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I.

HISTORICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS


PANGASINAN TRANSPORTATION INC. v PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
70 PHIL 221
LAUREL; June 26, 1940
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS
- For the past 20 years, Pangasinan Transport has been engaged in the
business of transporting in Pangasinan, Tarlac and Nueva Ecija through TPU
buses in accordance with the terms and conditions of the certificates of
public convenience issued by the Public Utility Commission (later called
Public Service Commission).
- August 26, 1939 PTI applied for an authorization to operate ten additional
Brockway trucks on the ground that they were needed to comply with the
terms and conditions of its existing certificates and as a result of the
application of the Eight Hour Labor Law. This was granted by the Public
Service Commission with the following conditions (which are written in a
beautiful language called Spanish so you may refer to the original text in the
case if there is a lack of confidence in my translation ^_^):
- That the certificates of authorization issued to Pangasinan Transport
would be valid only for a period of 25 years counted from the date of
promulgation
- That the company may be acquired by the Philippine Commonwealth
with proper payment of the cost price of its equipment, taking into
account reasonable depreciation to be fixed by the Commission at the
time of it acquisition.
- October 9, 1939 PTI did not agree with the conditions set by PSC so it filed
a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the latter.
- November 20, 1939 - The present petition for a writ of certiorari was
instituted in this court praying that:
- An order be issued directing the secretary of the Public Service
Commission to certify forthwith to this court the records of all
proceedings in the case.
- After hearing, the Court should render a decision declaring section 1
of Commonwealth Act No. 454 unconstitutional and void
- If this court should be of the opinion that section 1 of Commonwealth
Act No. 454 is constitutional, a decision should be rendered declaring
that the provisions are not applicable to valid and subsisting
certificates issued prior to June 8, 1939.
- Section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended by section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 454 states that no public service shall operate in
the Philippines without possessing a valid and subsisting certificate from the
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Public Service Commission and that the Commission may prescribe as a


condition for the issuance of the certificate provided in the preceding
paragraph that the service can be acquired by the Commonwealth of the
Philippines or by any instrumentality thereof upon payment of the cost price
of its useful equipment, less reasonable depreciation; and likewise, that the
certificate shall valid only for a definite period of time; and that the violation
of any of these conditions shall produce the immediate cancellation of the
certificate without the necessity of any express action on the part of the
Commission.
ISSUE
WON the conditions set by the Public Service Commission were valid (as
mandated by Commonwealth Act 146)
HELD
YES but a remand of the case was ordered
Reasoning
- The condition that the Commission can acquire PTI is a restatement of the
constitutional provision that the State may, in the interest of national
welfare and defense, establish and operate industries and means of
transportation and communication, and, upon payment of just compensation,
transfer to public ownership utilities and other private enterprises to be
operated by the Government.
- PTI assails the condition that the certificates will be valid only for a period
of time. This should be construed with the mandate that the Public Service
Commission should issue certifications with the public interest in mind. Thus
the period for validity is established in relation to promoting and
safeguarding public interest.
- Section 8 of Article XIII of the Constitution provides, among other
things, that no franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization
for the operation of a public utility shall be "for a longer period than
fifty years."
- When it was ordained, in section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as
amended by Commonwealth Act No. 454, that the Public Service
Commission may prescribe as a condition for the issuance of a
certificate that it "shall be valid only for a definite period of time" and,
in section 16 (a) that "no such certificates shall be issued for a period
of more than fifty years," the National Assembly meant to give effect to
this constitutional mandate.
- All that has been delegated to the Commission, therefore, is the
administrative function, involving the use discretion, to carry out the
will of the National Assembly having in view, in addition, the promotion
of "public interests in a proper and suitable manner."
- The petitioner is mistaken in the suggestion that, simply because its
existing certificates had been granted before June 8, 1939, the date when
Commonwealth Act No. 454, amendatory of section 15 of Commonwealth Act
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No. 146, was approved, it must be deemed to have the right of holding them
in perpetuity. The Constitution of the Philippines provided, in section 8 of
Article XIII, that "no franchise or right shall be granted to any individual, firm,
or corporation, except under the condition that it shall be subject to
amendment, alteration, or repeal by the National Assembly when the public
interest so requires." This is in accordance with all other previous laws (such
as the Jones Law and the Philippine Bill) on the matter.
- Statutes enacted for the regulation of public utilities, being a proper
exercise by the state of its police power, are applicable not only to those
public utilities coming into existence after its passage, but likewise to those
already established and in operation.
- Commonwealth Acts Nos. 146 and 454 are not only the organic acts of the
Public Service Commission but are "a part of the charter of every utility
company operating or seeking to operate a franchise" in the Philippines.
- However the Court ordered a remand of the case.
- The petitioner's application here was for an increase of its equipment
to enable it to comply with the conditions of its certificates of public
convenience.
- On the matter of limitation to twenty five (25) years of the life of its
certificates of public convenience, there had been neither notice nor
opportunity given the petitioner to be heard or present evidence.
Disposition The decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case
remanded to the Public Service Commission for further proceedings in
accordance with law and this decision, without any pronouncement regarding
costs.
MANILA ELECTRIC v PASAY TRANSPO
57 PHIL 600
MALCOLM ; NOV 25, 1932
FACTS
-Act No. 1446 granted a franchise to Charles M. Swift to construct, maintain,
and operate an electric railway, and to construct, maintain, and operate an
electric light, heat, and power system from a point in the City of Manila in an
easterly direction to the town in Pasig, in the Province of Rizal."
-Section 11 of the Act provides: "Whenever any franchise or right of way is
granted to any other person or corporation, now or hereafter in existence,
over portions of the lines and tracks of the grantee herein, the terms on
which said other person or corporation shall use such right of way, and the
compensation to be paid to the grantee herein by such other person or
corporation for said use, shall be fixed by the members of the Supreme
Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a majority of whom
shall be final."
- Manila Electric now asks the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a
board of arbitrators, to fix the terms upon which certain transportation
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companies shall be permitted to use the Pasig bridge of the Manila Electric
Company and the compensation to be paid to the Manila Electric Company
by such transportation companies
ISSUE/S
WON the members of the SC has legal right to act as board of arbitrators
HELD
NO
- Section 11 of Act No. 1446 contravenes the maxims which guide the
operation of a democratic government constitutionally established, and that
it would be improper and illegal for the members of the Supreme Court,
sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a majority of whom shall be
final, to act on the petition of the Manila Electric Company.
-The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands represents one of the three
divisions of power in our government. It is judicial power and judicial power
only which is exercised by the Supreme Court. Just as the Supreme Court, as
the guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any
other department of the government, so should it as strictly confine its own
sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by implication conferred on it
by the Organic Act. The Supreme Court and its members should not and
cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to
assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administering of
judicial functions.
-The Organic Act provides that the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands
shall possess and exercise jurisdiction as heretofore provided and such
additional jurisdiction as shall hereafter be prescribed by law. When the
Organic Act speaks of the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the Supreme Court, it
could only mean the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the Supreme Court acting as
a court, and could hardly mean the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the members
of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators. There is an important
distinction between the Supreme Court as an entity and the members of the
Supreme Court. A board of arbitrators is not a "court" in any proper sense of
the term, and possess none of the jurisdiction which the Organic Act
contemplates shall be exercised by the Supreme Court.
Disposition The members of the Supreme Court decline to proceed further
in the matter.
NOBLEJAS v TEEHANKEE
23 SCRA 405
REYES JBL; April 29, 1968
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NATURE:
Petition for writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction
FACTS:
- Antonio H. Noblejas is the duly appointed, confirmed and qualified
Commissioner of Land Registration. By the terms of section 2 of RA 1151,
the said Commissioner is declared "entitled to the same compensation,
emoluments and privileges as those of a Judge of the Court of First
Instance."
- On March 7, 1968, Sec of Justice Teehankee coursed to Noblejas a letter
requiring him to explain in writing why no disciplinary action should be
taken against petitioner for "approving or recommending approval of
subdivision, consolidation and consolidated-subdivision plans covering
areas greatly in excess of the areas covered by the original titles." Noblejas
answered and apprised the Secretary of Justice that, as he enjoyed the
rank, privileges, emoluments and compensation of a Judge of the Court of
First Instance, he could only be suspended and investigated in the same
manner as a Judge of the Courts of First Instance, and, therefore, the
papers relative to his case should be submitted to the Supreme Court, for
action thereon conformably to section 67 of the Judiciary Act (R. A. No. 296)
and Revised Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.
- On March 17, 1968, Noblejas received a communication signed by the
Executive Secretary, "by authority of the President", whereby, based on
"finding that a prima facie case exists against you for gross negligence and
conduct prejudicial to the public interest", petitioner was "hereby
suspended, upon receipt hereof, pending investigation of the above
charges."
- On March 18, 1968, petitioner applied to this Court, reiterating the
contentions advanced in his letter to the Secretary of Justice, claiming lack
of jurisdiction and abuse of discretion, and praying for restraining writs. In
their answer respondents admit the facts but denied that petitioner, as
Land Registration Commissioner, exercises judicial functions, or that the
petitioner may be considered a Judge of First Instance within the purview of
the Judiciary Act and Revised Rules of Court 140; that the function of
investigating charges against public officers is administrative or executive
in nature; that the Legislature may not charge the judiciary with nonjudicial functions or duties except when reasonably incidental to the
fulfillment of judicial duties, as it would be in violation of the principle of the
separation of powers.
ISSUE:
WON the Commissioner of Land Registration may only be investigated by the
Supreme Court, in view of the conferment upon him by RA 1151 and
Appropriation Laws of the rank and privileges of a Judge of the Court of First
Instance.
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HELD:
NO
- section 67 of the Judiciary Act providing for investigation, suspension or
removal of Judges, specifically recites that "No District Judge shall be
separated or removed from office by the President of the Philippines unless
sufficient cause shall exist in the judgment of the Supreme Court . . ." and it
is nowhere claimed, much less shown, that the Commissioner of Land
Registration is a District Judge, or in fact a member of the Judiciary.
- petitioner's theory that the grant of "privileges of a Judge of First Instance"
includes by implication the right to be investigated only by the Supreme
Court and to be suspended or removed upon its recommendation, would
necessarily result in the same right being possessed by a variety of
executive officials upon whom the Legislature had indiscriminately conferred
the same privileges.
- Incidentally, petitioner's stand would also lead to the conclusion that the
Solicitor General, another appointee of the President, could not be removed
by the latter, since the Appropriation Acts confer upon the Solicitor General
the rank and privileges of a Justice of the Court of Appeals, and these
Justices are only removable by the Legislature, through the process of
impeachment (Judiciary Act, sec. 24, par. 2).
- such unusual corollaries could not have been intended by the Legislature
when it granted these executive officials the rank and privileges of Judges of
First Instance. Where the legislative design is to make the suspension or
removal procedure prescribed for Judges of First Instance applicable to other
officers, provision to that effect is made in plain and unequivocal language.
- if the Legislature had really intended to include in the general grant of
"privileges" or "rank and privileges of Judges of the Court of First Instance"
the right to be investigated by the Supreme Court, and to be suspended or
removed only upon recommendation of that Court, then such grant of
privileges would be unconstitutional, since it would violate the fundamental
doctrine of separation of powers, by charging this court with the
administrative function of supervisory control over executive officials, and
simultaneously reducing pro tanto the control of the Chief Executive over
such officials.
Disposition Writs denied, petition dismissed
GARCIA v MACARAIG
39 SCRA 106
BARREDO; MAY 31, 1971
NATURE
Administrative complaint
FACTS
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-Respondent Judge Macaraig was appointed to one of the newly created CFI
branches in Laguna, in 1970. At the time of appointment, he was Chief of the
Technical Staff of the DOJ, receiving salary therefrom.
- After confirmation of his appointment by the COA, respondent judge took
his oath of office on June 1970. However, due to several delays in securing
the court sala (unavailability of funds for office equipment and supplies,
trouble securing the space for the courtroom due to objections and
disagreement over price), he never had the chance to actually perform the
functions of a district judge. After realizing that it might take sometime
before he could actually begin hearing cases in his court, he decided to apply
for an extended leave of absence. The Sec. of Justice, however, asked him to
forego his leave and, instead, requested him to assist him, without being
extended a formal detail, which he accepted.
- Having taken his oath as District Judge and, drawing salary as judge but
without performing his functions as such, respondent was charged by Paz
Garcia for dishonesty, violation of his oath of office as judge.. .gross
incompetence, violation of RA 296, particularly Secs 5, 55 and 58 thereof.
ISSUE
WON respondent is guilty of the allegations
HELD
No.
Reasoning He has not yet started performing any judicial functions. None of
these laws and circulars apply to him, for all of them contemplate judges
who are actually holding trials and hearings and making decisions and
others. That he could not actually hold office in the court to which he was
appointed was not of his making.
***While the SC dismissed the complaint, it nevertheless expressed the
opinion that it did not look with favor the long standing practice of judges
being detailed in the DOJ to assist the Secretary even if it were only in
connection with his work of exercising administrative authority over the
courts, stressing the principle of separation of powers. The Court was of the
opinion that respondent was not guilty of dishonesty or violation of his oath
of office as district judge as it was not altogether his fault that he could not
actually perform his functions as presiding judge of the CFI of Laguna. Under
the circumstances he was placed in, he made himself available to the DOJ to
assist the Secretary, using his experience as technical assistant in said office.
Disposition Administrative complaint DISMISSED.
IN RE: DESIGNATION OF JUDGE RODOLFO U. MANZANO AS MEMBER
OF THE ILOCOS NORTE PROVINCIAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE
166 SCRA 106
PADILLA; October 5, 1988
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NATURE
Request for the issuance of a SC Resolution on the appointment of Judge
Manzano as a member of the Prov. Committee on Justice
FACTS
-On 4 July 1988, Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano, Executive Judge, RTC, Bangui,
Ilocos Norte, Branch 19, sent this Court a letter which reads:
I was designated as a member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on
Justice
Before I may accept the appointment and enter in the discharge of the
powers and duties of the position as member of the Provincial Committee on
Justice, may I have the honor to request for the issuance by the
Honorable Supreme Court of a Resolution, as follows:
(1) Authorizing me to accept the appointment and to as assume and
discharge the powers and duties attached to the said position;
(2) Considering my membership in the Committee as neither violative of the
Independence of the Judiciary nor a violation of Section 12, Article VIII, or of
the second paragraph of Section .7, Article IX (B), both of the Constitution,
and will not in any way amount to an abandonment of my present position as
Executive Judge and as a member of the Judiciary; and
(3) Consider my membership in the said Committee as part of the primary
functions of an Executive Judge.
- An examination of Executive Order No. 856, as amended, reveals that
Provincial/City Committees on Justice are created to insure the speedy
disposition of cases of detainees, particularly those involving the poor and
indigent ones, thus alleviating jail congestion and improving local jail
conditions. Among the functions of the Committee are:
-- Receive complaints against any apprehending officer, jail warden, final or
judge who may be found to have committed abuses in the discharge of his
duties and refer the same to proper authority for appropriate action;
-- Recommend revision of any law or regulation which is believed prejudicial
to the proper administration of criminal justice.
- It is evident that such Provincial/City Committees on Justice perform
administrative functions. Administrative functions are those which involve
the regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for;
their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better
carry out the policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the
administrative agency by the organic law of its existence.
- Furthermore, it is provided that The Provincial/City Committees on Justice
shall be under the supervision of the Secretary of justice Quarterly
accomplishment reports shall be submitted to the Office of the Secretary of
Justice.
HELD

- Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and other
courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing
quasi- judicial or administrative functions
- Considering that membership of Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte
Provincial Committee on Justice, which discharges a administrative functions,
will be in violation of the Constitution, the Court is constrained to deny his
request.
- in Garcia vs. Macaraig: While the doctrine of separation of powers is a
relative theory not to be enforced with pedantic rigor, the practical demands
of government precluding its doctrinaire application, it cannot justify a
member of the judiciary being required to assume a position or perform a
duty non-judicial in character. That is implicit in the principle. Otherwise
there is a plain departure from its command. The essence of the trust
reposed in him is to decide. Only a higher court can pass on his actuation. He
is not a subordinate of an executive or legislative official, however eminent.
It is indispensable that there be no exception to the rigidity of such a norm if
he is, as expected, to be confined to the task of adjudication. Fidelity to his
sworn responsibility no less than the maintenance of respect for the judiciary
can be satisfied with nothing less.
- This declaration does not mean that RTC Judges should adopt an attitude of
monastic insensibility or unbecoming indifference to Province/City Committee
on Justice. As incumbent RTC Judges, they form part of the structure of
government. Their integrity and performance in the adjudication of cases
contribute to the solidity of such structure. As public officials, they are
trustees of an orderly society. Even as non-members of Provincial/City
Committees on Justice, RTC judges should render assistance to said
Committees to help promote the laudable purposes for which they exist, but
only when such assistance may be reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of
their judicial duties.
Disposition The aforesaid request of Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano is DENIED.
SEPARATE OPINIONS
GUTIERREZ, dissenting:
- The Constitution prohibits the designation of members of the judiciary to
any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.
- Insofar as the term "quasi-judicial" is concerned, it has a fairly clear
meaning and Judges can confidently refrain from participating in the work of
any administrative agency which adjudicates disputes and controversies
involving the rights of parties within its jurisdiction. The issue involved in this
case is where to draw the line insofar as administrative functions are
concerned.
- "Administrative functions" as used in Section 12 refers to the executive
machinery of government and the performance by that machinery of
governmental acts. It refers to the management actions, determinations, and
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orders of executive officials as they administer the laws and try to make
government effective. There is an element of positive action, of supervision
or control.
- membership in the Provincial or City Committee on Justice would
not involve any regulation or control over the conduct and affairs of
individuals. Neither will the Committee on Justice promulgate rules
and regulations nor exercise any quasi-legislative functions. Its
work is purely advisory. I do not see anything wrong in a member of the
judiciary joining any study group which concentrates on the administration of
justice as long as the group merely deliberates on problems involving the
speedy disposition of cases particularly those involving the poor and needy
litigants or detainees, pools the expertise and experiences of the members,
and limits itself to recommendations which may be adopted or rejected by
those who have the power to legislate or administer the particular function
involved in their implementation.
-The constitutional provision is intended to shield Judges from participating in
activities which may compromise their independence or hamper their work.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, dissenting:
- What I believe is contemplated by the Constitutional prohibition is
designation, for example, to such quasi-judicial bodies as the SEC, or
administrative agencies like the BIR. Those are full-time positions involving
running the affairs of government, which will interfere with the discharge of
judicial functions or totally remove a Judge/Justice from the performance of
his regular functions.
- The Committee on Justice cannot be likened to such an administrative
agency of government. It is a study group with recommendatory functions.
PUYAT v DE GUZMAN JR.
113 SCRA 31
Melencio-Herrera; March 25 1982
NATURE
This suit for certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction is poised
against the Order of respondent Associate Commissioner of the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) granting Assemblyman Estanislao A.
Fernandez leave to intervene in SEC Case No. 1747
FACTS
On May 14,1979, an election for the eleven Directors of the International
Pipe Industries Corporation (IPI) a private corporation, was held. Some
named on the left list of elected officials may be called the Puyat Group;
those on the right, the Acero Group. Thus, the Puyat Group would be in
control of the Board and of the management of IPI. The Acero Group
instituted at the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) quo
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warranto proceedings, docketed as Case No. 1747 (the SEC Case),


questioning the election of May 14, 1979. The Acero Group claimed that
the stockholders' votes were not properly counted. The Puyat Group
claims that at conferences of the parties with respondent SEC
Commissioner de Guzman, Justice Estanislao A. Fernandez, then a
member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa, orally entered his
appearance as counsel for respondent Acero to which the Puyat Group
objected on Constitutional grounds. Section 11, Article VIII, of the 1973
Constitution, then in force, provided that no Assemblyman could "appear
as counsel before ... any administrative body", and SEC was an
administrative body. Incidentally, the same prohibition was maintained by
the April 7, 1981 plebiscite. The cited Constitutional prohibition being
clear, Assemblyman Fernandez did not continue his appearance for
respondent Acero.
When the SEC Case was called, it turned out that:
(i) On May 15, 1979, Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez had
purchased from Augusto A. Morales ten (10) shares of stock of IPI for
P200.00 upon request of respondent Acero to qualify him to run for
election as a Director.
(ii) The deed of sale, however, was notarized only on May 30, 1979 and
was sought to be registered on said date.
(iii) On May 31, 1979, the day following the notarization of Assemblyman
Fernandez' purchase, the latter had filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention
in the SEC Case as the owner of ten (10) IPI shares alleging legal interest
in the matter in litigation.
The SEC granted leave to intervene on the basis of Atty. Fernandez'
ownership of the said ten shares. It is this Order allowing intervention that
precipitated the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition with
Preliminary Injunction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, as a then stockholder of IPI
may intervene in the SEC Case without violating Section 11, Article VIII of
the Constitution
HELD
1. NO.
Ratio
Section 11, Article VIII of the Constitution, which, as amended, reads: SEC.
11.
No Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall appear as counsel before any
court without appellate jurisdiction.
before any court in any civil case wherein the Government, or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof is the adverse party,
or in any criminal case wherein any officer or employee of the Government is
accused of an offense committed in relation to his office,
or before any administrative body.
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Neither shall he, directly or indirectly be interested financially in any contract


with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or
any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including any
government-owned or controlled corporation, during his term of office.
He shall not accept employment to intervene in any cause or matter where
he may be called to act on account of his office. (Emphasis supplied)
Reasoning
Certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of
Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC Case. He had acquired a mere P200.00
worth of stock in IPI, representing ten shares out of 262,843 outstanding
shares. He acquired them "after the fact" that is, on May 30, 1979, after the
contested election of Directors on May 14, 1979, after the quo warranto suit
had been filed on May 25, 1979 before SEC and one day before the
scheduled hearing of the case before the SEC on May 31, 1979. And what is
more, before he moved to intervene, he had signified his intention to appear
as counsel for respondent Eustaquio T. C. Acero, but which was objected to
by petitioners. Realizing, perhaps, the validity of the objection, he decided,
instead, to "intervene" on the ground of legal interest in the matter under
litigation. And it maybe noted that in the case filed before the Rizal Court of
First Instance (L-51928), he appeared as counsel for defendant Excelsior, codefendant of respondent Acero therein.
Under those facts and circumstances, we are constrained to find that there
has been an indirect "appearance as counsel before ... an administrative
body" and, in our opinion, that is a circumvention of the Constitutional
prohibition. The "intervention" was an afterthought to enable him to appear
actively in the proceedings in some other capacity. To believe the avowed
purpose, that is, to enable him eventually to vote and to be elected as
Director in the event of an unfavorable outcome of the SEC Case would be
pure naivete. He would still appear as counsel indirectly. A ruling upholding
the "intervention" would make the constitutional provision ineffective. All an
Assemblyman need do, if he wants to influence an administrative body is to
acquire a minimal participation in the "interest" of the client and then
"intervene" in the proceedings. That which the Constitution directly prohibits
may not be done by indirection or by a general legislative act which is
intended to accomplish the objects specifically or impliedly prohibited.
In brief, the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in SEC. No. 1747 falls
within the ambit of the prohibition contained in Section 11, Article VIII of the
Constitution.
II. CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
A. ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES AND THE EXECUTIVE POWER OF THE
PRESIDENT
ARTICLE VII, 1987 Constitution
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Section 1. The executive power shall be vested in the President of the


Philippines.
Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed.

B. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT POWER


MACALINTAL v COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
405 SCRA 693
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J., July 10, 2003
NATURE
Petition for certiorari and prohibition
FACTS
-Macalintal as taxpayer avers that Sections 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189
violate Article IX-A (Common Provisions) of the Constitution, to wit: Section 1.
The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent, are the Civil
Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on
Audit.
-He submits that the creation of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee
with the power to review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing
Rules and Regulations promulgated by the COMELEC, R.A. No. 9189 intrudes
into the independence of the COMELEC which, as a constitutional body, is not
under the control of either the executive or legislative departments of
government; that only the COMELEC itself can promulgate rules and
regulations which may be changed or revised only by the majority of its
members; and that should the rules promulgated by the COMELEC violate
any law, it is the Court that has the power to review the same via the petition
of any interested party, including the legislators.
-It is only on this question that respondent COMELEC submitted its Comment.
It agrees with the petitioner that Sections 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 are
unconstitutional. Like the petitioner, respondent COMELEC anchors its claim
of unconstitutionality of said Sections upon Section 1, Article IX-A of the
Constitution providing for the independence of the constitutional
commissions such as the COMELEC. It asserts that its power to formulate
rules and regulations has been upheld in Gallardo vs. Tabamo, Jr. [RELATIVE
NI JAT?-hehe] where this Court held that the power of the COMELEC to
formulate rules and regulations is implicit in its power to implement
regulations under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution. COMELEC
joins the petitioner in asserting that as an independent constitutional body, it
may not be subject to interference by any government instrumentality and
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that only this Court may review COMELEC rules and only in cases of grave
abuse of discretion.
- The COMELEC adds, however, that another provision, vis--vis its rulemaking power, to wit:
SEC. 17. Voting by Mail. 17.1. For the May, 2004 elections, the Commission shall authorize voting by
mail in not more than three (3) countries, subject to the approval of the
Congressional Oversight Committee. Voting by mail may be allowed in
countries that satisfy the following conditions:
a)
Where the mailing system is fairly well-developed and secure to
prevent occasion for fraud;
b)
Where there exists a technically established identification system
that would preclude multiple or proxy voting; and
c)
Where the system of reception and custody of mailed ballots in the
embassies, consulates and other foreign service establishments concerned
are adequate and well-secured.
Thereafter, voting by mail in any country shall be allowed only upon review
and approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee.
...
...
...
is likewise unconstitutional as it violates Section 1, Article IX-A mandating the
independence of constitutional commissions.
-The Solicitor General takes exception to his prefatory statement that the
constitutional challenge must fail and agrees with the petitioner that
Sections 19 and 25 are invalid and unconstitutional on the ground that there
is nothing in Article VI of the Constitution on Legislative Department that
would as much as imply that Congress has concurrent power to enforce and
administer election laws with the COMELEC; and by the principles of
exclusio unius est exclusio alterius and expressum facit cessare
tacitum, the constitutionally enumerated powers of Congress circumscribe
its authority to the exclusion of all others.
ISSUE
Whether or not Congress, through the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee created in Section 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189, exercise the
power to review, revise, amend, and approve the Implementing
Rules and Regulations that the Commission on Elections shall
promulgate without violating the independence of the COMELEC
under Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution?
HELD
NO.
RATIO
Once a law is enacted and approved, the legislative function is deemed
accomplished and complete. The legislative function may spring back to
Congress relative to the same law only if that body deems it proper to
14

review, amend and revise the law, but certainly not to approve, review,
revise and amend the IRR of the COMELEC.
-By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review, amend, and revise the
IRR for The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, Congress went beyond
the scope of its constitutional authority. Congress trampled upon the
constitutional mandate of independence of the COMELEC. Under such a
situation, the Court is left with no option but to withdraw from its usual
reticence in declaring a provision of law unconstitutional.
REASONING Composed of Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives, the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee (JCOC) is a
purely legislative body. There is no question that the authority of Congress
to "monitor and evaluate the implementation" of R.A. No. 9189 is geared
towards possible amendments or revision of the law itself and thus, may be
performed in aid of its legislation.
-However, aside from its monitoring and evaluation functions, R.A. No. 9189
gives to the JCOC the following functions: (a) to "review, revise, amend and
approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations" (IRR) promulgated by the
COMELEC [Sections 25 and 19]; and (b) subject to the approval of the JCOC
[Section 17.1], the voting by mail in not more than three countries for the
May 2004 elections and in any country determined by COMELEC.
-The ambit of legislative power under Article VI of the Constitution is
circumscribed by other constitutional provisions. One such provision is
Section 1 of Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution ordaining that constitutional
commissions such as the COMELEC shall be "independent."
-Interpreting Section 1, Article X of the 1935 Constitution providing that there
shall be an independent COMELEC, the Court has held that "[w]hatever may
be the nature of the functions of the Commission on Elections, the fact is that
the framers of the Constitution wanted it to be independent from the other
departments of the Government.
-The Court has no general powers of supervision over COMELEC which is an
independent body "except those specifically granted by the Constitution,"
that is, to review its decisions, orders and rulings. In the same vein, it is not
correct to hold that because of its recognized extensive legislative power to
enact election laws, Congress may intrude into the independence of the
COMELEC by exercising supervisory powers over its rule-making authority.
-By virtue of Section 19 of R.A. No. 9189, Congress has empowered the
COMELEC to "issue the necessary rules and regulations to effectively
implement the provisions of this Act within sixty days from the effectivity of
this Act." This provision of law follows the usual procedure in drafting rules
and regulations to implement a law
the legislature grants an
administrative agency the authority to craft the rules and regulations
implementing the law it has enacted, in recognition of the administrative
expertise of that agency in its particular field of operation.
-The second sentence of the first paragraph of Section 19 stating that "[t]he
Implementing Rules and Regulations shall be submitted to the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee created by virtue of this Act for prior
15

approval," and the second sentence of the second paragraph of Section 25


stating that "[i]t shall review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing
Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Commission," whereby Congress,
in both provisions, arrogates unto itself a function not specifically vested by
the Constitution, should be stricken out of the subject statute for
constitutional infirmity. Both provisions brazenly violate the mandate on the
independence of the COMELEC.
-Similarly, the phrase, "subject to the approval of the Congressional
Oversight Committee" in the first sentence of Section 17.1 which empowers
the Commission to authorize voting by mail in not more than three countries
for the May, 2004 elections; and the phrase, "only upon review and approval
of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee" found in the second
paragraph of the same section are unconstitutional as they require review
and approval of voting by mail in any country after the 2004 elections.
Congress may not confer upon itself the authority to approve or disapprove
the countries wherein voting by mail shall be allowed, as determined by the
COMELEC pursuant to the conditions provided for in Section 17.1 of R.A. No.
9189.[48]
Otherwise, Congress would overstep the bounds of its
constitutional mandate and intrude into the independence of the COMELEC.
-During the deliberations, all the members of the Court agreed to ADOPT
THE SEPARATE OPINION OF JUSTICE REYNATO S. PUNO AS PART OF
THE PONENCIA ON THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTIONS 17.1,
19 AND 25 OF R.A. NO. 9189 INSOFAR AS THEY RELATE TO THE
CREATION
OF AND THE POWERS
GIVEN TO THE JOINT
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE.
Disposition WHEREFORE, the petition is partly GRANTED. The following
portions of R.A. No. 9189 are declared VOID for being UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
a)
The phrase in the first sentence of the first paragraph of Section 17.1,
to wit:
"subject to the approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee;"
b)
The portion of the last paragraph of Section 17.1, to wit: "only upon
review and approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee;"
c)
The second sentence of the first paragraph of Section 19, to wit: "The
Implementing Rules and Regulations shall be submitted to the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee created by virtue of this Act for prior
approval;" and
d)
The second sentence in the second paragraph of Section 25, to wit: "It
shall review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and
Regulations promulgated by the Commission" of the same law;
for being repugnant to Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution mandating
the independence of constitutional commission, such as COMELEC.
The constitutionality of Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is UPHELD with respect
only to the authority given to the COMELEC to proclaim the winning
candidates for the Senators and party-list representatives but not as to the
power to canvass the votes and proclaim the winning candidates for
16

President and Vice-President which is lodged with Congress under Section 4,


Article VII of the Constitution.
The constitutionality of Section 5(d) is UPHELD.
Pursuant to Section 30 of R.A. No. 9189, the rest of the provisions of said law
continues to be in full force and effect.
SEPARATE OPINION
PUNO, concurring and dissenting:1:
The resolution of the issue entails a two-tiered discussion of the: (1) whether
Congress has oversight functions over constitutional bodies like the
COMELEC; and (2) assuming that it has, whether Congress exceeded the
permissible exercise of its oversight functions.
Separation of powers and checks and balances
The principle of separation of powers prevents the concentration of
legislative, executive, and judicial powers to a single branch of government
by deftly allocating their exercise to the three branches of government. This
principle dates back from the time of Aristotle but the "modern" concept
owes its origin in the seventeenth and eighteenth century writings of political
philosophers including Locke and Montesquieu. Their writings were mainly
reactions to the ruinous struggle for power by the monarchs and the
parliaments in Western Europe.
-The Constitution divided the powers of our government into three
categories, legislative, executive, and judicial. Although not "hermetically
sealed" from one another, the powers of the three branches are functionally
identifiable. In this respect, legislative power is generally exercised in the
enactment of the law; executive power, in its execution; and judicial power,
in its interpretation. In the absence of specific provision in the Constitution, it
is fundamental under the principle of separation of powers that one branch
cannot exercise or share the power of the other.
-Justce Puno locates the concept of congressional oversight in the grand
scheme of checks and balances under the doctrine of separation of power.
Concept and bases of congressional oversight
-Broadly defined, the power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken
by Congress to enhance its understanding of and influence over the
implementation of legislation it has enacted. Clearly, oversight concerns
post-enactment measures undertaken by Congress: (a) to monitor
bureaucratic compliance with program objectives, (b) to determine whether
agencies are properly administered, (c) to eliminate executive waste and
1

I dissent from the majoritys ruling upholding the constitutionality of section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189, which allows an immigrant or a
permanent resident of a foreign country to vote for President, Vice-President, Senators and Party-List Representatives after executing the
required affidavit. I concur, however, with the majoritys ruling upholding the constitutionality of section 18.5 of Rep. Act No. 9189 with respect to
the authority given to the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for Senators and Party-List Representatives but not as to the power to
canvass the votes and proclaim the winning candidates for President and Vice-President. I also concur with the majority with respect to the
unconstitutionality of sections 17.1, 19 and 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189 subjecting the implementation of voting by mail, and the Implementing
Rules and Regulations of Rep. Act No. 9189 to be promulgated by COMELEC, to prior review and approval by Congress.

17

dishonesty, (d) to prevent executive usurpation of legislative authority, and


(d) to assess executive conformity with the congressional perception of
public interest.
-The power of oversight has been held to be intrinsic in the grant of
legislative power itself and integral to the checks and balances
inherent in a democratic system of government. Among the most
quoted justifications for this power are the writings of John Stuart Mill and
Woodrow Wilson. In his Consideration of Representative Government, Mill
wrote that the duty of the legislature is "to watch and control the
government; to throw the light of publicity on its acts; to compel a full
exposition and justification of all of them which any one considers
objectionable; and to censure them if found condemnable." Wilson went one
step farther and opined that the legislatures informing function should be
preferred to its legislative function. He emphasized that "[E]ven more
important than legislation is the instruction and guidance in political affairs
which the people might receive from a body which kept all national concerns
suffused in a broad daylight of discussion."
Categories of congressional oversight functions
The acts done by Congress purportedly in the exercise of its oversight
powers may be divided into three categories, namely: scrutiny, investigation
and supervision.
a. Scrutiny
Congressional scrutiny implies a lesser intensity and continuity of attention
to administrative operations. Its primary purpose is to determine economy
and efficiency of the operation of government activities. In the exercise of
legislative scrutiny, Congress may request information and report from the
other branches of government. It can give recommendations or pass
resolutions for consideration of the agency involved.
-Legislative scrutiny is based primarily on the power of appropriation of
Congress. Under the Constitution, the "power of the purse" belongs to
Congress. The President may propose the budget, but still, Congress has the
final say on appropriations. Consequently, administrative officials appear
every year before the appropriation committees of Congress to report and
submit a budget estimate and a program of administration for the
succeeding fiscal year. During budget hearings, administrative officials
defend their budget proposals.
-The power of appropriation carries with it the power to specify the project or
activity to be funded. Hence, the holding of budget hearing has been the
usual means of reviewing policy and of auditing the use of previous
appropriation to ascertain whether they have been disbursed for purposes
authorized in an appropriation act. The consideration of the budget is also an
opportunity for the lawmakers to express their confidence in the
performance of a Cabinet Secretary or to manifest their disgust or disfavor of
the continuance in office of a bureaucrat. Congress can even curtail the
activities of the administrative agencies by denial of funds.
18

-But legislative scrutiny does not end in budget hearings. Congress can ask
the heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either House of
Congress on any matter pertaining to their departments. Section 22, Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution provides: The heads of departments may, upon
their own initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the request of
either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear before and be
heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written
questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of
the House of Representatives at least three days before their scheduled
appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but may
cover matters related thereto. When the security of the State or the public
interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance
shall be conducted in executive session.
-This provision originated from the Administrative Code and was later
elevated to the level of a constitutional provision due to its "great value in
the work of the legislature."
-Likewise, Congress exercises legislative scrutiny thru its power of
confirmation. Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides for the
organization of a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of
the Senate as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve members of
the House of Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties or organizations
registered under the party-list system. Consent of the Commission on
Appointments is needed for the nominees of the President for the following
positions: (a) heads of executive departments, (b) ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, (c) officers of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain, and (d) other officers whose appointments are
vested with the President under the Constitution.
-Through the power of confirmation, Congress shares in the appointing power
of the executive. Theoretically, it is intended to lessen political
considerations in the appointment of officials in sensitive positions in the
government. It also provides Congress an opportunity to find out whether the
nominee possesses the necessary qualifications, integrity and probity
required of all public servants.
b. Congressional investigation
While congressional scrutiny is regarded as a passive process of looking at
the facts that are readily available, congressional investigation involves a
more intense digging of facts. The power of Congress to conduct
investigation is recognized by the 1987 Constitution under section 21,
Article VI, viz: The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its
respective committee may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
-But even in the absence of an express provision in the Constitution,
congressional investigation has been held to be an essential and
appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function.
19

-American jurisprudence upholding the inherent power of Congress to


conduct investigation has been adopted in our jurisdiction in Arnault v.
Nazareno, decided in 1950, when no provision yet existed granting Congress
the power to conduct investigation. Upholding the power of the Senate to
punish Arnault for contempt, the Court ruled as follows:
-Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either
House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to
the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and
effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be
implied. In other words, the power of inquiry with process to enforce it
is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A
legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of
information respecting the conditions which legislation is intended to affect
or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the
requisite information which is not frequently true recourse must be had
to others who do possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests for
such information are often unavailing, and also that information which is
volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of
compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed. . . The fact that the
Constitution expressly gives the Congress the power to punish its Members
for disorderly behaviour, does not by necessary implication exclude the
power to punish for contempt any other person.
-The Court further ruled that the power of the Senate to punish a witness for
contempt does not terminate upon the adjournment of the session.
-The Court further held that once an inquiry is admitted or established to be
within the jurisdiction of a legislative body to make, the investigating
committee has the power to require a witness to answer any question
pertinent to that inquiry, subject to his constitutional right against selfincrimination. The inquiry must be material or necessary to the exercise of a
power in it vested by the Constitution. Hence, a witness can not be coerced
to answer a question that obviously has no relation to the subject of the
inquiry. But the Court explained that "the materiality of the question must be
determined by its direct relation to the subject of the inquiry and not by its
indirect relation to any proposed or possible legislation." The reason is that
the necessity or lack of necessity for legislative action and the form and
character of the action itself are determined by the sum total of the
information to be gathered as a result of the investigation, and not by a
fraction of such information elicited from a single question.
-Finally, the Court ruled that the ground on which Arnault invoked the right
against self-incrimination "is too shaky, infirm, and slippery to afford him
safety." It noted that since Arnault himself said that the transaction was
legal, and that he gave the P440,000.00 to a representative of Burt in
compliance with the latters verbal instruction, there is therefore no basis
upon which to sustain his claim that to reveal the name of that person would
incriminate him. It held that it is not enough for the witness to say that the
answer will incriminate him for he is not the sole judge of his liability, thus:
20

. . .[T]he danger of self-incrimination must appear reasonable and real to the


court, from all the circumstances and from the whole case, as well as from
his general conception of the relations of the witness. . . The fact that the
testimony of the witness may tend to show that he has violated the law is
not sufficient to entitle him to claim the protection of the constitutional
provision against self-incrimination, unless he is at the same time liable to
prosecution and punishment for such violation. The witness cannot assert his
privilege by reason of some fanciful excuse, for protection against an
imaginary danger, or to secure immunity to a third person.[
-As now contained in the 1987 Constitution, the power of Congress to
investigate is circumscribed by three limitations, namely: (a) it must be in
aid of its legislative functions, (b) it must be conducted in
accordance with duly published rules of procedure, and (c) the
persons appearing therein are afforded their constitutional rights.
-In Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, this Court held that the
senate committee exceeded the permissible exercise of legislative
investigation because there was nothing in Senator Enriles speech which
indicate that it is in aid of legislation.
-The conduct of legislative investigation is also subject to the rules of each
House. In the House of Representatives, an inquiry may be initiated or
conducted by a committee motu proprio on any matter within its jurisdiction
upon a majority vote of all its Members or upon order of the House of
Representatives through:
(1)
the referral of a privilege speech containing or conveying a request or
demand for the conduct of an inquiry, to the appropriate committee, upon
motion of the Majority Leader or his deputies; or
(2)
the adoption of a resolution directing a committee to conduct an
inquiry reported out by the Committee on Rules after making a
determination on the necessity and propriety of the conduct of an inquiry by
such committee: Provided, That all resolutions directing any committee to
conduct an inquiry shall be referred to the Committee on Rules; or
(3)
the referral by the Committee on Rules to the appropriate committee,
after making a determination on the necessity and propriety of the conduct
of inquiry by such committee, of a petition filed or information given by a
Member of the House requesting such inquiry and endorsed by the Speaker:
Provided, That such petition or information shall be given under oath, stating
the facts upon which it is based, and accompanied by supporting affidavits.
-The committee to which a privilege speech, resolution, petition or
information requesting an inquiry is referred may constitute and appoint subcommittees composed of at least one-third (1/3) of the committee for the
purpose of performing any and all acts which the committee as a whole is
authorized to perform, except to punish for contempt. In case a privilege
speech is referred to two or more committees, a joint inquiry by the said
committees shall be conducted. The inquiries are to be held in public except
when the committee or sub-committee deems that the examination of a
21

witness in a public hearing may endanger national security. In which case, it


shall conduct the hearing in an executive session.
-The Rules further provide that "the filing or pendency of a case
before any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial or administrative bodies
shall not stop or abate any inquiry conducted to carry out a specific
legislative purpose." In exercise of congressional inquiry, the committee
has the power "to issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum to a witness in
any part of the country, signed by the chairperson or acting chairperson and
the Speaker or acting Speaker." Furthermore, the committee may, by a vote
of two-thirds (2/3) of all its members constituting a quorum, punish
for contempt any person who: (a) refuses, after being duly summoned, to
obey such summons without legal excuse; (b) refuses to be sworn or placed
under affirmation; (c) refuses to answer any relevant inquiry; (d) refuses to
produce any books, papers, documents or records that are relevant to the
inquiry and are in his/her possession; (e) acts in a disrespectful manner
towards any member of the Committee or commits misbehavior in the
presence of the committee; or (f) unduly interferes in the conduct of
proceedings during meetings.
-Nevertheless, any person called to be a witness may be represented by a
counsel and is entitled to all rights including the right against selfincrimination.
c. Legislative supervision
The third and most encompassing form by which Congress exercises its
oversight power is thru legislative supervision. "Supervision" connotes a
continuing and informed awareness on the part of a congressional committee
regarding executive operations in a given administrative area. While both
congressional scrutiny and investigation involve inquiry into past executive
branch actions in order to influence future executive branch performance,
congressional supervision allows Congress to scrutinize the exercise of
delegated law-making authority, and permits Congress to retain part of that
delegated authority.
-Congress exercises supervision over the executive agencies through its veto
power. It typically utilizes veto provisions when granting the President or an
executive agency the power to promulgate regulations with the force of law.
These provisions require the President or an agency to present the
proposed regulations to Congress, which retains a "right" to
approve or disapprove any regulation before it takes effect. Such
legislative veto provisions usually provide that a proposed regulation will
become a law after the expiration of a certain period of time, only if
Congress does not affirmatively disapprove of the regulation in the
meantime. Less frequently, the statute provides that a proposed regulation
will become law if Congress affirmatively approves it.
-The legislative veto was developed initially in response to the problems of
reorganizing the U.S. Government structure during the Great Depression in
early 20th century. When U.S. President Hoover requested authority to
reorganize the government in 1929, he coupled his request with a proposal
22

for legislative review. He proposed that the Executive "should act upon
approval of a joint Committee of Congress or with the reservation of power of
revision by Congress within some limited period adequate for its
consideration." Congress followed President Hoovers suggestion and
authorized reorganization subject to legislative review. Although the
reorganization authority reenacted in 1933 did not contain a legislative veto
provision, the provision returned during the Roosevelt administration and has
since been renewed several times. Over the years, the provision was used
extensively. Various American Presidents submitted to Congress some 115
Reorganization Plans, 23 of which were disapproved pursuant to legislative
veto provisions.
-Supporters of legislative veto stress that it is necessary to maintain the
balance of power between the legislative and the executive branches of
government as it offers lawmakers a way to delegate vast power to the
executive branch or to independent agencies while retaining the option to
cancel particular exercise of such power without having to pass new
legislation or to repeal existing law. They contend that this arrangement
promotes democratic accountability as it provides legislative check on the
activities of unelected administrative agencies. One proponent thus explains:
It is too late to debate the merits of this delegation policy: the policy is too
deeply embedded in our law and practice. It suffices to say that the
complexities of modern government have often led Congress-whether by
actual or perceived necessity- to legislate by declaring broad policy
goals and general statutory standards, leaving the choice of policy
options to the discretion of an executive officer. Congress articulates
legislative aims, but leaves their implementation to the judgment of parties
who may or may not have participated in or agreed with the development of
those aims. Consequently, absent safeguards, in many instances the reverse
of our constitutional scheme could be effected: Congress proposes, the
Executive disposes. One safeguard, of course, is the legislative power to
enact new legislation or to change existing law. But without some means of
overseeing post enactment activities of the executive branch, Congress
would be unable to determine whether its policies have been implemented in
accordance with legislative intent and thus whether legislative intervention
is appropriate.
-Its opponents, however, criticize the legislative veto as undue encroachment
upon the executive prerogatives. They urge that any post-enactment
measures undertaken by the legislative branch should be limited to scrutiny
and investigation; any measure beyond that would undermine the separation
of powers guaranteed by the Constitution.] They contend that legislative
veto constitutes an impermissible evasion of the Presidents veto authority
and intrusion into the powers vested in the executive or judicial branches of
government. Proponents counter that legislative veto enhances separation
of powers as it prevents the executive branch and independent agencies
from accumulating too much power. They submit that reporting requirements
and congressional committee investigations allow Congress to scrutinize only
23

the exercise of delegated law-making authority. They do not allow Congress


to review executive proposals before they take effect and they do not afford
the opportunity for ongoing and binding expressions of congressional intent.
In contrast, legislative veto permits Congress to participate prospectively
in the approval or disapproval of "subordinate law" or those enacted
by the executive branch pursuant to a delegation of authority by
Congress. They further argue that legislative veto "is a necessary response
by Congress to the accretion of policy control by forces outside its
chambers." In an era of delegated authority, they point out that legislative
veto "is the most efficient means Congress has yet devised to retain control
over the evolution and implementation of its policy as declared by statute."
-Given the concept and configuration of the power of congressional
oversight, the next level of inquiry is whether congress exceeded its
permissible exercise in the case at bar. But before proceeding, a discussion
of the nature and powers of the Commission on Elections as provided in the
1987 Constitution is decisive to the issue.
Congressional Oversight and COMELEC
The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) is a constitutional body exclusively
charged with the enforcement and administration of "all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and
recall," and is invested with the power to decide all questions affecting
elections save those involving the right to vote.
-Given its important role in preserving the sanctity of the right of suffrage,
the COMELEC was purposely constituted as a body separate from the
executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. Originally, the
power to enforce our election laws was vested with the President and
exercised through the Department of the Interior. According to Dean Sinco,
however, the view ultimately emerged that an independent body could
better protect the right of suffrage of our people. Hence, the enforcement
of our election laws, while an executive power, was transferred to
the COMELEC.
-Several safeguards have been put in place to protect the independence of
the COMELEC from unwarranted encroachment by the other branches of
government. While the President appoints the Commissioners with the
concurrence of the Commission on Appointments, the Commissioners are not
accountable to the President in the discharge of their functions. They have a
fixed tenure and are removable only by impeachment. To ensure that not all
Commissioners are appointed by the same President at any one time, a
staggered system of appointment was devised. Thus, of the Commissioners
first appointed, three shall hold office for seven years, three for five years,
and the last three for three years.
Reappointment and temporary
designation or appointment is prohibited. In case of vacancy, the appointee
shall only serve the unexpired term of the predecessor. The COMELEC is
likewise granted the power to promulgate its own rules of procedure,] and to
appoint its own officials and employees in accordance with Civil Service laws.
24

-The COMELEC exercises quasi-judicial powers but it is not part of the


judiciary. This Court has no general power of supervision over the
Commission on Elections except those specifically granted by the
Constitution. As such, the Rules of Court are not applicable to the
Commission on Elections. In addition, the decisions of the COMELEC are
reviewable only by petition for certiorari on grounds of grave abuse of
discretion.
-The COMELEC is, however, subject to congressional scrutiny especially
during budget hearings. But Congress cannot abolish the COMELEC as it can
in case of other agencies under the executive branch. The reason is obvious.
The COMELEC is not a mere creature of the legislature; it owes its origin from
the Constitution.
-Be that as it may, I respectfully submit that the legislative veto
power or congressional oversight power over the authority of
COMELEC to issue rules and regulations in order to enforce election
laws is unconstitutional. The COMELEC occupies a distinct place in our
scheme of government.
As the constitutional body charged with the
administration of our election laws, it is endowed with independence in the
exercise of some of its powers and the discharge of its responsibilities. The
power to promulgate rules and regulations in order to administer our election
laws belongs to this category of powers as this has been vested exclusively
by the 1987 Constitution to the COMELEC. It cannot be trenched upon by
Congress in the exercise of its oversight powers.
DOUBTLESS, IF ITS RULE-MAKING POWER IS MADE TO DEPEND ON STATUTES,
CONGRESS MAY WITHDRAW THE SAME AT ANY TIME. INDEED, THE PRESENT
CONSTITUTION ENVISIONS A TRULY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS COMMITTED TO ENSURE FREE, ORDERLY, HONEST, PEACEFUL
AND CREDIBLE ELECTIONS, AND TO SERVE AS THE GUARDIAN OF THE
PEOPLE'S SACRED RIGHT OF SUFFRAGE THE CITIZENRY'S VITAL WEAPON
IN EFFECTING A PEACEFUL CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT AND IN ACHIEVING
AND PROMOTING POLITICAL STABILITY. [ BSJ: This statement of Puno
supports the notion that in the Philippines, there is such thing as a legislative
veto albeit there is no express constitutional provision using the term
LEGISLATIVE VETO. He limits the notion of legislative veto to powers
conferred by statute or delegated powers. When a power is conferred by the
Constitution itself such as the COMELECs rulemaking power, it is already
beyond the ambit of legislative veto]
The elevation of the COMELECs power to promulgate rules and regulations
in the 1987 Constitution is suffused with significance. Heretofore, it was
Congress that granted COMELEC the power to promulgate rules and
regulations, and hence, Congress can withdraw or restrict it by the exercise
of its veto or oversight power. Under the 1987 Constitution, the power to
promulgate rules and regulations has been directly granted by the
Constitution and no longer by Congress. Undoubtedly, the power was
granted to COMELEC to strengthen its independence, hence, its exercise is
beyond invasion by Congress. Under any lens, sections 19 and 25 of Rep. Act
25

No. 9189 constitute undue restrictions on the constitutional power of the


COMELEC to promulgate rules and regulations for such rules are made
subject to the prior review and approval of Congress. The impugned
provisions can result in the denial of this constitutionally conferred power
because Congress can veto the rules and regulations the COMELEC has
promulgated. Thus, I respectfully submit that sections 19 and 25 of Rep. Act
No. 9189 granting Congress the power to review, revise, amend and approve
the implementing rules and regulations of the COMELEC, otherwise known as
subordinate legislations in other countries, are unconstitutional.
Since the legislative standards have been defined, all that remains is their
enforcement. Our Constitution has specifically given the COMELEC the power
to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of
an election. The power is exclusive and it ought to be self-evident that it
cannot be subject to review and revision or veto by Congress in the exercise
of its oversight power. Again, the reason for the exclusivity is to insulate
COMELEC from the virus of partisan politics. In the exercise of this exclusive
power, the Commission must be accorded considerable latitude. Unless the
means and methods adopted by COMELEC are clearly illegal or constitute
grave abuse of discretion, they should not be interfered with.

