Electronic Evidence Cases

ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE
SUPREME
Manila
COURT
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 170633
October 17, 2007
MCC INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
SSANGYONG CORPORATION, respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 82983
and its Resolution2 denying the motion for reconsideration
thereof.
Petitioner MCC Industrial Sales (MCC), a domestic corporation
with office at Binondo, Manila, is engaged in the business of
importing and wholesaling stainless steel products. 3 One of
its suppliers is the Ssangyong Corporation (Ssangyong), 4 an
international trading company5 with head office in Seoul,
South Korea and regional headquarters in Makati City,
Philippines.6 The two corporations conducted business
through telephone calls and facsimile or telecopy
transmissions.7 Ssangyong would send the pro forma invoices
containing the details of the steel product order to MCC; if
the latter conforms thereto, its representative affixes his
signature on the faxed copy and sends it back to Ssangyong,
again by fax.8
On April 13, 2000, Ssangyong Manila Office sent, by fax, a
letter9 addressed to Gregory Chan, MCC Manager [also the
President10 of Sanyo Seiki Stainless Steel Corporation], to
confirm MCC's and Sanyo Seiki's order of 220 metric

tons (MT) of hot rolled stainless steel under a preferential
rate of US$1,860.00 per MT. Chan, on behalf of the
corporations, assented and affixed his signature on
the conforme portion of the letter.11
On April 17, 2000, Ssangyong forwarded to MCC Pro
Forma Invoice No. ST2-POSTSO40112 containing the terms
and conditions of the transaction. MCC sent back by fax to
Ssangyong the invoice bearing the conformity signature 13 of
Chan. As stated in the pro forma invoice, payment for the
ordered steel products would be made through an irrevocable
letter
of
credit
(L/C)
at
sight
in
favor
of
Ssangyong.14 Following their usual practice, delivery of the
goods was to be made after the L/C had been opened.
In the meantime, because of its confirmed transaction with
MCC, Ssangyong placed the order with its steel
manufacturer, Pohang Iron and Steel Corporation (POSCO), in
South Korea15 and paid the same in full.
Because MCC could open only a partial letter of credit, the
order for 220MT of steel was split into two, 16 one
for110MT covered
by Pro
Forma Invoice
No. ST2POSTS0401-117 and another for 110MT covered by ST2POSTS0401-2,18 both dated April 17, 2000.
On June 20, 2000, Ssangyong, through its Manila Office,
informed Sanyo Seiki and Chan, by way of a fax transmittal,
that it was ready to ship 193.597MT of stainless steel from
Korea to the Philippines. It requested that the opening of the
L/C be facilitated.19 Chan affixed his signature on the fax
transmittal and returned the same, by fax, to Ssangyong. 20
Two days later, on June 22, 2000, Ssangyong Manila Office
informed Sanyo Seiki, thru Chan, that it was able to secure a
US$30/MT price adjustment on the contracted price of
US$1,860.00/MT for the 200MT stainless steel, and that the
goods were to be shipped in two tranches, the first 100MT on
that day and the second 100MT not later than June 27, 2000.
Ssangyong reiterated its request for the facilitation of the

L/C's opening.21
Ssangyong later, through its Manila Office, sent a letter, on
June 26, 2000, to the Treasury Group of Sanyo Seiki that it
was looking forward to receiving the L/C details and a cable
copy thereof that day.22 Ssangyong sent a separate letter of
the same date to Sanyo Seiki requesting for the opening of
the L/C covering payment of the first 100MT not later than
June 28, 2000.23 Similar letters were transmitted by
Ssangyong Manila Office on June 27, 2000. 24 On June 28,
2000, Ssangyong sent another facsimile letter to MCC stating
that its principal in Korea was already in a difficult
situation25 because of the failure of Sanyo Seiki and MCC to
open the L/C's.
The following day, June 29, 2000, Ssangyong received, by
fax, a letter signed by Chan, requesting an extension of time
to open the L/C because MCC's credit line with the bank had
been fully availed of in connection with another transaction,
and MCC was waiting for an additional credit line. 26 On the
same date, Ssangyong replied, requesting that it be informed
of the date when the L/C would be opened, preferably at the
earliest possible time, since its Steel Team 2 in Korea was
having problems and Ssangyong was incurring warehousing
costs.27 To maintain their good business relationship and to
support MCC in its financial predicament, Ssangyong offered
to negotiate with its steel manufacturer, POSCO, another
US$20/MT discount on the price of the stainless steel
ordered. This was intimated in Ssangyong's June 30, 2000
letter to MCC.28 On July 6, 2000, another follow-up letter 29 for
the opening of the L/C was sent by Ssangyong to MCC.
However, despite Ssangyong's letters, MCC failed to open a
letter of credit.30 Consequently, on August 15, 2000,
Ssangyong, through counsel, wrote Sanyo Seiki that if the
L/C's were not opened, Ssangyong would be compelled to
cancel the contract and hold MCC liable for damages for
breach thereof amounting to US$96,132.18, inclusive of
warehouse expenses, related interests and charges. 31
Later, Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS080-132 and ST2POSTS080-233 dated August 16, 2000 were issued by
Ssangyong and sent via fax to MCC. The invoices slightly
varied the terms of the earlier pro forma invoices (ST2POSTSO401, ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2),
in that the quantity was now officially 100MT per invoice and
the price was reduced to US$1,700.00 per MT. As can be
gleaned from the photocopies of the said August 16, 2000
invoices submitted to the court, they both bear the
conformity signature of MCC Manager Chan.
On August 17, 2000, MCC finally opened an L/C with PCIBank
for US$170,000.00 covering payment for 100MT of stainless
steel coil under Pro Forma Invoice No. ST2-POSTS0802.34 The goods covered by the said invoice were then shipped
to and received by MCC.35
MCC then faxed to Ssangyong a letter dated August 22, 2000
signed by Chan, requesting for a price adjustment of the
order stated in Pro Forma Invoice No. ST2-POSTS080-1,
considering that the prevailing price of steel at that time was
US$1,500.00/MT, and that MCC lost a lot of money due to a
recent strike.36
Ssangyong rejected the request, and, on August 23, 2000,
sent a demand letter37 to Chan for the opening of the second
and last L/C of US$170,000.00 with a warning that, if the said
L/C was not opened by MCC on August 26, 2000, Ssangyong
would be constrained to cancel the contract and hold MCC
liable for US$64,066.99 (representing cost difference,
warehousing expenses, interests and charges as of August
15, 2000) and other damages for breach. Chan failed to reply.
Exasperated, Ssangyong through counsel wrote a letter to
MCC, on September 11, 2000, canceling the sales contract
under ST2-POSTS0401-1 /ST2-POSTS0401-2,
and
demanding payment of US$97,317.37 representing losses,
warehousing expenses, interests and charges. 38
Ssangyong then filed, on November 16, 2001, a civil action
for damages due to breach of contract against defendants
MCC, Sanyo Seiki and Gregory Chan before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City. In its complaint, 39Ssangyong alleged that
defendants breached their contract when they refused to
open the L/C in the amount of US$170,000.00 for the
remaining 100MT of steel under Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2.
After Ssangyong rested its case, defendants filed a Demurrer
to Evidence40 alleging that Ssangyong failed to present the
original copies of the pro forma invoices on which the civil
action was based. In an Order dated April 24, 2003, the court
denied the demurrer, ruling that the documentary evidence
presented had already been admitted in the December 16,
2002 Order41 and their admissibility finds support in Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic
Commerce Act of 2000. Considering that both testimonial
and documentary evidence tended to substantiate the
material allegations in the complaint, Ssangyong's evidence
sufficed for purposes of a prima facie case.42
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision 43 on
March 24, 2004, in favor of Ssangyong. The trial court ruled
that when plaintiff agreed to sell and defendants agreed to
buy the 220MT of steel products for the price of US$1,860
per MT, the contract was perfected. The subject transaction
was evidenced by Pro FormaInvoice Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1
and ST2-POSTS0401-2, which were later amended only in
terms of reduction of volume as well as the price per MT,
following Pro
Forma Invoice
Nos. ST2-POSTS0801 and ST2-POSTS080-2. The RTC, however, excluded Sanyo
Seiki from liability for lack of competent evidence.
The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Judgment is hereby
rendered ordering defendants MCC Industrial Sales
Corporation and Gregory Chan, to pay plaintiff, jointly
and severally the following:
1) Actual damages of US$93,493.87 representing the
outstanding principal claim plus interest at the rate of
6% per annum from March 30, 2001.
2) Attorney's fees in the sum of P50,000.00

plus P2,000.00 per counsel's appearance in court, the
same being deemed just and equitable considering
that by reason of defendants' breach of their obligation
under the subject contract, plaintiff was constrained to
litigate to enforce its rights and recover for the
damages it sustained, and therefore had to engage the
services of a lawyer.
3) Costs of suit.
No award of exemplary damages for lack of sufficient
basis.
SO ORDERED.44
On April 22, 2004, MCC and Chan, through their counsel of
record, Atty. Eladio B. Samson, filed their Notice of
Appeal.45 On June 8, 2004, the law office of Castillo Zamora &
Poblador entered its appearance as their collaborating
counsel.
In their Appeal Brief filed on March 9, 2005, 46 MCC and Chan
raised before the CA the following errors of the RTC:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO PLAINLY ERRED IN
FINDING
THAT
APPELLANTS
VIOLATED
THEIR
CONTRACT WITH APPELLEE
A. THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO PLAINLY
ERRED IN FINDING THAT APPELLANTS AGREED
TO PURCHASE 200 METRIC TONS OF STEEL
PRODUCTS FROM APPELLEE, INSTEAD OF ONLY
100 METRIC TONS.
1.
THE
HONORABLE
COURT A
QUO PLAINLY ERRED IN ADMITTING IN
EVIDENCE
THE PRO
FORMA INVOICES
WITH REFERENCE NOS. ST2- POSTS04011 AND ST2-POSTS0401-2.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO PLAINLY ERRED IN

AWARDING ACTUAL DAMAGES TO APPELLEE.
III. THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO PLAINLY ERRED IN
AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES TO APPELLEE.
IV. THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO PLAINLY ERRED IN
FINDING APPELLANT GREGORY CHAN JOINTLY AND
SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH APPELLANT MCC.47
48
On August 31, 2005, the CA rendered its Decision affirming

the ruling of the trial court, but absolving Chan of any
liability. The appellate court ruled, among others, that Pro
Forma
Invoice
Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2POSTS0401-2 (Exhibits "E", "E-1" and "F") were admissible
in evidence, although they were mere facsimile printouts of
MCC's steel orders.49 The dispositive portion of the appellate
court's decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court holds:
(1) The award of actual damages, with interest,
attorney's fees and costs ordered by the lower court is
hereby AFFIRMED.
(2) Appellant Gregory Chan is hereby ABSOLVED from
any liability.
SO ORDERED.50
A copy of the said Decision was received by MCC's and
Chan's principal counsel, Atty. Eladio B. Samson, on
September 14, 2005.51 Their collaborating counsel, Castillo
Zamora & Poblador,52 likewise, received a copy of the CA
decision on September 19, 2005.53
On October 4, 2005, Castillo Zamora & Poblador, on behalf
of MCC, filed a motion for reconsideration of the said
decision.54 Ssangyong opposed the motion contending that
the decision of the CA had become final and executory on
account of the failure of MCC to file the said motion within
the reglementary period. The appellate court resolved, on

November 22, 2005, to deny the motion on its
merits,55 without, however, ruling on the procedural issue
raised.
Aggrieved,
MCC
filed
a
petition
for
review
56
on certiorari before this Court, imputing the following errors
to the Court of Appeals:
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED A LEGAL QUESTION
NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH JURISPRUDENCE AND
SANCTIONED A DEPARTURE FROM THE USUAL AND
ACCEPTED COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS BY
REVERSING THE COURT A QUO'S DISMISSAL OF THE
COMPLAINT IN CIVIL CASE NO. 02-124 CONSIDERING
THAT:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
SUSTAINING THE ADMISSIBILITY IN EVIDENCE OF
THE PRO-FORMA INVOICES WITH REFERENCE
NOS. ST2-POSTSO401-1 AND ST2-POSTSO401-2,
DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE SAME WERE MERE
PHOTOCOPIES OF FACSIMILE PRINTOUTS.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO
APPRECIATE THE OBVIOUS FACT THAT, EVEN
ASSUMING
PETITIONER
BREACHED
THE
SUPPOSED CONTRACT, THE FACT IS THAT
PETITIONER FAILED TO PROVE THAT IT
SUFFERED ANY DAMAGES AND THE AMOUNT
THEREOF.
III. THE AWARD OF ACTUAL DAMAGES IN THE
AMOUNT
OF
US$93,493.87
IS
SIMPLY
UNCONSCIONABLE AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN AT
LEAST REDUCED, IF NOT DELETED BY THE
COURT OF APPEALS.57
In its Comment, Ssangyong sought the dismissal of the
petition, raising the following arguments: that the CA
decision dated 15 August 2005 is already final and executory,
because MCC's motion for reconsideration was filed beyond

the reglementary period of 15 days from receipt of a copy
thereof, and that, in any case, it was a pro forma motion; that
MCC breached the contract for the purchase of the steel
products when it failed to open the required letter of credit;
that the printout copies and/or photocopies of facsimile or
telecopy transmissions were properly admitted by the trial
court because they are considered original documents under
R.A. No. 8792; and that MCC is liable for actual damages and
attorney's fees because of its breach, thus, compelling
Ssangyong to litigate.
The principal issues that this Court is called upon to resolve
are the following:
I Whether the CA decision dated 15 August 2005 is already
final and executory;
II Whether the print-out and/or photocopies of facsimile
transmissions are electronic evidence and admissible as
such;
III Whether there was a perfected contract of sale between
MCC and Ssangyong, and, if in the affirmative, whether MCC
breached the said contract; and
IV Whether the award of actual damages and attorney's
fees in favor of Ssangyong is proper and justified.
-IIt cannot be gainsaid that in Albano v. Court of Appeals,58 we
held that receipt of a copy of the decision by one of several
counsels on record is notice to all, and the period to appeal
commences on such date even if the other counsel has not
yet received a copy of the decision. In this case, when Atty.
Samson received a copy of the CA decision on September 14,
2005, MCC had only fifteen (15) days within which to file a
motion for reconsideration conformably with Section 1, Rule
52 of the Rules of Court, or to file a petition for review on
certiorari in accordance with Section 2, Rule 45. The period
should not be reckoned from September 29, 2005 (when

Castillo Zamora & Poblador received their copy of the
decision) because notice to Atty. Samson is deemed notice to
collaborating counsel.
We note, however, from the records of the CA, that it was
Castillo Zamora & Poblador, not Atty. Samson, which filed
both MCC's and Chan's Brief and Reply Brief. Apparently, the
arrangement between the two counsels was for the
collaborating, not the principal, counsel to file the appeal
brief and subsequent pleadings in the CA. This explains why
it was Castillo Zamora & Poblador which filed the motion for
the reconsideration of the CA decision, and they did so on
October 5, 2005, well within the 15-day period from
September 29, 2005, when they received their copy of the
CA decision. This could also be the reason why the CA did not
find it necessary to resolve the question of the timeliness of
petitioner's motion for reconsideration, even as the CA
denied the same.
Independent of this consideration though, this Court
assiduously reviewed the records and found that strong
concerns of substantial justice warrant the relaxation of this
rule.
In Philippine Ports Authority v. Sargasso Construction and
Development Corporation,59 we ruled that:
In Orata v. Intermediate Appellate Court, we held that
where strong considerations of substantive justice are
manifest in the petition, this Court may relax the strict
application of the rules of procedure in the exercise of
its legal jurisdiction. In addition to the basic merits of
the main case, such a petition usually embodies
justifying circumstance which warrants our heeding to
the petitioner's cry for justice in spite of the earlier
negligence of counsel. As we held in Obut v. Court of
Appeals:
[W]e cannot look with favor on a course of
action which would place the administration of
justice in a straight jacket for then the result

would be a poor kind of justice if there would be
justice at all. Verily, judicial orders, such as the
one subject of this petition, are issued to be
obeyed, nonetheless a non-compliance is to be
dealt with as the circumstances attending the
case may warrant. What should guide judicial
action is the principle that a party-litigant is to
be given the fullest opportunity to establish the
merits of his complaint or defense rather than
for him to lose life, liberty, honor or property on
technicalities.
The rules of procedure are used only to secure and not
override or frustrate justice. A six-day delay in the
perfection of the appeal, as in this case, does not
warrant the outright dismissal of the appeal.
InDevelopment Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of
Appeals, we gave due course to the petitioner's appeal
despite the late filing of its brief in the appellate court
because such appeal involved public interest. We
stated in the said case that the Court may exempt a
particular case from a strict application of the rules of
procedure where the appellant failed to perfect its
appeal within the reglementary period, resulting in the
appellate court's failure to obtain jurisdiction over the
case. In Republic vs. Imperial, Jr., we also held that
there is more leeway to exempt a case from the
strictness of procedural rules when the appellate court
has already obtained jurisdiction over the appealed
case. We emphasize that:
[T]he rules of procedure are mere tools intended
to facilitate the attainment of justice, rather
than frustrate it. A strict and rigid application of
the rules must always be eschewed when it
would subvert the rule's primary objective of
enhancing fair trials and expediting justice.
Technicalities should never be used to defeat
the substantive rights of the other party. Every
party-litigant must be afforded the amplest
opportunity
for
the
proper
and
just
determination of his cause, free from the

constraints of technicalities.60
Moreover, it should be remembered that the Rules were
promulgated to set guidelines in the orderly administration of
justice, not to shackle the hand that dispenses it. Otherwise,
the courts would be consigned to being mere slaves to
technical rules, deprived of their judicial discretion.
Technicalities must take a backseat to substantive rights.
After all, it is circumspect leniency in this respect that will
give the parties the fullest opportunity to ventilate the merits
of their respective causes, rather than have them lose life,
liberty, honor or property on sheer technicalities. 61
The other technical issue posed by respondent is the
alleged pro
forma nature
of
MCC's
motion
for
reconsideration, ostensibly because it merely restated the
arguments previously raised and passed upon by the CA.
In this connection, suffice it to say that the mere restatement
of arguments in a motion for reconsideration does not per se
result in a pro forma motion. In Security Bank and Trust
Company, Inc. v. Cuenca,62 we held that a motion for
reconsideration may not be necessarily pro forma even if it
reiterates the arguments earlier passed upon and rejected by
the appellate court. A movant may raise the same arguments
precisely to convince the court that its ruling was erroneous.
Furthermore, the pro forma rule will not apply if the
arguments were not sufficiently passed upon and answered
in the decision sought to be reconsidered.
- II The second issue poses a novel question that the Court
welcomes. It provides the occasion for this Court to
pronounce a definitive interpretation of the equally
innovative provisions of the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000
(R.A. No. 8792) vis--vis the Rules on Electronic Evidence.
Although the parties did not raise the question whether the
original facsimile transmissions are "electronic data
messages" or "electronic documents" within the context of

the Electronic Commerce Act (the petitioner merely assails as
inadmissible evidence the photocopies of the said facsimile
transmissions), we deem it appropriate to determine first
whether the said fax transmissions are indeed within the
coverage of R.A. No. 8792 before ruling on whether the
photocopies thereof are covered by the law. In any case, this
Court has ample authority to go beyond the pleadings when,
in the interest of justice or for the promotion of public policy,
there is a need to make its own findings in order to support
its conclusions.63
Petitioner contends that the photocopies of the pro
forma invoices presented by respondent Ssangyong to prove
the perfection of their supposed contract of sale are
inadmissible in evidence and do not fall within the ambit of
R.A. No. 8792, because the law merely admits as the best
evidence the original fax transmittal. On the other hand,
respondent posits that, from a reading of the law and the
Rules on Electronic Evidence, the original facsimile
transmittal of the pro forma invoice is admissible in evidence
since it is an electronic document and, therefore, the best
evidence under the law and the Rules. Respondent further
claims that the photocopies of these fax transmittals
(specifically ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2)
are admissible under the Rules on Evidence because the
respondent sufficiently explained the non-production of the
original fax transmittals.
The argument is untenable.

