Professional Documents
Culture Documents
ISSUES:
I. WON the charges constitute a ground to deport- YES
II. WON the President has the power to deport- YES
III. WON the President can delegate this power to the
Deportation Board- YES
IV. WON the Deportation Board has authority to issue
warrants of arrest- NO
RATIO:
reads:.
JBL Reyes
alycat
SUMMARY: The Calacday boys came to the Philippines from
Hong Kong, seeking Filipino citizenship. It was found that they
were the sons of one Isaac Calacday, a Filipino. However, Isaac
Calacday confessed that the boys were not his sons (although
such confession was later retracted). Commissioner Vivo issued
warrants of arrest against the Calacday boys, for them to be
brought before the Commissioner so they may show cause why
they should not be deported. The Calacday boys filed a civil
case before the CFI (with Hon. Montesa as judge) to prohibit
their deportation. The CFI ruled that the Commissioner could
not summarily order the arrest and deportation of the Calacday
boys without giving them a chance to be heard. The SC held
that the CFI is without jurisdiction to restrain the deportation
proceedings of the Calacday boys. Nevertheless, the issuance
of warrants of arrest conflicts with Sec. 1 of the Bill of Rights.
ISSUE:
1. Does the CFI have jurisdiction to restrain the deportation
proceedings of the Calacday boys? NO
2. May the Commissioner of Immigration issue warrants of
arrest? NO
RATIO:
The CFI is without jurisdiction to restrain the deportation
proceedings of the Calacday boys. These proceedings are within
the jurisdiction of the immigration authorities, due to the
Philippine Immigration Act.
Porta Perez v. Board of Special Inquiry This case was not
one where Philippine citizenship was admitted or conclusively
appeared, to respondents were allowed to continue proceedings
that had already begun by them until they have determined
whether or not petitioners were aliens.
Miranda v. Deportation Board A mere plea of citizenship
does not divest the Board of its jurisdiction over the case.
When the petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed,
deportation proceedings had already been started but not yet
completed. The Board of Commissioners had not yet rendered
any decision. The Calacday boys were then, not yet being
deported. Before the Board reaches a decision as to deportation,
it has to conduct a hearing where the main issue will be the
RULING: The writ prayed for is granted, and the order of the CFI
set aside.
Santos v. Commissioner
Bureau of Immigration
November 29, 1976
Fernando, J.
sai
SUMMARY: Lucio Santos filed petition for habeas corpus because he
was detained by virtue of the order of Commissioner. Lower Court
granted his release. Commissioner appealed stating that lower court is
FACTS:
Application for habeas corpus was filed by Lucio Santos, who
was detained under a warrant of arrest issued by Commissioner
of the Bureau of Immigration on the ground of his being a
Chinese citizen who entered the country illegally.
Lower Court issued a writ of habeas corpus commanding the
Commissioner of Immigration to produce before it on January 19,
1966 at 8:30 A.M. the person of Lucio Santos; to explain under
what circumstances he was arrested and is being detained; and
to show cause why he should not be set at liberty. Commissioner
asked the lower Court for 3 days within which to submit his
written return which was granted and the hearing was set anew
for January 25, 1966
January 21, 1966, Commissioner filed his return to the write of
habeas corpus which stated that Santos is not a Filipino citizen
but a Chinese subject whose real name is Ong Hiong King; that
petitioner illegally entered this country from Hongkong and was
detained by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued by the
Commissioner of Immigration; that deportation proceedings
against him were pending hearing before the Board of Special
Inquiry; that he had confessed that he was an illegal entrant to
this country; that based on his own application for registration
with the Philippine Consulate General in Hongkong for
documentation as a Filipino, it is evident that he is a Chinese
because, even if he was born of a Filipino mother and a Chinese
father, his election of Filipino citizenship was made much too
late and thus he was in estoppel to claim or elect Filipino
citizenship.
In the Qua Chee Gan whose ponente was Justice Barrera this was
answered in the negative. Thus: "Under the express terms of our
Constitution, it is therefore, even doubtful whether the arrest of
an individual may be ordered by any authority other than the
judge if the purpose is merely to determine the existence of a
probable cause, leading to an administrative investigation. The
Constitution does not distinguish between warrants in a criminal
case and administrative warrants in administrative proceedings.