C. Legislative and Judicial


Making; Salvador T. Carlota

Control

of

Administrative

Decision

Administrative agencies have proliferated in recent years. Administrative


agencies are endowed with significant rulemaking and adjudicative powers
and make decisions that affect both public interest and private rights. To
confer both rule making powers and adjudicatory powers seem to run
counter the principle of separation of powers. But recent developments and
the complexities of contemporary society has left us with no choice but to
adopt a more hospitable interpretation of the doctrine of separation of
powers that can accommodate the existence of administrative agencies
within our constitutional system.
-Their creation is directed towards the regulation of sensitive areas in social
and economic relations but the exercise of the powers vested upon them is
constantly attended by arbitrariness or abuse of discretion, thus the need
and the development of mechanisms of control over these agencies.
LEGISLATIVE CONTROL OVER ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
Power of Creation, Appropriation, and Investigation
Creation
- (In theory) Congress can create, divide, merge modify and abolish agencies.
- (In reality) Congress creates rather than abolish (evidenced by the
multiplication of regulatory agencies) as society becomes more complex.
26

-the state is compelled to create admin agencies to deal with problems


brought by social and economic change.
Appropriation
-have potential for checking arbitrariness in the administrative process but in
reality these have no appreciable effect in controlling administrative
discretionary power.
-Congress has the power to withhold funds for these agencies but at the end
of the day it is reluctant in wielding this power because it recognizes that if it
does, it will affect public interest. So what happens is, during budget
hearings, these agencies undergo strict scrutiny but receive their
appropriations just the same.
Investigation
-has limited value as a tool to provide as effective regular control of the
improper exercise of administrative power
-effective only as an aid in legislation
The non-delegation doctrine and the requirement of legislative standards
-traditional legal thinking places considerable emphasis on the nondelegation doctrine and the prescription of legislative standards to control
administrative agencies in the exercise of their powers
-the rule is for delegation of powers to an administrative agency to be valid,
the legislature must not only declare the policy to be executed but it must
likewise fix a standard to guide the agency in the exercise of its delegated
power
-for this doctrine to be effective, the legislature must be able to provide
sufficient or definite standards every time it decides to delegate powers to
an administrative agency, the more specific the standards the greater the
chances of confining administrative discretion within its proper limits
If the standards are too broad or vague, the administrator is allowed to
exercise uncontrolled discretion
-Non-delegation cases shows that in many instances of delegation, the
legislature is unable to provide for definite or specific standards because
there are numerous areas of regulation which are of different nature, subject
to variable conditions and policy considerations with varying degrees of
susceptibility to definite standards. Stone stresses that in providing definite
standards the following must be considered (a) the number, vagueness and
degree of potential conflicts among policy indications which the legislature
wants to be accommodated, and (b) the rate of change and movement in the
facts concerning such policies
-this inability has not caused the Supreme Court to shy away from assuming
a liberal posture I resolving challenges regarding the sufficiency of standards,
the Court is generally unwilling to strike down the validity of the delegation
for broadness or vagueness of the standards.
-Interest of law and order, public interest, justice and equity and substantial
merits of the case have been considered as sufficient standards to sustain
the constitutionality of the delegation of powers.
27

-the SC recognizes that delegation to administrative agencies is a compelling


necessity on a modern complex society.
-this combination (inability of congress to provide sufficient standards and
reluctance of SC to strike down the constitutionality of such delegation)
undermines the efficacy of the non-delegation doctrine. Thus, the
administrators discretion is virtually unconfined and the possibility of abuse
in the exercise of such discretionary power becomes a real problem
-In the US this doctrine has long been regarded as unsatisfactory
-Davis suggests that the non-delegation doctrine should be altered to turn it
into an effective and useful judicial tool. The focus should no longer be
exclusively on standards; it should be on the totality of protections against
arbitrariness, Including both safeguards and standards. The key should no
longer be statutory words; it should be protections and the administrators in
fact provide, irrespective of what the statutes say or fail to say. The focus of
judicial inquiries thus should shift from statutory standards to administrative
safeguards and standards.
Administrative Procedure as a Mode of Control
-the legislature can, although indirectly exert control over the activities of
administrative agencies through the prescription of rules or principles of
administrative procedure
-these rules of procedure serve to maximize fairness in the administrative
process
-in prescribing rules of procedure the following must be considered (a)
administrative agencies are not bound by the technical rules of procedure
and evidence followed in regular courts (b) administrative agencies are
designed to act with dispatch and flexibility to enable them to speedily
accomplish their objectives. This does not however exempt them from the
fundamental requirements of procedural due process (see Ang Tibay v CIR).
(c)Administrative agencies are created to deal with specific problems, with
different objectives and under varying conditions, thus a uniform rule of
procedure for all is out of the question. There is a need to grant them enough
leeway to come up with rules particularly suited to their areas of concern.
The ideal situation is to provide them with minimum procedural guidelines
and general principles to be observed in the performance of their rulemaking
and adjudicative functions.
-for a long time there was no law that prescribed common procedural
guidelines for all administrative agencies, thus they adopted their own rules
of procedure which resulted in a bewildering variety of rules and regulations
promulgated by the agencies which in turn caused confusion and was
prejudicial to the persons affected especially when the rules were not made
easily available to them.
-The Administrative Code of 1987 was a significant legislative measure that
answered this problem; it contains provisions which are applicable to all
agencies. It provides for the minimum procedural standards which in their
28

totality strike a harmonious balance between the fundamental requirements


of procedural due process and the demands of administrative flexibility.
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION MAKING
-Judicial review of agency decisions is given special emphasis in
administrative law.
-that there should be judicial review is not contested, the debate is on the
purpose of such review.
-A radical view would subject not only the agency conclusion of law but its
determinations of fact policy as well.
-the controlling principles frown upon a wide-ranging or freewheeling type of
judicial review.
-The courts, traditionally, have been confined to the role of seeing to it that
administrative agencies stay within the limits of their power as defined in
their enabling statutes and protecting private rights by checking
arbitrariness in the administrative process.
-Even if the enabling statutes of these agencies are silent with regard to
judicial review, the Supreme Court has consistently held that this does not
foreclose the possibility of such review. In one case it held that it is generally
understood that as to administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial or
legislative power there is an underlying power in the courts to scrutinize the
acts of such agencies on the question of law ad jurisdiction even though no
right of review is given by statute. The purpose of judicial review is to keep
the administrative agency within its jurisdiction and protects substantial
rights of parties affected by its decisions. It is part of a system of checks and
balances which restricts the separation of powers and forestalls arbitrary and
unjust adjudications. Judicial review is proper in case of lack of jurisdiction,
grave abuse of discretion, error of law, fraud or collusion (San Miguel v Sec
of Labor).
-note that the Supreme Court made no mention of judicial review of agency
determination of fact and policy.
-The judiciary recognizes that its traditional role is deeply rooted to the idea
of judicial deference to administrative expertise and the now well entrenched
substantial evidence rule in administrative law.
-Questions of law belong to the domain of the judiciary, questions of fact and
policy on the other hand are better resolved by administrative agencies
which posses expertise or experience in their respective areas of
specialization.
-While deference to administrative expertise is the rule the courts
nevertheless is not precluded from reviewing agency determination of fact
and policy. When the substantiality of the evidence supporting the factual
findings of the agency is challenged, the issue assumes a judicial character.
And the lack of substantial evidence to support agency finding causes the
overturning of such by the courts.
-The courts generally avoid intervention in cases involving policy
considerations, however there are occasions when in the course of resolving
29

questions of law which are intimately linked to policy matters, the courts are
unable to exclude the consideration of such matters in the review.
CONCLUSION
The rise of administrative power has generated a host of problems regarding
controls over the exercise of such power.
Legislative Controls
Appropriation Power of the purse; but is generally not wielded in
consideration of public interest
Fixing of Standards- Has been proven to be of little value
Prescription of Rules-prescription of minimum procedural guidelines and
general principles to be commonly observed by agencies can help maximize
fairness in the administrative process.
Administrative Code of 1987 strikes a harmonious balance
between the fundamental requirements of fairness and the need for
administrative flexibility
Judicial Review important instrument to control agency behavior through the
courts actual policing of agency behavior to ensure that it is confined within
the limits set by law
D. THE OMBUDSMAN: ITS EFFECTIVITY AND VISIBILITY AMIDST
BUREAUCRATIC ABUSE AND IRREGULARITY
E. CASES
CONCERNED OFFICALS OF MWSS v VASQUEZ, PLDPPMA
240 SCRA 502
VITUG; January 25, 1995
NATURE
Petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction
FACTS
- MWSS conducted bidding for two projects concerning its water distribution
system in Metro Manila. The Philippine Large Diameter Pressure Pipes
Manufacturers Association (PLDPPMA) then questioned the award of the
projects with the Office of the Ombudsman (Vasquez), charging an apparent
plan on the part of the MWSS to favor certain suppliers (those offering
fiberglass pipes over those offering steel pipes) through the technical
specifications, and urging the Ombudsman to conduct an investigation
thereon and hold in abeyance the award of the contracts. The Ombudsman
then issued the assailed order, directing the MWSS to: set aside the
30

recommendation of an MWSS committee to award the contact to a


contractor offering fiberglass pipes, and award the subject contract to a
complying and responsive bidder
- the officials of MWSS filed the instant petition with the SC, contending that
the ombudsman acted beyond the competence of his office when he
assumed jurisdiction over the complaint, when the same is clearly among the
excepted cases enumerated in the Ombudsman Act. Also, that the
Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion by arbitrarily and
capriciously interfering with the exercise of sound discretion of the MWSS
ISSUE
1. WON the Ombudsman had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint
filed by the PLDPPMA and correspondingly issue the challenged orders
HELD
1. NO
Ratio The
Reasoning On the basis of all the provisions regarding the Office of the
Ombudsman, Solicitor-General insists that the authority of the Ombudsman
is sufficiently broad enough to cloth it with sufficient power to look into the
alleged irregularities in the bidding conducted by the MWSS
- The reason for the creation of the Ombudsman in the 1987 Consti and for
the grant to it of broad investigative authority, is to insulate said office from
the long tentacles of officialdom that are able to penetrate judges' and
fiscals' offices, and others involved in the prosecution of erring public
officials, and through the exertion of official pressure and influence, quash,
delay, or dismiss investigations into malfeasances and misfeasances
committed by public officers. It was deemed necessary, therefore, to create a
special office to investigate all criminal complaints against public officers
regardless of whether or not the acts or omissions complained of are related
to or arise from the performance of the duties of their office. The
Ombudsman Act makes perfectly clear that the jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman encompasses 'all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance that have been committed by any officer or employee as
mentioned in Section 13 hereof, during his tenure of office.
- the powers, functions and duties of the Ombudsman have generally been
categorized into: Investigatory Power; Prosecutory Power; Public Assistance
Functions; Authority to Inquire and Obtain Information; and Function to
Adopt, Institute and Implement. This case concerns the investigatory power
and Public Assistance Duties of the Ombudsman
- the Ombudsman, in resolving the complaint, considered 3 issues: (1) WON
the technical specifications prescribed by MWSS in the projects have been so
designed as to really favor Fiberglass Pipes-Contractors/ Bidders; (2) WON
the MWSS has the technical knowledge and expertise with fiberglass pipes;
and (3) WON the contractors and local manufacturers of fiberglass pipes
31

have the experience and qualification to undertake the projects. While the
broad authority of the Ombudsman to investigate any act or omission which
"xxx appears illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient" may be yielded, it is
difficult to equally concede, however, that the Constitution and the Law have
intended to likewise confer upon it veto or revisory power over an exercise of
judgment or discretion by an agency or officer upon whom that judgment or
discretion is lawfully vested. It seems that the Ombudsman, in issuing the
challenged orders, has not only directly assumed jurisdiction over, but
likewise preempted the exercise of discretion by, the Board of Trustees of
MWSS. Indeed, the recommendation of the MWSS Committee to award the
contract appears to be yet pending consideration and action by the MWSS
Board of Trustees.
We can only view the assailed order to be more of an undue interference in
the adjudicative responsibility of the MWSS Board of Trustees rather than a
mere directive requiring the proper observance of and compliance with the
law.
Disposition Petition is granted. Order annulled and set aside.
LASTIMOSA v VASQUEZ
243 SCRA 497
MENDOZA; April 6, 1995
NATURE
Petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioner to set aside the
orders of the Ombudsman with respect to the two proceedings: complaint for
grave misconduct, insubordination, gross neglect of duty and maliciously
refraining from prosecuting crime and a charge for indirect contempt.
FACTS
- February 18, 1993 > Dayon, public health nurse at Cebu, filed with the
Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas a criminal complaint for frustrated rape
and an administrative complaint for immoral acts, abuse of authority and
grave misconduct against the Municipal Mayor of Santa Fe, Rogelio
Ilustrisimo. After an investigation, the investigating officer found no prima
facie evidence and recommended its dismissal. But the Ombudsman,
Vasquez, disapproved the recommendation and directed that Mayor
Ilustrisimo be charged with attempted rape. Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas
Mojica referred the case to Cebu Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar for the "filing
of appropriate information with the Regional Trial Court of Danao City. The
case eventually went to First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Gloria G.
Lastimosa.
- Lastimosa conducted a PI and found that only acts of lasciviousness had
been committed. With the approval of Kintanar, she filed an information for
acts of lasciviousness. As no case for attempted rape had been filed by the
32

Prosecutor's Office, Mojica ordered Kintanar and Lastimosa to show cause


why they should not be punished for contempt for "refusing and failing to
obey the lawful directives" of the Office of the Ombudsman.
- Mojica issued an order placing Lastimosa and Kintanar under preventive
suspension for a period of six (6) months as approved by Ombudsman
Vasquez
- September 6, 1994 > Lastimosa filed the petition for certiorari and
prohibition to set aside the orders directing them to file of the action (for
Attempted Rape) against the Mayor; instructing Lastimosa and Kintanar to
explain in writing why they should not be punished for indirect Contempt of
the Office of the Ombudsman "for refusing and failing to file the appropriate
Information for Attempted Rape against the Mayor; stating that the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor to comply with the directive of the Office of the
Ombudsman that a charge for attempted rape be filed against the Mayor in
recognition of the authority of said Office; approving of the placement of
Lastimosa and Kintanar under preventive suspension for a period of six (6)
months, without pay; directing Assistant Regional State Prosecutor to
implement preventive suspension; and designating Assistant Regional State
Prosecutor Concepcion as Acting Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu
- Petitioner claims: Office of the Ombudsman and the prosecutor's office
have concurrent authority to investigate public officers or employees and
that when the former first took cognizance of the case against Mayor
Ilustrisimo, it did so to the exclusion of the latter. In any event, the Office of
the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the case against the mayor because
the crime involved (rape) was not committed in relation to a public office.
Therefore the Office of the Ombudsman has no authority to place her and
Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar under preventive suspension for refusing to
follow his orders and to cite them for indirect contempt for such refusal.
ISSUES
1. WON the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to call on the Provincial
Prosecutor to assist it in the prosecution of the case for attempted rape
against Mayor Ilustrisimo
2. WON Office of the Ombudsman has the power to punish for contempt and
impose preventive suspension
HELD
1. YES
Ratio When a prosecutor is deputized, he comes under the "supervision and
control" of the Ombudsman which means that he is subject to the power of
the Ombudsman to direct, review, approve, reverse or modify his
(prosecutor's) decision. Petitioner cannot legally act on her own and refuse to
prepare and file the information as directed by the Ombudsman.
Reasoning
- Ombudsman is authorized to call on prosecutors for assistance. Sec 31 of
the Ombudsman Act of 1989 (RA6770) provides: Designation of Investigators
33

and Prosecutors. The Ombudsman may utilize the personnel of his office
and/or designate of deputize any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the
government service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist in
the investigation and prosecution of certain cases. Those designated or
deputized to assist him as herein provided shall be under his supervision and
control.
Obiter
- The office of the Ombudsman has the power to "investigate and prosecute
on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public
officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to
be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient." This power has been held to
include the investigation and prosecution of any crime committed by a public
official regardless of whether the acts or omissions complained of are related
to, or connected with, or arise from, the performance of his official duty. It is
enough that the act or omission was committed by a public official. Hence,
the crime of rape, when committed by a public official like a municipal
mayor, is within the power of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute.
2. YES
- Sec 15(g) of the Ombudsman Act gives the Office of the Ombudsman the
power to "punish for contempt, in accordance with the Rules of Court and
under the same procedure and with the same penalties provided therein."
- Suspension is not a punishment or penalty for the acts of dishonesty and
misconduct in office, but only as a preventive measure. Suspension is a
preliminary step in an administrative investigation. If after such
investigation, the charges are established and the person investigated is
found guilty of acts warranting his removal, then he is removed or dismissed.
This is the penalty. There is, therefore, nothing improper in suspending an
officer pending his investigation and before the opportunity to prove his
innocence.
Disposition Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the Motion to Lift
Order of Preventive Suspension is DENIED
BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE v OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
380 SCRA 424
de Leon, Jr., J; April 11, 2002
NATURE
Special civil Action . Certiorari and Prohibition
FACTS
- The Office of the Ombudsman received information from an informant for
reward regarding the anomalous grant of tax refunds to Distillera Limtuaco
and La Tondena Distilleries. On the basis of this information, the Ombudsman
directed via a subpoena duces tecum, Atty. Mansequiao of the legal
department of the BIR to appear before him together with the complete case
34

dockets of the two companies.


- BIR resisted this summons on the grounds that the grant of the tax refund
had already been decided by the Sandiganbayan in People vs Larin, that the
BIR had exclusive authority to grant a tax credit, that the proper authority to
review is with the Court of Tax Appeal, that there must be a pending action
before the issuance of a subpoena can be made, and that the subpoena did
not specifically described the documents sought to be produced.
- The Ombudsman denied the motion of the BIR and reiterated it instructions
to the BIR to produce the documents sought.
- The BIR filed this Petition for certiorari, prohibition, and preliminary
injunction, and temporary restraining order with the SC
ISSUE/S
1. WON the Ombudsman could validly exercise its power to investigate only
when there exist an appropriate case
2. WON it violated due process in issuing subpoena without first giving BIR
the summary of complaint and requiring it to submit a written reply
HELD
1. No. The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the
Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. The 1987 Constitution provides that
the Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act
promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or
employees of the government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof, including government owned or controlled corporations, and shall, in
appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the action taken and the result
thereof. The Ombudsman Act makes it perfectly clear that the jurisdiction
of the Ombudsman encompasses all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and
nonfeasance that have been committed by any officer or employeeduring
his tenure.
2. Yes. The SC held that the procedure of immediately issuing the subpeona
duces tecum was violative of the right to due process and did no comply with
Section 26, paragraph 2 of the Ombudsman Act (RA 6770). The law clearly
provides that if there is reasonable ground to investigate further, the
investigator shall first furnish the respondent public official or employee with
a summary of the complaint and require him to submit a written answer
within 72 hours from receipt of said complaint. As noted, the BIR was never
given a copy of the complaint but was summarily ordered to appear before
the Ombudsman and to produce the case dockets of the tax refunds granted
to the two companies. Clearly, the Ombudsman failed to afford BIR with the
basic due process in conducting the investigation.
Disposition
Petition is granted. Ombudsman is prohibited from proceeding with the case
and its orders are annulled and set aside.
35

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v ENOC


G.R. Nos. 145957-68
MENDOZA; January 25, 2002
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS
- Respondents were employed at the Office of the Southern Cultural
Communities (OSCC), Davao del Sur with salaries below grade 27.
- They were charged with 11 counts of malversation through falsification,
based on alleged purchases of medicine and food assistance for cultural
community members, and one count of violation of R.A. No. 3019, 3(e),
in connection with the purchases of supplies for the OSCC without
bidding/canvass.
- Respondents moved to quash the informations saying that the Ombudsman
has no authority to prosecute graft cases falling within the jurisdiction of
regular courts. This motion was granted by the RTC and the cases were
dismissed without prejudice, however, to their refiling by the appropriate
officer.
- The Office of the Ombudsman filed the instant petition.
ISSUE
WON the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute cases
before the regular courts.
HELD
- YES. Ombudsman has powers to prosecute not only graft cases within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but also those cognizable by the regular
courts. The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the
Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. It pertains to any act or omission
of any public officer or employee when such act or omission appears
to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The law does not make a
distinction between cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and those
cognizable by regular courts. It has been held that the clause any illegal act
or omission of any public official is broad enough to embrace any crime
committed by a public officer or employee.
- The jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman should not be equated with
the limited authority of the Special Prosecutor under Section 11 of RA 6770.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor is merely a component of the Office of
the Ombudsman and may only act under the supervision and control and
upon authority of the Ombudsman.
Its power to conduct preliminary
investigation and to prosecute is limited to criminal cases within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
- The Ombudsman is mandated by law to act on all complaints against
36

officers and employees of the government and to enforce their


administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case where the evidence
warrants. To carry out this duty, the law allows him to utilize the personnel
of his office and/or designate any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the
government service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist in
the investigation and prosecution of certain cases. Those designated or
deputized to assist him work under his supervision and control. The law
likewise allows him to direct the Special prosecutor to prosecute cases
outside the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction in accordance with Section 11(4c)
of RA 6770.
Disposition WHEREFORE, the order, dated October 7, 2000, of the Regional
Trial Court, branch 19 of Digos, Davao del Sur is SET ASIDE and Criminal Case
Nos. 374(97) to 385(97) are hereby REINSTATED and the Regional Trial Court
is ORDERED to try and decide the same.
FUENTES v OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
GR NO. 124295
PARDO; October 23, 2001
NATURE
Petition for certiorari
FACTS
- Pursuant to the government's plan to construct its first fly-over in Davao
City, the RP represented by the DPWH filed an expropriation case against
the owners of the properties affected by the project (namely, Tessie
Amadeo, Reynaldo Lao and Rev. Alfonso Galo). The case was presided by
Judge Renato A. Fuentes.
- The govt won the expropriation case.
- The properties subject of the levy as described as all scrap iron/junks found
in the premises of the DPWH. An auction was conducted wherein Alex
Bacquial emerged as the highest bidder. However, Bacquial together with
Sheriff Norberto Paralisan attempted to withdraw the auctioned properties
but they were prevented from doing so because many of these were still
serviceable and were due for repair and rehabilitation. (as opposed to their
classification as scrap iron/junk)
- So Alex Baquial filed an ex-parte urgent motion for the issuance of a 'break
through' order to enable him to effect the withdrawal of the auctioned
properties. The motion was granted by Judge Fuentes that same day. Thus,
Bacquial succeeded in hauling off the scrap iron/junk equipment in the
depot, including the repairable equipment within the DPWH depot. He
hauled equipment from the depot for five successive days until the lower
court issued another order temporarily suspending the writ of execution it
earlier issued in the expropriation case and directing Bacquial not to
37

implement the writ. The lower court issued another order upholding the
validity of the writ of execution
- On the basis of letters from Congressman Manuel M. Garcia of the Second
District of Davao City and Engineer Ramon A. Alejo, the Court
Administrator, the SC directed Judge Renato A. Fuentes and Sheriff Norberto
Paralisan to comment on the report recommending the filing of an
administrative case against the sheriff and other persons responsible for
the anomalous implementation of the writ of execution. Also, the DPWH
filed an administrative complaint against Sheriff Norberto Paralisan for
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, in violation of Article
IX, Section 36 (b) of P. D. No. 807.
- After considering the facts, the SC ordered the sheriffs dismissal. From this
order, the office of the Court Administrator was also directed to conduct an
investigation on Judge Renato Fuentes and to charge him if the result of the
investigation so warrants. The Office of the Solicitor General is likewise
ordered to take appropriate action to recover the value of the serviceable
or repairable equipment which were unlawfully hauled by Alex Bacquial.
- Thus, Director Antonio E. Valenzuela of the Office of the OmbudsmanMindanao recommended that petitioner Judge Renato A. Fuentes be
charged before the Sandiganbayan with violation of Republic Act No. 3019,
Section 3 (e) and likewise be administratively charged before the Supreme
Court with acts unbecoming of a judge. Fuentes. filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao a motion to dismiss complaint and/or manifestation
to forward all records to the Supreme Court. The motion was dismissed
hence this petition.
ISSUE
1.
WON the Ombudsman may conduct an investigation of acts of a judge
in the exercise of his official functions alleged to be in violation of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act, in the absence of an administrative charge
for the same acts before the Supreme Court.
HELD
NO.
The Ombudsman may not initiate or investigate a criminal or
administrative complaint before his office against petitioner judge, pursuant
to his power to investigate public officers. The Ombudsman must indorse the
case to the Supreme Court, for appropriate action. Article VIII, Section 6 of
the Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative
supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of
the Court of Appeals to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. Hence, it is the
Supreme Court that is tasked to oversee the judges and court personnel and
take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any
violation of the laws of the land. No other branch of government may intrude
into this power, without running afoul of the independence of the judiciary
and the doctrine of separation of powers. No other entity or official of the
Government, not the prosecution or investigation service of any other
38

branch, not any functionary thereof, has competence to review a judicial


order or decision--whether final and executory or not--and pronounce it
erroneous so as to lay the basis for a criminal or administrative complaint for
rendering an unjust judgment or order. That prerogative belongs to the
courts alone.
Dispositive
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Ombudsman is directed to
dismiss the case and refer the complaint against petitioner Judge Renato A.
Fuentes to the Supreme Court for appropriate action.
LEDESMA v CA (DESIERTO)
G.R. No. 161629
YNARES-SANTIAGO; July 29, 2005
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari to reverese and set aside CA decision
FACTS
- Atty Ronaldo Ledesma is the chaiman of the 1 st division of the Board of
Special Inquiry (BSI) of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID).
Agusto Somalio with the Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FIIB) of the
Office of the Ombudsman filed a complaint requesting for an investigation on
alleged anomalies surrounding the extension of the Temporary Resident
Visas (TRVs) of 2 foreigners. The FIIB investigation revealed 7 other cases of
TRV extensions with similar irregularities.
- The FIIB, as nominal complainant filed with Adjudication Bureau (AAB) of
the Office of the Ombudsman a formal complaint against the petitioner. Atty.
Artherl Caronongan (board member) and Ma. Elena Ang (exec asst) were also
charged administratively. The case against the petitioner was treated as both
criminal and administative for 9 countsof violationof the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act for falsification of public documents and 9 counts of
Dishonesty, grave Misconduct, Falsification of Public Documents and Gross
Neglect of Duty.
- The complaint alleged the ff illegal acts: (a) irregularily in granting TRVs
beyond the prescbed period and (b) using photocopied applications for a TRV
extension wthout the applicants fixing their signatures to validate the
correctness of the information. Ladesma and Coarongan allegedly signed the
Memorandum of Transmittal to the Board of Commission (BOC) of the BID,
forwarding the applications for TRV extension of several aliens whose papers
were questionable.
- Graft Investigation Officer Marlyn Reyes resolved the administrative cases
in a resolution recommending that Ledesma be suspended from the service
for 1 year for Conduct Prejudicial to the Interest of the Service, that
Caronongan be dismissed for being moot and academic and the case against
39

Ang be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.


