complainants were included
in the list of bonafide squatters during the census by the
PHHC, and they are capable of paying the lot, being
interested in Lot No. 23.
He further believed that both complainants have
the priority rights to purchase the lot for simple reason
that they were pioneers of the place. He recommends to
the Executive Committee to render their sound judgment
to the above-mentioned case. However, no action was
taken on the aforesaid report.
CIVIL PROCEDURE
Facts:
PHHC filed an action for Recovery of Possession
before the CFI of Rizal, QC Branch. The appellant
interposed the Special Defense of Priority of Right to
purchase, and ability to pay, as found by no less that the
investigators of PHHC. The case was then scheduled for
hearing, however, Atty. Tanega, failed to notify the
appellants, and in their absence, PHHC introduced
evidence showing ownership of the property.
A judgment was rendered against the appellants,
ordering them to vacate the property, remove their
houses and other improvements thereon, to pay the sum
of P26.70 per month from date of occupation until the
restoration of the property to PHHC, and to pay
attorneys fee plus costs.
The judgment was received by their counsel,
Atty. Tanega BUT did not inform them, neither did he
take steps to protect the interests of his clients, by
presenting a motion for reconsideration or file a petition
to set aside judgment.
Appellants only came to know about the adverse
judgment when the sheriff of the court served them a
copy of writ of execution ordering them to vacate the
premises. They lost no time to contact Atty. Tanega, but
to no avail. They engaged the services of a new counsel,
Atty. Sayson, who filed before the CFI a Petition for Relief
from Judgment with affidavits of merit. The judge cited
Atty. Tanega to appear before him because of the
seriousness of the charges. He admitted to the court that
he did not informed his clients because it just escaped his
attention for he had so may ejectment cases at that time.
PHHC opposed the said petition contending that
it was filed out of time (receipt of decision: March 7, 1961
/ filing: May 9, 1961).
The court issued an order denying the aforesaid
petition holding that it was filed beyond the reglementary
period of 60 days, and that the mistake or negligence of
an attorney is binding upon his client.
Hence, the present appeal
Issue:
Whether or not the petition for relief from
judgment was filed within the reglementary period
Held:
YES. Viewed from the strictly legal perspective, it
appears that the petition was presented outside the
reglementary period of sixty (60) days from notice of the
judgment. Nevertheless due to the very peculiar
circumstances obtaining in the premises, We consider
that the rule was substantially complied with and the
petition for relief from judgment was seasonably filed.
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The rules should receive liberal interpretation in
order to promote their object and to assist the parties in
obtaining a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of
every action. Procedural technicality, should not be made
a bar to the vindication of a legitimate grievance. When
such technicality "deserts from being an aid to justice,"
the Courts are justified in excepting from its operation a
particular case, We find no better opportunity to apply
this prerogative than in the case at bar.
There was something fishy and suspicious
concerning the actuations of former counsel Atty. Taega
in this case. He did not give any significance at all, to the
processes of the court, which has proven prejudicial to
the rights of his clients. There was nothing which could
have prevented the appellants from attending the trial of
the case themselves, or moving for a reconsideration of
the decision or taking the necessary appeal from the
judgment, if only their counsel had informed them of the
court's processes. Counsel had simply ignored the rights
of his clients by giving a lame and flimsy explanation that
the court's processes just escaped his attention. He
deprived them of their day in court.
There should be no dispute regarding the
doctrine that normally notice to counsel is notice to
parties, and that such doctrine has beneficient effects
upon the prompt dispensation of justice. Its application to
a given case, however, should be looked into and
adopted, according to the surrounding circumstances;
otherwise, in the court's desire to make a short cut of the
proceedings, it might foster, wittingly or unwittingly,
dangerous collusions to the detriment of justice. It would
then be easy for one lawyer to sell one's rights down the
river, by just alleging that he just forgot every process of
the court affecting his clients, because he was so busy.
Under this circumstance, one should not insist that a
notice to such irresponsible lawyer is also a notice to his
clients.
Moreover, the petition for relief from judgment
under consideration, may even be considered as one for
relief from the order of execution, which was filed within
the reglementary period, inasmuch as Section 2 of Rule
38, Revised Rules, does not only refer to judgments, but
also to orders, or any other proceedings.
The very allegations in the petition for relief and
affidavits and other documents attached thereto, justify
the return of the case to the court of origin so that, in the
interest of justice, appellants may be given a chance to
prove their defenses.
The attention of the trial court is invited to the
censurable conduct of Atty. Bonifacio Taega in this
particular case, and to take such action as may be
warranted in the premises.
CIVIL PROCEDURE
CONFORMABLY WITH THE FOREGOING, the
order of the lower court dated July 17, 1961, is hereby set
aside and another entered, remanding the case to the
court of origin for further proceedings, and thereafter to
render judgment accordingly. With costs against appellee
PHHC, in both instances
Manner of filing - Secs. 3 & 4, Rule 13

BENGUET ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. vs NLRC
G.R. No. 89070, May 18, 1992
Background:
Cosalan was the GM of BENECO. Audit
Memorandums were sent to him by COA because the
audit shows substantial inconsistencies with the
directives of NEA. When BENECO received the COA Audit
Report on the financial status and operations of BENECO,
which enumerated irregularities in the utilization of funds
amounting to P37M release by NEA to BENECO, the Board
members issued the following Resolutions:
1. Resolution No. 91-4 dated 28 July 1984:
. . . that the services of Peter M. Cosalan as General
Manager of BENECO is terminated upon approval of the
National Electrification Administration;
2. Resolution No. 151-84 dated September 15,
1984;
. . . that Peter M. Cosalan is hereby suspended from his
position as General Manager of the Benguet Electric
Cooperative, Inc. (BENECO) effective as of the start of the
office hours on September 24, 1984, until a final decision
has been reached by the NEA on his dismissal;
. . . that GM Cosalan's suspension from office shall remain
in full force and effect until such suspension is sooner
lifted, revoked or rescinded by the Board of Directors;
that all monies due him are withheld until cleared;
3. Resolution No. 176-84 dated September 25,
1984;
. . . that Resolution No. 151-84, dated September 15,
1984 stands as preventive suspension for GM Peter M.
Cosalan.
Respondent Cosalan nevertheless continued to work as
General Manager of Beneco, in the belief that he could be
suspended or removed only by duly authorized officials of
NEA, in accordance with provisions of P.D. No, 269, as
amended by P.D. No. 1645 (the statute creating the NEA,
providing for its capitalization, powers and functions and
organization), the loan agreement between NEA and
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petitioner Beneco and the NEA Memorandum of 2 July
1980. Accordingly, on 5 October and 10 November 1984,
respondent Cosalan requested petitioner Beneco to
release the compensation due him. Beneco, acting
through respondent Board members, denied the written
request of respondent Cosalan.
Facts:
Respondent Cosalan filed a complaint with the
NLRC against members of BENECO Board, challenging the
legality of the Board Resolutions which ordered his
suspension and termination from the service and demand
payment of his salaries and allowances, which he later
amended to implead the petitioner, BENECO.
In the course of the proceedings before the
arbiter, Cosalan filed a motion for reinstatement which,
although opposed by the petitioner, was granted by the
arbiter. The petitioner reinstated Cosalan through a
board resolution.
The labor arbiter rendered decision confirming
Cosalans reinstatement and ordering payment of his
money claims. The respondent Board members appealed
to NLRC, and filed a Memorandum on Appeal, while
BENECO did not appeal, but moved to dismiss the appeal
filed by respondent Board members and for the
execution of judgment. By this time, BENECO had a new
set of directors.
NLRC modified the award rendered by the Labor
Arbiter by declaring that petitioner Beneco alone, and not
respondent Board members, was liable for respondent
Cosalan's backwages and allowances, and by ruling that
there was no legal basis for the award of moral damages
and attorney's fees made by the Labor Arbiter.
BENECO, through its new set of directors, moved
for reconsideration of the NLRC decision, but without
success.
Hence, the present petition.
CIVIL PROCEDURE
appeal was posted by registered mail on 3 May 1988 and
received by the NLRC the following day. Clearly, the
memorandum on appeal was filed out of time.
Respondent Board members, however, insist
that their Memorandum on Appeal was filed on time
because it was delivered for mailing on 1 May 1988 to the
Garcia Communications Company, a licensed private
letter carrier. The Board members in effect contend that
the date of delivery to Garcia Communications was the
date of filing of their appeal memorandum.
Respondent Board member's contention runs
counter to the established rule that transmission through
a private carrier or letter-forwarder instead of the
Philippine Post Office is not a recognized mode of filing
pleadings. The established rule is that the date of delivery
of pleadings to a private letter-forwarding agency is not
to be considered as the date of filing thereof in court, and
that in such cases, the date of actual receipt by the court,
and not the date of delivery to the private carrier, is
deemed the date of filing of that pleading.
There, was, therefore, no reason grounded upon
substantial justice and the prevention of serious
miscarriage of justice that might have justified the NLRC
in disregarding the ten-day reglementary period for
perfection of an appeal by the respondent Board
members.
Accordingly, the applicable rule was that the
ten-day reglementary period to perfect an appeal is
mandatory and jurisdictional in nature, that failure to file
an appeal within the reglementary period renders the
assailed decision final and executory and no longer
subject to review. The respondent Board members had
thus lost their right to appeal from the decision of the
Labor Arbiter and the NLRC should have forthwith
dismissed their appeal memorandum.
Issue:
Whether or not NLRC had acted with grave
abuse of discretion in accepting and giving due course to
respondent Board members' appeal although such appeal
had been filed out of time.
Held:
We consider that petitioner's first contention is
meritorious. There is no dispute about the fact that the
respondent Beneco Board members received the decision
of the labor Arbiter on 21 April 1988. Accordingly, and
because 1 May 1988 was a legal holiday, they had only up
to 2 May 1988 within which to perfect their appeal by
filing their memorandum on appeal. It is also not disputed
that the respondent Board members' memorandum on
Substituted service - Sec. 8, Rule 13

CUBAR vs MENDOZA
G.R. No. L-55035, February 23, 1983
Facts:
Petitioners filed a complaint with the CFI of Cebu
for the nullification of certain documents alleged in the
complaint, which they, claiming to be "illiterate mountain
people", supposedly had signed upon the representations
of the defendants, herein private respondents, that what
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they were signing was a right of way in favor of the
government over their lands for the construction of a
road leading to a mining site, with the inducement that
once operational, each landowner shall be entitled to a
royalty of P.30 per ton of minerals loaded in trucks
passing through their respective lots. However, the
documents turned out to be authorizations for entry into
their lots for the purpose of mining exploration. Through
the said documents, private respondents were granted by
the Bureau of Mines permits to make mineral
explorations over their lands.
Private respondents specifically denied the
material allegations thereof, claiming that the questioned
documents were freely and voluntarily executed by the
petitioners.
The trial court rendered judgment declaring the
subject documents null and void, and ordering
respondents to pay damages to petitioners. A copy of the
decision was served to private respondents' counsel and
was received by his wife at his given address. No appeal
was filed by respondents.
4 days after the issuance of the order of
execution, Branch V became vacant with the
appointment of Judge Zosa to the Court of Appeals.
Private respondents, through a new lawyer, Atty.
Ponciano H. Alivio, filed a motion for reconsideration and
to quash the writ of execution, on the ground that the
decision is not yet final and executory for lack of valid
service thereof. Said motion was opposed by petitioners,
who insisted that said decision is already final and
executory, and Atty. Alivio has no personality to file said
motion for want of formal substitution of counsel as
required by the Rules.
Since Branch V was then vacant, the motion for
reconsideration was resolved by Branch VI, presided over
by the respondent judge who issued the herein assailed
Order setting aside the Order of execution and quashing
the writ issued thereunder.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration filed
against the above order of respondent judge having been
denied, this petition was filed.
CIVIL PROCEDURE
November 23, 1979, is not disputed. It is likewise not
disputed that said wife has been receiving prior notices
of the case for her husband at the office of the latter,
who had always acted as if he had received said notices
himself for he had duly complied therewith. With these
facts, no other ruling can be had but that the service of
the decision in question is valid and binding. It is fully
being in accordance with Rule 13, Section 4, on personal
service, said wife being of sufficient discretion to receive
notice of final judgment.
It is already well settled rule that when a party is
represented by counsel, notice should be made upon the
counsel of record at his given address, to which notices of
all kind emanating from the court should be sent in the
absence of a proper and adequate notice to the court of a
change of address.
Petitioner's argument, likewise, fails to consider
the need of observing a legal formality before a counsel
of record may be considered relieved of his responsibility
as such counsel on account of withdrawal. This legal
formality is that a lawyer's withdrawal as counsel must be
made in a formal petition filed in the case, without which,
notice of judgment rendered in the case served on the
counsel of record, is, for all legal purposes notice to the
client, the date of receipt of which is considered the
starting point from which the period of appeal prescribed
by law shall begin to run. Not having withdrawn formally
as counsel in the case, Atty. Romeo Gonzaga continued to
be the counsel of record and was, for all legal purpose,
private respondents' attorney upon whom the court's
processes may be served, as they were in fact duly
served.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted and
the questioned Order of respondent judge is hereby
annulled and set aside. The writ of prohibition is likewise
granted and respondent judge or whoever would be
appointed to the appropriate branch of the Regional Trial
Court, prohibited from acting in any wise or form except
to order execution of the subject decision. The temporary
restraining order heretofore issued is hereby made
permanent. Costs against private respondents.
Issue:
Whether or not the service is not valid. (Private
respondents argue that said service is not valid because
Atty. Gonzaga had left Cebu City, his address of record,
and has resided in Legaspi City.)
Held:
No. It is valid. The court found the petition to
be meritorious. That the decision of the trial court was
received by the wife of Atty. Romeo Gonzaga, private
respondents' counsel of record at his given address on
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Service of judgments, final orders or resolutions v.
Priorities in modes of service and filing - Sec. 9, Rule 13
FERAREN vs SANTOS
G.R. No. L-41323, April 27, 1982
Facts:
This case is about the judgment of the Court of
Appeals which became final and executory because the
counsel for the losing party did not claim from the post
office the registered mail containing the copy of the
resolution denying his motion for reconsideration.
CA in its decision in Feraren vs. Santos, CA-G.R.
No. 52724-R ordered Feraren to deliver a certain
Volkswagen car to Remedios Santos and to pay her as
damages ten pesos a day from September 22, 1967 up to
the time of delivery.
A copy of that decision was served on Felipe
Ponce, Feraren's counsel. Ponce withdrew from the case
and he was replaced by Mendez, Mendez & Associates
who entered their appearance as Feraren's new counsel
and filed a motion asking for an extension of thirty days
within which to file a motion for reconsideration. CA
approved Ponce's withdrawal from the case and granted
Feraren's new lawyers the thirty-day extension with the
warning that no further extension would be granted.
The Mendez law office received a copy of that
resolution by registered mail. Lawyer Pershing L. Mendez
asked for another thirty-day extension which was
reluctantly granted by the Court of Appeals in its
resolution in this wise: "Motion is apparently not wellfounded because appellee's (Feraren's) counsel is a law
firm with several members. However, granted as a last
chance." Feraren's lawyers received a copy of that
resolution also by registered mail.
Feraren's motion for reconsideration was denied
for lack of merit in the resolution.
A copy of that resolution, like the two prior
resolutions, was sent by registered mail in the Manila
central post office to Mendez, Mendez & Associates at
their address of record. Two notices dated March 21 and
26 regarding that registered mail were sent to the
Mendez law office at that address. However, that
particular registered mail was returned to the Court of
Appeals with the notation stamped on the envelope:
"Return to Sender Unclaimed". Also stamped on the
envelope were the words "March 26 Second Notice" and
"Entry Registry April 2, 1975 ". The officer-in-charge of
the central post office in Manila informed the Court of
Appeals that the said registered mail was returned to the
Court's representative after two notices were sent at the
Mendez law office and the mail was not claimed.
On the assumption that the judgment became
final, entry of judgment was made the record was
CIVIL PROCEDURE
remanded to the lower court. Copies of the entry of
judgment were mailed to the lawyers of the parties.
Pershing L. Mendez, Feraren's counsel, filed a
manifestation (motion) wherein he prayed for the recall
of the entry of judgment on the ground that his motion
for reconsideration had not yet been resolved; hence, the
judgment "could not become final and executory".
CA denied the motion for the recall of the entry
of judgment because, as already stated, the motion for
reconsideration had already been resolved.
Mendez filed a manifestation (motion) wherein
he prayed that he be allowed to appeal "as a
consequence of the denial of the motion for
reconsideration". He said that he had not received a copy
of the resolution denying his motion for reconsideration.
CA did not grant that prayer. A copy of that resolution
was received by Mendez by registered mail.
More than a month later after a writ of
execution was served on Feraren, he filed in this Court
this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
wherein he prayed that he be allowed to appeal and that
the lower court be enjoined from executing the judgment
of the Court of Appeals. Lawyer Mendez alleged in that
petition and in his affidavit that in his office at his
residence there was always someone to attend to
correspondence and that he did not leave the city during
the period when the notice of registered mail was
supposedly sent to his law office. His office clerk made a
similar affidavit.
However, the fact remains that the postmaster
certified that although two notices were sent to Mendez's
office, the registered mail in question was not claimed at
the Manila central post office.
Issue:
Whether or not CA gravely abuse its discretion in
not allowing Feraren to appeal to this Court. No.
Whether or not the failure to claim registered
mail of which notice had been duly given by the
postmaster is excusable that would warrant the
reopening of a decided case. No.
Held:
The rule is that if the addressee of registered
mail fails to claim it from the post office within five days
from the date of the first notice of the postmaster,
service becomes effective at the expiration of that fiveday period (Sec. 8, Rule 13, Rules of Court).
Between the denial of a lawyer that he received
the first notice of registered mail and the postmaster's
certification that said notice was sent, the postmaster's
claim should be believed because it is his official duty to
send notices of registered mail. The presumption is that
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official duty was regularly performed. (Grafil vs. Feliciano,
L-27166, June, 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 616 citing Enriquez vs.
Bautista, 79 Phil. 220, 222).
It is the duty of a practising lawyer to so arrange
matters that official or judicial communications sent by
mail will reach him promptly. Failing to do so, he and his
clients must suffer the consequences of his negligence.
(Islas vs. Platon and Ona, 47 Phil. 162).
It has been held that the failure to claim
registered mail of which notice had been duly given by
the postmaster is not excusable negligence that would
warrant the reopening of a decided case (Pielago vs.
Generosa, 73 Phil. 654).
We find that the Court of Appeals did not gravely
abuse its discretion in not allowing Feraren to appeal to
this Court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of
merit. The temporary restraining order is dissolved. No
costs.
Service of judgments, final orders or resolutions v.

Priorities in modes of service and filing - Sec. 9, Rule 13
MAGNO vs CA
G.R. No. L-58781, July 31, 1987
Facts:
Private respondents filed an action for Partition
of Certain Properties and for Damages against petitioners
in the CFI Pangasinan. The lower court ordered the
partition of the properties. Petitioners appealed to the
Court of Appeals. CA affirmed the lower court.
Notice of the decision was sent to petitioners'
counsel Atty. Atinidoro B. Sison at his given mailing
address. However, it was returned to the court with the
certification of the postmaster "Return to sender,
Reason moved."
Then, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution
wherein it resolved to resend the said copy of the
Decision to the appellants(petitioners herein) themselves
at Alaminos, Pangasinan, and the appellants are hereby
informed that 15 days period within which to file for
reconsideration will be counted from the receipt of the
decision herewith attached.
A copy of the resolution was sent but again the
envelope addressed to them was returned to the court
with the notation deceased.
CIVIL PROCEDURE
CA- ordered the issuance of the entry of
judgment.MR of petitioner was denied. Hence, the
present petition.
Issue:
Whether or not there was proper service of
notice
Held:
Yes. It is well-settled that when a party is
represented by counsel, notice should be made upon the
counsel of record at his given address to which notices of
all kinds emanating from the court should be sent in the
absence of a proper and adequate notice to the court of a
change of address.
In this case, the records show that the notice
and copy of the decision of respondent Court of Appeals
were sent to petitioners's counsel of record Atty. Sison at
his given mailing address which is 33 B.M.A. Avenue,
Tatalon, Quezon City. The first notice to him by the
Postmaster to claim his mail was on July 9, 1981. The rule
is that service of notice becomes effective at the
expiration of the five-day period upon failure of the
addresse to claim his mail within five (5) days from the
date of first notice
Therefore in this case the service became
effective five days after July 9, 1981 which is July 14,
1981. The decision became final on August 13, 1981. If
Atty. Sison moved to another address without informing
the respondent of his change of address the omission or
neglect will not stay the finality of the decision. The
notice sent to petitioners themselves, under the
circumstances is not even necessary. It may be stated
though that while petitioners claim that Teofilo Magno to
whom the notice to the petitioners was addressed is
already dead, it is not explained why their present
petition before this Court still includes the name Teofilo
Magno. There is no indication in the record that he has
been duly substituted by his legal representative.
The decision in this case having become final on
July 29, 1981, there being no appeal taken therefrom,
respondent court committed no error ordering the
issuance of the corresponding entry of judgment.
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When service is deemed complete - Sec. 10, Rule 13
ISAAC vs MENDOZA
G.R. No. L-2820, June 21, 1951
Facts:
Fausto Isaac sold to Leopoldo Mendoza a parcel
of land in Pili, Camarines Sur, reserving the right to
repurchase within four years. After liberation, the seller
offered to redeem, but defendant objected, saying the
redemption was premature. Hence this litigation
instituted in the CFI to compel re-transfer.
After having been duly summoned, the
defendant failed to answer. Upon plaintiff's motion, he
was defaulted by order of the lower court.
Thereafter, considering the plaintiff's evidence
the court rendered judgment requiring the defendant to
execute a deed of re-sale of the land, to receive the
amount of P90 Philippine currency, which Isaac had
consigned in court, to pay damages in the sum of P95.
Then, Mendoza submitted a petition to set aside
the judgment invoking accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence.
Respondents arguments: his attorney Jorge C.
Briones had not received notice of the court's denial of
his motion to dismiss the complaint, he had reason to
believe the time to answer had not expired.
It appears from the record that, duly summoned,
defendant through Attorney Briones filed a motion to
dismiss, which was overruled by order of April 8, 1946. At
the bottom of that order there is notation that had been
furnished Attorney Briones by ordinary mail. Then the
plaintiff filed his motion for default, asserting that,
defendant's motion to dismiss had been denied and that
so far, defendant had interposed no answer.
The court issued an auto suspending
consideration of plaintiff's motion and giving the
defendant a period of ten days within which to reply
thereto, if so desired. Copy of this directive was sent by
registered mail to Attorney Briones, but the latter
"refused to claim the registered letter despite the
notices given him by the postmaster". And according to
an affidavit submitted to the court, Attorney Peas for
the plaintiff, had again and gain reminded Briones that
the time was come for the answer.
CFI- denied the petition to set aside. Hence this
petition.
Issue:
Whether or not there was completed service
Held:
Yes. We affirm the order of the trial court
denying the petition to set aside.
CIVIL PROCEDURE
According to the rules, Attorney Briones is
deemed to have received the copy of the auto which he
declined to accept from the mails. That order was
sufficient to advise him of the rejection of his previous
motion of dismissal, supposing he had not actually
received the copy of the order which had been forwarded
to him by ordinary mail.
The appellant insist here that "the record fails to
show a conclusive evidence that Atty. Jorge C. Briones . . .
was notified". This is refuted by the above account of the
facts and of the governing principles. It is remarkable
that, to meet the conclusions therein set forth, defendant
has not introduced any sworn statement of Attorney
Briones.
Unless the appellant has filed a motion to set
aside the order of default, on any of the grounds
enumerated in Rule 38, he has no standing in court nor
the right to appeal. Examining appellant's motion we
observe that he merely requested for the annulment of
the decision rendered after his default without praying
for the revocation of the order of May 10, 1947 declaring
him to be default. But granting, for the sake of argument
that the aforesaid pleading impliedly included the second
prayer, we are met by the insuperable objection that the
petition was too late. Because filed beyond the six-month
period within which applications for relief under Rule 38
may be entertained. From May 10 to December 9 seven
months had elapsed.
Proof of filing and service - Secs. 12 & 13, Rule 13

