EXCESSIVE FINES - PEOPLE VERSUS DACUYCUY

FACTS: Herein private respondents Celestino S. Matondo, Segundino A. Caval and

Cirilo M. Zanoria, public school officials of Leyte, were charged before the Municipal
Court of Hindang, Leyte for violation of Republic Act No. 4670 (Magna Carta for Public
School Teachers). They also charged the constitutionality of Sec. 32 ( punished by a fine
of not less than P100 not more that P 1000, or by imprisonment, in the discretion of the
court.) of said R.A. (1) It imposes a cruel and unusual punishment, the term of
imprisonment being unfixed and may run to reclusion perpetua; and (2) It also constitutes
an undue delegation of legislative power, the duration of the penalty of imprisonment
being solely left to the discretion of the court as if the latter were the legislative
department of the Government.
Respondent judge rendered the aforecited challenged decision holding in substance that
Republic Act No. 4670 is valid and constitutional but cases for its violation fall outside of
the jurisdiction of municipal and city courts, and remanding the case to the former
Municipal Court of Leyte only for preliminary investigation. Motions for reconsideration
were denied, hence the petition.
ISSUE: WON REPUBLIC ACT NO. 4670 Section 32 imposes cruel fines and unusual
punishment.
RULING: NO, R.A. No. 4670 sec. 32 does not impose cruel fines and unusual
punishment.
The disputed section of Republic Act No. 4670 provides:
Sec. 32. Penal Provision. A person who shall wilfully interfere with, restrain or coerce
any teacher in the exercise of his rights guaranteed by this Act or who shall in any other
manner commit any act to defeat any of the provisions of this Act shall, upon conviction,
be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred pesos nor more than one thousand
pesos, or by imprisonment, in the discretion of the court. (Emphasis supplied).
Two alternative and distinct penalties are consequently imposed, to wit: (a) a fine ranging
from P100.00 to P1,000.00; or (b) imprisonment. It is apparent that the law has no
prescribed period or term for the imposable penalty of imprisonment. While a minimum
and maximum amount for the penalty of fine is specified, there is no equivalent provision
for the penalty of imprisonment, although both appear to be qualified by the phrase "in
the discretion of the court.
The court note with approval the holding of respondent judge that
The rule is established beyond question that a punishment authorized by statute is not
cruel or unusual or disproportionate to the nature of the offense unless it is a barbarous
one unknown to the law or so wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to
shock the moral sense of the community. Based on the principle, our Supreme Court has
consistently overruled contentions of the defense that the punishment of fine or
imprisonment authorized by the statute involved is cruel and unusual.
When the penalty is grossly disproportionate to the crime, it is an insufficient basis to
declare the law unconstitutional on the ground that it is cruel and unusual. The fact that

the punishment authorized by the statute is severe does not make it cruel or unusual. In
addition, what degree of disproportion the Court will consider as obnoxious to the
Constitution has still to await appropriate determination in due time since, to the credit of
our legislative bodies, no decision has as yet struck down a penalty for being "cruel and
unusual" or "excessive."
In conclusion, With the deletion by invalidation of the provision on imprisonment in
Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670, the imposable penalty for violations of said law
should be limited to a fine of not less than P100.00 and not more than P1,000.00, the
same to serve as the basis in determining which court may properly exercise jurisdiction
thereover. When the complaint against private respondents was filed in 1975, the
pertinent law then in force was Republic Act No. 296, under which crimes punishable by
a fine of not more than P 3,000.00 fall under the original jurisdiction of the former
municipal courts. Consequently, Criminal case against herein private respondents falls
within the original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court of Hindang, Leyte.
Wherefore, the decision and resolution of respondent judge are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The case filed against private respondents herein is hereby ordered to be
remanded to the Municipal Trial Court of Hindang, Leyte for trial on the merits.
Fulltext: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1989/may1989/gr_45127_1989.html

Case: Agbanlog versus People of the Philippines and Sandiganbayan

FACTS: Feliciano Agbanlog was the Officer-in-Charge of the Office of the Municipal
Treasurer of Aglipay, Quirino, for the period: March 24, 1986 to May 31, 1988. When
audited by COA was found short in his cash and accounts in the sum of P21,940.70. A
written demand to explain the shortage and to pay the amount thereof was neither
answered nor acted upon by the accountable officer.
Consequently, a Report was made by Examining Auditors manifesting their findings and
recommending the institution of administrative and/or criminal charges against Acting
Municipal Treasurer Feliciano Agbanlog. Petitioner admits the shortage of the
accountable funds charged by the prosecution but claims that the prosecution failed to
show that the shortage accrued during his short stint as acting treasurer.
The prosecution has established (a) that appellant received in his possession public funds;
(b) that he could not account for them and did not have them in his possession when
audited; and (c) that he could not give a satisfactory explanation or reasonable excuse for
the disappearance of said funds. The prosecution is not required to present direct evidence
of the misappropriation, which may be impossible to do.The failure of a public officer to
have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon
demand by any duly authorized officer, is a prima facie evidence that he has put such
funds or property to personal use.
Petitioner questions as oppressive and unconstitutional the penalty imposed on him
that of eleven years and one day of prision mayor, as minimum, to sixteen years, five
months and eleven days of reclusion temporal, as maximum. He argues that considering
the value of the peso in 1932 when the Revised Penal Code was enacted and the value of
peso today, the penalty for malversation of P21,000.00 should only be an imprisonment

of one or two years.

ISSUE: WON the penalty imposed upon Agbanlog in violation of Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code ( Malversation of Funds) is oppressive and unconstitutional.
RULING: NO, the penalty imposed upon the accused is not oppressive and
unconstitutional.
Assuming arguendo that inflation has in effect made more severe the penalty for
malversing P21,000.00, the remedy cannot come from this Court but from the Congress.
The Court can intervene and strike down a penalty as cruel, degrading or inhuman only
when it has become so flagrantly oppressive and so wholly disproportionate to the nature
of the offense as to shock the moral senses. Considering that malversation of public funds
by a public officer is a betrayal of the public trust, We are not prepared to say that the
penalty imposed on petitioner is so disproportionate to the crime committed as to shock
the moral sense.
Full text: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1993/may1993/gr_105907_1993.html