V.

TO THE COURTS
1. CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TOWARDS THE COURTS
2. RESPECT FOR COURTS AND JUDICIAL OFFICERS
ROSE BUNAGAN-BANSIG, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERA, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before us is a Petition for Disbarment dated January 8, 2002 filed by complainant Rose BunaganBansig (Bansig) against respondent Atty. Rogelio Juan A. Celera (respondent) for Gross Immoral
Conduct.
1

In her complaint, Bansig narrated that, on May 8, 1997, respondent and Gracemarie R. Bunagan
(Bunagan), entered into a contract of marriage, as evidenced by a certified xerox copy of the
certificate of marriage issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila. Bansig is the sister of Gracemarie
R. Bunagan, legal wife of respondent.
2

However, notwithstanding respondent's marriage with Bunagan, respondent contracted another

marriage on January 8, 1998 with a certain Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba (Alba), as evidenced by a
certified xerox copy of the certificate of marriage issued by the City Registration Officer of San Juan,
Manila.
3

Bansig stressed that the marriage between respondent and Bunagan was still valid and in full legal
existence when he contracted his second marriage with Alba, and that the first marriage had never
been annulled or rendered void by any lawful authority.
Bansig alleged that respondents act of contracting marriage with Alba, while his marriage is still
subsisting, constitutes grossly immoral and conduct unbecoming of a member of the Bar, which
renders him unfit to continue his membership in the Bar.
In a Resolution dated February 18, 2002, the Court resolved to require respondent to file a comment
on the instant complaint.
4

Respondent failed to submit his comment on the complaint, despite receipt of the copy of the Court's
Resolution, as evidenced by Registry Return Receipt No. 30639. Thus, the Court, in a
Resolution dated March 17, 2003, resolved to require respondent to show cause why he should not
be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for failing to file his comment on the complaint against
him.
5

On December 10, 2002, Bansig filed an Omnibus Ex Parte Motion praying that respondent's failure
to file his comment on the complaint be deemed as a waiver to file the same, and that the case be
submitted for disposition.
7

On May 4, 2003, in a Motion, respondent claimed that while it appeared that an administrative case
was filed against him, he did not know the nature or cause thereof since other than Bansig's
Omnibus Motion, he received no other pleading or any processes of this Court. Respondent,
however, countered that Bansig's Omnibus Motion was merely a ploy to frighten him and his wife
from pursuing the criminal complaints for falsification of public documents they filed against Bansig
and her husband. He also explained that he was able to obtain a copy of the Court's Show Cause
Order only when he visited his brother who is occupying their former residence at 59-B Aguho St.,
Project 3, Quezon City. Respondent further averred that he also received a copy of Bansig's
Omnibus Motion when the same was sent to his law office address.
Respondent pointed out that having been the family's erstwhile counsel and her younger sister's
husband, Bansig knew his law office address, but she failed to send a copy of the complaint to him.
Respondent suspected that Bansig was trying to mislead him in order to prevent him from defending
himself. He added that Bansig has an unpaid obligation amounting to P2,000,000.00 to his wife
which triggered a sibling rivalry. He further claimed that he and his wife received death threats from
unknown persons; thus, he transferred to at least two (2) new residences, i.e., in Sampaloc, Manila
and Angeles City. He then prayed that he be furnished a copy of the complaint and be given time to
file his answer to the complaint.
In a Resolution dated July 7, 2003, the Court resolved to (a) require Bansig to furnish respondent
with a copy of the administrative complaint and to submit proof of such service; and (b) require
respondent to file a comment on the complaint against him.
8

In compliance, Bansig submitted an Affidavit of Mailing to show proof that a copy of the
administrative complaint was furnished to respondent at his given address which is No. 238
Mayflower St., Ninoy Aquino Subdivision, Angeles City, as evidenced by Registry Receipt No. 2167.

On March 17, 2004, considering that respondent failed anew to file his comment despite receipt of
the complaint, the Court resolved to require respondent to show cause why he should not be
disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such failure.
10

On June 3, 2004, respondent, in his Explanation, reiterated that he has yet to receive a copy of the
complaint. He claimed that Bansig probably had not complied with the Court's Order, otherwise, he
would have received the same already. He requested anew that Bansig be directed to furnish him a
copy of the complaint.
11

Again, on August 25, 2004, the Court granted respondent's prayer that he be furnished a copy of the
complaint, and required Bansig to furnish a copy of the complaint to respondent.
12

On October 1, 2004, Bansig, in her Manifestation, lamented the dilatory tactics allegedly
undertaken by respondent in what was supposedly a simple matter of receipt of complaint. Bansig
asserted that the Court should sanction respondent for his deliberate and willful act to frustrate the
actions of the Court. She attached a copy of the complaint and submitted an Affidavit of Mailing
stating that again a copy of the complaint was mailed at respondent's residential address in Angeles
City as shown by Registry Receipt No. 3582.
13

On May 16, 2005, the Court anew issued a Show Cause Order to respondent as to why he should
not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for failure to comply with the Resolution dated July
7, 2003 despite service of copy of the complaint by registered mail.
14

On August 1, 2005, the Court noted the returned and unserved copy of the Show Cause Order dated
May 16, 2005 sent to respondent at 238 Mayflower St., Ninoy Aquino Subd. under Registry Receipt
No. 55621, with notation "RTS-Moved." It likewise required Bansig to submit the correct and present
address of respondent.
15

On September 12, 2005, Bansig manifested that respondent had consistently indicated in his
correspondence with the Court No. 238 Mayflower St., Ninoy Aquino Subdivision, Angeles City as
his residential address. However, all notices served upon him on said address were returned with a
note "moved" by the mail server. Bansig averred that in Civil Case No. 59353, pending before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 1, Tuguegarao City, respondent entered his appearance as
counsel with mailing address to be at "Unit 8, Halili Complex, 922 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon
City."
16

On February 13, 2006, the Court resolved to resend a copy of the Show Cause Order dated May 16,
2005 to respondent at his new address at Unit 8, Halili Complex, 922 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon
City.
17

On June 30, 2008, due to respondent's failure to comply with the Show Cause Order dated May 16,
2005, for failure to file his comment on this administrative complaint as required in the Resolution
dated July 7, 2003, the Court resolved to: (a) IMPOSE upon Atty. Celera a FINE of P1,000.00
payable to the court, or a penalty of imprisonment of five (5) days if said fine is not paid, and (b)
REQUIRE Atty. Celera to COMPLY with the Resolution dated July 7, 2003 by filing the comment
required thereon.
18

In a Resolution dated January 27, 2010, it appearing that respondent failed to comply with the
Court's Resolutions dated June 30, 2008 and July 7, 2003, the Court resolved to: (1) DISPENSE
with the filing by respondent of his comment on the complaint; (2) ORDER the arrest of Atty. Celera;
and (3) DIRECT the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to (a) ARREST and
DETAIN Atty. Celera for non-compliance with the Resolution dated June 30, 2008; and (b) SUBMIT a
report of compliance with the Resolution. The Court likewise resolved to REFER the complaint to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation.
19

20

However, the Return of Warrant dated March 24, 2010, submitted by Atty. Frayn M. Banawa,
Investigation Agent II, Anti-Graft Division of the NBI, showed that respondent cannot be located
because neither Halili Complex nor No. 922 Aurora Blvd., at Cubao, Quezon City cannot be located.
During surveillance, it appeared that the given address, i.e., No. 922 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon
City was a vacant lot with debris of a demolished building. Considering that the given address
cannot be found or located and there were no leads to determine respondent's whereabouts, the
warrant of arrest cannot be enforced.
21

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, meanwhile, in compliance with the Court's Resolution,
reported that as per their records, the address of respondent is at No. 41 Hoover St., Valley View
Royale Subd., Taytay, Rizal.