The copies of the said pro-forma invoices submitted by
the appellee are admissible in evidence, although they
are mere electronic facsimile printouts of appellant's
orders. Such facsimile printouts are considered
Electronic Documents under the New Rules on
Electronic Evidence, which came into effect on August
1, 2001. (Rule 2, Section 1 [h], A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC).
"(h) 'Electronic document' refers to information
or the representation of information, data,
figures, symbols or other modes of written
expression, described or however represented,
by which a right is established or an obligation
extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved
and affirmed, which is received, recorded,
transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or
produced electronically. It includes digitally
signed documents and any printout or output,
readable by sight or other means, which
accurately reflects the electronic data message
or electronic document. For purposes of these
Rules, the term 'electronic document' may be
used interchangeably with 'electronic data
message'.
Forma
Contract
An electronic document shall be regarded as the

equivalent of an original document under the Best
Evidence Rule, as long as it is a printout or output
readable by sight or other means, showing to reflect
the data accurately. (Rule 4, Section 1, A.M. No. 01-701-SC)
Turning first to the appellants' argument against the

admissibility of the Pro Forma Invoices with Reference
Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2 (Exhibits
"E", "E-1" and "F", pp. 215-218, Records), appellants
argue that the said documents are inadmissible (sic)
being violative of the best evidence rule.
The ruling of the Appellate Court is incorrect. R.A. No.

8792,64 otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of
2000, considers an electronic data message or an electronic
document as the functional equivalent of a written document
for evidentiary purposes.65 The Rules on Electronic
Evidence66 regards an electronic document as admissible in
evidence if it complies with the rules on admissibility
In resolving this issue, the appellate court ruled as follows:

Admissibility
Invoices;
by Appellants
of
Breach
Pro
of
prescribed by the Rules of Court and related laws, and is

authenticated in the manner prescribed by the said
Rules.67 An electronic document is also the equivalent of an
original document under the Best Evidence Rule, if it is a
printout or output readable by sight or other means, shown
to reflect the data accurately.68
Thus, to be admissible in evidence as an electronic data
message or to be considered as the functional equivalent of
an original document under the Best Evidence Rule,
the writing must foremost be an "electronic data message"
or an "electronic document."
The Electronic Commerce Act of 2000 defines electronic data
message and electronic document as follows:
Sec. 5. Definition of Terms. For the purposes of this
Act, the following terms are defined, as follows:
xxx
c. "Electronic Data Message" refers to information
generated, sent, received or stored by electronic,
optical or similar means.
xxx
f. "Electronic Document" refers to information or the
representation of information, data, figures, symbols or
other modes of written expression, described or
however represented, by which a right is established
or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may
be proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded,
transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced
electronically.
The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No.
8792,69 which was signed on July 13, 2000 by the then
Secretaries of the Department of Trade and Industry, the
Department of Budget and Management, and then Governor
of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, defines the terms as:
Sec. 6. Definition of Terms. For the purposes of this

Act and these Rules, the following terms are defined,
as follows:
xxx
(e) "Electronic Data Message" refers to information
optical or similar means, but not limited to, electronic
data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex
or telecopy. Throughout these Rules, the term
"electronic data message" shall be equivalent to and
be used interchangeably with "electronic document."
xxxx
(h) "Electronic Document" refers to information or the
electronically. Throughout these Rules, the term
"electronic document" shall be equivalent to and be
used interchangeably with "electronic data message."
The phrase "but not limited to, electronic data interchange
(EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy" in the
IRR's definition of "electronic data message" is copied from
the Model Law on Electronic Commerce adopted by the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL),70 from which majority of the provisions of R.A.
No. 8792 were taken.71 While Congress deleted this phrase in
the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, the drafters of the IRR
reinstated it. The deletion by Congress of the said phrase is
significant and pivotal, as discussed hereunder.
The clause on the interchangeability of the terms "electronic
data message" and "electronic document" was the result of
the Senate of the Philippines' adoption, in Senate Bill 1902,
of the phrase "electronic data message" and the House of

Representative's employment, in House Bill 9971, of the term
"electronic
document."72 In
order
to
expedite
the
reconciliation of the two versions, the technical working
group of the Bicameral Conference Committee adopted both
terms and intended them to be the equivalent of each
one.73 Be that as it may, there is a slight difference between
the two terms. While "data message" has reference
to information electronically sent, stored or transmitted, it
does not necessarily mean that it will give rise to a right or
extinguish an obligation,74unlike an electronic document.
Evident from the law, however, is the legislative intent to
give the two terms the same construction.
The Rules on Electronic Evidence promulgated by this Court
defines the said terms in the following manner:
SECTION 1. Definition of Terms. For purposes of these
Rules, the following terms are defined, as follows:
xxxx
(g) "Electronic data message" refers to information
optical or similar means.
(h) "Electronic document" refers to information or the
electronically. It includes digitally signed documents
and print-out or output, readable by sight or other
means, which accurately reflects the electronic data
message or electronic document. For purposes of
these Rules, the term "electronic document" may be
used interchangeably with "electronic data message."
Given these definitions, we go back to the original question:

Is an original printout of a facsimile transmission an
electronic data message or electronic document?
The definitions under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000,
its IRR and the Rules on Electronic Evidence, at first glance,
convey the impression that facsimile transmissions are
electronic data messages or electronic documents because
they are sent by electronic means. The expanded definition
of an "electronic data message" under the IRR, consistent
with the UNCITRAL Model Law, further supports this theory
considering that the enumeration "xxx [is] not limited to,
electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram,
telex or telecopy." And to telecopy isto send a document
from one place to another via a fax machine.75
As further guide for the Court in its task of statutory
construction, Section 37 of the Electronic Commerce Act of
2000 provides that
Unless otherwise expressly provided for, the
interpretation of this Act shall give due regard to its
international origin and the need to promote
uniformity in its application and the observance of
good faith in international trade relations. The
generally accepted principles of international law and
convention on electronic commerce shall likewise be
considered.
Obviously, the "international origin" mentioned in this section
can only refer to the UNCITRAL Model Law, and the
UNCITRAL's definition of "data message":
"Data message" means information generated, sent,
received or stored by electronic, optical or similar
means including, but not limited to, electronic data
interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or
telecopy.76
is substantially the same as the IRR's characterization of an
"electronic data message."
However, Congress deleted the phrase, "but not limited to,

electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram,
telex or telecopy," and replaced the term "data message" (as
found in the UNCITRAL Model Law ) with "electronic data
message." This legislative divergence from what is assumed
as the term's "international origin" has bred uncertainty and
now impels the Court to make an inquiry into the true intent
of the framers of the law. Indeed, in the construction or
interpretation of a legislative measure, the primary rule is to
search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law. 77 A
construction should be rejected that gives to the language
used in a statute a meaning that does not accomplish the
purpose for which the statute was enacted, and that tends to
defeat the ends which are sought to be attained by the
enactment.78
Interestingly, when Senator Ramon B. Magsaysay, Jr., the
principal author of Senate Bill 1902 (the predecessor of R.A.
No. 8792), sponsored the bill on second reading, he proposed
to adopt the term "data message" as formulated and defined
in the UNCITRAL Model Law. 79 During the period of
amendments,
however,
the
term
evolved
into
"electronic data message," and the phrase "but not limited
to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail,
telegram, telex or telecopy" in the UNCITRAL Model Law was
deleted. Furthermore, the term "electronic data message,"
though maintaining its description under the UNCITRAL Model
Law, except for the aforesaid deleted phrase, conveyed a
different meaning, as revealed in the following proceedings:
xxxx
be defined. I would like to add a definition on what is

"data," what is "electronic record" and what is an
"electronic record system."
If the gentleman will give me permission, I will proceed
with the proposed amendment on Definition of Terms,
Section 5.
Senator Magsaysay.
Santiago.
Please
go
ahead,
Senator
Senator Santiago. We are in Part 1, short title on the

Declaration of Policy, Section 5, Definition of Terms.
At the appropriate places in the listing of these terms
that have to be defined since these are arranged
alphabetically, Mr. President, I would like to insert the
term DATA and its definition. So, the amendment will
read: "DATA" MEANS REPRESENTATION, IN ANY FORM,
OF INFORMATION OR CONCEPTS.
The explanation is this: This definition of "data" or
"data" as it is now fashionably pronounced in America -the definition of "data" ensures that our bill applies to
any form of information in an electronic record,
whether these are figures, facts or ideas.
So again, the proposed amendment is this: "DATA"
MEANS REPRESENTATIONS, IN ANY FORM, OF
INFORMATION OR CONCEPTS.
Senator Santiago. Yes, Mr. President. I will furnish a

copy together with the explanation of this proposed
amendment.
Senator Magsaysay. May I know how will this affect the

definition of "Data Message" which encompasses
electronic records, electronic writings and electronic
documents?
And then finally, before I leave the Floor, may I please

be allowed to go back to Section 5; the Definition of
Terms. In light of the acceptance by the good Senator
of my proposed amendments, it will then become
necessary to add certain terms in our list of terms to
Senator Santiago. These are completely congruent

with each other. These are compatible. When we
define "data," we are simply reinforcing the definition
of what is a data message.
Senator Magsaysay. It is accepted, Mr. President.

Senator Santiago. Thank you. The next term is
"ELECTRONIC RECORD." The proposed amendment is
as follows:
"ELECTRONIC RECORD" MEANS DATA THAT IS
RECORDED OR STORED ON ANY MEDIUM IN OR BY A
COMPUTER SYSTEM OR OTHER SIMILAR DEVICE, THAT
CAN BE READ OR PERCEIVED BY A PERSON OR A
COMPUTER SYSTEM OR OTHER SIMILAR DEVICE. IT
INCLUDES A DISPLAY, PRINTOUT OR OTHER OUTPUT
OF THAT DATA.
The explanation for this term and its definition is as
follows: The term "ELECTRONIC RECORD" fixes the
scope of our bill. The record is the data. The record
may be on any medium. It is electronic because it is
recorded or stored in or by a computer system or a
similar device.
The amendment is intended to apply, for example, to
data on magnetic strips on cards or in Smart cards. As
drafted, it would not apply to telexes or faxes,
except computer-generated faxes, unlike the
United Nations model law on electronic
commerce. It would also not apply to regular digital
telephone conversations since the information is not
recorded. It would apply to voice mail since the
information has been recorded in or by a device
similar to a computer. Likewise, video records are not
covered. Though when the video is transferred to a
website, it would be covered because of the
involvement of the computer. Music recorded by a
computer system on a compact disc would be covered.
In short, not all data recorded or stored in digital form
is covered. A computer or a similar device has to be
involved in its creation or storage. The term "similar
device" does not extend to all devices that create or
store data in digital form. Although things that are not
recorded or preserved by or in a computer system are

omitted from this bill, these may well be admissible
under other rules of law. This provision focuses on
replacing the search for originality proving the
reliability of systems instead of that of individual
records and using standards to show systems
reliability.
Paper records that are produced directly by a
computer system such as printouts are themselves
electronic records being just the means of intelligible
display of the contents of the record. Photocopies of
the printout would be paper record subject to the
usual rules about copies, but the original printout
would be subject to the rules of admissibility of this
bill.
However, printouts that are used only as paper records
and whose computer origin is never again called on
are treated as paper records. In that case, the
reliability of the computer system that produces the
record is irrelevant to its reliability.
Senator Magsaysay. Mr. President, if my memory does
not fail me, earlier, the lady Senator accepted that we
use
the
term "Data Message" rather than
"ELECTRONIC RECORD" in being consistent with the
UNCITRAL term of "Data Message." So with the new
amendment of defining "ELECTRONIC RECORD," will
this affect her accepting of the use of "Data Message"
instead of "ELECTRONIC RECORD"?
Senator Santiago. No, it will not. Thank you for
reminding me. The term I would like to insert is
ELECTRONIC DATA MESSAGE in lieu of "ELECTRONIC
RECORD."
Senator Magsaysay. Then we are, in effect, amending
the term of the definition of "Data Message" on
page 2A, line 31, to which we have no objection.
Senator Santiago. Thank you, Mr. President.

xxxx
Senator Santiago. Mr. President, I have proposed all
the amendments that I desire to, including the
amendment on the effect of error or change. I will
provide the language of the amendment together with
the explanation supporting that amendment to the
distinguished sponsor and then he can feel free to take
it up in any session without any further intervention.
Senator Magsaysay. Before we end, Mr. President, I
understand from the proponent of these amendments
that these are based on the Canadian E-commerce
Law of 1998. Is that not right?
Senator Santiago. That is correct.
80
Thus, when the Senate consequently voted to adopt the term

"electronic data message," it was consonant with the
explanation of Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago that it
would not apply "to telexes or faxes, except computergenerated faxes, unlike the United Nations model law on
electronic commerce." In explaining the term "electronic
record" patterned after the E-Commerce Law of Canada,
Senator Defensor-Santiago had in mind the term "electronic
data message." This term then, while maintaining part of the
UNCITRAL Model Law's terminology of "data message," has
assumed a different context, this time, consonant with the
term "electronic record" in the law of Canada. It accounts for
the addition of the word "electronic" and the deletion of the
phrase "but not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI),
electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy." Noteworthy is
that the Uniform Law Conference of Canada, explains the
term "electronic record," as drafted in the Uniform Electronic
Evidence Act, in a manner strikingly similar to Sen.
Santiago's explanation during the Senate deliberations:
"Electronic record" fixes the scope of the Act. The
record is the data. The record may be any medium. It
is "electronic" because it is recorded or stored in or by

a computer system or similar device. The Act is
intended to apply, for example, to data on magnetic
strips on cards, or in smart cards. As drafted, it would
not apply to telexes or faxes (except computergenerated faxes), unlike the United Nations Model Law
on Electronic Commerce. It would also not apply to
regular digital telephone conversations, since the
information is not recorded. It would apply to voice
mail, since the information has been recorded in or by
a device similar to a computer. Likewise video records
are not covered, though when the video is transferred
to a Web site it would be, because of the involvement
of the computer. Music recorded by a computer system
on a compact disk would be covered.
In short, not all data recorded or stored in "digital"
form is covered. A computer or similar device has to
be involved in its creation or storage. The term "similar
device" does not extend to all devices that create or
store data in digital form. Although things that are not
recorded or preserved by or in a computer system are
omitted from this Act, they may well be admissible
under other rules of law. This Act focuses on replacing
the search for originality, proving the reliability of
systems instead of that of individual records, and using
standards to show systems reliability.
Paper records that are produced directly by a
computer system, such as printouts, are themselves
electronic records, being just the means of intelligible
display of the contents of the record. Photocopies of
the printout would be paper records subject to the
usual rules about copies, but the "original" printout
would be subject to the rules of admissibility of this
Act.
However, printouts that are used only as paper
records, and whose computer origin is never again
called on, are treated as paper records. See subsection
4(2). In this case the reliability of the computer system