ZULUETA vs ASIA BREWERY, INC.
G.R. No. 138137, March 8, 2001
Facts:
Respondent Asia Brewery, Inc., is engaged in the
manufacture, the distribution and sale of beer; while
Petitioner Perla Zulueta is a dealer and an operator of an
outlet selling the formers beer products. A Dealership
Agreement governed their contractual relations.
Petitioner filed before the RTC of Iloilo a
complaint against respondent for breach of contract,
specific performance and damages which was grounded
on the alleged violation of dealership agreement.
During the pendency of the Iloilo case
respondent filed with the Makati RTC a complaint for the
collection of sum of money in the amount of Php 463,
107.75 representing the value of beer products, which
respondent delivered to petitioner.
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Petitioner moved to dismiss the Makati case on
the ground that it had split the cause of action in violation
of the rule against multiplicity of suits.
The motion was denied. Upon petitioners
motion, Judge Rosario inhibited himself and the case was
raffled again presided by Judge Parentala.
Petitioner moved for the consolidation of the
Makati case with Iloilo case. Granting the Motion, the two
cases were consolidated.
CA set aside the trial courts assailed
consolidation orders on the ground that there is no
common issue of law or fact between the two cases. The
issue in the Makati case if private respondents
indebtedness while in the Iloilo case; the breach of
contract.
Hence, this petition
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in ordering the
consolidation of cases despite respondents nonpresentation of written explanation on the matter of
serving petitioners counsel of the petition by registered
mail.
Held:
The CA erred in consolidating the cases.
Petitioner also faults respondent for the absence of a
written explanation why the Petition with the Court of
Appeals was served on her counsel by registered mail. In
reply, respondent points out that such explanation was
not necessary, because its counsel held office in Makati
City while petitioner and her counsel were in Iloilo City.
We agree with petitioner. Under Section 11, Rule
13 of the 1997 Rules, personal service of petitions and
other pleadings is the general rule, while a resort to other
modes of service and filing is the exception. Where
recourse is made to the exception, a written explanation
why the service and the filing were not done personally is
indispensable, even when such explanation by its nature
is acceptable and manifest. Where no explanation is
offered to justify the resort to other modes, the
discretionary power of the court to expunge the pleading
becomes mandatory. Thus, the CA should have
considered the Petition as not having been filed, in view
of the failure of respondent to present a written
explanation of its failure to effect personal service.
In sum, the Petition for Certiorari filed with the CA
by herein respondent, questioning the orders of
consolidation by the Makati RTC, should not have been
given due course. Not only was the Petition filed beyond
the sixty-day reglementary period; it likewise failed to
observe the requirements of non-forum shopping and
CIVIL PROCEDURE
personal service or filing. All or any of these acts ought to
have been sufficient cause for its outright denial.
Lis pendens - Sec. 14, Rule 13

TAN vs LANTIN
G.R. No. L-28526, July 7, 1986
Facts:
Remigio, Aida and Alejandro filed a complaint for
the annulment of a Deed of Absolute Sale covering three
parcels of land executed by their mother, Hilaria, in favor
of their brother, Clemente and his wife. Respondent
spouses caused its execution without giving any price or
consideration, and eventually obtaining new registered
titles in their names.
Hilaria died. Petitioners caused a notice of lis
pendens to be annotated on the corresponding titles to
protect their rights over the subject properties as
compulsory heirs of the deceased.
Judge Lantin (respondent) issued an Order
cancelling the notice of lis pendens upon private
respondents' filing of a bond in the amount of P100K.
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with
preliminary injunction to set aside the Order; claiming
that Judge Lantin acted with grave abuse of discretion
because said notice was necessary to protect their rights
in the event of any intended alienation of the properties.
Respondent spouses argument: (a) Petitioners'
claim that they have no motive to molest them is selfserving; and (b) The sufficient bond filed by them renders
the notice of lis pendens unnecessary to protect
petitioners' rights.
The SC enjoined the respondents from enforcing
the assailed order cancelling the notice of lis pendens.
Later, petitioner Remigio Tan died. His heirs
substituted him as plaintiffs in the said civil case.
However, no formal substitution was made in the present
petition.
CFI dismissed the complaint. The decision is now
pending appeal before the IAC.
Issue:
Whether or not the cancellation of the notice
of lis pendens was valid.
Held:
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CIVIL PROCEDURE
The Doctrine of Lis pendens is founded upon

reasons of public policy and necessity. The purpose of
which is to keep the properties in litigation within the
power of the court until the litigation is terminated, and
to prevent the defeat of the judgment or decree by
subsequent alienation. This purpose would be rendered
meaningless if private respondents are allowed to file a
bond, regardless of the amount, in substitution of said
notice. The law does not authorize a judge to cancel a
notice of lis pendens pending litigation, upon the mere
filing of a sufficient bond by the party on whose title said
notice is annotated.
Under Section 14, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court,
the courts can cancel a notice of lis pendens only on two
grounds:
(a) After a proper showing that the notice is for the
purpose of molesting the adverse party; or
(b) It is not necessary to project the interest of the party
who caused it to be recorded.
Respondent spouses themselves manifested
their intent to temporarily encumber subject properties
as security for a loan required for their business.
Consequently, annotation of the notice of lis pendens is
essential in case they are adjudged the lawful owners
thereof.
The assailed order is hereby annulled or set
aside and the writ of preliminary injunction is hereby
declared permanent.
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Full Text: Rule 13 Filing and Service of Pleadings

G.R. No. 75919 May 7, 1987
MANCHESTER
DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION,
ET
AL., petitioners,
vs.
COURT
OF
APPEALS,
CITY
LAND
DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, STEPHEN ROXAS, ANDREW LUISON, GRACE
LUISON and JOSE DE MAISIP, respondents.
Tanjuatco, Oreta and Tanjuatco for petitioners.
Pecabar Law Offices for private respondents.
RESOLUTION
GANCAYCO, J.:
Acting on the motion for reconsideration of the resolution of
the Second Division of January 28,1987 and another motion to
refer the case to and to be heard in oral argument by the
Court En Banc filed by petitioners, the motion to refer the case
to the Court en banc is granted but the motion to set the case
for oral argument is denied.
Petitioners in support of their contention that the filing fee
must be assessed on the basis of the amended complaint cite
the case of Magaspi vs. Ramolete. 1 They contend that the
Court of Appeals erred in that the filing fee should be levied by
considering the amount of damages sought in the original
complaint.
The environmental facts of said case differ from the present in
that
1. The Magaspi case was an action for recovery of ownership
2
and possession of a parcel of land with damages. While the
present case is an action for torts and damages and specific
3
performance with prayer for temporary restraining order, etc.
2. In the Magaspi case, the prayer in the complaint seeks not
only the annulment of title of the defendant to the property,
the declaration of ownership and delivery of possession thereof
to plaintiffs but also asks for the payment of actual moral,
exemplary damages and attorney's fees arising therefrom in the
4
amounts specified therein. However, in the present case, the
prayer is for the issuance of a writ of preliminary prohibitory
injunction during the pendency of the action against the
defendants' announced forfeiture of the sum of P3 Million paid
by the plaintiffs for the property in question, to attach such
property of defendants that maybe sufficient to satisfy any
judgment that maybe rendered, and after hearing, to order
defendants to execute a contract of purchase and sale of the
subject property and annul defendants' illegal forfeiture of the
money of plaintiff, ordering defendants jointly and severally to
pay plaintiff actual, compensatory and exemplary damages as
well as 25% of said amounts as maybe proved during the trial as
attorney's fees and declaring the tender of payment of the
purchase price of plaintiff valid and producing the effect of
payment and to make the injunction permanent. The amount of
damages sought is not specified in the prayer although the body
of the complaint alleges the total amount of over P78 Million as
5
damages suffered by plaintiff.
CIVIL PROCEDURE
3. Upon the filing of the complaint there was an honest
difference of opinion as to the nature of the action in the
Magaspi case. The complaint was considered as primarily an
action for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of
land. The damages stated were treated as merely to the main
cause of action. Thus, the docket fee of only P60.00 and P10.00
6
for the sheriff's fee were paid.
In the present case there can be no such honest difference of
opinion. As maybe gleaned from the allegations of the
complaint as well as the designation thereof, it is both an action
for damages and specific performance. The docket fee paid
upon filing of complaint in the amount only of P410.00 by
considering the action to be merely one for specific
performance where the amount involved is not capable of
pecuniary estimation is obviously erroneous. Although the total
amount of damages sought is not stated in the prayer of the
complaint yet it is spelled out in the body of the complaint
totalling in the amount of P78,750,000.00 which should be the
basis of assessment of the filing fee.
4. When this under-re assessment of the filing fee in this case
was brought to the attention of this Court together with similar
other cases an investigation was immediately ordered by the
Court. Meanwhile plaintiff through another counsel with leave
of court filed an amended complaint on September 12, 1985 for
the inclusion of Philips Wire and Cable Corporation as coplaintiff and by emanating any mention of the amount of
damages in the body of the complaint. The prayer in the original
complaint was maintained. After this Court issued an order on
October 15, 1985 ordering the reassessment of the docket fee
in the present case and other cases that were investigated, on
November 12, 1985 the trial court directed plaintiffs to rectify
the amended complaint by stating the amounts which they are
asking for. It was only then that plaintiffs specified the amount
of damages in the body of the complaint in the reduced amount
7
of P10,000,000.00. Still no amount of damages were specified
in the prayer. Said amended complaint was admitted.
On the other hand, in the Magaspi case, the trial court ordered
the plaintiffs to pay the amount of P3,104.00 as filing fee
covering the damages alleged in the original complaint as it did
not consider the damages to be merely an or incidental to the
action for recovery of ownership and possession of real
8
property. An amended complaint was filed by plaintiff with
leave of court to include the government of the Republic as
defendant and reducing the amount of damages, and attorney's
fees prayed for to P100,000.00. Said amended complaint was
9
also admitted.
In the Magaspi case, the action was considered not only one for
recovery of ownership but also for damages, so that the filing
fee for the damages should be the basis of assessment.
Although the payment of the docketing fee of P60.00 was found
to be insufficient, nevertheless, it was held that since the
payment was the result of an "honest difference of opinion as
to the correct amount to be paid as docket fee" the court "had
acquired jurisdiction over the case and the proceedings
thereafter had were proper and regular." 10 Hence, as the
amended complaint superseded the original complaint, the
allegations of damages in the amended complaint should be the
basis of the computation of the filing fee. 11
In the present case no such honest difference of opinion was
possible as the allegations of the complaint, the designation and
the prayer show clearly that it is an action for damages and
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specific performance. The docketing fee should be assessed by
considering the amount of damages as alleged in the original
complaint.
CIVIL PROCEDURE
SO ORDERED.
As reiterated in the Magaspi case the rule is well-settled "that a

case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee
regardless of the actual date of filing in court . 12 Thus, in the
present case the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
case by the payment of only P410.00 as docket fee. Neither can
the amendment of the complaint thereby vest jurisdiction upon
the Court. 13 For an legal purposes there is no such original
complaint that was duly filed which could be amended.
Consequently, the order admitting the amended complaint and
all subsequent proceedings and actions taken by the trial court
are null and void.
The Court of Appeals therefore, aptly ruled in the present case
that the basis of assessment of the docket fee should be the
amount of damages sought in the original complaint and not in
the amended complaint.
The Court cannot close this case without making the
observation that it frowns at the practice of counsel who filed
the original complaint in this case of omitting any specification
of the amount of damages in the prayer although the amount of
over P78 million is alleged in the body of the complaint. This is
clearly intended for no other purpose than to evade the
payment of the correct filing fees if not to mislead the docket
clerk in the assessment of the filing fee. This fraudulent practice
was compounded when, even as this Court had taken
cognizance of the anomaly and ordered an investigation,
petitioner through another counsel filed an amended
complaint, deleting all mention of the amount of damages
being asked for in the body of the complaint. It was only when
in obedience to the order of this Court of October 18, 1985, the
trial court directed that the amount of damages be specified in
the amended complaint, that petitioners' counsel wrote the
damages sought in the much reduced amount of
P10,000,000.00 in the body of the complaint but not in the
prayer thereof. The design to avoid payment of the required
docket fee is obvious.
The Court serves warning that it will take drastic action upon a
repetition of this unethical practice.
To put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth all complaints,
petitions, answers and other similar pleadings should specify
the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of
the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be
considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any
pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall not bib
accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from
the record.
The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the
payment of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the
complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in
the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on
the amounts sought in the amended pleading. The ruling in the
Magaspi case 14 in so far as it is inconsistent with this
pronouncement is overturned and reversed.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is denied for lack
of merit.
meikimouse

G.R. Nos. 79937-38 February 13, 1989
SUN INSURANCE OFFICE, LTD., (SIOL), E.B. PHILIPPS and D.J.
WARBY, petitioners,
vs.
HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge, Branch 104,
Regional Trial Court, Quezon City and MANUEL CHUA UY PO
TIONG, respondents.
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles Law
Offices for petitioners. Tanjuatco, Oreta, Tanjuatco, Berenguer
& Sanvicente Law Offices for private respondent.
GANCAYCO, J.:
Again the Court is asked to resolve the issue of whether or not a
court acquires jurisdiction over a case when the correct and
proper docket fee has not been paid.
On February 28, 1984, petitioner Sun Insurance Office, Ltd.
(SIOL for brevity) filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court
of Makati, Metro Manila for the consignation of a premium
refund on a fire insurance policy with a prayer for the judicial
declaration of its nullity against private respondent Manuel Uy
Po Tiong. Private respondent as declared in default for failure to
file the required answer within the reglementary period.
On the other hand, on March 28, 1984, private respondent filed
a complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for the
refund of premiums and the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-41177,
initially against petitioner SIOL, and thereafter including E.B.
Philipps and D.J. Warby as additional defendants. The complaint
sought, among others, the payment of actual, compensatory,
moral, exemplary and liquidated damages, attorney's fees,
expenses of litigation and costs of the suit. Although the prayer
in the complaint did not quantify the amount of damages
sought said amount may be inferred from the body of the
complaint to be about Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00).
Only the amount of P210.00 was paid by private respondent as
docket fee which prompted petitioners' counsel to raise his
objection. Said objection was disregarded by respondent Judge
Jose P. Castro who was then presiding over said case. Upon the
order of this Court, the records of said case together with
twenty-two other cases assigned to different branches of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which were under
investigation for under-assessment of docket fees were
transmitted to this Court. The Court thereafter returned the
said records to the trial court with the directive that they be reraffled to the other judges in Quezon City, to the exclusion of
Judge Castro. Civil Case No. Q-41177 was re-raffled to Branch
104, a sala which was then vacant.
On October 15, 1985, the Court en banc issued a Resolution in
Administrative Case No. 85-10-8752-RTC directing the judges in
said cases to reassess the docket fees and that in case of
deficiency, to order its payment. The Resolution also requires all
clerks of court to issue certificates of re-assessment of docket
fees. All litigants were likewise required to specify in their
pleadings the amount sought to be recovered in their
complaints.
CIVIL PROCEDURE
On December 16, 1985, Judge Antonio P. Solano, to whose sala
Civil Case No. Q-41177 was temporarily assigned, issuedan
order to the Clerk of Court instructing him to issue a certificate
of assessment of the docket fee paid by private respondent and,
in case of deficiency, to include the same in said certificate.
On January 7, 1984, to forestall a default, a cautionary answer
was filed by petitioners. On August 30,1984, an amended
complaint was filed by private respondent including the two
additional defendants aforestated.
Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion, to whom Civil Case No. Q41177
was thereafter assigned, after his assumption into office on
January 16, 1986, issued a Supplemental Order requiring the
parties in the case to comment on the Clerk of Court's letterreport signifying her difficulty in complying with the Resolution
of this Court of October 15, 1985 since the pleadings filed by
private respondent did not indicate the exact amount sought to
be recovered. On January 23, 1986, private respondent filed a
"Compliance" and a "Re-Amended Complaint" stating therein a
claim of "not less than Pl0,000,000. 00 as actual compensatory
damages" in the prayer. In the body of the said second
amended complaint however, private respondent alleges actual
and compensatory damages and attorney's fees in the total
amount of about P44,601,623.70.
On January 24, 1986, Judge Asuncion issued another Order
admitting the second amended complaint and stating therein
that the same constituted proper compliance with the
Resolution of this Court and that a copy thereof should be
furnished the Clerk of Court for the reassessment of the docket
fees. The reassessment by the Clerk of Court based on private
respondent's claim of "not less than P10,000,000.00 as actual
and compensatory damages" amounted to P39,786.00 as
docket fee. This was subsequently paid by private respondent.
Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals questioning the said order of Judie Asuncion dated
January 24, 1986.
On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a supplemental
complaint alleging an additional claim of P20,000,000.00 as
d.qmages so the total claim amounts to about P64,601,623.70.
On October 16, 1986, or some seven months after filing the
supplemental complaint, the private respondent paid the
1
additional docket fee of P80,396.00.
On August 13, 1987, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision
ruling, among others, as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Denying due course to the petition in CAG.R. SP No. 1, 09715 insofar as it seeks
annulment of the order
(a) denying petitioners' motion to dismiss
the complaint, as amended, and
(b) granting the writ of preliminary
attachment, but giving due course to the
portion
thereof
questioning
the
reassessment of the docketing fee, and
requiring the Honorable respondent Court
to reassess the docketing fee to be paid by
meikimouse

private respondent on the basis of the
2
amount of P25,401,707.00.
Hence, the instant petition.
During the pendency of this petition and in conformity with the
said judgment of respondent court, private respondent paid the
3
additional docket fee of P62,432.90 on April 28, 1988.
The main thrust of the petition is that the Court of Appeals
erred in not finding that the lower court did not acquire
jurisdiction over Civil Case No. Q-41177 on the ground of
nonpayment of the correct and proper docket fee. Petitioners
allege that while it may be true that private respondent had
paid the amount of P182,824.90 as docket fee as herein-above
related, and considering that the total amount sought to be
recovered in the amended and supplemental complaint is
P64,601,623.70 the docket fee that should be paid by private
respondent is P257,810.49, more or less. Not having paid the
same, petitioners contend that the complaint should be
dismissed and all incidents arising therefrom should be
annulled. In support of their theory, petitioners cite the latest
ruling of the Court in Manchester Development Corporation vs.
4
CA, as follows:
The Court acquires jurisdiction over any
case only upon the payment of the
prescribed docket fee. An amendment of
the complaint or similar pleading will not
thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much
less the payment of the docket fee based on
the amounts sought in the amended
pleading. The ruling in the Magaspi Case in
so far as it is inconsistent with this
pronouncement is overturned and reversed.
On the other hand, private respondent claims that the ruling
in Manchester cannot apply retroactively to Civil Case No.
Q41177 for at the time said civil case was filed in court there
was no such Manchester ruling as yet. Further, private
respondent avers that what is applicable is the ruling of
5
this Court in Magaspi v. Ramolete, wherein this Court held
that the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the case even if
the docket fee paid was insufficient.
The contention that Manchester cannot apply retroactively to
this case is untenable. Statutes regulating the procedure of the
courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are
6
retrospective in that sense and to that extent.
7
In Lazaro vs. Endencia and Andres, this Court held that the
payment of the full amount of the docket fee is an
indispensable step for the perfection of an appeal. In a forcible
entry and detainer case before the justice of the peace court of
Manaoag, Pangasinan, after notice of a judgment dismissing the
case, the plaintiff filed a notice of appeal with said court but he
deposited only P8.00 for the docket fee, instead of P16.00 as
required, within the reglementary period of appeal of five (5)
days after receiving notice of judgment. Plaintiff deposited the
additional P8.00 to complete the amount of the docket fee only
fourteen (14) days later. On the basis of these facts, this court
held that the Court of First Instance did notacquire jurisdiction
to hear and determine the appeal as the appeal was not
thereby perfected.
CIVIL PROCEDURE
8
In Lee vs. Republic, the petitioner filed a verified declaration of

intention to become a Filipino citizen by sending it through
registered mail to the Office of the Solicitor General in 1953 but
the required filing fee was paid only in 1956, barely 5V2 months
prior to the filing of the petition for citizenship. This Court ruled
that the declaration was not filed in accordance with the legal
requirement that such declaration should be filed at least one
year before the filing of the petition for citizenship.
Citing Lazaro, this Court concluded that the filing of petitioner's
declaration of intention on October 23, 1953 produced no legal
effect until the required filing fee was paid on May 23, 1956.
9
In Malimit vs. Degamo, the same principles enunciated in