Respondent likewise failed to appear before the mandatory conference and hearings set by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), despite several notices.
Thus, in an Order dated August 4, 2010, Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, of the IBP-CBD,
declared respondent to be in default and the case was submitted for report and recommendation.
The Order of Default was received by respondent as evidenced by a registry return receipt.
However, respondent failed to take any action on the matter.
On January 3, 2011, the IBP-CBD, in its Report and Recommendation, recommended that
respondent Atty. Celera be suspended for a period of two (2) years from the practice of law.
RULING
A disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal, but is rather an
investigation by the court into the conduct of its officers. The issue to be determined is whether
respondent is still fit to continue to be an officer of the court in the dispensation of justice. Hence, an
administrative proceeding for disbarment continues despite the desistance of a complainant, or
failure of the complainant to prosecute the same, or in this case, the failure of respondent to answer
the charges against him despite numerous notices.
22

In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial evidence,
the allegations in the complaint. Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. For the Court to exercise
its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established by clear, convincing
and satisfactory proof. Considering the serious consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a
member of the Bar, this Court has consistently held that clear preponderant evidence is necessary to
justify the imposition of the administrative penalty.
23

In the instant case, there is a preponderance of evidence that respondent contracted a second
marriage despite the existence of his first marriage. The first marriage, as evidenced by the certified
xerox copy of the Certificate of Marriage issued on October 3, 2001 by the City Civil Registry of
Manila, Gloria C. Pagdilao, states that respondent Rogelio Juan A. Celera contracted marriage on
May, 8, 1997 with Gracemarie R. Bunagan at the Church of Saint Augustine, Intramuros, Manila; the
second marriage, however, as evidenced by the certified xerox copy of the Certificate of Marriage
issued on October 4, 2001 by the City Civil Registry of San Juan, Manila, states that respondent
Rogelio Juan A. Celera contracted marriage on January 8, 1998 with Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba at
the Mary the Queen Church, Madison St., Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila.
Bansig submitted certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates to prove that respondent entered
into a second marriage while the latters first marriage was still subsisting. We note that the second
marriage apparently took place barely a year from his first marriage to Bunagan which is indicative
that indeed the first marriage was still subsisting at the time respondent contracted the second
marriage with Alba.
The certified xerox copies of the marriage contracts, issued by a public officer in custody thereof, are
admissible as the best evidence of their contents, as provided for under Section 7 of Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court, to wit:

Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. When the original of a
document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be
proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof.
Moreover, the certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates, other than being admissible in
evidence, also clearly indicate that respondent contracted the second marriage while the first
marriage is subsisting. By itself, the certified xerox copies of the marriage certificates would already
have been sufficient to establish the existence of two marriages entered into by respondent. The
certified xerox copies should be accorded the full faith and credence given to public documents. For
purposes of this disbarment proceeding, these Marriage Certificates bearing the name of respondent
are competent and convincing evidence to prove that he committed bigamy, which renders him unfit
to continue as a member of the Bar.
24

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law,
nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the
legal profession.
Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of
the Bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. His act
of contracting a second marriage while his first marriage is subsisting constituted grossly immoral
conduct and are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.
25

This case cannot be fully resolved, however, without addressing rather respondents defiant stance
against the Court as demonstrated by his repetitive disregard of its Resolution requiring him to file
his comment on the complaint. This case has dragged on since 2002. In the span of more than 10
years, the Court has issued numerous directives for respondent's compliance, but respondent
seemed to have preselected only those he will take notice of and the rest he will just ignore. The
Court has issued several resolutions directing respondent to comment on the complaint against him,
yet, to this day, he has not submitted any answer thereto. He claimed to have not received a copy of
the complaint, thus, his failure to comment on the complaint against him. Ironically, however,
whenever it is a show cause order, none of them have escaped respondent's attention. Even
assuming that indeed the copies of the complaint had not reached him, he cannot, however, feign
ignorance that there is a complaint against him that is pending before this Court which he could have
easily obtained a copy had he wanted to.
The Court has been very tolerant in dealing with respondent's nonchalant attitude towards this case;
accommodating respondent's endless requests, manifestations and prayers to be given a copy of
the complaint. The Court, as well as Bansig, as evidenced by numerous affidavits of service, have
relentlessly tried to reach respondent for more than a decade; sending copies of the Court's
Resolutions and complaint to different locations - both office and residential addresses of
respondent. However, despite earnest efforts of the Court to reach respondent, the latter, however
conveniently offers a mere excuse of failure to receive the complaint. When said excuse seemed no

longer feasible, respondent just disappeared. In a manner of speaking, respondents acts were
deliberate, maneuvering the liberality of the Court in order to delay the disposition of the case and to
evade the consequences of his actions. Ultimately, what is apparent is respondents deplorable
disregard of the judicial process which this Court cannot countenance.
Clearly, respondent's acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful orders of this Court, which
under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is in itself alone a sufficient cause for suspension
or disbarment. Respondents cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the Supreme Court
constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial institution. Respondents conduct indicates a high degree
of irresponsibility. We have repeatedly held that a Courts Resolution is "not to be construed as a
mere request, nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively." Respondents
obstinate refusal to comply with the Courts orders "not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in his
character; it also underscores his disrespect of the Court's lawful orders which is only too deserving
of reproof."
26

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court grounds therefor. - A member of
the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason
of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
Considering respondent's propensity to disregard not only the laws of the land but also the lawful
orders of the Court, it only shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good
demeanor. He is, thus, unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we find respondent ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERA, guilty
of grossly immoral conduct and willful disobedience of lawful orders rendering him unworthy of
continuing membership in the legal profession. He is thus ordered DISBARRED from the practice of
law and his name stricken of the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately.
1wphi1

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, which shall forthwith record it
in the personal file of respondent. All the Courts of the Philippines and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines shall disseminate copies thereof to all its Chapters.
SO ORDERED.
HON. MARIBETH RODRIGUEZ-MANAHAN, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court, San Mateo,
Rizal,Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RODOLFO FLORES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Respondent Atty. Rodolto Flores (Atty. Flores) was counsel for the defendant in Civil Case No. 1863
captioned as Marsha Aranas plaintiff versus Arnold Balmores defendant a suit for damages filed
before the Municipal Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal and presided by herein complainant Judge
Maribeth Rodriguez-Manahan (Judge Manahan). During the proceedings in Civil Case No. 1863,
Judge Manahan issued an Order dated January 12, 2011, whereby she voluntarily inhibited from
hearing Civil Case No. 1863. The said Order reads in part, viz:
1

More than mere contempt do his (Atty. Flores) unethical actuations, his traits of dishonesty and
discourtesy not only to his own brethren in the legal profession, but also to the bench and judges,
would amount to grave misconduct, if not a malpractice of law, a serious ground for disciplinary
action of a member of the bar pursuant to Rules 139 a & b.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, furnish a copy of this Order to the Bar Discipline Committee, Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, to the Supreme Court en banc, for appropriate investigation and sanction.
2

Upon receipt of the copy of the above Order, the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) deemed the
pronouncements of Judge Manahan as a formal administrative Complaint against Atty. Flores.
Docketed as A.C. No. 8954, the case was referred to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court
of Rizal for investigation, report and recommendation.
3

In her Investigation, Report and Recommendation, Investigating Judge Josephine Zarate Fernandez
(Investigating Judge) narrated the antecedents of the case as follows:
4

A complaint for Damages was filed before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Mateo, Rizal
docketed as Civil Case No. 1863, entitled Marsha Aranas vs. Arnold Balmores. The Public Attorneys
Office (PAO) thru Atty. Ferdinand P. Censon represented the complainant while Atty. Rodolfo Flores
appeared as counsel for the defendant.
x x x During the Preliminary Conference x x x, respondent Atty. Flores entered his appearance and
was given time to file a Pre-Trial Brief. x x x On May 24, 2010, respondent Atty. Flores filed his PreTrial Brief but without proof of MCLE compliance hence it was expunged from the records without
prejudice to the filing of another Pre-Trial Brief containing the required MCLE compliance. x x x Atty.
Flores asked for ten (10) days to submit proof.
The preliminary conference was reset several times (August 11, September 8) for failure of
respondent Atty. Flores to appear and submit his Pre-Trial Brief indicating thereon his MCLE
compliance. The court a quo likewise issued Orders dated September 15 and October 20, 2010
giving respondent Atty. Flores a last chance to submit his Pre-Trial Brief with stern warning that
failure to do so shall be considered a waiver on his part.
Meanwhile, respondent Atty. Flores filed a Manifestation in Court dated September 14, 2010 stating
among others, the following allegations:
xxxx
4. When you took your oath as member of the Bar, you promised to serve truth,
justice and fair play. Do you think you are being truthful, just and fair by serving a
cheater?

5. Ignorance of the law excuses no one for which reason even Erap was convicted
by the Sandiganbayan. But even worse is a lawyer who violates the law.
1wphi1

6. Last but not the least, God said Thou shall not lie. Again the Philippine Constitution
commands: Give every Filipino his due. The act of refusal by the plaintiff is violative
of the foregoing divine and human laws.
xxxx
Respondent Atty. Flores later filed his Pre-Trial Brief bearing an MCLE number which was merely
superimposed without indicating the date and place of compliance. During the preliminary
conference on November 24, 2010, respondent Atty. Flores manifested that he will submit proof of
compliance of his MCLE on the following day. On December 1, 2010, respondent Atty. Flores again
failed to appear and to submit the said promised proof of MCLE compliance. In its stead, respondent
Atty. Flores filed a Letter of even date stating as follows:
If only to give your Honor another chance to prove your pro plaintiff sentiment, I am hereby filing the
attached Motion which you may once more assign to the waste basket of nonchalance.
With the small respect that still remains, I have asked the defendant to look for another lawyer to
represent him for I am no longer interested in this case because I feel I cannot do anything right in
your sala.
5

The Investigating Judge found Atty. Flores to have failed to give due respect to the court by failing to
obey court orders, by failing to submit proof of his compliance with the Mandatory Continuing Legal
Education (MCLE) requirement, and for using intemperate language in his pleadings. The
Investigating Judge recommended that Atty. Flores be suspended from the practice of law for one
year.
6

The OBC adopted the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Judge.