that produced the record is relevant to its reliability. 81
There is no question then that when Congress formulated the
term "electronic data message," it intended the same
meaning as the term "electronic record" in the Canada law.
This construction of the term "electronic data message,"
which excludes telexes or faxes, except computer-generated
faxes, is in harmony with the Electronic Commerce Law's
focus on "paperless" communications and the "functional
equivalent approach"82 that it espouses. In fact, the
deliberations of the Legislature are replete with discussions
on paperless and digital transactions.
Facsimile transmissions are not, in this sense, "paperless,"
but verily are paper-based.
A facsimile machine, which was first patented in 1843 by
Alexander Bain,83 is a device that can send or receive
pictures and text over a telephone line. It works by digitizing
an imagedividing it into a grid of dots. Each dot is either on
or off, depending on whether it is black or white.
Electronically, each dot is represented by a bit that has a
value of either 0 (off) or 1 (on). In this way, the fax machine
translates a picture into a series of zeros and ones (called a
bit map) that can be transmitted like normal computer data.
On the receiving side, a fax machine reads the incoming
data, translates the zeros and ones back into dots, and
reprints the picture.84 A fax machine is essentially an image
scanner, a modem and a computer printer combined into a
highly specialized package. The scanner converts the content
of a physical document into a digital image, the modem
sends the image data over a phone line, and the printer at
the other end makes a duplicate of the original
document.85 Thus, in Garvida v. Sales, Jr.,86 where we
explained the unacceptability of filing pleadings through fax
machines, we ruled that:
A facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving
the transmission and reproduction of printed and
graphic matter by scanning an original copy, one
elemental area at a time, and representing the shade

or tone of each area by a specified amount of electric
current. The current is transmitted as a signal over
regular telephone lines or via microwave relay and is
used by the receiver to reproduce an image of the
elemental area in the proper position and the correct
shade. The receiver is equipped with a stylus or other
device that produces a printed record on paper
referred to as a facsimile.
x x x A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic
pleading. It is, at best, an exact copy preserving all the
marks of an original. Without the original, there is no
way of determining on its face whether the facsimile
pleading is genuine and authentic and was originally
signed by the party and his counsel. It may, in fact, be
a sham pleading.87
Accordingly, in an ordinary facsimile transmission, there
exists an original paper-based information or data that is
scanned, sent through a phone line, and re-printed at the
receiving end. Be it noted that in enacting the Electronic
Commerce Act of 2000, Congress intended virtual or
paperless writings to be the functional equivalent and to
have
the
same legal
function as
paper-based
88
documents. Further, in a virtual or paperless environment,
technically, there is no original copy to speak of, as all direct
printouts of the virtual reality are the same, in all respects,
and are considered as originals. 89 Ineluctably, the law's
definition of "electronic data message," which, as aforesaid,
is interchangeable with "electronic document," could not
have included facsimile transmissions, which have anoriginal
paper-based copy as
sent and
a paper-based
facsimile copy as received. These two copies are distinct
from each other, and have different legal effects. While
Congress
anticipated
future
developments
in
communications and computer technology 90 when it drafted
the law, it excluded the early forms of technology, like
telegraph, telex and telecopy (except computer-generated
faxes, which is a newer development as compared to the
ordinary fax machine to fax machine transmission), when it
defined the term "electronic data message."
Clearly then, the IRR went beyond the parameters of the law
when it adopted verbatim the UNCITRAL Model Law's
definition of "data message," without considering the
intention of Congress when the latter deleted the phrase "but
not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic
mail, telegram, telex or telecopy." The inclusion of this
phrase in the IRR offends a basic tenet in the exercise of the
rule-making power of administrative agencies. After all, the
power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the
implementation of a statute is necessarily limited to what is
found in the legislative enactment itself. The implementing
rules and regulations of a law cannot extend the law or
expand its coverage, as the power to amend or repeal a
statute is vested in the Legislature. 91 Thus, if a discrepancy
occurs between the basic law and an implementing rule or
regulation, it is the former that prevails, because the law
cannot be broadened by a mere administrative issuancean
administrative agency certainly cannot amend an act of
Congress.92 Had the Legislature really wanted ordinary fax
transmissions to be covered by the mantle of the Electronic
Commerce Act of 2000, it could have easily lifted without a
bit of tatter the entire wordings of the UNCITRAL Model Law.
Incidentally, the National Statistical Coordination Board Task
Force on the Measurement of E-Commerce, 93 on November
22, 2006, recommended a working definition of "electronic
commerce," as "[a]ny commercial transaction conducted
through electronic, optical and similar medium, mode,
instrumentality and technology. The transaction includes the
sale or purchase of goods and services, between individuals,
households, businesses and governments conducted over
computer-mediated networks through the Internet, mobile
phones, electronic data interchange (EDI) and other channels
through open and closed networks." The Task Force's
proposed definition is similar to the Organization of Economic
Cooperation and Development's (OECD's) broad definition as
it covers transactions made over any network, and, in
addition, it adopted the following provisions of the OECD
definition: (1) for transactions, it covers sale or purchase of
goods and services; (2) for channel/network, it considers any
computer-mediated network and NOT limited to Internet
alone; (3) it excludes transactions received/placed using fax,
telephone or non-interactive mail; (4) it considers payments

done online or offline; and (5) it considers delivery made
online (like downloading of purchased books, music or
software programs) or offline (deliveries of goods). 94
We, therefore, conclude that the terms "electronic data
message" and "electronic document," as defined under the
Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, do not include a facsimile
transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile transmissioncannot be
considered as electronic evidence. It is not the functional
equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence Rule and is
not admissible as electronic evidence.
Since a facsimile transmission is not an "electronic data
message" or an "electronic document," and cannot be
considered as electronic evidence by the Court, with greater
reason is a photocopy of such a fax transmission not
electronic evidence. In the present case, therefore, Pro Forma
Invoice
Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2
(Exhibits "E" and "F"), which are mere photocopies of the
original fax transmittals, are not electronic evidence,
contrary to the position of both the trial and the appellate
courts.
- III Nevertheless, despite the pro forma invoices not being
electronic evidence, this Court finds that respondent has
proven by preponderance of evidence the existence of a
perfected contract of sale.
In an action for damages due to a breach of a contract, it is
essential that the claimant proves (1) the existence of a
perfected contract, (2) the breach thereof by the other
contracting party and (3) the damages which he/she
sustained due to such breach. Actori incumbit onus probandi.
The burden of proof rests on the party who advances a
proposition affirmatively.95 In other words, a plaintiff in a civil
action must establish his case by a preponderance of
evidence, that is, evidence that has greater weight, or is
more convincing than that which is offered in opposition to

it.96
In general, contracts are perfected by mere consent, 97 which
is manifested by the meeting of the offer and the acceptance
upon the thing and the cause which are to constitute the
contract. The offer must be certain and the acceptance
absolute.98 They are, moreover, obligatory in whatever form
they may have been entered into, provided all the essential
requisites for their validity are present. 99 Sale, being a
consensual contract, follows the general rule that it is
perfected at the moment there is a meeting of the minds
upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon
the price. From that moment, the parties may reciprocally
demand performance, subject to the provisions of the law
governing the form of contracts.100
E-1
Pro forma Invoice dated 17 To show that def

April 2000 with Contract their confirmation
No.ST2-POSTS0401, cont delivery to it of
ained in facsimile/thermal stainless steel p
paper faxed by defendants defendants' payme
to plaintiff showing the way of an irrevoc
printed
transmission credit in favor of pl
details on the upper other conditions.
portion of said paper as
coming from defendant
MCC on 26 Apr 00
08:41AM
E-2
Conforme signature of Mr. To show that def

Gregory Chan, contained their confirmation
in facsimile/thermal paper delivery to it of
faxed by defendants to 220MT specified s
plaintiff
showing
the products,
(ii)
printed
transmission payment thereof b
details on the upper irrevocable letter
portion of said paper as favor of plaintiff,
coming from defendant conditions.
MCC on 26 Apr 00
08:41AM
Pro forma Invoice dated 17 To

show
that
April 2000 with Contract contracted with
No.ST2-POSTSO401-2, p delivery of anothe
hotocopy
stainless
steel
payable by way of
letter of credit in fav
among other condit
The essential elements of a contract of sale are (1) consent

or meeting of the minds, that is, to transfer ownership in
exchange for the price, (2) object certain which is the subject
matter of the contract, and (3) cause of the obligation which
is established.101
In this case, to establish the existence of a perfected contract
of sale between the parties, respondent Ssangyong formally
offered in evidence the testimonies of its witnesses and the
following exhibits:
Exhibit
Description
Purpose
Pro forma Invoice dated 17 To

show
that
defendants
April 2000 with Contract contracted with plaintiff for the
No.ST2-POSTS0401-1, p delivery of 110 MT of stainless
hotocopy
steel from Korea payable by way
of an irrevocable letter of credit in
favor of plaintiff, among other
G
conditions.
Letter to defendant SANYO To prove that def

SEIKE dated 20 June informed of the
2000,contained
in opening
facsimile/thermal paper
defendant's conforme
thereof.
G-1
Signature of defendant
Gregory Chan, contained
in facsimile/thermal paper.
Letter to defendants dated To prove that defendants were

22 June 2000, original
informed of the successful price
adjustments secured by M-1
plaintiff
in favor of former and were
advised of the schedules of its
L/C opening.
Letter to defendants dated To prove that plaintiff repeatedly

requested defendants for the
agreed opening of the Letters of
Credit, defendants' failure and
Letter to defendants dated refusal to comply with their
obligations and the problems of
N
plaintiff is incurring by reason
of
defendants' failure and refusal to
open the L/Cs.
Letter to defendants dated
O
Facsimile
message
to
defendants dated 28 June
2000, photocopy
Letter from defendants To prove that defendants admit of

dated
29
June their liabilities to plaintiff, that
2000, contained
in they
requested
for P "more
facsimile/thermal
paper extension" of time for the
faxed by defendants to opening of the Let

plaintiff
showing
the and
begging
fo
printed
transmission understanding and c
details on the upper
MCC on 29 June 00 11:12
AM
Signature of defendant
Gregory Chan, contained
in facsimile/thermal paper
faxed by defendants to
plaintiff
showing
the
printed
transmission
details on the upper
MCC on June 00 11:12 AM

Letter to defendants dated To prove that plain

30 June 2000, photocopy its request for defe
opening after the la
for extension of
granted, defendant
refusal to comp
extension
o
notwithstanding.

06 July 2000, original
Demand
letter
to To prove that plaintiff was
defendants dated 15 Aug constrained to engaged services
2000, original
of a lawyer for collection efforts.
W-2
Demand
letter
to To prove that defendants opened
defendants dated 23 Aug the first L/C in favor of plaintiff,
2000, original
requested
for
further
postponement of the final L/C and
for minimal amounts, were
X urged
to open the final L/C on time, and
were informed that failure to
comply will cancel the contract.
Demand
letter
to To show defendants' refusal and
defendants dated 11 Sept failure to open the final L/C on
2000, original
time, the cancellation X-1
of the
contract
as
a
consequence
thereof, and final demand upon
defendants
to
remit
its
obligations.
X-2
W-1
Letter
from
plaintiff To prove that there was a
SSANGYONG to defendant perfected sale and purchase
SANYO SEIKI dated 13 agreement between the parties
April 2000, with fax back for 220 metric tons of steel
X-3 of
from defendants SANYO products
at
the
price
SEIKI/MCC
to
plaintiff US$1,860/ton.
SSANGYONG,contained in
facsimile/thermal
paper
with back-up photocopy
Conforme signature
of To prove that defendants, acting
defendant Gregory Chan, through Gregory Chan, agreed to
contained in
the sale and purchase of 220
facsimile/thermal
paper metric tons of steel products at
the price of US$1,86
Name of sender MCC To prove that def

Industrial
Sales their conformity to
Corporation
purchase agreemen
transmission.
Pro forma Invoice dated 16 To prove that de

August 2000, photocopy
agreed to adjust
confirmed purchase
shipments at 100
each at the discou
US$1,700/ton.
Notation "1/2", photocopy To prove that the

forma Invoice was
pro forma invoices.
Ref. No. ST2-POSTS080- To prove that the

1,photocopy
formaInvoice was
2 pro formainvoices
Conforme signature
of To prove that def
defendant
Gregory acting through G
Chan,photocopy
agreed to the sale
of the balance of 10
at the discounte
US$1,700/ton, apa
other order and shi
metric tons which
by plaintiff SSANGY
for by defendant MC
DD
DD-1
DD-2
"F"). After sifting through the records, the Court found that
these invoices
Letter from defendant MCC To prove that there
was a are mere photocopies of their original fax
transmittals.
to plaintiff SSANGYONG perfected sale and purchaseSsangyong avers that these documents were
prepared
after MCC asked for the splitting of the original
dated
22
August agreement
between
plaintiff
order
into
two, so that the latter can apply for an L/C with
2000, contained
in SSANGYONG and defendant MCC
greater
facility.
facsimile/thermal
paper for the balance of 100 metric It, however, failed to explain why the originals
of these
were not presented.
tons, apart from the
other documents
order
and shipment of 100 metric tons
To by
determine
which was delivered
plaintiff whether these documents are admissible in
evidence,
SSANGYONG and paid for we
by apply the ordinary Rules on Evidence, for as
discussed
above
we cannot apply the Electronic Commerce
defendant MCC.
Act of 2000 and the Rules on Electronic Evidence.
Because these documents are mere photocopies, they are
Ref. No. ST2-POSTS080- To prove that there was a
simply secondary evidence, admissible only upon compliance
1,contained
in perfected sale and purchase
with Rule 130, Section 5, which states, "[w]hen the original
facsimile/thermal
paper agreement
between
plaintiff
document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced
SSANGYONG and defendant MCC
in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence
for the balance of 100 metric
and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his
tons, apart from the other order
part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its
and shipment of 100 metric tons
contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of
which was delivered by plaintiff
witnesses in the order stated." Furthermore, the offeror of
SSANGYONG and paid for by
secondary evidence must prove the predicates thereof,
defendant MCC.
namely: (a) the loss or destruction of the original without bad
faith on the part of the proponent/offeror which can be shown
by circumstantial evidence of routine practices of destruction
Signature of defendant To prove that defendant
MCC, (b) the proponent must prove by a fair
of documents;
Gregory
Chan, acting through Gregory
Chan, of evidence as to raise a reasonable inference
preponderance
contained in
agreed to the sale of
and
thepurchase
loss or destruction of the original copy; and (c) it must
facsimile/thermal
paper of the balance of 100
bemetric
showntons,
that a diligent and bona fide but unsuccessful
apart from the other
order
and
search has been made for the document in the proper place
shipment of 100 ormetric
places. tons
It has been held that where the missing document
which was delivered
by plaintiff
is the
foundation of the action, more strictness in proof is
Ssangyong and required
paid for than
by where the document is only collaterally
defendant MCC.102 involved.103
Significantly, among these documentary evidence presented

by respondent, MCC, in its petition before this Court, assails
the admissibility only of Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2 (Exhibits "E" and
Given these norms, we find that respondent failed to prove

the existence of the original fax transmissions of Exhibits E
and F, and likewise did not sufficiently prove the loss or
destruction of the originals. Thus, Exhibits E and F cannot be
admitted in evidence and accorded probative weight.
It is observed, however, that respondent Ssangyong did not

rely merely on Exhibits E and F to prove the perfected
contract. It also introduced in evidence a variety of other
documents, as enumerated above, together with the
testimonies of its witnesses. Notable among them are Pro
Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS080-1 and ST2-POSTS0802 which were issued by Ssangyong and sent via fax to MCC.
As already mentioned, these invoices slightly varied the
terms of the earlier invoices such that the quantity was now
officially 100MT per invoice and the price reduced
to US$1,700.00 per MT. The copies of the said August 16,
2000 invoices submitted to the court bear the conformity
signature of MCC Manager Chan.
Pro
Forma Invoice
No. ST2-POSTS080-1 (Exhibit
"X"),
however, is a mere photocopy of its original. But then again,
petitioner MCC does not assail the admissibility of this
document in the instant petition. Verily, evidence not
objected to is deemed admitted and may be validly
considered by the court in arriving at its judgment. 104 Issues
not raised on appeal are deemed abandoned.
As to Pro Forma Invoice No. ST2-POSTS080-2 (Exhibits "1A" and "2-C"), which was certified by PCIBank as a true copy
of its original,105 it was, in fact, petitioner MCC which
introduced this document in evidence. Petitioner MCC paid
for the order stated in this invoice. Its admissibility, therefore,
is not open to question.
These invoices (ST2-POSTS0401, ST2-POSTS080-1 and
ST2-POSTS080-2), along with the other unchallenged
documentary
evidence
of
respondent
Ssangyong,
preponderate in favor of the claim that a contract of sale was
perfected by the parties.
This Court also finds merit in the following observations of
the trial court:
Defendants presented Letter of Credit (Exhibits "1", "1A" to "1-R") referring to Pro Forma Invoice for Contract
No. ST2POSTS080-2, in the amount of US$170,000.00,
and which bears the signature of Gregory Chan,