Lazaro and Lee were applied. It was an original petition for quo
warranto contesting the right to office of proclaimed candidates
which was mailed, addressed to the clerk of the Court of First
Instance, within the one-week period after the proclamation as
10
provided therefor by law. However, the required docket fees
were paid only after the expiration of said period.
Consequently, this Court held that the date of such payment
must be deemed to be the real date of filing of aforesaid
petition and not the date when it was mailed.
11
Again, in Garica vs, Vasquez, this Court reiterated the rule

that the docket fee must be paid before a court will act on a
petition or complaint. However, we also held that said rule is
not applicable when petitioner seeks the probate of several
wills of the same decedent as he is not required to file a
separate action for each will but instead he may have other
wills probated in the same special proceeding then pending
before the same court.
12
Then in Magaspi, this Court reiterated the ruling

in Malimit and Lee that a case is deemed filed only upon
payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual date of its
filing in court. Said case involved a complaint for recovery of
ownership and possession of a parcel of land with damages filed
in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. Upon the payment of
P60.00 for the docket fee and P10.00 for the sheriffs fee, the
complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. R-11882. The prayer
of the complaint sought that the Transfer Certificate of Title
issued in the name of the defendant be declared as null and
void. It was also prayed that plaintiff be declared as owner
thereof to whom the proper title should be issued, and that
defendant be made to pay monthly rentals of P3,500.00 from
June 2, 1948 up to the time the property is delivered to plaintiff,
P500,000.00 as moral damages, attorney's fees in the amount
of P250,000.00, the costs of the action and exemplary damages
in the amount of P500,000.00.
The defendant then filed a motion to compel the plaintiff to pay
the correct amount of the docket fee to which an opposition
was filed by the plaintiff alleging that the action was for the
recovery of a parcel of land so the docket fee must be based on
its assessed value and that the amount of P60.00 was the
correct docketing fee. The trial court ordered the plaintiff to pay
P3,104.00 as filing fee.
The plaintiff then filed a motion to admit the amended
complaint to include the Republic as the defendant. In the
prayer of the amended complaint the exemplary damages
earlier sought was eliminated. The amended prayer merely
sought moral damages as the court may determine, attorney's
fees of P100,000.00 and the costs of the action. The defendant
filed an opposition to the amended complaint. The opposition
notwithstanding, the amended complaint was admitted by the
meikimouse
CIVIL PROCEDURE
trial court. The trial court reiterated its order for the payment of
the additional docket fee which plaintiff assailed and then
challenged before this Court. Plaintiff alleged that he paid the
total docket fee in the amount of P60.00 and that if he has to
pay the additional fee it must be based on the amended
complaint.
the plaintiff to rectify the amended complaint by stating the

amounts which they were asking for. This plaintiff did as
instructed. In the body of the complaint the amount of damages
alleged was reduced to P10,000,000.00 but still no amount of
damages was specified in the prayer. Said amended complaint
was admitted.
The question posed, therefore, was whether or not the plaintiff

may be considered to have filed the case even if the docketing
fee paid was not sufficient. In Magaspi, We reiterated the rule
that the case was deemed filed only upon the payment of the
correct amount for the docket fee regardless of the actual date
of the filing of the complaint; that there was an honest
difference of opinion as to the correct amount to be paid as
docket fee in that as the action appears to be one for the
recovery of property the docket fee of P60.00 was correct; and
that as the action is also one, for damages, We upheld the
assessment of the additional docket fee based on the damages
alleged in the amended complaint as against the assessment of
the trial court which was based on the damages alleged in the
original complaint.
Applying the principle in Magaspi that "the case is deemed filed

only upon payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual
date of filing in court," this Court held that the trial court did
not acquire jurisdiction over the case by payment of only
P410.00 for the docket fee. Neither can the amendment of the
complaint thereby vest jurisdiction upon the Court. For all legal
purposes there was no such original complaint duly filed which
could be amended. Consequently, the order admitting the
amended complaint and all subsequent proceedings and actions
13
taken by the trial court were declared null and void.
However,
as
aforecited,
this
Court
overturned Magaspi in Manchester. Manchester involves
an
action for torts and damages and specific performance with a
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, etc.
The prayer in said case is for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary prohibitory injunction during the pendency of the
action against the defendants' announced forfeiture of the sum
of P3 Million paid by the plaintiffs for the property in question,
the attachment of such property of defendants that may be
sufficient to satisfy any judgment that may be rendered, and,
after hearing, the issuance of an order requiring defendants to
execute a contract of purchase and sale of the subject property
and annul defendants' illegal forfeiture of the money of
plaintiff. It was also prayed that the defendants be made to pay
the plaintiff jointly and severally, actual, compensatory and
exemplary damages as well as 25% of said amounts as may be
proved during the trial for attorney's fees. The plaintiff also
asked the trial court to declare the tender of payment of the
purchase price of plaintiff valid and sufficient for purposes of
payment, and to make the injunction permanent. The amount
of damages sought is not specified in the prayer although the
body of the complaint alleges the total amount of over P78
Millon allegedly suffered by plaintiff.
Upon the filing of the complaint, the plaintiff paid the amount
of only P410.00 for the docket fee based on the nature of the
action for specific performance where the amount involved is
not capable of pecuniary estimation. However, it was obvious
from the allegations of the complaint as well as its designation
that the action was one for damages and specific performance.
Thus, this court held the plaintiff must be assessed the correct
docket fee computed against the amount of damages of about
P78 Million, although the same was not spelled out in the
prayer of the complaint.
Meanwhile, plaintiff through another counsel, with leave of
court, filed an amended complaint on September 12, 1985 by
the inclusion of another co-plaintiff and eliminating any
mention of the amount of damages in the body of the
complaint. The prayer in the original complaint was maintained.
On October 15, 1985, this Court ordered the re-assessment of
the docket fee in the said case and other cases that were
investigated. On November 12, 1985, the trial court directed
The present case, as above discussed, is among the several

cases of under-assessment of docket fee which were
investigated by this Court together with Manchester. The facts
and circumstances of this case are similar toManchester. In the
body of the original complaint, the total amount of damages
sought amounted to about P50 Million. In the prayer, the
amount of damages asked for was not stated. The action was
for the refund of the premium and the issuance of the writ of
preliminary attachment with damages. The amount of only
P210.00 was paid for the docket fee. On January 23, 1986,
private respondent filed an amended complaint wherein in the
prayer it is asked that he be awarded no less than
P10,000,000.00 as actual and exemplary damages but in the
body of the complaint the amount of his pecuniary claim is
approximately P44,601,623.70. Said amended complaint was
admitted and the private respondent was reassessed the
additional docket fee of P39,786.00 based on his prayer of not
less than P10,000,000.00 in damages, which he paid.
On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a supplemental
complaint alleging an additional claim of P20,000,000.00 in
damages so that his total claim is approximately
P64,601,620.70. On October 16, 1986, private respondent paid
an additional docket fee of P80,396.00. After the promulgation
of the decision of the respondent court on August 31, 1987
wherein private respondent was ordered to be reassessed for
additional docket fee, and during the pendency of this petition,
and after the promulgation of Manchester, on April 28, 1988,
private respondent paid an additional docket fee of P62,132.92.
Although private respondent appears to have paid a total
amount of P182,824.90 for the docket fee considering the total
amount of his claim in the amended and supplemental
complaint amounting to about P64,601,620.70, petitioner
insists that private respondent must pay a docket fee of
P257,810.49.
The principle in Manchester could very well be applied in the
present case. The pattern and the intent to defraud the
government of the docket fee due it is obvious not only in the
filing of the original complaint but also in the filing of the
second amended complaint.
However, in Manchester, petitioner did not pay any additional
docket fee until] the case was decided by this Court on May 7,
1987. Thus, in Manchester, due to the fraud committed on the
government, this Court held that the court a quo did not
acquire jurisdiction over the case and that the amended
meikimouse
CIVIL PROCEDURE
complaint could not have been admitted inasmuch as the

original complaint was null and void.
In the present case, a more liberal interpretation of the rules is
called for considering that, unlike Manchester, private
respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules
by paying the additional docket fees as required. The
promulgation of the decision in Manchester must have had that
sobering influence on private respondent who thus paid the
additional docket fee as ordered by the respondent court. It
triggered his change of stance by manifesting his willingness to
pay such additional docket fee as may be ordered.
Nevertheless, petitioners contend that the docket fee that was
paid is still insufficient considering the total amount of the
claim. This is a matter which the clerk of court of the lower
court and/or his duly authorized docket clerk or clerk in-charge
should determine and, thereafter, if any amount is found due,
he must require the private respondent to pay the same.
Thus, the Court rules as follows:
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate
initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket
fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject
matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory
pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the
court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time
but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third
party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be
considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed
therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee
within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the
filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the
prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a
claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has
been left for determination by the court, the additional filing
fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be
the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized
deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional
fee.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
Clerk of Court of the court a quo is hereby instructed to reassess
and determine the additional filing fee that should be paid by
private respondent considering the total amount of the claim
sought in the original complaint and the supplemental
complaint as may be gleaned from the allegations and the
prayer thereof and to require private respondent to pay the
deficiency, if any, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
meikimouse

G.R. No. 125683 March 2, 1999
EDEN BALLATAN and SPS. BETTY MARTINEZ and CHONG CHY
LING, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, GONZALO GO, WINSTON GO, LI CHING
YAO, ARANETA INSTITUTE OF AGRICULTURE and JOSE N.
QUEDDING, respondents.
PUNO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the
Court of Appeals dated March 25, 1996 in CA-G.R. CV No. 32472
entitled "Eden Ballatan., et. al., plaintiffs-appellees v. Gonzalo
Go and Winston Go, appellants and third-party plaintiffs1
appellants v. Li Ching Yao, et. al., third-party defendants."
The instant case arose from a dispute over forty-two (42)
square meters of residential land belonging to petitioners. The
parties herein are owners of adjacent lots located at Block No.
3, Poinsettia Street, Araneta University Village, Malabon, Metro
Manila. Lot No. 24, 414 square meters in area, is registered in
the name of petitioners Eden Ballatan and spouses Betty
2
Martinez and Chong Chy Ling. Lots Nos. 25 and 26, with an
area of 415 and 313 square meters respectively, are registered
3
in the name of respondent Gonzalo Go, Sr. On Lot No. 25,
respondent Winston Go, son of Gonzalo Go, Sr., constructed his
house. Adjacent to Lot No. 26 is Lot No. 27, 417 square meters
in area, and is registered in the name of respondent Li Ching
4
Yao.
In 1985, petitioner Ballatan constructed her house on Lot No.
24. During the construction, she noticed that the concrete fence
and side pathway of the adjoining house of respondent Winston
Go encroached on the entire length of the eastern side of her
5
property. Her building contractor formed her that the area of
her lot was actually less than that described in the title.
Forthwith, Ballatan informed respondent Go of this discrepancy
and his encroachment on her property. Respondent Go,
however, claimed that his house, including its fence and
pathway, were built within the parameters of his father's lot;
and that this lot was surveyed by Engineer Jose Quedding, the
authorized surveyor of the Araneta Institute of Agriculture
(AIA), the owner-developer of the subdivision project.
Petitioner Ballatan called the attention of the IAI to the
discrepancy of the land area in her title and the actual land area
received from them. The AIA authorized another survey of the
land by Engineer Jose N. Quedding.
In a report dated February 28, 1985, Engineer Quedding found
that the lot area of petitioner Ballatan was less by few meters
and that of respondent Li Ching Yao, which was three lots away,
increased by two (2) meters. Engineer Quedding declared that
he made a verification survey of Lots Nos. 25 and 26 of
respondents Go in 1983 and allegedly found the boundaries to
have been in their proper position. He, however, could not
explain the reduction in Ballatan's area since he was not present
6
at the time respondents Go constructed their boundary walls.
On June 2, 1985, Engineer Quedding made a third relocation
survey upon request of the parties. He found that Lot No. 24
lost approximately 25 square meters on its eastern boundary
CIVIL PROCEDURE
that Lot No. 25, although found to have encroached on Lot No.
24, did not lose nor gain any area; that Lot No. 26 lost some
three (3) square meters which, however, were gained by Lot
7
No. 27 on its western boundary. In short, Lots Nos. 25, 26 and
27 moved westward to the eastern boundary of Lot No. 24.
On the basis of this survey, on June 10, 1985, petitioner Ballatan
made a written demand on respondents Go to remove and
dismantle their improvements on Lot No. 24. Respondents Go
refused. The parties including Li Ching Yao, however, met
several times to reach an agreement one matter.
Failing to agree amicably, petitioner Ballatan brought the issue
before the barangay. Respondents Go did not appear. Thus, on
April 1, 1986, petitioner Ballatan instituted against respondents
Go Civil Case No. 772-MN for recovery of possession before the
Regional Trial Court, Malabon, Branch 169. The Go' s filed their
"Answer with Third-Party Complaint" impleading as third-party
defendants respondents Li Ching Yao, the AIA and Engineer
Quedding.
On August 23, 1990, the trial court decided in favor of
petitioners. It ordered the Go's to vacate the subject portion of
Lot No. 24, demolish their improvements and pay petitioner
Ballatan actual damages, attorney's fees and the costs of the
suit. It dismissed the third-party complaint against: (1) AIA after
finding that the lots sold to the parties were in accordance with
the technical description a verification plan covered by their
respective titles; (2) Jose N. Quedding, there being no privity of
relation between him and respondents Go and his erroneous
survey having been made at the instance of AIA, not the parties;
and (3) Li Ching Yao for failure to prove that he committed any
8
wrong in the subject encroachment. The court made the
following disposition:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
defendants, ordering the latter:
1. To demolish and remove all
improvements existing and encroaching on
plaintiff's lot;
2. To clear, vacate and deliver possession of
the encroached area to the plaintiffs;
3. To pay plaintiffs jointly and severally the
following:
a) P7,800.00 for the
expenses paid to the
surveyors;
b)
P5,000.00
plaintiffs'
transportation;
for
4. To pay plaintiffs, jointly and severally,

attorney's fees equivalent to 25% of the
current market value of the subject matter
in litigation at the time of execution; and
5. To pay the costs of suit.
meikimouse

The third-party complaint filed by thirdparty plaintiff Gonzalo Go and Winston Go
against third-party defendants Araneta
Institute of Agriculture, Jose N. Quedding
and Li Ching Yao is hereby DISMISSED,
without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Respondents Go appealed. On March 25, 1996, the Court of
Appeals modified the decision of the trial court. It affirmed the
dismissal of the third-party complaint against the AIA but
reinstated the complaint against Li Ching Yao and Jose
Quedding. Instead of ordering respondents Go to demolish their
improvements on the subject land, the appellate court ordered
them to pay petitioner Ballatan, and respondent Li Ching Yao to
pay respondents Go, a reasonable amount for that portion of
the lot which they encroached, the value to be fixed at the time
of taking. It also ordered Jose Quedding to pay respondents Go
attorney's fees of P5,000.00 for his erroneous survey. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED
insofar as the dismissal of the third-party
complaint against Araneta Institute of
Agriculture is concerned but modified in all
other aspects as follows:
1) Defendants-appellants are hereby
ordered to pay plaintiffs-appellees the
reasonable value of the forty-two (42)
square meters of their lot at the time of its
taking;
2) Third-party defendant Li Ching Yao is
hereby ordered to pay defendantsappellants the reasonable value of the
thirty-seven (37) square meters of the
latter's lot at the time of its taking; and
3) Third-party defendant Jose N. Quedding
is hereby ordered to pay to defendantsappellants the amount of P5,000.00 as
attorney's fees.
LET THE RECORD of the case be remanded
to the Regional Trial Court of Malabon for
further proceedings and reception of
evidence for the determination of the
reasonable value of Lots Nos. 24 and 26.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this petition. Petitioners allege that:

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
ON QUESTIONS OF LAW AND GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN:
1. IT APPLIED EQUITY OR EQUITABLE
SOLUTIONS TO THE INSTANT CASE IN UTTER
DISREGARD AND IN VIOLATION OR GROSS
IGNORANCE OF EXISTING LAWS AND
CIVIL PROCEDURE
JURISPRUDENCE VESTING BASIC PROPERTY
RIGHTS
TO
HEREIN
PETITIONERS.
RESPONDENT COURT HAS NO POWER TO
APPLY/USE EQUITY IN THE PRESENCE OF
EXISTING LAWS TO THE CONTRARY.
2. UNDER THE GUISE OF APPLYING EQUITY
BUT IN EFFECT A VERY APPARENT
PARTIALITY AND FAVOR TO RESPONDENTS
GO, IT ORDERED PAYMENT OF THE
ENCROACHED AREA AT THE VALUE AT THE
TIME OF ITS TAKING AND NOT THE VALUE
AT THE TIME OF PAYMENT, THEREBY
ENRICHING THE GO'S BUT DEPRIVING
PETITIONERS OF THE FRUITS OR INCREASE
IN VALUE OF THEIR PROPERTY TO WHICH
THEY ARE ENTITLED UNDER THE LAW AS
THE REGISTERED OWNERS WITH TORRENS
TITLE IN THEIR NAMES.
3. WHEN IT DID NOT DISMISS THE THIRDPARTY COMPLAINT DUE TO NON-PAYMENT
OF ANY FILING OR DOCKET FEE.
4. WHEN IT DENIED PETITIONERS THE
RECOVERY OF THE NECESSARY EXPENSES IN
10
PROTECTING THEIR RIGHTS IN THIS CASE.
Petitioners question the admission by respondent Court of
Appeals of the third-party complaint by respondents Go against
the AIA, Jose Quedding and Li Ching Yao. Petitioners claim that
the third-party complaint should not have been considered by
the Court of Appeals for lack of jurisdiction due to third-party
plaintiffs' failure to pay the docket and filing fees before the
trial court.
The third-party complaint in the instant case arose from the
complaint of petitioners against respondents Go. The complaint
filed was for accion publiciana, i.e., the recovery of possession
of real property which is a real action. The rule in this
jurisdiction is that when an action is filed in court, the complaint
must be accompanied the payment of the requisite docket and
11
filing fees. In real actions, the docket and filing fees are based
on the value of the property and the amount of damages
12
claimed, if any If the complaint is filed but the fees are not
paid at the time of filing, the court acquires jurisdiction upon
full payment of the fees within a reasonable time as the court
13
may grant, barring prescription. Where the fees prescribed for
the real action have been paid but the fees of certain related
damages are not, the court, although having jurisdiction over
the real action, may not have acquired jurisdiction over the
14
accompnying claim for damages. Accordingly, the court may
expunge those claims for damages, or allow, on motion, a
reasonable time for amendment of the complaint so as to allege
the precise amount of damages and accept payment of the
15
requisite legal fee. If there are unspecified claims, the
determination of which may arise after the filing of the
complaint or similar pleading, the additional filing fee thereon
16
shall constitute a lien on the judgment award. The same rule
17
also applies to third-party claims and other similar pleadings.
In the case at bar, the third-party complaint filed by
respondents Go was incorporated in their answer to the
complaint. The third-party complaint sought the same remedy
as the principal complaint but added a prayer for attorney's fees
and costs without specifying their amounts, thus:
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ON THE THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT
1. That summons be issued against ThirdParty Defendants Araneta Institute of
Agriculture, Jose N. Quedding and Li Ching
Yao;
2. That after hearing, they be sentenced to
indemnify the Third-Party Plaintiffs for
whatever is adjudged against the latter in
favor of the Plaintiffs;
3. That Third-Party Defendants be ordered
to pay attorney's fees as may be proved
during trial;
4. That Third-Party Defendants be ordered
to pay the costs.
Other just and equitable reliefs are also
18
prayed for.
The Answer with Third-Party Complaint was admitted by the
trial court without the requisite payment of filing fees,
19
particularly on the Go's prayer for damages. The trial court
did not award the Go's any damages. It dismissed the thirdparty complaint. The Court of Appeals, however, granted the
third-party complaint in part by ordering third-party defendant
Jose N. Quedding to pay the Go's the sum of P5,000.00 as
attorney's fees.
Contrary to petitioners' claim, the Court of Appeal did not err in
awarding damages despite the Go's failure to specify the
amount prayed for and pay the corresponding additional filing
fees thereon. The claim for attorney's fees refers to damages
arising after the filing of the complaint against the Go's. The
additional filing fee on this claim is deemed to constitute a lien
20
on the judgment award.
The Court of Appeals found that the subject portion is actually
forty-two (42) square meters in area, not forty-five (45), as
initially found by the trial court; that this forty-two (42) square
meter portion is on the entire eastern side of Lot No. 24
belonging to petitioners; that this said portion is found the
concrete fence and pathway that extends from respondent
Winston Go's house on adjacent Lot No. 25; that inclusive of the
subject portion, respondents Go did not gain nor lose any
portion of Lots Nos. 25 and 26; that instead, Lot No. 27, on
which respondent Li Ching Yao built his house, encroached on
the land of respondents Go, gaining in the process thirty-seven
21
(37) square meters of the latter's land.
We hold that the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the thirdparty complaint against AIA.. The claim that the discrepancy in
the lot areas was due to AIA's fault was not proved. The
appellate court, however, found that it was the erroneous
survey by Engineer Quedding that triggered these
discrepancies. And it was this survey that respondent Winston
Go relied upon in constructing his house on his father's land. He
built his house in the belief that it was entirely within the
parameters of his father's land. In short, respondents Go had no
knowledge that they encroached petitioners' lot. They are
22
deemed builders in good faith until the time petitioner
Ballatan informed them of their encroachment on her
23
property.
CIVIL PROCEDURE
Respondent Li Ching Yao built his house on his lot before any of
24
the other parties did. He constructed his house in 1982,
25
respondents Go in 1983, and petitioners in 1985. There is no
evidence, much less, any allegation that respondent Li Ching
Yao was aware that when he built his house he knew that a
portion thereof encroached on respondents Go's adjoining land.
Good faith is always presumed, and upon him who alleges bad
26
faith on the part of a possessor rests the burden of proof.
All the parties are presumed to have acted in good faith. Their
rights must, therefore, be determined in accordance with the
appropriate provisions of the Civil Code on property.
Art. 448 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 448. The owner of the land on which
anything has been built, sown or planted in
good faith, shall have the right to
appropriate as his own the works, sowing or
planting, after payment of the indemnity
27
provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to
oblige the one who built or planted to pay
the price of the land, and the one who
sowed the proper rent. However, the
builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy
the land if its value is considerably more
than that of the building or trees. In such
case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the
owner of the land does not choose to
appropriate the building or trees after
proper indemnity. The parties shall agree
upon the terms of the lease and in case of
disagreement, the court shall fix the terms
thereof.
The owner of the land on which anything has been
built, sown or planted in good faith shall have the
right to appropriate as his own the building, planting
or sowing, after payment to the builder, planter or
sower of the necessary and useful expenses, and in
the proper case, expenses for pure luxury or mere
pleasure. The owner of the land may also oblige the
builder, planter or sower to purchase and pay the
price of the land. If the owner chooses to sell his land,
the builder, planter or sower must purchase the land,
otherwise the owner may remove the improvements
thereon. The builder, planter or sower, however, is
not obliged to purchase the land if its value
considerably more than the building, planting or
sowing. In such case, the builder, planter or sower
must pay rent to the owner of the land. If the parties
cannot come to terms over the conditions of the
lease, the court must fix the terms thereof. The right
to choose between appropriating the improvement or
selling the land on which the improvement stands to
the builder, planter or sower, is given to the owner of
28
the land.
Art. 448 has been applied to improvements or portions of
improvements built by mistaken belief on land belonging to the
29
adjoining owner. The facts of the instant case are similar to
30
those in Cabral v. Ibanez, to wit:
[P]laintiffs Geronima Zabala and her
husband Justino Bernardo, constructed their
house in the belief that it was entirely
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within the area of their own land without
knowing at that time that part of their
house was occupying a 14-square meter
portion of the adjoining lot belonging to the
defendants, and that the defendants
Bernardo M. Cabral and Mamerta M. Cabral
were likewise unaware of the fact that a
portion of plaintiff's house was extending
and occupying a portion of their lot with an
area of 14 square meters. The parties came
to know of the fact that part of the
plaintiff's house was occupying part of
defendant's land when the construction of
plaintiff's house was about to be finished,
after a relocation of the monuments of the
two properties had been made by the U.S.
Army through the Bureau of Lands,
according to their "Stipulation of Facts,"
dated August 17, 1951.
On the basis of these facts, we held that:
The court, therefore, concludes that the
plaintiffs are builders in good faith and the
relative rights of the defendant Mamerta
Cabral as owner of the land and of the
plaintiffs as owners of the building is
governed by Article 361 of the Civil Code (Co
Tao v. Joaquin Chan Chico, 46 Off.
Gaz.5514). Article 361 of the old Civil Code
has been reproduced with an additional
provision in Article 448 of the new Civil
31
Code, approved June 18, 1949.
Similarly, in Grana and Torralba v. Court of Appeals,
that:
32
we held
Although without any legal and valid claim