Our Ruling
There is no doubt that Atty. Flores failed to obey the trial courts order to submit proof of his MCLE
compliance notwithstanding the several opportunities given him. "Court orders are to be respected
not because the judges who issue them should be respected, but because of the respect and
consideration that should be extended to the judicial branch of the Government. This is absolutely
essential if our Government is to be a government of laws and not of men. Respect must be had not
because of the incumbents to the positions, but because of the authority that vests in them.
Disrespect to judicial incumbents is disrespect to that branc the Government to which they belong,
as well as to the State which has instituted the judicial system."
8

Atty. Flores also employed intemperate language in his pleadings. As an officer of the court, Atty.
Flores is expected to be circumspect in his language. Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility enjoins all attorneys to abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing
language or behavior before the Courts. Atty. Flores failed in this respect.
At this juncture, it is well to remind respondent that:

While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client full devotion to his client's genuine
interest and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client's rights, as well as the exertion
of his utmost learning and ability, he must do so only within the bounds of law. A lawyer is entitled to
voice his c1iticism within the context of the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech which
must be exercised responsibly. After all, every right carries with it the corresponding obligation.
Freedom is not freedom from responsibility, but freedom with responsibility. The lawyer's fidelity to
his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth and orderly administration of justice. It must be
done within the confines of reason and common sense.
9

However, we find the recommended penalty too harsh and not commensurate with the infractions
committed by the respondent. It appears that this is the first infraction committed by respondent.
Also, we are not prepared to impose on the respondent the penalty of one-year suspension for
humanitarian reasons. Respondent manifested before this Court that he has been in the practice of
law for half a century. Thus, he is already in his twilight years. Considering the foregoing, we deem
it proper to fine respondent in the amount of P5,000.00 and to remind him to be more circumspect in
his acts and to obey and respect court processes.
10

ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Rodolfo Flores is FINED in the amount of P5,000.00 with STERN
WARNING that the repetition of a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
IN RE: PUBLISHED ALLEGED THREATS AGAINST MEMBERS OF THE COURT IN THE
PLUNDER LAW CASE HURLED BY ATTY. LEONARD DE VERA
KAPUNAN, J.:
On December 11, 2001, the court En Banc issued the following Resolution directing respondent Atty.
Leonard De Vera to explain why he should not be cited for indirect contempt of court for uttering
some allegedly contemptuous statements in relation to the case involving the constitutionality of the
Plunder Law (Republic Act No. 7080)1 which was then pending resolution:
Quoted hereunder are newspaper articles with contemptuous statements attributed to Atty.
Leonard De Vera concerning the Plunder Law case while the same was still pending before
the Court. The statements are italicized for ready identification:
PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER
Tuesday, November 6, 2001
Erap camp blamed for oust-Badoy maneuvers
Plunder Law
De Vera asked the Supreme Court to dispel rumors that it would vote in favor of a
petition filed by Estradas lawyers to declare the plunder law unconstitutional for its
supposed vagueness.

De Vera said he and his group were "greatly disturbed" by the rumors from Supreme
Court insiders.
Reports said that Supreme Court justices were tied 6-6 over the constitutionality of
the Plunder Law, with two other justices still undecided and uttered most likely to
inhibit, said Plunder Watch, a coalition formed by civil society and militant groups to
monitor the prosecution of Estrada.
"We are afraid that the Estrada camps effort to coerce, bribe, or influence the
justices ---considering that it has a P500 million slush fund from the aborted power
grab that May-will most likely result in pro-Estrada decision declaring the Plunder
Law either unconstitutional or vague, " the group said.
PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER
Monday, November 19, 2001
SC under pressure from Erap pals, foes
xxx
"People are getting dangerously passionate...emotionally charged." Said lawyer
Leonard de Vera of the Equal Justice for All Movement and a leading member of the
Estrada Resign movement.
He voiced his concern that a decision by the high tribunal rendering the plunder law
unconstitutional would trigger mass actions, probably more massive than those that
led to People Power II.
xxx
De Vera warned of a crisis far worse than the "jueteng" scandal that led to People
Power II if the rumor turned out to be true.
"People wouldnt just swallow any Supreme Court decision that is basically wrong.
Sovereignty must prevail."
WHEREFORE, the court resolved to direct Atty. Leonard De Vera to explain within a nonextendible period of ten (10) days from notice why he should not be punished for contempt of
court.
SO ORDERED.2
In his Answer, respondent admitted the report in the November 6, 2002 issue of the Inquirer that he
"suggested that the Court must take steps to dispel once and for all these ugly rumors and reports"
that "the Court would vote in favor of or against the validity of the Plunder Law" to protect the
credibility of the Court.3 He explained therein:

(4) In short, the integrity of the Court, including the names of the Honorable Members who
were being unfairly dragged and maliciously rumored to be in favor or against one side of the
issue, was being viciously attacked. To remain silent at this time when the Honorable Court
was under siege by what appeared to be an organized effort to influence the court in their
decision would and could lend credence to these reports coming from anonymous sources. 4
Respondent admitted further to "having appealed to the Supreme Court to dispel rumors that it
would vote in favor of a petition by [former President Joseph] Estradas lawyers to declare the
plunder [law] unconstitutional for its supposed vagueness" because he and his group were "greatly
disturbed" by such rumors.5
Anent the November 19, 2001 report in the Inquirer quoting respondent as having said that the
people were "getting dangerously passionate...emotionally charged," pending the courts resolution
on the petition filed by former President Estrada assailing the validity of the Plunder Law, respondent
claimed that such statement was "factually accurate."6 He also argued that he was merely exercising
his constitutionally guaranteed right to freedom of speech when he said that a decision by the Court
declaring the Plunder Law unconstitutional "would trigger mass actions, probably more massive than
those that led to People Power II."7
Furthermore, respondent justified his statement and said that "the people wouldnt just swallow any
Supreme Court decision that is basically wrong" as an expression of his opinion and as "historically
correct," citing the ouster of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos through people power in 1986,
and the resignation of former President Estrada from office as a result of pressure from the people
who gathered at EDSA to demand the impeachment process be stopped for being a farce, and that
Estrada step down because he no longer had the mandate of the Filipino people. 8
While he admitted to having uttered the aforecited statements, respondent denied having made the
same to degrade the Court, to destroy public confidence in it and to bring it into disrepute. 9
After a careful consideration of respondents arguments, the Court finds his explanation
unsatisfactory and hereby finds him guilty of indirect contempt of court for uttering statements aimed
at influencing and threatening the Court in deciding in favor of the constitutionality of the Plunder
Law.
The judiciary, as the branch of government tasked to administer justice, to settle justiciable
controversies or disputes involving enforceable and demandable rights, and to afford redress of
wrongs for the violation of said rights10 must be allowed to decide cases independently, free of
outside influence or pressure. An independent judiciary is essential to the maintenance of
democracy, as well as of peace and order in society. Further, maintaining the dignity of courts and
enforcing the duty of citizens to respect them are necessary adjuncts to the administration of
justice.11
Thus, Rule 71, Section 3 (d) of the Revised Rules of Court authorizes the courts to hold liable for
criminal contempt a person guilty of conduct that is directed against the dignity or authority of the
court, or of an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court into
disrepute or disrespect.12
Respondent cannot justify his contemptuous statements--asking the Court to dispel rumors that it
would declare the Plunder Law unconstitutional, and stating that a decision declaring it as such was

basically wrong and would not be accepted by the peopleas utterances protected by his right to
freedom of speech.
Indeed, freedom of speech includes the right to know and discuss judicial proceedings, but such
right does not cover statements aimed at undermining the Courts integrity and authority, and
interfering with the administration of justice. Freedom of speech is not absolute, and must
occasionally be balanced with the requirements of equally important public interests, such as the
maintenance of the integrity of the courts and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. 13
Thus, the making of contemptuous statements directed against the Court is not an exercise of free
speech; rather, it is an abuse of such right. Unwarranted attacks on the dignity of the courts cannot
be disguised as free speech, for the exercise of said right cannot be used to impair the
independence and efficiency of courts or public respect therefor and confidence therein.14 It is a
traditional conviction of civilized society everywhere that courts should be immune from every
extraneous influence as they resolve the issues presented before them. 15 The court has previously
held that-xxx As important as the maintenance of an unmuzzled press and the free exercise of the
right of the citizen, is the maintenance of the independence of the judiciary. xxx This Court
must be permitted to proceed with the disposition of its business in an orderly manner free
from outside interference obstructive of its constitutional functions. This right will be insisted
upon as vital to an impartial court, and, as a last resort, as an individual exercises the right of
self-defense, it will act to preserve its existence as an unprejudiced tribunal. 16
In People vs. Godoy,17 this Court explained that while a citizen may comment upon the proceedings
and decisions of the court and discuss their correctness, and even express his opinions on the
fitness or unfitness of the judges for their stations, and the fidelity with which they perform the
important public trusts reposed in them, he has no right to attempt to degrade the court, destroy
public confidence in it, and encourage the people to disregard and set naught its orders, judgments
and decrees. Such publications are said to be an abuse of the liberty of speech and of the press, for
they tend to destroy the very foundation of good order and well-being in society by obstructing the
course of justice.18
Clearly, respondents utterances pressuring the Court to rule in favor of the constitutionality of the
Plunder Law or risk another series of mass actions by the public cannot be construed as falling
within the ambit of constitutionally-protected speech, because such statements are not fair criticisms
of any decision of the Court, but obviously are threats made against it to force the Court to decide
the issue in a particular manner, or risk earning the ire of the public. Such statements show
disrespect not only for the Court but also for the judicial system as a whole, tend to promote distrust
and undermine public confidence in the judiciary, by creating the impression that the Court cannot be
trusted to resolve cases impartially and violate the right of the parties to have their case tried fairly by
an independent tribunal, uninfluenced by public clamor and other extraneous influences.19
It is respondents duty as an officer of the court, to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts and
to promote confidence in the fair administration of justice20 and in the Supreme Court as the last
bulwark of justice and democracy. Respondents utterances as quoted above, while the case
of Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan was pending consideration by this Court, belies his protestation of
good faith but were clearly made to mobilize public opinion and bring pressure on the Court.