General Manager of MCC. Plaintiff, on the other hand,
presented Pro Forma Invoice referring to Contract No.
ST2-POSTS080-1, in the amount of US$170,000.00,
which likewise bears the signature of Gregory Chan,
MCC. Plaintiff accounted for the notation "1/2" on the
right upper portion of the Invoice, that is, that it was
the first of two (2) pro forma invoices covering the
subject contract between plaintiff and the defendants.
Defendants, on the other hand, failed to account for
the notation "2/2" in its Pro Forma Invoice (Exhibit "1A"). Observably further, both Pro Forma Invoices bear
the same date and details, which logically mean that
they both apply to one and the same transaction. 106
Indeed, why would petitioner open an L/C for the second half
of the transaction if there was no first half to speak of?
The logical chain of events, as gleaned from the evidence of
both parties, started with the petitioner and the respondent
agreeing on the sale and purchase of 220MT of stainless
steel at US$1,860.00 per MT. This initial contract
was perfected. Later, as petitioner asked for several
extensions to pay, adjustments in the delivery dates, and
discounts in the price as originally agreed, the parties slightly
varied the terms of their contract, without necessarily
novating it, to the effect that the original order was reduced
to 200MT, split into two deliveries, and the price discounted
to US$1,700 per MT. Petitioner, however, paid only half of its
obligation and failed to open an L/C for the other 100MT.
Notably, the conduct of both parties sufficiently established
the existence of a contract of sale, even if the writings of the
parties, because of their contested admissibility, were not as
explicit in establishing a contract. 107 Appropriate conduct by
the parties may be sufficient to establish an agreement, and
while there may be instances where the exchange of
correspondence does not disclose the exact point at which
the deal was closed, the actions of the parties may indicate
that a binding obligation has been undertaken. 108
With our finding that there is a valid contract, it is crystalclear that when petitioner did not open the L/C for the first
half of the transaction (100MT), despite numerous demands
from respondent Ssangyong, petitioner breached its
contractual obligation. It is a well-entrenched rule that the
failure of a buyer to furnish an agreed letter of credit is a
breach of the contract between buyer and seller. Indeed,
where the buyer fails to open a letter of credit as stipulated,
the seller or exporter is entitled to claim damages for such
breach. Damages for failure to open a commercial credit
may, in appropriate cases, include the loss of profit which the
seller would reasonably have made had the transaction been
carried out.109
- IV This Court, however, finds that the award of actual damages
is not in accord with the evidence on record. It is axiomatic
that actual or compensatory damages cannot be presumed,
but must be proven with a reasonable degree of
certainty.110 In Villafuerte v. Court of Appeals,111 we explained
that:
Actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in
order to compensate a party for an injury or loss he
suffered. They arise out of a sense of natural justice
and are aimed at repairing the wrong done. Except as
provided by law or by stipulation, a party is entitled to
an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary
loss as he has duly proven. It is hornbook doctrine that
to be able to recover actual damages, the claimant
bears the onus of presenting before the court actual
proof of the damages alleged to have been suffered,
thus:
A party is entitled to an adequate compensation
for such pecuniary loss actually suffered by him
as he has duly proved. Such damages, to be
recoverable, must not only be capable of proof,
but must actually be proved with a reasonable
degree of certainty. We have emphasized that
these damages cannot be presumed and courts,

in making an award must point out specific facts
which could afford a basis for measuring
whatever compensatory or actual damages are
borne.112
In the instant case, the trial court awarded to respondent
Ssangyong US$93,493.87 as actual damages. On appeal, the
same was affirmed by the appellate court. Noticeably,
however, the trial and the appellate courts, in making the
said award, relied on the following documents submitted in
evidence by the respondent: (1) Exhibit "U," the Statement of
Account dated March 30, 2001; (2) Exhibit "U-1," the details
of the said Statement of Account); (3) Exhibit "V," the
contract of the alleged resale of the goods to a Korean
corporation; and (4) Exhibit "V-1," the authentication of the
resale contract from the Korean Embassy and certification
from the Philippine Consular Office.
The statement of account and the details of the losses
sustained by respondent due to the said breach are, at best,
self-serving. It was respondent Ssangyong itself which
prepared the said documents. The items therein are not even
substantiated by official receipts. In the absence of
corroborative evidence, the said statement of account is not
sufficient basis to award actual damages. The court cannot
simply rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork as to the
fact and amount of damages, but must depend
on competent proof that the claimant had suffered, and on
evidence of, the actual amount thereof.113
Furthermore, the sales contract and its authentication
certificates, Exhibits "V" and "V-1," allegedly evidencing the
resale at a loss of the stainless steel subject of the parties'
breached contract, fail to convince this Court of the veracity
of its contents. The steel items indicated in the sales
contract114 with a Korean corporation are different in all
respects from the items ordered by petitioner MCC, even in
size and quantity. We observed the following discrepancies:
List of commodities as stated in Exhibit "V":
COMMODITY: Stainless Steel HR Sheet in Coil, Slit

Edge
SPEC: SUS304 NO. 1
6.0MM X 1,219MM X C
7.878MT
6.0MM X 1,219MM X C
8.397MT
TOTAL:
95.562MT115
SIZE/Q'TY:
2.8MM X 1,219MM X C
3.0MM X 1,219MM X C
8.193MT
7.736MT
List of commodities as stated in Exhibit "X" (the
invoice that was not paid):
3.0MM X 1,219MM X C
7.885MT
DESCRIPTION: Hot Rolled Stainless Steel Coil SUS 304
3.0MM X 1,219MM X C
8.629MT
SIZE AND QUANTITY:
4.0MM X 1,219MM X C
4.0MM X 1,219MM X C
4.5MM X 1,219MM X C
4.5MM X 1,219MM X C
5.0MM X 1,219MM X C
6.0MM X 1,219MM X C
7.307MT
2.6 MM X 4' X C
10.0MT
3.0 MM X 4' X C
25.0MT
4.0 MM X 4' X C
15.0MT
4.5 MM X 4' X C
15.0MT
5.0 MM X 4' X C
10.0MT
7.247MT
8.450MT
8.870MT
8.391MT
6.589MT
6.0 MM X 4' X C
25.0MT
TOTAL:
100MT116
From the foregoing, we find merit in the contention of MCC

that Ssangyong did not adequately prove that the items
resold at a loss were the same items ordered by the
petitioner. Therefore, as the claim for actual damages was
not proven, the Court cannot sanction the award.
Nonetheless, the Court finds that petitioner knowingly
breached its contractual obligation and obstinately refused to
pay despite repeated demands from respondent. Petitioner
even asked for several extensions of time for it to make good
its obligation. But in spite of respondent's continuous
accommodation, petitioner completely reneged on its
contractual duty. For such inattention and insensitivity, MCC
must be held liable for nominal damages. "Nominal damages
are 'recoverable where a legal right is technically violated
and must be vindicated against an invasion that has
produced no actual present loss of any kind or where there
has been a breach of contract and no substantial injury or
actual damages whatsoever have been or can be
shown.'"117 Accordingly, the Court awards nominal damages
of P200,000.00 to respondent Ssangyong.
As to the award of attorney's fees, it is well settled that no
premium should be placed on the right to litigate and not
every winning party is entitled to an automatic grant of
attorney's fees. The party must show that he falls under one
of the instances enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil
Code.118 In the instant case, however, the Court finds the
award of attorney's fees proper, considering that petitioner
MCC's unjustified refusal to pay has compelled respondent
Ssangyong to litigate and to incur expenses to protect its
rights.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED,

the
appeal
is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 82983 is MODIFIED in that the
award of actual damages is DELETED. However, petitioner
is ORDERED to pay respondent NOMINAL DAMAGES in the
amount of P200,000.00, and theATTORNEY'S FEES as
awarded by the trial court.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, Chairperson,
Nazario, Reyes, JJ., concur.
Austria-Martinez,
Chico-
EN BANC
[A.M. No. CA-05-18-P. April 12, 2005]
ZALDY
NUEZ, complainant,
APAO, respondent.
vs.
ELVIRA
CRUZ-
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
What brings our judicial system into disrepute are often the
actuations of a few erring court personnel peddling influence
to party-litigants, creating the impression that decisions can
be bought and sold, ultimately resulting in the
disillusionment of the public. This Court has never wavered in
its vigilance in eradicating the so-called bad eggs in the
judiciary. And whenever warranted by the gravity of the
offense, the supreme penalty of dismissal in an
administrative case is meted to erring personnel. [1]
The above pronouncement of this Court in the case
of Mendoza vs. Tiongson[2] is applicable to the case at bar.
This is an administrative case for Dishonesty and Grave
Misconduct[3] against
Elvira
Cruz-Apao
(Respondent),
Executive Assistant II of the Acting Division Clerk of Court of

the Fifteenth (15th) Division, Court of Appeals (CA). The
complaint arose out of respondents solicitation of One Million
Pesos (P1,000,000.00) from Zaldy Nuez (Complainant) in
exchange for a speedy and favorable decision of the latters
pending case in the CA,[4] more particularly, CA-G.R. SP No.
73460 entitled PAGCOR vs. Zaldy Nuez.[5] Complainant
initially lodged a complaint with the Action Center of the
Television program Imbestigador of GMA Network,[6] the crew
of which had accompanied him to the Presidential AntiOrganized Crime CommissionSpecial Projects Group (PAOCCSPG) in Malacaang where he filed a complaint for
extortion[7] against respondent. This led to the conduct of an
entrapment operation by elements of the Presidential AntiOrganized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) on 28 September 2004
at the Jollibee Restaurant, 2 nd Floor, Times Plaza Bldg., corner
Taft and United Nations Avenue, Manila, [8] the place where
the supposed hand-over of the money was going to take
place.
Respondents apprehension by agents of the PAOCTF in
the course of the entrapment operation prompted then CA
Presiding Justice (PJ) Cancio C. Garcia (now Supreme Court
Justice) to issue Office Order No. 297-04-CG [9] (Order) which
created an ad-hoc investigating committee (Committee).
[10]
The Committee was specifically tasked among others to
conduct a thorough and exhaustive investigation of
respondents case and to recommend the proper
administrative sanctions against her as the evidence may
warrant.[11]
In accordance with the mandate of the Order, the
Committee conducted an investigation of the case and issued
a Resolution[12] dated 18 October 2004 where it concluded
that a prima facie case of Dishonesty and Serious Misconduct
against
respondent
existed.
The
Committee
thus
recommended respondents preventive suspension for ninety
(90) days pending formal investigation of the charges against
her.[13] On 28 January 2005, the Committee submitted
a Report[14] to the new CA Presiding Justice Romeo A. Brawner

with its recommendation that respondent be dismissed from
service.
Based on the hearings conducted and the evidence
received by the Committee, the antecedent facts are as
follows:
Complainants case referred to above had been pending
with the CA for more than two years. [15] Complainant filed an
illegal dismissal case against PAGCOR before the Civil Service
Commission (CSC).
The CSC ordered complainants
reinstatement but a writ of preliminary injunction and a
temporary restraining order was issued by the CA in favor of
PAGCOR, thus complainant was not reinstated to his former
job pending adjudication of the case.[16] Desiring an
expeditious decision of his case, complainant sought the
assistance of respondent sometime in July 2004 after
learning of the latters employment with the CA from her
sister, Magdalena David. During their first telephone
conversation[17] and thereafter through a series of messages
they
exchanged
via
SMS,[18] complainant
informed
respondent of the particulars of his pending case. Allegedly,
complainant thought that respondent would be able to advise
him on how to achieve an early resolution of his case.
However, a week after their first telephone conversation,
respondent allegedly told complainant that a favorable and
speedy decision of his case was attainable but the person
who was to draft the decision was in return asking for One
Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00).[19]
Complainant expostulated that he did not have that kind
of money since he had been jobless for a long time, to which
respondent replied, Eh, ganoon talaga ang lakaran dito, eh.
Kung wala kang pera, pasensiya na.[20] Complainant then
tried to ask for a reduction of the amount but respondent
held firm asserting that the price had been set, not by her
but by the person who was going to make the decision. [21]
Respondent even admonished complainant with the

words Wala tayo sa palengke iho![22] when the latter
bargained for a lower amount.[23]
Complainant then asked for time to determine whether or
not to pay the money in exchange for the decision. Instead,
in August of 2004, he sought the assistance of Imbestigador.
[24]
The crew of the TV program accompanied him to PAOCCFSPG where he lodged a complaint against respondent for
extortion.[25] Thereafter, he communicated with respondent
again to verify if the latter was still asking for the
money[26] and to set up a meeting with her. [27] Upon learning
that respondents offer of a favorable decision in exchange
for One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) was still standing, the
plan for the entrapment operation was formulated
by Imbestigador in cooperation with the PAOCC.
On 24 September 2004, complainant and respondent met
for the first time in person at the 2 nd Floor of Jollibee, Times
Plaza Bldg.,[28] the place where the entrapment operation was
later conducted. Patricia Siringan (Siringan), a researcher
of Imbestigador, accompanied complainant and posed as his
sister-in-law.[29] During the meeting, complainant clarified
from respondent that if he gave the amount of One Million
Pesos (P1,000,000.00), he would get a favorable decision.
This was confirmed by the latter together with the assurance
that it would take about a month for the decision to come
out.[30] Respondent also explained that the amount of One
Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) guaranteed a favorable
decision only in the CA but did not extend to the Supreme
Court should the case be appealed later. [31]
When respondent was asked where the money will go,
she claimed that it will go to a male researcher whose name
she refused to divulge. The researcher was allegedly a lawyer
in the CA Fifth (5th) Division where complainant case was
pending.[32] She also claimed that she will not get any part
of the money unless the researcher decides to give her some.
[33]
Complainant tried once again to bargain for a lower

amount during the meeting but respondent asserted that the
amount was fixed. She even explained that this was their
second transaction and the reason why the amount was
closed at One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) was because on
a previous occasion, only Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P800,000.00) was paid by the client despite the fact that the
amount had been pegged at One Million Three Hundred
Thousand
Pesos
(P1,300,000.00).[34] Complainant
then
proposed that he pay a down payment of Seven Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P700,000.00) while the balance of Three
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00) will be paid once the
decision had been released. [35] However, respondent refused
to entertain the offer, she and the researcher having learned
their lesson from their previous experience for as then, the
client no longer paid the balance of Five Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P500,000.00) after the decision had come out. [36]
Complainant brought along copies of the documents
pertinent to his case during the first meeting. After reading
through them, respondent allegedly uttered, Ah, panalo
ka.[37] The parties set the next meeting date at lunchtime on
28 September 2004 and it was understood that the money
would be handed over by complainant to respondent then. [38]
On the pre-arranged meeting date, five (5) PAOCTF
agents, namely: Capt. Reynaldo Maclang (Maclang) as team
leader, SPO1 Renato Banay (Banay), PO1 Bernard Villena
(Villena), PO1 Danny Feliciano, and PO2 Edgar delos
Reyes[39] arrived at around 11:30 in the morning at Jollibee.
[40]
Nuez and Siringan arrived at past noon and seated
themselves at the table beside the one occupied by the two
(2) agents, Banay and Villena. Complainant had with him an
unsealed long brown envelope containing ten (10) bundles of
marked money and paper money which was to be given to
respondent.[41] The envelope did not actually contain the One
Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) demanded by respondent, but
instead contained paper money in denominations of One
Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) and
One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00), as well as newspaper cutouts.[42] There were also ten (10) authentic One Hundred Peso
(P100.00) bills which had been previously dusted with ultraviolet powder by the PAOCTF. [43] The three other PAOCTF
agents were seated a few tables away [44] and there were also
three (3) crew members from Imbestigador at another table
operating a mini DV camera that was secretly recording the
whole transaction.[45]
Respondent arrived at around 1:00 p.m. [46] She appeared
very nervous and suspicious during the meeting. [47] Ironically,
she repeatedly said that complainant might entrap her,
precisely like those that were shown on Imbestigador.[48] She
thus refused to receive the money then and there. What she
proposed was for complainant and Siringan to travel with her
in a taxi and drop her off at the CA where she would receive
the money.[49]
More irony ensued. Respondent actually said that she
felt there were policemen around and she was afraid that
once she took hold of the envelope complainant proffered,
she would suddenly be arrested and handcuffed. [50] At one
point, she even said, Ayan o, tapos na silang kumain, bakit
hindi pa sila umaalis?,[51] referring to Banay and Villena at
the next table. To allay respondents suspicion, the two
agents stood up after a few minutes and went near the
staircase where they could still see what was going on. [52]
Complainant, respondent and Siringan negotiated for
almost one hour.[53] Complainant and Siringan bargained for
a lower price but respondent refused to accede. When
respondent finally touched the unsealed envelope to look at
the money inside, the PAOCTF agents converged on her and
invited her to the Western Police District (WPD) Headquarters
at United Nations Avenue for questioning.[54] Respondent
became hysterical as a commotion ensued inside the
restaurant.[55]
On the way to the WPD on board the PAOCTF vehicle,