- Asst Ombudsman Abelardo Aportadera reviewed the joint resolution which
was approved by Ombudsman Desierto.
- Pending the approval by Desierto, he approved the resolution of Graft
Investigation Officer Marilou Ancheta-Mejica dismissing criminal charges for
insufficiency of evidence.
- Petitioner filed an MFR in the administrative case alleging that the BOC
which reviewed the applications for extension approved theTRVs in question
thereby effectively declared the applicationd regular and in order and waived
any infurmity thereon.
- Graft Officer Reyes recommended the denial of the MFR which was
approved by Desierto but reduced the suspension from 1yr to 9mos without
pay.
- Petitionerfiled a petition for review with the CA with a preliminary
prohobitory mandatory injunction and/or temporary restraining order to
enjoin public respondents from the implementation of the order of
suspension. CA issued the TRO.
- CA affirmed the suspension but reduced it to 6mos and 1day without pay.
MFR was denied.
ISSUE/S
1. WON CA manifestly overlooked relevant facts which would have justified a
conclusion in favor of the petitioner
2. WON CA erred in finding that the ombudsman is not merely advisory on
the Bureau of Immigration
3. WON CA failed to consider that the Ombudsmand's resolution finding
Ledesma administratively liable constitutes an indirect encroachment intot
he power of the Bureau of Immigration over immigration matters
HELD
1. NO
Reasoning Petitioner undermines his position in the BID and his role in the
processing of the subject applications. The BSI reviews the applications and
when it finds them in order, executes a Memorandum of Tranmittal to the
BOC certifying to the regularity of the application.
All heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinated.
He cannot feign good faith when the irregularities of the TRV extention
application were patently clear on its face. The contention that the BOC's
approval of the defective application for TRV extension cured any infirmaties
absolved petitioner's administrative lapse.
The main thrust of the case is to determine whether petitioner committedany
misconduct, nonfeasance, misfeasance or mal feasance in the performance
of his duties.
2and3. NO
Ratio The creation of the Office of the Ombudsman is a unique feature of
the 1987 Constitution. The Ombudsman and his deputies are mandated to
40

act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against officers or


employeed of the Government. Foremost among its powers is the authority
to investigate and prosecute public officers and employees.
Reasoning Ledesma argues that to uphold CA's ruling expands authority
granted by the constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman.
The authority of the Ombudsman to conduct administrative investigations as
in the present case is settled. Section 19 of RA 6770 providesa that the
Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating, but not limited to acts or
omissions which: (a) Are contrary to law or regulation; (b) Are unreasonable,
unfair, oppressive or discriminatory; (c) Are inconsistent with the general
course of an agencys functions, though in accordance with law; (d) Proceed
from a mistake of law or an arbitrary ascertainment of facts; (e) Are in the
exercise of discretionary powers but for an improper purpose; or (f) Are
otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of justification.
Under Section 13, subparagraph (3), of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution,
the Ombudsman can only recommend the removal of the public official or
employee found to be at fault, to the public official concerned. The Solicitor
General and the Office of the Ombudsman argue that the word recommend
must be taken in conjunction with the phrase and ensure compliance
therewith and not its literal meaning.
The Constitutional Commission left to Congress to empower the Ombudsman
with prosecutorial functions which it did when RA 6770 was enacted.
Disposition WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED.

ESTARIJA v RANADA
492 SCRA 652
QUISUMBING; Jun 26, 2006
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS
Captain Edgardo V. Estarija, Harbor Master of the Philippine Ports Authority
(PPA), was found guilty by the Ombudsman of dishonesty and grave
misconduct for having been demanding monies for the approval and
issuance of berthing permits and monthly contribution from the Davao Pilots
Association, Inc. (DPAI). He was dismissed from the service.
ISSUES
1.
WON there is substantial evidence to hold petitioner liable for
dishonesty and grave misconduct
2.
WON the power of the Ombudsman to directly remove, suspend,
demote, fine or censure erring officials is unconstitutional since the under
41

the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsmans administrative authority is merely


recommendatory
HELD
1. YES.
Reasoning:
a. Estarija was caught red-handed in an entrapment operation. When
Estarija went to the office of Adrian Cagata to pick up the money, his doing
so was indicative of his willingness to commit the crime.
b. In an administrative proceeding, the quantum of proof required for a
finding of guilt is only substantial evidence, that amount of relevant evidence
which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.
2. NO.
Rep. Act No. 6770 provides for the functional and structural organization of
the Office of the Ombudsman. In passing Rep. Act No. 6770, Congress
deliberately endowed the Ombudsman with the power to prosecute offenses
committed by public officers and employees to make him a more active and
effective agent of the people in ensuring accountability in public office.
Moreover, the legislature has vested the Ombudsman with broad powers to
enable him to implement his own actions.
Reasoning
a. Jurisprudence
- In Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, we held that Rep. Act No. 6770 is
consistent with the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution. They gave
Congress the discretion to give the Ombudsman powers that are not merely
persuasive in character. Thus, in addition to the power of the Ombudsman to
prosecute and conduct investigations, the lawmakers intended to provide the
Ombudsman with the power to punish for contempt and preventively
suspend any officer under his authority pending an investigation when the
case so warrants. He was likewise given disciplinary authority over all
elective and appointive officials of the government and its subdivisions,
instrumentalities and agencies except members of Congress and the
Judiciary.
b. intent of the framers of the Constitution
- Based on the record of the Constitutional Commission, they clarified that
the powers of the Ombudsman are not exclusive. They are not foreclosing
the possibility that in the future, the Assembly may have to give additional
powers to the Ombudsman.
3. The Constitution does not restrict the powers of the Ombudsman in
Section 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, but allows the Legislature to
enact a law that would spell out the powers of the Ombudsman. Through the
enactment of Rep. Act No. 6770, specifically Section 15, par. 3, the
lawmakers gave the Ombudsman such powers to sanction erring officials and
employees, except members of Congress, and the Judiciary.
42

DISPOSITION The petition is DENIED.


OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN VS MASING
Puno
January 22, 2008
The principal and office clert of Davao City Integrated Special School were
administratively charged before the OMB for Mindanao for allegedly
collecting unauthorized fees, failing to remit authorized fees and to account
for public funds.
Issue: WON the OMB may directly discipline public school teachers and
employees. Held: Yes.
The authority of the OMB to act on complaints filed against public officers
and employees is explicit in Article XI, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution,
Article XI, section 13, which delineates the powers, functions and duties of
the OMB and such enumeration is non-exclusive. Then RA 6770 gave OMB
such other powers that it may need to efficiently perform the task given by
the Consti.
In fine, the manifest intent of the lawmakers was to bestow on the Office of
the OMB full administrative disciplinary authority in accord with the
constitutional deliberations. In 1973, it was limited only in cases of failure of
justice. In 1987, it was intended to play a more active role in the
enforcement of laws on anti-graft and corrupt practices and other offenses
committed by public officers and employees. Not just a passive one but an
activist watchman. In Office of the OMB vs Laja, it was emphasized that the
OMBs order to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an
officer or employee is not merely advisory or recommendatory but is actually
mandatory. Implementation of the order imposing the penalty is, however to
coursed through the proper officer.
The authority of the OMB to conduct administrative investigations is beyond
cavil. As the principal and primary complaints and action center against
erring public officers and employees, it is mandated by no less than Section
13(1), Article XI of the Constitution. In conjunction therewith, Section 19 of
RA 6770 grants to the OMB the authority to act on all administrative
complaints.
Fabella case, the procedure set there was for administrative investigations
conducted by DECS. This is not also applicable because they were filed with
violations of civil service laws by the DECS secretary unlike in the present
case where they were charged with violations of RA 6713 or the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.
III. POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
43

A. LEGISLATIVE FUNCTION
1. NON DELEGATION DOCTRINE
COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DE FILIPINAS v THE BOARD OF
PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISIONERS
G.R. NO. L-11216
Moreland, J.: March 6, 1916
NATURE
Petition for review of an order of the Board of Public Utility Commissioners
(the Board)
FACTS
-petitioner is a foreign corporation organized under the laws of Spain and
engaged in business in the Phils. as a common carrier of passengers and
merchandise by water. The Board dictated an order requiring petitioner to
present a detailed report of its finances and operations of its vessels in the
Phils. in the form of annual reports, upon hearing and service of an order for
petitioner to show cause why such reports should not be required of them.
-The Board relied on Sec. 16 of Act No. 2307 for its authority which states
that:
the board shall have power, after hearing, upon notice, by order in writing,
to require every public utility as herein defined
(e) to furnish annually a detailed report of finances and operations, in
such form and containing such matters as the Boars may from time to
time by order prescribe.
-petitioner questioned the Boards authority on the ground that Act No. 2307
was invalid as constituting an unlawful attempt on the part of Legislature to
delegate legislative power to the Board.
ISSUE
WON there was a delegation of legislative power to the Board
HELD
YES. Act No. 2307 failed to lay down the general rules of action under which
the Board was to proceed, and did not prescribe in detail the contents of the
reports it required. Everything was left to the judgment and discretion of the
Board rendering the Act arbitrary, special legislation, and violative of the
constitution. It did not indicate what specific information the State required
and instead authorized the Board to require whatever information it wanted.
This amounted to the Legislatures abdication of its powers and functions to
the Boardas held in Birdsall vs Clark: if discretion and judgment are to be
exercised, either as to time or manner, the body entrusted with the duty
must exercise it, and cannot delegate it to another.
-As stated in Interstate Commerce Commission vs Goodrich Transit, The
Congress may not delegate its purely legislative powers to a commission,
44

but, having laid down the general rules of action under which a commission
shall proceed, it may require of that commission the application of such rules
to particular situations and the investigation of facts, with a view to making
orders in a particular matter within the rules laid down by the Congress.
Here, the general rules had been laid down for the guidance of the
commission, the latter only having to carry out the details. This case
illustrates the conferring of authority as to the execution of the law, which is
completely valid, as opposed to the delegation of the power to make the law.
Dowling vs Lancashire Insurance Co. furthers that the law must be complete,
in all its terms and provisions, when it leaves the legislature, so that, in form
and substance, it is a law in all its details, in presenti, but which may be left
to take effect in futuro. As held in Merchants Exchange vs Knott, in essence,
the delegation of legislative power is pure and simple despotism.
The order appealed from is set aside and the cause returned to the
Board with instruction to dismiss
US v ANG TANG HO
43 Phil 1
Johns; February 27, 1922
FACTS
- In 1919, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2868. The Act 1) makes
unlawful the monopoly and hoarding of palay, rice or corn and provides
penalty for such violations; and 2) authorizes the GG to fix the quantities of
sais products that a company or individual may acquire, and the maximum
sale price that the industrial or merchant may demand.
- The GG thus issued a proclamation fixing the price at which rice should be
sold.
- A complaint was filed against the Ang Tang Ho, charging him with the sale
of rice at an excessive price. Upon this charge, he was tried, found guilty and
sentenced to imprisonment and to pay a fine. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE
WON Act No. 2868, in so far as it authorizes the GG to fix the price at which
rice should be sold, is unconstitutional.
HELD.
YES
It will be noted that section 1 authorizes the GG, with the consent of the
Council of State, for any cause resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price
of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgated temporary rules and
emergency measures for carrying out the purposes of the Act. By its very
terms, the promulgation of temporary rules and emergency measures is left
to the discretion of the GG. The Legislature does not undertake reasons the
Governor-General shall issue the proclamation, but says that it may be
45

issued " for any cause," and leaves the question as to what is "any cause" to
the discretion of the GG. The Act also says: "For any cause, conditions arise
resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn." The
Legislature does not specify or define what is "an extraordinary rise." That is
also left to the discretion of the GG. The Act also says that the GovernorGeneral, "with the consent of the Council of State," is authorized to issue and
promulgate "temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the
purposes of this Act." It does not specify or define what is a temporary rule or
an emergency measure, or how long such temporary rules or emergency
measures shall remain in force and effect, or when they shall take effect.
That is to say the Legislature itself has no in any manner specified or defined
any basis for the order, but has left it to the sole judgment and discretion of
the GG to say what is or what is not "a cause," and what is or what is not "an
extraordinary rise in the price of rice," and as to what a temporary rule or an
emergency measure for the carrying out the purpose of the Act. Under this
state of facts, if the law is valid and the GG issues a proclamation fixing the
minimum price at which rice should be sold, any dealer who, with or without
notice, sells rice at a higher price, is a criminal. There may not have been
any cause, and the price may not have been extraordinary, and there may
not have been an emergency, but, if the GG found the existence of such
facts and issued a proclamation, and rice is sold at any higher price, the
seller commits a crime.
By the Organic Law, all legislative power is vested in the Legislature, and the
power conferred upon the Legislature to make laws cannot be delegated to
the GG, or any one else. The Legislative cannot delegate the Legislative
power to enact any law. If Act No. 2868 is a law unto itself and within itself,
and it does nothing more than to authorize the GG to make rules and
regulations to carry the law into effect, then the Legislature itself created the
law. There is no delegation of power and it is valid. On the other hand, if the
Act within itself does not define a crime, and is not a law, and some
legislative act remains to be done to make it a law or a crime, the doing of
which is vested in the GG, then the Act is a delegation of legislative power, is
unconstitutional and void.
Supreme Court of Wisconsin:
"That no part of the legislative power can be delegated by the legislature to
any other department of the government, executive or judicial, is a
fundamental principle in constitutional law, essential to the integrity and
maintenance of the system of government established by the constitution.
"Where an act is clothed with all the forms of law, and is complete in and of
itself, it may be provided that it shall become operative only upon some
certain act or event, or, in like manner, that its operation shall be suspended.
The legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law, but it can make a
law to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things upon
which the law makes, or intends to make, its own action to depend."
It must conceded that, after the passage of Act No. 2868, and before any
rules and regulations were promulgated by the GG, a dealer in rice could sell
46

it at any price, and that he would not commit a crime, because there would
be no law fixing the price of rice, and the sale of it at any price would not be
a crime. That is to say, in the absence of a proclamation, it was not a crime
to sell rice at any price. Hence, it must follow that, if the defendant
committed a crime, it was because the Governor-General issued the
proclamation. There was no act of the Legislature making it a crime to sell
rice at any price, and without the proclamation, the sale of it at any price
was not crime.
When Act No. 2868 is analyzed, it is the violation of the proclamation of the
GG which constitutes the crime. Without that proclamation, it was no crime
to sell rice at any price. In other words, the Legislature left it to the sole
discretion of the GG to say what was and what was not "any cause" for
enforcing the act, and what was and what was not "an extraordinary rise in
the price of palay, rice or corn," and under certain undefined conditions to fix
the price at which rice should be sold, without regard to grade or quality,
also to say whether a proclamation should be issued, if so, when, and
whether or not the law should be enforced, how long it should be enforced,
and when the law should be suspended. The Legislature did not specify or
define what was "any cause," or what was "an extraordinary rise in the price
of rice, palay or corn." Neither did it specify or define the conditions upon
which the proclamation should be issued. In the absence of the proclamation
no crime was committed. The alleged sale was made a crime, if at all,
because the GG issued the proclamation.
PEOPLE v VERA
65 Phil 56
LAUREL; November 16, 1937
FACTS
-1931: information for criminal case against Mariano Cu Unjieng, et. al was
filed in CFI Manila. HSBC, the offended party, intervened.
-1934: CFI convicted Cu Unjieng
-1935: SC upholds conviction of Cu Unjieng, modified duration of
imprisonment. After MFR and motions for new trial which were denied by SC,
final judgment was entered. Cu Unjieng now sought to elevate case to US SC.
US SC denied petition for certiorari.
-1936: RP SC denied Cu Unjiengs petition for leave to file MFR or new trial,
remanded the case to CFI Manila for execution of judgment. Cu Unjieng
applied for provation under Act No. 4221, which was referred to the Insular
Probation Office (IPO)
-1937: IPO recommended denial of Cu Unjiengs application for probation.
Petition for probation heard before Judge Veras court. HSBC attacked
constitutionality of Act No. 4221 based on the following: equal protection
of the laws (its applicability is not uniform throughout the Islands); undue
delegation of legislative power (section 11 of the said Act endows provl
47

boards w/ power to make said law effective or otherwise in their respective


provinces). Judge Vera eventually promulgates resolution finding Cu Unjieng
innocent of the crime of which he stands convicted but denying the latters
petition for probation. Counsel for MCU files exception to the resolution
denying probation & notice of intention to file MFR. This was followed by a
series of alternative motions for new reconsideration or new trial. A motion
for leave to intervene in the case as amici curiae signed by 33 (34) attorneys
was also filed. (Attorney Eulalio Chaves, 1 of the 34, subsequently filed a
petition for leave to withdraw his appearance as amicus curiae on the ground
that the motion was circulated at a banquet given by counsel for MCU & that
he signed the same "without mature deliberation & purely as a matter of
courtesy.) HSBC filed opposition to motion for intervention. The Fiscal of the
City of Manila filed motion w/ TC for issuance of an order to execute
judgment of Phil SC in said case & to commit MCU to jail in obedience to said
judgment.
-19 August 1937: hearing on the various motions for CFIs consideration. On
this same date, this instant case was field before Phil SC to put an end to
what they alleged was an interminable proceeding in CFI Mnla.
- Note Probation implies guilt by final judgment. While a probation case
may look into the circumstances attending the commission of the offense,
this does not authorize it to reverse the findings and conclusive of this court,
either directly or indirectly, especially wherefrom its own admission reliance
was merely had on the printed briefs, averments, and pleadings of the
parties. If each and every Court of First Instance could enjoy the privilege of
overruling decisions of the Supreme Court, there would be no end to
litigation, and judicial chaos would result. <emphasis on the hierarchy in
the Philippine judicial system>
ISSUE
NOTE: There were many issues in this case regarding the constitutionality of
Act No. 4221 but for purposes of Admininstative law, the focus of the digest
is the non delegation doctrine WON section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitute
Undue Delegation of Legislative Power, and is therefore unconstitutional and
void
HELD
YES. Section 11 constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation of
legislative authority to the provincial boards, therefore, unconstitutional and
void.
Reasoning. Under the Consti, govt powers are distributed among 3
coordinate and substantially independent organs: legislative, executive and
judicial. Each department derives its authority from the Constitution, the
highest expression of popular will. Each has exclusive cognizance of the
matters within its jurisdiction, supreme within its own sphere.
- The power to make laws (the legislative power) is vested in a bicameral
Legislature by the Jones Law (sec. 12) and in a unicameral National Assembly
48

by the Constitution (A6,s1). The Philippine Legislature or the National


Assembly may not escape its duties and responsibilities by delegating that
power to any other body or authority. Any attempt to abdicate the power is
unconstitutional and void, on the principle that potestas delegata non
delegare potest, an accepted corollary of the principle of separation of
powers.
- The rule, however, which forbids the delegation of legislative power is not
absolute and inflexible. It admits of exceptions like: (1) delegation of
legislative powers to local authorities; (2) to such agencies in US territories
as Congress may select; (3) to the people at large; and (4) to those whom
the Constitution itself delegates such legislative powers (e.g., the President).
The case before us does not fall under any of these exceptions.
- Test of Undue Delegation: to inquire whether the statute was complete
in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the legislature so that
nothing was left to the judgment of any other appointee or delegate of the
legislature. BUT to a certain extent matters of detail may be left to be filled
in by rules and regulations to be adopted or promulgated by executive
officers and administrative boards. As a rule, an act of the legislature is
incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite
standard by which the administrative officer or board may be guided in the
exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it.
- In the case at bar, the provincial boards of the various provinces are to
determine for themselves, whether the Probation Law shall apply to their
provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of the Probation Act
are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial
board does not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it has to
do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a
probation officer. The plain language of the Act is not susceptible of any
other interpretation.
- The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law,
which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring
an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in
pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid
objection can be made.
- It is true that laws may be made effective on certain contingencies, as by
proclamation of the executive or the adoption by the people of a particular
community. The legislature may delegate a power not legislative which it
may itself rightfully exercise. The power to ascertain facts is such a power
which may be delegated. There is nothing essentially legislative in
ascertaining the existence of facts or conditions as the basis of the taking
into effect of a law. That is a mental process common to all branches of the
government.
- The efficiency of an Act as a declaration of legislative will must, of course,
come from Congress, but the ascertainment of the contingency upon which
the Act shall take effect may be left to such agencies as it may designate.
The legislature, then may provide that a contingencies leaving to some other
49

person or body the power to determine when the specified contingencies has
arisen. In the case at bar, the various provincial boards are, in practical
effect, endowed with the power of suspending the operation of the Probation
Law in their respective provinces.
- While the legislature may suspend a law, or the execution or operation of a
law, a law may not be suspended as to certain individuals only, leaving the
law to be enjoyed by others. The suspension must be general, and cannot be
made for individual cases or for particular localities. Here the sovereign and
absolute power resides in the people; and the legislature can only exercise
what is delegated to them according to the constitution. It is manifestly
contrary to the first principles of civil liberty and natural justice, and to the
spirit of our constitution and laws, that any one citizen should enjoy
privileges and advantages which are denied to all others under like
circumstances; or that ant one should be subject to losses, damages, suits,
or actions from which all others under like circumstances are exempted.
- True, the legislature may enact laws for a particular locality different from
those applicable to other localities. But option laws thus sustained treat of
subjects purely local in character which should receive different treatment in
different localities placed under different circumstances. While we do not
deny the right of local self-government and the propriety of leaving matters
of purely local concern in the hands of local authorities or for the people of
small communities to pass upon, we believe that in matters of general of
general legislation like that which treats of criminals in general, and as
regards the general subject of probation, discretion may not be vested in a
manner so unqualified and absolute as provided in Act No. 4221. The validity
of a law is not tested by what has been done but by what may be done under
its provisions.
- A great deal of latitude should be granted to the legislature not only in the
expression of what may be termed legislative policy but in the elaboration
and execution thereof. "Without this power, legislation would become
oppressive and yet imbecile." The mass of powers of government is vested in
the representatives of the people and that these representatives are no
further restrained under our system than by the express language of the
instrument imposing the restraint, or by particular provisions which by clear
intendment, have that effect. (Angara case)
Decision WHEREFORE, Act No. 4221 is hereby declared unconstitutional
and void and the writ of prohibition is, accordingly, granted. Without any
pronouncement regarding costs. So ordered.
PELAEZ v AUDITOR GENERAL
G.R. L-23285
CONCEPCION; December 24, 1965
NATURE
Special civil action (for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction)
50

against the Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as his representatives


and agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in
implementation of contested EOs
FACTS
- Emmanuel Pelaez, in his capacity as Vice President and as a taxpayer
instituted this civil action alleging validity of EO Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126
to 129. These executive orders created 33 municipalities, and were issued by
the President in virtue of Sec. 68 of the Revised Admin Code.
- Pelaez alleged that such are null and void, since Sec. 68 has been impliedly
repealed by RA 2370 and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative
power.
Sec 3 of RA 2370 provides that barrios may "not be created or their
boundaries altered nor their names changed" except by Act of Congress or of
the corresponding provincial board "upon petition of a majority of the voters
in the areas affected" and the "recommendation of the council of the
municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated."
- Petitioner argues, accordingly: "If the President, under this new law, cannot
even create a barrio, can he create a municipality which is composed of
several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?"
- Auditor General answered that this can be done, upon the theory that a
new municipality can be created without creating new barrios, such as, by
placing old barrios under the jurisdiction of the new municipality.
ISSUE/S
1. WON the power of the President to create municipalities under Sec. 68 2 of
the Revised Admin Code amounts to an undue delegation of legislative
power
2. WON Sec. 68 is deemed repealed
HELD
1.YES
Ratio The authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative
in nature. In the language of other courts, it is "strictly a legislative function"
or solely and exclusively the exercise of legislative power." Although
Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to
fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it
is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers,
The (Governor-General) President of the Philippines may by executive order define the boundary, or boundaries, of any province,
subprovince, municipality, [township] municipal district, or other political subdivision, and increase or diminish the territory comprised therein,
may divide any province into one or more subprovinces, separate any political division other than a province, into such portions as may be
required, merge any of such subdivisions or portions with another, name any new subdivision so created, and may change the seat of
government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require: Provided, That the authorization of the (Philippine
Legislature) Congress of the Philippines shall first be obtained whenever the boundary of any province or subprovince is to be defined or any
province is to be divided into one or more subprovinces. When action by the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines in accordance
herewith makes necessary a change of the territory under the jurisdiction of any administrative officer or any judicial officer, the (GovernorGeneral) President of the Philippines, with the recommendation and advice of the head of the Department having executive control of such
officer, shall redistrict the territory of the several officers affected and assign such officers to the new districts so formed.
2

