Professional Documents
Culture Documents
No. 146, was approved, it must be deemed to have the right of holding them
in perpetuity. The Constitution of the Philippines provided, in section 8 of
Article XIII, that "no franchise or right shall be granted to any individual, firm,
or corporation, except under the condition that it shall be subject to
amendment, alteration, or repeal by the National Assembly when the public
interest so requires." This is in accordance with all other previous laws (such
as the Jones Law and the Philippine Bill) on the matter.
- Statutes enacted for the regulation of public utilities, being a proper
exercise by the state of its police power, are applicable not only to those
public utilities coming into existence after its passage, but likewise to those
already established and in operation.
- Commonwealth Acts Nos. 146 and 454 are not only the organic acts of the
Public Service Commission but are "a part of the charter of every utility
company operating or seeking to operate a franchise" in the Philippines.
- However the Court ordered a remand of the case.
- The petitioner's application here was for an increase of its equipment
to enable it to comply with the conditions of its certificates of public
convenience.
- On the matter of limitation to twenty five (25) years of the life of its
certificates of public convenience, there had been neither notice nor
opportunity given the petitioner to be heard or present evidence.
Disposition The decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case
remanded to the Public Service Commission for further proceedings in
accordance with law and this decision, without any pronouncement regarding
costs.
MANILA ELECTRIC v PASAY TRANSPO
57 PHIL 600
MALCOLM ; NOV 25, 1932
FACTS
-Act No. 1446 granted a franchise to Charles M. Swift to construct, maintain,
and operate an electric railway, and to construct, maintain, and operate an
electric light, heat, and power system from a point in the City of Manila in an
easterly direction to the town in Pasig, in the Province of Rizal."
-Section 11 of the Act provides: "Whenever any franchise or right of way is
granted to any other person or corporation, now or hereafter in existence,
over portions of the lines and tracks of the grantee herein, the terms on
which said other person or corporation shall use such right of way, and the
compensation to be paid to the grantee herein by such other person or
corporation for said use, shall be fixed by the members of the Supreme
Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a majority of whom
shall be final."
- Manila Electric now asks the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a
board of arbitrators, to fix the terms upon which certain transportation
3
companies shall be permitted to use the Pasig bridge of the Manila Electric
Company and the compensation to be paid to the Manila Electric Company
by such transportation companies
ISSUE/S
WON the members of the SC has legal right to act as board of arbitrators
HELD
NO
- Section 11 of Act No. 1446 contravenes the maxims which guide the
operation of a democratic government constitutionally established, and that
it would be improper and illegal for the members of the Supreme Court,
sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a majority of whom shall be
final, to act on the petition of the Manila Electric Company.
-The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands represents one of the three
divisions of power in our government. It is judicial power and judicial power
only which is exercised by the Supreme Court. Just as the Supreme Court, as
the guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any
other department of the government, so should it as strictly confine its own
sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by implication conferred on it
by the Organic Act. The Supreme Court and its members should not and
cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to
assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administering of
judicial functions.
-The Organic Act provides that the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands
shall possess and exercise jurisdiction as heretofore provided and such
additional jurisdiction as shall hereafter be prescribed by law. When the
Organic Act speaks of the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the Supreme Court, it
could only mean the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the Supreme Court acting as
a court, and could hardly mean the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the members
of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators. There is an important
distinction between the Supreme Court as an entity and the members of the
Supreme Court. A board of arbitrators is not a "court" in any proper sense of
the term, and possess none of the jurisdiction which the Organic Act
contemplates shall be exercised by the Supreme Court.
Disposition The members of the Supreme Court decline to proceed further
in the matter.
NOBLEJAS v TEEHANKEE
23 SCRA 405
REYES JBL; April 29, 1968
4
NATURE:
Petition for writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction
FACTS:
- Antonio H. Noblejas is the duly appointed, confirmed and qualified
Commissioner of Land Registration. By the terms of section 2 of RA 1151,
the said Commissioner is declared "entitled to the same compensation,
emoluments and privileges as those of a Judge of the Court of First
Instance."
- On March 7, 1968, Sec of Justice Teehankee coursed to Noblejas a letter
requiring him to explain in writing why no disciplinary action should be
taken against petitioner for "approving or recommending approval of
subdivision, consolidation and consolidated-subdivision plans covering
areas greatly in excess of the areas covered by the original titles." Noblejas
answered and apprised the Secretary of Justice that, as he enjoyed the
rank, privileges, emoluments and compensation of a Judge of the Court of
First Instance, he could only be suspended and investigated in the same
manner as a Judge of the Courts of First Instance, and, therefore, the
papers relative to his case should be submitted to the Supreme Court, for
action thereon conformably to section 67 of the Judiciary Act (R. A. No. 296)
and Revised Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.
- On March 17, 1968, Noblejas received a communication signed by the
Executive Secretary, "by authority of the President", whereby, based on
"finding that a prima facie case exists against you for gross negligence and
conduct prejudicial to the public interest", petitioner was "hereby
suspended, upon receipt hereof, pending investigation of the above
charges."
- On March 18, 1968, petitioner applied to this Court, reiterating the
contentions advanced in his letter to the Secretary of Justice, claiming lack
of jurisdiction and abuse of discretion, and praying for restraining writs. In
their answer respondents admit the facts but denied that petitioner, as
Land Registration Commissioner, exercises judicial functions, or that the
petitioner may be considered a Judge of First Instance within the purview of
the Judiciary Act and Revised Rules of Court 140; that the function of
investigating charges against public officers is administrative or executive
in nature; that the Legislature may not charge the judiciary with nonjudicial functions or duties except when reasonably incidental to the
fulfillment of judicial duties, as it would be in violation of the principle of the
separation of powers.
ISSUE:
WON the Commissioner of Land Registration may only be investigated by the
Supreme Court, in view of the conferment upon him by RA 1151 and
Appropriation Laws of the rank and privileges of a Judge of the Court of First
Instance.
5
HELD:
NO
- section 67 of the Judiciary Act providing for investigation, suspension or
removal of Judges, specifically recites that "No District Judge shall be
separated or removed from office by the President of the Philippines unless
sufficient cause shall exist in the judgment of the Supreme Court . . ." and it
is nowhere claimed, much less shown, that the Commissioner of Land
Registration is a District Judge, or in fact a member of the Judiciary.
- petitioner's theory that the grant of "privileges of a Judge of First Instance"
includes by implication the right to be investigated only by the Supreme
Court and to be suspended or removed upon its recommendation, would
necessarily result in the same right being possessed by a variety of
executive officials upon whom the Legislature had indiscriminately conferred
the same privileges.
- Incidentally, petitioner's stand would also lead to the conclusion that the
Solicitor General, another appointee of the President, could not be removed
by the latter, since the Appropriation Acts confer upon the Solicitor General
the rank and privileges of a Justice of the Court of Appeals, and these
Justices are only removable by the Legislature, through the process of
impeachment (Judiciary Act, sec. 24, par. 2).
- such unusual corollaries could not have been intended by the Legislature
when it granted these executive officials the rank and privileges of Judges of
First Instance. Where the legislative design is to make the suspension or
removal procedure prescribed for Judges of First Instance applicable to other
officers, provision to that effect is made in plain and unequivocal language.
- if the Legislature had really intended to include in the general grant of
"privileges" or "rank and privileges of Judges of the Court of First Instance"
the right to be investigated by the Supreme Court, and to be suspended or
removed only upon recommendation of that Court, then such grant of
privileges would be unconstitutional, since it would violate the fundamental
doctrine of separation of powers, by charging this court with the
administrative function of supervisory control over executive officials, and
simultaneously reducing pro tanto the control of the Chief Executive over
such officials.
Disposition Writs denied, petition dismissed
GARCIA v MACARAIG
39 SCRA 106
BARREDO; MAY 31, 1971
NATURE
Administrative complaint
FACTS
6
-Respondent Judge Macaraig was appointed to one of the newly created CFI
branches in Laguna, in 1970. At the time of appointment, he was Chief of the
Technical Staff of the DOJ, receiving salary therefrom.
- After confirmation of his appointment by the COA, respondent judge took
his oath of office on June 1970. However, due to several delays in securing
the court sala (unavailability of funds for office equipment and supplies,
trouble securing the space for the courtroom due to objections and
disagreement over price), he never had the chance to actually perform the
functions of a district judge. After realizing that it might take sometime
before he could actually begin hearing cases in his court, he decided to apply
for an extended leave of absence. The Sec. of Justice, however, asked him to
forego his leave and, instead, requested him to assist him, without being
extended a formal detail, which he accepted.
- Having taken his oath as District Judge and, drawing salary as judge but
without performing his functions as such, respondent was charged by Paz
Garcia for dishonesty, violation of his oath of office as judge.. .gross
incompetence, violation of RA 296, particularly Secs 5, 55 and 58 thereof.
ISSUE
WON respondent is guilty of the allegations
HELD
No.
Reasoning He has not yet started performing any judicial functions. None of
these laws and circulars apply to him, for all of them contemplate judges
who are actually holding trials and hearings and making decisions and
others. That he could not actually hold office in the court to which he was
appointed was not of his making.
***While the SC dismissed the complaint, it nevertheless expressed the
opinion that it did not look with favor the long standing practice of judges
being detailed in the DOJ to assist the Secretary even if it were only in
connection with his work of exercising administrative authority over the
courts, stressing the principle of separation of powers. The Court was of the
opinion that respondent was not guilty of dishonesty or violation of his oath
of office as district judge as it was not altogether his fault that he could not
actually perform his functions as presiding judge of the CFI of Laguna. Under
the circumstances he was placed in, he made himself available to the DOJ to
assist the Secretary, using his experience as technical assistant in said office.
Disposition Administrative complaint DISMISSED.
IN RE: DESIGNATION OF JUDGE RODOLFO U. MANZANO AS MEMBER
OF THE ILOCOS NORTE PROVINCIAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE
166 SCRA 106
PADILLA; October 5, 1988
7
NATURE
Request for the issuance of a SC Resolution on the appointment of Judge
Manzano as a member of the Prov. Committee on Justice
FACTS
-On 4 July 1988, Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano, Executive Judge, RTC, Bangui,
Ilocos Norte, Branch 19, sent this Court a letter which reads:
I was designated as a member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on
Justice
Before I may accept the appointment and enter in the discharge of the
powers and duties of the position as member of the Provincial Committee on
Justice, may I have the honor to request for the issuance by the
Honorable Supreme Court of a Resolution, as follows:
(1) Authorizing me to accept the appointment and to as assume and
discharge the powers and duties attached to the said position;
(2) Considering my membership in the Committee as neither violative of the
Independence of the Judiciary nor a violation of Section 12, Article VIII, or of
the second paragraph of Section .7, Article IX (B), both of the Constitution,
and will not in any way amount to an abandonment of my present position as
Executive Judge and as a member of the Judiciary; and
(3) Consider my membership in the said Committee as part of the primary
functions of an Executive Judge.