 WHEREFORE, Atty. Leonard De Vera is found GUILTY of indirect contempt of court and is
hereby FINED in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) to be paid within ten
(10) days from receipt of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of
the University of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and
Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court."
RESOLUTION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Plagiarism is the act of appropriating the literary composition of another, or parts or passages of his
writings, or the ideas or language of the same, and passing them off as the product of ones own
mind.1
Allegations of this intellectual offense were hurled by Atty. Harry L. Roque, Jr. and Atty. Romel R.
Bagares against Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo for his ponencia in the case of Vinuya v. Executive
Secretary, G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010. In said case, the Court denied the petition for certiorari
filed by Filipino comfort women to compel certain officers of the executive department 2 to espouse
their claims for reparation and demand apology from the Japanese government for the abuses
committed against them by the Japanese soldiers during World War II. Attys. Roque and Bagares
represent the comfort women in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, which is presently the subject of a
motion for reconsideration.
The authors and their purportedly plagiarized articles are: (1) Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Decent
from their article, "A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens" published in 2009 in the Yale Journal of
International Law; (2) Christian J. Tams from his book, "Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations in
International Law" published by the Cambridge University Press in 2005; and (3) Mark Ellis from his
article, "Breaking the Silence: On Rape as an International Crime" published in the Case Western
Reserve Journal of International Law in 2006. The allegations of plagiarism centered on Justice Del
Castillos discussion of the principles of jus cogens and erga omnes.
On August 9, 2010, Attys. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Froilan M. Bacungan, Pacifico A. Agabin, Merlin M.
Magallona, Salvador T. Carlota, Carmelo V. Sison, Patricia R.P. Salvador Daway, Dante B.
Gatmaytan, Theodore O. Te, Florin T. Hilbay, Jay L. Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo) D. Battad, Gwen G.
De Vera, Solomon F. Lumba, Rommel J. Casis, Jose Gerardo A. Alampay, Miguel R. Armovit, Arthur
P. Autea, Rosa Maria J. Bautista, Mark R. Bocobo, Dan P. Calica, Tristan A. Catindig, Sandra Marie
O. Coronel, Rosario O. Gallo, Concepcion L. Jardeleza, Antonio G.M. La Via, Carina C. Laforteza,
Jose C. Laureta, Owen J. Lynch, Rodolfo Noel S. Quimbo, Antonio M. Santos, Gmeleen Faye B.
Tomboc, Nicholas Felix L. Ty, Evalyn G. Ursua, Raul V. Vasquez, Susan D. Villanueva, and Dina D.
Lucenario, members of the faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law published a
statement on the allegations of plagiarism and misrepresentation relative to the Courts decision in
Vinuya v. Executive Secretary. Essentially, the faculty of the UP College of Law, headed by its dean,
Atty. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, calls for the resignation of Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo in the face of
allegations of plagiarism in his work.

Notably, while the statement was meant to reflect the educators opinion on the allegations of
plagiarism against Justice Del Castillo, they treated such allegation not only as an established fact,
but a truth. In particular, they expressed dissatisfaction over Justice Del Castillos explanation on
how he cited the primary sources of the quoted portions and yet arrived at a contrary conclusion to
those of the authors of the articles supposedly plagiarized.
Beyond this, however, the statement bore certain remarks which raise concern for the Court. The
opening sentence alone is a grim preamble to the institutional attack that lay ahead. It reads:
An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave Filipinas who had
suffered abuse during a time of war.
The first paragraph concludes with a reference to the decision in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary as a
reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land. The authors
also not only assumed that Justice Del Castillo committed plagiarism, they went further by directly
accusing the Court of perpetrating extraordinary injustice by dismissing the petition of the comfort
women in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary. They further attempt to educate this Court on how to go
about the review of the case.
The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations of deliberately delaying the
resolution of the said case, its dismissal on the basis of "polluted sources," the Courts alleged
indifference to the cause of petitioners, as well as the supposed alarming lack of concern of the
members of the Court for even the most basic values of decency and respect. Paragraph 9 of their
published statement reads,
But instead of acting with urgency on this case, the Court delayed its resolution for almost seven
years, oblivious to the deaths of many of the petitioners seeking justice from the Court. When it
dismissed the Vinuya petition based on misrepresented and plagiarized materials, the Court decided
this case based on polluted sources. By doing so, the Supreme Court added insult to injury by failing
to actually exercise its "power to urge and exhort the Executive Department to take up the claims of
the Vinuya petitioners. Its callous disposition, coupled with false sympathy and nonchalance, belies
(sic) [betrays] a more alarming lack of concern for even the most basic values of decency and
respect. (Emphasis supplied).
1avvphi1

The publication of a statement by the faculty of the UP College of Law regarding the allegations of
plagiarism and misrepresentation in the Supreme Court was totally unnecessary, uncalled for and a
rash act of misplaced vigilance. Of public knowledge is the ongoing investigation precisely to
determine the truth of such allegations. More importantly, the motion for reconsideration of the
decision alleged to contain plagiarized materials is still pending before the Court. We made it clear in
the case of In re Kelly3 that any publication, pending a suit, reflecting upon the court, the jury, the
parties, the officers of the court, the counsel with reference to the suit, or tending to influence the
decision of the controversy, is contempt of court and is punishable.
While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to maintaining a free and democratic
society, there is also a general consensus that healthy criticism only goes so far. Many types of
criticism leveled at the judiciary cross the line to become harmful and irresponsible attacks. These
potentially devastating attacks and unjust criticism can threaten the independence of the
judiciary.4 The court must "insist on being permitted to proceed to the disposition of its business in an

orderly manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass
the administration of justice."5
The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the facultys less than objective
comments except to discredit the April 28, 2010 Decision in the Vinuya case and undermine the
Courts honesty, integrity and competence in addressing the motion for its reconsideration. As if the
case on the comfort womens claims is not controversial enough, the UP Law faculty would fan the
flames and invite resentment against a resolution that would not reverse the said decision. This runs
contrary to their obligation as law professors and officers of the Court to be the first to uphold the
dignity and authority of this Court, to which they owe fidelity according to the oath they have taken as
attorneys, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice.6 Their actions likewise
constitute violations of Canons 10, 11, and 137 and Rules 1.02 and 11.058 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.9
1awp++il

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, Attys. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Froilan M. Bacungan, Pacifico
A. Agabin, Merlin M. Magallona, Salvador T. Carlota, Carmelo V. Sison, Patricia R.P. Salvador
Daway, Dante B. Gatmaytan, Theodore O. Te, Florin T. Hilbay, Jay L. Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo) D.
Battad, Gwen G. De Vera, Solomon F. Lumba, Rommel J. Casis, Jose Gerardo A. Alampay, Miguel
R. Armovit, Arthur P. Autea, Rosa Maria J. Bautista, Mark R. Bocobo, Dan P. Calica, Tristan A.
Catindig, Sandra Marie O. Coronel, Rosario O. Gallo, Concepcion L. Jardeleza, Antonio G.M. La
Via, Carina C. Laforteza, Jose C. Laureta, Owen J. Lynch, Rodolfo Noel S. Quimbo, Antonio M.
Santos, Gmeleen Faye B. Tomboc, Nicholas Felix L. Ty, Evalyn G. Ursua, Raul V. Vasquez, Susan
D. Villanueva, and Dina D. Lucenario, members of the faculty of the University of the Philippines
College of Law, are directed to SHOW CAUSE, within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy of this
Resolution, why they should not be disciplined as members of the Bar for violation of Canons 10, 11,
and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Further, Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen is directed to SHOW CAUSE, within ten (10) days from receipt
of this Resolution, why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with for violation of Canon 10, Rules
10.01, 10.02 and 10.03 for submitting, through his letter dated August 10, 2010, during the pendency
of G.R. No. 162230, Vinuya v. Executive Secretary and of the investigation before the Committee on
Ethics and Ethical Standards, for the consideration of the Court En Banc, a dummy which is not a
true and faithful reproduction of the purported statement, entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by
the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and
Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court." Enclosed are copies of the said dummy and signed
statement, respectively, attached to the said letter dated August 10, 2010 and to the Compliance
dated August 31, 2010 filed by Roque & Butuyan Law Offices with the Committee on Ethics and
Ethical Standards.
Let this matter be DOCKETED as a regular administrative matter.
Let service of this Resolution upon the above-named UP College of Law faculty members be
effected by personal delivery.
SO ORDERED.
ANTERO J. POBRE, Complainant,
vs.
Sen. MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, Respondent.

DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
In his sworn letter/complaint dated December 22, 2006, with enclosures, Antero J. Pobre invites the
Courts attention to the following excerpts of Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiagos speech delivered
on the Senate floor:
x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am
humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle
years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio
Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief
Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not in the
Supreme Court of idiots x x x.
To Pobre, the foregoing statements reflected a total disrespect on the part of the speaker towards
then Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and the other members of the Court and constituted direct
contempt of court. Accordingly, Pobre asks that disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary actions
be taken against the lady senator.
In her comment on the complaint dated April 25, 2007, Senator Santiago, through counsel, does not
deny making the aforequoted statements. She, however, explained that those statements were
covered by the constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity, being part of a speech she
delivered in the discharge of her duty as member of Congress or its committee. The purpose of her
speech, according to her, was to bring out in the open controversial anomalies in governance with a
view to future remedial legislation. She averred that she wanted to expose what she believed "to be
an unjust act of the Judicial Bar Council [JBC]," which, after sending out public invitations for
nomination to the soon to-be vacated position of Chief Justice, would eventually inform applicants
that only incumbent justices of the Supreme Court would qualify for nomination. She felt that the JBC
should have at least given an advanced advisory that non-sitting members of the Court, like her,
would not be considered for the position of Chief Justice.
The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted primarily on the provision of Article VI, Section 11 of
the Constitution, which provides: "A Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall, in all
offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the
Congress is in session. No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place
for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof." Explaining the import of
the underscored portion of the provision, the Court, in Osmea, Jr. v. Pendatun, said:
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in
every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose "is
to enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness
and success" for "it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech and
that he should be protected from resentment of every one, however, powerful, to whom the exercise
of that liberty may occasion offense."1
As American jurisprudence puts it, this legislative privilege is founded upon long experience and
arises as a means of perpetuating inviolate the functioning process of the legislative department.
Without parliamentary immunity, parliament, or its equivalent, would degenerate into a polite and

ineffective debating forum. Legislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of
their legislative duties, not for their private indulgence, but for the public good. The privilege would
be of little value if they could be subjected to the cost and inconvenience and distractions of a trial
upon a conclusion of the pleader, or to the hazard of a judgment against them based upon a judges
speculation as to the motives.2
This Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in the forefront in upholding the institution of
parliamentary immunity and promotion of free speech. Neither has the Court lost sight of the
importance of the legislative and oversight functions of the Congress that enable this representative
body to look diligently into every affair of government, investigate and denounce anomalies, and talk
about how the country and its citizens are being served. Courts do not interfere with the legislature
or its members in the manner they perform their functions in the legislative floor or in committee
rooms. Any claim of an unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of the statement uttered by
the member of the Congress does not destroy the privilege. 3 The disciplinary authority of the
assembly4 and the voters, not the courts, can properly discourage or correct such abuses committed
in the name of parliamentary immunity.5
For the above reasons, the plea of Senator Santiago for the dismissal of the complaint for
disbarment or disciplinary action is well taken. Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable
criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court. It is felt, however, that this could
not be the last word on the matter.
The Court wishes to express its deep concern about the language Senator Santiago, a member of
the Bar, used in her speech and its effect on the administration of justice. To the Court, the lady
senator has undoubtedly crossed the limits of decency and good professional conduct. It is at once
apparent that her statements in question were intemperate and highly improper in substance. To
reiterate, she was quoted as stating that she wanted "to spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio
Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court," and calling the Court a "Supreme Court of
idiots."
The lady senator alluded to In Re: Vicente Sotto.6 We draw her attention to the ensuing passage
in Sotto that she should have taken to heart in the first place:
x x x [I]f the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of this Court and believe that
they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and
disorder and perhaps chaos would be the result.
1avvphi1

No lawyer who has taken an oath to maintain the respect due to the courts should be allowed to
erode the peoples faith in the judiciary. In this case, the lady senator clearly violated Canon 8, Rule
8.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which respectively provide:
Canon 8, Rule 8.01.A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Canon 11.A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to the judicial
officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
Senator/Atty. Santiago is a cut higher than most lawyers. Her achievements speak for themselves.
She was a former Regional Trial Court judge, a law professor, an oft-cited authority on constitutional

and international law, an author of numerous law textbooks, and an elected senator of the land.
Needless to stress, Senator Santiago, as a member of the Bar and officer of the court, like any other,
is duty-bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court and to maintain the respect due its
members. Lawyers in public service are keepers of public faith and are burdened with the higher
degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than their brethren in private practice.7Senator
Santiago should have known, as any perceptive individual, the impact her statements would make
on the peoples faith in the integrity of the courts.
As Senator Santiago alleged, she delivered her privilege speech as a prelude to crafting remedial
legislation on the JBC. This allegation strikes the Court as an afterthought in light of the insulting
tenor of what she said. We quote the passage once more:
x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am
humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle
years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio
Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief
Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not in the
Supreme Court of idiots x x x. (Emphasis ours.)
A careful re-reading of her utterances would readily show that her statements were expressions of
personal anger and frustration at not being considered for the post of Chief Justice. In a sense,
therefore, her remarks were outside the pale of her official parliamentary functions. Even
parliamentary immunity must not be allowed to be used as a vehicle to ridicule, demean, and destroy
the reputation of the Court and its magistrates, nor as armor for personal wrath and disgust.
Authorities are agreed that parliamentary immunity is not an individual privilege accorded the
individual members of the Parliament or Congress for their personal benefit, but rather a privilege for
the benefit of the people and the institution that represents them.
To be sure, Senator Santiago could have given vent to her anger without indulging in insulting
rhetoric and offensive personalities.
Lest it be overlooked, Senator Santiagos outburst was directly traceable to what she considered as
an "unjust act" the JBC had taken in connection with her application for the position of Chief Justice.
But while the JBC functions under the Courts supervision, its individual members, save perhaps for
the Chief Justice who sits as the JBCs ex-officio chairperson,8 have no official duty to nominate
candidates for appointment to the position of Chief Justice. The Court is, thus, at a loss to
understand Senator Santiagos wholesale and indiscriminate assault on the members of the Court
and her choice of critical and defamatory words against all of them.
At any event, equally important as the speech and debate clause of Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the
Constitution is Sec. 5(5) of Art. VIII of the Constitution that provides:
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of the law, the Integrated Bar,
and legal assistance to the underprivileged. (Emphasis ours.)

The Court, besides being authorized to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, exercises specific authority to promulgate rules governing the Integrated Bar
with the end in view that the integration of the Bar will, among other things:
(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself except within its own forum, from the
assaults that politics and self interest may level at it, and assist it to maintain its integrity, impartiality
and independence;
xxxx
(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards x x x.9
In Re: Letter Dated 21 February 2005 of Atty. Noel S. Sorreda, 10 we reiterated our pronouncement in
Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer11 that the duty of attorneys to the courts can only be maintained
by rendering no service involving any disrespect to the judicial office which they are bound to uphold.
The Court wrote in Rheem of the Philippines:
x x x As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that "[i]t is the duty of a lawyer to
maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the
judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance." That same canon, as a corollary,
makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to support the courts against "unjust criticism and
clamor." And more. The attorneys oath solemnly binds him to a conduct that should be "with all good
fidelity x x x to the courts."
Also, in Sorreda, the Court revisited its holding in Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v.
Cloribel12 that:
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance
the ends of justice." His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes
fidelity, "not to promote distrust in the administration of justice." Faith in the courts, a lawyer should
seek to preserve. For, to undermine the judicial edifice "is disastrous to the continuity of government
and to the attainment of the liberties of the people." Thus has it been said of a lawyer that "[a]s an
officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that
high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice." 13
The lady senator belongs to the legal profession bound by the exacting injunction of a strict Code.
Society has entrusted that profession with the administration of the law and dispensation of justice.
Generally speaking, a lawyer holding a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the
Bar for misconduct committed while in the discharge of official duties, unless said misconduct also
constitutes a violation of his/her oath as a lawyer.14
Lawyers may be disciplined even for any conduct committed in their private capacity, as long as their
misconduct reflects their want of probity or good demeanor,15 a good character being an essential
qualification for the admission to the practice of law and for continuance of such privilege. When the
Code of Professional Responsibility or the Rules of Court speaks of "conduct" or "misconduct," the
reference is not confined to ones behavior exhibited in connection with the performance of lawyers
professional duties, but also covers any misconduct, whichalbeit unrelated to the actual practice of
their professionwould show them to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which
their license and the law invest in them.16