And, if one suspected of having committed a crime is entitled to
a determination of the probable cause against him, by a judge,
why should one suspected of a violation of an administrative
nature deserve less guarantee? Of course it is different if the
order of arrest is issued to carry out a final finding of a violation,
either by an executive or legislative officer or agency duly
authorized for the purpose, as then the warrant is not that
mentioned in the Constitution which is issuable only on probable
cause. Such, for example, would be a warrant of arrest to carry
out a final order of deportation, or to effect compliance of an
order of contempt. The contention of the Solicitor General that
the arrest of a foreigner is necessary to carry into effect the
power of deportation is valid only when, as already stated, there
is already an order of deportation. To carry out the order of
deportation, the President obviously has the power to order the
arrest of the deportee But, certainly, during the investigation, it
is not indispensable that the alien be arrested."
DISPOSITIVE: LC affirmed
The foregoing does not deviate from the ruling in Qua Chee
Gan vs. Deportation Board that "under the express terms of
our [1935] Constitution, it is therefore even doubtful
whether the arrest of an individual may be ordered by any
authority other than a judge if the purpose is merely to
determine the existence of a probable cause, leading to an
administrative investigation." For, as heretofore stated,
probable cause had already been shown to exist before the
warrants of arrest were issued.
Harvey v. Defensor-Santiago
June 28, 1988
Melencio-Herrera
Paolo Q. Bernardo
FACTS:
RATIO:
The three petitioners filed an Urgent Petition for Release Under Bond
alleging that
their health was being seriously affected by their continuous detention.
Upon recommendation of the Board of Commissioners for their
provisional release, Defensor-Santiago ordered the CID doctor to
examine petitioners, who certified that the three petitioners were
healthy. A Petition for Bail filed by the three was denied by respondent
considering the certification by the CID physician that petitioners were
healthy.
Harvey filed a Manifestation/Motion stating that he had "finally agreed
to a self-deportation" and praying that he be "provisionally released for
at least 15 days and placed under the custody of Atty. Asinas before he
voluntarily departs the country." The Board of Special Inquiry allowed
provisional release of five days under certain conditions.
However, it appears that on the same date that the Manifestation/
Motion was filed, Harvey and his co-petitioners had already filed a
Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus.
In the petition, Harvey, Sherman and Elshout question the validity of
their detention on the following grounds:
4) There is no provision in the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940
nor under Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code, which
gives the Commissioner any authority to arrest and
detain the three petitioners pending determination of
the existence of a probable cause leading to an
administrative investigation.
5) Defensor-Santiago violated Section 2, Article III of the
1987 Constitution prohibiting unreasonable searches and
seizures since the CID agents were not clothed with valid
Warrants of arrest, search and seizure as required by the said
provision.
6) Mere confidential information made to the CID agents and
their suspicion of the activities of the three petitioners that they
are pedophiles, coupled with their association with other
suspected pedophiles, are not valid legal grounds for their
arrest and detention unless they are caught in the act. They
further allege that being a pedophile is not punishable by any
Philippine Law nor is it a crime to be a pedophile.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
SUMMARY:
Lucien Tran Van Nghia, a French immigrant, was arrested
because of a complaint filed by his landlord accusing him of
being an undesirable alien for "committing acts inimical to
public safety and progress." Commissioner Liwag ordered his
arrest without a warrant of arrest. Nghia filed the case for
Habeas Corpus questioning the legality of his detention and his
arrest. SC ruled that his arrest was legal. Even if arrest was
illegal subsequent events cured the illegality of his arrest such
as his release and initiation of formal deportation proceedings.
DOCTRINE:
- The requirement of probable cause to be determined by a
Judge, does not extend to deportation proceedings.' (Morano
vs. Vivo, supra, citing Tiu Chun Hai vs. Commissioner, infra).
There need be no 'truncated' recourse to both judicial and
administrative warrants in a single deportation proceeding.
- What is essential is that there should be a specific charge
against the alien intended to be arrested and deported, that a
fair hearing be conducted (Section 37 [c] with the assistance of
counsel, if desired, and that the charge be substantiated by
competent evidence.
FACTS:
- Lucien Tran Van Nghia is a French national who came to the
Philippines as a temporary visitor, but his status was later
changed to that of an immigrant based on his representation
that he is financially capable and will invest in the Philippines.
BUT even assuming that the arrest of Nghia was not legal at
the beginning, certain events have supervened to render his
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SALAZAR v. ACHACOSO
March 14, 1990
Sarmiento, J
Denn
10
11
But 17 years after being readmitted, the NBI charged him with
violations of the Immigration Act. Pursuant to this, the Commissioner
of Immigration and Deportation issued an order commanding the
arrest of Gatchalian. What is relevant in the SCs decision is the
propriety of the Commissioners issuance of the warrant of arrest. The
SC declared the issuance of the warrant of arrest as unconstitutional
and Gatchalian was declared a Filipino citizen.