Banay asked respondent why she went to the restaurant. The
latter replied that she went there to get the One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00).[56]
Respondent was brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory at
the WPD where she was tested and found positive for ultraviolet powder that was previously dusted on the money. [57]
She was later detained at the WPD Headquarters.
At seven oclock in the evening of 28 September 2004,
respondent called Atty. Lilia Mercedes Encarnacion Gepty
(Atty. Gepty), her immediate superior in the CA at the latters
house.[58] She tearfully confessed to Atty. Gepty that she
asked for money for a case and was entrapped by police
officers and the media. [59] Enraged at the news, Atty. Gepty
asked why she had done such a thing to which respondent
replied, Wala lang maam, sinubukan ko lang baka
makalusot.[60] Respondent claimed that she was ashamed of
what she did and repented the same. She also asked for
Atty. Geptys forgiveness and help. The latter instead
reminded respondent of the instances when she and her coemployees at the CA were exhorted during office meetings
never to commit such offenses.[61]
Atty. Gepty rendered a verbal report[62] of her
conversation with their divisions chairman, Justice Martin S.
Villarama. She reduced the report into writing and submitted
the same to then PJ Cancio Garcia on 29 September 2004.
[63]
She also later testified as to the contents of her report to
the Committee.
During the hearing of this case, respondent maintained
that what happened was a case of instigation and not an
entrapment. She asserted that the offer of money in
exchange for a favorable decision came not from her but
from complainant. To support her contention, she presented
witnesses who testified that it was complainant who allegedly
offered money to anyone who could help him with his
pending case. She likewise claimed that she never touched

the money on 28 September 2004, rather it was Capt.
Maclang who forcibly held her hands and pressed it to the
envelope containing the money. She thus asked that the
administrative case against her be dismissed.
This Court is not persuaded by respondents version.
Based on the evidence on record, what happened was a clear
case of entrapment, and not instigation as respondent would
like to claim.
In entrapment, ways and means are resorted to for the
purpose of ensnaring and capturing the law-breakers in the
execution of their criminal plan. On the other hand, in
instigation, the instigator practically induces the would-be
defendant into the commission of the offense, and he himself
becomes a co-principal.[64]
In this case, complainant and the law enforcers resorted
to entrapment precisely because respondent demanded the
amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) from
complainant in exchange for a favorable decision of the
latters pending case. Complainants narration of the
incidents which led to the entrapment operation are more in
accord with the circumstances that actually transpired and
are more credible than respondents version.
Complainant was able to prove by his testimony in
conjunction with the text messages from respondent duly
presented before the Committee that the latter asked for One
Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) in exchange for a favorable
decision of the formers pending case with the CA. The text
messages were properly admitted by the Committee since
the same are now covered by Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the
Rules on Electronic Evidence[65] which provides:
Ephemeral electronic communication refers to telephone
conversations, text messages . . . and other electronic forms
of communication the evidence of which is not recorded or

retained.
Under Section 2, Rule 11 of the Rules on Electronic
Evidence, Ephemeral electronic communications shall be
proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the
same or who has personal knowledge thereof . . . . In this
case, complainant who was the recipient of said messages
and therefore had personal knowledge thereof testified on
their contents and import. Respondent herself admitted that
the cellphone number reflected in complainants cellphone
from which the messages originated was hers. [66] Moreover,
any doubt respondent may have had as to the admissibility
of the text messages had been laid to rest when she and her
counsel signed and attested to the veracity of the text
messages between her and complainant.[67] It is also well to
remember that in administrative cases, technical rules of
procedure and evidence are not strictly applied. [68] We have
no doubt as to the probative value of the text messages as
evidence in determining the guilt or lack thereof of
respondent in this case.
Complainants testimony as to the discussion between
him and respondent on the latters demand for One Million
Pesos (P1,000,000.00) was corroborated by the testimony of
a
disinterested
witness,
Siringan,
the
reporter
of Imbestigador who was present when the parties met in
person.
Siringan was privy to the parties actual
conversation since she accompanied complainant on both
meetings held on 24 and 28 of September 2004 at Jollibee.
Respondents evidence was comprised by the testimony
of her daughter and sister as well as an acquaintance who
merely testified on how respondent and complainant first
met. Respondents own testimony consisted of bare denials
and self-serving claims that she did not remember either the
statements she herself made or the contents of the
messages she sent. Respondent had a very selective
memory made apparent when clarificatory questions were

propounded by the Committee.
When she was asked if she had sent the text messages
contained in complainants cellphone and which reflected her
cellphone number, respondent admitted those that were not
incriminating but claimed she did not remember those that
clearly showed she was transacting with complainant. Thus,
during the 17 November 2004 hearing, where respondent
was questioned by Justice Salazar-Fernando, the following
transpired:
Q:
After reading those text messages, do you

remember having made those text messages?
Q:
A:
(Respondent)
A:
Opo, your Honors.

Q:
A:
And on September 23, 2004 at 1731 which

was around 5:31 in the afternoon you again
texted Zaldy Nuez and you said Sige bukas
nang tanghali sa Times Plaza, Taft Avenue,
corner U.N. Avenue. Magdala ka ng I.D. para
makilala kita o isama mo si Len David.
How about on September 23 at 5:05 in the

afternoon when you said Di pwede kelan mo
gusto fixed price na iyon.
I dont remember that, your Honors.

Q:
Only some of these, your honors.
Again on September 23 at 5:14 p.m. you

said Alam mo di ko iyon price and nagbigay
noon yung gagawa. Wala ako doon. You dont
also remember this?
Justice Salazar-Fernando: Which one?

A:
A:
Q:
Q:
What else?
A:
Q:
A:
Sabi ko po magpunta na lang sila sa office.

Yung nasa bandang unahan po, your Honors.
Yes, your Honors.
Tapos yung sabi ko pong pagpunta niya

magdala siya ng I.D. or isama niya sa kanya si
Len David.
Okay, You remember having texted Zaldy Nuez
on September 23, 2004 at 1309 which was
around 1:09 in the afternoon and you said di
me pwede punta na lang kayo dito sa office
Thursday 4:45 p.m. Room 107 Centennial
Building.
Yes, your Honors.
A:
Yes Your Honors.

Q:
A:
September 27 at 1:42 p.m. Oo naman ayusin

nyo yung hindi halatang pera. You also dont
remember that?
September 27 at 1:30 in the afternoon, Di na

pwede sabi sa akin. Pinakaiusapan ko na nga
ulit iyon. You dont remember that?
No, your Honors.[69]
Respondent would like this Court to believe that she

never had any intention of committing a crime, that the offer
of a million pesos for a favorable decision came from
complainant and that it was complainant and the law
enforcers who instigated the whole incident.
Respondent thus stated that she met with complainant

only to tell the latter to stop calling and texting her, not to
get the One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as pre-arranged.
This claim of respondent is preposterous to say the least.
Had the offer of a million pesos really come from complainant
and had she really intended to stop the latter from corrupting
her, she could have simply refused to answer the latters
messages and calls. This she did not do. She answered
those calls and messages though she later claimed she did
not remember having sent the same messages to
complainant. She could also have reported the matter to the
CA Presiding Justice, an action which respondent admitted
during the hearing was the proper thing to do under the
circumstances.[70] But this course of action she did not resort
to either, allegedly because she never expected things to
end this way.[71]
While claiming that she was not interested in
complainants offer of a million pesos, she met with him not
only once but twice, ostensibly, to tell the latter to stop
pestering her. If respondent felt that telling complainant to
stop pestering her would be more effective if she did it in
person, the same would have been accomplished with a
single meeting. There was no reason for her to meet with
complainant again on 28 September 2004 unless there was
really an understanding between them that the One Million
Pesos (P1,000,000.00) will be handed over to her then.
Respondent even claimed that she became afraid of
complainant when she learned that the latter had been
dismissed by PAGCOR for using illegal drugs. [72] This
notwithstanding, she still met with him on 28 September
2004.
Anent complainants narration of respondents refusal to
reduce the amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000.000.00)
based on the lesson learned from a previous transaction,
while admitting that she actually said the same, respondent
wants this Court to believe that she said it merely to have
something to talk about.[73] If indeed, respondent had no

intention of committing any wrongdoing, it escapes the Court
why she had to make up stories merely to test if complainant
could make good on his alleged boast that he could come up
with a million pesos. It is not in accord with ordinary human
experience for an honest government employee to make up
stories that would make party-litigants believe that court
decisions may be bought and sold. Time and again this Court
has declared, thus:
Everyone in the judiciary bears a heavy burden of
responsibility for the proper discharge of his duty and it
behooves everyone to steer clear of any situations in which
the slightest suspicion might be cast on his conduct. Any
misbehavior on his part, whether true or only perceived, is
likely to reflect adversely on the administration of justice. [74]
Respondent having worked for the government for twenty
four (24) years, nineteen (19) of which have been in the CA,
[75]
should have known very well that court employees are
held to the strictest standards of honesty and integrity. Their
conduct should at all times be above suspicion. As held by
this Court in a number of cases, The conduct or behavior of
all officials of an agency involved in the administration of
justice, from the Presiding Judge to the most junior clerk,
should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of
responsibility.[76] Their conduct must, at all times be
characterized by among others, strict propriety and decorum
in order to earn and maintain the respect of the public for the
judiciary.[77]
Respondents actuations from the time she started
communicating with complainant in July 2004 until the
entrapment operation on 28 September 2004 show a lack of
the moral fiber demanded from court employees.
Respondents avowals of innocence notwithstanding, the
evidence clearly show that she solicited the amount of One
Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) from complainant in exchange
for a favorable decision. The testimony of Atty. Gepty, the
recipient of respondents confession immediately after the

entrapment operation, unmistakably supports the finding
that respondent did voluntarily engage herself in the activity
she is being accused of.
Respondents solicitation of money from complainant in
exchange for a favorable decision violates Canon I of the
Code of Conduct for Court Personnel which took effect on 1
June 2004 pursuant to A.M. No. 03-06-13-SC. Sections 1 and
2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel
expressly provide:
SECTION 1. Court personnel shall not use their official
position to secure unwarranted benefits, privileges or
exemption for themselves or for others.
SECTION 2. Court personnel shall not solicit or accept
any gift, favor or benefit based on any explicit or
implicit understanding that such gift, favor or benefit
shall influence their official actions.(Underscoring
supplied)
It is noteworthy that the penultimate paragraph of the
Code of Conduct for Court Personnel specifically provides:
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), Supreme Court for

allegedly deceiving him into giving her money in the total
amount of Fifty Two Thousand Pesos (P52,000.00) in
exchange for his acquittal in a murder case on appeal before
the Supreme Court. It turned out that respondents
representation was false because complainant was
subsequently convicted of murder and sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua by the Supreme Court.[79]
The Supreme Court en banc found Esmeralda Abalos
guilty of serious misconduct and ordered her dismissal from
the service. This Court aptly held thus:
In Mirano vs. Saavedra,[80] this Court emphatically declared
that a public servant must exhibit at all times the highest
sense of honesty and integrity. The administration of justice
is a sacred task, and by the very nature of their duties and
responsibilities, all those involved in it must faithfully adhere
to, hold inviolate, and invigorate the principle that public
office is a public trust, solemnly enshrined in the
Constitution.[81]
Likewise, in the grave misconduct case against Datu
Alykhan T. Amilbangsa of the Sharia Circuit Court, Bengo,
Tawi-Tawi,[82] this Court stated:
INCORPORATION OF OTHER RULES

SECTION 1. All provisions of the law, Civil Service rules, and
issuances of the Supreme Court governing the conduct of
public officers and employees applicable to the judiciary are
deemed incorporated into this Code.
By soliciting the amount of One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00) from complainant, respondent committed an
act of impropriety which immeasurably affects the honor and
dignity of the judiciary and the peoples confidence in it.
In the recent case of Aspiras vs. Abalos,[78] complainant
charged respondent, an employee of the Records Section,
No position demands greater moral righteousness and

uprightness from the occupant than the judicial office. Those
connected with the dispensation of justice bear a heavy
burden of responsibility. Court employees in particular, must
be individuals of competence, honesty and probity charged
as they are with safeguarding the integrity of the court . . . .
The High Court has consistently held that persons involved in
the administration of justice ought to live up to the strictest
standards of honesty and integrity in the public service. He
should refrain from financial dealings which would interfere
with the efficient performance of his duties. [83] The conduct
required of court personnel must always be beyond
reproach.[84]
The following pronouncement of this Court in the case

of Yrastorza, Sr. vs. Latiza, Court Aide, RTC Branch 14 Cebu
City[85] is also worth remembering:
Court employees bear the burden of observing exacting
standards of ethics and morality. This is the price one pays
for the honor of working in the judiciary. Those who are part
of the machinery dispensing justice from the lowliest clerk to
the presiding judge must conduct themselves with utmost
decorum and propriety to maintain the publics faith and
respect for the judiciary. Improper behavior exhibits not only
a paucity of professionalism at the workplace but also a great
disrespect to the court itself. Such demeanor is a failure of
circumspection demanded of every public official and
employee.[86]
In view of the facts narrated above and taking into
account the applicable laws and jurisprudence, the
Committee in their Report[87] recommended that respondent
be dismissed from government service for GRAVE
MISCONDUCT and violation of Sections 1 and 2, Canon 1 of
the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel.[88]
Finding the Committees recommendation to be
supported by more than substantial evidence and in accord
with
the
applicable
laws
and
jurisprudence,
the
recommendation is well taken.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Elvira
Cruz-Apao is found GUILTY of GRAVE MISCONDUCT and
violation of SECTIONS 1 and 2 of the CODE OF CONDUCT FOR
COURT PERSONNEL and is accordingly DISMISSED from
government service, with prejudice to re-employment in any
branch, instrumentality or agency of the government,
including government-owned and controlled corporations.
Her retirement and all benefits except accrued leave credits
are hereby FORFEITED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, YnaresSantiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez,
Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga and ChicoNazario, JJ., concur.
Garcia, J., No part.
Republic
SUPREME
Manila
of
the
Philippines
COURT
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 164273
March 28, 2007
EMMANUEL
B.
AZNAR, Petitioner,
vs.
CITIBANK, N.A., (Philippines), Respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review assailing the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
62554 dated January 30, 2004 which set aside the November
25, 1998 Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 10,
Cebu City and reinstated the Decision of RTC Branch 20 of
Cebu City dated May 29, 1998 in Civil Case No. CEB-16474;
and the CA Resolution dated May 26, 2004 denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
Emmanuel B. Aznar (Aznar), a known businessman 2 in Cebu,

is a holder of a Preferred Master Credit Card (Mastercard)
bearing number 5423-3920-0786-7012 issued by Citibank
with a credit limit of P150,000.00. As he and his wife,
Zoraida, planned to take their two grandchildren, Melissa and
Richard Beane, on an Asian tour, Aznar made a total advance
deposit of P485,000.00 with Citibank with the intention of
increasing his credit limit toP635,000.00.3
With the use of his Mastercard, Aznar purchased plane tickets
to Kuala Lumpur for his group worth P237,000.00. On July 17,
1994, Aznar, his wife and grandchildren left Cebu for the said
destination.4
Aznar claims that when he presented his Mastercard in some
establishments in Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, the
same was not honored.5 And when he tried to use the same
in Ingtan Tour and Travel Agency (Ingtan Agency) in Indonesia
to purchase plane tickets to Bali, it was again dishonored for
the reason that his card was blacklisted by Citibank. Such
dishonor forced him to buy the tickets in cash. 6 He further
claims that his humiliation caused by the denial of his card
was aggravated when Ingtan Agency spoke of swindlers
trying to use blacklisted cards. 7 Aznar and his group returned
to the Philippines on August 10, 1994.8
On August 26, 1994, Aznar filed a complaint for damages
against Citibank, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-16474 and
raffled to RTC Branch 20, Cebu City, claiming that Citibank
fraudulently or with gross negligence blacklisted his
Mastercard which forced him, his wife and grandchildren to
abort important tour destinations and prevented them from
buying certain items in their tour. 9 He further claimed that he
suffered mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings,
besmirched reputation and social humiliation due to the
wrongful blacklisting of his card. 10 To prove that Citibank
blacklisted his Mastercard, Aznar presented a computer printout, denominated as ON-LINE AUTHORIZATIONS FOREIGN
ACCOUNT ACTIVITY REPORT, issued to him by Ingtan Agency
(Exh. "G") with the signature of one Victrina Elnado Nubi

(Nubi)11 which shows that his card in question was "DECL
OVERLIMIT" or declared over the limit.12
Citibank denied the allegation that it blacklisted Aznars card.
It also contended that under the terms and conditions
governing the issuance and use of its credit cards, Citibank is
exempt from any liability for the dishonor of its cards by any
merchant affiliate, and that its liability for any action or
incident which may be brought against it in relation to the
issuance and use of its credit cards is limited to P1,000.00 or
the actual damage proven whichever is lesser. 13
To prove that they did not blacklist Aznars card, Citibanks
Credit Card Department Head, Dennis Flores, presented
Warning Cancellation Bulletins which contained the list of its
canceled cards covering the period of Aznars trip. 14
On May 29, 1998, RTC Branch 20, Cebu City, through Judge
Ferdinand J. Marcos, rendered its decision dismissing Aznars
complaint for lack of merit. 15 The trial court held that as
between the computer print-out 16presented by Aznar and the
Warning Cancellation Bulletins17 presented by Citibank, the
latter had more weight as their due execution and
authenticity were duly established by Citibank. 18 The trial
court also held that even if it was shown that Aznars credit
card was dishonored by a merchant establishment, Citibank
was not shown to have acted with malice or bad faith when
the same was dishonored.19
Aznar filed a motion for reconsideration with motion to reraffle the case saying that Judge Marcos could not be
impartial as he himself is a holder of a Citibank credit
card.20 The case was re-raffled21 and on November 25, 1998,
the RTC, this time through Judge Jesus S. De la Pea of
Branch 10 of Cebu City, issued an Order granting Aznars
motion for reconsideration, as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby

GRANTED. The DECISION dated May 29, 1998 is hereby
reconsidered, and consequently, the defendant is hereby
condemned liable to pay the following sums of money:
a) P10,000,000.00 as moral damages;
Citibank filed an appeal with the CA and its counsel filed an

administrative case against Judge De la Pea for grave
misconduct, gross ignorance of the law and incompetence,
claiming among others that said judge rendered his decision
without having read the transcripts. The administrative case
was held in abeyance pending the outcome of the appeal
filed by Citibank with the CA.24lawphi1.net
b) P5,000,000.00 as exemplary damages;

c) P1,000,000.00 as attorneys fees; and
d) P200,000.00 as litigation expenses.22
Judge De la Pea ruled that: it is improbable that a man of
Aznars stature would fabricate Exh. "G" or the computer
print-out which shows that Aznars Mastercard was
dishonored for the reason that it was declared over the limit;
Exh. "G" was printed out by Nubi in the ordinary or regular
course of business in the modern credit card industry and
Nubi was not able to testify as she was in a foreign country
and cannot be reached by subpoena; taking judicial notice of
the practice of automated teller machines (ATMs) and credit
card facilities which readily print out bank account status,
Exh. "G" can be received as prima facie evidence of the
dishonor of Aznars Mastercard; no rebutting evidence was
presented by Citibank to prove that Aznars Mastercard was
not dishonored, as all it proved was that said credit card was
not included in the blacklisted cards; when Citibank accepted
the additional deposit of P485,000.00 from Aznar, there was
an implied novation and Citibank was obligated to increase
Aznars credit limit and ensure that Aznar will not encounter
any embarrassing situation with the use of his Mastercard;
Citibanks failure to comply with its obligation constitutes
gross negligence as it caused Aznar inconvenience, mental
anguish and social humiliation; the fine prints in the flyer of
the credit card limiting the liability of the bank to P1,000.00
or the actual damage proven, whichever is lower, is a
contract of adhesion which must be interpreted against
Citibank.23
On January 30, 2004, the CA rendered its Decision granting