- An examination of Executive Order No. 856, as amended, reveals that
Provincial/City Committees on Justice are created to insure the speedy
disposition of cases of detainees, particularly those involving the poor and
indigent ones, thus alleviating jail congestion and improving local jail
conditions. Among the functions of the Committee are:
-- Receive complaints against any apprehending officer, jail warden, final or
judge who may be found to have committed abuses in the discharge of his
duties and refer the same to proper authority for appropriate action;
-- Recommend revision of any law or regulation which is believed prejudicial
to the proper administration of criminal justice.
- It is evident that such Provincial/City Committees on Justice perform
administrative functions. Administrative functions are those which involve
the regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for;
their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better
carry out the policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the
administrative agency by the organic law of its existence.
- Furthermore, it is provided that The Provincial/City Committees on Justice
shall be under the supervision of the Secretary of justice Quarterly
accomplishment reports shall be submitted to the Office of the Secretary of
Justice.
HELD
- Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and other
courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing
quasi- judicial or administrative functions
- Considering that membership of Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte
Provincial Committee on Justice, which discharges a administrative functions,
will be in violation of the Constitution, the Court is constrained to deny his
request.
- in Garcia vs. Macaraig: While the doctrine of separation of powers is a
relative theory not to be enforced with pedantic rigor, the practical demands
of government precluding its doctrinaire application, it cannot justify a
member of the judiciary being required to assume a position or perform a
duty non-judicial in character. That is implicit in the principle. Otherwise
there is a plain departure from its command. The essence of the trust
reposed in him is to decide. Only a higher court can pass on his actuation. He
is not a subordinate of an executive or legislative official, however eminent.
It is indispensable that there be no exception to the rigidity of such a norm if
he is, as expected, to be confined to the task of adjudication. Fidelity to his
sworn responsibility no less than the maintenance of respect for the judiciary
can be satisfied with nothing less.
- This declaration does not mean that RTC Judges should adopt an attitude of
monastic insensibility or unbecoming indifference to Province/City Committee
on Justice. As incumbent RTC Judges, they form part of the structure of
government. Their integrity and performance in the adjudication of cases
contribute to the solidity of such structure. As public officials, they are
trustees of an orderly society. Even as non-members of Provincial/City
Committees on Justice, RTC judges should render assistance to said
Committees to help promote the laudable purposes for which they exist, but
only when such assistance may be reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of
their judicial duties.
Disposition The aforesaid request of Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano is DENIED.
SEPARATE OPINIONS
GUTIERREZ, dissenting:
- The Constitution prohibits the designation of members of the judiciary to
any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.
- Insofar as the term "quasi-judicial" is concerned, it has a fairly clear
meaning and Judges can confidently refrain from participating in the work of
any administrative agency which adjudicates disputes and controversies
involving the rights of parties within its jurisdiction. The issue involved in this
case is where to draw the line insofar as administrative functions are
concerned.
- "Administrative functions" as used in Section 12 refers to the executive
machinery of government and the performance by that machinery of
governmental acts. It refers to the management actions, determinations, and
9
orders of executive officials as they administer the laws and try to make
government effective. There is an element of positive action, of supervision
or control.
- membership in the Provincial or City Committee on Justice would
not involve any regulation or control over the conduct and affairs of
individuals. Neither will the Committee on Justice promulgate rules
and regulations nor exercise any quasi-legislative functions. Its
work is purely advisory. I do not see anything wrong in a member of the
judiciary joining any study group which concentrates on the administration of
justice as long as the group merely deliberates on problems involving the
speedy disposition of cases particularly those involving the poor and needy
litigants or detainees, pools the expertise and experiences of the members,
and limits itself to recommendations which may be adopted or rejected by
those who have the power to legislate or administer the particular function
involved in their implementation.
-The constitutional provision is intended to shield Judges from participating in
activities which may compromise their independence or hamper their work.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, dissenting:
- What I believe is contemplated by the Constitutional prohibition is
designation, for example, to such quasi-judicial bodies as the SEC, or
administrative agencies like the BIR. Those are full-time positions involving
running the affairs of government, which will interfere with the discharge of
judicial functions or totally remove a Judge/Justice from the performance of
his regular functions.
- The Committee on Justice cannot be likened to such an administrative
agency of government. It is a study group with recommendatory functions.
PUYAT v DE GUZMAN JR.
113 SCRA 31
Melencio-Herrera; March 25 1982
NATURE
This suit for certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction is poised
against the Order of respondent Associate Commissioner of the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) granting Assemblyman Estanislao A.
Fernandez leave to intervene in SEC Case No. 1747
FACTS
On May 14,1979, an election for the eleven Directors of the International
Pipe Industries Corporation (IPI) a private corporation, was held. Some
named on the left list of elected officials may be called the Puyat Group;
those on the right, the Acero Group. Thus, the Puyat Group would be in
control of the Board and of the management of IPI. The Acero Group
instituted at the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) quo
10
that only this Court may review COMELEC rules and only in cases of grave
abuse of discretion.
- The COMELEC adds, however, that another provision, vis--vis its rulemaking power, to wit:
SEC. 17. Voting by Mail. 17.1. For the May, 2004 elections, the Commission shall authorize voting by
mail in not more than three (3) countries, subject to the approval of the
Congressional Oversight Committee. Voting by mail may be allowed in
countries that satisfy the following conditions:
a)
Where the mailing system is fairly well-developed and secure to
prevent occasion for fraud;
b)
Where there exists a technically established identification system
that would preclude multiple or proxy voting; and
c)
Where the system of reception and custody of mailed ballots in the
embassies, consulates and other foreign service establishments concerned
are adequate and well-secured.
Thereafter, voting by mail in any country shall be allowed only upon review
and approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee.
...
...
...
is likewise unconstitutional as it violates Section 1, Article IX-A mandating the
independence of constitutional commissions.
-The Solicitor General takes exception to his prefatory statement that the
constitutional challenge must fail and agrees with the petitioner that
Sections 19 and 25 are invalid and unconstitutional on the ground that there
is nothing in Article VI of the Constitution on Legislative Department that
would as much as imply that Congress has concurrent power to enforce and
administer election laws with the COMELEC; and by the principles of
exclusio unius est exclusio alterius and expressum facit cessare
tacitum, the constitutionally enumerated powers of Congress circumscribe
its authority to the exclusion of all others.
ISSUE
Whether or not Congress, through the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee created in Section 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189, exercise the
power to review, revise, amend, and approve the Implementing
Rules and Regulations that the Commission on Elections shall
promulgate without violating the independence of the COMELEC
under Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution?
HELD
NO.
RATIO
Once a law is enacted and approved, the legislative function is deemed
accomplished and complete. The legislative function may spring back to
Congress relative to the same law only if that body deems it proper to
14
review, amend and revise the law, but certainly not to approve, review,
revise and amend the IRR of the COMELEC.
-By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review, amend, and revise the
IRR for The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, Congress went beyond
the scope of its constitutional authority. Congress trampled upon the
constitutional mandate of independence of the COMELEC. Under such a
situation, the Court is left with no option but to withdraw from its usual
reticence in declaring a provision of law unconstitutional.
REASONING Composed of Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives, the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee (JCOC) is a
purely legislative body. There is no question that the authority of Congress
to "monitor and evaluate the implementation" of R.A. No. 9189 is geared
towards possible amendments or revision of the law itself and thus, may be
performed in aid of its legislation.
-However, aside from its monitoring and evaluation functions, R.A. No. 9189
gives to the JCOC the following functions: (a) to "review, revise, amend and
approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations" (IRR) promulgated by the
COMELEC [Sections 25 and 19]; and (b) subject to the approval of the JCOC
[Section 17.1], the voting by mail in not more than three countries for the
May 2004 elections and in any country determined by COMELEC.
-The ambit of legislative power under Article VI of the Constitution is
circumscribed by other constitutional provisions. One such provision is
Section 1 of Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution ordaining that constitutional
commissions such as the COMELEC shall be "independent."
-Interpreting Section 1, Article X of the 1935 Constitution providing that there
shall be an independent COMELEC, the Court has held that "[w]hatever may
be the nature of the functions of the Commission on Elections, the fact is that
the framers of the Constitution wanted it to be independent from the other
departments of the Government.
-The Court has no general powers of supervision over COMELEC which is an
independent body "except those specifically granted by the Constitution,"
that is, to review its decisions, orders and rulings. In the same vein, it is not
correct to hold that because of its recognized extensive legislative power to
enact election laws, Congress may intrude into the independence of the
COMELEC by exercising supervisory powers over its rule-making authority.
-By virtue of Section 19 of R.A. No. 9189, Congress has empowered the
COMELEC to "issue the necessary rules and regulations to effectively
implement the provisions of this Act within sixty days from the effectivity of
this Act." This provision of law follows the usual procedure in drafting rules
and regulations to implement a law
the legislature grants an
administrative agency the authority to craft the rules and regulations
implementing the law it has enacted, in recognition of the administrative
expertise of that agency in its particular field of operation.
-The second sentence of the first paragraph of Section 19 stating that "[t]he
Implementing Rules and Regulations shall be submitted to the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee created by virtue of this Act for prior
15
I dissent from the majoritys ruling upholding the constitutionality of section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189, which allows an immigrant or a
permanent resident of a foreign country to vote for President, Vice-President, Senators and Party-List Representatives after executing the
required affidavit. I concur, however, with the majoritys ruling upholding the constitutionality of section 18.5 of Rep. Act No. 9189 with respect to
the authority given to the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for Senators and Party-List Representatives but not as to the power to
canvass the votes and proclaim the winning candidates for President and Vice-President. I also concur with the majority with respect to the
unconstitutionality of sections 17.1, 19 and 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189 subjecting the implementation of voting by mail, and the Implementing
Rules and Regulations of Rep. Act No. 9189 to be promulgated by COMELEC, to prior review and approval by Congress.