51

that said law: (a) be complete in itself - it must set forth therein the policy
to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate and (b) fix a
standard - the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable
to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.
Reasoning Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet
these well settled requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the
details in the enforcement of a law.
- "Public welfare" and "public interest," are sufficient standards for a valid
delegation of the authority to execute the law. But, the doctrine laid down in
Calalang v Williams must be construed in relation to the specific facts and
issues involved - grants to administrative officers of powers related to the
exercise of their administrative functions, calling for the determination of
questions of fact. Such is not the nature of the powers dealt with in section
68. The question of whether or not "public interest" demands the exercise of
such power is not one of fact. it is "purely a legislative question " or a
political question.
NON-DELEGATION DOCTRINE
- If the validity of the delegation of powers made in Section 68 were upheld,
there would no longer be any legal impediment to a statutory grant of
authority to the President to do anything which, in his opinion, may be
required by public welfare or public interest. Such grant of authority would be
a virtual abdication of the powers of Congress in favor of the Executive.
- Section 10 (1) of Article VII of our fundamental law ordains: The President
shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices,
exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided
by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed. The power of
control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in
the exercise of such discretion BUT this power is denied by the Constitution
to the Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned. The President
cannot interfere with local governments, so long as the same or its officers
act within the scope of their authority. Manifestly, such control does not
include the authority either to abolish an executive department or bureau, or
to create a new one.
2. YES
Reasoning Even if it did entail an undue delegation of legislative powers, as
it certainly does, said Sec 68, as part of the Revised Administrative Code,
approved on March 10, 1917, must be deemed repealed by the subsequent
adoption of the Constitution, in 1935, which is utterly incompatible and
inconsistent with said statutory enactment.
Disposition The Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and
void ab initio and the respondent (Auditor General) permanently restrained
from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of
said Executive Orders or any disbursement by the municipalities above
referred to.
BENGZON [concur & dissent]
52

- The issue is whether the legislature can validly delegate to the Executive
such power. The power to create a municipality is legislative in character.
American authorities have therefore favored the view that it cannot be
delegated; that what is delegable is not the power to create municipalities
but only the power to determine the existence of facts under which creation
of a municipality will result.
- The test is said to lie in whether the statute allows any discretion on the
delegate as to whether the municipal corporation should be created. If so,
there is an attempted delegation of legislative power and the statute is
invalid. Now Section 68 no doubt gives the President such discretion, since it
says that the President "may by executive order" exercise the powers therein
granted.
EDU v ERICTA
35 SCRA 481
FERNANDO; October 24, 1970
NATURE
Petition for certiorari and prohibition
FACTS
-Galo, on his behalf and that of other motorists, filed on May 20, 1970 a suit
for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction assailing the validity
of the Reflector Law as an invalid exercise of the police power, for being
violative of the due process clause.
-This he followed on May 28, 1970 with a manifestation wherein he sought as
an alternative remedy that, in the event that respondent Judge would hold
said statute constitutional, Administrative Order No. 2 of the Land
Transportation Commissioner, implementing such legislation be nullified as
an undue exercise of legislative power.
-On May 28, 1970, respondent Judge ordered the issuance of a preliminary
injunction directed against the enforcement of such administrative order.
-SolGen filed MFR
-On June 9, 1970, respondent Judge denied the motion for reconsideration of
the order of injunction, hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition
ISSUE
WON Admninstrative Order No. 2 is invalid for being contrary to the principle
of non-delegation of legislative power.
HELD
No.
-It is not to be lost sight of that under Republic Act No. 4136, of which the
Reflector Law is an amendment, petitioner, as the Land Transportation
Commissioner, may, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
53

Communications, issue rules and regulations for its implementation as long


as they do not conflict with its provisions
-It is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine of separation
of powers that Congress may not delegate its legislative power to
the two other branches of the government, subject to the exception
that local governments may over local affairs participate in its
exercise.
-What cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution
to make laws and to alter and repeal them; the test is the
completeness of the statute in all its term and provisions when it
leaves the hands of the legislature.
-To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative
power the inquiry must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the
measure enacted. The legislature does not abdicate its functions when it
describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his
authority.
-A distinction has rightfully been made between delegation of power
to make the laws which necessarily involves a discretion as to what
it shall be, which constitutionally may not be done, and delegation
of authority or discretion as to its execution to exercised under and
in pursuance of the law, to which no valid objection call be made.
-The Constitution is thus not to be regarded as denying the legislature the
necessary resources of flexibility and practicability.
-To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which
implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of
principle and lay down fundamental policy. A standard thus defines
legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and
specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the
circumstances under which the legislative command is to be
effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be
carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated
may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules
and regulations.
-The standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the nondelegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be
spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the
act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly the legislative
objective is public safety.
-Justice Laurel: The principle of non-delegation "has been made to
adapt itself the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to
the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of "subordinate
legislation" not only in the United States and England but in practically all
modern governments. Accordingly, with the growing complexity of
modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental
regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws,
there is a constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of
54

greater powers by the legislature and toward the approval of the


practice by the courts."
-Justice J. B. L. Reyes in People vs. Exconde: "It is well establish in this
jurisdiction that, while the making of laws is a non-delegable activity
that corresponds exclusively to Congress, nevertheless the latter
may constitutionally delegate authority to promulgate rules and
regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its
policies, for the reason that the legislature often finds it
impracticable (if not impossible) to anticipate and proved for the
multifarious and complex situations that may be met in carrying the
law in effect. All that is required is that the regulation should
germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation
be not in contradiction with it; but conform to the standards that
the law prescribes ... "
-Chief Justice, Concepcion: "It is one thing is to delegate the power to
determine what the law shall be, and another thing to delegate the
authority to fix the details in the execution of enforcement of a
policy set out in the law itself. Briefly stated, the rule is that the
delegated powers fall under the second category, if the law authorizing the,
delegation furnishes a reasonable standard which "sufficiently marks the
field within which the Administrator is to act so that it may be known
whether he has kept within it in compliance with the legislative will."
-The Reflector Law, construed together with the Land Transportation Code,
Republic Act No. 4136, of which it is an amendment, leaves no doubt as to
the stress and emphasis on public safety which is the prime consideration in
statutes of this character. There is likewise a categorical affirmation of the
power of petitioner as Land Transportation Commissioner to promulgate rules
and regulations to give life to and translate into actuality such fundamental
purpose. His power is clear. There has been no abuse. His Administrative
Order No. 2 can easily survive the attack, far-from-formidable, launched
against it by respondent Galo.
Disposition Petition is granted. The constitutionality of the Reflector Law
and the validity of Administrative Order No. 2 issued in the implementation
thereof are sustained.
AGUSTIN v EDU
88 SCRA 195
FERNANDO; Feb. 2, 1979
NATURE
Petition for prohibition
FACTS
55

-Letter of Instruction No. 229 (1974) as amended by Letter of Instruction No.


479 (1976) required every motor vehicle owner to procure and use one pair
of a reflectorized triangular early warning device whenever any vehicle is
stalled or disabled or is parked for thirty (30) minutes or more on any street,
or highway, including expressways or limited access roads.
-The implementing rules and regulations prepared by the respondent Land
Transportation Commissioner on December 10, 1976 were not enforced as
President Marcos, on January 25, 1977, ordered a six-month period of
suspension insofar as the installation of early warning device (EWD) as a preregistration requirement for motor vehicles was concerned. Letter of
Instruction No. 716, issued on June 30, 1978 lifted such suspension and in
pursuance thereof, the rules and regulations prepared by respondent
Commission were approved for immediate implementation by respondent
Minister of Public Works and Communication.
-Petitioner came to court alleging that Letter of Instruction 229, as amended,
clearly violates the provisions of the New Constitution on due process, equal
protection and delegation of police power. That it is oppressive,
unreasonable, arbitrary, confiscatory and contrary to the precepts of our
compassionate New Society.
-The respondents' Answer demonstrated that the assailed Letter of
Instruction was a valid exercise of the police power; that the implementing
rules and regulations of respondent Land Transportation Commissioner do
not constitute unlawful delegation of legislative power and that the hazards
posed by such obstructions to traffic have been recognized by international
bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road
Signs and Signals of which Philippines was a signatory and which was duly
ratified and the United Nations Organization.
ISSUE
1.
WON the implementing rules and regulations of respondent Land
Transportation Commissioner constitute unlawful delegation of legislative
power
HELD
1.
NO.
Reasoning The Court dismissed the petition for prohibition ruling that the
Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise of the State's
police power intended to promote public safety; that there has been no
undue delegation of legislative power as a standard has been set; and that
the country cannot repudiate its commitment to international bodies and the
accepted principles of international law. The petition itself quoted these two
whereas clauses of the assailed Letter of Instruction: "[Whereas], the hazards
posed by such obstructions to traffic have been recognized by international
bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road
Signs and Signals and the United Nations Organization (U.N.); [Whereas], the
said Vienna Convention, which was ratified by the Philippine Government
56

under P.D. No. 207, recommended the enactment of local legislation for the
installation of road safety signs and devices; . . ." It cannot be disputed then
that this Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution possesses
relevance: "The Philippines . . . adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land, . . ." The 1968 Vienna
Convention on Road Signs and Signals is impressed with such a character. It
is not for this country to repudiate a commitment to which it had pledged its
word. The concept of Pacta sunt servanda stands in the way of such an
attitude, which is, moreover, at war with the principle of international
morality.
Disposition Petition DISMISSED
FREE TELEPHONE WORKERS UNION v MINISTER OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT
108 SCRA 757
FERNANDO; Feb. 2, 1979
NATURE
Petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court
FACTS
-Petitioner filed with the Ministry of Labor a notice of strike for unfair labor
practices allegedly committed by private respondent company inviolation of
their existing collective bargaining agreement, particularly the unilateral and
arbitrary implementation of a Code of Conduct to the detriment and interest
of its members.
-Several conciliation meetings called by the Ministry followed. Thereafter, the
Ministry of Labor pursuant to law, certified the labor dispute to the NLRC for
compulsory arbitration and the holding of any strike at private respondent
establishment was enjoined. Hearing was subsequently conducted whereas
private respondent agreed to the indefinite preventive suspension of the
provisions of the Code of Conduct, the principal cause of the controversy.
-In a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court, petitioner union
submits that Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 insofar as it amends Article 264 of the
Labor Code delegating to the Minister of Labor the power and discretion to
assume jurisdiction and/or certify strikes for compulsory arbitration to the
NLRC, and in effect make or unmake the law on free collective bargaining, is
an undue delegation of legislative powers and is contrary to the assurance of
the State to the workers' right to self organization and collective bargaining.
Such power, according to petitioner union, is within the competence of the
President who can best determine national interests when a strike is in
progress.
ISSUE
57

2.
WON Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 insofar as it amends Article 264 of the
Labor Code delegating to the Minister of Labor the power and discretion to
assume jurisdiction and/or certify strikes for compulsory arbitration to the
NLRC, and in effect make or unmake the law on free collective bargaining,
is an undue delegation of legislative powers and hence unconstitutional
HELD
2.
NO.
Reasoning the unconstitutional of the act has not been demonstrated and
that any ruling on the question of unconstitutional application would be
premature in the absence of factual determination by the Ministry of Labor
and the NLRC. Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 insofar as it empowers the Minister
of Labor to assume jurisdiction over labor disputes causing or likely to cause
strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the national interest and thereafter
decide it or certify the same to the NLRC is not on its face unconstitutional
for being violative of the doctrine of non-delegation of legislative power. It
stressed further that compulsory arbitration must be exercised in accordance
with the constitutional mandate of protection to labor. To repeat, there is no
ruling on the question of whether or not it has been unconstitutionally
applied in this case, for being repugnant to the regime of self-organization
and free collective bargaining, as on the facts alleged, disputed by private
respondent, the matter is not ripe for judicial determination. It must be
stressed anew, however, that the power of compulsory arbitration, while
allowable under the Constitution and quite understandable in labor disputes
affected with a national interest, to be free from the taint of
unconstitutionality, must be exercised in accordance with the constitutional
mandate of protection to labor.
Disposition Petition DISMISSED
PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CORPORATION v ALCUAZ
180 SCRA 218
REGALADO; Dec 18, 1989
NATURE
Petition to annul and set aside an Order issued by respondent Commissioner
Jose Luis Alcuaz of the National Telecommunications Commission
FACTS
By virtue of Republic Act No. 5514, PHILCOMSAT was granted "a franchise to
establish, construct, maintain and operate in the Philippines, at such places
as the grantee may select, station or stations and associated equipment and
facilities for international satellite communications." Under this franchise, it
was likewise granted the authority to "construct and operate such ground
facilities as needed to deliver telecommunications services from the
communications satellite system and ground terminal or terminals."
58

Pursuant to said franchise, petitioner puts on record that it undertook the


certain activities and established the various installations:
By designation of the Republic of the Philippines, the petitioner is also the
sole signatory for the Philippines in the Agreement and the Operating
Agreement relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite
Organization (INTELSAT) of 115 member nations, as well as in the Convention
and the Operating Agreement of the International Maritime Satellite
Organization (INMARSAT) of 53 member nations, which two global
commercial telecommunications satellite corporations were collectively
established by various states in line with the principles set forth in Resolution
1721 (XVI) of the General Assembly of the United Nations.
Since 1968, the petitioner has been leasing its satellite circuits to:1.
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company; 2. Philippine Global
Communications, Inc.; 3. Eastern Telecommunications Phils., Inc.; 4. Globe
Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. ITT; and 5. Capitol Wireless, Inc.
or their predecessors-in-interest. The satellite services thus provided by
petitioner enable said international carriers to serve the public with
indispensable communication services, such as overseas telephone, telex,
facsimile, telegrams, high speed data, live television in full color, and
television standard conversion from European to American or vice versa.
Under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5514, petitioner was exempt from the
jurisdiction of the then Public Service Commission, now respondent NTC.
However, pursuant to Executive Order No. 196 issued on June 17, 1987,
petitioner was placed under the jurisdiction, control and regulation of
respondent NTC, including all its facilities and services and the fixing of rates.
Implementing said Executive Order No. 196, respondents required petitioner
to apply for the requisite certificate of public convenience and necessity
covering its facilities and the services it renders, as well as the corresponding
authority to charge rates therefor.
Consequently, under date of September 9, 1987, petitioner filed with
respondent NTC an application for authority to continue operating and
maintaining the same facilities it has been continuously operating and
maintaining since 1967, to continue providing the international satellite
communications services it has likewise been providing since 1967, and to
charge the current rates applied for in rendering such services. Pending
hearing, it also applied for a provisional authority so that it can continue to
operate and maintain the above mentioned facilities, provide the services
and charge therefor the aforesaid rates therein applied for.
On September 16, 1987, petitioner was granted a provisional authority to
continue operating its existing facilities, to render the services it was then
offering, and to charge the rates it was then charging. This authority was
valid for six (6) months from the date of said order. When said provisional
59

authority expired on March 17, 1988, it was extended for another six (6)
months, or up to September 16, 1988.
The NTC order now in controversy had further extended the provisional
authority of the petitioner for another six (6) months, counted from
September 16, 1988, but it directed the petitioner to charge modified
reduced rates through a reduction of fifteen percent (15%) on the present
authorized rates.
PHILCOMSAT argues that the enabling act (Executive Order No. 546) of
respondent NTC empowering it to fix rates for public service communications
does not provide the necessary standards constitutionally required, hence
there is an undue delegation of legislative power, particularly the
adjudicatory powers of NTC.
ISSUE
WON Executive Orders Nos. 546 and 196 are unconstitutional on the ground
that the same do not fix a standard for the exercise of the power therein
conferred.
HELD
NO. Fundamental is the rule that delegation of legislative power may be
sustained only upon the ground that some standard for its exercise is
provided and that the legislature in making the delegation has prescribed the
manner of the exercise of the delegated power. Therefore, when the
administrative agency concerned, respondent NTC in this case, establishes a
rate, its act must both be non- confiscatory and must have been established
in the manner prescribed by the legislature; otherwise, in the absence of a
fixed standard, the delegation of power becomes unconstitutional. In case of
a delegation of rate-fixing power, the only standard which the legislature is
required to prescribe for the guidance of the administrative authority is that
the rate be reasonable and just. However, it has been held that even in the
absence of an express requirement as to reasonableness, this standard may
be implied.
It becomes important then to ascertain the nature of the power delegated to
respondent NTC and the manner required by the statute for the lawful
exercise thereof.
Pursuant to Executive Orders Nos. 546 and 196, respondent NTC is
empowered,among others, to determine and prescribe rates pertinent to the
operation of public service communications which necessarily include the
power to promulgate rules and regulations in connection therewith. And,
under Section 15(g) of Executive Order No. 546, respondent NTC should be
guided by the requirements of public safety, public interest and reasonable
feasibility of maintaining effective competition of private entities in
communications and broadcasting facilities. Likewise, in Section 6(d) thereof,
which provides for the creation of the Ministry of Transportation and
Communications with control and supervision over respondent NTC, it is
60

specifically provided that the national economic viability of the entire


network or components of the communications systems contemplated
therein should be maintained at reasonable rates.
We need not go into an in-depth analysis of the pertinent provisions of the
law in order to conclude that respondent NTC, in the exercise of its rate-fixing
power, is limited by the requirements of public safety, public interest,
reasonable feasibility and reasonable rates, which conjointly more than
satisfy the requirements of a valid delegation of legislative power.
Dispositive Petition granted
CHIONGBIAN v ORBOS
245 SCRA 253
MENDOZA; June 22, 1995
NATURE: PROHIBITION AND CERTIORARI
Facts:
- These suits challenge the validity of a provision of the Organic Act for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (or R.A. No. 6734 which was passed
pursuant to Art. X, Sec 18 of the 1987 Constitution), authorizing the
President of the Philippines to "merge" by administrative determination the
regions remaining after the establishment of the AR, and the EO No. 429
issued by the President pursuant to such authority, "Providing for the
Reorganization of Administrative Regions in Mindanao."
- Pursuant to Art. XIX, Sec 13 of R.A. No. 6734(which provides for the
authority of merging upon administrative determination the other regions),
Pres. Aquino issued the questioned EO No. 429 joining provinces from other
regions to another region (eg. Misamis Occidental, wast part of Region X,
became part of Region IX etc.)
- Herein petitioners in the first case, wrote then President Aquino protesting
E.O. No. 429.
- They contended that the transfer of the provinces of Misamis Occidental
from Region X to Region IX etc are alterations of the existing structures of
governmental units, in other words, reorganization. And that her authority
necessarily includes the authority to merge, the authority to merge does not
include the authority to reorganize. Therefore, the President's authority
under RA 6734 to "merge existing regions" cannot be construed to include
the authority to reorganize them.
- Jaldon, a resident of Zamboanga City, who is suing in the capacity of
taxpayer also contends that Art. XIX, Sec. 13 of R.A. No. 6734 is
unconstitutional because (1) it unduly delegates legislative power to the
President by authorizing him to "merge [by administrative determination] the
existing regions" or at any rate provides no standard for the exercise of the
power delegated and (2) the power granted is not expressed in the title of
the law.
61

- SOLGEN: the exercise of a power "traditionally lodged in the President," as


held in Abbas v. Comelec, and as a mere incident of his power of general
supervision over local governments and control of executive departments,
bureaus and offices under Art. X Sec 16 and Art. VII Sec 17 of the
Constitution.
- He contends that there is no undue delegation of legislative power but only
a grant of the power to "fill up" or provide the details of legislation because
Congress did not have the facility to provide for them.
- Also, he justifies the grant to the President of the power "to merge the
existing regions" as something fairly embraced in the title of R.A. No. 6734,
to wit, "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao," because it is germane to it.
- He argues that the power is not limited to the merger of those regions in
which the provinces and cities which took part in the plebiscite are located
but that it extends to all regions in Mindanao as necessitated by the
establishment of the autonomous region.
Issues:
1. WON the merging of admin regions is an administrative matter
2. WON Congress has provided a sufficient standard by which the President is
to be guided in the exercise of the power granted and
3. WON the grant of power to him is included in the subject expressed in the
title of the law.
4. WON the power granted to the President is limited to the reorganization of
administrative regions in which some of the provinces and cities which voted
in favor of regional autonomy are found pursuant to Art. 13 Sec 13
HELD:
1. YES. The power conferred on the President to MERGE Admin
Regions is similar to the power to adjust municipal boundaries
which has been described in Pelaez v. Auditor General or as
"administrative in nature." (while the CREATION of municipalities is
purely a legislative matter.)
2. YES. The standard is to be found in the same policy underlying the grant
to the President in R.A. No. 5435.
- A legislative standard need not be expressed. It may simply be gathered or
implied. Nor need it be found in the law challenged because it may be
embodied in other statutes on the same subject as that of the challenged
legislation.
- Nature of administrative regions and the basis and purpose for their
creation:
* Basis: R.A. No. 5435 granted authority to the Pres, with the help of a
Commission on Reorganization, to reorganize the different executive
departments, bureaus, offices, etc.
62

* The law provided that any reorganization plan submitted would


become effective only upon the approval of Congress.
* Purpose was to promote "simplicity, economy and efficiency in the
government."
- The choice of the President as delegate is logical because the division of
the country into regions is intended to facilitate not only the administration
of local governments but also the direction of executive departments which
the law requires should have regional offices.
- Abbas v. COMELEC: "while the power to merge administrative regions is not
expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a power which has
traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the
power of general supervision over local governments [see Art. X, Sec 4 of
the Constitution]." The regions themselves are not territorial and political
divisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays but are "mere
groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes."
- There is, therefore, no abdication by Congress of its legislative power in
conferring on the President the power to merge administrative regions.
3. YES. It is a sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement if the
title expresses the general subject and all provisions of the statute are
germane to that subject. Certainly the reorganization of the remaining
administrative regions is germane to the general subject of R.A. No. 6734,
which is the establishment of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.
4. YES. The questioned EO No. 429 distorted and, in fact, contravened the
clear intent of this provision by moving out or transferring certain political
subdivisions (provinces/cities) out of their legally designated regions.
- Aggravating this unacceptable or untenable situation is EO No. 429's
effecting certain movements on areas which did not even participate in the
plebiscite.
- While Art. XIX, Sec 13 provides that "The provinces and cities which do not
vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing
administrative regions," this provision is subject to the qualification that "the
President may by administrative determination merge the existing regions."
- This means that while non-assenting provinces and cities are to remain in
the regions as designated upon the creation of the Autonomous Region, they
may nevertheless be regrouped with contiguous provinces forming other
regions as the exigency of administration may require.
- The regrouping is done only on paper. It involves no more than are
definition or redrawing of the lines separating administrative regions for the
purpose of facilitating the administrative supervision of local government
units by the President and insuring the efficient delivery of essential services.
- There will be no "transfer" of local governments from one region to another
except as they may thus be regrouped so that a province like Lanao del
Norte, which is at present part of Region XII, will become part of Region IX.
63

