Alcantara v. Alcantara(G.R. No.

167746 August 28, 2007)

FACTS:A petition for annulment of marriage was filed by petitioner Restituto
M. Alcantara against respondent Rosita A. Alcantara alleging thaton
December 8, 1982 she and respondent, without securing the required
marriage license, went to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a
person who could arrange a marriage for them. They met Rev. Aquilino
Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC BR Chapel, who assisted their
wedding for a fee and get married for that same day. Petitioner and
respondent went through another marriage ceremony which was celebrated
without themarriage license at the San Jose de Manuguit Church in Tondo,
Manila, on March 26, 1983. The alleged marriage license, procured in
Carmona, Cavite,appearing on the marriage contract, is a sham, as neither
party was a resident of Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to apply
for a license with thelocal civil registrar. They then have a child in 1985. In
1988, they parted ways and lived separate lives. Petitioner prayed that after
due hearing, judgment beissued declaring their marriage void and ordering
the Civil Registrar to cancel the corresponding marriage contract and its entry
on file. Respondent praysthat the petition for annulment of marriage be
denied for lack of merit. The RTC rendered its Decision in favor of the
Respondent, and dismiss the Petitionfor lack of merit.Petitioner then submits
at the C.A that at the precise time that his marriage with the respondent was
celebrated, there was no marriage license because he andrespondent just
went to the Manila City Hall and dealt with a fixer who arranged everything
for them.
The wedding took place at the stairsin Manila City Hall and not in CDCC BR
Chapel where Rev.Aquilino Navarro who solemnized the marriage belongs.
He and respondent did not goto Carmona, Cavite, to apply for a marriage
license. Assuming a marriage license from Carmona, Cavite, was issued to
them, neither he nor the respondentwas a resident of the place.ISSUE:1.)
Was the absence of the marriage license before the marriage shall render
the marriage void?
Whether or not the marriage license issued in Carmona Cavite was
valid.HELD:To be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage
license, the law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be
apparent on themarriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a
certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was
issued to the parties. In thiscase, the marriage contract between the
petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage license number.Petitioner, in a
faint attempt to demolish the probative value of the marriage license, claims
that neither he nor respondent is a residentof Carmona, Cavite. Even then,
we still hold that there is no sufficient basis to annul petitioner and

respondents marriage. Issuance of a marriage license ina city or

municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting parties, and
issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of publication or prior
tothe completion of the 10-day period for publication are considered mere
irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage. An irregularity in
any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the
party or parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and
administrativelyliable.The certification of Municipal Civil Registrar Macrino L.
Diaz of Carmona, Cavite, reads:This is to certify that as per the registry
Records of Marriage filed in this office, Marriage License No. 7054133 was
issued in favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario
onDecember 8, 1982.Likewise, the issue raised by petitioner -- that they
appeared before a fixer who arranged everything for them and who
facilitated the ceremony before a certain Rev.Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of
the Gospel of the CDCC Br Chapel -- will not strengthen his posture. The
authority of the officer or clergyman shown to have performed a marriage
ceremony will be presumed in the absence of any showing to the contrary.
Moreover, the solemnizingofficer is not duty-bound to investigate whether or
not a marriage license has been duly and regularly issued by the local civil
registrar. All the solemnizingofficer needs to know is that the license has been
issued by the competent official, and it may be presumed from the issuance
of the license that said officialhas fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether the
contracting parties had fulfilled the requirements of law.
WHEREFORE
, premises considered, the instant Petition is
DENIED
for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated 30 September
2004 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 143 of Makati
City, dated 14 February 2000, are
AFFIRMED
. Costs against petitioner.

Republic vs Dayot
Republic vs. Dayot
GR No. 175581, March 28, 2008

FACTS:

Jose and Felisa Dayot were married at the Pasay City Hall on November 24,
1986. In lieu of a marriage license, they executed a sworn affidavit that they
had lived together for at least 5years. On August 1990, Jose contracted
marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual. They were both employees of the
National Statistics and Coordinating Board. Felisa then filed on June 1993 an
action for bigamy against Jose and an administrative complaint with the
Office of the Ombudsman. On the other hand, Jose filed a complaint on July
1993 for annulment and/or declaration of nullity of marriage where he
contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham and his consent was
secured through fraud.

ISSUE: Whether or not Joses marriage with Felisa is valid considering that
they executed a sworn affidavit in lieu of the marriage license requirement.

HELD:
CA indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for
five years at the time they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted
marriage. Jose and Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely
five months before the celebration of their marriage on November 1986.
Findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding in the Supreme Court.
The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of
the law and invalidates a marriage. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation
in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisas cohabitation,
which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement
for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a
quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested
to by the parties under oath. Hence, Jose and Felisas marriage is void ab
initio. The court also ruled that an action for nullity of marriage is
imprescriptible. The right to impugn marriage does not prescribe and may be
raised any time.