over the land in question, petitioners,
however, were found by the Court of
Appeals to have constructed a portion of
their house thereon in good faith. Under
Article 361 of the old Civil Code (Article 448
of the new), the owner of the land on which
anything has been built in good faith shall
have the right to appropriate as his own the
building, after payment to the builder of
necessary or useful expenses, and in the
proper case, expenses for pure luxury or
mere pleasure, or to oblige the builder to
pay the price of the land. Respondents, as
owners of the land, have therefore the
choice of either appropriating the portion of
petitioners' house which is on their land
upon payment of the proper indemnity to
petitioners, or selling to petitioners that
part of their land on which stands the
improvement. It may here be pointed out
that it would be impractical for respondents
to choose to exercise the first
alternative, i.e., buy that portion of the
house standing on their land, for in that
event the whole building might be rendered
useless. The more workable solution, it
would seem, is for respondents to sell to
petitioners that part of their land on which
was constructed a portion of the latter's
CIVIL PROCEDURE
house. If petitioners are unwilling or unable
to buy, then they must vacate the land and
must pay rentals until they do so. Of course,
respondents cannot oblige petitioners to
buy the land if its value is considerably more
than that of the aforementioned portion of
the house. If such be the case, then
petitioners must pay reasonable rent. The
parties must come to an agreement as to
the conditions of the lease, and should they
fail to do so, then the court shall fix the
33
same.
In light of these rulings, petitioners, as owners of Lot No. 24,
may choose to purchase the improvement made by
respondents Go on their land, or sell to respondents Go the
subject portion. If buying the improvement is impractical as it
may render the Go's house useless, then petitioners may sell to
respondents Go that portion of Lot No. 24 on which their
improvement stands. If the Go's are unwilling or unable to buy
the lot, then they must vacate the land and, until they vacate,
they must pay rent to petitioners. Petitioners, however, cannot
compel respondents Go to buy the land if its value is
considerably more than the portion of their house constructed
thereon. If the value of the land is much more than the Go's
improvement, the respondents Go must pay reasonable rent. If
they do not agree on the terms of the lease, then they may go
to court to fix the same.
In the event that petitioners elect to sell to respondents Go the
subject portion of their lot, the price must be fixed at the
prevailing market value at the time of payment. The Court of
Appeals erred in fixing the price at the time of taking, which is
the time the improvements were built on the land. The time of
taking is determinative of just compensation in expropriation
proceedings. The instant case is not for expropriation. It is not a
taking by the state of private property for a public purpose
upon payment of just compensation. This is a case of an owner
who has been paying real estate taxes on his land but has been
deprived of the use of a portion of this land for years. It is but
34
fair and just to fix compensation at the time of payment.
Art. 448 and the same conditions abovestated also apply to
respondents Go as owners and possessors of their land and
respondent Li Ching Yao as builder of the improvement that
encroached on thirty-seven (37) square meters of respondents
Go's land.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals
is modified as follows:
(1) Petitioners are ordered to exercise within thirty (30) days
from finality of this decision their option to either buy the
portion of respondents Go's improvement on their Lot No. 24,
or sell to said respondents the portion of their land on which
the improvement stands. If petitioners elect to sell the land or
buy the improvement, the purchase price must be at the
prevailing market price at the time of payment. If buying the
improvement will render respondents Go's house useless, then
petitioners should sell the encroached portion of their land to
respondents Go. If petitioners choose to sell the land but
respondents Go are unwilling or unable to buy, then the latter
must vacate the subject portion and pay reasonable rent from
the time petitioners made their choice up to the time they
actually vacate the premises. But if the value of the land is
considerably more than the value of the improvement, then
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CIVIL PROCEDURE
respondents Go may elect to lease the land, in which case the

parties shall agree upon the terms, the lease. Should they fail to
agree on said terms, the court of origin is directed to fix the
terms of the lease.
From the moment petitioners shall have exercised their option,
respondents Go shall pay reasonable monthly rent up to the
time the parties agree on the terms of the lease or until the
court fixes such terms.
(2) Respondents Go are likewise directed to exercise their rights
as owners of Lots Nos. 25 and 26, vis-a-visrespondent Li Ching
Yao as builder of the improvement that encroached on thirty
seven (37) square meters of respondents Go 's land in
accordance with paragraph one abovementioned.
(3) The Decision of the Court of Appeals ordering Engineer
Quedding, as third-party defendant, to pay attorney's fees of
P5,000.00 to respondents Go is affirmed. The additional filing
fee on the damages constitutes a lien on this award.
(4) The Decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing third-party
complaint against Araneta Institute of Agriculture is affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
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G.R. No. 144934
January 15, 2004
ADELFA S. RIVERA, CYNTHIA S. RIVERA, and JOSE S.

RIVERA, petitioners,
vs.
FIDELA DEL ROSARIO (deceased and substituted by her corespondents), and her children, OSCAR, ROSITA, VIOLETA,
ENRIQUE JR., CARLOS, JUANITO and ELOISA, all surnamed DEL
ROSARIO, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Court of
1
Appeals decision , dated November 29, 1999, in CA-G.R. CV No.
2
60552, which affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 17, in Civil Case No. 151-M93. The RTC granted respondents complaint for nullity of
contract of sale and annulment of the transfer certificates of
title issued in favor of petitioners.
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
Respondents Fidela (now deceased), Oscar, Rosita,
Violeta, Enrique Jr., Carlos, Juanito and Eloisa, all
surnamed Del Rosario, were the registered owners of
Lot No. 1083-C, a parcel of land situated at Lolomboy,
Bulacan. This lot spanned an area of 15,029 square
meters and was covered by TCT No. T-50.668 (M)
registered in the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan.
On May 16, 1983, Oscar, Rosita, Violeta, Enrique Jr., Juanito,
3
and Eloisa, executed a Special Power of Attorney in favor of
their mother and co-respondent, Fidela, authorizing her to sell,
lease, mortgage, transfer and convey their rights over Lot No.
4
1083-C. Subsequently, Fidela borrowed P250,000 from
Mariano Rivera in the early part of 1987. To secure the loan, she
and Mariano Rivera agreed to execute a deed of real estate
mortgage and an agreement to sell the land. Consequently, on
March 9, 1987, Mariano went to his lawyer, Atty. Efren
Barangan, to have three documents drafted: the Deed of Real
5
6
Estate Mortgage , a Kasunduan (Agreement to Sell) , and a
7
Deed of Absolute Sale.
The Kasunduan provided that the children of Mariano Rivera,
herein petitioners Adelfa, Cynthia and Jose, would purchase Lot
No. 1083-C for a consideration of P2,141,622.50. This purchase
price was to be paid in three installments: P250,000 upon the
signing of the Kasunduan, P750,000 on August 31, 1987,
8
and P1,141,622.50 on December 31, 1987. It also provided that
the Deed of Absolute Sale would be executed only after the
second installment is paid and a postdated check for the last
9
installment is deposited with Fidela. As previously stated,
however, Mariano had already caused the drafting of the Deed
of Absolute Sale. But unlike the Kasunduan, the said deed
stipulated a purchase price of only P601,160, and covered a
10
certain Lot No. 1083-A in addition to Lot No. 1083-C. This
deed, as well as the Kasunduan and the Deed of Real Estate
11
Mortgage , was signed by Marianos children, petitioners
Adelfa, Cynthia and Jose, as buyers and mortgagees, on March
12
9, 1987.
The following day, Mariano Rivera returned to the office of Atty.
Barangan, bringing with him the signed documents. He also
CIVIL PROCEDURE
brought with him Fidela and her son Oscar del Rosario, so that
the latter two may sign the mortgage and the Kasunduan there.
Although Fidela intended to sign only the Kasunduan and the
Real Estate Mortgage, she inadvertently affixed her signature
on all the three documents in the office of Atty. Barangan on
the said day, March 10, 1987. Mariano then gave Fidela the
amount of P250,000. On October 30, 1987, he also gave Fidela a
check for P200,000. In the ensuing months, also, Mariano gave
Oscar del Rosario several amounts totaling P67,800 upon the
latters demand for the payment of the balance despite Oscars
lack of authority to receive payments under the
13
Kasunduan. While Mariano was making payments to Oscar,
Fidela entrusted the owners copy of TCT No. T-50.668 (M) to
Mariano to guarantee compliance with the Kasunduan.
14
When Mariano unreasonably refused to return the TCT, one of

the respondents, Carlos del Rosario, caused the annotation on
TCT No. T-50.668 (M) of an Affidavit of Loss of the owners
duplicate copy of the title on September 7, 1992. This
annotation was offset, however, when Mariano registered the
Deed of Absolute Sale on October 13, 1992, and afterwards
caused the annotation of an Affidavit of Recovery of Title on
October 14, 1992. Thus, TCT No. T-50.668 (M) was cancelled,
and in its place was issued TCT No. 158443 (M) in the name of
15
petitioners Adelfa, Cynthia and Jose Rivera.
Meanwhile, the Riveras, representing themselves to be the new
owners of Lot No. 1083-C, were also negotiating with the
tenant, Feliciano Nieto, to rid the land of the latters tenurial
right. When Nieto refused to relinquish his tenurial right over
9,000 sq. m. of the land, the Riveras offered to give 4,500 sq. m.
in exchange for the surrender. Nieto could not resist and he
accepted. Subdivision Plan No. Psd-031404-052505 was then
made on August 12, 1992. Later, it was inscribed on TCT No.
158443 (M), and Lot No. 1083-C was divided into Lots 1083 C-1
16
and 1083 C-2.
To document their agreement with Feliciano Nieto, the Riveras
executed a Kasulatan sa Pagtatakwil ng Karapatan sa
Pagmamay-ari ng Bahagi ng Isang Lagay na Lupa (Written
17
Abdication of Rights over a Portion of a Parcel of Land) on
November 16, 1992. Four days later, they registered the
document with the Registry of Deeds. Two titles were then
issued: TCT No. T-161784 (M) in the name of Nieto, for 4,500 sq.
m. of land, and TCT No. T-161785 (M) in the name of petitioners
Adelfa, Cynthia and Jose Rivera, over the remaining 10,529 sq.
18
m. of land.
19
On February 18, 1993, respondents filed a complaint in the

Regional Trial Court of Malolos, asking that theKasunduan be
rescinded for failure of the Riveras to comply with its
conditions, with damages. They also sought the annulment of
the Deed of Absolute Sale on the ground of fraud, the
cancellation of TCT No. T-161784 (M) and TCT No. T-161785
(M), and the reconveyance to them of the entire property with
20
TCT No. T-50.668 (M) restored.
Respondents claimed that Fidela never intended to enter into a
deed of sale at the time of its execution and that she signed the
said deed on the mistaken belief that she was merely signing
copies of the Kasunduan. According to respondents, the
position where Fidelas name was typed and where she was
supposed to sign her name in theKasunduan was roughly in the
same location where it was typed in the Deed of Absolute Sale.
They argued that given Fidelas advanced age (she was then
meikimouse
CIVIL PROCEDURE
21
around 72 at the time) and the fact that the documents were
stacked one on top of the other at the time of signing, Fidela
could have easily and mistakenly presumed that she was merely
22
signing additional copies of the Kasunduan. They also alleged
that petitioners acquired possession of the TCT through fraud
and machination.
In their defense, petitioners denied the allegations and averred
that the Deed of Absolute Sale was validly entered into by both
parties. According to petitioners, Fidela del Rosario mortgaged
Lot No. 1083-C to their predecessor in interest, Mariano Rivera,
on March 9, 1987. But on the following day Fidela decided to
sell the lot to petitioners forP2,161,622.50. When Mariano
agreed (on the condition that Lot No. 1083-C will be delivered
free from all liens and encumbrances), the Kasunduan was
consequently drawn up and signed. After that, however, Fidela
informed Mariano of the existence of Feliciano Nietos tenancy
right over the lot to the extent of 9,000 sq. m. When Mariano
continued to want the land, albeit on a much lower price of
only P601,160, as he had still to deal with Feliciano Nieto, the
parties drafted the Deed of Absolute Sale on March 10, 1987, to
supersede the Kasunduan.
Petitioners likewise argued that respondents cause of action
had been barred by laches or estoppel since more than four
years has lapsed from the time the parties executed the Deed of
Absolute Sale on March 10, 1987, to the time respondents
instituted their complaint on February 18, 1993.
Petitioners also filed a counterclaim asking for moral and
exemplary damages and the payment of attorneys fees and
costs of suit.
After trial, the RTC ruled in favor of respondents:
WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing,
judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale dated
March 10, 1987 as null and void;
2. Annulling TCT No. T-158443 (M) and TCT
No. T-161785 (M) both in the names of
Adelfa, Cynthia and Jose, all surnamed
Rivera;
3. Declaring the plaintiffs to be the
legitimate owners of the land covered by
TCT No. T-161785 (M) and ordering
defendant Adelfa, Cynthia, and Jose, all
surnamed Rivera, to reconvey the same to
the plaintiffs;
4. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Bulacan
to cancel TCT No. T-161785 (M) and to issue
in its place a new certificate of title in the
name of the plaintiffs as their names appear
in TCT No. T-50.668;
5. Declaring TCT No. T-161784 (M) in the
name of Feliciano Nieto as valid;
6. Ordering the defendant Riveras to pay
the plaintiffs solidarily the following
amounts:
a) P191,246.98 as balance for the

4,500 square-meter portion given
to defendant Feliciano Nieto
b) P200,000.00 as moral damages
c) P50,000.00
damages
as
exemplary
d) P50,000.00 as attorneys fees

e) costs of the suit.
7. Dismissing the counterclaim of the
defendant Riveras;
8. Dismissing the counterclaim and the
crossclaim of defendant Feliciano Nieto.
SO ORDERED.
23
The trial court ruled that Fidelas signature in the Deed of

Absolute Sale was genuine, but found that Fidela never
intended to sign the said deed. Noting the peculiar differences
between the Kasunduan and the Deed of Absolute Sale, the trial
court concluded that the Riveras were guilty of fraud in securing
the execution of the deed and its registration in the Registry of
24
Deeds. This notwithstanding, the trial court sustained the
validity of TCT No. T-161784 (M) in the name of Feliciano Nieto
since there was no fraud proven on Nietos part. The trial court
found him to have relied in good faith on the representations of
ownership of Mariano Rivera. Thus, Nietos rights, according to
the trial court, were akin to those of an innocent purchaser for
25
value.
On the foregoing, the trial court rescinded the Kasunduan but
ruled that the P450,000 paid by petitioners be retained by
respondents as payment for the 4,500 sq. m. portion of Lot No.
26
1083-C that petitioners gave to Nieto. The trial court likewise
ordered petitioners to pay P191,246.98 as balance for the price
of the land given to Nieto, P200,000 as moral damages, P50,000
as exemplary damages, P50,000 as attorneys fees, and the
27
costs of suit.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the trial courts judgment
was modified as follows:
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated March 10, 1987 is declared null
and void only insofar as Lot No. 1083-C is concerned,
but valid insofar as it conveyed Lot No. 1083-A, that
TCT No. 158443 (M) is valid insofar as Lot No. 1083-A
is concerned and should not be annulled, and
increasing the amount to be paid by the defendantsappellants to the plaintiffs-appellees for the 4,500
square meters of land given to Feliciano Nieto
toP323,617.50.
Costs against the defendants-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
28
meikimouse

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this
petition.
While this petition was pending, respondent Fidela del Rosario
died. She was substituted by her children, herein respondents.
In this petition, petitioners rely on the following grounds:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS,
GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AWARDING LOT 1083-A IN
FAVOR OF THE PETITIONERS AND FELICIANO NIETO WHICH IS
ADMITTEDLY A PART AND PORTION OF THE EXISTING NORTH
LUZON EXPRESSWAY AND AS SUCH ACTED WITHOUT OR IN
EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION, OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
JUDICIAL DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION.
II
RESPONDENTS FAILED TO PAY THE CORRECT DOCKET, FILING
AND OTHER LAWFUL FEES WITH THE OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF
COURT OF THE COURT A QUO (RTC, MALOLOS, BULACAN) AT
THE TIME OF THE FILING OF THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT IN 1993
29
PURSUANT TO THE SIOL DOCTRINE.
III
[THE] TRIAL COURT AWARDED RELIEFS NOT SPECIFICALLY
PRAYED FOR IN THE AMENDED COMPLAINT WITHOUT
REQUIRING THE PAYMENT OF THE CORRECT DOCKET, FILING
AND OTHER LAWFUL FEES.
IV
THE COURT A QUO HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE
RESPONDENTS CAUSE OF ACTION AND OVER THE RES
CONSIDERING THAT FELICIANO NIETO IS AN AGRICULTURAL
TENANT OF THE RICELAND IN QUESTION.
V
RESPONDENTS[] MAIN CAUSE OF ACTION [IS] FOR RESCISSION
OF CONTRACT WHICH IS SUBSIDIARY IN NATURE[,] AND
ANNULMENT OF SALE[,] BOTH OF WHICH HAVE ALREADY
PRESCRIBED UNDER ARTICLES 1389 AND 1391 OF THE CIVIL
30
CODE.
Petitioners assignment of errors may be reduced into three
issues: (1) Did the trial court acquire jurisdiction over the case,
despite an alleged deficiency in the amount of filing fees paid by
respondents and despite the fact that an agricultural tenant is
involved in the case? (2) Did the Court of Appeals correctly rule
that the Deed of Absolute Sale is valid insofar as Lot 1083-A is
concerned? (3) Is the respondents cause of action barred by
prescription?
On the first issue, petitioners contend that jurisdiction was not
validly acquired because the filing fees respondents paid was
only P1,554.45 when the relief sought was reconveyance of
land that was worth P2,141,622.50 under the Kasunduan. They
contend that respondents should have paid filing fees
amounting to P12,183.70. In support of their argument,
CIVIL PROCEDURE
petitioners invoke the doctrine in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd.,
31
32
(SIOL) v. Asuncion and attach a certification from the Clerk of
Court of the RTC of Quezon City.
Respondents counter that it is beyond dispute that they paid
the correct amount of docket fees when they filed the
complaint. If the assessment was inadequate, they could not be
faulted because the clerk of court made no notice of demand or
reassessment, respondents argue. Respondents also add that
since petitioners failed to contest the alleged underpayment of
docket fees in the lower court, they cannot raise the same on
33
appeal.
We rule in favor of respondents. Jurisdiction was validly
acquired over the complaint. In Sun Insurance Office, Ltd.,
34
(SIOL) v. Asuncion, this Court ruled that the filing of the
complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading and the payment of
the prescribed docket fee vest a trial court with jurisdiction over
the subject matter or nature of the action. If the amount of
docket fees paid is insufficient considering the amount of the
claim, the clerk of court of the lower court involved or his duly
authorized deputy has the responsibility of making a deficiency
assessment. The party filing the case will be required to pay the
deficiency, but jurisdiction is not automatically lost.
Here it is beyond dispute that respondents paid the full amount
of docket fees as assessed by the Clerk of Court of the Regional
Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 17, where they filed the
complaint. If petitioners believed that the assessment was
incorrect, they should have questioned it before the trial court.
Instead, petitioners belatedly question the alleged
underpayment of docket fees through this petition, attempting
to support their position with the opinion and certification of
the Clerk of Court of another judicial region. Needless to state,
such certification has no bearing on the instant case.
Petitioners also contend that the trial court does not have
jurisdiction over the case because it involves an agricultural
tenant. They insist that by virtue of Presidential Decree Nos.
35
316 and 1038, it is the Department of Agrarian Reform
36
Adjudication Board (DARAB) that has jurisdiction.
Petitioners contention lacks merit. The DARAB has exclusive
original jurisdiction over cases involving the rights and
obligations of persons engaged in the management, cultivation
and use of all agricultural lands covered by the Comprehensive
37
Agrarian Reform Law. However, the cause of action in this
case is primarily against the petitioners, as indispensable
parties, for rescission of the Kasunduan and nullification of the
Deed of Sale and the TCTs issued because of them. Feliciano
Nieto was impleaded merely as a necessary party, stemming
from whatever rights he may have acquired by virtue of the
agreement between him and the Riveras and the corresponding
TCT issued. Hence, it is the regular judicial courts that have
jurisdiction over the case.
On the second issue, contrary to the ruling of the Court of
Appeals that the Deed of Absolute Sale is void only insofar as it
covers Lot No. 1083-C, we find that the said deed is void in its
entirety. Noteworthy is that during the oral arguments before
the Court of Appeals, both petitioners and respondents
admitted that Lot No. 1083-A had been expropriated by the
government long before the Deed of Absolute Sale was entered
38
into. Whats more, this case involves only Lot No. 1083-C. It
never involved Lot 1083-A. Thus, the Court of Appeals had no
meikimouse

jurisdiction to adjudicate on Lot 1083-A, as it was never touched
39
upon in the pleadings or made the subject of evidence at trial.
40
41
As to the third issue, petitioners cite Articles 1383, 1389 and