Citibanks appeal thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The assailed
order of the Regional Trial Court, 7th Judicial Region, Branch
10, Cebu City, in Civil Case No. CEB-16474, is hereby SET
ASIDE and the decision, dated 29 May 1998 of the Regional
Trial Court, 7th Judicial Region, Branch 20, Cebu City in this
case is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.25
The CA ruled that: Aznar had no personal knowledge of the
blacklisting of his card and only presumed the same when it
was dishonored in certain establishments; such dishonor is
not sufficient to prove that his card was blacklisted by
Citibank; Exh. "G" is an electronic document which must be
authenticated pursuant to Section 2, Rule 5 of the Rules on
Electronic Evidence26 or under Section 20 of Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court27 by anyone who saw the document executed
or written; Aznar, however, failed to prove the authenticity of
Exh. "G", thus it must be excluded; the unrefuted testimony
of Aznar that his credit card was dishonored by Ingtan
Agency and certain establishments abroad is not sufficient to
justify the award of damages in his favor, absent any
showing that Citibank had anything to do with the said
dishonor; Citibank had no absolute control over the actions of
its merchant affiliates, thus it should not be held liable for the
dishonor of Aznars credit card by said establishments. 28
Aznar filed a motion for reconsideration which the CA

dismissed in its Resolution dated May 26, 2004. 29
Parenthetically, the administrative case against Judge De la
Pea was activated and on April 29, 2005, the Courts Third
Division30 found respondent judge guilty of knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment and ordered his suspension for
six months. The Court held that Judge De la Pea erred in
basing his Order on a manifestation submitted by Aznar to
support his Motion for Reconsideration, when no copy of such
manifestation was served on the adverse party and it was
filed beyond office hours. The Court also noted that Judge De
la Pea made an egregiously large award of damages in favor
of Aznar which opened himself to suspicion. 31
Aznar now comes before this Court on a petition for review
alleging that: the CA erroneously made its own factual finding
that his Mastercard was not blacklisted when the matter of
blacklisting was already a non-issue in the November 25,
1998 Order of the RTC; the RTC found that Aznars Mastercard
was dishonored for the reason that it was declared over the
credit limit; this factual finding is supported by Exh. "G" and
by his (Aznars) testimony; the issue of dishonor on the
ground of DECL OVERLIMIT, although not alleged in the
complaint, was tried with the implied consent of the parties
and should be treated as if raised in the pleadings pursuant
to Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure; 32 Exh.
"G" cannot be excluded as it qualifies as an electronic
evidence following the Rules on Electronic Evidence which
provides that print-outs are also originals for purposes of the
Best Evidence Rule; Exh. "G" has remained complete and
unaltered, apart from the signature of Nubi, thus the same is
reliable for the purpose for which it was generated; the RTC
judge correctly credited the testimony of Aznar on the
issuance of the computer print-out as Aznar saw that it was
signed by Nubi; said testimony constitutes the "other
evidence showing the integrity and reliability of the print-out
to the satisfaction of the judge" which is required under the
Rules on Electronic Evidence; the trial court was also correct
in finding that Citibank was grossly negligent in failing to

credit the additional deposit and make the necessary entries
in its systems to prevent Aznar from encountering any
embarrassing situation with the use of his Mastercard. 33
Citibank, in its Comment, contends that: Aznar never had
personal knowledge that his credit card was blacklisted as he
only presumed such fact; the issue of dishonor on the ground
that the card was declared over the limit was also never tried
with the implied consent of both parties; Aznars self-serving
testimony is not sufficient to prove the integrity and
reliability of Exh. "G"; Aznar did not declare that it was Nubi
who printed the document and that said document was
printed in his presence as he merely said that the print-out
was provided him; there is also no annotation on Exh. "G" to
establish that it was Nubi who printed the same; assuming
further that Exh. "G" is admissible and Aznars credit card
was dishonored, Citibank still cannot be held liable for
damages as it only shows that Aznars credit card was
dishonored for having been declared over the limit; Aznars
cause of action against Citibank hinged on the alleged
blacklisting of his card which purportedly caused its dishonor;
dishonor alone, however, is not sufficient to award Aznar
damages as he must prove that the dishonor was caused by
a grossly negligent act of Citibank; the award of damages in
favor of Aznar was based on Article 1170 34 of the Civil
Code, i.e., there was fraud, negligence or delay in the
performance of its obligation; there was no proof, however
that Citibank committed fraud or delay or that it contravened
its obligations towards Aznar; the terms and conditions of the
credit card cannot be considered as a contract of adhesion
since Aznar was entirely free to reject the card if he did not
want the conditions stipulated therein; a person whose
stature is such that he is expected to be more prudent with
respect to his transactions cannot later on be heard to
complain for being ignorant or having been forced into
merely consenting to the contract.35
In his Reply, Aznar contended that to a layman, the term

"blacklisting" is synonymous with the words "hot list" or
"declared overlimit"; and whether his card was blacklisted or
declared over the limit, the same was dishonored due to the
fault or gross negligence of Citibank.36
Stripped to its essentials, the only question that needs to be

answered is: whether Aznar has established his claim against
Citibank.
Aznar also filed a Memorandum raising as issues the

following:
It is basic that in civil cases, the burden of proof rests on the

plaintiff to establish his case based on a preponderance of
evidence. The party that alleges a fact also has the burden of
proving it.40
I. Whether or not the augmentation deposit in the

amount of P485,000.00 of the Petitioner constitutes
relative extinctive novation;
II. Whether or not the purchases made by Petitioner
were beyond his credit limit;
III. Whether or not the issues of dishonor by reason of
overlimit was tried with the consent of the parties;
IV. Whether or not the "On Line Authorization Report"
is an electronic document."
V. Whether or not the "On Line Authorization Report"
constitutes electronic evidence;
VI. Whether or not the agreement between the parties
is a contract of adhesion;
VII. Whether or not the Respondent is negligent in not
crediting the deposits of the Respondent. 37
Aznar further averred in his Memorandum that Citibank
assured him that with the use of his Mastercard, he would
never be turned down by any merchant store, and that under
Section 43, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, Exh. "G" is
admissible in evidence.38
Citibank also filed a Memorandum reiterating its earlier
arguments.39
The answer is no.
In the complaint Aznar filed before the RTC, he claimed that

Citibank blacklisted his Mastercard which caused its dishonor
in several establishments in Malaysia, Singapore, and
Indonesia, particularly in Ingtan Agency in Indonesia where
he was humiliated when its staff insinuated that he could be
a swindler trying to use a blacklisted card.
As correctly found by the RTC in its May 29, 1998 Decision,
Aznar failed to prove with a preponderance of evidence that
Citibank blacklisted his Mastercard or placed the same on the
"hot list."41
Aznar in his testimony admitted that he had no personal
knowledge that his Mastercard was blacklisted by Citibank
and only presumed such fact from the dishonor of his card.
Q Now, paragraph 12 also states and I quote: "its entry in the
"hot" list was confirmed to be authentic".
Now, who confirmed that the blacklisting of your Preferred
Citibank Mastercard was authentic?
A. Okey. When I presented this Mastercard, my card rather, at
the Merchants store, I do not know, they called up somebody
for verification then later they told me that "your card is
being denied". So, I am not in a position to answer that. I do
not know whom they called up; where they verified. So,
when it is denied thats presumed to be blacklisted.
Q. So the word that was used was denied?
the document executed or written; or (b) by evidence of the

genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
A. Denied.
Q. And after you were told that your card was denied
you presumed that it was blacklisted?
A. Definitely.
Q. So your statement that your card was allegedly
blacklisted is only your presumption drawn from the
fact, from your allegations, that it was denied at the
merchandise store?
A. Yes, sir.42 (Emphasis supplied)
The dishonor of Aznars Mastercard is not sufficient to
support a conclusion that said credit card was blacklisted by
Citibank, especially in view of Aznars own admission that in
other merchant establishments in Kuala Lumpur and
Singapore, his Mastercard was accepted and honored. 43
Aznar puts much weight on the ON-LINE AUTHORIZATION
FOREIGN ACCOUNT ACTIVITY REPORT, a computer print-out
handed to Aznar by Ingtan Agency, marked as Exh. "G", to
prove that his Mastercard was dishonored for being
blacklisted. On said print-out appears the words "DECL
OVERLIMIT" opposite Account No. 5423-3920-0786-7012.
As correctly pointed out by the RTC and the CA, however,
such exhibit cannot be considered admissible as its
authenticity and due execution were not sufficiently
established by petitioner.
The prevailing rule at the time of the promulgation of the RTC
Decision is Section 20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. It
provides that whenever any private document offered as
authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and
authenticity must be proved either by (a) anyone who saw
Aznar, who testified on the authenticity of Exh. "G," did not

actually see the document executed or written, neither was
he able to provide evidence on the genuineness of the
signature or handwriting of Nubi, who handed to him said
computer print-out. Indeed, all he was able to allege in his
testimony are the following:
Q I show to you a Computer Print Out captioned as On Line
Authorization Activity Report where it is shown that the
Preferred Master Card Number 5423392007867012 was
denied as per notation on the margin of this Computer Print
Out, is this the document evidencing the dishonor of your
Preferred Master Card?
xxxx
A Yes sir, after that Ingtan incident, I went straight to the
Service Agency there and on the left hand side you will be
able to see the name of the person in-charged [sic] there
certifying that really my card is being blacklisted and there is
the signature there of the agency.
ATTY. NAVARRO:
The witness, your honor, is pointing to the signature over the
handwritten name of Victrina Elnado Nubi which I pray, your
honor, that the Computer Print Out be marked as our Exhibit
"G" and the remarks at the left hand bottom portion of
Victorina Elnado Nubi with her signature thereon be encircled
and be marked as our Exhibit "G-1".
xxxx
Q Mr. Aznar, where did you secure this Computer Print
Out marked as Exhibit "G"?
A This is provided by that Agency, your honor. They

were the ones who provided me with this. So what the
lady did, she gave me the Statement and I requested
her to sign to show proof that my Preferred Master
Card has been rejected.44 (Emphasis supplied).
Pertinent sections of Rule 5 read:
from Ingtan Agency merely handed him the computer printout and that he thereafter asked said person to sign the
same cannot be considered as sufficient to show said printouts integrity and reliability. As correctly pointed out by
Judge Marcos in his May 29, 1998 Decision, Exh. "G" does not
show on its face that it was issued by Ingtan Agency as Aznar
merely mentioned in passing how he was able to secure the
print-out from the agency; Aznar also failed to show the
specific business address of the source of the computer printout because while the name of Ingtan Agency was mentioned
by Aznar, its business address was not reflected in the printout.45
Section 1. Burden of proving authenticity. The person

seeking to introduce an electronic document in any legal
proceeding has the burden of proving its authenticity in the
manner provided in this Rule.
Indeed, Aznar failed to demonstrate how the information

reflected on the print-out was generated and how the said
information could be relied upon as true. In fact, Aznar to
repeat, testified as follows:
Section 2. Manner of authentication. Before any private

electronic document offered as authentic is received in
evidence, its authenticity must be proved by any of the
following means:
ATTY. NERI
Even if examined under the Rules on Electronic Evidence,

which took effect on August 1, 2001, and which is being
invoked by Aznar in this case, the authentication of Exh. "G"
would still be found wanting.
Q Now, paragraph 12 also states and I quote: "its entry in the

"hot" list was confirmed to be authentic"
(a) by evidence that it had been digitally signed by the

person purported to have signed the same;
Now, who confirmed that the blacklisting of your Preferred

Citibank Mastercard was authentic?
(b) by evidence that other appropriate security

procedures or devices as may be authorized by the
Supreme Court or by law for authentication of
electronic documents were applied to the document;
or
A Okey. When I presented this Mastercard, my card rather, at

the Merchants store, I do not know, they called up somebody
for verification then later they told me that "your card is
being denied". So, I am not in a position to answer that. I do
not know whom they called up; where they verified.
So, when it is denied thats presumed to be
blacklisted.46 (Emphasis supplied)
(c) by other evidence showing its integrity and

reliability to the satisfaction of the judge.
Aznar claims that his testimony complies with par. (c), i.e., it
constitutes the "other evidence showing integrity and
reliability of Exh. "G" to the satisfaction of the judge." The
Court is not convinced. Aznars testimony that the person
Aznar next invokes Section 43 of Rule 130 of the Rules of

Court, which pertains to entries in the course of business, to
support Exh. "G". Said provision reads:
Sec. 43. Entries in the course of business. Entries made at,

or near the time of the transactions to which they refer, by a
person deceased or unable to testify, who was in a position
to know the facts therein stated, may be received as prima
facie evidence, if such person made the entries in his
professional capacity or in the performance of duty and in
the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.
Under this rule, however, the following conditions are
required:
1. the person who made the entry must be dead, or
unable to testify;
2. the entries were made at or near the time of the
transactions to which they refer;
3. the entrant was in a position to know the facts
stated in the entries;
4. the entries were made in his professional capacity
or in the performance of a duty, whether legal,
contractual, moral or religious; and
5. the entries were made in the ordinary or regular
course of business or duty.47
As correctly pointed out by the RTC in its May 29, 1998
Decision, there appears on the computer print-out the name
of a certain "Victrina Elnado Nubi" and a signature
purportedly belonging to her, and at the left dorsal side were
handwritten the words "Sorry for the delay since the records
had to be retrieved. Regards. Darryl Mario." It is not clear
therefore if it was Nubi who encoded the information stated
in the print-out and was the one who printed the same. The
handwritten annotation signed by a certain Darryl Mario even
suggests that it was Mario who printed the same and only
handed the print-out to Nubi. The identity of the entrant,
required by the provision above mentioned, was therefore
not established. Neither did petitioner establish in what

professional capacity did Mario or Nubi make the entries, or
whether the entries were made in the performance of their
duty in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.
And even if Exh. "G" is admitted as evidence, it only shows
that the use of the credit card of petitioner was denied
because it was already over the limit. There is no allegation
in the Complaint or evidence to show that there was gross
negligence on the part of Citibank in declaring that the credit
card has been used over the limit.
The Court is also perplexed that stated on Exh. "G" is the
amount of "6,289,195.10" opposite petitioner's account
number, which data, petitioner did not clarify. 48 As plaintiff in
this case, it was incumbent on him to prove that he did not
actually incur the said amount which is above his credit limit.
As it is, the Court cannot see how Exh. "G" could help
petitioner's claim for damages.
The claim of petitioner that Citibank blacklisted his card
through fraud or gross negligence is likewise effectively
negated by the evidence of Citibank which was correctly
upheld by the RTC and the CA, to wit:
xxx Mr. Dennis Flores, the Head of the Credit Card
Department of defendant Bank, presented documents known
as Warning Cancellation Bulletin for July 10, 17, 24, and 31,
1994 (Exhibits 3, 3-1 to 3-38, 4, 4-1 to 4-38 5, 5-1
to 5-39 and 6, 6-1 to 6-39), for August 7, 1994
(Exhibit[s] 7, 7-1 to 7-37), for August 8, 1994 (Exhibit[s]
8, 8-1 to 8-20) which show that plaintiffs Citibank
preferred mastercard was not placed in a hot list or was not
blacklisted.
The Warning Cancellation Bulletins (WCB) (Exhibits 3, 4,
5, 6, 7, 8 and their submarkings) which covered the
period of four (4) days in July 1994 (from July 10, 17, 24 and
31, 1994), and two (2) days in August 1994, (August 7 and 8,
1994), when plaintiff traveled in the aforementioned Asian

countries showed that said Citibank preferred mastercard
had never been placed in a hot list or the same was
blacklisted, let alone the fact that all the credit cards which
had been cancelled by the defendant bank were all
contained, reported and listed in said Warning Cancellation
Bulletin which were issued and released on a regular basis.
These three hundred (300) Warning Cancellation Bulletins
pieces of documentary proofs, all in all, adduced by
defendant pointed to the fact that said plaintiffs credit car
(sic) was not among those found in said bulletins as having
been cancelled for the period for which the said bulletins had
been issued.
Between said computer print out (Exhibit G) and the
Warning Cancellation Bulletins (Exhibits 3 to 8 and their
submarkings) the latter documents adduced by defendant
are entitled to greater weight than that said computer print
out presented by plaintiff that bears on the issue of whether
the plaintiffs preferred master card was actually placed in
the hot list or blacklisted for the following reasons:
The first reason is that the due execution and authentication
of these Warning Cancellation Bulletins (or WCB) have been
duly established and identified by defendants own witness,
Dennis Flores, one of the banks officers, who is the head of
its credit card department, and, therefore, competent to
testify on the said bulletins as having been issued by the
defendant bank showing that plaintiffs preferred master
credit card was never blacklisted or placed in the Banks hot
list. But on the other hand, plaintiffs computer print out
(Exhibit G) was never authenticated or its due execution
had never been duly established. Thus, between a set of duly
authenticated
commercial
documents,
the
Warning
Cancellation Bulletins (Exhibits 3 to 8 and their
submarkings), presented by defendants (sic) and an
unauthenticated private document, plaintiffs computer print
out (Exhibit G), the former deserves greater evidentiary
weight supporting the findings of this Court that plaintiffs

preferred master card (Exhibit 1) had never been blacklisted
at all or placed in a so-called hot list by defendant. 49
Petitioner next argues that with the additional deposit he
made in his account which was accepted by Citibank, there
was an implied novation and Citibank was under the
obligation to increase his credit limit and make the necessary
entries in its computerized systems in order that petitioner
may not encounter any embarrassing situation with the use
of his credit card. Again, the Court finds that petitioner's
argument on this point has no leg to stand on.
Citibank never denied that it received petitioners additional
deposit.50 It even claimed that petitioner was able to
purchase plane tickets from Cebu to Kuala Lumpur in the
amount of P237,170.00, which amount was beyond
hisP150,000.00 limit, because it was able to credit
petitioners additional deposit to his account. Flores of
Citibank testified:
COURT:
Q When was this ticket purchased, after the account was
augmented
or before?
A After the account was augmented, Your Honor, because
there is no way we can approve a P250,000.00 purchase with
a P150,000.00 credit limit.51
xxx
ATTY. NERI:
For the record, your honor, the deposit of P450,000.00
was made as per exhibit of the plaintiff on June 28.
The purchase of the tickets amount to P237,000.00
was approved and debited on the account of Mr. Aznar

on July 20, your honor. The deposit was made about a
month before the purchase of the tickets as per
documentary exhibits, your honor.
COURT:
So, Atty. Navarro,
explanation?
what
do
you
say
to
that
Citibank, in its attempt to evade liability, invokes paragraphs