Balogbog vs CA
Balogbog vs. CA
GR No. 83598, March 7, 1997
FACTS:
Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog filed an action for partition and accounting

against their Aunt Leoncia and Uncle Gaudioso for partition and accounting of
their grandparents estate at the Court of First Instance of Cebu City which
was granted by the latter. Leoncia and Gaudioso appealed to the Court of
Appeals but the latter affirmed the lower courts decision.
Basilio Balogbog and Genoveva Arnibal died intestate in 1951 and 1961
respectively. They have three children, Leoncia, Gaudioso and Gavino, their
older brother who died in 1935. Ramoncito and Generoso was claiming that
they were the legitimate children of Gavino by Catalina Ubas and that, as
such they were entitled to the one-third share in the estate of their
grandparents. However, Leoncia and Gaudioso claimed they are not aware
that their brother has 2 sons and that he was married. They started to
question the validity of the marriage between their brother Gavino and
Catalina despite how Gaudioso himself admitted during a police investigation
proceeding that indeed Ramonito is his nephew as the latter is the son of his
elder brother Gavino.
In the efforts of Ramoncito and Generoso to prove the validity of their
parents marriage, they presented Priscilo Trazo, 81 years old then mayor of
Asturias from 1928 to 1934 and Matias Pogoy who both testified that he knew
Gavino and Catalina to be husband and wife and that they have three
children. Catalina herself testified that she was handed a receipt
presumably the marriage certificate by Fr. Jomao-as but it was burned during
the war.
On the other hand,Leoncia claimed that her brother Gavino died single at the
family residence in Asturias. She obtained a certificate from the local Civil
Registrar of Asturias to the effect that the office did not have a record of the
names of Gavino and Catalina which was prepared by Assistant Municipal
Treasurer Juan Maranga who testified in the hearing as well.
Leoncia and Gaudioso contended that the marriage of Gavino and Catalina
should have been proven in accordance with Arts. 53 and 54 of the Civil Code
of 1889 because this was the law in force at the time of the alleged marriage
was celebrated.
Art. 53 provides that marriages celebrated under the Civil Code of 1889
should be proven only by a certified copy of the memorandum in the Civil
Registry, unless the books thereof have not been kept or have been lost, or
unless they are questioned in the courts, in which case any other proof, such
as that of the continuous possession by parents of the status of husband and
wife, may be considered, provided that the registration of the birth of their
children as their legitimate children is also submitted in evidence.
ISSUE: Whether or not Gavino and Catalinas marriage is valid.
HELD:
Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the trial court and Court of Appeals

in rendering Gavino and Catalinas marriage as valid and thus entitle

Ramonito and Generoso one third of their grandparents estate.
The court further states that Arts. 42 to 107 of the Civil Code of 889 of Spain
did not take effect, having been suspended by the Governor General of the
Philippines shortly after the extension of that code of this country. Therefore,
Arts. 53 and 54 never came into force. Since this case was brought in the
lower court in 1968, the existence of the marriage must be determined in
accordance with the present Civil Code, which repealed the provisions of the
former Civil Code, except as they related to vested rights, and the rules of
evidence. Under the Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and a
woman conducting themselves as husband and wife are legally married.
Albeit, a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage,
failure to present it would not mean that marriage did not take place. Other
evidence may be presented where in this case evidence consisting of the
testimonies of witnesses was held competent to prove the marriage of Gavino
and Catalina in 1929, that they have three children, one of whom, Petronilo,
died at the age of six and that they are recognized by Gavinos family and by
the public as the legitimate children of Gavino.

AGAPAY vs. PALANGG.R. No. 116668July 28, 1997

Facts:
Miguel Palang contracted his first marriage with Carlina (or Cornelia) on July
16,1949. A few months after the wedding, in October 1949, he left for work in
Hawaii. Miguel
and Carlinas only child,
Herminia Palang, was born on May 12, 1950. During his visit in 1964to the
Philippines, he stayed with his brother in Zambales. The trial court found that
as earlyas 1957, Miguel had attempted to divorce Carlina in Hawaii. When he
returned for good in1972, Miguel refused to stay with Carlina but stayed
alone in a house in Pozorrubio,Pangasinan. On July 15, 1973, 63 yr old Miguel
contracted with second marriage with 19 yrold Erlinda Agapay. Two months
earlier, Miguel and Erlinda jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land
located at San Felipe, Binalonan Pangasinan. A house and lot in
Binalonan,Pangasinan was also purchased by Erlinda as sole vendee. On
October 1975, Miguel andCornelia Palang executed a deed of donation as a
form of compromise agreement. Theparties agreed to donate their conjugal
property to their only child, Herminia Palang. Migueland Erlinda had a son,
Kristopher A. Palang. In 1979, Miguel and Erlinda were convicted of