42
1391 of the New Civil Code. They submit that the complaint
for rescission of the Kasunduan should have been dismissed, for
respondents failure to prove that there was no other legal
means available to obtain reparation other than to file a case
for rescission, as required by Article 1383. Moreover,
petitioners contend that even assuming respondents had
satisfied this requirement, prescription had already set in, the
complaint having been filed in 1992 or five years after the
execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale in March 10, 1987.
Respondents counter that Article 1383 of the New Civil Code
applies only to rescissible contracts enumerated under Article
1381 of the same Code, while the cause of action in this case is
for rescission of a reciprocal obligation, to which Article
43
1191 of the Code applies. They assert that their cause of
action had not prescribed because the four-year prescriptive
period is counted from the date of discovery of the fraud,
which, in this case, was only in 1992.
Rescission of reciprocal obligations under Article 1191 of the
New Civil Code should be distinguished from rescission of
contracts under Article 1383 of the same Code. Both
presuppose contracts validly entered into as well as subsisting,
and both require mutual restitution when proper, nevertheless
44
they are not entirely identical.
In countless times there has been confusion between rescission
under Articles 1381 and 1191 of the Civil Code. Through this
case we again emphasize that rescission of reciprocal
obligations under Article 1191 is different from rescissible
contracts under Chapter 6 of the law on contracts under the
45
Civil Code. While Article 1191 uses the term rescission, the
original term used in Article 1124 of the old Civil Code, from
46
which Article 1191 was based, was resolution. Resolution is a
principal action that is based on breach of a party, while
rescission under Article 1383 is a subsidiary action limited to
cases of rescission for lesion under Article 1381 of the New Civil
47
Code, which expressly enumerates the following rescissible
contracts:
ART. 1381. The following contracts are rescissible:
(1) Those which are entered into by
guardians whenever the wards whom they
represent suffer lesion by more than onefourth of the value of the things which are
the object thereof;
(2) Those agreed upon in representation of
absentees, if the latter suffer the lesion
stated in the preceding number;
(3) Those undertaken in fraud of creditors
when the latter cannot in any other manner
collect the claims due them;
(4) Those which refer to things under
litigation if they have been entered into by
the defendant without the knowledge and
approval of the litigants or of competent
judicial authority;
CIVIL PROCEDURE
(5) All other contracts specially declared by
law to be subject to rescission.
Obviously, the Kasunduan does not fall under any of those
situations mentioned in Article 1381. Consequently, Article
1383 is inapplicable. Hence, we rule in favor of the respondents.
May the contract entered into between the parties, however,
be rescinded based on Article 1191?
A careful reading of the Kasunduan reveals that it is in the
nature of a contract to sell, as distinguished from a contract of
sale. In a contract of sale, the title to the property passes to the
vendee upon the delivery of the thing sold; while in a contract
to sell, ownership is, by agreement, reserved in the vendor and
is not to pass to the vendee until full payment of the purchase
48
price. In a contract to sell, the payment of the purchase price
49
is a positive suspensive condition, the failure of which is not a
breach, casual or serious, but a situation that prevents the
obligation of the vendor to convey title from acquiring an
50
obligatory force.
Respondents in this case bound themselves to deliver a deed of
absolute sale and clean title covering Lot No. 1083-C after
petitioners have made the second installment. This promise to
sell was subject to the fulfillment of the suspensive condition
that petitioners pay P750,000 on August 31, 1987, and deposit a
postdated
check
for
the
third
installment
51
of P1,141,622.50. Petitioners, however, failed to complete
payment of the second installment. The non-fulfillment of the
condition rendered the contract to sell ineffective and without
force and effect. It must be stressed that the breach
contemplated in Article 1191 of the New Civil Code is the
obligors failure to comply with an obligation already extant, not
a failure of a condition to render binding that
52
obligation. Failure to pay, in this instance, is not even a breach
but an event that prevents the vendors obligation to convey
53
title from acquiring binding force. Hence, the agreement of
the parties in the instant case may be set aside, but not because
of a breach on the part of petitioners for failure to complete
payment of the second installment. Rather, their failure to do
so prevented the obligation of respondents to convey title from
54
acquiring an obligatory force.
Coming now to the matter of prescription. Contrary to
petitioners assertion, we find that prescription has not yet set
in. Article 1391 states that the action for annulment of void
contracts shall be brought within four years. This period shall
begin from the time the fraud or mistake is discovered. Here,
the fraud was discovered in 1992 and the complaint filed in
1993. Thus, the case is well within the prescriptive period.
On the matter of damages, the Court of Appeals awarded
respondents P323,617.50 as actual damages for the loss of the
land that was given to Nieto, P200,000 as moral
damages, P50,000 as exemplary damages, P50,000 as attorneys
fees and the costs of suit. Modifications are in order, however.
Moral damages may be recovered in cases where one willfully
causes injury to property, or in cases of breach of contract
where the other party acts fraudulently or in bad
55
faith. Exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or
56
correction for the public good, when the party to a contract
acts in a wanton, fraudulent, oppressive or malevolent
57
manner. Attorneys fees are allowed when exemplary
meikimouse
CIVIL PROCEDURE
damages are awarded and when the party to a suit is compelled

58
to incur expenses to protect his interest.
While it has been sufficiently proven that the respondents are
entitled to damages, the actual amounts awarded by the lower
court must be reduced because damages are not intended for a
59
litigants enrichment, at the expense of the petitioners. The
purpose for the award of damages other than actual damages
would be served, in this case, by reducing the amounts
awarded.
Respondents were amply compensated through the award of
actual damages, which should be sustained. The other damages
awarded total P300,000, or almost equivalent to the amount of
actual damages. Practically this will double the amount of actual
damages awarded to respondents. To avoid breaching the
doctrine on enrichment, award for damages other than actual
should be reduced. Thus, the amount of moral damages should
be set at only P30,000, and the award of exemplary damages at
only P20,000. The award of attorneys fees should also be
reduced to P20,000, which under the circumstances of this case
appears justified and reasonable.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is
MODIFIED. The Deed of Absolute Sale in question is declared
NULL and VOID in its entirety. Petitioners are ORDERED to pay
respondents P323,617.50 as actual damages, P30,000.00 as
moral
damages, P20,000.00
as
exemplary
damages
and P20,000.00 as attorneys fees. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
meikimouse

G.R. No. 139303 August 25, 2005
Cipriano Enriquez, Raymundo Enriquez, Concepcion Enriquez,
assisted by her husband Matias Quitanes, Tomas Enriquez,
Luis Diaz, Cesar Diaz, Manuel Diaz, Domingo Enriquez, Elpidio
Enriquez, Filipina Enriquez, Casimira Dizon, Saturnino Dizon,
Jose Ramos, Amado Mislang, Antonio Quitaneg, Villamor
Quitaneg, Jimmy Clavo, Oscar Laborce, Sevilla Pizarro, Angelita
Pizzaro, Isidro Rico, Pio Famisan, Pantaleon Abille, Beinvenido
Corum, Martina Hisole, Erna D. Enriquez, assisted by her
husband Ritchie Flauta, and Ignacio Enriquez, Jr., Petitioners,
vs.
MAXIMO ENRIQUEZ (now deceased), substituted by CARMEN
AGANA, IGMIDIO ENRIQUEZ, CONCEPCION ENRIQUEZ,
CIPRIANO
ENRIQUEZ,
DIONISIONENRIQUEZ,
MAXIMO
ENRIQUEZ, CLEOFE ENRIQUEZ, TOMAS ENRIQUEZ, RAYMUNDO
ENRIQUEZ and NICOLAS ENRIQUEZ, Respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Assailed in the instant petition for review on certiorari are the
Resolutions dated February 3, 1999 and July 7, 1999 issued by
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV UDK-7011 dismissing the
appeal of petitioners for their failure to pay the appellate court
docket fee.
On November 17, 1988, Maximo Enriquez, later substituted by
his heirs (now respondents), filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 71 of Iba, Zambales a complaint for partition
against petitioners, docketed as Civil Case No. RTC-568-1. The
complaint involves a parcel of land situated at Amungan, Iba,
same province, covered by TCT No. T-28593, with an area of
44,984 square meters. He alleged that he owns 10/18 undivided
portion of the property, 9/18 by purchase and 1/18 by
inheritance; and that petitioners have been residing in the
premises without his knowledge and consent, thereby depriving
him of his undivided share of the property.
CIVIL PROCEDURE
"Per copy of the official receipt attached to appellants motion
for reconsideration, the docket fee was paid on November 4,
1998 or 4 months after the notice of appeal was filed on July 3,
1998.
Consequently, appellants motion for reconsideration is hereby
denied."
In the instant petition for review, petitioners raise the following
errors allegedly committed by the Appellate Court:
"I. The respondent Court of Appeals seriously erred in
considering petitioners appeal as deemed abandoned and
dismissed for alleged failure of petitioners to pay docket fee.
II. the respondent Court of Appeals gravely erred in denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration of the resolution
considering petitioners appeal as deemed abandoned and
dismissed on the ground that the docket fee was paid on
November 4, 1998, or four (4) months after the notice of appeal
was filed on July 3, 1998.
III. the respondent Court of Appeals in issuing the aforesaid
resolutions gave premium on technicalities rather on substance
and substantial justice and disregarded the merits of
petitioners case."
In sum, the issue is whether the Court of Appeals correctly
dismissed the petition for failure of the petitioners to pay
appellate court docket fee.
In dismissing petitioners appeal, the Court of Appeals cited
Section 1(c), Rule 50 of the Revised Rules of Court which
provides:
"Section 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. An appeal may be
dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on its own motion or on that
of the appellee, on the following grounds:
Petitioners, in their answer, averred that Cipriano Enriquez, one

of the petitioners, owns of the property, while the others are
in possession of the other areas with his knowledge and
consent.
xxx
On June 4, 1998, the RTC rendered a Decision ordering the

petitioners to vacate the property and to surrender possession
thereof to respondents.
Petitioners admit that the governing Rule on their payment of

appellate court docket fee is Section 4, Rule 41 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which provides:
A copy of the Decision was received by counsel for petitioners

on June 22, 1998. On July 3, 1998, they filed a Notice of Appeal
with the RTC. It was approved on July 7, 1998.
"Section 4. Appellate court docket and other lawful fees.

Within the period for taking an appeal, the appellantshall pay to
the clerk of the court which rendered the judgment or final
order appealed from, the full amount of the appellate court
docket and other lawful fees. Proof of payment of said fees shall
be transmitted to the appellate court together with the original
record of the record or the record on appeal."
On February 3, 1999, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal

of petitioners for their failure to pay the appellate court docket
fee, thus:
"For failure to pay docket fee, the appeal is deemed
ABANDONED and DISMISSED, pursuant to Section 1(c), Rule 50,
Revised Rules of Court."
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied
by the Appellate Court in a Resolution dated July 7, 1999, thus:
(c) Failure of the appellant to pay the docket and other lawful
fees as provided in Section 4 of Rule 41."
Underscoring the sentence "Proof of payment of said fees shall

be transmitted to the appellate court together with the original
record or the record on appeal," petitioners maintain that the
trial court must first send them a notice to pay the appellate
court docket fee and other lawful fees within the period for
taking an appeal. Hence, they waited for the notice for them to
pay the appellate court docket fee. When they did not receive
any, they paid the docket fee to the trial court. Consequently,
meikimouse

they cannot be faulted if they paid the appellate court docket
fee four (4) months after their Notice of Appeal was approved
on July 7, 1998.
Prior to the effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, payment of appellate court docket fee is not a
prerequisite for the perfection of an appeal. In Santos vs. Court
1
of Appeals, this Court held that although an appeal fee is
required to be paid in case of an appeal taken from the
Municipal Trial Court to the Regional Trial Court, it is not a
prerequisite for the perfection of an appeal under Sections
2
3
20 and 23 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines issued by this
Court on January 11, 1983 implementing the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1981 (B.P. Blg. 129). Under these
sections, there are only two requirements for the perfection of
an appeal, to wit: (a) the filing with the trial court of a notice of
appeal within the reglementary period; and (b) the expiration of
the last day to appeal by any party.
However, the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which
took effect on July 1, 1997, now require that appellate docket
and other lawful fees must be paid within the same period for
taking an appeal. This is clear from the opening sentence of
Section 4, Rule 41 of the same Rules that, "(W)ithin the period
for taking an appeal, the appellant shall pay to the clerk of the
court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed
from, the full amount of the appellate court docket and other
lawful fees."
The use of the word "shall" underscores the mandatory
character of the Rule. The term "shall" is a word of command,
and one which has always or which must be given a compulsory
meaning,
and
it
is
generally
imperative
or
4
mandatory. Petitioners cannot give a different interpretation
to the Rule and insist that payment of docket fee shall be made
only upon their receipt of a notice from the trial court to pay.
For it is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the
statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e.,
that every part of the statute must be interpreted together with
the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of
5
the whole enactment. Indeed, petitioners cannot deviate from
the Rule.
Also under Rule 41 of the same Rules, an appeal to the Court of
Appeals from a case decided by the RTC in the exercise of the
latters original jurisdiction, shall be taken within fifteen (15)
days from the notice of judgment or final order appealed from.
Such appeal is made by filing a notice thereof with the court
that rendered the judgment or final order and by serving a copy
of that notice upon the adverse party. Furthermore, within this
same period, appellant shall pay to the clerk of court which
rendered the judgment or final order appealed from, the full
amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees. The
payment of docket fee within this period is mandatory for the
perfection of appeal. Otherwise, the appellate court would not
be able to act on the subject matter of the action, and the
decision sought to be appealed from becomes final and
6
executory.
CIVIL PROCEDURE
Petitioners argue that the Appellate Court, in issuing the
assailed Resolutions, gave premium to technicalities rather than
substance and disregarded the merits of the petition. They ask
for a liberal construction of the Rules.
Appeal is not a right but a statutory privilege, thus, appeal must
be made strictly in accordance with the provision set by law.
The requirement of the law under Section 4, Rule 41 is clear.
The payment of appellate docket fee is not a mere technicality
of law or procedure but an essential requirement for the
8
perfection of an appeal.
The payment of the docket fee within the period is a
condition sine qua non for the perfection of an appeal. Contrary
to petitioners submission, the payment of the appellate court
docket and other lawful fees is not a mere technicality of law or
procedure. It is an essential requirement, without which the
decision or final order appealed from would become final and
9
executory as if no appeal was filed at all.
This Court has consistently ruled that litigation is not a game of
technicalities and that every case must be prosecuted in
accordance with the prescribed procedure so that issues may
be properly presented and justly resolved. The rules of
procedure must be faithfully followed except only when, for
persuasive and weighting reasons, they may be relaxed to
relieve a litigant of an injustice commensurate with his failure to
comply within the prescribed procedure. Concomitant to a
liberal interpretation of the rules of procedure should be an
effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to adequately
10
explain his failure to abide by the rules. Anyone seeking
exemption from the application of the Rule has the burden of
proving that exceptionally meritorious instances exist which
11
warrant such departure.
In the present case, petitioners failed to establish any sufficient
and satisfactory reason to warrant a relaxation of the
mandatory rule on the payment of appellate court docket fee.
Actually, the payment of the required docket fee was late
because of the erroneous interpretation of the Rule by
petitioners counsel. Verily, to grant their petition would be
putting a premium on his ignorance or lack of knowledge of
existing Rules. He should be reminded that it is his duty to keep
abreast of legal developments and prevailing laws, rules and
12
legal principles, otherwise his clients will be prejudiced, as in
this case.
In fine, the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing
petitioners appeal.
WHEREFORE,
the
instant
petition
for
on certiorari is DENIED. Costs against petitioners.
review
SO ORDERED.
Time and again, this Court has consistently held that payment
of docket fee within the prescribed period is mandatory for the
perfection of an appeal. Without such payment, the appellate
court does not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the action and the decision sought to be appealed from
7
becomes final and executory.
meikimouse

G.R. No. L-17444
June 30, 1962
MARIA
ELLI,
ET
AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
JUAN DITAN, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Teodosio
Dio,
Jr.
for
plaintiffs-appellees.
Fernando P. Gerona, Sr. for defendants-appellants.
PAREDES, J.:
In a Forcible Entry case instituted by Juan Elli and Maria Elli, in
the Justice of the Peace Court of Bacon, Sorsogon, against Juan
Ditan and Marcial Bronola, judgement was rendered, after due
hearing, the dispositive portion of which reads
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the defendant is
ordered to return the land and restore the plaintiffs in
their original possession of the land; pay the plaintiffs
P200.00 as damages and P100.00 as attorney's fees
and pay the costs of this suit.
Plaintiffs and defendants were furnished with copies of the
above judgment on July 17, 1959.
On July 28, 1959, the defendants, thru Atty. Fernando Gerona,
Jr., "Attorney for defendants-appellants", filed with the said
Justice of the Peace Court, a Notice of Appeal. The record of the
case was received by the CFI on August 6, same year. On August
11, 1959, a Notice of Appealed Case was sent by the Clerk,
Court of First Instance, to the parties, which were received on
August 15 and 17, by Maria Elli and Juan Ditan, respectively, and
on September 18, 1959, by Marcial Broola. In spite of receipt
by the parties, the defendants failed to file their Answer to the
Complaint, which was deemed reproduced. Under date of
December 23, 1959, the plaintiffs, thru counsel, presented a
Motion to Declare Defendants in Default and to set date for
presentation of Evidence. The CFI declared defendants in
default on January 7, 1960. On March 10, 1960, after hearing
wherein the plaintiffs presented oral as well as documentary
evidence, the CFI rendered the following judgment
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby sentences the
defendants to vacate the premises and return the
possession thereof to the plaintiffs. They are hereby
senteced jointly and severally to pay the plaintiffs the
sum of P480.00 as damages. The Court cannot grant
the plaintiffs a greater amount than this, because the
defendant are defaulted. The defendants shall pay the
costs of this action.
Copies of the above decision were received by the defendants,
on April 5, 1960. On April 20, 1960, defendants thru counsel,
presented a pleading captioned "Motion to Reconsider Decision
dated March 10, 1960", where, in the main, it was contended
that the reason for the failure to file Answer was due to lack of
notice to counsel. The defendants claim that inasmuch as they
were represented by counsel, notice should have been sent to
said counsel, and there being no notice to him, there is no
service in law and, therefore, they can not be in default. On
May 6, 1960, the court a quo handed down an Order denying
the motion, stating that there was no need to send the notice
to counsel, since in appeals from the Justice of the Peace
Courts, no summons is necessary in order that defendant may
have to file Answer, and that the notice of receipt of appealed
CIVIL PROCEDURE
case may be either sent to the attorney or the party. This Order
is now before Us on appeal, defendants claiming that it was
error on the part of the lower court to consider that notice to
them was sufficient.
The provisions of the rules pertinent to the issues raised by the
parties the Sec. 2, of Rule 27, and Sec. 7, Rule 40, which are
reproduced below:
Sec. 2. Every order required by its terms to be served,
every pleading subsequent to the complaint, every
written motion other than one which may be
heard ex-parte, and every written notice, appearance,
demand, offer of judgment or similar papers shall be
filed with the court, and served upon the parties
affected thereby. If any of such parties has appeared
by an attorney or attorneys, service upon him shall be
made upon his attorneys or one of them, unless
service upon the party himself is ordered by the court.
Where one attorney appears for several parties, he
shall only be entitled to one copy of any paper served
upon him by the opposite side. (Rule 27).
SEC. 7. Upon the docketing of the cause under appeal,
the complaint filed in the justice of the peace or
municipal court shall be considered reproduced in the
Court of First Instance and it shall be the duty of the
clerk of the court to notify the parties of that fact by
registered mail, and the period for making an answer
shall begin with the date of the receipt of such notice
by the defendant. (Rule 40).
Under the above provisions, therefore, it would seem quite
clear that service, notice, and the like, should be made on the
party, if not represented by counsel. The moment a party
appears by counsel, notice and other processes should be made
upon said counsel, service upon the party himself not being
considered service in law. It is true that under Sec. 7, Rule 40,
the Rule requires that notification be made on the parties by
registered mail. The wordparties as used in said provision,
should not, however, be interpreted to mean the parties
themselves. The word "parties" is used because, more often
than not, in the Justice of the Peace Court, the parties are not
represented by a lawyer. A party can appear in his own behalf,
and notice to him would be sufficient. The moment an attorney
appears for any party, notice should be given to the former. ". . .
where a party appears by attorney in an action or proceeding in
a court of record all notices thereafter required to be given in
the action or proceeding must be given to the attorney and not
to the client; and a notice given to the client and not to his
attorney is not a notice in law." (Palad v. Cui, et al., 28 Phil. 44).
In legal contemplation, therefore, and under the facts of the
present case, there was no legal service of the notice, and the
defendants could not be in default.
The Order appealed from, is hereby set aside. The case is
remanded for further and appropriate proceedings in the
premises. No costs.1wph1.t
meikimouse