This Court, in its unceasing quest to promote the peoples faith in courts and trust in the rule of law,
has consistently exercised its disciplinary authority on lawyers who, for malevolent purpose or
personal malice, attempt to obstruct the orderly administration of justice, trifle with the integrity of
courts, and embarrass or, worse, malign the men and women who compose them. We have done it
in the case of former Senator Vicente Sotto in Sotto, in the case of Atty. Noel Sorreda in Sorreda,
and in the case of Atty. Francisco B. Cruz in Tacordan v. Ang17 who repeatedly insulted and
threatened the Court in a most insolent manner.
The Court is not hesitant to impose some form of disciplinary sanctions on Senator/Atty. Santiago for
what otherwise would have constituted an act of utter disrespect on her part towards the Court and
its members. The factual and legal circumstances of this case, however, deter the Court from doing
so, even without any sign of remorse from her. Basic constitutional consideration dictates this kind of
disposition.
We, however, would be remiss in our duty if we let the Senators offensive and disrespectful
language that definitely tended to denigrate the institution pass by. It is imperative on our part to reinstill in Senator/Atty. Santiago her duty to respect courts of justice, especially this Tribunal, and
remind her anew that the parliamentary non-accountability thus granted to members of Congress is
not to protect them against prosecutions for their own benefit, but to enable them, as the peoples
representatives, to perform the functions of their office without fear of being made responsible before
the courts or other forums outside the congressional hall. 18 It is intended to protect members of
Congress against government pressure and intimidation aimed at influencing the decision-making
prerogatives of Congress and its members.
The Rules of the Senate itself contains a provision on Unparliamentary Acts and Language that
enjoins a Senator from using, under any circumstance, "offensive or improper language against
another Senator or against any public institution."19 But as to Senator Santiagos unparliamentary
remarks, the Senate President had not apparently called her to order, let alone referred the matter to
the Senate Ethics Committee for appropriate disciplinary action, as the Rules dictates under such
circumstance.20 The lady senator clearly violated the rules of her own chamber. It is unfortunate that
her peers bent backwards and avoided imposing their own rules on her.
Finally, the lady senator questions Pobres motives in filing his complaint, stating that disciplinary
proceedings must be undertaken solely for the public welfare. We cannot agree with her more. We
cannot overstress that the senators use of intemperate language to demean and denigrate the
highest court of the land is a clear violation of the duty of respect lawyers owe to the courts. 21
Finally, the Senator asserts that complainant Pobre has failed to prove that she in fact made the
statements in question. Suffice it to say in this regard that, although she has not categorically denied
making such statements, she has unequivocally said making them as part of her privilege speech.
Her implied admission is good enough for the Court.
WHEREFORE, the letter-complaint of Antero J. Pobre against Senator/Atty. Miriam DefensorSantiago is, conformably to Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution, DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

3. ASSISTANCE IN THE SPEEDY AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION

OF JUSTICE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant
vs.
DEMETRIO JARDIN, accused-appellee.
The Solicitor-General for plaintiff-appellant.
Marcos C. Lucero, Jr. for accused-appellee.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Two constitutional rightsspeedy trial and freedom from double jeopardyare interposed as
defenses by the accused in this petition for review on certiorari.
The petitioner asks us to review and annul the orders of the Court of First Instance of Quezon,
Branch V, which dismissed the criminal cases against accuse Demetrio Jardin because his
constitutional right to speedy trial was allegedly violated.
The criminal prosecutions originated from a letter complaint of the Provincial Auditor of Quezon
requesting the Provincial Fiscal to file the necessary criminal action under Article 217 of the Revised
Penal Code against Demetrio Jardin for malversation of public funds thru falsification of public
documents on six counts.
The cases were assigned to Assistant Fiscal Meliton V. Angeles who set them for preliminary
investigation.The accused moved to postpone the investigation twice. On the third time that the
investigation was re-set, the accused and his counsel failed to appear.
On the fourth resetting, the accused and his counsel again failed to appear. Inspire of their absence,
the preliminary investigation was conducted and shortly afterwards, six informations were filed
against the accused before the Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch II, docketed as Cases
Nos. 16052 (0043-M), 16053 (0044-M), 16054 (0045-ML 16055 (0046-M), 16056 (0047-M), and
16057 (0048-M). The arraignment was set for May 9, 1967.
The records show that from May 9, 1967, the arraignment was re-set for June 6; then re-set for June
26; then from August 16, the same was re-set for September 5, all because of the motions for
postponement filed at the instance of the accused. (Original records [0043-M] pp. 54, 61, 66 and 69).
When the arraignment of the accused was called on September 5, 1967, counsel for the accused
verbally moved for reinvestigation on the ground that the accused was not given the opportunity to
present his defense during the preliminary investigation. This was granted by the court and the first
reinvestigation was set on November 24, 1967. On this date, however, the Investigating Fiscal motu

proprio postponed said reinvestigation due to the non-appearance of accused and his counsel and
re-set the date for December 21, 1967.
A series of postponements was again filed by the accused causing further. delays of the
reinvestigation. On June 27, 1968, accused and his counsel appeared together but requested for a
period of fifteen (15) days within which to file a memorandum.
In view of the expiration of the 15-day period, the Investigating Fiscal filed a manifestation before the
court that the records of these cases be returned and the trial on the merits of the same be set.
The court without acting on said manifestation, issued an order transferring the six (6) cases to the
new branch (Branch V) of the Court of First Instance at Mauban, Quezon. Upon receipt by the latter
of the records of these cases, the arraignment and trial were set for December 3, 1968.
On the latter date, the counsel for the accused sought again the postponement of the arraignment
and this was followed by more postponements, all at the instance of the accused. (Original records,
[0043-M] pp. 90,93,120 and 125).
On March 31, 1969, counsel for the accused moved for the postponement of the arraignment and
requested the court that the records be returned again to the Office of the Fiscal for further
reinvestigation. This was granted and the reinvestigation was again set for May 5, 1969. The
accused and his counsel, however, failed to appear and thus, the said reinvestigation was re-set for
June 2, 1969. On this date, counsel for accused requested that he be given five (5) days within
which to file a written sworn statement of the accused which would constitute the defense of the
latter, subject to the cross-examination of the Investigating Fiscal.
Considering the fact that the period to file such sworn statement had already expired without
anything being filed, the records of the cases were returned to the court which set said cases for
arraignment and trial on September 2, 1970. On this date, the accused again moved for
postponement.
When these cases were called for arraignment on September 8, 1970, Demetrio Jardin, pleaded not
guilty to the crime as charged, after which he requested that the trial be postponed and re-set for
September 29, 1970.
On September 29, 1970, the trial scheduled on that day was postponed again on motion of counsel
for the accused. The trial was re-set for October 12, 1970, with notice to both parties.
On October 12, 1970, when the said criminal cases were called for hearing, no one appeared for the
prosecution, except a state witness, Mr. Cesar Alcala of the Provincial Auditor's office who remained
silent during the proceedings.
Invoking his client's constitutional right to speedy trial and seizing the opportunity to take advantage
of the prosecution's failure to appear on that day, the defense counsel moved for the dismissal of the
cases. The respondent court granted the oral motion for dismissal "for reasons of constitutional
rights of the accused Demetrio Jardin. "
Two questions are now raised by the People in this appeal:

I. Considering the factual setting in the criminal cases at bar, was the respondent
Court correct in dismissing the cases and in predicating the dismissal on the right of
the defendant to a speedy trial?
II. Does the present appeal place the respondent accuse in double jeopardy?
The respondent court committed a grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the cases and in basing
the dismissal on the constitutional right of the accused to speedy trial. The right to a speedy trial
means that the accused is free from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, its salutary
objective being to assure that an innocent person may be free from anxiety and expense of a court
litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time compatible
with the presentation and consideration of whatever legitimate defense he may interpose. (See
Andres v. Cacdac, 113 SCRA 216)
[From a perusal of the facts, it is readily seen that all the delays in the prosecution of the cases were
caused by the accused himself.] All the postponements of proceedings were made at his instance
and for his behalf. Hence, the constitutional right to a speedy trial afforded to an accused by our
Constitution cannot be invoked. From the start of the preliminary investigation of the cases up to the
trial on the merits, the accused always managed to delay the proceedings through postponements
and requests for reinvestigation. [It would, therefore, be a mockery of the criminal justice system if
the accused would be allowed to benefit from his own wrongdoings or tactical maneuvers intended
to frustrate the administration of justice. By his own deliberate acts, he is deemed to have waived or
abandoned his right to a speedy trial. In the case of Andres v. Cacdac, 113 SCRA 216, we ruled:]
In this case, however, there was a waiver or abandonment of the right to a speedy
trial in the first case when the herein petitioners sought and obtained several
postponements of the trial: first, when they asked for the deferment of the
arraignment because the accused Ladislao Tacipit was not present; second, when
they asked for the postponement of the trial for March 5, 1968 upon the ground that
they have requested the Provincial Fiscal of Cagayan for a reinvestigation of the
case; and finally, when they agreed, with the prosecution, to postpone the hearing
set for November 28, 1968 to January 4, 1969..
The dismissal of the criminal cases against the accused by the respondent court on the ground that
his right to speedy trial had beer violated was devoid of factual and legal basis. The order denying
the motion for reconsideration is similarly infirm. There being no basis for the questioned orders,
they are consequently null and void.
Would a reinstatement of the dismissed cases place the accused in double jeopardy?
In order that the protection against double jeopardy may inure to the benefit of an accused, the
following requisites must be present in the first prosecution: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a
competent court; (c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (d) the defendant was acquitted,
or convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent. (Rule 117, Section 9, Rules of Court; People v. Ledesma, 73 SCRA 77). The last requisite
assumes a valid acquittal and a valid acquittal presupposes a valid judgment by a court of
competent jurisdiction. Since in the instant cases, the dismissal was void for having been issued
without legal basis, it follows that the acquittal brought about by the dismissal is also void. Hence, no
jeopardy can attach from such acquittal. The act of respondent judge in discussing the cases