17
-But legislative scrutiny does not end in budget hearings. Congress can ask
the heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either House of
Congress on any matter pertaining to their departments. Section 22, Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution provides: The heads of departments may, upon
their own initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the request of
either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear before and be
heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written
questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of
the House of Representatives at least three days before their scheduled
appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but may
cover matters related thereto. When the security of the State or the public
interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance
shall be conducted in executive session.
-This provision originated from the Administrative Code and was later
elevated to the level of a constitutional provision due to its "great value in
the work of the legislature."
-Likewise, Congress exercises legislative scrutiny thru its power of
confirmation. Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides for the
organization of a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of
the Senate as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve members of
the House of Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties or organizations
registered under the party-list system. Consent of the Commission on
Appointments is needed for the nominees of the President for the following
positions: (a) heads of executive departments, (b) ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, (c) officers of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain, and (d) other officers whose appointments are
vested with the President under the Constitution.
-Through the power of confirmation, Congress shares in the appointing power
of the executive. Theoretically, it is intended to lessen political
considerations in the appointment of officials in sensitive positions in the
government. It also provides Congress an opportunity to find out whether the
nominee possesses the necessary qualifications, integrity and probity
required of all public servants.
b. Congressional investigation
While congressional scrutiny is regarded as a passive process of looking at
the facts that are readily available, congressional investigation involves a
more intense digging of facts. The power of Congress to conduct
investigation is recognized by the 1987 Constitution under section 21,
Article VI, viz: The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its
respective committee may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
-But even in the absence of an express provision in the Constitution,
congressional investigation has been held to be an essential and
appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function.
19
for legislative review. He proposed that the Executive "should act upon
approval of a joint Committee of Congress or with the reservation of power of
revision by Congress within some limited period adequate for its
consideration." Congress followed President Hoovers suggestion and
authorized reorganization subject to legislative review. Although the
reorganization authority reenacted in 1933 did not contain a legislative veto
provision, the provision returned during the Roosevelt administration and has
since been renewed several times. Over the years, the provision was used
extensively. Various American Presidents submitted to Congress some 115
Reorganization Plans, 23 of which were disapproved pursuant to legislative
veto provisions.
-Supporters of legislative veto stress that it is necessary to maintain the
balance of power between the legislative and the executive branches of
government as it offers lawmakers a way to delegate vast power to the
executive branch or to independent agencies while retaining the option to
cancel particular exercise of such power without having to pass new
legislation or to repeal existing law. They contend that this arrangement
promotes democratic accountability as it provides legislative check on the
activities of unelected administrative agencies. One proponent thus explains:
It is too late to debate the merits of this delegation policy: the policy is too
deeply embedded in our law and practice. It suffices to say that the
complexities of modern government have often led Congress-whether by
actual or perceived necessity- to legislate by declaring broad policy
goals and general statutory standards, leaving the choice of policy
options to the discretion of an executive officer. Congress articulates
legislative aims, but leaves their implementation to the judgment of parties
who may or may not have participated in or agreed with the development of
those aims. Consequently, absent safeguards, in many instances the reverse
of our constitutional scheme could be effected: Congress proposes, the
Executive disposes. One safeguard, of course, is the legislative power to
enact new legislation or to change existing law. But without some means of
overseeing post enactment activities of the executive branch, Congress
would be unable to determine whether its policies have been implemented in
accordance with legislative intent and thus whether legislative intervention
is appropriate.
-Its opponents, however, criticize the legislative veto as undue encroachment
upon the executive prerogatives. They urge that any post-enactment
measures undertaken by the legislative branch should be limited to scrutiny
and investigation; any measure beyond that would undermine the separation
of powers guaranteed by the Constitution.] They contend that legislative
veto constitutes an impermissible evasion of the Presidents veto authority
and intrusion into the powers vested in the executive or judicial branches of
government. Proponents counter that legislative veto enhances separation
of powers as it prevents the executive branch and independent agencies
from accumulating too much power. They submit that reporting requirements
and congressional committee investigations allow Congress to scrutinize only
23
Control
of
Administrative
Decision
questions of law which are intimately linked to policy matters, the courts are
unable to exclude the consideration of such matters in the review.
CONCLUSION
The rise of administrative power has generated a host of problems regarding
controls over the exercise of such power.
Legislative Controls
Appropriation Power of the purse; but is generally not wielded in
consideration of public interest
Fixing of Standards- Has been proven to be of little value
Prescription of Rules-prescription of minimum procedural guidelines and
general principles to be commonly observed by agencies can help maximize
fairness in the administrative process.
Administrative Code of 1987 strikes a harmonious balance
between the fundamental requirements of fairness and the need for
administrative flexibility
Judicial Review important instrument to control agency behavior through the
courts actual policing of agency behavior to ensure that it is confined within
the limits set by law
D. THE OMBUDSMAN: ITS EFFECTIVITY AND VISIBILITY AMIDST
BUREAUCRATIC ABUSE AND IRREGULARITY
E. CASES
CONCERNED OFFICALS OF MWSS v VASQUEZ, PLDPPMA
240 SCRA 502
VITUG; January 25, 1995
NATURE
Petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction
FACTS
- MWSS conducted bidding for two projects concerning its water distribution
system in Metro Manila. The Philippine Large Diameter Pressure Pipes
Manufacturers Association (PLDPPMA) then questioned the award of the
projects with the Office of the Ombudsman (Vasquez), charging an apparent
plan on the part of the MWSS to favor certain suppliers (those offering
fiberglass pipes over those offering steel pipes) through the technical
specifications, and urging the Ombudsman to conduct an investigation
thereon and hold in abeyance the award of the contracts. The Ombudsman
then issued the assailed order, directing the MWSS to: set aside the
30
have the experience and qualification to undertake the projects. While the
broad authority of the Ombudsman to investigate any act or omission which
"xxx appears illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient" may be yielded, it is
difficult to equally concede, however, that the Constitution and the Law have
intended to likewise confer upon it veto or revisory power over an exercise of
judgment or discretion by an agency or officer upon whom that judgment or
discretion is lawfully vested. It seems that the Ombudsman, in issuing the
challenged orders, has not only directly assumed jurisdiction over, but
likewise preempted the exercise of discretion by, the Board of Trustees of
MWSS. Indeed, the recommendation of the MWSS Committee to award the
contract appears to be yet pending consideration and action by the MWSS
Board of Trustees.
We can only view the assailed order to be more of an undue interference in
the adjudicative responsibility of the MWSS Board of Trustees rather than a
mere directive requiring the proper observance of and compliance with the
law.
Disposition Petition is granted. Order annulled and set aside.
LASTIMOSA v VASQUEZ
243 SCRA 497
MENDOZA; April 6, 1995
NATURE
Petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioner to set aside the
orders of the Ombudsman with respect to the two proceedings: complaint for
grave misconduct, insubordination, gross neglect of duty and maliciously
refraining from prosecuting crime and a charge for indirect contempt.
FACTS
- February 18, 1993 > Dayon, public health nurse at Cebu, filed with the
Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas a criminal complaint for frustrated rape
and an administrative complaint for immoral acts, abuse of authority and
grave misconduct against the Municipal Mayor of Santa Fe, Rogelio
Ilustrisimo. After an investigation, the investigating officer found no prima
facie evidence and recommended its dismissal. But the Ombudsman,
Vasquez, disapproved the recommendation and directed that Mayor
Ilustrisimo be charged with attempted rape. Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas
Mojica referred the case to Cebu Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar for the "filing
of appropriate information with the Regional Trial Court of Danao City. The
case eventually went to First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Gloria G.
Lastimosa.
- Lastimosa conducted a PI and found that only acts of lasciviousness had
been committed. With the approval of Kintanar, she filed an information for
acts of lasciviousness. As no case for attempted rape had been filed by the
32
and Prosecutors. The Ombudsman may utilize the personnel of his office
and/or designate of deputize any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the
government service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist in
the investigation and prosecution of certain cases. Those designated or
deputized to assist him as herein provided shall be under his supervision and
control.
Obiter
- The office of the Ombudsman has the power to "investigate and prosecute
on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public
officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to
be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient." This power has been held to
include the investigation and prosecution of any crime committed by a public
official regardless of whether the acts or omissions complained of are related
to, or connected with, or arise from, the performance of his official duty. It is
enough that the act or omission was committed by a public official. Hence,
the crime of rape, when committed by a public official like a municipal
mayor, is within the power of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute.
2. YES
- Sec 15(g) of the Ombudsman Act gives the Office of the Ombudsman the
power to "punish for contempt, in accordance with the Rules of Court and
under the same procedure and with the same penalties provided therein."
- Suspension is not a punishment or penalty for the acts of dishonesty and
misconduct in office, but only as a preventive measure. Suspension is a
preliminary step in an administrative investigation. If after such
investigation, the charges are established and the person investigated is
found guilty of acts warranting his removal, then he is removed or dismissed.
This is the penalty. There is, therefore, nothing improper in suspending an
officer pending his investigation and before the opportunity to prove his
innocence.
Disposition Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the Motion to Lift
Order of Preventive Suspension is DENIED
BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE v OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
380 SCRA 424
de Leon, Jr., J; April 11, 2002
NATURE
Special civil Action . Certiorari and Prohibition
FACTS
- The Office of the Ombudsman received information from an informant for
reward regarding the anomalous grant of tax refunds to Distillera Limtuaco
and La Tondena Distilleries. On the basis of this information, the Ombudsman
directed via a subpoena duces tecum, Atty. Mansequiao of the legal
department of the BIR to appear before him together with the complete case
34
implement the writ. The lower court issued another order upholding the
validity of the writ of execution
- On the basis of letters from Congressman Manuel M. Garcia of the Second
District of Davao City and Engineer Ramon A. Alejo, the Court
Administrator, the SC directed Judge Renato A. Fuentes and Sheriff Norberto
Paralisan to comment on the report recommending the filing of an
administrative case against the sheriff and other persons responsible for
the anomalous implementation of the writ of execution. Also, the DPWH
filed an administrative complaint against Sheriff Norberto Paralisan for
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, in violation of Article
IX, Section 36 (b) of P. D. No. 807.
- After considering the facts, the SC ordered the sheriffs dismissal. From this
order, the office of the Court Administrator was also directed to conduct an
investigation on Judge Renato Fuentes and to charge him if the result of the
investigation so warrants. The Office of the Solicitor General is likewise
ordered to take appropriate action to recover the value of the serviceable
or repairable equipment which were unlawfully hauled by Alex Bacquial.