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS
v. DELA ROSA
May 31, 1991
Bidin, J
Diwata
SUMMARY:
William Gatchalians grandfather was recognized by the Bureau of
Immigration as a native born Filipino citizen. A year after, William
Gatchalian arrived in the Philippines. Upon his entry, there was an
issue as to his exclusion as a Filipino Citizen and an order of exclusion
and a warrant of arrest were issued. But not long after, his exclusion
was reversed and he was reaffirmed as a Filipino citizen.
DOCTRINE:
A warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, to be
valid, must be for the sole purpose of executing a final order of
deportation. A warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of
Immigration for purposes of investigation only, as in the case at bar, is
null and void for being unconstitutional
FACTS:
12
b.
c.
Seventeen years after, upon request by the NBI, the Secretary of Justice
charged William with violations of the Immigration Act of 1940. The
Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation issued an order
commanding the arrest of Gatchalian. William posted a cash bond for
his release.
William filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with injunction with
the RTC to enjoin the deportation proceedings. The TRO was granted.
d.
ISSUES:
1. W/N RTC and not the CA has jurisdiction
2. W/N the arrest of Gatchalian follows as a matter of
consequence based on the warrant of exclusion
HELD:
1. YES, RTC has jurisdiction because Bureau of Immigration is not a
quasi-judicial agency
2. NO, arrest does not follow the exclusion order
RATIO: (There are several issues in the case which made it reach 68
pages on iPad. But I will skip the ratio on the irrelevant issue)
1. SKIPPED
2. NO, arrest does not follow the exclusion order
a. Sec. 37 (a) of the Immigration Act of 1940
i. The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of
the Commissioner of Immigration or of any other officer
e.
f.
g.
13
h.
i.
j.
k.
l.
DISPOSITIVE:
Gatchalian is declared a Filipino Citizen. Commissioner is enjoined from
continuing with the deportation proceedings.
DAVIDES CONCURRING-DISSENTING OPINION
14
his entry. Technically, the alien in this case is being excluded; however,
the rules on deportation can be made to apply to him in view of the fact
that the cause for his exclusion is discovered only after he had gained
physical entry.
DOCTRINE:
1) Generally, a search of private property without proper
consent is "unreasonable" unless it has been authorized
by a valid search warrant (Stoner v. California, etc.)
a. Exception: Frank v. Maryland (The Court upheld
the conviction of one who refused to permit a
warrantless inspection of private premises for the
purposes of locating and abating a suspected
public nuisance.)
2) Warrantless administrative searches are significant
intrusions upon interests protected by the 4th
Amendment, and will be subjected to scrutiny by the
Court, particularly as to reasonableness and whether
there is an emergency or not.
ISSUES:
1) WON the arrest of Camara due to his refusal to allow
warrantless inspection of his apartment is contrary to the
4th and 14th Amendment
2) WON inspections should only be conducted when the
inspector has probable cause to believe that there is a
violation.
ARGUMENTS OF CAMARA: Sec. 503 is contrary to the 4th and
14th Amendments.
FACTS:
15
16
SEE v. SEATTLE
June 5, 1967
Mr. Justice White
Krissy
SUMMARY: See refused to allow access to his commercial warehouse
without a warrant a representative of the City of Seattle Fire
Department for inspection pursuant to Seattles Fire Code. He then
was charged and convicted under 8.01.050 of said Code. The US SC
reversed his conviction and held as violative of the 4th Amendment
said entry without a warrant.
DOCTRINE: The 4th Amendment bars prosecution of a person who has
refused to permit a warrantless code-enforcement inspection of his
17
18
Why the ceremony, the delay, the expense, the abuse of the
search warrant? This will not only destroy its integrity but will
degrade the magistrate issuing them and soon bring disrepute
not only upon the practice but upon the judicial process. It will
be very costly to the city in paperwork incident to the issuance
of the paper warrants, in loss of time of inspectors and waste of
the time of magistrates and will result in more annoyance to the
public. It will also be more burdensome to the occupant of the
premises to be inspected. Under a search warrant the inspector
The Majority says that under the present system, the occupant
has no way of knowing the necessity for the inspection, the
limits of the inspectors power, or whether the inspector is
authorized to perform the search.