amounted to lack of jurisdiction which would prevent double jeopardy from attaching. In the case
of People v. Court of appeals (10 1 SCRA 450) we ruled:
Private respondents further argue that a judgment of acquittal ends the case which
cannot be appealed nor reopened, otherwise, they would be put twice in jeopardy for
the same offense. That is the general rule and presupposes a valid judgment. As
earlier pointed out, however, respondent Courts' Resolution of acquittal was a void
judgment for having been issued without jurisdiction No double jeopardy attaches,
therefore. A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. (Comia v. Nicolas, 29
SCRA 492 [1969]) By it no rights are divested Through it, no rights can be attains &
Being worthless, all proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless It neither
binds nor bars anyone. All acts performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are
void. (Gomez v. Concepcion, 47 Phil. 717, 722.[1925]; Chavez vs. Court of Appeals,
24 SCRA 663, 685 [1968]; Parades v. Moya, 61 SCRA 526, [1974]). ...
We also note that the dismissall of the criminal cases was upon motion and with the wxpress
consent of respondent Demetrio Jardin. For double jeopardy to attach, the general rule is that the
dismissal of the case must be without the express consent of the accused. (People v. Salico, 84 Phil.
722; People v. Obsania, 23 SCRA 1249; People v. Pilpa, 79 SCRA 81; and People v. Cuevo, 104
SCRA 312).
If the accused had been denied his right to speedy trial or if some other basic right had been
impaired, the doctrine of waiver of the right to invoke double jeopardy would not apply even if the
accused had expressly moved for the termination of proceedings. In the instant case, however, the
defendant had deliberately used all the available dilatory tactics he could utilize and abused the
principle that the accused must be given every opportunity to disprove the criminal charge. The
doctrine of double jeopardy was never intended for this purpose.
Even as we rule that the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion, we also rebuke the
attorneys for both the defense and the prosecution and to a certain extent, the court itself because of
the breach of duties to the courts and to the administration of justice apparent in this case.
The duties of an attorney found in Rule 138, Section 20 include: xxx xxx xxx
(d) To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such
means only as are consistent with truth and honor,...
xxx xxx xxx
(g) Not to encourage either the commencement or the continuance of an action or
proceeding, or delay any man's cause, from any corrupt motive or interest.
xxx xxx xxx
The dilatory tactics of the defense counsel and the failure of both the judge and the fiscal to take
effective counter measures to obviate the delaying acts constitute obstruction of justice.

As aptly stared:
12.09 Obstructing the administration of justice
An attorney as an officer of the court is called upon to assist in the due administration
of justice. Like the court itself, he is an instrument to advance its cause. (Surigao
Mineral Reservation Board vs. Cloribel, G.R. No. 11071, Jan. 9, 1972, 31 SCRA 1; In
re Climaco, G.R. Adm. Case No. 134-J, Jan. 21, 1974, 55 SCRA 107) For this
reason, any act on the part of a lawyer that obstructs, perverts or impedes the
administration of justice constitutes misconduct and justifies disciplinary action
against him. (Cantorne vs. Ducasin 57 Phil, 23 [1932]; De los Santos vs. Sagalongos
69 Phil. 406 [1940]).
Acts which amount to obstruction in the administration of justice may take many
forms. They include such acts as instructing a complaining witness in a criminal
action not to appear at the scheduled hearing so that the case against the client, the
accused, would be dismissed. (Cantorne vs. Ducasin supra) asking a client to plead
guilty to a crime which the lawyer knows his client did not commit, (Nueno v. Santos,
58 Phil. 557 [1933]) advising a client who is detained for a crime to escape from
prison, (Cf. Medina v. Yan, G.R. No. 30978, Sept. 30, 1974) employing dilatory
tactics to frustrate satisfaction of clearly valid claims, Pajares vs. Abad Santos, G.R.
No. 29543, Nov. 29, 1969, 30 SCRA 748) prosecuting clearly frivolous cases or
appeals to drain the resources of the other party and compel him to submit out of
exhaustion (Samar Mining Co. vs. Arnado, G.R. No. 22304. July 30, 1968) and filing
multiple petitions or complaints for a cause that has been previously rejected in the
false expectation of getting favorable action. (Gabriel vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
43757, July 30, 1976, 72 SCRA 173; Ramos vs. Potenciano, G.R. No. 27104, Dec.
20, 1976, 74 SCRA 345; Macias v. Uy Kim, G.R. No. 31174, May 30, 1972, 45 SCRA
251) Acts of this or similar nature are grounds for disciplinary action." Agpalo Legal
Ethics, U.P. Law Center, 1980 Edition, pp. 405-406)
The invocation of constitutional rights by the private respondent is without merit.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned orders of the respondent court are
hereby SET ASIDE. Criminal Cases Nos. 0043-M, 0044-M, 0045-M, 0046M, 0047-M, and 0048-M
are reinstated and the proper regional trial court is ordered to proceed with all deliberate speed in
these cases.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NOLITO BORAS Y DOE, accused-appellant.
DECISION
BUENA, J.:

For allegedly raping a six year-old girl, Nolito Boras was convicted of statutory rape by the Regional
Trial Court of Libmanan, Camarines Sur and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, and to pay P50,000.00 as civil indemnity. Hence, this appeal questioning his conviction.
On December 13, 1991, while Melanie Medallas parents were sleeping in their house at Barangay
Bahay, Libmanan, Camarines Sur, she remained downstairs playing alone. At around 9 oclock in the
morning of that day, Nolito Boras, herein accused-appellant, went to her and invited her to go with
him. Since she is familiar with the accused-appellant as neighbor, she was cajoled to go with him.
When they arrived at a guava tree near the coconut plantation, which is about 15 meters from her
house, accused-appellant told her "magkitoan"1 which means "we will have sex." Obeying the
instruction of accused-appellant, she removed her panty. Thereafter, she was placed "on top and inbetween accused-appellants legs"2 who then inserted his penis into her vagina. While accusedappellant was satisfying his salacious desire, Cirilo Guirela, the victims uncle arrived. When she saw
her uncle Cirilo, she ran away. Thereafter, Cirilo told Jesus Amenia, brother-in-law of accusedappellant, that the latter raped his niece. Jesus Amenia got angry with the accused-appellant then
proceeded home with the latter.
On December 14, 1991, Cirilo reported the matter to the Barangay Captain3 and was advised to
report the incident to the police authority of Libmanan, Camarines Sur.4 The police advised the
examination of the victim at the Libmanan District Hospital.
On December 15, 1991, Dr. Cynthia S. Algery of Libmanan District Hospital examined the six-yearold victim. The examination revealed hymenal laceration at 3 oclock caused by any organ which is
inserted into the vagina, like a penis, and hypremia of the introitus (redness found at the entrance of
the vagina).5 While being examined, the doctor asked the victim what happened and the victim
described the person who raped her.6
On February 12, 1992, an information for the crime of rape was filed against Nolito Boras y Doe
alleging"That on or about the 13th day of December 1991, at about 9:00 oclock in the morning, at Brgy.
Bahay, Municipality of Libmanan, Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design, with violence and force,
intimidation and with grave abuse of confidence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge with Melanie Medalla, a six (6) years old (sic), against her will
and the offended party suffered damages.
"ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW."7
Upon arraignment on May 18, 1992, the accused, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty.
At the trial, on December 22, 1992, counsel for the accusedappellant manifested in court that he
noticed something strange with the accused-appellant and asked that the latter be examined by a
psychiatrist to determine his mental fitness. The trial court advised the counsel to file a formal motion
for the examination of the accused. Thereafter trial ensued.
On June 16, 1993, the defense presented accused-appellant. When asked about his personal
circumstances, he answered that his name is Diosdado Macapagal;8 that he does not know the
name of his father and his mother; that he does not know whether he has a brother and sister; that