- The regrouping of contiguous provinces is not even analogous to a


redistricting or to the division or merger of local governments, which all have
political consequences on the right of people residing in those political units
to vote and to be voted for. It cannot be overemphasized that
administrative regions are mere groupings of contiguous provinces
for administrative purposes, not for political representation.
- To be fundamental reason Art. XIX, Sec 13 is not so limited. But the more
fundamental reason is that the President's power cannot be so limited
without neglecting the necessities of administration.
- E.O. No. 429 is based on relevant criteria, to wit: (1) contiguity and
geographical features; (2) transportation and communication facilities; (3)
cultural and language groupings; (4) land area and population; (5) existing
regional centers adopted by several agencies; (6) socio-economic
development programs in the regions and (7) number of provinces and cities.
Dispositive: The petitions for certiorari and prohibition are DISMISSED for
lack of merit.
SANTIAGO v COMELEC
DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997
FACTS:
In 1996, Atty. Jesus Delfin filed with COMELEC a petition to
amendConstitution, to lift term limits of elective officials, by peoples
initiative. Delfin wanted COMELEC to control and supervise said peoples
initiative the signature-gathering all over the country. The proposition is: Do
you approve of lifting the term limits of all elective government officials,
amending for the purpose Sections 4 ) and 7 of Article VI, Section 4 of Article
VII, and Section 8 of Article 8 of Article X of the 1987
Philippine Constitution? Said Petition for Initiative will first be submitted to
the people, and after it is signed by at least 12% total number of registered
voters in the country, it will be formally filed with the COMELEC.
COMELEC in turn ordered Delfin for publication of the petition. Petitioners
Sen. Roco et al moved for dismissal of the Delfin Petition on the ground that
it is not the initiatory petition properly cognizable by the COMELEC.
a. Constitutional provision on peoples initiative to amend the
Constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No
such law has been passed.b.Republic Act No. 6735 provides for 3 systems on
initiative but failed to provide anysubtitle on initiative on the Constitution,
unlike in the other modes of initiative. This deliberate omission indicates
matter of peoples initiative was left to some future law.c. COMELEC has no
power to provide rules and regulations for the exercise of peoples initiative.
Only Congress is authorized by the Constitution to pass the implementing
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law.d. Peoples initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to


revision thereof. Extending or lifting of term limits constitutes a
revision.e.Congress nor any government agency has not yet appropriated
funds for peoples initiative.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the people can directly propose amendments to the
Constitution through the system of initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of
the 1987 Constitution.
HELD:
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6735
It was intended to include or cover peoples initiative onamendments to the
Constitution but, as worded, it does not adequately cover such intiative.
Article XVII Section 2 of the 1987Constitution providing
for amendments to Constitution, is not self-executory. While the
Constitution has recognized or granted the right of the people to directly
propose amendments to the Constitution via PI, the people cannot exercise it
if Congress, for whatever reason, does not provide for its implementation.
FIRST: Contrary to the assertion of COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not
suggest an initiative on amendments to the Constitution. The inclusion of the
word Constitution therein was a delayed afterthought. The word is not
relevant to the section which is silent as to amendments of the Constitution.
SECOND: Unlike in the case of the other systems of initiative, the Act does
not provide for the contents of a petition for initiative onthe Constitution. Sec
5(c) does not include the provisions of the Constitution sought to be
amended, in the case of initiative on the Constitution.
THIRD: No subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This
conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of the
Act is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. The argument
that the initiative on amendments to the Constitution is not accepted to be
subsumed under the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum because
it is national in scope. Under Subtitle II and III, the classification is not based
on the scope of the initiative involved, but on its nature and character.
National initiative what is proposed to be enacted is a national law, or a law
which only Congress can pass.
Local initiative what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a law,
ordinance or resolution which only legislative bodies of the governments of
the autonomous regions, provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays can
pass.
Potestas delegata non delegari potest

65

What has been delegated, cannot be delegated. The recognized exceptions


to the rule are: [1] Delegation of tariff powers to the President; [2] Delegation
of emergency powers to the President; [3] Delegation to the people at large;
[4] Delegation to local governments; and [5] Delegation to administrative
bodies.
COMELEC
Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi judicial
functions, to promulgate rules and regulations is a form of delegation of
legislative authority. In every case of permissible delegation, there must be a
showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is
complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried
out, or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard the limits of
which are sufficiently determinate and determinable to which the delegate
must conform in the performance of his functions. Republic Act No. 6735
failed to satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation. The delegation
of the power to the COMELEC is then invalid.
COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300
Insofar as it prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative
on amendments to the Constitution is void. COMELEC cannot validly
promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right of
the people to directly propose amendmentsto the Constitution through the
system of initiative. It does not have that power under Republic Act No. 6735.
Whether the COMELEC can take cognizance of, or has jurisdiction over, a
petition solely intended to obtain an order: (a) fixing the time and dates for
signature gathering; (b) instructing municipal election officers to assist
Delfins movement and volunteers in establishing signature stations; and (c)
directing or causing the publication of the unsigned proposed Petition for
Initiative on the 1987 Constitution.
DELFIN PETITION
COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN ENTERTAINING THE DELFIN PETITION. Even if it be conceded
ex gratia that RA 6735 is a full compliance with the power of Congress to
implement the right to initiate constitutionalamendments, or that it has
validly vested upon the COMELEC the power of subordinate legislation and
that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid, the COMELEC acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the Delfin
Petition.
The Delfin Petition does not contain signatures of the required number of
voters. Without the required signatures, the petition cannot be deemed
66

validly initiated. The COMELEC requires jurisdiction over a petition for


initiative only after its filing. The petition then is the initiatory pleading.
Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en banc.
Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under RA6735 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or given cognizance
of by the COMELEC. The petition was merely entered as UND, meaning
undocketed. It was nothing more than a mere scrap of paper, which should
not have been dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on 12
December 1996, and the order directing Delfin and the oppositors to file their
memoranda to file their memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the
COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and
merely wasted its time, energy, and resources.
Therefore, Republic Act No. 6735 did not apply to constitutionalamendment.
PANAMA REFINING CO v RYAN
293 U.S. 388
HUGHES; January 7, 1935
FACTS
- EO 6199, which prohibited the transportation in interstate and foreign
commerce of petroleum and the products produced or withdrawn from
storage in excess of the amount permitted to be produced or withdrawn from
storage by any State law or valid regulation or order prescribed by any
board, commission, officer, or other duly authorized agency of a State, was
enacted, pursuant to sec 9(c) of title 1 of the National Industrial Recovery Act
of June 16, 193, which states that 'The President is authorized to prohibit
the transportation in interstate and foreign commerce of petroleum and the
products thereof produced or withdrawn from storage in excess of the
amount permitted to be produced or withdrawn from storage by any State
law or valid regulation or order prescribed by any board, commission, officer,
or other duly authorized agency of a State. Any violation of any order of the
Pres issued under the provisions of this subsection shall be punishable by
fine of not to exceed $1k, or imprisonment for not to exceed 6 months, or
both.
- EO 6204, based on sec 10(a) of the NIRA, authorizing the Pres 'to prescribe
such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes' of
title 1 and providing that 'any violation of any such rule or regulation shall be
punishable by fine of not to exceed $500, or imprisonment for not to exceed
6 months, or both,' authorized the Sec of the Interior to exercise all the
powers vested in the Pres for the purpose of enforcing Sec 9(c), including full
authority to designate and appoint such agents and to set up such boards
and agencies as he may see fit, and to promulgate such rules and
regulations as he may deem necessary.
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- Sec of Interior issued the regulations which included the requirement for
every producer, purchaser or shipper of petroleum to file a monthly
statement under oath, giving information re: their residence and post office
address, and other information regarding the sale, purchase, production of
petroleum (Regulations IV, V and VII)
- EO 6256 approved Code of Fair Competition for the Petroleum Industry.
- Thru EO of August 28, 1933, the Pres designated the Sec of the Interior as
Administrator, and the Dept of the Interior as the federal agency, to exercise
on his behalf all the powers vested in him under that act and code. Sec 3(f),
title 1 of the NIRA, provides that, when a code of fair competition has been
approved or prescribed by the Pres under that title, 'any violation of any
provision in any transaction in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce
shall be a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof an offender shall be
fined not more than $500 for each offense, and each day such violation
continues shall be deemed a separate offense.'
- By EO No. 6284-a, the 2nd par of sec 4 of art III 3 was eliminated. It was
reinstated by EO 6855.
- Panama Refining Company, as owner of an oil refining plant in Texas, and
its coplaintiff, a producer having oil and gas leases in Texas, and Amazon
Petroleum Corporation and its coplaintiffs, all being oil producers in Texas
and owning separate properties, sued to restrain officials from enforcing the
laws promulgated by the Sec of Interior and questioned the constitutionality
of the EOs.
ISSUE
WON the EOs are constitutional
HELD
NO, because of unconstitutional delegation of legislative power
Ratio The Legislature, to prevent its being a pure delegation of legislative
power, must enjoin upon the agent a certain course of procedure and certain
rules of decision in the performance of its function.
Reasoning
- The Constitution has never been regarded as denying the Congress the
necessary resources of flexibility and practicality, which will enable it to
perform its function in laying down policies and establishing standards, while
leaving to selected instrumentalities the making of subordinate rules within
prescribed limits and the determination of facts to which the policy as
declared by the Legislature is to apply. But the constant recognition of the
necessity and validity of such provisions and the wide range of
administrative authority which has been developed by means of them cannot
3

'If any subdivision into quotas of production allocated to any State shall be made within a State any production by any person,
as person is defined in Article I, Section 3 of this code in excess of any such quota assigned to him, shall be deemed an unfair
trade practice and in violation of this code.'

68

be allowed to obscure the limitations of the authority to delegate, if our


constitutional system is to be maintained.
- Authorizations given by Congress to selected instrumentalities for the
purpose of ascertaining the existence of facts to which legislation is directed
have constantly been sustained. Moreover the Congress may not only give
such authorizations to determine specific facts, but may establish primary
standards, devolving upon others the duty to carry out the declared
legislative policy.
- Thus, in every case in which the question has been raised, the Court has
recognized that there are limits of delegation which there is no constitutional
authority to transcend. We think that section 9(c) goes beyond those limits.
As to the transportation of oil production in excess of state permission, the
Congress has declared no policy, has established no standard, has laid down
no rule. There is no requirement, no definition of circumstances and
conditions in which the transportation is to be allowed or prohibited.
- Section 9(c) is brief and unambiguous. It leaves to the states and to their
constituted authorities the determination of what production shall be
permitted. It does not qualify the President's authority by reference to the
basis or extent of the state's limitation of production. It does not state
whether or in what circumstances or under what conditions the President is
to prohibit the transportation of the amount of petroleum or petroleum
products produced in excess of the state's permission. It establishes no
creterion to govern the President's course. It does not require any finding by
the President as a condition of his action.The Congress in section 9(c) thus
declares no policy as to the transportation of the excess production. So far as
this section is concerned, it gives to the President an unlimited authority to
determine the policy and to lay down the prohibition, or not to lay it down, as
he may see fit. And disobedience to his order is made a crime punishable by
fine and imprisonment.
- The Congress left the matter to the President without standard or rule, to be
dealt with as he pleased. The effort by ingenious and diligent construction to
supply a criterion still permits such a breadth of authorized action as
essentially to commit to the President the functions of a Legislature rather
than those of an executive or administrative officer executing a declared
legislative policy. We find nothing in section 1 which limits or controls the
authority conferred by section 9(c).
- When the President is invested with legislative authority as the delegate of
Congress in carrying out a declared policy, he necessarily acts under the
constitutional restriction applicable to such a delegation.
Disposition EO Nos. 6199, 6204, and the regulations issued by the Sec of
the Interior, are without constitutional authority.
SEPARATE OPINION
CARDOZO [dissenting]
- To uphold the delegation there is need to discover in the terms of the act a
69

standard reasonably clear whereby discretion must be governed. Such a


standard is not lacking in respect of the prohibitions permitted by this section
when the act with all its reasonable implications is considered as a whole.
What the standard is becomes the pivotal inquiry.
- The Pres has choice, though within limits, as to the occasion, but none
whatever as to the means. The means have been prescribed by Congress.
There has been no grant to the Executive of any roving commission to
inquire into evils and then, upon discovering them, do anything he pleases. If
we look to the whole structure of the statute, the test is plainly this, that the
President is to forbid the transportation of the oil when he believes, in the
light of the conditions of the industry as disclosed from time to time, that the
prohibition will tend to effectuate the declared policies of the act-not merely
his own conception of its policies, undirected by any extrinsic guide, but the
policies announced by section 1.
- The President has the privilege of choice between one standard and
another. What he does is to inquire into the industrial facts as they exist from
time to time. These being ascertained, he is not to prefer one standard to
another in any subjective attitude of mind, in any personal or willful way. He
is to study the facts objectively, the violation of a standard impelling him to
action or inaction according to its observed effect upon industrial recoverythe ultimate end, as appears by the very heading of the title, to which all the
other ends are tributary and mediate.
- Congress was aware that for the recovery of national well-being there might
be need of temp restriction upon production in one industry or another.
When it clothed the Pres with power to impose such a restriction-to prohibit
the flow of oil illegally produced-it laid upon him a mandate to inquire and
determine whether the conditions in that particular industry were such at
any given time as to make restriction helpful to the declared objectives of
the act and to the ultimate attainment of industrial recovery.
- A reference, express or implied, to the policy of Congress, is a sufficient
definition of a standard to make the statute valid. Discretion is not
unconfined and vagrant. The separation of powers between the Executive
and Congress is not a doctrinaire concept to be made use of with pedantic
rigor. There must be sensible approximation, there must be elasticity of
adjustment, in response to the practical necessities of government, which
cannot foresee to-day the developments of tomorrow in their nearly infinite
variety.
- The President was not required either by the Constitution or by any statute
to state the reasons that had induced him to exercise the granted power. It is
enough that the grant of power had been made and that pursuant to that
grant he had signified the will to act.
- The President, when acting in the exercise of a delegated power, is not a
quasi judicial officer, whose rulings are subject to review upon certiorari or
appeal, or an administrative agency supervised in the same way. Officers and
bodies such as those may be required by reviewing courts to express their
decision in formal and explicit findings to the end that review may be
70

intelligent. Such is not the position or duty of the President. He is the Chief
Executive of the nation, exercising a power committed to him by Congress,
and subject, in respect of the formal qualities of his acts, to the restrictions, if
any, accompanying the grant, but not to any others.
ABAKADA GURO v EXEC. SEC. ERMITA
GR No. 168207
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ; September 1, 2005
NATURE
Petitions for certiorari and prohibition
FACTS
- On May 24, 2005, the President signed into law Republic Act 9337 or the
VAT Reform Act. Before the law was to take effect on July 1, 2005, the Court
issued a temporary restraining order enjoining government from
implementing the law in response to a slew of petitions for certiorari and
prohibition questioning the constitutionality of the new law.
- NON-DELEGATION ISSUE: The new law in its Sections 4, 5 and 6 granted the
Secretary of Finance the authority to ascertain whether by December 31,
2005, the VAT collection as a percentage of GDP of the previous year
exceeds 2 and 4/5% or the national government deficit as a percentage of
GDP of the previous year exceeds 1 and 1/2%. If either of these two
instances has occurred, the Secretary of Finance, must submit such
information to the President. Then the 12% VAT rate must be imposed by the
President effective January 1, 2006.
ISSUE
WON the RA 9337's stand-by authority to the Executive to increase the VAT
rate, especially on account of the recommendatory power granted to the
Secretary of Finance, constitutes undue delegation of legislative power
HELD
NO.
Ratio Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power
when it describes what job must be done, who must do it, and what is the
scope of his authority; in our complex economy that is frequently the only
way in which the legislative process can go forward.
Reasoning The case before the Court is not a delegation of legislative
power. It is simply a delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which
enforcement and administration of the increased rate under the law is
contingent. The legislature has made the operation of the 12% rate effective
January 1, 2006, contingent upon a specified fact or condition. It leaves the
entire operation or non-operation of the 12% rate upon factual matters
outside of the control of the executive. No discretion would be exercised by
71

the President. Highlighting the absence of discretion is the fact that the word
shall is used in the common proviso. The use of the word shall connote a
mandatory order. Its use in a statute denotes an imperative obligation and is
inconsistent with the idea of discretion.
- Thus, it is the ministerial duty of the President to immediately impose the
12% rate upon the existence of any of the conditions specified by Congress.
This is a duty, which cannot be evaded by the President. It is a clear directive
to impose the 12% VAT rate when the specified conditions are present.
- In making his recommendation to the President on the existence of either of
the two conditions, the Secretary of Finance is not acting as the alter ego of
the President or even her subordinate. He is acting as the agent of the
legislative department, to determine and declare the event upon which its
expressed will is to take effect. The Secretary of Finance becomes the means
or tool by which legislative policy is determined and implemented,
considering that he possesses all the facilities to gather data and information
and has a much broader perspective to properly evaluate them. His function
is to gather and collate statistical data and other pertinent information and
verify if any of the two conditions laid out by Congress is present.
- There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion
as to the execution of a law. This is constitutionally permissible. Congress did
not delegate the power to tax but the mere implementation of the law. The
intent and will to increase the VAT rate to 12% came from Congress and the
task of the President is to simply execute the legislative policy.
Disposition Petition is DENIED.
REVIEW CENTER ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA and COMMISSION ON
HIGHER EDUCATION represented by its Chairman ROMULO L. NERI,
Respondents.
CPA REVIEW SCHOOL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (CPAR), PROFESSIONAL
REVIEW AND TRAINING CENTER, INC. (PRTC), ReSA REVIEW SCHOOL, INC.
(ReSA), CRC-ACE REVIEW SCHOOL, INC. (CRC-ACE)Petitioners-Intervenors.
PIMSAT COLLEGES, Respondent-Intervenor.
Carpio, 2009
Facts:
- There was a report that handwritten copies of two sets of 2006 Nursing
Board examination were circulated during the examination period among
examinees reviewing at the R.A. Gapuz Review Center and Inress Review
Center. The examinees were provided with a list of 500 questions and
answers in two of the examinations five subjects, particularly Tests III
(Psychiatric Nursing) and V (Medical-Surgical Nursing). The PRC later
admitted the leakage and traced it to two Board of Nursing members. Exam
72

results came out but Court of Appeals restrained the PRC from proceeding
with the oath-taking of the successful examinees.
- President GMA ordered for a re-examination and issued EO 566 which
authorized the CHED to supervise the establishment and operation of all
review centers and similar entities in the Philippines. CHED Chairman Puno
approved CHED Memorandum Order No. 49 series of 2006 (Implementing
Rules and Regulations).
- Review Center Association of the Philippines (petitioner), an organization of
independent review centers, asked the CHED to "amend, if not withdraw" the
IRR arguing, among other things, that giving permits to operate a review
center to Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) or consortia of HEIs and
professional organizations will effectively abolish independent review
centers. CHED Chairman Puno however believed that suspending the
implementation of the IRR would be inconsistent with the mandate of EO
566.
- A dialogue between the petitioner and CHED took place. Revised IRR was
approved. Petitioner filed before the CHED a Petition to Clarify/Amend RIRR
praying to exclude independent review center from the coverage of the
CHED; to clarify the meaning of the requirement for existing review centers
to tie-up with HEIs; to revise the rules to make it conform with RA 7722
limiting the CHEDs coverage to public and private institutions of higher.
- In 2007, then CHED Chairman Neri responded to the petitioner that: to
exclude the operation of independent review centers from the coverage of
CHED would clearly contradict the intention of the said Executive Order No.
566; As to the request to clarify what is meant by tie-up/be integrated with
an HEI, tie-up/be integrated simply means, to be in partner with an HEI.
- Petitioner filed a petition for Prohibition and Mandamus before this
Court praying for the annulment of the RIRR, the declaration of EO
566 as invalid and unconstitutional exercise of legislative power, and
the prohibition against CHED from implementing the RIRR. Motion to
intervene filed by other organizations/institutions were granted by the Court.
- On 21 May 2008, CHED issued CHED Memorandum Order No. 21,
Series of 2008 (CMO 21, s. 2008) extending the deadline for six
months from 27 May 2008 for all existing independent review
centers to tie-up or be integrated with HEIs in accordance with the
RIRR. On 25 November 2008 Resolution, SC resolved to require the parties
to observe the status quo prevailing before the issuance of EO 566, the RIRR,
and CMO 21, s. 2008.

73

Issues: 1. Whether EO 566 is an unconstitutional exercise by the Executive


of legislative power as it expands the CHEDs jurisdiction [Yes, it expands
CHEDs jurisdiction, hence unconsititutional]; and
2. Whether the RIRR is an invalid exercise of the Executives rule-making
power. [Yes, it is invalid.]
Held/Ratio: 1. The scopes of EO 566 and the RIRR clearly expand the
CHEDs coverage under RA 7722. The CHEDs coverage under RA 7722
is limited to public and private institutions of higher education and
degree-granting programs in all public and private post-secondary
educational institutions. EO 566 directed the CHED to formulate a
framework for the regulation of review centers and similar entities.
The definition of a review center under EO 566 shows that it refers to one
which offers "a program or course of study that is intended to refresh and
enhance the knowledge or competencies and skills of reviewees obtained in
the formal school setting in preparation for the licensure examinations" given
by the PRC. It does not offer a degree-granting program that would put it
under the jurisdiction of the CHED. A review course is only intended to
"refresh and enhance the knowledge or competencies and skills of
reviewees." Thus, programs given by review centers could not be
considered "programs x x x of higher learning" that would put them
under the jurisdiction of the CHED. "Higher education," is defined as
"education beyond the secondary level or "education provided by a college
or university."
Further, the "similar entities" in EO 566 cover centers providing "review or
tutorial services" in areas not covered by licensure examinations given by
the PRC, which include, although not limited to, college entrance
examinations, Civil Services examinations, and tutorial services. These
review and tutorial services hardly qualify as programs of higher learning.
2. ) The exercise of the Presidents residual powers under Section 20, Title I
of Book III of EO (invoked by the OSG to justify GMAs action) requires
legislation; as the provision clearly states that the exercise of the
Presidents other powers and functions has to be "provided for under the
law." There is no law granting the President the power to amend the
functions of the CHED. The President has no inherent or delegated legislative
power to amend the functions of the CHED under RA 7722.
The line that delineates Legislative and Executive power is not indistinct.
Legislative power is "the authority, under the Constitution, to make
laws, and to alter and repeal them." The Constitution, as the will of the
people in their original, sovereign and unlimited capacity, has vested this
power in the Congress of the Philippines. Any power, deemed to be
74

legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress,


unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere.
The President has control over the executive department, bureaus and
offices. Meaning, he has the authority to assume directly the functions of the
executive department, bureau and office, or interfere with the discretion of
its officials. Corollary to the power of control, he is granted administrative
power. Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies
and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs. It
enables the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency
and check the official conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue
administrative orders, rules and regulations. An administrative order is an
ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the
administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the
law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and
carrying out the legislative policy.
Since EO 566 is an invalid exercise of legislative power, the RIRR is
also an invalid exercise of the CHEDs quasi-legislative power.
Administrative agencies exercise their quasi-legislative or rule-making power
through the promulgation of rules and regulations. The CHED may only
exercise its rule-making power within the confines of its jurisdiction under RA
7722. But The RIRR covers review centers and similar entities.
Other issues: Re: issue judicial hierarchy, the alleged violation of the
Constitution by the Executive Department when it issued EO 566 justifies the
exercise by the Court of its primary jurisdiction over the case. The Court is
not precluded from brushing aside technicalities and taking cognizance of an
action due to its importance to the public.
Re: police power, no delegation of police power exists under RA 7722
authorizing the President to regulate the operations of non-degree granting
review centers.
Re: RA 8981 as the appropriate law, the PRC has the power to adopt
measures to preserve the integrity and inviolability of licensure
examinations. However, this power should properly be interpreted to refer to
the conduct of the examinations. The power to preserve the integrity and
inviolability of licensure examinations should be read together with these
functions. These powers of the PRC have nothing to do at all with the
regulation of review centers.
A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v United States
295 U.S. 495
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES ; May 27, 1935
75

FACTS
- Schechter was found to have violated the Live Poultry Code promulgated
under NIRA (National Industrial Recovery Act) but written by industry groups
then approved by the President through the Ag Secy. NIRA gave President
the authority to approve codes of fair competition applied by a trade or
industrial group.
- Section 3 of the National Industrial Recovery Act provides that "codes of fair
competition," which shall be the " standards of fair competition" for the
trades and industries to which they relate, may be approved by the President
upon application of representative associations of the trades or industries to
be affected, or may be prescribed by him on his own motion. Their provisions
[p496] are to be enforced by injunctions from the federal courts, and "any
violation of any of their provisions in any transaction in or affecting interstate
commerce" is to be deemed an unfair method of competition within the
meaning of the Federal Trade Commission Act, and is to be punished as a
crime against the United States. Before approving, the President is to make
certain findings as to the character of the association presenting the code
and absence of design to promote monopoly or oppress small enterprises,
and must find that it will "tend to effectuate the policy of this title." Codes
permitting monopolies or monopolistic practices are forbidden. The President
may "impose such conditions (including requirements for the making of
reports and the keeping of accounts) for the protection of consumers,
competitors, employees and others, and in the furtherance of the public
interest, and may provide such exceptions and exemptions from the
provisions of such code," as he, in his discretion, deems necessary "to
effectuate the policy herein declared." A code prescribed by him is to have
the same effect as one approved on application.
ISSUE
WON the Live Poultry Code is unconstitutional for being an undue delegation
of legislative powers. (YES.)
HELD
RATIO: Congress is not permitted by the Constitution to abdicate, or to
transfer to others, the essential legislative functions with which it is vested.
Congress may leave to selected instrumentalities the making of subordinate
rules within prescribed limits, and the determination of facts to which the
policy, as declared by Congress, is to apply; but it must itself lay down the
policies and establish standards.
REASONING:
- The delegation of legislative power sought to be made to the President by
3 of the National Industrial Recovery Act of June 16, 1933, is
unconstitutional and the Act is also unconstitutional, as applied in this case,
because it exceeds the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce
and invades the power reserved exclusively to the States
76

- This code was found to be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative


power because:
1) private groups were given lawmaking function and discretion to
make the policies. Authority wasnt really delegated to the President.
2) It covered every sector of the economy (not like the FCC, which just
deals with communications). It was an overbroad delegation of
authority. There was no limitation on things that could be subject to the
codes of fair competition.
3) no formal procedures constraining the President when he
decides to approve/disapprove the codes. No deliberation was required in
acting to promulgate the codes.
- Furthermore, there were no statutory standards or procedural safeguards
for promulgating the codes.
+ Cardozo wrote a strong concurrence saying that this was a situation of
delegation run riot, that although Congress delegating power to executive
can sometimes be ok, congress delegating power to industrial or trade
associations was out of the question.
FEDERAL ENERGY ADMINISTRATION v AL GONQUIN SNG, INC.
Facts: Under the 232(b) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, the
President of the United States is authorized to
take such action, and for such time, as he deems necessary to
adjust the imports of [the] article and its derivatives so that
imports [of the article] will not threaten to impair national
security.
This gave the President the authority to adjust the imports of
petroleum and petroleum products by imposing QUOTAS on such
imports. In 1973, President Nixon authorized the Secretary of
Treasury to determine the effects of petroleum imports to national
security. The Secretary concluded that the current import policy of
the United States and its dependence on foreign oil threaten to
impair national security. To address this, the President, through the
Federal Energy Administration decided to impose an additional
measure to curtail oil importation by imposing a licensing fees
structure.