- Thus, Director Antonio E. Valenzuela of the Office of the OmbudsmanMindanao recommended that petitioner Judge Renato A. Fuentes be
charged before the Sandiganbayan with violation of Republic Act No. 3019,
Section 3 (e) and likewise be administratively charged before the Supreme
Court with acts unbecoming of a judge. Fuentes. filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao a motion to dismiss complaint and/or manifestation
to forward all records to the Supreme Court. The motion was dismissed
hence this petition.
ISSUE
1.
WON the Ombudsman may conduct an investigation of acts of a judge
in the exercise of his official functions alleged to be in violation of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act, in the absence of an administrative charge
for the same acts before the Supreme Court.
HELD
NO.
The Ombudsman may not initiate or investigate a criminal or
administrative complaint before his office against petitioner judge, pursuant
to his power to investigate public officers. The Ombudsman must indorse the
case to the Supreme Court, for appropriate action. Article VIII, Section 6 of
the Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative
supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of
the Court of Appeals to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. Hence, it is the
Supreme Court that is tasked to oversee the judges and court personnel and
take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any
violation of the laws of the land. No other branch of government may intrude
into this power, without running afoul of the independence of the judiciary
and the doctrine of separation of powers. No other entity or official of the
Government, not the prosecution or investigation service of any other
38
ESTARIJA v RANADA
492 SCRA 652
QUISUMBING; Jun 26, 2006
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS
Captain Edgardo V. Estarija, Harbor Master of the Philippine Ports Authority
(PPA), was found guilty by the Ombudsman of dishonesty and grave
misconduct for having been demanding monies for the approval and
issuance of berthing permits and monthly contribution from the Davao Pilots
Association, Inc. (DPAI). He was dismissed from the service.
ISSUES
1.
WON there is substantial evidence to hold petitioner liable for
dishonesty and grave misconduct
2.
WON the power of the Ombudsman to directly remove, suspend,
demote, fine or censure erring officials is unconstitutional since the under
41
A. LEGISLATIVE FUNCTION
1. NON DELEGATION DOCTRINE
COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DE FILIPINAS v THE BOARD OF
PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISIONERS
G.R. NO. L-11216
Moreland, J.: March 6, 1916
NATURE
Petition for review of an order of the Board of Public Utility Commissioners
(the Board)
FACTS
-petitioner is a foreign corporation organized under the laws of Spain and
engaged in business in the Phils. as a common carrier of passengers and
merchandise by water. The Board dictated an order requiring petitioner to
present a detailed report of its finances and operations of its vessels in the
Phils. in the form of annual reports, upon hearing and service of an order for
petitioner to show cause why such reports should not be required of them.
-The Board relied on Sec. 16 of Act No. 2307 for its authority which states
that:
the board shall have power, after hearing, upon notice, by order in writing,
to require every public utility as herein defined
(e) to furnish annually a detailed report of finances and operations, in
such form and containing such matters as the Boars may from time to
time by order prescribe.
-petitioner questioned the Boards authority on the ground that Act No. 2307
was invalid as constituting an unlawful attempt on the part of Legislature to
delegate legislative power to the Board.
ISSUE
WON there was a delegation of legislative power to the Board
HELD
YES. Act No. 2307 failed to lay down the general rules of action under which
the Board was to proceed, and did not prescribe in detail the contents of the
reports it required. Everything was left to the judgment and discretion of the
Board rendering the Act arbitrary, special legislation, and violative of the
constitution. It did not indicate what specific information the State required
and instead authorized the Board to require whatever information it wanted.
This amounted to the Legislatures abdication of its powers and functions to
the Boardas held in Birdsall vs Clark: if discretion and judgment are to be
exercised, either as to time or manner, the body entrusted with the duty
must exercise it, and cannot delegate it to another.
-As stated in Interstate Commerce Commission vs Goodrich Transit, The
Congress may not delegate its purely legislative powers to a commission,
44
but, having laid down the general rules of action under which a commission
shall proceed, it may require of that commission the application of such rules
to particular situations and the investigation of facts, with a view to making
orders in a particular matter within the rules laid down by the Congress.
Here, the general rules had been laid down for the guidance of the
commission, the latter only having to carry out the details. This case
illustrates the conferring of authority as to the execution of the law, which is
completely valid, as opposed to the delegation of the power to make the law.
Dowling vs Lancashire Insurance Co. furthers that the law must be complete,
in all its terms and provisions, when it leaves the legislature, so that, in form
and substance, it is a law in all its details, in presenti, but which may be left
to take effect in futuro. As held in Merchants Exchange vs Knott, in essence,
the delegation of legislative power is pure and simple despotism.
The order appealed from is set aside and the cause returned to the
Board with instruction to dismiss
US v ANG TANG HO
43 Phil 1
Johns; February 27, 1922
FACTS
- In 1919, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2868. The Act 1) makes
unlawful the monopoly and hoarding of palay, rice or corn and provides
penalty for such violations; and 2) authorizes the GG to fix the quantities of
sais products that a company or individual may acquire, and the maximum
sale price that the industrial or merchant may demand.
- The GG thus issued a proclamation fixing the price at which rice should be
sold.
- A complaint was filed against the Ang Tang Ho, charging him with the sale
of rice at an excessive price. Upon this charge, he was tried, found guilty and
sentenced to imprisonment and to pay a fine. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE
WON Act No. 2868, in so far as it authorizes the GG to fix the price at which
rice should be sold, is unconstitutional.
HELD.
YES
It will be noted that section 1 authorizes the GG, with the consent of the
Council of State, for any cause resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price
of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgated temporary rules and
emergency measures for carrying out the purposes of the Act. By its very
terms, the promulgation of temporary rules and emergency measures is left
to the discretion of the GG. The Legislature does not undertake reasons the
Governor-General shall issue the proclamation, but says that it may be
45
issued " for any cause," and leaves the question as to what is "any cause" to
the discretion of the GG. The Act also says: "For any cause, conditions arise
resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn." The
Legislature does not specify or define what is "an extraordinary rise." That is
also left to the discretion of the GG. The Act also says that the GovernorGeneral, "with the consent of the Council of State," is authorized to issue and
promulgate "temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the
purposes of this Act." It does not specify or define what is a temporary rule or
an emergency measure, or how long such temporary rules or emergency
measures shall remain in force and effect, or when they shall take effect.
That is to say the Legislature itself has no in any manner specified or defined
any basis for the order, but has left it to the sole judgment and discretion of
the GG to say what is or what is not "a cause," and what is or what is not "an
extraordinary rise in the price of rice," and as to what a temporary rule or an
emergency measure for the carrying out the purpose of the Act. Under this
state of facts, if the law is valid and the GG issues a proclamation fixing the
minimum price at which rice should be sold, any dealer who, with or without
notice, sells rice at a higher price, is a criminal. There may not have been
any cause, and the price may not have been extraordinary, and there may
not have been an emergency, but, if the GG found the existence of such
facts and issued a proclamation, and rice is sold at any higher price, the
seller commits a crime.
By the Organic Law, all legislative power is vested in the Legislature, and the
power conferred upon the Legislature to make laws cannot be delegated to
the GG, or any one else. The Legislative cannot delegate the Legislative
power to enact any law. If Act No. 2868 is a law unto itself and within itself,
and it does nothing more than to authorize the GG to make rules and
regulations to carry the law into effect, then the Legislature itself created the
law. There is no delegation of power and it is valid. On the other hand, if the
Act within itself does not define a crime, and is not a law, and some
legislative act remains to be done to make it a law or a crime, the doing of
which is vested in the GG, then the Act is a delegation of legislative power, is
unconstitutional and void.
Supreme Court of Wisconsin:
"That no part of the legislative power can be delegated by the legislature to
any other department of the government, executive or judicial, is a
fundamental principle in constitutional law, essential to the integrity and
maintenance of the system of government established by the constitution.
"Where an act is clothed with all the forms of law, and is complete in and of
itself, it may be provided that it shall become operative only upon some
certain act or event, or, in like manner, that its operation shall be suspended.
The legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law, but it can make a
law to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things upon
which the law makes, or intends to make, its own action to depend."
It must conceded that, after the passage of Act No. 2868, and before any
rules and regulations were promulgated by the GG, a dealer in rice could sell
46
it at any price, and that he would not commit a crime, because there would
be no law fixing the price of rice, and the sale of it at any price would not be
a crime. That is to say, in the absence of a proclamation, it was not a crime
to sell rice at any price. Hence, it must follow that, if the defendant
committed a crime, it was because the Governor-General issued the
proclamation. There was no act of the Legislature making it a crime to sell
rice at any price, and without the proclamation, the sale of it at any price
was not crime.
When Act No. 2868 is analyzed, it is the violation of the proclamation of the
GG which constitutes the crime. Without that proclamation, it was no crime
to sell rice at any price. In other words, the Legislature left it to the sole
discretion of the GG to say what was and what was not "any cause" for
enforcing the act, and what was and what was not "an extraordinary rise in
the price of palay, rice or corn," and under certain undefined conditions to fix
the price at which rice should be sold, without regard to grade or quality,
also to say whether a proclamation should be issued, if so, when, and
whether or not the law should be enforced, how long it should be enforced,
and when the law should be suspended. The Legislature did not specify or
define what was "any cause," or what was "an extraordinary rise in the price
of rice, palay or corn." Neither did it specify or define the conditions upon
which the proclamation should be issued. In the absence of the proclamation
no crime was committed. The alleged sale was made a crime, if at all,
because the GG issued the proclamation.
PEOPLE v VERA
65 Phil 56
LAUREL; November 16, 1937
FACTS
-1931: information for criminal case against Mariano Cu Unjieng, et. al was
filed in CFI Manila. HSBC, the offended party, intervened.
-1934: CFI convicted Cu Unjieng
-1935: SC upholds conviction of Cu Unjieng, modified duration of
imprisonment. After MFR and motions for new trial which were denied by SC,
final judgment was entered. Cu Unjieng now sought to elevate case to US SC.
US SC denied petition for certiorari.
-1936: RP SC denied Cu Unjiengs petition for leave to file MFR or new trial,
remanded the case to CFI Manila for execution of judgment. Cu Unjieng
applied for provation under Act No. 4221, which was referred to the Insular
Probation Office (IPO)
-1937: IPO recommended denial of Cu Unjiengs application for probation.