he does not know Tinagis Penal Farm where he is presently confined; that he does not know how he
was able to come to court and who escorted him. On such note, the trial court issued
an Order setting forth the foregoing declarations, with further pronouncement that accused-appellant
in all appearances seems to be normal but is feigning insanity. Thus, the Provincial Warden of
Tinagis Penal Farm was directed to bring accused-appellant to Don Susano Rodriguez Mental
Hospital at Cadlan, Pili, Camarines Sur for necessary physical and mental examination and
observation in order to determine whether he is insane or not, and whether he has the necessary
faculties to undergo trial. The Chief of Susano Rodriguez Mental Hospital was directed to admit and
conduct the necessary examination and submit a written report to the trial court on the mental
condition of the accused within 15 days after the last examination/treatment. Pending the submission
of the report, the hearing was suspended. After the issuance of the aforementioned Order, accusedappellant rendered two songs, one after another, after the trial court requested him. 9
On May 2, 1995, the Bicol Regional Hospital - Department of Psychiatry submitted its report on the
mental status of Nolito Boras remarking that accused-appellant was "coherent and relevant" and that
he was "free of psychotic signs and symptoms." The remarks further stated that accused-appellant
knows the case filed against him and that his anxiety or apprehension was due to fears of being
incarcerated in jail.10
After trial, judgment was rendered convicting accused-appellant, thus "WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds and so holds that the accused Nolito Boras is
found guilty of the offense of statutory rape of Melanie Medalla, a six (6) year old girl at the time of
the rape and, therefore, sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and is ordered to
pay Melanie Medalla the amount of P50,000.00 for indemnity. No pronouncement as to cost.
"SO ORDERED."11
Accused-appellant now appeals questioning his conviction for rape, assigning as error the admission
of Exhibit "B", which is a photocopy of the certificate of livebirth of the victim.
Initially, to avoid criminal liability, accused-appellant feigned insanity. To bolster such imagined
dementia, accused-appellant offered his fathers testimony declaring that accused-appellant was
afflicted with a mental defect since childhood. As observed by the trial court, accused-appellant is
normal. In this regard, the trial courts observation of the demeanor and deportment of witnesses, as
a rule, will not be interfered with, considering that the behavior, gesture, inflection of voice and
manner of responding to questions propounded to witnesses are best available to the trial court. It is
not appropriate to calibrate anew such observations on the basis alone of the cold transcript of
stenographic notes unless such findings are clearly shown to be arbitrary. In fact, the trial court was
not remiss in its duty in determining the mental capacity of accused-appellant when it ordered
accused-appellants confinement in a hospital for medical and psychiatric evaluation which
examination revealed that accused-appellant is "sane and coherent." The foregoing steps clearly
demonstrate that the judge had sufficiently and effectively satisfied the two components of "insanity
test" that will effectively guarantee accused-appellants right to a fair trial, which are: (1) whether the
defendant is sufficiently coherent to provide counsel with information necessary or relevant to
constructing a defense and (2) whether he is able to comprehend the significance of the trial and his
relation to it.12

Accused-appellant was convicted under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code 13 which provides that
rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under twelve years of age, thus"Article 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of
a woman under any of the following circumstances.
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
"x x x x x x x x x"
In statutory rape, there are two elements that must be established prior to conviction of this crime,
namely: (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of a woman and (2) that the woman is below
twelve years of age.14
As to the first element, accused-appellant denied having sexual contact with the victim and
challenges the latters credibility. After a thorough review of the records of this case, we find the
victims testimony credible. From the victims narration, it was clear that there was sexual
intercourse. The victim even demonstrated in court how she was raped by the accused-appellant in
squatting position by holding her hips.15 She narrated that she felt pain and when she was crying,
accused-appellant stopped thrusting his organ. She declared that she was not able to shout because
during the sexual contact, accused-appellant was covering her mouth. 16 Her credible testimony alone
suffices to establish accused-appellants guilt.17 In rape, mere touching by the males organ, or
instrument of sex, of the labia of the pudendum of the females private part is sufficient to
consummate rape.18 But when the victim is below 12 years old, sexual contact of the males sex
organ with the womans private part consummates rape and it is not required to prove force,
intimidation, or consent.19 The victims declarations were corroborated by the testimony of her uncle
who witnessed the bestial act. Such testimonies were further supported by the medical findings of
Dr. Algery who examined the victim two days after the incident. The medical report shows that there
was penetration by the male organ into her genitalia.
The victim even testified to other occasions of rape committed against her by accused-appellant
prior to December 13, 1991.20 However, accused-appellant cannot be convicted for the alleged rapes
committed other than the one charged in the information. A rule to the contrary will violate accusedappellants constitutional rights to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him.21 Such other alleged rapes committed which are not alleged in the information may be taken
only as proof of specific intent or knowledge, plan, system or scheme. 22
Anent the second element as to the age of the victim when the crime was committed, accusedappellant questions the admission of the photocopy of the birth certificate of the child invoking
Section 3, Rule 130. Accused-appellant argues that the failure of the prosecution to prove the
circumstances that will warrant the admission in evidence of the said photocopy, renders the same
inadmissible and he cannot be convicted of statutory rape since the age of the victim was not proven
with reasonable certainty. It is clear from the records that complainant Melanie Medalla was born on
October 23, 1985.23 Besides, under Section 36, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, objection to evidence
offered orally must be made immediately after the offer is made. In the case at bar, the photocopy of

the birth certificate was formally offered in evidence and marked as Exhibit "B". It was offered to
prove (a) the fact of birth of the victim, and (b) the fact that the victim was below twelve years old
when she was ravished on December 13, 1991. The defense objected to the purpose for which
Exhibit "B" was being offered,24 but did not object to the presentation of the photocopied birth
certificate which is merely treated as a secondary evidence. Having failed to raise a valid and timely
objection against the presentation of this secondary evidence the same became a primary
evidence,25 and the same is deemed admitted and the other party is bound thereby. Even so, if the
evidence objected to was not received, it would not have varied the conclusion arrived at by the
court as to the correct age of the victim considering that the victim and her mother testified as to her
age.26 The testimony of the mother as to the age of her child is admissible in evidence for who else
would be in the best position to know when she delivered the child. Besides, the court could very
well assess whether or not the victim is below twelve years old by simply looking at her physique
and built.
It must be stressed that in dealing with rape cases of children, especially those below twelve years
of age, due care must be observed by the trial court in handling the victim. In fact, more often than
not, the grueling experience in the trial court in the course of direct and cross-examination is more
traumatic than the fact of rape itself. On such occasions, mishandling of victims lead to psychological
imbalances which, if not properly treated by medical experts will lead to an abnormal behavioral
response against the idea of sex itself and disturbed interaction with the opposite sex or of the same
sex. The frightful experience of rape committed to children who are bereft of "mundane
wiles"27necessitates the highest degree of tact, patience and diplomacy. No woman, especially a
child of tender years would exactly remember step-by-step the sexual intercourse in the hands of the
maniacal beast. It is enough that the child was able to explain in her own way that there was sexual
intercourse. By subjecting her into explaining whether she was forced or intimidated is excessive.
For proof of force and intimidation is unnecessary in statutory rape. Considering that there is a
medical report substantiating the allegations made by the victim, the manner of examination of the
victim must be tempered. Especially in this case, since the child is only six years old who remains
uncorrupted. In rape, mere touching of males organ to the pudendum of females organ is enough to
consummate the crime. Whether the organ was fully erect or not, to a child of six years of age, slight
penetration consummates rape. Thus, asking questions like"Q: Did you have any opportunity at that time when you were raped to hold the penis of Nolito
Boras?
"A: No, Sir.
"Q: At the time, when you were raped by Nolito Boras, was his penis hard or soft?
"A: Hard, sir"28
and
"Q: Did you see your Uncle Cerilo Guirela after the accused Nolito Boras stop pushing and pulling
his penis to your vagina or while he was still in the process of pushing and pulling his penis to your
vagina?
"A: Nolito Boras was not yet finished pushing and pulling his penis to my vagina." 29 are unnecessary,
uncalled for and excessive queries. Imputation of rape against a neighbor cannot be concocted with
1wphi1

ease for malicious reasons by parents of a six-year-old child because it would cause more harm
than good. Aside from the traumatic experience of rape, the victims story of defloration must
withstand not only the examination in court but also the medical examination of the victims private
parts by a licensed physician.
Lastly, at the time of the commission of rape on December 13, 1991, the victim was only six (6)
years old. Statutory rape committed in 1991 is punishable by reclusion perpetua. The present law
provides that when the crime of rape is committed against a child below seven (7) years of age,
death penalty shall be imposed. Considering that the retroactive application 30 of the law will be
unfavorable to accused-appellant, the latter is fortunate enough to be meted only the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. Had it been committed after the enactment of the new law, this Court will not
hesitate to impose the penalty of death. The award of P50,000.00 representing civil indemnity is
proper. In addition thereto, accused-appellant shall pay P50,000.0031 representing moral damages
without necessity of proof other than the fact of rape plus P20,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Exemplary damages may be awarded if the crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances. In this case, abuse of confidence should be appreciated as an aggravating
circumstance. The victim trusted accused-appellant in going with him upon the latters invitation on
account of her familiarity with him as their neighbor.
WHEREFORE, the trial courts judgment convicting accused-appellant of statutory rape is hereby
AFFIRMED subject to the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant is ordered to pay P50,000.00 as
moral damages and P20,000.00 as exemplary damages IN ADDITION to the P50,000.00 civil
indemnity awarded by the trial court.
SO ORDERED.