G.R. No. L-18891
November 28, 1964
PEOPLE'S HOMESITE and HOUSING CORPORATION, plaintiffappellee,

vs.
MELCHOR TIONGCO and MELCHOR ESCASA, defendantsappellants.
Bonifacio Abaya and Antonio E. Buenaventura for plaintiffappellee.
Ciriaco C. Sayson for defendants-appellants.
PAREDES, J.:
Appellants Melchor Tiongco and Melchor Escasa were
registered squatters of lot No. 23 Block No. E-156, containing an
area of about 460 sq. meters. Since 1947, long before the
plaintiff People's Homesite & Housing Corporation (PHHC for
short) declared a parcel of land embraced in TCT 1356 of the
Quezon City Register of Deeds, for subdivision purposes (a
portion of which is the lot in question), appellants were already
occupying the portion and have introduced improvements
thereon (a house of strong materials) and had declared the
property for taxation purposes. In the census list of the
corporation, the appellant were considered as bonafide
occupants of the property. During the same period also, they
had applied to purchase the property from the PHHC They
found out later, that the same had already been awarded to
Asuncion Enverga, a relative of a Congressman, in spite of the
fact that she had not occupied the property at any time, nor
introduced any improvements thereon. Immediately upon the
discovery of the award a complaint was lodged by Tiongco and
Escasa with the appellee PHHC After a preliminary investigation
of the complaint, Eugenio Alvarado, Jr., Chief of Investigation &
Research Section, PHHC Investigating Committee
...
believes
that prima-facie case
exists
against respondent squatter/awardee and respectfully
indorses the case to the Honorable investigating
Committee for appropriate action.
On July 13, 1960 another investigation was conducted, this time
by one Panfilo T. Bajade, who thereafter submitted a report,
with the following "Remarks and Recommendations", to wit:
In the above-mentioned lot, there are two bonafide
squatters since 1949 and introduced improvements
therein. That their names were included in the list of
bonafide squatters during the census by the PHHC.
That the complainant is capable of paying the lot, he
being interested in Lot 23, Block 156.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
In my honest belief and ability I firmly believed that
the complainant has the priority rights to purchase
the lot for the simple reason that they were the
pioneers of the place. Besides they are willing and
able to pay the amount to the PHHC, anytime it is
demanded
It is therefore respectfully submitted to the Executive
Committee to render their sound judgment to the
abovementioned case.
CIVIL PROCEDURE
No action was taken on the report. On June 29, 1960, however,
four (4) months after the filing of the complaint, the PHHC
instituted with the CFI of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, an action
for Recovery of Possession (Civil Case No. Q-5227). After the
issues have been joined, with the appellant interposing the
Special Defense of Priority of right to purchase, and ability to
pay, as found by no less than the investigators of the appellee
PHHC, the case was set for hearing on February 7, 1961.
Defendants-appellants' counsel, Atty. Bonifacio Taega failed to
notify appellants of the scheduled hearing and the case was
heard, in their absence and plaintiff introduced evidence
showing ownership of the property. On February 24, 1961,
judgment was rendered pertinent portions of which are
reproduced hereunder, to wit:
It appears from the evidence adduced that plaintiff is
a corporation duly organized and existing under and
by virtue of the laws of the Philippines; that plaintiff is
the owner of a parcel of land situated in Quezon City
and more particularly described as Lot No. 23, Block
No. E-156, East Ave. Subdivision, this city and covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1356 of the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City; that sometime in
the year 1954 the defendants without the knowledge
and consent of the plaintiff entered upon and
thereafter constructed their houses on portion of the
land referred to therein depriving the plaintiff of the
possession thereof; ... .
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering
the defendants and all persons claiming under them
to vacate the premises in question; to remove their
houses and other improvements thereon and to pay
the plaintiff the sum of P26.70 per month from the
date of occupation until, the premises in question is
restored to the plaintiff; to pay the attorney's fees in
the amount of P200.00 plus costs.
Although the above judgment was received by counsel for the
appellants, he never informed the latter about the matter.
Neither did he take steps to protect the interests of his clients,
by presenting a motion for reconsideration and/or filing a
petition to set aside judgment. Appellants only came to know
that an adverse decision had been promulgated when on May
12, 1961, the Deputy Sheriff of Quezon City, served them a copy
of writ of execution ordering them to vacate the premises and
to pay the amounts ordained therein. Appellants lost no time in
contacting their counsel, Atty. Taega, and failing to do so, they
engaged the services of Atty. Ciriaco Sayson, who presented
with the lower Court a Petition for Relief from Judgment,
accompanied by affidavits of merit. The Presiding Judge cited
Atty. Taega to appear before him, because of the seriousness
of the charges. Atty. Taega admitted to the court that he did
not inform the appellants of the hearing, as he forgot all about
the same; that he received the decision but did not also inform
the appellants about it, because he forgot all about the case,
explaining that he had so many ejectment cases then, that the
orders and decisions in the case just escaped his attention.
Plaintiff PHHC interposed an opposition to the Petition for Relief
claiming, in the main, that the same was filed out of time,
because the decision was received by former counsel on March
7, 1961, and the petition was presented only on May 9, 1961.
meikimouse

Under date of June 17, 1961, the court a quo issued an order
denying the petition for relief, the pertinent excerpts thereof
reading as follows:
From the foregoing it is therefore very clear that the
petition for relief from judgment was presented
beyond the reglementary period of 60 days from the
date defendants' attorney received copy of the
decision which was, as above-stated on March 7, 1961
to May 9, 1961 when the petition for relief was filed
more than 60 days has elapsed. It is a constant
doctrine laid down by our Supreme Court, not to cite
any particular one, that notice to the attorney of a
party litigant is equivalent to a notice to the party
itself represented by said attorney and the mistake or
negligence of an attorney is binding upon his client. As
pointed to by our Supreme Court in its numerous
decisions, if such ground would be admitted as reason
for reopening a case or set aside the decision, there
would be no end to a suit so long as new counsel
could be employed and could show that the prior
counsel had not been sufficiently diligent or
inexperienced or learned.
The above judgment is now before Us on appeal posing the
following propositions:
(1) Whether the petition for relief from judgment was
filed within the reglementary period; and
CIVIL PROCEDURE
circumstances; otherwise, in the court's desire to make a short
cut of the proceedings, it might foster, wittingly or unwittingly,
dangerous collusions to the detriment of justice. It would then
be easy for one lawyer to sell one's rights down the river, by
just alleging that he just forgot every process of the court
affecting his clients, because he was so busy. Under this
circumstance, one should not insist that a notice to such
irresponsible lawyer is also a notice to his clients.
Moreover, the petition for relief from judgment under
consideration, may even be considered as one for relief from
the order of execution, which was filed within the reglementary
period, inasmuch as Section 2 of Rule 38, Revised Rules, does
not only refer to judgments, but also to orders, or any other
proceedings.
The very allegations in the petition for relief and affidavits and
other documents attached thereto, justify the return of the case
to the court of origin so that, in the interest of justice,
appellants may be given a chance to prove their defenses.
The attention of the trial court is invited to the censurable
conduct of Atty. Bonifacio Taega in this particular case, and to
take such action as may be warranted in the premises.
CONFORMABLY WITH THE FOREGOING, the order of the lower
court dated July 17, 1961, is hereby set aside and another
entered, remanding the case to the court of origin for further
proceedings, and thereafter to render judgment accordingly.
With costs against appellee PHHC, in both instances.
(2) Whether under the circumstances the acts of

appellants' former counsel should bind them.
Viewed from the strictly legal perspective, it appears that the
petition was presented outside the reglementary period of sixty
(60) days from notice of the judgment. Nevertheless due to the
very peculiar circumstances obtaining in the premises, We
consider that the rule was substantially complied with and the
petition for relief from judgment was seasonably filed. The rules
should receive liberal interpretation in order to promote their
object and to assist the parties in obtaining a just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of every action. Procedural
technicality, should not be made a bar to the vindication of a
legitimate grievance. When such technicality "deserts from
being an aid to justice," the Courts are justified in excepting
from its operation a particular case, We find no better
opportunity to apply this prerogative than in the case at bar.
There was something fishy and suspicious concerning the
actuations of former counsel Atty. Taega in this case. He did
not give any significance at all, to the processes of the court,
which has proven prejudicial to the rights of his clients. There
was nothing which could have prevented the appellants from
attending the trial of the case themselves, or moving for a
reconsideration of the decision or taking the necessary appeal
from the judgment, if only their counsel had informed them of
the court's processes. Counsel had simply ignored the rights of
his clients by giving a lame and flimsy explanation that the
court's processes just escaped his attention. He deprived them
of their day in court.
There should be no dispute regarding the doctrine that
normally notice to counsel is notice to parties, and that such
doctrine has beneficient effects upon the prompt dispensation
of justice. Its application to a given case, however, should be
looked into and adopted, according to the surrounding
meikimouse

G.R. No. 89070 May 18, 1992
BENGUET
ELECTRlC
COOPERATIVE,
INC., petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, PETER COSALAN
and BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF BENGUET ELECTRIC
COOPERATIVE, INC., * respondents.
Raymundo W. Celino for respondent Peter Cosalan.
Reenan Orate for respondent Board of Directors of BENECO.
FELICIANO, J.:
Private respondent Peter Cosalan was the General Manager of
Petitioner Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. ("Beneco"), having
been elected as such by the Board of Directors of Beneco, with
the approval of the National Electrification Administrator, Mr.
Pedro Dumol, effective 16 October 1982.
On 3 November 1982, respondent Cosalan received Audit
Memorandum No. 1 issued by the Commission on Audit
("COA"). This Memorandum noted that cash advances received
by officers and employees of petitioner Beneco in the amount
of P129,618.48 had been virtually written off in the books of
Beneco. In the Audit Memorandum, the COA directed petitioner
Beneco to secure the approval of the National Electrification
Administration ("NEA") before writing off or condoning those
cash advances, and recommended the adoption of remedial
measures.
On 12 November 1982, COA issued another Memorandum
Audit Memorandum No. 2 addressed to respondent Peter
Cosalan, inviting attention to the fact that the audit of per
diems and allowances received by officials and members of the
Board of Directors of Beneco showed substantial
inconsistencies with the directives of the NEA. The Audit
Memorandum once again directed the taking of immediate
action in conformity with existing NEA regulations.
On 19 May 1983, petitioner Beneco received the COA Audit
Report on the financial status and operations of Beneco for the
eight (8) month period ended 30 September 1982. This Audit
Report noted and enumerated irregularities in the utilization of
funds amounting to P37 Million released by NEA to Beneco, and
recommended that appropriate remedial action be taken.
Having been made aware of the serious financial condition of
Beneco and what appeared to be mismanagement, respondent
Cosalan initiated implementation of the remedial measures
recommended by the COA. The respondent members of the
Board of Beneco reacted by adopting a series of resolutions
during the period from 23 June to 24 July 1984. These Board
Resolutions abolished the housing allowance of respondent
Cosalan; reduced his salary and his representation and
commutable allowances; directed him to hold in abeyance all
pending personnel disciplinary actions; and struck his name out
as a principal signatory to transactions of petitioner Beneco.
During the period from 28 July to 25 September 1984, the
respondent Beneco Board members adopted another series of
resolutions which resulted in the ouster of respondent Cosalan
as General Manager of Beneco and his exclusion from
CIVIL PROCEDURE
performance of his regular duties as such, as well as the
withholding of his salary and allowances. These resolutions
were as follows:
1. Resolution No. 91-4 dated 28 July 1984:
. . . that the services of
Peter M. Cosalan as
General Manager of
BENECO is terminated
upon approval of the
National Electrification
Administration;
2. Resolution No. 151-84 dated September
15, 1984;
. . . that Peter M.
Cosalan
is
hereby
suspended from his
position as General
Manager of the Benguet
Electric Cooperative, Inc.
(BENECO) effective as of
the start of the office
hours on September 24,
1984, until a final
decision
has
been
reached by the NEA on
his dismissal;
. . . that GM Cosalan's
suspension from office
shall remain in full force
and effect until such
suspension is sooner
lifted,
revoked
or
rescinded by the Board
of Directors; that all
monies due him are
withheld until cleared;
3. Resolution No. 176-84 dated September
25, 1984;
. . . that Resolution No.
151-84,
dated
September 15, 1984
stands as preventive
suspension for GM Peter
1
M. Cosalan.
Respondent Cosalan nevertheless continued to work as General
Manager of Beneco, in the belief that he could be suspended or
removed only by duly authorized officials of NEA, in accordance
with provisions of P.D. No, 269, as amended by P.D. No. 1645
(the statute creating the NEA, providing for its capitalization,
powers and functions and organization), the loan agreement
2
between NEA and petitioner Beneco and the NEA
3
Memorandum of 2 July 1980. Accordingly, on 5 October and
10 November 1984, respondent Cosalan requested petitioner
Beneco to release the compensation due him. Beneco, acting
through respondent Board members, denied the written
request of respondent Cosalan.
meikimouse

Respondent Cosalan then filed a complaint with the National
Labor Relations Commission ("NLRC") on 5 December 1984
against respondent members of the Beneco Board, challenging
the legality of the Board resolutions which ordered his
suspension and termination from the service and demanding
payment of his salaries and allowances. On 18 February 1985,
Cosalan amended his complaint to implead petitioner Beneco
and respondent Board members, the latter in their respective
dual capacities as Directors and as private individuals.
In the course of the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter,
Cosalan filed a motion for reinstatement which, although
opposed by petitioner Beneco, was granted on 23 October 1987
by Labor Arbiter Amado T. Adquilen. Petitioner Beneco
complied with the Labor Arbiter's order on 28 October 1987
through Resolution No. 10-90.
On 5 April 1988, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision (a)
confirming Cosalan's reinstatement; (b) ordering payment to
Cosalan of his backwages and allowances by petitioner Beneco
and respondent Board members, jointly and severally, for a
period of three (3) years without deduction or qualification,
amounting to P344,000.00; and (3) ordering the individual
Board members to pay, jointly and severally, to Cosalan moral
damages of P50,000.00 plus attorney's fees of ten percent
(10%) of the wages and allowances awarded him.
Respondent Board members appealed to the NLRC, and there
filed a Memorandum on Appeal. Petitioner Beneco did not
appeal, but moved to dismiss the appeal filed by respondent
Board members and for execution of judgment. By this time,
petitioner Beneco had a new set of directors.
In a decision dated 21 November 1988, public respondent NLRC
modified the award rendered by the Labor Arbiter by declaring
that petitioner Beneco alone, and not respondent Board
members, was liable for respondent Cosalan's backwages and
allowances, and by ruling that there was no legal basis for the
award of moral damages and attorney's fees made by the Labor
Arbiter.
Beneco, through its new set of directors, moved for
reconsideration of the NLRC decision, but without success.
In the present Petition for Certiorari, Beneco's principal
contentions are two-fold: first, that the NLRC had acted with
grave abuse of discretion in accepting and giving due course to
respondent Board members' appeal although such appeal had
been filed out of time; and second, that the NLRC had acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
in holding petitioner alone liable for payment of the backwages
and allowances due to Cosalan and releasing respondent Board
members from liability therefor.
We consider that petitioner's first contention is meritorious.
There is no dispute about the fact that the respondent Beneco
Board members received the decision of the labor Arbiter on 21
April 1988. Accordingly, and because 1 May 1988 was a legal
holiday, they had only up to 2 May 1988 within which to perfect
their appeal by filing their memorandum on appeal. It is also
not disputed that the respondent Board members'
memorandum on appeal was posted by registered mail on 3
4
May 1988 and received by the NLRC the following day. Clearly,
the memorandum on appeal was filed out of time.
CIVIL PROCEDURE
Respondent Board members, however, insist that their
Memorandum on Appeal was filed on time because it was
delivered for mailing on 1 May 1988 to the Garcia
Communications Company, a licensed private letter carrier. The
Board members in effect contend that the date of delivery to
Garcia Communications was the date of filing of their appeal
memorandum.
Respondent Board member's contention runs counter to the
established rule that transmission through a private carrier or
letter-forwarder instead of the Philippine Post Office is
5
not a recognized mode of filing pleadings. The established rule
is that the date of delivery of pleadings to a private letterforwarding agency is not to be considered as the date of filing
thereof in court, and that in such cases, the date of actual
receipt by the court, and not the date of delivery to the private
6
carrier, is deemed the date of filing of that pleading.
There, was, therefore, no reason grounded upon substantial
justice and the prevention of serious miscarriage of justice that
might have justified the NLRC in disregarding the ten-day
reglementary period for perfection of an appeal by the
respondent Board members. Accordingly, the applicable rule
was that the ten-day reglementary period to perfect an appeal
is mandatory and jurisdictional in nature, that failure to file an
appeal within the reglementary period renders the assailed
decision final and executory and no longer subject to
7
review. The respondent Board members had thus lost their
right to appeal from the decision of the Labor Arbiter and the
NLRC should have forthwith dismissed their appeal
memorandum.
There is another and more compelling reason why the
respondent Board members' appeal should have been
dismissed forthwith: that appeal was quite bereft of merit. Both
the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC had found that the indefinite
suspension and termination of services imposed by the
respondent Board members upon petitioner Cosalan was illegal.
That illegality flowed, firstly, from the fact that the suspension
of Cosalan was continued long after expiration of the period of
thirty (30) days, which is the maximum period of preventive
suspension that could be lawfully imposed under Section 4, Rule
XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code.
Secondly, Cosalan had been deprived of procedural due process
by the respondent Board members. He was never informed of
the charges raised against him and was given no opportunity to
meet those charges and present his side of whatever dispute
existed; he was kept totally in the dark as to the reason or
reasons why he had been suspended and effectively dismissed
from the service of Beneco Thirdly, respondent Board members
failed to adduce any cause which could reasonably be regarded
as lawful cause for the suspension and dismissal of respondent
Cosalan from his position as General Manager of Beneco.
Cosalan was, in other words, denied due process both
procedural and substantive. Fourthly, respondent Board
members failed to obtain the prior approval of the NEA of their
suspension now dismissal of Cosalan, which prior approval was
required, inter alia, under the subsisting loan agreement
between the NEA and Beneco. The requisite NEA approval was
subsequently sought by the respondent Board members; no
NEA approval was granted.
In reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter declaring
petitioner Beneco and respondent Board members solidarily
liable for the salary, allowances, damages and attorney's fees
awarded to respondent Cosalan, the NLRC said:
meikimouse

. . . A perusal of the records show that the
members of the Board never acted in their
individual capacities. They were acting as a
Board passing resolutions affecting their
general manager. If these resolutions and
resultant acts transgressed the law, to then
BENECO for which the Board was acting in
behalf should bear responsibility. The
records do not disclose that the individual
Board members were motivated by malice
or bad faith, rather, it reveals an intramural
power play gone awry and misapprehension
of its own rules and regulations. For this
reason, the decision holding the individual
board members jointly and severally liable
with BENECO for Cosalan's backwages is
untenable. The same goes for the award of
damages which does not have the
proverbial leg to stand on.
The Labor Arbiter below should have
heeded his own observation in his decision
Respondent BENECO as
an artificial person could
not have, by itself, done
anything to prevent it.
But because the former
have acted while in
office and in the course
of their official functions
as directors of BENECO, .
..
Thus, the decision of the Labor Arbiter
should be modified conformably with all the
foregoing holding BENECO solely liable for
backwages and releasing the appellant
board members from any individual
liabilities. 8 (Emphasis supplied)
The applicable general rule is clear enough. The Board members
and officers of a corporation who purport to act for and in
behalf of the corporation, keep within the lawful scope of their
authority in so acting, and act in good faith, do not become
liable, whether civilly or otherwise, for the consequences of
their acts, Those acts, when they are such a nature and are
done under such circumstances, are properly attributed to the
corporation alone and no personal liability is incurred by such
9
officers and Board members.
The major difficulty with the conclusion reached by the NLRC is
that the NLRC clearly overlooked or disregarded the
circumstances under which respondent Board members had in
fact acted in the instant case. As noted earlier, the respondent
Board members responded to the efforts of Cosalan to take
seriously and implement the Audit Memoranda issued by the
COA explicitly addressed to the petitioner Beneco, first by
stripping Cosalan of the privileges and perquisites attached to
his position as General Manager, then by suspending
indefinitely and finally dismissing Cosalan from such position. As
also noted earlier, respondent Board members offered no
suggestion at all of any just or lawful cause that could sustain
the suspension and dismissal of Cosalan. They obviously wanted
to get rid of Cosalan and so acted, in the words of the NLRC
CIVIL PROCEDURE
itself, "with indecent haste" in removing him from his position
and denying him substantive and procedural due process. Thus,
the record showed strong indications that respondent Board
members had illegally suspended and dismissed Cosalan
precisely because he was trying to remedy the financial
irregularities and violations of NEA regulations which the COA
had brought to the attention of Beneco. The conclusion reached
by the NLRC that "the records do not disclose that the individual
Board members were motivated by malice or bad faith" flew in
the face of the evidence of record. At the very least, a strong
presumption had arisen, which it was incumbent upon
respondent Board members to disprove, that they had acted in
reprisal against respondent Cosalan and in an effort to suppress
knowledge about and remedial measures against the financial
irregularities the COA Audits had unearthed. That burden
respondent Board members did not discharge.
The Solicitor General has urged that respondent Board
members may be held liable for damages under the foregoing
circumstance under Section 31 of the Corporation Code which
reads as follows:
Sec. 31. Liability of directors, trustees or
officers. Directors or trustees who
willfully and knowingly vote for or assent to
patently unlawful acts of the corporation
or who are guilty of gross negligence or bad
faith in directing the affairs of the
corporation or acquire any personal or
pecuniary interest in conflict with their duty
as such directors or trustees shall be jointly
liable and severally for all damages resulting
therefrom suffered by the corporation, its
stockholders or members and other persons
. . . (Emphasis supplied)
We agree with the Solicitor General, firstly, that Section 31 of
the Corporation Code is applicable in respect of Beneco and
other electric cooperatives similarly situated. Section 4 of the
Corporation Code renders the provisions of that Code
applicable in a supplementary manner to all corporations,
including those with special or individual charters so long as
those provisions are not inconsistent with such charters. We
find no provision in P.D. No. 269, as amended, that would
exclude expressly or by necessary implication the applicability
of Section 31 of the Corporation Code in respect of members of
the boards of directors of electric cooperatives. Indeed, P.D. No.
269 expressly describes these cooperatives as "corporations:"
Sec. 15. Organization and Purpose.
Cooperative non-stock,
non-profit
membership corporationsmay be organized,
and electric
cooperative
corporations heretofore
formed
or
registered under the Philippine nonAgricultural Co-operative Act may as
hereinafter provided be converted, under
this Decree for the purpose of supplying,
and of promoting and encouraging-the
fullest use of, service on an area coverage
basis at the lowest cost consistent with
sound economy and the prudent
management of the business of such
10
corporations. (Emphasis supplied)
meikimouse
CIVIL PROCEDURE
We agree with the Solicitor General, secondly, that respondent