Petition for probation heard before Judge Veras court. HSBC attacked
constitutionality of Act No. 4221 based on the following: equal protection
of the laws (its applicability is not uniform throughout the Islands); undue
delegation of legislative power (section 11 of the said Act endows provl
47
person or body the power to determine when the specified contingencies has
arisen. In the case at bar, the various provincial boards are, in practical
effect, endowed with the power of suspending the operation of the Probation
Law in their respective provinces.
- While the legislature may suspend a law, or the execution or operation of a
law, a law may not be suspended as to certain individuals only, leaving the
law to be enjoyed by others. The suspension must be general, and cannot be
made for individual cases or for particular localities. Here the sovereign and
absolute power resides in the people; and the legislature can only exercise
what is delegated to them according to the constitution. It is manifestly
contrary to the first principles of civil liberty and natural justice, and to the
spirit of our constitution and laws, that any one citizen should enjoy
privileges and advantages which are denied to all others under like
circumstances; or that ant one should be subject to losses, damages, suits,
or actions from which all others under like circumstances are exempted.
- True, the legislature may enact laws for a particular locality different from
those applicable to other localities. But option laws thus sustained treat of
subjects purely local in character which should receive different treatment in
different localities placed under different circumstances. While we do not
deny the right of local self-government and the propriety of leaving matters
of purely local concern in the hands of local authorities or for the people of
small communities to pass upon, we believe that in matters of general of
general legislation like that which treats of criminals in general, and as
regards the general subject of probation, discretion may not be vested in a
manner so unqualified and absolute as provided in Act No. 4221. The validity
of a law is not tested by what has been done but by what may be done under
its provisions.
- A great deal of latitude should be granted to the legislature not only in the
expression of what may be termed legislative policy but in the elaboration
and execution thereof. "Without this power, legislation would become
oppressive and yet imbecile." The mass of powers of government is vested in
the representatives of the people and that these representatives are no
further restrained under our system than by the express language of the
instrument imposing the restraint, or by particular provisions which by clear
intendment, have that effect. (Angara case)
Decision WHEREFORE, Act No. 4221 is hereby declared unconstitutional
and void and the writ of prohibition is, accordingly, granted. Without any
pronouncement regarding costs. So ordered.
PELAEZ v AUDITOR GENERAL
G.R. L-23285
CONCEPCION; December 24, 1965
NATURE
Special civil action (for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction)
50
51
that said law: (a) be complete in itself - it must set forth therein the policy
to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate and (b) fix a
standard - the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable
to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.
Reasoning Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet
these well settled requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the
details in the enforcement of a law.
- "Public welfare" and "public interest," are sufficient standards for a valid
delegation of the authority to execute the law. But, the doctrine laid down in
Calalang v Williams must be construed in relation to the specific facts and
issues involved - grants to administrative officers of powers related to the
exercise of their administrative functions, calling for the determination of
questions of fact. Such is not the nature of the powers dealt with in section
68. The question of whether or not "public interest" demands the exercise of
such power is not one of fact. it is "purely a legislative question " or a
political question.
NON-DELEGATION DOCTRINE
- If the validity of the delegation of powers made in Section 68 were upheld,
there would no longer be any legal impediment to a statutory grant of
authority to the President to do anything which, in his opinion, may be
required by public welfare or public interest. Such grant of authority would be
a virtual abdication of the powers of Congress in favor of the Executive.
- Section 10 (1) of Article VII of our fundamental law ordains: The President
shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices,
exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided
by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed. The power of
control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in
the exercise of such discretion BUT this power is denied by the Constitution
to the Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned. The President
cannot interfere with local governments, so long as the same or its officers
act within the scope of their authority. Manifestly, such control does not
include the authority either to abolish an executive department or bureau, or
to create a new one.
2. YES
Reasoning Even if it did entail an undue delegation of legislative powers, as
it certainly does, said Sec 68, as part of the Revised Administrative Code,
approved on March 10, 1917, must be deemed repealed by the subsequent
adoption of the Constitution, in 1935, which is utterly incompatible and
inconsistent with said statutory enactment.
Disposition The Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and
void ab initio and the respondent (Auditor General) permanently restrained
from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of
said Executive Orders or any disbursement by the municipalities above
referred to.
BENGZON [concur & dissent]
52
- The issue is whether the legislature can validly delegate to the Executive
such power. The power to create a municipality is legislative in character.
American authorities have therefore favored the view that it cannot be
delegated; that what is delegable is not the power to create municipalities
but only the power to determine the existence of facts under which creation
of a municipality will result.
- The test is said to lie in whether the statute allows any discretion on the
delegate as to whether the municipal corporation should be created. If so,
there is an attempted delegation of legislative power and the statute is
invalid. Now Section 68 no doubt gives the President such discretion, since it
says that the President "may by executive order" exercise the powers therein
granted.
EDU v ERICTA
35 SCRA 481
FERNANDO; October 24, 1970
NATURE
Petition for certiorari and prohibition
FACTS
-Galo, on his behalf and that of other motorists, filed on May 20, 1970 a suit
for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction assailing the validity
of the Reflector Law as an invalid exercise of the police power, for being
violative of the due process clause.
-This he followed on May 28, 1970 with a manifestation wherein he sought as
an alternative remedy that, in the event that respondent Judge would hold
said statute constitutional, Administrative Order No. 2 of the Land
Transportation Commissioner, implementing such legislation be nullified as
an undue exercise of legislative power.
-On May 28, 1970, respondent Judge ordered the issuance of a preliminary
injunction directed against the enforcement of such administrative order.
-SolGen filed MFR
-On June 9, 1970, respondent Judge denied the motion for reconsideration of
the order of injunction, hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition
ISSUE
WON Admninstrative Order No. 2 is invalid for being contrary to the principle
of non-delegation of legislative power.
HELD
No.
-It is not to be lost sight of that under Republic Act No. 4136, of which the
Reflector Law is an amendment, petitioner, as the Land Transportation
Commissioner, may, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
53
under P.D. No. 207, recommended the enactment of local legislation for the
installation of road safety signs and devices; . . ." It cannot be disputed then
that this Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution possesses
relevance: "The Philippines . . . adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land, . . ." The 1968 Vienna
Convention on Road Signs and Signals is impressed with such a character. It
is not for this country to repudiate a commitment to which it had pledged its
word. The concept of Pacta sunt servanda stands in the way of such an
attitude, which is, moreover, at war with the principle of international
morality.
Disposition Petition DISMISSED
FREE TELEPHONE WORKERS UNION v MINISTER OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT
108 SCRA 757
FERNANDO; Feb. 2, 1979
NATURE
Petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court
FACTS
-Petitioner filed with the Ministry of Labor a notice of strike for unfair labor
practices allegedly committed by private respondent company inviolation of
their existing collective bargaining agreement, particularly the unilateral and
arbitrary implementation of a Code of Conduct to the detriment and interest
of its members.
-Several conciliation meetings called by the Ministry followed. Thereafter, the
Ministry of Labor pursuant to law, certified the labor dispute to the NLRC for
compulsory arbitration and the holding of any strike at private respondent
establishment was enjoined. Hearing was subsequently conducted whereas
private respondent agreed to the indefinite preventive suspension of the
provisions of the Code of Conduct, the principal cause of the controversy.
-In a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court, petitioner union
submits that Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 insofar as it amends Article 264 of the
Labor Code delegating to the Minister of Labor the power and discretion to
assume jurisdiction and/or certify strikes for compulsory arbitration to the
NLRC, and in effect make or unmake the law on free collective bargaining, is
an undue delegation of legislative powers and is contrary to the assurance of
the State to the workers' right to self organization and collective bargaining.
Such power, according to petitioner union, is within the competence of the
President who can best determine national interests when a strike is in
progress.
ISSUE
57
2.
WON Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 insofar as it amends Article 264 of the
Labor Code delegating to the Minister of Labor the power and discretion to
assume jurisdiction and/or certify strikes for compulsory arbitration to the
NLRC, and in effect make or unmake the law on free collective bargaining,
is an undue delegation of legislative powers and hence unconstitutional
HELD
2.
NO.
Reasoning the unconstitutional of the act has not been demonstrated and
that any ruling on the question of unconstitutional application would be
premature in the absence of factual determination by the Ministry of Labor
and the NLRC. Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 insofar as it empowers the Minister
of Labor to assume jurisdiction over labor disputes causing or likely to cause
strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the national interest and thereafter
decide it or certify the same to the NLRC is not on its face unconstitutional
for being violative of the doctrine of non-delegation of legislative power. It
stressed further that compulsory arbitration must be exercised in accordance
with the constitutional mandate of protection to labor. To repeat, there is no
ruling on the question of whether or not it has been unconstitutionally
applied in this case, for being repugnant to the regime of self-organization
and free collective bargaining, as on the facts alleged, disputed by private
respondent, the matter is not ripe for judicial determination. It must be
stressed anew, however, that the power of compulsory arbitration, while
allowable under the Constitution and quite understandable in labor disputes
affected with a national interest, to be free from the taint of
unconstitutionality, must be exercised in accordance with the constitutional
mandate of protection to labor.
Disposition Petition DISMISSED
PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CORPORATION v ALCUAZ
180 SCRA 218
REGALADO; Dec 18, 1989
NATURE
Petition to annul and set aside an Order issued by respondent Commissioner
Jose Luis Alcuaz of the National Telecommunications Commission
FACTS
By virtue of Republic Act No. 5514, PHILCOMSAT was granted "a franchise to
establish, construct, maintain and operate in the Philippines, at such places
as the grantee may select, station or stations and associated equipment and
facilities for international satellite communications." Under this franchise, it
was likewise granted the authority to "construct and operate such ground
facilities as needed to deliver telecommunications services from the
communications satellite system and ground terminal or terminals."
58
authority expired on March 17, 1988, it was extended for another six (6)
months, or up to September 16, 1988.
The NTC order now in controversy had further extended the provisional
authority of the petitioner for another six (6) months, counted from
September 16, 1988, but it directed the petitioner to charge modified
reduced rates through a reduction of fifteen percent (15%) on the present
authorized rates.
PHILCOMSAT argues that the enabling act (Executive Order No. 546) of
respondent NTC empowering it to fix rates for public service communications
does not provide the necessary standards constitutionally required, hence
there is an undue delegation of legislative power, particularly the
adjudicatory powers of NTC.
ISSUE
WON Executive Orders Nos. 546 and 196 are unconstitutional on the ground
that the same do not fix a standard for the exercise of the power therein
conferred.