19
20
But, in so far as the case of Wong Wing held that the trial and
punishment for an infamous offense was not an administrative,
but a judicial, function, it is wholly irrelevant to this case, since,
on the face of the section which authorizes the Secretary of
Commerce and Labor to impose the exaction, it is apparent that
it does not purport to define and punish an infamous crime, or
indeed any criminal offense. When the section is enlightened by
an analysis of the context of the act and by a consideration of
the report of the Senate committee, its various sections
accurately distinguish between those cases where it was
intended that particular violations of the act should be
considered as criminal and be punished accordingly, and those
where it was contemplated that violations should not constitute
crime, but merely entail the infliction of a penalty, enforceable in
some cases by purely administrative action and in others by civil
suit. By a consideration of the report of the Senate committee, it
no doubt that the sole purpose of Section 9 was to impose a
penalty, based upon the medical examination for which the
statute provided, thus tending, by the avoidance of controversy
and delay, to secure the efficient performance by the steamship
company of the duty to examine in the foreign country, before
embarkation, and thereby aid in carrying out the policy of
Congress to exclude from the United States aliens afflicted with
loathsome or dangerous contagious diseases as defined in the
act.
21
Section
of
the
Alien
The CAB claims that PAL should have first obtained the
permission of the CAB before operating the flagstop and that
such failure to obtain permission is a violation of Republic Act
No. 776. Thus, the CAB imposed a fine of P5,000 on PAL through
a resolution, quoted below.
SUMMARY: The CAB imposed a fine on PAL for having its flight
from Tugegarao to Manila to make a stop in Baguio without first
obtaining the permission of the CAB.
DOCTRINE: The fine imposed upon PAL is not in the nature of
fines as contemplated by the RPC. It is in the nature of an
administrative penalty which administrative officers are
empowered to impose without criminal prosecution. The
imposition of the fine is not so much on exacting penalty for
the violation committed as the need to stress upon the air
22
23
CIR DECISION:
The CIR found the employers guilty of unfair labor practice, and
ordered payment o a fine of P100, reinstatement, and backwages.
On appeal, they assail the findings of fact as well as the legality of
the imposition of a fine of P100.
FACTS:
Nena Micaller was employed as a salesgirl in the Scoty's Department
Store, owned and operated by Yu Ki Lam, Richard Yang, Yu Si Kiao, and
Helen Yang. She was earning P4.80 a day. After every new year, she was
given from P180 to P200 as bonus. Other employees were only given
P60. She was also given the first prize for being the best seller, most
cooperative, and most honest employee for 3 consecutive years.
On October 1953, she organized a union, later affiliated with the
National Labor Union (NLU), which then sent a petition to the employers
containing 10 demands. Micaller was then called for questioning, and
was asked who the members of the union were. She pretended no to
know them
Later, Yang and Kiao went to Micaller's house to question her again
regarding her union membership. Still later, she was brought to the
counsel for the employers and questioned about her union activities.
She was made to sign a paper of withdrawal from the union.
Lam, on the other hand, questioned asked each and every employee
of their union membership and threatened to close the store if they
would not dissolved the union. The union thus gave a notice of strike to
the management, which then hired temporary employees affiliated with
another union.
Soon after, an informations for threats and slander were filed against
Micaller. Then she was dismissed from work for "insulting the owner xxx
and for talking to the girls inside the store during business hours."
She filed charges of unfair labor practice, under Section 5, Industrial
Peace Act (RA 875), alleging that (1) she was dismissed because of her
membership in the National Labor Union, (2) prior to her dismissal, her
employers had been questioning their employees regarding their union
24
RULING:
The imposition of fine is illegal. The CIR decision was modified.
US V. Barrias
24 September 1908
Justice Tracey
CA RULING: n/a
ISSUES: IS THE RULE VALID? NO. The Collector cannot fix the
penalty of the law.
RATIO:
I.
SEC. 5. The Collector of Customs for the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized,
empowered, and directed to promptly make and publish suitable rules and regulations to
carry this law into effect and to regulate the business herein licensed.
FACTS:
RULE: Paragraphs 702 and 833 of Circular No. 397 of the Insular
Collector of Customs
SEC. 8. Any person who shall violate the provisions of this Act, or of any rule or regulation
made and issued by the Collector of Customs for the Philippine Islands, under and by
authority of this Act, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall be
punished by imprisonment for not more than six months, or by a fine of not more than one
hundred dollars, United States currency, or by both such fine and imprisonment, at the
discretion of the court; Provided, That violations of law may be punished either by the
method prescribed in section seven hereof, or by that prescribed in this section or by both.