7 and 15 of the terms and conditions governing the issuance
of its Mastercard which read:
7. MERCHANT AFFILIATES. [Citibank is] not responsible if the
Card is not honored by any merchant affiliate for any
reason. Furthermore, [the cardholder] will not hold [Citibank]
responsible for any defective product or service purchased
through the Card.
ATTY. NAVARRO [counsel of petitioner]:
xxxx
That is correct, your honor, that is borne out by the

records, your honor. (Emphasis supplied)
15. LIMITATION OF LIABILITY. In any action arising from this

agreement or any incident thereto which [the cardholder] or
any other party may file against [Citibank], [Citibanks]
liability shall not exceed One Thousand Pesos [P1,000.00] or
the actual damages proven, whichever is lesser. 53
COURT: (to witness)

Q So, I think Atty. Navarro is only after whether a credit line
could be extended?
A Yes, your honor.
Q Even if there is no augmenting?
A No, sir, it is not possible. So, the only way
the P237,000.00 transaction could be approved was
by way of advance payment which actually happened
in this case because there is no way that
the P237,000.00
can
be
approved
with
52
the P150,000.00 credit limit. (Emphasis supplied)
The allegations of blacklisting not having been proved, is
Citibank liable for damages for the dishonor of Aznars
Mastercard?
Again, the answer is no.
On this point, the Court agrees with Aznar that the terms and
conditions of Citibanks Mastercard constitute a contract of
adhesion. It is settled that contracts between cardholders
and the credit card companies are contracts of adhesion, socalled, because their terms are prepared by only one party
while the other merely affixes his signature signifying his
adhesion thereto.54
In this case, paragraph 7 of the terms and conditions states
that "[Citibank is] not responsible if the Card is not honored
by any merchant affiliate for any reason x x x". While it is
true that Citibank may have no control of all the actions of its
merchant affiliates, and should not be held liable therefor, it
is incorrect, however, to give it blanket freedom from liability
if its card is dishonored by any merchant affiliate for any
reason. Such phrase renders the statement vague and as the
said terms and conditions constitute a contract of adhesion,
any ambiguity in its provisions must be construed against the
party who prepared the contract, 55 in this case Citibank.
Citibank also invokes paragraph 15 of its terms and

conditions which limits its liability to P1,000.00 or the actual
damage proven, whichever is lesser.
Again, such stipulation cannot be considered as valid for
being unconscionable as it precludes payment of a larger
amount even though damage may be clearly proven. This
Court is not precluded from ruling out blind adherence to the
terms of a contract if the attendant facts and circumstances
show that they should be ignored for being obviously too
one-sided.56
The invalidity of the terms and conditions being invoked by
Citibank, notwithstanding, the Court still cannot award
damages in favor of petitioner.
It is settled that in order that a plaintiff may maintain an
action for the injuries of which he complains, he must
establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty
which the defendant owed to the plaintiff a concurrence of
injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person
causing it. The underlying basis for the award of tort
damages is the premise that an individual was injured in
contemplation of law; thus there must first be a breach
before damages may be awarded and the breach of such
duty should be the proximate cause of the injury. 57
It is not enough that one merely suffered sleepless nights,
mental anguish or serious anxiety as a result of the
actuations of the other party. It is also required that a
culpable act or omission was factually established, that proof
that the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is shown
as the proximate cause of the damage sustained by the
claimant and that the case is predicated on any of the
instances expressed or envisioned by Arts. 2219 58 and
222059 of the Civil Code.60
In culpa contractual or breach of contract, moral damages
are recoverable only if the defendant has acted fraudulently
or in bad faith, or is found guilty of gross negligence

amounting to bad faith, or in wanton disregard of his
contractual obligations. The breach must be wanton,
reckless, malicious or in bad faith, oppressive or abusive. 61
While the Court commiserates with Aznar for whatever undue
embarrassment he suffered when his credit card was
dishonored by Ingtan Agency, especially when the agencys
personnel insinuated that he could be a swindler trying to
use blacklisted cards, the Court cannot grant his present
petition as he failed to show by preponderance of evidence
that Citibank breached any obligation that would make it
answerable for said suffering.
As the Court pronounced in BPI Express Card Corporation v.
Court of Appeals,62
We do not dispute the findings of the lower court that private
respondent suffered damages as a result of the cancellation
of his credit card. However, there is a material distinction
between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a
legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results
from the injury; and damages are the recompense or
compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there
can be damage without injury to those instances in which the
loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty.
In such cases, the consequences must be borne by the
injured person alone, the law affords no remedy for damages
resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury
or wrong. These situations are often called damnum absque
injuria.63
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 170491
April 4, 2007
NATIONAL
POWER
CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. RAMON G. CODILLA, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC of
Cebu, Br. 19, BANGPAI SHIPPING COMPANY, and
WALLEM SHIPPING, INCORPORATED, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing the Decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 00848, dated 9
November 2005, which dismissed the Petition for Certiorari
filed by the National Power Corporation seeking to set aside
the Order2 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu,
Branch 19 dated 16 November 2004, denying admission and
excluding from the records plaintiffs (herein petitioner)
Exhibits "A", "C", "D", "E", "H" and its sub-markings, "I", "J",
and its sub-markings, "K", "L", "M" and its sub-markings, "N"
and its sub-markings, "O", "P" and its sub-markings, "Q" and
its sub-markings, "R" and "S" and its sub-markings.
On 20 April 1996, M/V Dibena Win, a vessel of foreign registry
owned and operated by private respondent Bangpai
Shipping, Co., allegedly bumped and damaged petitioners
Power Barge 209 which was then moored at the Cebu
International Port. Thus, on 26 April 1996, petitioner filed
before the Cebu RTC a complaint for damages against private
respondent Bangpai Shipping Co., for the alleged damages
caused on petitioners power barges.
Thereafter, petitioner filed an Amended Complaint dated 8
July 1996 impleading herein private respondent Wallem
Shipping, Inc., as additional defendant, contending that the
latter is a ship agent of Bangpai Shipping Co. On 18
September 1996, Wallem Shipping, Inc. filed a Motion to
Dismiss which was subsequently denied by public respondent

Judge in an Order dated 20 October 1998. Bangpai Shipping
Co. likewise filed a Motion to Dismiss which was also denied
by public respondent Judge in an Order issued on 24 January
2003.
Petitioner, after adducing evidence during the trial of the
case, filed a formal offer of evidence before the lower court
on 2 February 2004 consisting of Exhibits "A" to "V" together
with the sub-marked portions thereof. Consequently, private
respondents Bangpai Shipping Co. and Wallem Shipping, Inc.
filed their respective objections to petitioners formal offer of
evidence.
On 16 November 2004, public respondent judge issued the
assailed order denying the admission and excluding from the
records petitioners Exhibits "A", "C", "D", "E", "H" and its
sub-markings, "I", "J" and its sub-markings, "K", "L", "M" and
its sub-markings, "N" and its sub-markings, "O", "P" and its
sub-markings, "Q" and its sub-markings, "R" and "S" and its
sub-markings. According to the court a quo:
The Court finds merit in the objections raised and the motion
to strike out filed respectively by the defendants. The record
shows that the plaintiff has been given every opportunity to
present the originals of the Xerox or photocopies of the
documents it offered. It never produced the originals. The
plaintiff attempted to justify the admission of the photocopies
by contending that "the photocopies offered are equivalent to
the original of the document" on the basis of the Electronic
Evidence (Comment to Defendant Wallem Philippines
Objections and Motion to Strike). But as rightly pointed out in
defendant Wallems Reply to the Comment of Plaintiff, the
Xerox copies do not constitute the electronic evidence
defined in Section 1 of Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic
Evidence as follows:
"(h) "Electronic document" refers to information or the
representation of information, data, figures, symbols or other
models of written expression, described or however

represented, by which a right is established or an obligation
extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed,
which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed,
retrieved or produced electronically. It includes digitally
signed documents and any printout, readable by sight or
other means which accurately reflects the electronic data
message or electronic document. For the purpose of these
Rules, the term "electronic document" may be used
interchangeably with "electronic data message".
The information in those Xerox or photocopies was not
received, recorded, retrieved or produced electronically.
Moreover, such electronic evidence must be authenticated
(Sections 1 and 2, Rule 5, Rules on Electronic Evidence),
which the plaintiff failed to do. Finally, the required Affidavit
to prove the admissibility and evidentiary weight of the
alleged electronic evidence (Sec. 1, Rule 9, Ibid) was not
executed, much less presented in evidence.
The Xerox or photocopies offered should, therefore, be
stricken off the record. Aside from their being not properly
identified by any competent witness, the loss of the
principals thereof was not established by any competent
proof.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs Exhibits "A", "C", "D", "E", "H" and its
sub-markings, "I", "J", and its sub-markings, "K", "L", "M" and
its sub-markings, "N" and its sub-markings, "O", "P" and its
sub-markings, "Q" and its sub-markings, and "R" are hereby
DENIED admission and excluded from the records. However,
these excluded evidence should be attached to the records of
this case to enable the appellate court to pass upon them
should an appeal be taken from the decision on the merits to
be rendered upon the termination of the trial of this case.
Exhibits "S" and its sub-markings are also DENIED admission

for lack of proper identification since the witness who brought
these pictures expressly admitted that he was not present
when the photos were taken and had not knowledge when
the same where taken.3
Upon denial of petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in an
Order dated 20 April 2005, petitioner filed a Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
before the Court of Appeals maintaining that public
respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying the
admission of its Exhibits "A", "C", "D", "E", "H" and its submarkings, "I", "J" and its sub-markings, "K", "L", "M" and its
sub-markings, "N" and its sub-markings, "O", "P" and its submarkings, "Q" and its sub-markings, "R", and "S" and its submarkings.
On 9 November 2005, the appellate court issued a Decision
dismissing petitioners petition for certiorari, the pertinent
portions of which elucidate:
After a judicious scrutiny of the record of the case on hand,
together with the rules and jurisprudence which are
applicable in the premises, we have come up with a finding
that the petition for certiorari filed in this case is not
meritorious.
It appears that there is no sufficient showing by the
petitioner that the respondent judge acted with grave abuse
of discretion in issuing the assailed orders in Civil Case No.
CEB-18662. As what our jurisprudence tells us, grave abuse
of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise
of judgment as would be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction x x
x.
In the case at bench, what has been shown to the contrary
by the totality of the record on hand is that the respondent
judge acted correctly and within the pale of his sound
discretion in issuing the assailed order, dated November 16,

2004, in Civil Case No. CEB-18662.
Indeed, it appears that the pieces of petitioners
documentary evidence which were denied admission by the
respondent judge were not properly identified by any
competent witness. As pointed out by the respondent
Bangpai Shipping Company in its comment on the petition
filed in this case which reproduces some excerpts of the
testimonies in the court a quo of Atty. Marianito De Los
Santos, Engr. Nestor Enriquez, Jr. and Mr. Rodulfo I. Pagaling,
the said witnesses did not have personal knowledge of and
participation in the preparation and making of the pieces of
documentary evidence denied admission by respondent
judge x x x. In other words, there was lack of proper
identification of said pieces of documentary evidence. x x x.
Then another ground for denying admission of petitioners
Exhibits A, C, D, E, H, I, J, K, L, M, N, O, P, Q, R, and S by the
respondent judge is that said pieces of documentary
evidence were merely photocopies of purported documents
or papers. There is no gainsaying the fact that the
respondent judge acted within the pale of his discretion when
he denied admission of said documentary evidence. Section
3 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court of the Philippines is very
explicit in providing that, when the subject of inquiry are the
contents of documents, no evidence shall be admissible
other than the original documents themselves, except in
certain cases specifically so enumerated therein, and the
petitioner has not shown that the non-presentation or nonproduction of its original documentary pieces of evidence
falls under such exceptions. As aptly pointed out by the
respondent judge in the order issued by him on November
16, 2004:
"x x x The record shows that the plaintiff (petitioner herein)
has been given every opportunity to present the originals of
the Xerox or photocopies of the documents it offered. It never
produced said originals."
So, the petitioner has only itself to blame for the respondent
judges denial of admission of its aforementioned
documentary evidence.
Of course, the petitioner tries to contend that the
photocopies of documents offered by it are equivalent to the
original documents that it sought to offer in evidence, based
on the Rules on Electronic Evidence which were in force and
effect since August 1, 2001. However, such a contention is
devoid of merit. The pieces of documentary evidence offered
by the petitioner in Civil Case CEB-18662 which were denied
admission by the respondent judge do not actually constitute
as electronic evidence as defined in the Rules on Electronic
Evidence. The informations therein were not received,
retrieved or produced electronically. The petitioner has not
adequately established that its documentary evidence were
electronic evidence. it has not properly authenticated such
evidence as electronic documents, assuming arguendo that
they are. Lastly, the petitioner has not properly established
by affidavit pursuant to Rule 9 of the Rules on Electronic
Evidence the admissibility and evidentiary weight of said
documentary evidence.
Thus, by any legal yardstick, it is manifest that the
respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
denying admission of the aforementioned documentary
evidence of petitioner.
But even if it be granted just for the sake of argument that
the respondent judge committed an error in denying the
aforementioned documentary evidence of the petitioner, still
the petition for certiorari filed in this case must fail. Such
error would at most be only an error of law and not an error
of jurisdiction. In Lee vs. People, 393 SCRA 397, the Supreme
Court of the Philippines said that certiorari will not lie in case
of an error of law. x x x.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is
hereby rendered by us DISMISSING the petition filed in this
case and AFFIRMING the assailed orders

respondent judge in Civil Case No. CEB-18662. 4
issued
by
Aggrieved by the aforequoted decision, petitioner filed the

instant petition.
The focal point of this entire controversy is petitioners
obstinate contention that the photocopies it offered as formal
evidence before the trial court are the functional equivalent
of their original based on its inimitable interpretation of the
Rules on Electronic Evidence.
Petitioner insists that, contrary to the rulings of both the trial
court and the appellate court, the photocopies it presented
as documentary evidence actually constitute electronic
evidence based on its own premise that an "electronic
document" as defined under Section 1(h), Rule 2 of the Rules
on Electronic Evidence is not limited to information that is
received, recorded, retrieved or produced electronically.
Rather, petitioner maintains that an "electronic document"
can also refer to other modes of written expression that is
produced electronically, such as photocopies, as included in
the sections catch-all proviso: "any print-out or output,
readable by sight or other means".
We do not agree.
In order to shed light to the issue of whether or not the
photocopies
are
indeed
electronic
documents
as
contemplated in Republic Act No. 8792 or the Implementing
Rules and Regulations of the Electronic Commerce Act, as
well as the Rules on Electronic Evidence, we shall enumerate
the following documents offered as evidence by the
petitioner, to wit:
1. Exhibit "A" is a photocopy of a letter manually
signed by a certain Jose C. Troyo, with "RECEIVED"
stamped thereon, together with a handwritten date;
2. Exhibit "C" is a photocopy of a list of estimated cost

of damages of petitioners power barges 207 and 209
prepared by Hopewell Mobile Power Systems
Corporation and manually signed by Messrs. Rex
Malaluan and Virgilio Asprer;
3. Exhibit "D" is a photocopy of a letter manually
signed by a certain Nestor G. Enriquez, Jr., with
"RECEIVED" stamped thereon, together with a
handwritten notation of the date it was received;
4. Exhibit "E" is a photocopy of a Standard Marine
Protest Form which was filled up and accomplished by
Rex Joel C. Malaluan in his own handwriting and signed
by him. Portions of the Jurat were handwritten, and
manually signed by the Notary Public;
5. Exhibit "H" is a photocopy of a letter manually
signed by Mr. Nestor G. Enriquez, Jr. with "RECEIVED"
stamped thereon, together with a handwritten notation
of the date it was received;
6. Exhibit "I" is a photocopy of a computation of the
estimated energy loss allegedly suffered by petitioner
which was manually signed by Mr. Nestor G. Enriquez,
Jr.;
7. Exhibit "J" is a photocopy of a letter containing the
breakdown of the cost estimate, manually signed by
Mr. Nestor G. Enriquez, Jr., with "RECEIVED" stamped
thereon, together with a handwritten notation of the
date it was received, and other handwritten notations;
8. Exhibit "K" is a photocopy of the Subpoena Duces
Tecum Ad Testificandum written using a manual
typewriter, signed manually by Atty. Ofelia Polo-De Los
Reyes, with a handwritten notation when it was
received by the party;
9. Exhibit "L" is a photocopy of

electricity supply and operation
agreement
between
petitioner
containing handwritten notations
containing three unidentified
signatures;
a portion of the
and maintenance
and
Hopewell,
and every page
manually placed
10. Exhibit "M" is a photocopy of the Notice of