HELD
NO. Fundamental is the rule that delegation of legislative power may be
sustained only upon the ground that some standard for its exercise is
provided and that the legislature in making the delegation has prescribed the
manner of the exercise of the delegated power. Therefore, when the
administrative agency concerned, respondent NTC in this case, establishes a
rate, its act must both be non- confiscatory and must have been established
in the manner prescribed by the legislature; otherwise, in the absence of a
fixed standard, the delegation of power becomes unconstitutional. In case of
a delegation of rate-fixing power, the only standard which the legislature is
required to prescribe for the guidance of the administrative authority is that
the rate be reasonable and just. However, it has been held that even in the
absence of an express requirement as to reasonableness, this standard may
be implied.
It becomes important then to ascertain the nature of the power delegated to
respondent NTC and the manner required by the statute for the lawful
exercise thereof.
Pursuant to Executive Orders Nos. 546 and 196, respondent NTC is
empowered,among others, to determine and prescribe rates pertinent to the
operation of public service communications which necessarily include the
power to promulgate rules and regulations in connection therewith. And,
under Section 15(g) of Executive Order No. 546, respondent NTC should be
guided by the requirements of public safety, public interest and reasonable
feasibility of maintaining effective competition of private entities in
communications and broadcasting facilities. Likewise, in Section 6(d) thereof,
which provides for the creation of the Ministry of Transportation and
Communications with control and supervision over respondent NTC, it is
60
65
- Sec of Interior issued the regulations which included the requirement for
every producer, purchaser or shipper of petroleum to file a monthly
statement under oath, giving information re: their residence and post office
address, and other information regarding the sale, purchase, production of
petroleum (Regulations IV, V and VII)
- EO 6256 approved Code of Fair Competition for the Petroleum Industry.
- Thru EO of August 28, 1933, the Pres designated the Sec of the Interior as
Administrator, and the Dept of the Interior as the federal agency, to exercise
on his behalf all the powers vested in him under that act and code. Sec 3(f),
title 1 of the NIRA, provides that, when a code of fair competition has been
approved or prescribed by the Pres under that title, 'any violation of any
provision in any transaction in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce
shall be a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof an offender shall be
fined not more than $500 for each offense, and each day such violation
continues shall be deemed a separate offense.'
- By EO No. 6284-a, the 2nd par of sec 4 of art III 3 was eliminated. It was
reinstated by EO 6855.
- Panama Refining Company, as owner of an oil refining plant in Texas, and
its coplaintiff, a producer having oil and gas leases in Texas, and Amazon
Petroleum Corporation and its coplaintiffs, all being oil producers in Texas
and owning separate properties, sued to restrain officials from enforcing the
laws promulgated by the Sec of Interior and questioned the constitutionality
of the EOs.
ISSUE
WON the EOs are constitutional
HELD
NO, because of unconstitutional delegation of legislative power
Ratio The Legislature, to prevent its being a pure delegation of legislative
power, must enjoin upon the agent a certain course of procedure and certain
rules of decision in the performance of its function.
Reasoning
- The Constitution has never been regarded as denying the Congress the
necessary resources of flexibility and practicality, which will enable it to
perform its function in laying down policies and establishing standards, while
leaving to selected instrumentalities the making of subordinate rules within
prescribed limits and the determination of facts to which the policy as
declared by the Legislature is to apply. But the constant recognition of the
necessity and validity of such provisions and the wide range of
administrative authority which has been developed by means of them cannot
3
'If any subdivision into quotas of production allocated to any State shall be made within a State any production by any person,
as person is defined in Article I, Section 3 of this code in excess of any such quota assigned to him, shall be deemed an unfair
trade practice and in violation of this code.'
68
intelligent. Such is not the position or duty of the President. He is the Chief
Executive of the nation, exercising a power committed to him by Congress,
and subject, in respect of the formal qualities of his acts, to the restrictions, if
any, accompanying the grant, but not to any others.
ABAKADA GURO v EXEC. SEC. ERMITA
GR No. 168207
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ; September 1, 2005
NATURE
Petitions for certiorari and prohibition
FACTS
- On May 24, 2005, the President signed into law Republic Act 9337 or the
VAT Reform Act. Before the law was to take effect on July 1, 2005, the Court
issued a temporary restraining order enjoining government from
implementing the law in response to a slew of petitions for certiorari and
prohibition questioning the constitutionality of the new law.
- NON-DELEGATION ISSUE: The new law in its Sections 4, 5 and 6 granted the
Secretary of Finance the authority to ascertain whether by December 31,
2005, the VAT collection as a percentage of GDP of the previous year
exceeds 2 and 4/5% or the national government deficit as a percentage of
GDP of the previous year exceeds 1 and 1/2%. If either of these two
instances has occurred, the Secretary of Finance, must submit such
information to the President. Then the 12% VAT rate must be imposed by the
President effective January 1, 2006.
ISSUE
WON the RA 9337's stand-by authority to the Executive to increase the VAT
rate, especially on account of the recommendatory power granted to the
Secretary of Finance, constitutes undue delegation of legislative power
HELD
NO.
Ratio Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power
when it describes what job must be done, who must do it, and what is the
scope of his authority; in our complex economy that is frequently the only
way in which the legislative process can go forward.
Reasoning The case before the Court is not a delegation of legislative
power. It is simply a delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which
enforcement and administration of the increased rate under the law is
contingent. The legislature has made the operation of the 12% rate effective
January 1, 2006, contingent upon a specified fact or condition. It leaves the
entire operation or non-operation of the 12% rate upon factual matters
outside of the control of the executive. No discretion would be exercised by
71
the President. Highlighting the absence of discretion is the fact that the word
shall is used in the common proviso. The use of the word shall connote a
mandatory order. Its use in a statute denotes an imperative obligation and is
inconsistent with the idea of discretion.
- Thus, it is the ministerial duty of the President to immediately impose the
12% rate upon the existence of any of the conditions specified by Congress.
This is a duty, which cannot be evaded by the President. It is a clear directive
to impose the 12% VAT rate when the specified conditions are present.
- In making his recommendation to the President on the existence of either of
the two conditions, the Secretary of Finance is not acting as the alter ego of
the President or even her subordinate. He is acting as the agent of the
legislative department, to determine and declare the event upon which its
expressed will is to take effect. The Secretary of Finance becomes the means
or tool by which legislative policy is determined and implemented,
considering that he possesses all the facilities to gather data and information
and has a much broader perspective to properly evaluate them. His function
is to gather and collate statistical data and other pertinent information and
verify if any of the two conditions laid out by Congress is present.
- There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion
as to the execution of a law. This is constitutionally permissible. Congress did
not delegate the power to tax but the mere implementation of the law. The
intent and will to increase the VAT rate to 12% came from Congress and the
task of the President is to simply execute the legislative policy.
Disposition Petition is DENIED.
REVIEW CENTER ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA and COMMISSION ON
HIGHER EDUCATION represented by its Chairman ROMULO L. NERI,
Respondents.
CPA REVIEW SCHOOL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (CPAR), PROFESSIONAL
REVIEW AND TRAINING CENTER, INC. (PRTC), ReSA REVIEW SCHOOL, INC.
(ReSA), CRC-ACE REVIEW SCHOOL, INC. (CRC-ACE)Petitioners-Intervenors.
PIMSAT COLLEGES, Respondent-Intervenor.
Carpio, 2009
Facts:
- There was a report that handwritten copies of two sets of 2006 Nursing
Board examination were circulated during the examination period among
examinees reviewing at the R.A. Gapuz Review Center and Inress Review
Center. The examinees were provided with a list of 500 questions and
answers in two of the examinations five subjects, particularly Tests III
(Psychiatric Nursing) and V (Medical-Surgical Nursing). The PRC later
admitted the leakage and traced it to two Board of Nursing members. Exam
72
results came out but Court of Appeals restrained the PRC from proceeding
with the oath-taking of the successful examinees.
- President GMA ordered for a re-examination and issued EO 566 which
authorized the CHED to supervise the establishment and operation of all
review centers and similar entities in the Philippines. CHED Chairman Puno
approved CHED Memorandum Order No. 49 series of 2006 (Implementing
Rules and Regulations).
- Review Center Association of the Philippines (petitioner), an organization of
independent review centers, asked the CHED to "amend, if not withdraw" the
IRR arguing, among other things, that giving permits to operate a review
center to Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) or consortia of HEIs and
professional organizations will effectively abolish independent review
centers. CHED Chairman Puno however believed that suspending the
implementation of the IRR would be inconsistent with the mandate of EO
566.
- A dialogue between the petitioner and CHED took place. Revised IRR was
approved. Petitioner filed before the CHED a Petition to Clarify/Amend RIRR
praying to exclude independent review center from the coverage of the
CHED; to clarify the meaning of the requirement for existing review centers
to tie-up with HEIs; to revise the rules to make it conform with RA 7722
limiting the CHEDs coverage to public and private institutions of higher.
- In 2007, then CHED Chairman Neri responded to the petitioner that: to
exclude the operation of independent review centers from the coverage of
CHED would clearly contradict the intention of the said Executive Order No.
566; As to the request to clarify what is meant by tie-up/be integrated with
an HEI, tie-up/be integrated simply means, to be in partner with an HEI.
- Petitioner filed a petition for Prohibition and Mandamus before this
Court praying for the annulment of the RIRR, the declaration of EO
566 as invalid and unconstitutional exercise of legislative power, and
the prohibition against CHED from implementing the RIRR. Motion to
intervene filed by other organizations/institutions were granted by the Court.
- On 21 May 2008, CHED issued CHED Memorandum Order No. 21,
Series of 2008 (CMO 21, s. 2008) extending the deadline for six
months from 27 May 2008 for all existing independent review
centers to tie-up or be integrated with HEIs in accordance with the
RIRR. On 25 November 2008 Resolution, SC resolved to require the parties
to observe the status quo prevailing before the issuance of EO 566, the RIRR,
and CMO 21, s. 2008.
73
FACTS
- Schechter was found to have violated the Live Poultry Code promulgated
under NIRA (National Industrial Recovery Act) but written by industry groups
then approved by the President through the Ag Secy. NIRA gave President
the authority to approve codes of fair competition applied by a trade or
industrial group.