Concubinage upon Carlinas complaint. Two years later, Miguel

died.On July 11, 1979, Carlina Palang and her daughter Herminia filed an
action forrecovery of ownership and possession of the Riceland and house
and lot both located atBinalonan, Pangasinan allegedly purchased by Miguel
during his cohabitation with ErlindaAgapay. The RTC dismissed the case and
ruled in favour of Agapay. On appeal, the
respondent court reversed the trial courts decision and declared Carlina and
Herminia
Palang the owners of the properties in question.Issue(s):
1.Whether or not the court erred in granting the ownership of the two parcels
of land to Carlina and Herminia Palang?
2.Whether or not the court erred in not declaring Kristopher Palang as
Miguelsillegitimate son and thus entitled to inherit Miguels estate?
3.Whether or not Kristopher Palang should be considered as party-defendant
inthe civil case?Decision:
1.No. Under Art 148 of the Family Code of the Philippines, only properties
acquiredby both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property,or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion
to their respectivecontributions. It must be stressed that actual contribution is
required in this

provision. In the case at bar, Erlinda failed to prove that she contributed
moneyto the purchase of the Riceland in Binalonan, Pangasinan, the court
finds no basisto justify her co-ownership with Miguel over the same.
Consequently, theRiceland should, as correctly held by the CA, revert to the
conjugal partnershipproperty of the deceased Miguel and Carlina Palang.
2.No. The issue is resolved in the respondent courts pronouncement
regardingKristophers heirship and filiation inasmuch as question as to who
are the heirs
of the decedent, proof of filiation of illegitimate children and the
determinationof the estate of the latter and claims thereto should be
ventilated in the properprobate court or in a special proceeding instituted for
that purpose and cannot
be adjudicated in the instant ordinary civil action xxx.
3.Yes. The trial court erred gravely. Kristopher, not having been impleaded,
wastherefore not a party to the case at bar. His mother, Erlinda, cannot be
called his guardian ad litem

for he was not involved in the case at bar.Wherefore, the petition is DENIED
and the decision of the Court of Appeals isAFFIRMED.

Estate of Melodia Ferraris

Filomena ABELLANA DE BACAYO, petitioner-appellant, vs.
Gaudencia FERRARIS, et al., oppositors-appellants.
G.R. No. L-19382, August 31, 1965
FACTS:
Melodia Ferraris left properties in Cebu City consisting of 1/3 share in the estate of her aunt
Rosa Ferraris. Ten years have elapsed since the last time she was known to be alive, she was
declared presumptively dead for purposes of opening her succession and distribute her estate
among heirs. Hence, a petition for the summary settlement of her estate was filed. Melodia left no
surviving descendant, ascendant or spouse, but was survived only by collateral relatives: 1) an
aunt and half-sister of decedents father; and 2) her nieces and nephews who were children of
Melodias only brother of full blood who predeceased her. In the settlement proceeding, Filomena
Abellana de Bacayo, who is the decedents half-sister, was excluded as an heir pursuant to a
resolution issued by the lower court. A motion for reconsideration was denied hence this action.
ISSUE:
Who should inherit the intestate estate of a deceased person when he or she is survived only
by collateral relatives, to wit an aunt and the children of a brother who predeceased him? Or will
the aunt concur with the children of the decedents brother or will the former be excluded by the
latter.
RULING:
As an aunt of the deceased she is as far distant as the nephews from the decedent (three
degrees) since in the collateral line to which both kinds of relatives belong, degrees are counted
by first ascending to the common ancestor and descending to the heir (Art. 966, Civil Code).
Appellant is likewise right in her contention that nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right
of representation unless concurring with brothers or sisters of the deceased, as provided
expressly by Art. 975.
Nevertheless, the trial court was correct when it held that, in case of intestacy, nephews and
nieces exclude all other collaterals (aunts and uncles, first cousins, etc.) from the succession.
This is readily apparent from articles 1001, 1004, 1005, and 1009 of the Civil Code.

Estrada v. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651, August 4, 2003

FACTS: On July 27, 2000, Alejandro Estrada filed a complaint with Judge Coijes
against court interpreter Soledad Escritor for living with a man not her
husband and having a child with him despite of her being married to another
man, and his live-in partner, Luciano Quilapio Jr, married to another woman.
Escritor testified that she was already a widow when she entered the judiciary
in 1999, and that her husband died in 1998. She admitted that she started

living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit of marriage more than
twenty years ago when her husband was still alive. She also admitted that
she and Quilapio have a son. She also admitted that Quilapio was also
married to another woman. But being members of the religious sect known as
the Jehovahs Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society, they
were able to contract a conjugal arrangement in conformity with their
religious beliefs and has the approval of the elders in their congregation. On
July 28, 1991, they executed a "Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness." This
Declaration may only be entered by parties who want to enter a marital
relationship with a person belonging to the same religious sect, but cannot
contract such due to legal impediments. However, witnesses from the
congregation attested that an investigation will first be conducted by their
members to check whether or not the parties contracting the Declaration are
already separated from their spouses. In the case at bar, the congregation
found out that Escritor is separated from her husband who has another
woman, and Quilapio, also separated from his wife. Hence, they were
qualified to execute the Declaration in conformity to their religious belief.

ISSUE: Whether or not Escritor is guilty of immoral conduct for living with a
man not her husband

HELD: Pursuant to the Freedom of Religion clause of the Constitution, the law
recognizes actions which are in accordance to religious beliefs. Escritor
executed a Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness inconformity with her religion,
Jehovahs Witness. Escritor is not guilty of immoral conduct and her conjugal
agreement with Quilapio is valid.