Board members were guilty of "gross negligence or bad faith in
directing the affairs of the corporation" in enacting the series of
resolutions noted earlier indefinitely suspending and dismissing
respondent Cosalan from the position of General Manager of
Beneco. Respondent Board members, in doing so, acted belong
the scope of their authority as such Board members. The
dismissal of an officer or employee in bad faith, without lawful
cause and without procedural due process, is an act that
iscontra legem. It cannot be supposed that members of boards
of directors derive any authority to violate the express
mandates of law or the clear legal rights of their officers and
employees by simply purporting to act for the corporation they
control.
We believe and so hold, further, that not only are Beneco and
respondent Board members properly held solidarily liable for
the awards made by the Labor Arbiter, but also that petitioner
Beneco which was controlled by and which could act only
through respondent Board members, has a right to be
reimbursed for any amounts that Beneco may be compelled to
pay to respondent Cosalan. Such right of reimbursement is
essential if the innocent members of Beneco are not to be
penalized for the acts of respondent Board members which
were both done in bad faith and ultra vires. The liabilitygenerating acts here are the personal and individual acts of
respondent Board members, and are not properly attributed to
Beneco itself.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is GIVEN DUE COURSE,
the comment filed by respondent Board members is TREATED
as their answer, and the decision of the National Labor
Relations Commission dated 21 November 1988 in NLRC Case
No. RAB-1-0313-84 is hereby SET ASIDE and the decision dated
5 April 1988 of Labor Arbiter Amado T. Adquilen hereby
REINSTATED in toto. In addition, respondent Board members
are hereby ORDERED to reimburse petitioner Beneco any
amounts that it may be compelled to pay to respondent Cosalan
by virtue of the decision of Labor Arbiter Amado T. Adquilen. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
meikimouse

G.R. No. L-55035 February 23, 1983
GENARO CUBAR,FLORA CUBAR, NARCISO CUBAR, CRESENCIA
CUBAR, ROSALIO CUBAR, PETRA T. VDA. DE CUBAR,
FELOMINO CUBAR, FAUSTO CUBAR, et al., petitioners,
vs.
HON. RAFEL T. MENDOZA, JUDGE of the Court of First Instance
of Cebu (Branch VI), VICTORIANO ENAD, RAFAEL ENAD, SIMON
VELOSO and ERLINDA PONCE, respondents.
Maximo S. Ylaya & Associate and Pelaez, Pelaez and Pelaez for
petitioners.
Alercado Law Office for private respondents.
DE CASTRO, J.:
Special civil action of certiorari and prohibition with writ of
preliminary injunction to annul and set aside the Order dated
January 28, 1980 of the defunct Court of First Instance of
Cebu, Branch VI, herein respondent judge presiding, setting
aside the Order for the issuance of a writ of execution issued
by Branch V of said Court in Civil Case No. R-15607 on January 8,
1980, and to restrain and enjoin respondent judge from further
proceeding with the case in any manner until further orders
from this Court.
On September 22, 1976, herein petitioners filed a complaint
with the Court of First Instance of Cebu, assigned toBranch
V thereof, then presided by Judge Mariano A. Zosa, docketed as
Civil Case No. R- 15607, for the nullification of certain
documents alleged in the complaint, which they, claiming to be
"illiterate mountain people", supposedly had signed upon the
representations of the defendants, herein private respondents,
that what they were signing was a right of way in favor of the
government over their lands for the construction of a road
leading to a mining site, with the inducement that once
operational, each landowner shall be entitled to a royalty of
P.30 per ton of minerals loaded in trucks passing through their
respective lots, which documents, however, turned out to be
alleged authorizations for entry into their 'lets by private
respondents for the purpose of exploring rich rock phosphate
deposits, and on the basis of said documents, private
respondents were granted by the Bureau of Mines permits to
exploit and develop the mineral resources in petitioners' land to
the exclusion of the latter.
In their answer, private respondents specifically denied the
material allegations thereof, claiming that the questioned
documents were freely and voluntarily executed by the
petitioners.
After hearing on the merits and the case submitted for decision,
the trial court rendered judgment on October 1, 1979 declaring
the subject documents null and void, and adjudging private
respondents liable to pay damages to petitioners. A copy of said
decision was served to Atty. Romeo Gonzaga, private
respondents' counsel of record and was received his wife at his
given address on November 23, 1979.
No appeal having been duly perfected within the reglementary
period provided by law, petitioners filed on January 7, 1980 a
CIVIL PROCEDURE
motion for the issuance of a writ of execution, which was
granted by the trial court in its Order of January 8, 1980,
On January 12, 1980 or four days after the issuance of the order
of execution, Branch V became vacant with the appointment of
Judge Zosa to the Court of Appeals.
On January 14, 1980, private respondents, through a new
lawyer, Atty. Ponciano H. Alivio, filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Order of January 8, 1980 and to quash
the writ of execution, on the ground that the decision is not yet
final and executory for lack of valid service thereof. Said motion
was opposed by petitioners, who insisted that said decision is
already final and executory, and Atty. Alivio has no personality
to file said motion for want of formal substitution of counsel as
required by the Rules.
Since Branch V was then vacant, the motion for reconsideration
was resolved by Branch VI, presided over by the respondent
judge who, on January 28, issued the herein assailed Order
setting aside the Order of execution and quashing the writ
issued thereunder.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration filed against the above
order of respondent judge having been denied, this petition was
filed.
We find the petition to be meritorious. That the decision of the
trial court was received by the wife of Atty. Romeo Gonzaga,
private respondents' counsel of record at his given address on
November 23, 1979, is not disputed. It is likewise not disputed
that said wife has been receiving prior notices of the case for
her husband at the office of the latter, who had always acted as
if he had received said notices himself for he had duly complied
therewith. With these facts, no other ruling can be had but that
the service of the decision in question is valid and binding. It is
fully being in accordance with Rule 13, Section 4, on personal
service, said wife being of sufficient discretion to receive notice
of final judgment.
Private respondents argue that said service is not valid because
Atty. Gonzaga had left Cebu City, his address of record, and has
resided in Legaspi City. It is already well settled rule that when a
party is represented by counsel, notice should be made upon
1
the counsel of record at his given address, to which notices of
all kind emanating from the court should be sent in the absence
of a proper and adequate notice to the court of a change of
2
address. Petitioner's argument, likewise, fails to consider the
need of observing a legal formality before a counsel of record
may be considered relieved of his responsibility as such counsel
on account of withdrawal. This legal formality is that a lawyer's
withdrawal as counsel must be made in a formal petition filed in
the case, without which, notice of judgment rendered in the
case served on the counsel of record, is, for all legal purposes
notice to the client, the date of receipt of which is considered
the starting point from which the period of appeal prescribed
3
by law shall begin to run. Not having withdrawn formally as
counsel in the case, Atty. Romeo Gonzaga continued to be the
4
counsel of record and was, for all legal purpose, private
respondents' attorney upon whom the court's processes may
be served, as they were in fact duly served.
Consequently, the decision of the trial court, copy of which was
served upon respondents' counsel on November 23, 1979, is
already final and executory at the time the order of execution
was issued on January 8, 1980, no appeal having been taken
meikimouse
CIVIL PROCEDURE
therefrom within the reglementary period provided by law.

Time and again, this court has ruled that once a judgment
becomes final and executory, the prevailing party can have it
executed as a matter of right, and the granting of execution
5
becomes a ministerial duty of the court. Therefore,
respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in issuing the
herein questioned order, in the absence of any justification,
both legal and factual, that would warrant the stay of
execution.
The claim of private respondents that the present petition was
filed late 2 months and 29 days after the assailed order was
issued, is without any merit. This is a special civil action of
certiorari and prohibition which may be filed within a
reasonable period, no time frame for its filing having been fixed
by Rule 65, Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted and the
questioned Order of respondent judge is hereby annulled and
set aside. The writ of prohibition is likewise granted and
respondent judge or whoever would be appointed to the
appropriate branch of the Regional Trial Court, prohibited from
acting in any wise or form except to order execution of the
subject decision. The temporary restraining order heretofore
issued is hereby made permanent. Costs against private
respondents.
SO ORDERED.
meikimouse

G.R. No. L-41323 April 27, 1982
ARISTEO
T.
FERAREN, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
REMEDIOS SANTOS, JUDGE SERAFIN SALVADOR, Branch XIV,
Court of First instance of Rizal, ZACARIAS M. CUNANAN,
Deputy Sheriff of Rizal and COURT OF APPEALS, respondentsappellees.
AQUINO, J.:
This case is about the judgment of the Court of Appeals which
became final and executory because the counsel for the losing
party did not claim from the post office the registered mail
containing the copy of the resolution denying his motion for
reconsideration.
The Court of Appeals in its decision dated December 20, 1974 in
Feraren vs. Santos, CA-G.R. No. 52724-R ordered Aristeo T.
Feraren to deliver a certain Volkswagen car to Remedios Santos
and to pay her as damages ten pesos a day from September 22,
1967 up to the time of delivery plus P1,000 as attorney's fees.
A copy of that decision was served on December 26, 1974 on
Felipe Ponce, Feraren's counsel. Ponce withdrew from the case
and he was replaced by Mendez, Mendez & Associates who on
January 8, 1975 entered their appearance as Feraren's new
counsel and filed a motion asking for an extension of thirty days
within which to file a motion for reconsideration.
The Court of Appeals in its resolution of January 13, 1975
approved Ponce's withdrawal from the case and granted
Feraren's new lawyers the thirty-day extension with the
warning that no further extension would be granted. The
Mendez law office received a copy of that resolution
by registered mail.
Lawyer Pershing L. Mendez asked for another thirty-day
extension which was reluctantly granted by the Court of
Appeals in its resolution of February 14, 1975 in this wise:
"Motion is apparently not well-founded because appellee's
(Feraren's) counsel is a law firm with several members.
However, granted as a last chance." Feraren's lawyers received
a copy of that resolution also by registered mail.
Feraren's motion for reconsideration, which was filed on March
11, 1975, was denied for lack of merit in the resolution dated
March 14, 1975 (Per Gatmaitan, J., with Reyes and Plana, JJ.,
concurring).
A copy of that resolution, like the two prior resolutions, was
sent by registered mail in the Manila central post office on
March 21, 1975 to Mendez, Mendez & Associates at their
address of record, 1740 Sisa Street, Sampaloc, Manila. Two
notices dated March 21 and 26 regarding that registered mail
were sent to the Mendez law office at that address.
However, that particular registered mail was returned to the
Court of Appeals with the notation stamped on the envelope:
"Return to Sender Unclaimed". Also stamped on the envelope
were the words "March 26 Second Notice" and "Entry Registry
April 2, 1975 ".
CIVIL PROCEDURE
The officer-in-charge of the central post office in Manila
informed the Court of Appeals that the said registered mail was
returned to the Court's representative on April 2, 1975 after
two notices were sent at the Mendez law office and the mail
was not claimed (p. 61, Rollo).
On the assumption that the judgment became final on March
31, 1975, entry of judgment was made the record was
remanded to the lower court on May 21, 1975. Copies of the
entry of judgment were mailed to the lawyers of the parties.
On June 5, 1975, Pershing L. Mendez, Feraren's counsel, filed a
manifestation (motion) wherein he prayed for the recall of the
entry of judgment on the ground that his motion for
reconsideration had not yet been resolved; hence, the
judgment "could not become final and executory".
The Court of Appeals in its minute resolution dated June 19,
1975 denied the motion for the recall of the entry of judgment
because, as already stated, the motion for reconsideration had
already been resolved.
On July 1, 1975, lawyer Mendez filed a manifestation (motion)
wherein he prayed that he be allowed to appeal "as a
consequence of the denial of the motion for reconsideration".
He said that he had not received a copy of the resolution
denying his motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals in
its resolution dated July 14, 1975 did not grant that prayer. A
copy of that resolution was received by Mendez by registered
mail on July 23, 1975.
Lawyer Mendez did not assail that resolution immediately in
this Court. More than a month later, or on September 5, 1975,
after a writ of execution was served on Feraren, he filed in this
Court this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
wherein he prayed that he be allowed to appeal and that the
lower court be enjoined from executing the judgment of the
Court of Appeals.
Lawyer Mendez alleged in that petition and in his affidavit that
in his office at his residence there was always someone to
attend to correspondence and that he did not leave the city
during the period when the notice of registered mail was
supposedly sent to his law office. His office clerk made a similar
affidavit.
However, the fact remains that the postmaster certified that
although two notices were sent to Mendez's office, the
registered mail in question was not claimed at the Manila
central post office (p. 83, CA Record).
The rule is that if the addressee of registered mail fails to claim
it from the post office within five days from the date of the first
notice of the postmaster, service becomes effective at the
expiration of that five-day period (Sec. 8, Rule 13, Rules of
Court).
Between the denial of a lawyer that he received the first notice
of registered mail and the postmaster's certification that said
notice was sent, the postmaster's claim should be believed
because it is his official duty to send notices of registered mail.
The presumption is that official duty was regularly performed.
(Grafil vs. Feliciano, L-27166, June, 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 616 citing
Enriquez vs. Bautista, 79 Phil. 220, 222).
meikimouse
CIVIL PROCEDURE
It is the duty of a practising lawyer to so

arrange matters that official or judicial
communications sent by mail will reach him
promptly. Failing to do so, he and his clients
must suffer the consequences of his
negligence. (Islas vs. Platon and Ona, 47
Phil. 162).
It has been held that the failure to claim registered mail of
which notice had been duly given by the postmaster is not
excusable negligence that would warrant the reopening of a
decided case (Pielago vs. Generosa, 73 Phil. 654).
Feraren's grievance is that he was prevented from appealing to
this Court. This case was heard on oral argument on November
24, 1975. The merits of the decision of the Court of Appeals
were discussed at that hearing.
An examination of Feraren's motion for reconsideration in the
Court of Appeals reveals that he raised therein only the factual
issue that he had proven by clear and convincing evidence that
he was the owner of the disputed car. He did not raise any
substantial legal issues.
Even if we allow Feraren to file a petition for review in this
Court, the likelihood is that his appeal would not be meritorious
because under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court he and this Court
are bound by the factual findings of the Court of Appeals. An
appeal to this Court is given due course as a rule only when it
involves important legal issues.
We find that the Court of Appeals did not gravely abuse its
discretion in not allowing Feraren to appeal to this Court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. The
temporary restraining order is dissolved. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
meikimouse

G.R. No. L-58781
July 31, 1987
TEOFILO MAGNO, ISIDRO CABATIC, HERMINIO CABATIC,

FELICITAS CABATIC, Assisted by her husband, JOSE CARINO,
TOMAS MAGNO, ELPIDIO MAGNO, AURORA MAGNO, Assisted
by her husband, ODELON BUGAYONG, NICANOR MAGNO and
LOLITA
MAGNO, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, GAVINO MAGNO, NICETAS
MAGNO, and NAZARIA MAGNO, Assisted by her husband,
SIMEON DE GUZMAN, respondents.
PARAS, J.:
This is a special civil action for certiorari seeking to declare void
ab initio the Resolution of respondent Court of Appeals dated
September 22, 1981 which ordered the issuance of an Entry of
Judgment in CA-G.R. No. 52655-R. The petition also prays for
the issuance of a preliminary injunction to temporarily maintain
the status quo by ordering the provincial sheriff of the province
of Pangasinan to desist from enforcing the writ of execution
issued in Civil Case No. A-413 pursuant to the said Entry of
Judgment.
Civil Case No. A-413 is an action for Partition of Certain
Properties and for Damages, filed by private respondents
against petitioners in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan,
*
Branch VII thereof. In a Decision dated October 5, 1972, the
lower court ordered the partition of the properties subject of
the complaint in accordance with the schedule therein
appearing. It also ordered the petitioners to pay jointly and
severally unto the private respondents the amount of P3,000.00
as attorney's fees.
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals which appeal was
docketed as CA-G.R. No. 52655-R. On June 30, 1981, the said
**
court promulgated its Decision affirming the decision of the
lower court.
Notice of the decision was sent to petitioners' counsel Atty.
Atinidoro B. Sison at his given mailing address which is 33
B.M.A. Ave., Tatalon, Quezon City. The same, however, was
returned to the court with the certification of the postmaster
"Return to sender, Reason moved."
On September 14, 1981, respondent Court of Appeals issued
the following Resolution:
Considering that the copy of Decision dated June 30,
1981 addressed to Atty. Atinidoro B. Sison of 33
B.M.A. Tatalon, Quezon City, counsel for the
appellants was returned unclaimed with the notation
on the envelope "MOVED", the Court Resolved to
resend the said copy of the Decision to the appellants
themselves at Alaminos, Pangasinan, and the
appellants are hereby informed that the fifteen (15)
days period within which to file for reconsideration
will be counted from the receipt of the decision
herewith attached. (Annex "5-A" p. 54, Rollo).
CIVIL PROCEDURE
addressed to them was returned to the court with the notation
deceased.
On September 22, 1981, the respondent court issued its now
assailed Resolution ordering the issuance of the entry of
judgment.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied hence, they
filed the present petition, which We find to be without merit.
It is well-settled that when a party is represented by counsel,
notice should be made upon the counsel of record at his given
address to which notices of all kinds emanating from the court
should be sent in the absence of a proper and adequate notice
to the court of a change of address. (Cubar vs. Mendoza, 120
SCRA 768).lawph!1
In the case now before Us, the records show that the notice and
copy of the decision of respondent Court of Appeals were sent
to petitioners's counsel of record Atty. Atinidoro E. Sison at his
given mailing address which is 33 B.M.A. Avenue, Tatalon,
Quezon City. The first notice to him by the Postmaster to claim
his mail was on July 9, 1981. The rule is that service of notice
becomes effective at the expiration of the five-day period upon
failure of the addresse to claim his mail within five (5) days from
the date of first notice Sec. 8, Rule 13 Rules of Court (Feraren
vs. Santos, 113 SCRA 707). Therefore in this case the service
became effective five days after July 9, 1981 which is July 14,
1981. The decision became final on August 13, 1981. A xerox
copy of the said envelope properly addressed appears on page
52 of the Rollo. This fact is further shown by the certification
issued by the then Acting Clerk of the Court of Appeals, Atty.
Cesar M. Marzan. (p. 51, Rollo). If Atty. Sison moved to another
address without informing the respondent of his change of
address the omission or neglect will not stay the finality of the
decision. The notice sent to petitioners themselves, under the
circumstances is not even necessary. (Francisco vs. Puno, 108
SCRA 427). It may be stated though that while petitioners claim
that Teofilo Magno to whom the notice to the petitioners was
addressed is already dead, it is not explained why their present
petition before this Court still includes the name Teofilo Magno.
There is no indication in the record that he has been duly
substituted by his legal representative.
The decision in this case having become final on July 29, 1981,
there being no appeal taken therefrom, respondent court
committed no error in issuing its resolution dated September
22, 1981 ordering the issuance of the corresponding entry of
judgment.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, this petition is hereby
DISMISSED. The restraining order earlier issued is lifted.
SO ORDERED.
A copy of this Resolution was sent to petitioners themselves

addressed as follows Mr. Teofilo Magno et al., Patricio,
Alaminos, Pangasinan. It is not disputed that this address is the
address on record of petitioners. But again the enveloped
meikimouse