The controversy was raised by governors of several states who


challenged the imposition of the fees. The District Court of DC
dismissed their petition, but the Court of Appeals reversed it.
77

Issue: Was the imposition of fees beyond the Presidents


constitutional and statutory authority?
Held: No. The imposition of license fees for petroleum imports was
within the mandate accorded by the Congress to the President in
the protection of national security.
1. The language of 232 (b) of the Trade Expansion Act grants the
President power.
The Supreme Court rejected the governors contention that the
section should be construed narrowly to avoid an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power. According to the Supreme Court,
the contended statute had an intelligible principle (Hampton Jr. v
US) that fulfills the precondition required for the President to be
allowed to exercise such power. There needs to be a determination
of threat to national security and the same was done in this case
when the Secretary of Treasury determined such imminent threat.
In addition, 232 (c) of the same statute accords additional
guidelines on the exercise of the power granted in the earlier
provision.
In addition, the discretion given to the President was broad enough
to accommodate any method of how he deems imports should be
adjusted. It does not prescribe that it should only be through
quantitative methods (quota), but also by controlling how the
circumstances that the import is received (license fees).
2. The legislative history shows that Congress intended to vest the
president with such power.
The Court looked at the history of the statute since 1955. An
interesting discussion was with regard to the promulgation of the
Trade Expansion Act of 1962. The Court of Appeals showed an
amendment that showed clear stipulations on the President having
the power to impose import duties. This amendment was
REJECTED. The Court of Appeals then construed legislative intent
to have taken down such power that the President is now implicitly
claiming over another provision. The Supreme Court disagreed
since the rejected proposal was incomplete because it did not
provide for the same requisite of a prior investigation by an
executive department prior to the Presidential action. It also
contends that since the rejected amendment used national
interest it is more BROAD than the language in 232(b) which
uses national security.
78

Ultimate conclusion: 232(b) authorizes the president to impose


license fees, however the Court says that it should not be
concluded that any action the President might take as long as it is
related to imports is authorized.
WHITE V ROUGHTON
530 F.2d 750
PER CURIAM; February 27,1976
NATURE
Appeal from order denying application for preliminary injunction to prevent
termination by defendant of general assistance granted to plaintiffs.
FACTS
- Roughton is supervisor of the town of the City of Champaign Township. In
this capacity he administers the general township assistance program which
provides locally collected taxes for distribution as welfare to needy township
residents.
- Plaintiff White received assistance in the form of food orders. Plaintiff
Walker was provided food order and rent. Subsequently, assistance to both
were terminated and they received neither notice, explanation nor
information as to the right of appeal.
- Plaintiff Silagy aplied for assistance at least thrice but was always denied
without informing her of the reasons supporting her rejection or the right to
appeal.
- Defendant admitted that he and his staff determine eligibility based upon
their own unwritten personal standards.
ISSUE/S
1. WON the injunction must issue
HELD
1. YES
Ratio Welfare recipients must be provided with adequate notice and an
evidentiary hearing before benefits may be discontinued. (Goldberg v Kelly)
Reasoning General assistance welfare grants are clearly state action under
provisions of statute relating to public aid and are therefore subject to due
process protection.
Defendant as administrator of the general assistance program has the
responsibility to administer the program to ensure the fair and consistent
application of eligibility requirements. Fair and consistent application of such
requirements requires that Roughton establish written standards and
regulations.
Disposition Reversed and remanded with directions
79

2. PERMISSIBLE DELEGATION
a. ASCERTAINMENT OF FACT
PANAMA REFINING CO v RYAN
293 U.S. 388
HUGHES; January 7, 1935
FACTS:
-Based on section 9(c) of title 1 of the National Industrial Recovery Act of
June 16, 1933 which states that: The President is authorized to prohibit the
transportation in interstate and foreign commerce of petroleum and the
products thereof produced or withdrawn from storage in excess of the
amount permitted to be produced or withdrawn from storage by any State
law or valid regulation or order prescribed thereunder, by any board,
commission, officer, or other duly authorized agency of a State. Any violation
of any order of the President issued under the provisions of this subsection
shall be punishable by fine of not to exceed $1,000, or imprisonment for not
to exceed six months, or both., the President by Executive Order No. 6199,
prohibited 'the transportation in interstate and foreign commerce of
petroleum and the products thereof produced or withdrawn from storage in
excess of the amount permitted to be produced or withdrawn from storage
by any State law or valid regulation or order prescribed thereunder, by any
board, commission, officer, or other duly authorized agency of a State.'
-Under section 10(a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act, authorizing the
President to prescribe such rules and regulations as may be necessary to
carry out the purposes' of title 1 of the National Industrial Recovery Act and
providing that 'any violation of any such rule or regulation shall be
punishable by fine of not to exceed $500, or imprisonment for not to exceed
six months, or both. the President, by Executive Order No. 6204, authorized
the Secretary of the Interior to exercise all the powers vested in the President
'for the purpose of enforcing Section 9(c) of said act and said order' of July
11, 1933, 'including full authority to designate and appoint such agents and
to set up such boards and agencies as he may see fit, and to promulgate
such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary.'
- On July 15, 1933, the Secretary of the Interior issued regulations to carry
out the President's orders of July 11 and 14, 1933. the regulations and the
orders of the President were questioned by oil companies affected by the
Orders. They question the basis of the power of the President to make such
orders as an undue delegation of legislative powers.
ISSUE:
WON there was an undue delegation of legislative powers when the
Legislature, through section 9(c) of title 1 of the National Industrial Recovery
Act of June 16, 1933, allowed the President to issue the Orders complained
of.
80

HELD: Yes the delegation of such power was undue.


(AS TO PERMISSIBLE DELEGATIONS)
-The Constitution has never been regarded as denying to the Congress the
necessary resources of flexibility and practicality, which will enable it to
perform its function in laying down policies and establishing standards, while
leaving to selected instrumentalities the making of subordinate rules within
prescribed limits and the determination of facts to which the policy as
declared by the Legislature is to apply. Without capacity to give
authorizations of that sort we should have the anomaly of a legislative power
which in many circumstances calling for its exertion would be but a futility
-the Court cited several cases wherein the Congress delegated the power of
ascertaining facts for the implementation of orders. First of which was Aurora
v US wherein the Congress left the power to determine whether Great Britain
modified her edicts so as not to violate the Neutral Commerce Act of the US.
It gave the President the power to suspend trade relations with Great Britain
until such determination by the President. The Court ruled that it could see
no sufficient reason why the Legislature should not exercise its discretion in
reviving the act of 1809, 'either expressly or conditionally, as their judgment
should direct.'
-Field v Clark where the case was about an Act which gave the President the
power to suspend the introduction of products from different countries which
imposed duties or other exactions on agricultural produce of the US. The
Court found that the act before it was not inconsistent with the principle of
delegation of powers; that it did not 'in any real sense, invest the president
with the power of legislation.' As 'the suspension was absolutely required
when the president ascertained the existence of a particular fact,' it could
not be said 'that in ascertaining that fact, and in issuing his proclamation, in
obedience to the legislative will, he exercised the function of making laws.'
'He was the mere agent of the law-making department to ascertain and
declare the event upon which its expressed will was to take effect.'
-authorizations given by Congress to selected instrumentalities for the
purpose of ascertaining the existence of facts to which legislation is directed
have constantly been sustained. Moreover the Congress may not only give
such authorizations to determine specific facts, but may establish primary
standards, devolving upon others the duty to carry out the declared
legislative policy
-examples for the allowing of the Congress to authorize instrumentalities to
fix standards were the Radio Act of 1927 and Hampton Jr. & Co. v United
States
-in the present case the Court ruled that section 9(c) goes beyond those
limits. As to the transportation of oil production in excess of state permission,
the Congress has declared no policy, has established no standard, has laid
down no rule. There is no requirement, no definition of circumstances and
conditions in which the transportation is to be allowed or prohibited
81

DISSENTING Cardozo supra


LOVINA v MORENO
Lovina vs. Moreno | Reyes, J.B.L., J. (1963)
FACTS
- This case started with a petition of numerous residents of Macabebe,
Pampanga to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications,
complaining that the spouses Lovina had blocked the "Sapang Bulati", a
navigable river and asking that the obstructions be ordered removed, under
the provisions of Republic Act No. 2056.
- After notice and hearing to the parties, the said Secretary found the
constructions to be a public nuisance in navigable waters, and, in his
decision ordered that the land owners, spouses Lovina, to remove five (5)
closures of Sapang Bulati; otherwise, the Secretary would order their removal
at the expense of the respondent.
- The Lovinas filed a petition in the CFI to restrain the Secretary from
enforcing his decision. The trial court, after due hearing, granted a
permanent injunction, which is now the subject of the present appeal by the
respondents-appellants, Moreno, the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, and Yonzon, the investigator.
- The position of the plaintiffs-appellees is that Republic Act No. 2056 is
unconstitutional because it invests the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications with sweeping, unrestrained, final and unappealable
authority to pass upon the issues of whether a river or stream is public and
navigable, whether a dam encroaches upon such waters and is constitutive
as a public nuisance, and whether the law applies to the state of facts,
thereby Constituting an alleged unlawful delegation of judicial
power to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS/HELD:
WON RA 2056 is unconstitutional. NO
RATIONALE
- (R.A. 2056) merely empowers the Secretary to remove unauthorized
obstructions or encroachments upon public streams, constructions that no
private person was anyway entitled to make, because the bed of navigable
streams is public property.
- It is true that the exercise of the Secretary's power under the Act
necessarily involves the determination of some questions of fact, such as the
existence of the stream and its previous navigable character; but these
functions, whether judicial or quasi-judicial, are merely incidental to the
exercise of the power granted by law.
- This is validly conferable upon executive officials provided the party
affected is given opportunity to be heard, as is expressly required by
82

Republic Act No. 2056, section 2.


- The delegation by Congress to executive or administrative agencies of
judicial or quasi-judicial functions is incidental to the exercise by such
agencies of their executive or administrative powers, and is thus not a
violation of the Separation of Powers.
- One important class of cases in which discretion may properly be vested in
administrative officers are those cases in which a general rule or
prohibition is laid down and power is vested in an executive officer
to determine when particular cases do or do not fall within such rule
or prohibition. Power exercised under such statutes, calling for the exercise
of judgment in the execution of a ministerial act, is never judicial in nature
within the sense prohibited by the Constitution.
- A direct precedent can be found in the "Bridge cases" upholding the
constitutionality of the U.S. River and Harbor Act, that empowered Secretary
of War to take action, after hearing, for the removal or alteration of bridges
unreasonably obstructing navigation. On the issue of undue delegation of
power, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled as follows:
- The statute itself prescribes the general rule applicable to all navigable
waters, and merely charged the Secretary of War with the duty of
ascertaining in each case, upon notice to the parties concerned, whether the
particular bridge came within the general rule. This is not an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative or judicial power to the Secretary.
*Other matters:
- Appellees invoke American rulings that abatement can not be done except
through court proceedings; but these rulings refer to summary abatements
without previous hearing, and are inapplicable to the case before us where
the law provides, and the investigator actually held, a hearing with notice to
the complainants and the, appellees, who appeared therein. It is a wellknown rule that due process does not have to be judicial process.
- As to the argument that the action of the Secretary amounts to a
confiscation of private property:
- The Court found that there is sufficient evidence to hold that the creek was
in fact navigable before it was closed by the spouses Lovina.
- It is a well-established rule that findings of fact in executive decisions in
matters within their jurisdiction are entitled to respect from the courts in the
absence of fraud, collusion, or grave abuse of discretion.

b. FILLING IN OF DETAILS
ALEGRE v COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS
53 PHIL 394
JOHNS; August 27, 1929
83

NATURE
Appeal from the decision of CFI
FACTS
- The petitioner for a number of years has been and is now engaged in the
production of abaca and its exportation to foreign markets. November 8,
1927, he applied to the respondent for a permit to export one hundred bales
of abaca to England, which was denied, and advised that he would not be
permitted to export the abaca in question without a certificate of the Fiber
Standardization Board. He then filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila a
petition for a writ of mandamus, alleging that the provisions of the
Administrative Code for the grading, inspection and certification of fibers
and, in particular, sections 1772 and 1244 of that Code, are unconstitutional
and void.
Section 1244. A collector of customs shall not permit abaca, maguey, or sisal
or other fibrous products for which standard grades have been established
by the Director of Agriculture to be laden aboard a vessel clearing for a
foreign port, unless the shipment conforms to the requirements of law
relative to the shipment of such fibers.
Section 1772. The Fiber Standardization Board shall determine the official
standards for the various commercial grades of Philippine fibers that are or
may hereafter be produced on the Philippine Islands for shipment abroad.
Each grade shall have its proper name and designation which, together with
the basis upon which the several grades are determined, shall be defined by
the said Board in a general order. Such order shall have the approval of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources; and for the dissemination of
information, copies of the same shall be supplied gratis to the foreign
markets, provincial governors, municipal presidents, and to such other
persons and agencies as shall make request therefor. If it is considered
expedient to change these standards at any time, notice shall be given in the
local and foreign markets for a period of at least six months before the new
standards shall go into effect.
Section 1788. No fiber within the purview of this law shall be exported from
the Philippine Islands in quantity greater than the amount sufficient to make
one bale, without being graded, baled, inspected, and certified as in this law
provided.
- CFI held that sections 1722 and 1783 of the Administrative Code, as
amended, are unconstitutional and void. Hence, this appeal by defs.
ISSUE/S
1. WON the law in question delegates to the Fiber Board legislative powers or
administrative functions to carry out the purpose and intent (details) of the
law for its more efficient administration
HELD
- The act in question, is not a delegation of legislative power to the Fiber
84

Board, and that the powers given by the Legislature to the board are for an
administrative purposes, to enforce and carry out the intent of the law.
- The law provides in detail for the inspection, grading and bailing of hemp
the Fiber Board with the power and authority to devise ways and means for
its execution. In legal effect, the Legislature has said that before any hemp is
exported from the Philippine Islands it must be inspected, graded and baled,
and has created a board or that purpose and vested it with the power and
authority to do the actual work. That is not a delegation o legislative power.
It is nothing more than a delegation of administrative power in the Fiber
Board, to carry out the purpose and intent of the law. In the very nature of
things, the Legislature could not inspect, grade and bale the hemp, and from
necessity, the power to do that would have to be vested in a board of
commission.
- The petitioner's contention would leave the law, which provides for the
inspection, grading and baling of hemp, without any means of its
enforcement. The criticism that there is partiality or even fraud in the
administration of the law is not an argument against its constitutionality.
Disposition The judgment of the lower court is reversed and the petition is
dismissed.
c. ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING
BOOK VII
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
CHAPTER 1
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section 1. Scope. - This Book shall be applicable to all agencies as defined
in the next succeeding section, except the Congress, the Judiciary, the
Constitutional Commissions, military establishments in all matters relating
exclusively to Armed Forces personnel, the Board of Pardons and Parole, and
state universities and colleges.
Section 2. Definitions. - As used in this Book:
(1) "Agency" includes any department, bureau, office, commission,
authority or officer of the National Government authorized by law or
executive order to make rules, issue licenses, grant rights or privileges,
and adjudicate cases; research institutions with respect to licensing
functions; government corporations with respect to functions
regulating private right, privileges, occupation or business; and officials
in the exercise of disciplinary power as provided by law.
(2) "Rule" means any agency statement of general applicability that
implements or interprets a law, fixes and describes the procedures in,
or practice requirements of, an agency, including its regulations. The
term includes memoranda or statements concerning the internal
85

administration or management of an agency not affecting the rights of,


or procedure available to, the public.
(3) "Rate" means any charge to the public for a service open to all and
upon the same terms, including individual or joint rates, tolls,
classifications, or schedules thereof, as well as commutation, mileage,
kilometerage and other special rates which shall be imposed by law or
regulation to be observed and followed by any person.
(4) "Rule making" means an agency process for the formulation,
amendment, or repeal of a rule.
(5) "Contested case" means any proceeding, including licensing, in
which the legal rights, duties or privileges asserted by specific parties
as required by the Constitution or by law are to be determined after
hearing.
(6) "Person" includes an individual, partnership, corporation,
association, public or private organization of any character other than
an agency.
(7) "Party" includes a person or agency named or admitted as a party,
or properly seeking and entitled as of right to be admitted as a party,
in any agency proceeding; but nothing herein shall be construed to
prevent an agency from admitting any person or agency as a party for
limited purposes.
(8) "Decision" means the whole or any part of the final disposition, not
of an interlocutory character, whether affirmative, negative, or
injunctive in form, of an agency in any matter, including licensing, rate
fixing and granting of rights and privileges.
(9) "Adjudication" means an agency process for the formulation of a
final order.
(10) "License" includes the whole or any part of any agency permit,
certificate, passport, clearance, approval, registration, charter,
membership, statutory exemption or other form of permission, or
regulation of the exercise of a right or privilege.
(11) "Licensing" includes agency process involving the grant, renewal,
denial, revocation, suspension, annulment, withdrawal, limitation,
amendment, modification or conditioning of a license.
(12) "Sanction" includes the whole or part of a prohibition, limitation or
other condition affecting the liberty of any person; the withholding of
relief; the imposition of penalty or fine; the destruction, taking, seizure
or withholding of property; the assessment of damages,
reimbursement, restitution, compensation, cost, charges or fees; the
revocation or suspension of license; or the taking of other compulsory
or restrictive action.
(13) "Relief" includes the whole or part of any grant of money,
assistance, license, authority, privilege, exemption, exception, or
remedy; recognition of any claim, right, immunity, privilege, exemption
or exception; or taking of any action upon the application or petition of
any person.
86

(14) "Agency proceeding" means any agency process with respect to


rule-making, adjudication and licensing.
1. "Agency action" includes the whole or part of every agency rule,
order, license, sanction, relief or its equivalent or denial thereof.
CHAPTER 2
RULES AND REGULATIONS
Section 3. Filing. (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law
Center three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in
force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within
three (3) months from that date shall not thereafter be the basis of any
sanction against any party or persons.
(2) The records officer of the agency, or his equivalent functionary,
shall carry out the requirements of this section under pain of
disciplinary action.
(3) A permanent register of all rules shall be kept by the issuing agency
and shall be open to public inspection.
Section 4. Effectivity. - In addition to other rule-making requirements
provided by law not inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall become
effective fifteen (15) days from the date of filing as above provided unless a
different date is fixed by law, or specified in the rule in cases of imminent
danger to public health, safety and welfare, the existence of which must be
expressed in a statement accompanying the rule. The agency shall take
appropriate measures to make emergency rules known to persons who may
be affected by them.
Section 5. Publication and Recording. - The University of the Philippines Law
Center shall:
(1) Publish a quarter bulletin setting forth the text of rules filed with it
during the preceding quarter; and
(2) Keep an up-to-date codification of all rules thus published and
remaining in effect, together with a complete index and appropriate
tables.
Section 6. Omission of Some Rules. (1) The University of the Philippines Law Center may omit from the
bulletin or the codification any rule if its publication would be unduly
cumbersome, expensive or otherwise inexpedient, but copies of that
rule shall be made available on application to the agency which
adopted it, and the bulletin shall contain a notice stating the general
subject matter of the omitted rule and new copies thereof may be
obtained.
(2) Every rule establishing an offense or defining an act which,
pursuant to law, is punishable as a crime or subject to a penalty shall
in all cases be published in full text.
Section 7. Distribution of Bulletin and Codified Rules. - The University of the
Philippines Law Center shall furnish one (1) free copy each of every issue of
the bulletin and of the codified rules or supplements to the Office of the
87

President, Congress, all appellate courts and the National Library. The
bulletin and the codified rules shall be made available free of charge to such
public officers or agencies as the Congress may select, and to other persons
at a price sufficient to cover publication and mailing or distribution costs.
Section 8. Judicial Notice. - The court shall take judicial notice of the
certified copy of each rule duly filed or as published in the bulletin or the
codified rules.
Section 9. Public Participation. (1) If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far as
practicable, publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and afford
interested parties the opportunity to submit their views prior to the
adoption of any rule.
(2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the
proposed rates shall have been published in a newspaper of general
circulation at least two (2) weeks before the first hearing thereon.
(3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be
observed.
1. LIMITS ON RULE-MAKING POWER
OLSEN v ALDENESE
43 Phil 259
JOHNS; March 29, 1922
NATURE
Petition for a peremptory writ of mandamus
FACTS
- The Tariff Act of 1913, conferred legal right on Olsen and Co. to export from
the Phil. Islands into the US cigars which it manufactured from tobacco grown
in the Phil. Islands In 1916, Phil. Legislature enacted Act. No. 2613 entitled
"An Act to improve the methods of production and the quality of tobacco in
the Philippine and to develop the export trade therein," The Collector of
Internal Revenue then promulgated Administrative Order No. 35, known as
"Tobacco Inspection Regulations."
- Olsen applied to the Collector of Internal Revenue (CIR) for such a
certificate re the 10,00 cigars manufactured by it from tobacco grown and
produced in the Philippine Islands.
- Olsen alleged that CIR wrongfully and unlawfully refused to issue such
certificate of origin "on the ground that said cigars were not manufactured of
long filler tobacco produced exclusively in the provinces of Cagayan, Isabela
or Nueva Vizcaya." Despite such refusal, Olsen applied to the Insular
Collector of Customs for the certificate of origin, and that officer wrongfully
and unlawfully refused to issue such certificate "on the ground that the
88

petitioner had not obtained and presented with the application the certificate
of the said respondent Collector of Internal Revenue.
Preliminary Notes:
- The important question here involved is the construction of Secs. 6, 7, and
11 of Act No. 2613 of the Philippine Legislature, and Sec. 9 of the "Tobacco
Inspection Regulations," promulgated by Administrative Order No. 35.
- Clause B of Sec 6 of Act No. 2613 empowers the Collector of Internal
Revenue to establish rules defining the standard and the type of leaf and
manufactured tobacco which may be exported into the United States. Portion
of Sec. 7 of said Act provides: "No leaf tobacco or manufactured tobacco
shall be exported from the Philippine Islands to the United States until it shall
have been in inspected by the Collector of Internal Revenue, etc." Portion of
Sec. 11 of the Act requires the certificate of origin of the Collector of Internal
Revenue to show that the tobacco to be exported is standard. And, portion of
Sec. 9 of Administrative Order No. 35 limits the exportation into the U.S. of
Philippine cigars to those manufactured from long filler tobacco exclusively
the product of the provinces of Cagayan, Isabela, or Nueva Vizcaya.
ISSUE
WON the CIR exceeded his rule-making powers as shown in Sec.9 of the
Adm. Order 35.
HELD
YES.
Ratio The authority of the Collector of Internal Revenue to make any rules
and regulations must be founded upon some legislative act, and that they
must follow and be within the scope and purview of the act.
Reasoning
- It will be noted that the power of the Collector of Internal Revenue to make
rules and regulations is confined to the making of rules and regulations for
the classification, making, and packing of tobacco, and that such power is
further limited to the making of such rules for the classification, marking, and
packing of tobacco as may be necessary to secure leaf tobacco of good
quality and its handling under sanitary conditions. It is for such purpose only
that the Collector of Internal Revenue is authorized to make any rules or
regulations.
- Analyzing the power conferred, it will be found that the provisions of the
legislative act are NOT limited to the provinces of Cagayan, Isabela, or Nueva
Vizcaya, or to any province, and that there is no limitation as to the place
where the tobacco should be grown in the Philippine Islands. The only power
conferred is to establish general and local rules for the classification,
marking, and packing of tobacco and the standard and the type of tobacco
which may be exported to the United States. By Sec. 9 of Admin Order 35,
Cir went beyond its authority of rule-making power as limited by law. Limting
the exportation into the U.S. of Philippine cigars to those manufactured from
89

long filler tobacco exclusively the product of the provinces of Cagayan,


Isabela, or Nueva Vizcaya is invalid.
*There was a long discussion on the inapplicability of and difference of this
case with Buttfield vs. Stranahan (192 U. S., 525). See original.
Disposition.Petition GRANTED.
SYMAN v JACINTO
93 Phil 1093
Montemayor; 31 Oct 1953
Nature
Appeal against the decision of CFI
Facts
-Collector of Customs for the Port of Manila ordered the seizure of two
shipments of textile and a number of sewing machines, consigned to the
petitioner (Sy Man).
-Collector of Customs for the Port of Manila, after due hearing, rendered a
decision that the articles covered are delivered to the importer after
payment of the necessary customs duty, sales tax and other charges except
the sewing machines which are hereby declared forfeited to the Government
of the Republic of the Philippines to be sold at public auction in conformity
with law if found saleable, otherwise, to be destroyed.
-Sy Man received a copy of the decision of the Collector of Customs for the
Port of Manila. Asking for the execution of the decision, in view of the fact
that it had become final and could no longer be reviewed by the
Commissioner of Customs after the lapse of fifteen days from the date of
notification thereof was given to the herein petitioner who did not appeal
from said decision to the Commissioner of Customs within the aforesaid
period of time.
-Counsel for the petitioner requested that the goods be released because of
the decision.
-Collector of Customs for the Port of Manila responded and said that such
was endorsed to the Commissioner of Customs, requesting information
whether the merchandise may now be delivered to the owner upon showing
that the decision has become final and executory after fifteen (15) days from
the receipt of a copy of the same by the claimant.
-Sy Man sought (1) to declare null and void that portion of the Memorandum
Order promulgated by the Insular Collector of Customs dated August 18,
1947, which provides that as in protest cases, decisions of the Collector of
Customs in seizure cases, whether appealed or not, are subject to review by
the Insular Collector (now commissioner); that such decisions and their
supporting papers be submitted to his office, and that pending action by him
on such decisions, final disposal of the goods involved shall not be made;
90

and (2) to order the Collector to deliver to the petitioner the shipments of
textiles claimed to be final and executory.
-TC granted the petition.
Issue
WON this supposed power of revision by the Commissioner of unappealed
decisions of the Collector in seizure cases, is supported by law
Held
Yes.
-Let us now see if there is any law giving authority to the Commissioner of
Customs to review and revise unappealed decisions in seizure cases. In cases
involving assessment of duties, even when the importer fails to protest the
decision of the Collector of Customs, the Commissioner may order a
reliquidation if he believes that the decision of the Collector was erroneous
and unfavorable to the Government; and the Department Head in his turn if
he believes that the decision of the Commissioner in any unprotested case of
assessment of duties is erroneous and unfavorable to the Government, may
require the Commissioner to order a reliquidation or he may direct the
Commissioner to certify the case to the CFI.
"SEC. 1393.
Supervisory authority of Commissioner and of Department
Head in certain cases. - If in any case involving the assessment of duties the
importer shall fail to protest the decision of the collector of customs and the
Commissioner shall be of the opinion that the decision was erroneous and
unfavorable to the Government, the latter may order a reliquidation; and if
the decision of the Commissioner in any unprotested case should, in the
opinion of the Department Head, be erroneous and unfavorable to the
Government, the Department Head may require the Commissioner to order a
reliquidation or he may, if in his opinion the public interest requires, direct
the Commissioner to certify the cause to the Court of First Instance of Manila,
in the manner provided in section one thousand three hundred and eighty-six
hereof, there to be reviewed by the court as other customs cases removed
thereto.
"Except as in the preceding paragraph provided, the supervisory authority of
the Department Head over the Bureau of Customs shall not extend to the
administrative revisal of the decisions of the Commissioner in matters
removable into court."
It will be noticed that the section is entitled "supervisory authority of the
Commissioner and of the Department Head in certain cases." We find no
similar legal provision in seizure cases. The logical inference is that the
lawmakers did not deem it necessary or advisable to provide for this
supervisory authority or power of revision by the Commissioner and
the Department Head on unappealed seizure cases; and it is highly
possible that up to and until 1947, when the memorandum order of
August 18th of that year was issued, it was not the practice of the
Bureau of Customs to have unappealed seizure cases sent up by
91