- Section 3 of the National Industrial Recovery Act provides that "codes of fair
competition," which shall be the " standards of fair competition" for the
trades and industries to which they relate, may be approved by the President
upon application of representative associations of the trades or industries to
be affected, or may be prescribed by him on his own motion. Their provisions
[p496] are to be enforced by injunctions from the federal courts, and "any
violation of any of their provisions in any transaction in or affecting interstate
commerce" is to be deemed an unfair method of competition within the
meaning of the Federal Trade Commission Act, and is to be punished as a
crime against the United States. Before approving, the President is to make
certain findings as to the character of the association presenting the code
and absence of design to promote monopoly or oppress small enterprises,
and must find that it will "tend to effectuate the policy of this title." Codes
permitting monopolies or monopolistic practices are forbidden. The President
may "impose such conditions (including requirements for the making of
reports and the keeping of accounts) for the protection of consumers,
competitors, employees and others, and in the furtherance of the public
interest, and may provide such exceptions and exemptions from the
provisions of such code," as he, in his discretion, deems necessary "to
effectuate the policy herein declared." A code prescribed by him is to have
the same effect as one approved on application.
ISSUE
WON the Live Poultry Code is unconstitutional for being an undue delegation
of legislative powers. (YES.)
HELD
RATIO: Congress is not permitted by the Constitution to abdicate, or to
transfer to others, the essential legislative functions with which it is vested.
Congress may leave to selected instrumentalities the making of subordinate
rules within prescribed limits, and the determination of facts to which the
policy, as declared by Congress, is to apply; but it must itself lay down the
policies and establish standards.
REASONING:
- The delegation of legislative power sought to be made to the President by
3 of the National Industrial Recovery Act of June 16, 1933, is
unconstitutional and the Act is also unconstitutional, as applied in this case,
because it exceeds the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce
and invades the power reserved exclusively to the States
76
2. PERMISSIBLE DELEGATION
a. ASCERTAINMENT OF FACT
PANAMA REFINING CO v RYAN
293 U.S. 388
HUGHES; January 7, 1935
FACTS:
-Based on section 9(c) of title 1 of the National Industrial Recovery Act of
June 16, 1933 which states that: The President is authorized to prohibit the
transportation in interstate and foreign commerce of petroleum and the
products thereof produced or withdrawn from storage in excess of the
amount permitted to be produced or withdrawn from storage by any State
law or valid regulation or order prescribed thereunder, by any board,
commission, officer, or other duly authorized agency of a State. Any violation
of any order of the President issued under the provisions of this subsection
shall be punishable by fine of not to exceed $1,000, or imprisonment for not
to exceed six months, or both., the President by Executive Order No. 6199,
prohibited 'the transportation in interstate and foreign commerce of
petroleum and the products thereof produced or withdrawn from storage in
excess of the amount permitted to be produced or withdrawn from storage
by any State law or valid regulation or order prescribed thereunder, by any
board, commission, officer, or other duly authorized agency of a State.'
-Under section 10(a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act, authorizing the
President to prescribe such rules and regulations as may be necessary to
carry out the purposes' of title 1 of the National Industrial Recovery Act and
providing that 'any violation of any such rule or regulation shall be
punishable by fine of not to exceed $500, or imprisonment for not to exceed
six months, or both. the President, by Executive Order No. 6204, authorized
the Secretary of the Interior to exercise all the powers vested in the President
'for the purpose of enforcing Section 9(c) of said act and said order' of July
11, 1933, 'including full authority to designate and appoint such agents and
to set up such boards and agencies as he may see fit, and to promulgate
such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary.'
- On July 15, 1933, the Secretary of the Interior issued regulations to carry
out the President's orders of July 11 and 14, 1933. the regulations and the
orders of the President were questioned by oil companies affected by the
Orders. They question the basis of the power of the President to make such
orders as an undue delegation of legislative powers.
ISSUE:
WON there was an undue delegation of legislative powers when the
Legislature, through section 9(c) of title 1 of the National Industrial Recovery
Act of June 16, 1933, allowed the President to issue the Orders complained
of.
80
b. FILLING IN OF DETAILS
ALEGRE v COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS
53 PHIL 394
JOHNS; August 27, 1929
83
NATURE
Appeal from the decision of CFI
FACTS
- The petitioner for a number of years has been and is now engaged in the
production of abaca and its exportation to foreign markets. November 8,
1927, he applied to the respondent for a permit to export one hundred bales
of abaca to England, which was denied, and advised that he would not be
permitted to export the abaca in question without a certificate of the Fiber
Standardization Board. He then filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila a
petition for a writ of mandamus, alleging that the provisions of the
Administrative Code for the grading, inspection and certification of fibers
and, in particular, sections 1772 and 1244 of that Code, are unconstitutional
and void.
Section 1244. A collector of customs shall not permit abaca, maguey, or sisal
or other fibrous products for which standard grades have been established
by the Director of Agriculture to be laden aboard a vessel clearing for a
foreign port, unless the shipment conforms to the requirements of law
relative to the shipment of such fibers.
Section 1772. The Fiber Standardization Board shall determine the official
standards for the various commercial grades of Philippine fibers that are or
may hereafter be produced on the Philippine Islands for shipment abroad.
Each grade shall have its proper name and designation which, together with
the basis upon which the several grades are determined, shall be defined by
the said Board in a general order. Such order shall have the approval of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources; and for the dissemination of
information, copies of the same shall be supplied gratis to the foreign
markets, provincial governors, municipal presidents, and to such other
persons and agencies as shall make request therefor. If it is considered
expedient to change these standards at any time, notice shall be given in the
local and foreign markets for a period of at least six months before the new
standards shall go into effect.
Section 1788. No fiber within the purview of this law shall be exported from
the Philippine Islands in quantity greater than the amount sufficient to make
one bale, without being graded, baled, inspected, and certified as in this law
provided.
- CFI held that sections 1722 and 1783 of the Administrative Code, as
amended, are unconstitutional and void. Hence, this appeal by defs.
ISSUE/S
1. WON the law in question delegates to the Fiber Board legislative powers or
administrative functions to carry out the purpose and intent (details) of the
law for its more efficient administration
HELD
- The act in question, is not a delegation of legislative power to the Fiber
84
Board, and that the powers given by the Legislature to the board are for an
administrative purposes, to enforce and carry out the intent of the law.
- The law provides in detail for the inspection, grading and bailing of hemp
the Fiber Board with the power and authority to devise ways and means for
its execution. In legal effect, the Legislature has said that before any hemp is
exported from the Philippine Islands it must be inspected, graded and baled,
and has created a board or that purpose and vested it with the power and
authority to do the actual work. That is not a delegation o legislative power.
It is nothing more than a delegation of administrative power in the Fiber
Board, to carry out the purpose and intent of the law. In the very nature of
things, the Legislature could not inspect, grade and bale the hemp, and from
necessity, the power to do that would have to be vested in a board of
commission.
- The petitioner's contention would leave the law, which provides for the
inspection, grading and baling of hemp, without any means of its
enforcement. The criticism that there is partiality or even fraud in the
administration of the law is not an argument against its constitutionality.
Disposition The judgment of the lower court is reversed and the petition is
dismissed.
c. ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING
BOOK VII
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
CHAPTER 1
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section 1. Scope. - This Book shall be applicable to all agencies as defined
in the next succeeding section, except the Congress, the Judiciary, the
Constitutional Commissions, military establishments in all matters relating
exclusively to Armed Forces personnel, the Board of Pardons and Parole, and
state universities and colleges.
Section 2. Definitions. - As used in this Book:
(1) "Agency" includes any department, bureau, office, commission,
authority or officer of the National Government authorized by law or
executive order to make rules, issue licenses, grant rights or privileges,
and adjudicate cases; research institutions with respect to licensing
functions; government corporations with respect to functions
regulating private right, privileges, occupation or business; and officials
in the exercise of disciplinary power as provided by law.
(2) "Rule" means any agency statement of general applicability that
implements or interprets a law, fixes and describes the procedures in,
or practice requirements of, an agency, including its regulations. The
term includes memoranda or statements concerning the internal
85
President, Congress, all appellate courts and the National Library. The
bulletin and the codified rules shall be made available free of charge to such
public officers or agencies as the Congress may select, and to other persons
at a price sufficient to cover publication and mailing or distribution costs.
Section 8. Judicial Notice. - The court shall take judicial notice of the
certified copy of each rule duly filed or as published in the bulletin or the
codified rules.
Section 9. Public Participation. (1) If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far as
practicable, publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and afford
interested parties the opportunity to submit their views prior to the
adoption of any rule.
(2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the
proposed rates shall have been published in a newspaper of general
circulation at least two (2) weeks before the first hearing thereon.
(3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be
observed.
1. LIMITS ON RULE-MAKING POWER
OLSEN v ALDENESE
43 Phil 259
JOHNS; March 29, 1922
NATURE
Petition for a peremptory writ of mandamus
FACTS
- The Tariff Act of 1913, conferred legal right on Olsen and Co. to export from
the Phil. Islands into the US cigars which it manufactured from tobacco grown
in the Phil. Islands In 1916, Phil. Legislature enacted Act. No. 2613 entitled
"An Act to improve the methods of production and the quality of tobacco in
the Philippine and to develop the export trade therein," The Collector of
Internal Revenue then promulgated Administrative Order No. 35, known as
"Tobacco Inspection Regulations."
- Olsen applied to the Collector of Internal Revenue (CIR) for such a
certificate re the 10,00 cigars manufactured by it from tobacco grown and
produced in the Philippine Islands.
- Olsen alleged that CIR wrongfully and unlawfully refused to issue such
certificate of origin "on the ground that said cigars were not manufactured of
long filler tobacco produced exclusively in the provinces of Cagayan, Isabela
or Nueva Vizcaya." Despite such refusal, Olsen applied to the Insular
Collector of Customs for the certificate of origin, and that officer wrongfully
and unlawfully refused to issue such certificate "on the ground that the
88
petitioner had not obtained and presented with the application the certificate
of the said respondent Collector of Internal Revenue.
Preliminary Notes:
- The important question here involved is the construction of Secs. 6, 7, and
11 of Act No. 2613 of the Philippine Legislature, and Sec. 9 of the "Tobacco
Inspection Regulations," promulgated by Administrative Order No. 35.