No heavily loaded casco, lighter, or other similar craft shall be permitted to move in the
Pasig River without being towed by steam or moved by other adequate power.
3
For the violation of any part of the foregoing regulations, the persons offending shall be
liable to a fine of not less than P5 and not more than P500, in the discretion of the court.
25
II.
A.
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF
THE PHILIPPINES, INC (RCPI)
v BOARD OF
COMMUNICATIONS
November 29, 1977
Martin, J.
Ana
26
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Board of Communications has the
power to impose a fine for the breach committed by
RCPI?
2. Whether or not the Board of Communications has
jurisdiction over the claim of damages for RCPIs breach
of contractual obligations?
FACTS:
1. The case is a consolidation of two petitions regarding the
jurisdiction of the Board of Communications over claims
for damages suffered by private respondents Diego
Morales and Pacifico Innociencio due to the failure of RCPI
to send them the corresponding telegrams sent to them
by their relatives.
2. In the case of Diego Morales, he claims that his daughter
sent him a telegram from Santiago, Isabela informing him
of the death of his wife. He did not receive the said
telegram and had to be informed personally about the
death of his wife. He had to take the trip by airplane to
Isabela. According to RCPI, the signal became
intermittent when they were relaying the telegram from
Isabela to Cubao, QC, which made the copy unreadable
and unintelligible.
3. On the other hand, Pacifico Innocencio claims that he
never received the telegram sent by Lourdes Innocencio
for the purpose of informing him about the death of their
father. The telegram was sent in Paniqui, Tarlac and was
supposed to be delivered to Innocencio in Cavinti, laguna.
He was not able to attend the interment of their father at
Tarlac and he was shocked when he learned about the
death of his father and claims that he suffered mental
anguish and personal inconveniences.
4. Both private respondents (Morales and Innocencio claims
for moral damages.
5. After hearing, the Board of Communications imposed
upon petitioner a disciplinary fine of P200 pursuant to
Sec. 21 of Commonwealth Act 146, as amended by PD 1
and Letter of Implementation No. 1. The Board found that
the services rendered by petitioner was inadequate and
unsatisfactory.
RATIO:
1. NO
a. Under Sec. 21 of the Public Service Act, a fine shall
be imposed if the public service violates or
failures to comply with the terms and
conditions of any certificate or any orders,
decisions, or regulations of the Commission.
b. In the two cases, RCPI is not charged with violating
or failing to comply with any orders, decisions, or
regulations of the Commissions. There are also no
complaints regarding the terms and conditions of
the certificate of public convenience issued to
RCPI. Rather, private respondents are asking for
damages for breach of contractual obligations
through negligence under the Civil Code.
c. Likewise, the charges does not relate toe the
management of the facilities and systems of
transmission of messages by petitioner in
accordance
with its certificate of
public
convenience.
2. NO
27
a. The Public Service Commission and its successorin-interest, the Board of Communications, being a
creature of the legislature and not a court, can
exercise only such jurisdiction and powers as are
expressly or by necessarily implication conferred
upon it by statute
b. The jurisdiction and functions of the Board of
Communications are those provided for in the
Public Service Act, which created its
successor-in-interest.
c. The Public Service Act confers upon the Board the
power to issue certificate of public convenience
28
3.
a.
b.
ISSUE: WON the RTC erred in declaring the provisions of the Circular
null and void, and prohibiting the Circulars implementation.
IV.
Note also that the enabling laws on which the Circular is based
were specifically intended to provide the DOE with increased
administrative and penal measures with which to effectively
curtail rampant adulteration and shortselling which are inimical
to public interest
V.
III.
FACTS:
The instant petition arose from an inspection
conducted by the Pollution Control Division of the Laguna
29
ISSUES:
1. WON the petition for certiorari filed by SM with the
CA is premature? YES.
The Court agrees with LLDA that SM did not exhaust
administrative remedies before filing a petition
for certiorari with the CA. Also, the Court is not
persuaded by respondent's contention that the
special civil action for certiorari it filed with the CA
involved only purely legal questions and did not
raise factual issues. A perusal of the petition
for certiorari filed by respondent readily shows that
factual matters were raised. Since the matters
raised by respondent involve factual issues, the
questioned Orders of the LLDA should have been
brought first before the DENR which has
administrative supervision of the LLDA.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE,
the
petition
is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, and
the Resolution are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Orders of the Laguna Lake Development Authority, are
hereby REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
32