Collectors to the Commissioner's office for review and revision. This


we may gather from the memorandum order itself, where the Commissioner
observes that in seizure cases some collectors of customs merely submit to
him their reports of their seizure and the subsequent final disposition thereof
without transmitting the records of their proceedings, and he therein asserts
the right of the Commissioner of Customs to review decisions of Collector of
Customs in seizure cases though unappealed. If that right and that practice
had existed from the beginning, it is not likely that Collectors would disregard
and ignore it, to the extent that it was necessary to remind them of it by
means of a memorandum order.
-It would seem that in a seizure case, the Collector transmits all the papers in
the cause to the Commissioner only when and after the importer notifies him
in writing signifying his desire to have the matter reviewed by the
Commissioner. The section does not say that without the notice of appeal,
the Collector is called upon to transmit the papers of the case to the
Commissioner. If this be true, then legally, a case of seizure unappealed ends
right in the office of the Collector, without prejudice of course to the Collector
subsequently making a report of his action to the Commissioner.
Furthermore, section 1388 of the Revised Administrative Code provides thus:.
"SEC. 1388.
Settlement of cause by payment of fine or redemption of
forfeited property. - If, in any seizure case, the owner or agent shall, while the
cause is yet before the collector of the district of seizure, pay to such
collector the fine imposed by him or, in case of forfeiture, shall pay the
appraised value of the property, or if, after removal of the cause, he shall
pay to the Commissioner the amount of the fine as finally determined by
him, or, in case of forfeiture, shall pay the appraised value of the property,
such property shall be forthwith surrendered, and all liability which may or
might attach to the property by virtue of the offense which was the occasion
of the seizure and all liability which might have been incurred under any
bond given by the owner or agent in respect to such property shall
thereupon be deemed to be discharged.
"Redemption of forfeited property shall not be allowed in any case where the
importation is absolutely prohibited or where the surrender of the property to
the person offering to redeem the same would be contrary to law."
If under the above provisions, in a seizure case the owner or agent may,
while the cause is yet before the collector, pay the fine imposed, or in case of
forfeiture, pay the appraised value of the property, and thereafter such
properties shall be surrendered and all liability which may attach to said
property by virtue of the offense causing the seizure is to be deemed
discharged, the conclusion to be drawn is that it is within the power and right
of an importer, owner or agent to end the case in the office of the Collector,
thereby precluding any intervention by the Commissioner in the way of
reviewing and revising the decision of the Collector. Again, under section
1389 immediately following which reads 92

"SEC. 1389. Right of protest in such cases. - Where payment is made or


redemption effected as allowed under the preceding section, the party
making payment or effecting the redemption may, if he desires to test the
validity of the proceedings, make formal protest at the time of making such
payment or affecting such redemption, or within fifteen days thereafter, and
make claim for the repayment of the whole or any part of the sum so paid by
him; whereupon the proceedings shall take the same course as in ordinary
cases of protest against customs duties and charges generally."
The importer or owner of goods seized, after payment is made or redemption
effected, is allowed if he desires to test the validity or correctness of the
decision of the Collector, to appeal the same to the Commissioner of
Customs presumably, to decrease the amount of his liability or annul the
seizure altogether and have all the amounts paid by him refunded. The
inference follows that by making payment and redeeming the
property seized under the decision of the Collector of Customs, the
owner
may
terminate
the
case
right
there,
although
notwithstanding his payment he still has the right to have the case
elevated to the Office of the Commissioner of Customs. It would seem
that the elevation of the case and the transmittal of the papers thereof to the
Commissioner lies within the owner's exclusive power and discretion. This
argues against the pretended power of the Commissioner of
automatic review and revision of decisions of Collectors in
unappealed seizure cases.
It is argued that if this power of review and revision by the Commissioner of
unappealed seizure cases is not conceded, then in cases where the Collector
in his decision commits a blunder prejudicial to the interests of the
Government, or renders a decision through fraud or in collusion with the
importer, the Government cannot protect itself. The argument is not without
merit; but we must bear in mind that the law is promulgated to operate on
ordinary, common, routine cases. The rule is and the law presumes that
in seizure cases Collectors of Customs act honestly and correctly
and as Government officials, always with an eye to the protection of
the interests of the Government employing them. If mistakes are
committed at all more often than not they are in favor of the
Government and not against it, and that is the reason why when the
importer feels aggrieved by their decision, he is given every chance
and facility to protest the decision and appeal to the Commissioner.
Cases of erroneous decisions against the interest of the Government
of decisions rendered in collusion and connivance with importers
are the exception. To protect the Government in such exceptional
cases, we find that in every seizure case, section 1378 of the
Revised Administrative Code requires the Collector to immediately
notify the Commissioner and the Auditor General. It may be that this
requirement has for its main purpose the recording of and
accounting for the articles seized so that in case of confiscation the
Commissioner and the Auditor General will know what articles have
93

become government property. But the notice will also inform the
Commissioner and the Auditor General of the seizure. If the seizure
is important or unusual, the Commissioner may, if he so desires,
order the Collector as his subordinate to withhold action on the
seizure, or hold in abeyance, within a reasonable time, the
promulgation of his decision until after he had conferred with the
Commissioner or the latter had studied the case and given
suggestions. At that stage of the proceedings before definite action
is taken by the Collector, and a decision rendered by him, it would
seem that any action by him as a subordinate is still subject to the
supervisory authority and control of the Commissioner as his Chief,
and the latter may still influence and direct the Collector's action if
he finds occasion for doing so.
But if the Government deems it necessary to provide for review and revision
by the Commissioner or even by the Department Head of the decisions of the
Collector of Customs in unappealed seizure cases, the Legislature may be
requested to insert a section in the Revised Administrative Code similar to
Section 1393 which applies to unprotested cases of assessment duties. The
defect in said section however is that it does not fix the period within which
the automatic review and revision or reliquidation to be ordered by the
Commissioner and the Secretary of Finance must be effected. This defect
should be remedied.
In conclusion, we find and hold that under the present law governing the
Bureau of Customs, the decision of the Collector of Customs in a seizure case
if not protested and appealed by the importer to the Commissioner of
Customs on time, becomes final not only as to him but against the
Government as well, and neither the Commissioner nor the Department
Head has the power to review, revise or modify such unappealed decision.
We also find and hold that the memorandum order of the Insular Collector of
Customs of August 18, 1947, is void and of no effect, not only because it has
not been duly approved by the Department Head and duly published as
required by section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code but also because
it is inconsistent with law.
Disposition
For the foregoing reasons, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed. No
pronouncement as to costs.
PEOPLE v MACEREN
79 SCRA 450
AQUINO; October 18, 1977
FACTS
94

- Section 11 of the Fisheries Law prohibits "the use of any obnoxious or


poisonous substance" in fishing.
- The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, upon the
recommendation of the Commissioner of Fisheries, promulgated Fisheries
Administrative Order No. 84 (62 O.G. 1224), prohibiting electro fishing in all
Philippine waters.
- Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes, Nazario Aquino and
Carlito del Rosario were charged with having violated Fisheries
Administrative Order No. 84-1. It was alleged that they engaged in electro
fishing.
- Upon motion of the accused, the municipal court dismissed the case. CFI
affirmed. The lower court held that electro fishing cannot be penalized
because electric current is not an obnoxious or poisonous substance as
contemplated in section II of the Fisheries Law. The lower court further held
that, since the law does not clearly prohibit electro fishing, the executive and
judicial departments cannot consider it unlawful.
ISSUE/S
1. WON the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources exceeded his
authority in issuing Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84
HELD
1. YES.
Ratio The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the
mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it his been enacted. The
power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory
requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute
Reasoning The Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As
electro fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to
penalize it. Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a
penal provision to that effect could have been easily embodied in the old
Fisheries Law. Nowhere in the said law is electro fishing specifically punished.
Administrative agents are clothed with rule-making powers because the
lawmaking body finds it impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate and
provide for the multifarious and complex situations that may be encountered
in enforcing the law. All that is required is that the regulation should be
germane to the defects and purposes of the law and that it should conform
to the standards that the law prescribes
Disposition Decision affirmed
TOLEDO v CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (COMELEC)
95

202 SCRA 507


PARAS, J.; October 4, 1991
NATURE
Petition for certiorari from a Resolution of the CSC
FACTS
- Petitioner Atty. Augusto Toledo was appointed by then Comelec Chairman
Ramon Felipe as Manager of the Education and Information Department of
the Comelec. At the time of his appointment, petitioner was already more
than 57 years old. However, no prior request for exemption from the
provisions of Sec. 22, Rule III of the Civil Service Rules on Personnel Action
and Policies (CSRPAP) was secured. Said provision prohibits the appointment
of persons 57 years old or above into the government service without prior
approval by the Civil Service Commission (CSC). Petitioner officially reported
for work and assumed the functions of his office.
- Public respondent Comelec, upon discovery of the lack of authority required
under the CSRPAP, issued Resolution No. 2066, which declared Toledos
appointment void ab initio. Petitioner appealed the foregoing Resolution to
public respondent CSC. CSC promulgated Resolution No. 89-468 which
disposed of the appeal, declaring the appointment merely voidable and not
void ab initio, and declaring Toledo a de facto officer from the time he
assumed to office to the issuance of Comelec Resolution No. 2066.
ISSUE
WON Sec. 22, Rule III of the CSRPAP is valid
HELD
NO
Ratio The provision on 57-year old persons in the Revised Civil Service Rules
cannot be accorded validity. It is entirely a creation of the CSC, having no
basis in the law which it was meant to implement. It cannot be related to or
connected with any specific provision of the law which it is meant to carry
into effect. It was therefore an unauthorized act of legislation on the part of
the CSC.
Reasoning RA 2260, establishing the CSC and authorizing it to prescribe
and enforce rules for carrying into effect the provisions of the law, contained
no provision prohibiting appointment or reinstatement in the Government
service of any person who was already 57 years old, or otherwise requiring
that some limitation as regards to age be placed on employment in the
Government service. This prohibition was purely a creation of the CSC. The
power vested in the CSC was to implement the law or put it into effect, not to
add to it; to carry the law into effect or execution, not to supply perceived
omissions in it.
Disposition
96

The petition is GRANTED


COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v CA (R.O.H. AUTO
PRODUCTS)
240 SCRA 368
VITUG; January 20, 1995
NATURE
Petition for review of a decision of the CA.
FACTS
- August 22, 1986: EO 41 was promulgated declaring a one-time tax amnesty
on unpaid income taxes, later amended to include estate and donors taxes
and taxes on business, for the taxable years 1981 to 1985.
- R.O.H. Auto Products availed of the amnesty, and filed in October 1986 and
November 1986 its Tax Amnesty Return and paid the corresponding amnesty
taxes due.
- Prior to this, petitioner CIR assessed R.O.H. deficiency income and business
taxes for its fiscal years ended 30 Sept 1981 and 30 Sept 1982 in an
aggregate amount of P1.41 M. The taxpayer wrote back to state that since it
had been able to avail itself of the tax amnesty, the deficiency tax notice
should forthwith be cancelled and withdrawn. The request was denied by the
Commissioner on the ground that Revenue Memorandum Order 4-87
implementing EO 41 had construed the amnesty coverage to include only
assessments issued by the BIR after promulgation of the executive order on
22 August 1986 and not to assessments theretofore made.
1.02. A certification by the Tax Amnesty Implementation Officer of the fact of
availment of the said tax amnesty shall be a sufficient basis for:
1.02.3. xxx the cancellation/ withdrawal of assessment notices and letters
of demand issued after August 21, 1986 for the collection of income,
business, estate or donors taxes due during the same taxable years.
- Court of Tax Appeals ruled for the taxpayer. It said that the Commissioner
failed to present any case or law which proves that an assessment can
withstand or negate the force and effects of a tax amnesty. This burden of
proof on taxpayer was created by the clear and express terms of the
executive orders intentionqualified availers of the amnesty may pay an
amnesty tax in lieu of said unpaid taxes which are forgiven.
- CA affirmed the decision of CTA. It said that a tax amnesty, being a
general pardon or intention overlooking by the State of its authority to
impose penalties on persons otherwise guilty of evasion or violation of a
revenue or tax law, partakes of an absolute forgiveness or waiver by the
Government of its right to collect what otherwise would be due it xxx
97

ISSUES
1. WON the position taken by the Commissioner coincides with the meaning
and intent of EO 41.
HELD
YES.
Ratio All issuances must not override, but must remain consistent and in
harmony with the law they seek to apply and implement. The authority of the
Minister of Finance (Secretary of Finance) in conjunction with the CIR to
promulgate all needful rules and regulations for the effective enforcement of
internal revenue laws cannot be controverted. Neither can it be disputed that
such rules and regulates, as well as administrative opinions and rulings,
ordinarily should deserve weight and respect by the courts.
Reasoning
- If EO 41 had not been intended to include 1981-1985 tax liabilities already
assessed prior to 22 August 1986, the law could have simply so provided in it
exclusionary clauses. It did not. The executive order has been designed to be
in the nature of a general grant of tax amnesty subject only to the cases
specifically excepted by it.
- There is no pretension that the tax amnesty returns and due payments
made by the taxpayer did not conform with the conditions expressed in the
amnesty order.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILS v CA (Yap)
249 SCRA 149 FRANCISCO; October 6, 1995
NATURE Consolidation of two separate petitions for review filed by
Department of Agrarian Reform and Land Bank of the Philippines, assailing
the CA decision, which granted private respondents' petition for Certiorari
and Mandamus.
FACTS
-Private respondents (Pedro Yap, Heirs of Emiliano Santiago, AMADCOR) are
landowners whose landholdings were acquired by the DAR and subjected to
transfer schemes to qualified beneficiaries under the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law (RA 6657). Aggrieved by the alleged lapses of the DAR
and the Landbank with respect to the valuation and payment of
compensation for their land, private respondents filed with this Court a
petition questioning the validity of DAR Admin Order No. 6 (1992) and DAR
Admin Order No. 9 (1990), and sought to compel the DAR to expedite the
pending summary administrative proceedings to finally determine the just
compensation of their properties, and the Landbank to deposit in cash and
bonds the amounts respectively "earmarked", "reserved" and "deposited in
trust accounts" for private respondents, and to allow them to withdraw the
same.
98

-SC referred the petition to CA for proper determination and disposition. CA


found the following facts undisputed.
Respondents Arguments:
-Admin Order No. 9 (1990) was issued in GADALEJ because it permits the
opening of trust accounts by the Landbank, in lieu of depositing in cash or
bonds in an accessible bank designated by the DAR, the compensation for
the land before it is taken and the titles are cancelled as provided under
Section 16(e) of RA 6657.
DAR and the Landbank merely "earmarked", "deposited in trust" or
"reserved" the compensation in their names as landowners despite the clear
mandate that before taking possession of the property, the compensation
must be deposited in cash or in bonds.
Petitioners Arguments:
-DAR: Admin Order No. 9 is a valid exercise of its rule-making power pursuant
to Section 49 of RA 6657. The issuance of the "Certificate of Deposit" by the
Landbank was a substantial compliance with Section 16(e) of RA 6657.
-Landbank: the issuance of the Certificates of Deposits is in consonance with
Circular Nos. 29, 29-A and 54 of the Land Registration Authority where the
words "reserved/deposited" were also used.
ISSUES
1. WON CA erred in declaring as null and void DAR Admin Order No. 9 (1990)
insofar as it provides for the opening of trust accounts in lieu of deposit in
cash or in bonds
2. WON CA erred in holding that private respondents are entitled as a matter
of right to the immediate and provisional release of the amounts deposited in
trust pending the final resolution of the cases it has filed for just
compensation.
HELD
1. NO.
-Section 16(e) of RA 6657: Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands. (e)
Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of
rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an
accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in
LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate
possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to
issue a TCT in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.
-It is very explicit that the deposit must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP
bonds". Nowhere does it appear nor can it be inferred that the deposit can be
made in any other form. There is no ambiguity in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 to
warrant an expanded construction of the term "deposit".
Ratio The conclusive effect of administrative construction is not absolute.
Action of an administrative agency may be disturbed or set aside by the
judicial department if there is an error of law, a grave abuse of power or lack
of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with either the
99

letter or the spirit of a legislative enactment. The function of promulgating


rules and regulations may be legitimately exercised only for the purpose of
carrying the provisions of the law into effect. The power of administrative
agencies is thus confined to implementing the law or putting it into effect.
Corollary to this is that administrative regulations cannot extend the law and
amend a legislative enactment, for settled is the rule that administrative
regulations must be in harmony with the provisions of the law. And in case
there is a discrepancy between the basic law and an implementing rule or
regulation, it is the former that prevails.
2. YES.
-The ruling in the case of Association of Small Landowners in the Phil. Inc. vs.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform merely recognized the extraordinary nature of
the expropriation to be undertaken under RA 6657 thereby allowing a
deviation from the traditional mode of payment of compensation and
recognized payment other than in cash. It did not, however, dispense with
the settled rule that there must be full payment of just compensation before
the title to the expropriated property is transferred.
-To withhold the right of the landowners to appropriate the amounts already
deposited in their behalf as compensation for their properties simply because
they rejected the DAR's valuation, and notwithstanding that they have
already been deprived of the possession and use of such properties, is an
oppressive exercise of eminent domain.
-It is unnecessary to distinguish between provisional compensation under
Section 16(e) and final compensation under Section 18 for purposes of
exercising the landowners' right to appropriate the same. The immediate
effect in both situations is the same, the landowner is deprived of the use
and possession of his property for which he should be fairly and immediately
compensated.
Disposition Petition denied for lack of merit. Appealed decision affirmed.
GMCR, INC. v BELL TELECOMMUNICATION PHILIPPINES, INC.
271 SCRA 790 HERMOSISIMA, JR.; April 30, 1997
NATURE Consolidated petitions seeking the review and reversal of the
decision] of the respondent Court of Appeals
FACTS
- Republic Act No. 7692 was enacted granting private respondent BellTel a
congressional franchise
- BellTel filed with the NTC a second Application praying for the issuance of a
Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity for the installation, operation
and maintenance of a combined nationwide local toll (domestic and
international) and tandem telephone exchanges and facilities using wire,
wireless, microwave radio, satellites and fiber optic cable with Public Calling
100

Offices (PCOs) and very small aperture antennas (VSATs) under an integrated
system.
- The CCAD submitted to Deputy Commissioner
Fidelo Q. Dumlao, a
Memorandum manifesting his findings and recommending that based on
technical documents submitted, BellTels proposal is technically feasible.
- Subsequently, Mr. Raulito Suarez, the chief of the Rates and Regulatory
Division of CCAD, conducted a financial evaluation of the project proposal of
private respondent BellTel. Mr. Suarez made the finding that BellTel has the
financial capability to support its proposed project at least for the initial two
(2) years.
- Agreeing with the findings and recommendations of the CCAD, NTC Deputy
Commissioners Fidelo Dumlao and Consuelo Perez adopted the same and
expressly signified their approval
-In view of these favorable recommendations by the CCAD and two members
of the NTC, the Legal Department thereof prepared a working draft of the
order granting provisional authority to private respondent BellTel. The said
working draft was initialed by Deputy Commissioners Fidelo Q. Dumlao and
Consuelo Perez but was not signed by Commissioner Simeon Kintanar.
- While ordinarily, a decision that is concurred in by two of the three
members composing a quasi-judicial body is entitled to promulgation,
petitioners claim that pursuant to the prevailing policy and the corresponding
procedure and practice in the NTC, the exclusive authority to sign, validate
and promulgate any and all orders, resolutions and decisions of the NTC is
lodged in the Chairman, in this case, Commissioner Simeon Kintanar, and,
thus, since only Commissioner Simeon Kintanar is recognized by the NTC
Secretariat as the sole authority to sign any and all orders, resolutions and
decisions of the NTC, only his vote counts; Deputy Commissioners Dumlao
and Perez have allegedly no voting power and both their concurrence which
actually constitutes the majority is inutile without the assent of
Commissioner Kintanar.
- Anxious over the inaction of the NTC in the matter of its petition praying for
the issuance of a provisional authority, private respondent BellTel an Urgent
Ex-Parte Motion to Resolve Application and for the Issuance of a Provisional
Authority.
- No action was taken by the NTC on the aforecited motion. Thus, BellTel
filed a Second Urgent Ex-Parte Motionreiterating its earlier prayer.
-In an Order signed solely by Commissioner Simeon Kintanar, the NTC,
instead of resolving the two pending motions of private respondent BellTel,
set the said motions for a hearing however, no hearing was conducted as the
same was reset.
- On the day of the hearing, BellTel filed a motion, prayed for the
promulgation of the working draft of the order granting a provisional
authority to private respondent BellTel, on the ground that the said working
draft had already been signed or initialed by Deputy Commissioners Dumlao
and Perez who, together, constitute a majority out of the three
commissioners composing the NTC.
101

- NTC denied the said motion in an Order solely signed by Commissioner


Simeon Kintanar.
- BellTel filed with this court a Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and
Prohibition seeking the nullification of the Order
- The SC issued a Resolution referring said petition to the respondent Court of
Appeals for proper determination and resolution
- The Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed decision which set aside
NTC Memorandum Circular No. 1-1-93, Annex J of the Petition, Memorandum
Circular No. 3-1-93, Annex K of the Petition and the Order of Kintanar,
Annex L of the Petition and directed . NTC to meet en banc and to consider
and act on the draft Order
- Petitioners filed with this court separate petitions for review.
ISSUE
WON the CAs act of nullifying NTC Memorandum Circular No. 1-1-93 and
NTC Memorandum Circular No. 3-1-93 was a collateral attack against the
aforecited circulars and an unnecessary and abusive exercise of the courts
power to nullify administrative regulations. HELD NO.
Ratio Administrative regulations derive their validity from the statute that
they were, in the first place, intended to implement.
Reasoning Memorandum Circulars 1-1-93 and 3-1-93 are on their face null
and void ab initio for being unabashedly contrary to law. They were nullified
by respondent Court of Appeals because they are absolutely illegal and, as
such, are without any force and effect. The fact that implementation of
these illegal regulations has resulted in the institutionalization of the oneman rule in the NTC, is not and can never be a ratification of such an illegal
practice.
At the least, these illegal regulations are an erroneous
interpretation of E.O. No. 546 and in the context of and its predecessor laws.
At the most, these illegal regulations are attempts to validate the one-man
rule in the NTC as executed by persons with the selfish interest of
maintaining their illusory hold of power.
Since the questioned memorandum circulars are inherently and patently null
and void for being totally violative of the spirit and letter of E.O. No. 546 that
constitutes the NTC as a collegial body, no court may shirk from its duty of
striking down such illegal regulations.
Disposition Petitions DISMISSED

102

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