G.R. No. L-2820
June 21, 1951
April 8, 1946, which had been forwarded to him by ordinary

mail.
FAUSTO
ISAAC, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
LEOPOLDO MENDOZA, defendant-appellee.
Cea,
Blancaflor
and
Jose M. Peas for appellee.
Cea
CIVIL PROCEDURE
for
appellant.
BENGZON, J.:
For the amount of four hundred and fifty pesos, Japanese
currency, Fausto Isaac, plaintiff, sold to Leopoldo Mendoza,
defendant, a parcel of land in Pili, Camarines Sur, reserving the
right to repurchase within four years. The sale took the place in
February 1944. After liberation, the seller offered to redeem,
but defendant objected, saying the redemption was premature.
Hence this litigation instituted in the court of first instance of
said province, in February 1946, to compel re-transfer.
After having been duly summoned, the defendant failed to
answer. Consequently, upon plaintiff's motion, he was
defaulted by order of May 10, 1947. Thereafter, i.e. on
September 23, 1947, considering the plaintiff's evidence the
court rendered judgment requiring the defendant to execute a
deed of re-sale of the land, to receive the amount of P90
Philippine currency, which Fausto Isaac had consigned in court,
to pay damages in the sum of P95.
On December 9, 1947 Leopoldo Mendoza submitted a petition
to set aside the judgment invoking accident, mistake, or
excusable negligence. Opposed by plaintiff, the petition was
denied. Wherefore defendant appealed directly to this court.
The appellant insist here that "the record fails to show a

conclusive evidence that Atty. Jorge C. Briones . . . was
notified". This is refuted by the above account of the facts and
of the governing principles. It is remarkable that, to meet the
conclusions therein set forth, defendant has not introduced any
sworn statement of Attorney Briones.
In connection with the argument that defendant should not
suffer for his lawyer's shortcoming, it should be explained that
the client is bound by the acts, even mistakes of his counsel in
1
realm of procedural technique ; but if the client is prejudiced by
the attorney's negligence or misconduct he may recover
2
damages.
Another point, which is equally decisive. Unless the appellant
has filed a motion to set aside the order of default, on any of
the grounds enumerated in Rule 38, he has no standing in court
3
nor the right to appeal. Examining appellant's motion of
December 9, 1947 we observe that he merely requested for the
annulment of the decision rendered after his default
(September 23, 1947) without praying for the revocation of the
order of May 10, 1947declaring him to be default. But granting,
for the sake of argument that the aforesaid pleading impliedly
included the second prayer, we are met by the insuperable
objection that the petition was too late. Because filed beyond
the six-month period within which applications for relief under
Rule 38 may be entertained. From May 10 to December 9 seven
months had elapsed.
Wherefore, this appeal being without merit, we affirm the order
of the trial judge denying the petition to set aside. With costs.
Basis of defendant's petition was the allegation that as his

attorney Jorge C. Briones had not received notice of the court's
denial of his motion to dismiss the complaint, he had reason to
believe the time to answer had not expired.
It appears from the record that, duly summoned, defendant
through Attorney Briones filed a motion to dismiss, which was
overruled by order of April 8, 1946. At the bottom of that order
there is notation that had been furnished Attorney Briones by
ordinary mail. On February 8, 1947, the plaintiff filed his motion
for default, asserting that, defendant's motion to dismiss had
been denied and that so far, defendant had interposed no
answer. On February 15, 1947 the court issued an auto
suspending consideration of plaintiff's motion and giving the
defendant a period of ten days within which to reply thereto, if
so desired. Copy of this directive was sent by registered mail to
Attorney Briones, but the latter "refused to claim the registered
letter despite the notices given him by the postmaster". And
according to an affidavit submitted to the court, Attorney Peas
for the plaintiff, had again and gain reminded Briones that the
time was come for the answer.
Apprised of the foregoing circumstances, the court of first
instance denied the petition to set aside.
We think such denial was entirely proper. According to the
rules, Attorney Briones is deemed to have received the copy of
the auto of February 15, 1947 which he declined to accept from
the mails (Rule 27 section 8). That order was sufficient to advise
him of the rejection of his previous motion of dismissal,
supposing he had not actually received the copy of the order of
meikimouse

G.R. No. 138137
March 8, 2001
PERLA
S.
vs.
ASIA BREWERY, INC., respondent.
ZULUETA, petitioner,
PANGANIBAN, J.:
When two or more cases involve the same parties and affect
closely related subject matters, they must be consolidated and
jointly tried, in order to serve the best interests of the parties
and to settle expeditiously the issues involved. Consolidation,
when appropriate, also contributes to the declogging of court
dockets.
CIVIL PROCEDURE
On January 3, 1997, petitioner moved for the consolidation of
the Makati case with the Iloilo case. Granting the Motion, Judge
Parentala ordered on February 13, 1997, the consolidation of
the two cases. Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
which was denied in an Order dated May 19, 1997.
On August 18, 1997, respondent filed before the Court of
Appeals a Petition for Certiorari assailing Judge Parentala's
February 13, 1997 and May 19, 1997 Orders.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Setting aside the trial court's assailed Orders which
consolidated the Iloilo and the Makati cases, the CA ruled in this
wise:
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
1
the Rules of Court, questioning the August 4, 1998 Decision of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 45020; as well as the
2
February 23, 1999 Resolution denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration. The decretal portion of the CA Decision reads
as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the instant petition is given due course.
The assailed orders of the Regional Trial Court, Makati
City, Branch 142 dated 13 February 1997 and 19 May
1997 are hereby ANNULED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED."
The Facts
Respondent Asia Brewery, Inc., is engaged in the manufacture,
the distribution and sale of beer; while Petitioner Perla Zulueta
is a dealer and an operator of an outlet selling the former's beer
products. A Dealership Agreement governed their contractual
relations.
On March 30, 1992, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Iloilo, Branch 22, a Complaint against respondent
for Breach of Contract, Specific Performance and Damages. The
Complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 20341 (hereafter referred
to as the "Iloilo case"), was grounded on the alleged violation of
the Dealership Agreement.
On July 7, 1994, during the pendency of the Iloilo case,
respondent filed with the Makati Regional Trial Court, Branch
66, a Complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 94-2110 (hereafter
referred to as the "Makati case"). The Complaint was for the
collection of a sum of money in the amount of P463,107.75
representing the value of beer products, which respondent had
delivered to petitioner.
In view of the pendency of the Iloilo case, petitioner moved to
dismiss the Makati case on the ground that it had split the cause
of action and violated the rule against the multiplicity of suits.
The Motion was denied by the Makati RTC through Judge
Eriberto U. Rosario.
Upon petitioner's Motion, however, Judge Rosario inhibited
himself. The case was raffled again and thereafter assigned to
Branch 142 of the Makati RTC, presided by Judge Jose Parentala
Jr.
"There is no common issue of law or fact between the

two cases. The issue in Civil Case No. 94-2110 is
private respondent's indebtedness for unpaid beer
products; while in Civil Case No. 20341, it is whether
or not petitioner (therein defendant) breached its
dealership contract with private respondent.
"Private respondent in her complaint aforequoted
attempts to project a commonality between the two
civil cases, but it cannot be denied that her obligation
to pay for the beer deliveries can exist regardless of
any "stop payment" order she made with regard to
the checks. Thus, the rationale for consolidation,
which is to avoid the possibility of conflicting
decisions being rendered, (Active Wood products, Co.
vs. Court of Appeals, 181 SCRA 774, Benguet
Corporation, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 165 SCRA 27;
Vallacar Transit, Inc. vs. Yap, 126 SCRA 503) does not
3
exist."
Hence, this Petition.
The Issues
5
In her Memorandum, petitioner interposes the following issues

for the consideration of this Court:
"a. Were the Orders of February 13, 1997 and May 19,
1997 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 142 in Makati
City (ordering consolidation of Makati Civil Case No.
94-2110 with the Iloilo Civil Case No. 20341) already
final and executory when respondent filed its petition
for certiorari with the Hon. Court of Appeals such that
said Court could no longer acquire jurisdiction over
the case and should have dismissed it outright (as it
originally did) x x x, instead of due giving course to the
petition?; and
"b. Independent of the first issue, did the Makati RTC,
Branch 142, correctly order the consolidation of the
Makati case (which was filed later) with the Iloilo Case
(which was filed earlier) for the reason that the
obligation sought to be collected in the Makati case is
the same obligation that is also one of the subject
6
matters of the Iloilo case, x x x?"
The Court's Ruling
meikimouse

The Petition is meritorious.
First
Propriety of Petition with the CA
Issue:
Petitioner avers that the Makati RTC's February 13, 1997 and
May 19, 1997 Orders consolidating the two cases could no
longer be assailed. Allegedly, respondent's Petition for
Certiorari was filed with the CA beyond the reglementary sixtyday period prescribed in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure, which took effect on July 1, 1997. Hence, the CA
should have dismissed it outright.
The records show that respondent received on May 23, 1997,
the Order denying its Motion for Reconsideration. It had,
according to petitioner, only sixty days or until July 22, 1997,
within which to file the Petition for Certiorari. It did so,
however, only on August 21, 1997.
On the other hand, respondent insists that its Petition was filed
on time, because the reglementary period before the effectivity
of the 1997 Rules was ninety days. It theorizes that the sixty-day
period under the 1997 Rules does not apply.
As a general rule, laws have no retroactive effect. But there are
certain recognized exceptions, such as when they are remedial
or procedural in nature. This Court explained this exception in
the following language:
"It is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippines,
"(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the
contrary is provided. But there are settled exceptions
to this general rule, such as when the statute is
CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in nature or when it CREATES
NEW RIGHTS.
xxx
xxx
xxx
"On the other hand, remedial or procedural laws, i.e.,

those statutes relating to remedies or modes of
procedure, which do not create new or take away
vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the
remedy or confirmation of such rights, ordinarily do
not come within the legal meaning of a retrospective
law, nor within the general rule against the
7
retrospective operation of statutes." (emphasis
supplied)
Thus, procedural laws may operate retroactively as to pending
proceedings even without express provision to that
8
effect. Accordingly, rules of procedure can apply to cases
9
pending at the time of their enactment. In fact, statutes
regulating the procedure of the courts will be applied on actions
undetermined at the time of their effectivity. Procedural laws
10
are retrospective in that sense and to that extent.
Clearly, the designation of a specific period of sixty days for the
filing of an original action for certiorari under Rule 65 is purely
remedial or procedural in nature. It does not alter or modify any
substantive right of respondent, particularly with respect to the
filing of petitions for certiorari. Although the period for filing the
same may have been effectively shortened, respondent had not
been unduly prejudiced thereby considering that he was not at
all deprived of that right.
CIVIL PROCEDURE
It is a well-established doctrine that rules of procedure may be
modified at any time to become effective at once, so long as the
11
change does not affect vested rights. Moreover, it is equally
axiomatic that there are no vested rights to rules of
12
procedure.
It also bears noting that the ninety-day limit established by
jurisprudence cannot be deemed a vested right. It is merely a
discretionary prerogative of the courts that may be exercised
depending on the peculiar circumstances of each case. Hence,
respondent was not entitled, as a matter of right, to the 90-day
period for filing a petition for certiorari; neither can it
imperiously demand that the same period be extended to it.
Upon the effectivity of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure on July 1, 1997, respondent's lawyers still had 21
days or until July 22, 1997 to file a petition for certiorari and to
comply with the sixty-day reglementary period. Had they been
more prudent and circumspect in regard to the implications of
these procedural changes, respondent's right of action would
not have been foreclosed. After all, the 1997 amendments to
the Rules of Court were well-publicized prior to their date of
effectivity. At the very least counsel should have asked for as
extension of time to file the petition.
Certification
Shopping Defective
of
Non-forum
Petitioner likewise assails the validity of the sworn certification

against forum-shopping, arguing that the same was signed by
counsel and not by petitioner as required by Supreme Court
Circular No. 28-91. For his part, respondent claims that even if it
was its counsel who signed the certification, there was still
substantial compliance with Circular No. 28-91 because, a
corporation acts through its authorized officers or agents, and
its counsel is an agent having personal knowledge of other
pending cases.
The requirement that the petitioner should sign the certificate
of non-forum shopping applies even to corporations,
considering that the mandatory directives of the Circular and
the Rules of Court make no distinction between natural and
juridical persons. In this case, the Certification should have been
signed "by a duly authorized director or officer of the
13
corporation," who has knowledge of the matter being
14
15
certified. In Robern Development Corporation v. Quitain, in
which the Certification was signed by Atty. Nemesio S. Caete
who was the acting regional legal counsel of the National Power
Corporation in Mindanao, the Court held that "he was not
merely a retained lawyer, but an NPC in-house counsel and
officer, whose basic function was to prepare legal pleadings and
to represent NPC-Mindanao in legal cases. As regional legal
counsel for the Mindanao area, he was the officer who was in
the best position to verify the truthfulness and the correctness
of the allegations in the Complaint for expropriation in Davao
City. As internal legal counsel, he was also in the best position
to know and to certify if an action for expropriation had already
been filed and pending with the courts."
Verily, the signatory in the Certification of the Petition before
the CA should not have been respondent's retained counsel,
who would not know whether there were other similar cases of
16
the corporation. Otherwise, this requirement would easily be
circumvented by the signature of every counsel representing
corporate parties.
meikimouse

No
Explanation
Non-Filing by Personal Service
for
Citing Section 11 of Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules, petitioner also

faults respondent for the absence of a written explanation why
the Petition with the Court of Appeals was served on her
counsel by registered mail. In reply, respondent points out that
such explanation was not necessary, because its counsel held
office in Makati City while petitioner and her counsel were in
Iloilo City.
We agree with petitioner. Under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997
Rules, personal service of petitions and other pleadings is the
general rule, while a resort to other modes of service and filing
is the exception. Where recourse is made to the exception,
a written explanation why the service and the filing were not
done personally is indispensable, even when such explanation
by its nature is acceptable and manifest. Where no explanation
is offered to justify the resort to other modes, the discretionary
power of the court to expunge the pleading becomes
17
mandatory. Thus, the CA should have considered the Petition
as not having been filed, in view of the failure of respondent to
present a written explanation of its failure to effect personal
service.
CIVIL PROCEDURE
Two cases involving the same parties and affecting closely
related subject matters must be ordered consolidated and
18
jointly tried in court, where the earlier case was filed. The
consolidation of cases is proper when they involve the
19
resolution of common questions of law or facts.
Indeed, upon the consolidation of the cases, the interests of
both parties in the two civil cases will best be served and the
issues involved therein expeditiously settled. After all, there is
no question on the propriety of the venue in the Iloilo case.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed
Decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders of the Makati
RTC (Br. 142) dated February 13, 1997 and May 19, 1997 are
hereby REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
In sum, the Petition for Certiorari filed with the CA by herein

respondent, questioning the orders of consolidation by the
Makati RTC, should not have been given due course. Not only
was the Petition filed beyond the sixty-day reglementary
period; it likewise failed to observe the requirements of nonforum shopping and personal service or filing. All or any of
these acts ought to have been sufficient cause for its outright
denial.
Second
Propriety of Consolidation
Issue:
Apart from procedural problems, respondent's cause is also

afflicted with substantial defects. The CA ruled that there was
no common issue in law or in fact between the Makati case and
the Iloilo case. The former involved petitioner's indebtedness to
respondent for unpaid beer products, while the latter pertained
to an alleged breach of the Dealership Agreement between the
parties. We disagree.
True, petitioner's obligation to pay for the beer products
delivered by respondent can exist regardless of an alleged
breach in the Dealership Agreement. Undeniably, however, this
obligation and the relationship between respondent and
petitioner, as supplier and distributor respectively, arose from
the Dealership Agreement which is now the subject of inquiry in
the Iloilo case. In fact, petitioner herself claims that her
obligation to pay was negated by respondent's contractual
breach. In other words, the non-payment -- the res of the
Makati case -- is an incident of the Iloilo case.
Inasmuch as the binding force of the Dealership Agreement was
put in question, it would be more practical and convenient to
submit to the Iloilo court all the incidents and their
consequences. The issues in both civil cases pertain to the
respective obligations of the same parties under the Dealership
Agreement. Thus, every transaction as well as liability arising
from it must be resolved in the judicial forum where it is put in
issue. The consolidation of the two cases then becomes
imperative to a complete, comprehensive and consistent
determination of all these related issues.
meikimouse

G.R. No. L-28526 July 7, 1986
REMIGIO V. TAN, AIDA T. CONCEPCION, and ALEJANDRO V.
TANKEH, petitioners,
vs.
HON. GREGORIO T. LANTIN, Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, Branch VII; CLEMENTE V. TANKEH and his
wife, LIGAYA A. LUALHATI; and the REGISTER OF DEEDS of
Pasay City, respondents.
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction to set
aside the Order dated December 21, 1967 in Civil Case No.
62320 of the Court of First Instance of Manila which cancelled
the notice of lis pendens annotated on the titles covering three
parcels of land.
Petitioners-plaintiffs filed an amended complaint praying,
among other things, for the annulment of a "Deed of Absolute
Sale" covering the said three parcels of land allegedly executed
on July 22, 1964 by their mother, Hilaria Isabelo Vda. de Tankeh,
in favor of their brother, respondent Clemente Tankeh and his
wife, who caused its execution without giving any price or
consideration therefor, and eventually obtaining new registered
titles in their names.
CIVIL PROCEDURE
allowed to file a bond, regardless of the amount, in substitution
of said notice. Moreover, the law does not authorize a judge to
cancel a notice of lis pendens pending litigation, upon the mere
filing of a sufficient bond by the party on whose title said notice
is annotated.
Section 24, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that
courts can cancel a notice of lis pendens only on two grounds:
(a) after a proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of
molesting the adverse party; or (b) it is not necessary to project
the interest of the party who caused it to be recorded. In the
case at bar, respondent spouses themselves manifested their
intent to temporarily encumber subject properties as security
for a loan required for their business. (p. 4, Rollo) Consequently,
annotation of the notice of lis pendens is essential, considering
that petitioners intend to preserve subject properties for
sentimental reasons, in case they are adjudged the lawful
owners thereof.
WHEREFORE, the assailed order directing the cancellation of the
notice of lis pendens is hereby ANNULLED or SET ASIDE and the
writ Of Preliminary injunction is hereby declared permanent.
SO ORDERED.
On March 2, 1965, Hilaria Isabelo Vda. de Tankeh died. To

protect their rights over the subject properties as compulsory
heirs of the deceased, petitioners caused a notice of lis
pendens to be annotated on the corresponding titles.
On December 21, 1967, respondent Judge ordered the
cancellation of the notice of lis pendens upon private
respondents' filing of a bond in the amount of P100,000.00.
Petitioners filed the instant petition claiming that respondent
Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion because said notice
was necessary to protect their rights in the event of any
intended alienation of the properties. Private respondents,
however, argue that: (a) petitioners' claim that they have no
motive to molest them is self-serving; and (b) the sufficient
bond filed by them (private respondents) renders the notice
of lis pendens unnecessary to protect petitioners' rights, if any.
On January 29, 1968, the Supreme Court enjoined the
respondents from enforcing the assailed order cancelling the
notice of lis pendens.
Later, petitioner Remigio Tan died. His heirs substituted him as
plaintiffs in the said civil case. However, due to oversight, no
formal substitution was made in the present petition.
On October 15, 1979, respondent court rendered its decision
dismissing the complaint. The decision is now pending appeal
before the Intermediate Appellate Court (formerly, the Court of
Appeals).
The Doctrine of Lis pendens is founded upon reasons of public
policy and necessity, the purpose of which is to keep the
properties in litigation within the power of the court until the
litigation is terminated, and to prevent the defeat of the
judgment or decree by subsequent alienation. This purpose
would be rendered meaningless if private respondents are
meikimouse

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Outline: Rule 13 Filing and Service of Pleadings

Lesson for September 2, 2014

Manchester Development Corp. v. CA, G.R. No. 75919, May 7, 1987

Ballatan v. CA, G.R. No. 125683, March 2, 1999

Rivera v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 144934, January 15, 2004

Enriquez v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 139303, August 25, 2005

3. Filing versus service of pleadings - Sec. 2, Rule 13

Elli v. Ditan, G.R. No. L-17444, June 30, 1962

PHHC v. Tiongco, G.R. No. L-18891, November 29, 1964

4. Periods of filing of pleadings - Rule 11

7. Modes of service - Sec. 5, Rule 13

Personal service - Sec. 6, Rule 13

ii. Service by mail - Sec. 7, Rule 13

Cubar v. Mendoza, G.R. No. L-55035, February 23, 1983

Feraren v. Santos, G.R. No. L-41323, April 27, 1982

Magno v. CA, G.R. No. L-58781, July 31, 1987

vi. When service is deemed complete - Sec. 10, Rule 13

Isaac v. Mendoza, G.R. No. L-2820, June 21, 1951

vii. Proof of filing and service - Secs. 12 & 13, Rule 13

Zulueta v. Asia Brewery, Inc., G.R. No. 138137, March 8, 2001

viii. Priorities in modes of service and filing - Sec. 11, Rule 13

Tan v. Lantin, G.R. No. L-28526, July 7, 1986

Case Digest: Rule 13 Filing and Service of Pleadings

Case Digest: Rule 13 Filing and Service of Pleadings

Case Digest: Rule 13 Filing and Service of Pleadings

Case Digest: Rule 13 Filing and Service of Pleadings

Case Digest: Rule 13 Filing and Service of Pleadings

Payment of docket fees

Case Digest: Rule 13 Filing and Service of Pleadings

Case Digest: Rule 13 Filing and Service of Pleadings

Case Digest: Rule 13 Filing and Service of Pleadings

Payment of docket fees

Case Digest: Rule 13 Filing and Service of Pleadings

Filing versus service of pleadings - Sec. 2, Rule 13

The Order appealed from, is hereby set aside.

Case Digest: Rule 13 Filing and Service of Pleadings

Filing versus service of pleadings - Sec. 2, Rule 13

Case Digest: Rule 13 Filing and Service of Pleadings

Manner of filing - Secs. 3 & 4, Rule 13

Case Digest: Rule 13 Filing and Service of Pleadings

Substituted service - Sec. 8, Rule 13

Case Digest: Rule 13 Filing and Service of Pleadings

Case Digest: Rule 13 Filing and Service of Pleadings

Case Digest: Rule 13 Filing and Service of Pleadings

Service of judgments, final orders or resolutions v.

Case Digest: Rule 13 Filing and Service of Pleadings

Proof of filing and service - Secs. 12 & 13, Rule 13

Case Digest: Rule 13 Filing and Service of Pleadings

Lis pendens - Sec. 14, Rule 13

Case Digest: Rule 13 Filing and Service of Pleadings

The Doctrine of Lis pendens is founded upon

Full Text: Rule 13 Filing and Service of Pleadings

Full Text: Rule 13 Filing and Service of Pleadings

As reiterated in the Magaspi case the rule is well-settled "that a

Full Text: Rule 13 Filing and Service of Pleadings

Full Text: Rule 13 Filing and Service of Pleadings

In Lee vs. Republic, the petitioner filed a verified declaration of

In Malimit vs. Degamo, the same principles enunciated in

Again, in Garica vs, Vasquez, this Court reiterated the rule

Then in Magaspi, this Court reiterated the ruling

Full Text: Rule 13 Filing and Service of Pleadings

the plaintiff to rectify the amended complaint by stating the

The question posed, therefore, was whether or not the plaintiff

Applying the principle in Magaspi that "the case is deemed filed

Rule 13 (Outline, Case Digest & Fulltext)

Rule 13 (Outline, Case Digest & Fulltext)