- Clause B of Sec 6 of Act No. 2613 empowers the Collector of Internal
Revenue to establish rules defining the standard and the type of leaf and
manufactured tobacco which may be exported into the United States. Portion
of Sec. 7 of said Act provides: "No leaf tobacco or manufactured tobacco
shall be exported from the Philippine Islands to the United States until it shall
have been in inspected by the Collector of Internal Revenue, etc." Portion of
Sec. 11 of the Act requires the certificate of origin of the Collector of Internal
Revenue to show that the tobacco to be exported is standard. And, portion of
Sec. 9 of Administrative Order No. 35 limits the exportation into the U.S. of
Philippine cigars to those manufactured from long filler tobacco exclusively
the product of the provinces of Cagayan, Isabela, or Nueva Vizcaya.
ISSUE
WON the CIR exceeded his rule-making powers as shown in Sec.9 of the
Adm. Order 35.
HELD
YES.
Ratio The authority of the Collector of Internal Revenue to make any rules
and regulations must be founded upon some legislative act, and that they
must follow and be within the scope and purview of the act.
Reasoning
- It will be noted that the power of the Collector of Internal Revenue to make
rules and regulations is confined to the making of rules and regulations for
the classification, making, and packing of tobacco, and that such power is
further limited to the making of such rules for the classification, marking, and
packing of tobacco as may be necessary to secure leaf tobacco of good
quality and its handling under sanitary conditions. It is for such purpose only
that the Collector of Internal Revenue is authorized to make any rules or
regulations.
- Analyzing the power conferred, it will be found that the provisions of the
legislative act are NOT limited to the provinces of Cagayan, Isabela, or Nueva
Vizcaya, or to any province, and that there is no limitation as to the place
where the tobacco should be grown in the Philippine Islands. The only power
conferred is to establish general and local rules for the classification,
marking, and packing of tobacco and the standard and the type of tobacco
which may be exported to the United States. By Sec. 9 of Admin Order 35,
Cir went beyond its authority of rule-making power as limited by law. Limting
the exportation into the U.S. of Philippine cigars to those manufactured from
89
and (2) to order the Collector to deliver to the petitioner the shipments of
textiles claimed to be final and executory.
-TC granted the petition.
Issue
WON this supposed power of revision by the Commissioner of unappealed
decisions of the Collector in seizure cases, is supported by law
Held
Yes.
-Let us now see if there is any law giving authority to the Commissioner of
Customs to review and revise unappealed decisions in seizure cases. In cases
involving assessment of duties, even when the importer fails to protest the
decision of the Collector of Customs, the Commissioner may order a
reliquidation if he believes that the decision of the Collector was erroneous
and unfavorable to the Government; and the Department Head in his turn if
he believes that the decision of the Commissioner in any unprotested case of
assessment of duties is erroneous and unfavorable to the Government, may
require the Commissioner to order a reliquidation or he may direct the
Commissioner to certify the case to the CFI.
"SEC. 1393.
Supervisory authority of Commissioner and of Department
Head in certain cases. - If in any case involving the assessment of duties the
importer shall fail to protest the decision of the collector of customs and the
Commissioner shall be of the opinion that the decision was erroneous and
unfavorable to the Government, the latter may order a reliquidation; and if
the decision of the Commissioner in any unprotested case should, in the
opinion of the Department Head, be erroneous and unfavorable to the
Government, the Department Head may require the Commissioner to order a
reliquidation or he may, if in his opinion the public interest requires, direct
the Commissioner to certify the cause to the Court of First Instance of Manila,
in the manner provided in section one thousand three hundred and eighty-six
hereof, there to be reviewed by the court as other customs cases removed
thereto.
"Except as in the preceding paragraph provided, the supervisory authority of
the Department Head over the Bureau of Customs shall not extend to the
administrative revisal of the decisions of the Commissioner in matters
removable into court."
It will be noticed that the section is entitled "supervisory authority of the
Commissioner and of the Department Head in certain cases." We find no
similar legal provision in seizure cases. The logical inference is that the
lawmakers did not deem it necessary or advisable to provide for this
supervisory authority or power of revision by the Commissioner and
the Department Head on unappealed seizure cases; and it is highly
possible that up to and until 1947, when the memorandum order of
August 18th of that year was issued, it was not the practice of the
Bureau of Customs to have unappealed seizure cases sent up by
91
become government property. But the notice will also inform the
Commissioner and the Auditor General of the seizure. If the seizure
is important or unusual, the Commissioner may, if he so desires,
order the Collector as his subordinate to withhold action on the
seizure, or hold in abeyance, within a reasonable time, the
promulgation of his decision until after he had conferred with the
Commissioner or the latter had studied the case and given
suggestions. At that stage of the proceedings before definite action
is taken by the Collector, and a decision rendered by him, it would
seem that any action by him as a subordinate is still subject to the
supervisory authority and control of the Commissioner as his Chief,
and the latter may still influence and direct the Collector's action if
he finds occasion for doing so.
But if the Government deems it necessary to provide for review and revision
by the Commissioner or even by the Department Head of the decisions of the
Collector of Customs in unappealed seizure cases, the Legislature may be
requested to insert a section in the Revised Administrative Code similar to
Section 1393 which applies to unprotested cases of assessment duties. The
defect in said section however is that it does not fix the period within which
the automatic review and revision or reliquidation to be ordered by the
Commissioner and the Secretary of Finance must be effected. This defect
should be remedied.
In conclusion, we find and hold that under the present law governing the
Bureau of Customs, the decision of the Collector of Customs in a seizure case
if not protested and appealed by the importer to the Commissioner of
Customs on time, becomes final not only as to him but against the
Government as well, and neither the Commissioner nor the Department
Head has the power to review, revise or modify such unappealed decision.
We also find and hold that the memorandum order of the Insular Collector of
Customs of August 18, 1947, is void and of no effect, not only because it has
not been duly approved by the Department Head and duly published as
required by section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code but also because
it is inconsistent with law.
Disposition
For the foregoing reasons, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed. No
pronouncement as to costs.
PEOPLE v MACEREN
79 SCRA 450
AQUINO; October 18, 1977
FACTS
94
ISSUES
1. WON the position taken by the Commissioner coincides with the meaning
and intent of EO 41.
HELD
YES.
Ratio All issuances must not override, but must remain consistent and in
harmony with the law they seek to apply and implement. The authority of the
Minister of Finance (Secretary of Finance) in conjunction with the CIR to
promulgate all needful rules and regulations for the effective enforcement of
internal revenue laws cannot be controverted. Neither can it be disputed that
such rules and regulates, as well as administrative opinions and rulings,
ordinarily should deserve weight and respect by the courts.
Reasoning
- If EO 41 had not been intended to include 1981-1985 tax liabilities already
assessed prior to 22 August 1986, the law could have simply so provided in it
exclusionary clauses. It did not. The executive order has been designed to be
in the nature of a general grant of tax amnesty subject only to the cases
specifically excepted by it.
- There is no pretension that the tax amnesty returns and due payments
made by the taxpayer did not conform with the conditions expressed in the
amnesty order.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILS v CA (Yap)
249 SCRA 149 FRANCISCO; October 6, 1995
NATURE Consolidation of two separate petitions for review filed by
Department of Agrarian Reform and Land Bank of the Philippines, assailing
the CA decision, which granted private respondents' petition for Certiorari
and Mandamus.
FACTS
-Private respondents (Pedro Yap, Heirs of Emiliano Santiago, AMADCOR) are
landowners whose landholdings were acquired by the DAR and subjected to
transfer schemes to qualified beneficiaries under the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law (RA 6657). Aggrieved by the alleged lapses of the DAR
and the Landbank with respect to the valuation and payment of
compensation for their land, private respondents filed with this Court a
petition questioning the validity of DAR Admin Order No. 6 (1992) and DAR
Admin Order No. 9 (1990), and sought to compel the DAR to expedite the
pending summary administrative proceedings to finally determine the just
compensation of their properties, and the Landbank to deposit in cash and
bonds the amounts respectively "earmarked", "reserved" and "deposited in
trust accounts" for private respondents, and to allow them to withdraw the
same.
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Offices (PCOs) and very small aperture antennas (VSATs) under an integrated
system.
- The CCAD submitted to Deputy Commissioner
Fidelo Q. Dumlao, a
Memorandum manifesting his findings and recommending that based on
technical documents submitted, BellTels proposal is technically feasible.
- Subsequently, Mr. Raulito Suarez, the chief of the Rates and Regulatory
Division of CCAD, conducted a financial evaluation of the project proposal of
private respondent BellTel. Mr. Suarez made the finding that BellTel has the
financial capability to support its proposed project at least for the initial two
(2) years.
- Agreeing with the findings and recommendations of the CCAD, NTC Deputy
Commissioners Fidelo Dumlao and Consuelo Perez adopted the same and
expressly signified their approval
-In view of these favorable recommendations by the CCAD and two members
of the NTC, the Legal Department thereof prepared a working draft of the
order granting provisional authority to private respondent BellTel. The said
working draft was initialed by Deputy Commissioners Fidelo Q. Dumlao and
Consuelo Perez but was not signed by Commissioner Simeon Kintanar.
- While ordinarily, a decision that is concurred in by two of the three
members composing a quasi-judicial body is entitled to promulgation,
petitioners claim that pursuant to the prevailing policy and the corresponding
procedure and practice in the NTC, the exclusive authority to sign, validate
and promulgate any and all orders, resolutions and decisions of the NTC is
lodged in the Chairman, in this case, Commissioner Simeon Kintanar, and,
thus, since only Commissioner Simeon Kintanar is recognized by the NTC
Secretariat as the sole authority to sign any and all orders, resolutions and
decisions of the NTC, only his vote counts; Deputy Commissioners Dumlao
and Perez have allegedly no voting power and both their concurrence which
actually constitutes the majority is inutile without the assent of
Commissioner Kintanar.
- Anxious over the inaction of the NTC in the matter of its petition praying for
the issuance of a provisional authority, private respondent BellTel an Urgent
Ex-Parte Motion to Resolve Application and for the Issuance of a Provisional
Authority.
- No action was taken by the NTC on the aforecited motion. Thus, BellTel
filed a Second Urgent Ex-Parte Motionreiterating its earlier prayer.
-In an Order signed solely by Commissioner Simeon Kintanar, the NTC,
instead of resolving the two pending motions of private respondent BellTel,
set the said motions for a hearing however, no hearing was conducted as the
same was reset.
- On the day of the hearing, BellTel filed a motion, prayed for the
promulgation of the working draft of the order granting a provisional
authority to private respondent BellTel, on the ground that the said working
draft had already been signed or initialed by Deputy Commissioners Dumlao
and Perez who, together, constitute a majority out of the three
commissioners composing the NTC.
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