Termination with attachments addressed to Rex Joel C.
Malaluan, manually signed by Jaime S. Patinio, with a
handwritten notation of the date it was received. The
sub-markings also contain manual signatures and/or
handwritten notations;
11. Exhibit "N" is a photocopy of a letter of termination
with attachments addressed to VIrgilio Asprer and
manually signed by Jaime S. Patino. The sub-markings
contain manual signatures and/or handwritten
notations;
12. Exhibit "O" is the same photocopied document
marked as Annex C;
13. Exhibit "P" is a photocopy of an incident report
manually signed by Messrs. Malaluan and Bautista and
by the Notary Public, with other handwritten notations;
14. Exhibit "Q" is a photocopy of a letter manually
signed by Virgilio Asprer and by a Notary Public,
together with other handwritten notations.
On the other hand, an "electronic document" refers to
information or the representation of information, data,
figures, symbols or other models of written expression,
described or however represented, by which a right is
established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact
may be proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded,
electronically.5 It includes digitally signed documents and any
printout, readable by sight or other means which accurately

reflects the electronic data message or electronic document. 6
The rules use the word "information" to define an electronic
document received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed,
retrieved or produced electronically. This would suggest that
an electronic document is relevant only in terms of the
information contained therein, similar to any other document
which is presented in evidence as proof of its
contents.7 However, what differentiates an electronic
document from a paper-based document is the manner by
which the information is processed; clearly, the information
contained in an electronic document is received, recorded,
electronically.
A perusal of the information contained in the photocopies
submitted by petitioner will reveal that not all of the contents
therein, such as the signatures of the persons who
purportedly signed the documents, may be recorded or
produced electronically. By no stretch of the imagination can
a persons signature affixed manually be considered as
information electronically received, recorded, transmitted,
stored, processed, retrieved or produced. Hence, the
argument of petitioner that since these paper printouts were
produced through an electronic process, then these
photocopies are electronic documents as defined in the Rules
on Electronic Evidence is obviously an erroneous, if not
preposterous, interpretation of the law. Having thus declared
that the offered photocopies are not tantamount to electronic
documents, it is consequential that the same may not be
considered as the functional equivalent of their original as
decreed in the law.
Furthermore, no error can be ascribed to the court a quo in
denying admission and excluding from the records
petitioners Exhibits "A", "C", "D", "E", "H" and its submarkings, "I", "J" and its sub-markings, "K", "L", "M" and its
sub-markings, "N" and its sub-markings, "O", "P" and its sub-
markings, "Q" and its sub-markings, and "R". The trial court
was correct in rejecting these photocopies as they violate the
best evidence rule and are therefore of no probative value
being incompetent pieces of evidence. Before the onset of
liberal rules of discovery, and modern technique of electronic
copying, the best evidence rule was designed to guard
against incomplete or fraudulent proof and the introduction
of altered copies and the withholding of the originals. 8 But
the modern justification for the rule has expanded from the
prevention of fraud to a recognition that writings occupy a
central position in the law.9 The importance of the precise
terms of writings in the world of legal relations, the fallibility
of the human memory as reliable evidence of the terms, and
the hazards of inaccurate or incomplete duplicate are the
concerns addressed by the best evidence rule. 10
Moreover, as mandated under Section 2, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court:
"SECTION 2. Original writing must be produced; exceptions.
There can be no evidence of a writing the contents of
which is the subject of inquiry, other than the original writing
itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost, destroyed, or
cannot be produced in court;
(b) When the original is in the possession of the party
against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter
fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original is a record or other document in
the custody of a public officer;
(d) When the original has been recorded in an existing
record a certified copy of which is made evidence by
law;
(e) When the original consists of numerous accounts or

other documents which cannot be examined in court
without great loss of time and the fact sought to be
established from them is only the general result of the
whole."
When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or
cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its
execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability
without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a
copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic
document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order
stated.11 The offeror of secondary evidence is burdened to
prove the predicates thereof: (a) the loss or destruction of
the original without bad faith on the part of the
proponent/offeror which can be shown by circumstantial
evidence
of
routine
practices
of
destruction
of
12
documents; (b) the proponent must prove by a fair
preponderance of evidence as to raise a reasonable inference
of the loss or destruction of the original copy; and (c) it must
be shown that a diligent and bona fide but unsuccessful
search has been made for the document in the proper place
or places.13 However, in the case at bar, though petitioner
insisted in offering the photocopies as documentary
evidence, it failed to establish that such offer was made in
accordance with the exceptions as enumerated under the
abovequoted rule. Accordingly, we find no error in the Order
of the court a quo denying admissibility of the photocopies
offered by petitioner as documentary evidence.
Finally, it perplexes this Court why petitioner continued to
obdurately disregard the opportunities given by the trial
court for it to present the originals of the photocopies it
presented yet comes before us now praying that it be
allowed to present the originals of the exhibits that were
denied admission or in case the same are lost, to lay the
predicate for the admission of secondary evidence. Had
petitioner presented the originals of the documents to the
court instead of the photocopies it obstinately offered as
evidence, or at the very least laid the predicate for the

admission of said photocopies, this controversy would not
have unnecessarily been brought before the appellate court
and finally to this Court for adjudication. Had it not been for
petitioners intransigence, the merits of petitioners
complaint for damages would have been decided upon by the
trial court long ago. As aptly articulated by the Court of
Appeals, petitioner has only itself to blame for the
respondent judges denial of admission of its aforementioned
documentary evidence and consequently, the denial of its
prayer to be given another opportunity to present the
originals of the documents that were denied admission nor to
lay the predicate for the admission of secondary evidence in
case the same has been lost.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is
hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CEB-SP No. 00848, dated 9 November 2005 is hereby
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
SANDOVALGUTIERREZ,
- versus -
CARPIO,
AUSTRIAMARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO
MORALES,*
CALLEJO,
SR.,
AZCUNA,*
TINGA,
CHICO-
NAZARIO, and
GARCIA, JJ.
CIELITO M. SALUD,
CLERK IV, COURT OF APPEALS,
Promulgated:
Respondent.
Septemb
er 9, 2005
x----------------------------------- --------------x
DECISION
EN BANC
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE DELILAH
A.M. No. CA-05-20P
VIDALLON-MAGTOLIS,
COURT
(Formerly OCA IPI No. 05OF APPEALS,
81-CA-P)
Complainant,
Present:
JR., C.J.,*
SANTIAGO,*
DAVIDE,
*
PUNO,
PANGANIBAN,**
QUISUMBING,*
YNARES-
Cielito Salud, Clerk IV, Mailing Section of the Judicial

Records Division, Court of Appeals (CA) stands charged with
the following offenses:
1.
Inefficiency and incompetence in the

performance of official duties;
2.
Conduct grossly prejudicial to the best
interest of the service; and
3.
Directly or indirectly having financial
and material interest in an official
transaction, under Section 22, paragraphs

(p), (t) and (u), Rule XIV of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing the Civil Service Law.
Irma
Del
Rosario,
Utility
Worker,
noticed
the
respondents unusual interest in the Lagua case. The
[1]
respondent had apparently been making inquiries whether

The Facts
the appellate court had already directed the issuance of an

order of release in the said case and was initially told there
Melchor Lagua was found guilty of homicide in Criminal
was none yet. Due to his persistence, the records of the case
Case Nos. 118032-H and 118033-H before the Regional Trial
were eventually found.[4] Atty. Madarang then directed the
Court of Pasig City, Branch 163.[2] On appeal, the case was
typing of the Order of Release Upon Bond, [5] and to notify the
assigned to the Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals,
mailing section that there were orders requiring personal
docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 27423. Lagua, who was then
service.[6] At around 4:00 p.m., the respondent then went to
detained at the Bureau of Prisons National Penitentiary in
Atty. Madarangs office and assisted in arranging and stapling
Muntinlupa City, filed a Very Urgent Petition for Bail. Finding
the papers for release. He brought the said resolutions and
the
other papers himself to the Mailing Section. [7]
petition
well-taken,
the
appellate
court
issued
Resolution on October 9, 2003, directing him to post

a P200,000.00 bond.
On November 7, 2003, the respondent went to the

National Penitentiary to serve the resolution and order of
Laguas bond was approved in a Resolution [3] dated

November 6, 2003, where the appellate court also directed
release in the Lagua case. The respondent left the prison

compound at around 2:30 p.m.[8]
the issuance of an order of release in favor of Lagua. The

resolution was then brought to the Office of the Division Clerk
of Court, Atty. Maria Isabel M. Pattugalan-Madarang, for
promulgation.
In the meantime, Atty. Madarang received a telephone

call from a certain Melissa Melchor, who introduced herself as
Laguas relative. It was about 2:00 p.m. The caller asked her
how much more they had to give to facilitate Laguas
provisional liberty. The caller also told Atty. Madarang that
5.
That I coordinated with Ms. Cecil Secarro,

the Acting Chief of the Mailing Section, to
inquire if it was usual/normal for her to text
her process servers on the field for an
update of their deliveries, to which she
answered in the affirmative. While she was in
the office, she texted Salud for his
whereabouts and he replied, that he was on
his way back to Quezon City. That was before
4 p.m., adding that his deliveries were ok.
6.
That I got Saluds mobile phone number

from Ms. Secarro and started texting him at
about the same time Ms. Secarro did. I
represented myself as Arlyn, Laguas
relative. Most of his text messages are still
stored in my mobile phone. In fact, I received
one text message from him while I was at
the office of Justice Magtolis, (the Chairman
of the 6th Division and the ponente of C.R.
No. 27423) in the late afternoon of
November 7, 2003 while reporting to her this
incident. Those stored in my phone are the
following:
they had sought the help of a certain Rhodora Valdez of the

Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig, where the criminal case
originated, but were told that they still had a balance to be
given to Justice Magtolis and Atty. Madarang through the
respondent. Atty. Madarang then called the said court and
asked to speak to Ms. Valdez, pretending to be Laguas
relative.
What
transpired
thereafter
is
contained
in
Atty.
Madarangs Affidavit dated December 8, 2003, as follows:

4.
That upon telephone queries made with

the office of the Clerk of Court of RTC Pasig, I
learned that Rhodora Valdez is the
incumbent Process Server of RTC, [Branch]
163, Pasig City, from which the original case
against accused-appellant Lagua originated.
Disguising myself as accused-appellant
Laguas relative, I dialed [Branch] 163, RTC,
Pasig (6314273) but Rhodora Valdez did not
report for work that day, according to Baby
(also known as Ester), her officemate (who)
answered my call. She added that Rhodora
Valdez has been waiting for us (Laguas
relatives) to call. Her exact words were
these: Wala si Rhodora. Meron lang siyang
nilakad. Pero kahapon pa nya hinihintay ang
tawag nyo. May kulang pa kayo eh.
Kailangan kasing i-en banc sa Court of
Appeals ang kaso ni Lagua.
1.
bkit,
C
639204439082.
15:36:15
rhodora
to.
Nov. 2003,
2. CNO KAMAGANAK AT ANONG

PANGALAN MO 639204439082, 7
Nov 2003 16:14:47
3. SINO K KC NAGHIWALAY N KAMI
639204439082,
7
Nov
2003
16:40:21
4.
TAWAG
K
639204439082
17:18:47
S
AKIN
7 Nov 2003
5. NARELEASE N C MR. LAGUA.

NAGKITA
N
B
KAYO
639204439082-7
Nov
2003
19:44:52
6. Magkano b and binigay nyo sa
middle nyo. Puede bang malaman
639184470111-7
Nov
2003
20:32:05
7. Gud evening. May gusto lng
akong
malaman.
Sana
alang
makaalam kahit cino. Lito
6391844701117
Nov.
2003
19:54:20
8. Cno ang kausap n Rhodora.
Pwede
bang
malaman
639184470111-7
Nov
2003
20:37:57
9. May landline ka. Tawagan kta
bukas
nang
umaga
639184470111-7
Nov
2003
20:56:31
10. Wag s Court of Appeal. Txt na
lang
kta
kung
saan.
639184470111-7
Nov
2003
20:52:58
11. Gusto mo bukas nang umaga
magkita tyo. 639184470111 7
Nov 2003 20:57:10
12. D ba pwede bukas tyo kita. May
gusto
lang
ako
malaman
639184470111
7
Nov
2003
21:02:41
13. D 2ngkol kay rhodora duon sa
kasama ko kaninang lalakeng
pinsan 639184470111 7 Nov

2003, 21:04:28
14. Ala po ako sa Lunes sa opis. Sa
hapon
po
puede
kyo
639184470111,
7
Nov
2003
21:07:23
15.
Kay
Melchor
Lagua
639184470111 7 Nov 2003
21:08:19
16. Kasama ko cya kanina nang
lumabas 639184470111 7 Nov.
2003 21:13:05
17. Ano m ba Melchor Lagua
639184470111 7 Nov 2003
21:15:52
18. Between 5 and 5:30 ng hapon.
Bkit. 639184470111 7 Nov. 2003
21:54:24
19.
3
PM
PUWEDE
KB
639004039082
10
Nov
2003
12:09:32
20. Kilala mo b c rhodora. Nagkita
na b kayo. Ala naman problema sa
kanya. Ok naman 639184470111
7 Nov 2003, 21:57:13
21. MAGKITA N LANG TAYO
639204439082 10 Nov. 2003,
12:20:16
22. A, OK, NAGKITA N B KAYO NG
KAMAGANAK MO 639204439082
10 Nov 2003 15:12:14
23. D TALAGA AKO DARATING

DAHIL WALA AKONG KAILANGAN S
IYO. 639204439082 10 Nov
2003 18:36:03
7.
That Salud called me up in the morning of

November 8, 2003 at around 7:33 but I
purposely did not answer him. Why did he
need to call me up?
8.
That I personally called up the Bureau of

Prisons for the exact time the Order of
Release was delivered and when accused
appellant Lagua was released. I learned that
the Order of Release was received at 9:15
A.M. and that Lagua was released between
5-5:30 P.M. of November 7, 2003.
9.
That I was able to talk to Rhodora Valdez

the following Monday, November 10, 2003.
Again, I introduced myself as Laguas
relative, Arlyn and told her I only wanted to
know how much more we had to pay for
Laguas release. She refused to entertain me
because according to her, Hindi ikaw ang
kausap ko. Duda ako sa yo. Kung gusto mo,
puntahan mo ako dito bukas, para magkita
tayo. Pero lumabas na si Lagua. Itinawag sa
akin ni Lito Salud. Then, she [hung] up.
10. That on Tuesday, November 11, 2003, I

brought Salud, accompanied by Ms. Secarro
to Justice Magtolis. Out of the confrontation,
we discovered that Salud did not properly
serve the copies of the Resolution and Order
of Release upon the accused-appellant and
his counsel, Atty. Salvador C. Quimpo of the
Quimpo Dingayan-Quimpo and Associates.
He gave them to a certain Art, allegedly
Laguas relative who he claimed approached
him at the Bureau of Prisons in the morning
of November 7, 2003. He told Justice
Magtolis that he gave these documents to

Art, who promised to take care of them, even
before he could deliver the copy addressed
to the Director of Prisons. He never
mentioned that this Art was connected with
the office of accused-appellants counsel.
Because of this information from Salud
himself, I did not sign the Certificate of
Service, Annex C.
11. That several days later, Salud accompanied
by Ms. Secarro, came to my office to
apologize. But before he could even say a
word, he broke down in [wails]. In between
his loud cries, he uttered, Boss, patawad po,
alang-alang sa aking mga anak. [9]
On November 11, 2003, Justice Magtolis called the

respondent to her office. When confronted, the respondent
denied extorting or receiving money for Laguas release, or in
any other case. He, however, admitted serving the copies of
resolution and order of release intended for Lagua and his
counsel to Art Baluran. [10] Justice Magtolis then called the
respondent to a meeting with Clerk of Court Atty. Tessie L.
Gatmaitan,
who
stated
that
she
would
transfer
the
respondent to another office which has nothing to do with

cases.
Justice Magtolis lodged the complaint against the

respondent in a Letter dated November 14, 2003, containing,
among others, the following allegations:
The delivery of resolutions/orders to
unauthorized persons and complete strangers
who promised to take care thereof (siya na
raw ang bahala) constitutes not only neglect of
duty but also conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service. Staying for the whole day
within the vicinity of the National Bilibid Prisons
to the point of failing to fulfill his other duties for
the
day
constitutes
inefficiency
and
incompetence in the performance of official
duties. On the other hand, the use of my name
and that of our Division Clerk of Court to illegally
solicit financial or material benefit from parties
with pending cases before this Court is
illegal per se.
In view of the foregoing, it is respectfully
requested that Cielito Salud be subjected to an
administrative investigation and disciplinary
action.[11]
Attached
to
the
complaint
were
the
following
documents to support the charges:

ANNEX A - Record of the cases received by
Salud on November 6, 2003 for delivery/service
the following day, November 7, 2003. Please
note that in each of the 3 cases assigned to him,
there are several parties/counsels to be served.
ANNEX B - Certificate of Service signed by
Salud, attested by the Acting Chief of the
Mailing Section and Division Clerk of Court Ma.
Ramona L. Ledesma, showing that the

parties/counsel in SP-67586 were served only on
November 10, 2003 (not on November 7, 2003).
ANNEX C Certificate of Service for CR27423, and corresponding Delivery Receipts.
C-1 - Delivery Receipts for Defense
Counsel Salvador Quimpo signed by someone
whose signature was identified by Salud [as]
Art a cousin of appellant Melchor Lagua.
C-2
- Delivery Receipt for the
accused-appellant, received by the same Art
and not served thru the Director of Prisons.
C-3 - Delivery Receipt for the OSG,
showing that it was delivered/received by the
said office on November 10, 2003, not on
November 7, 2003.
C-4 - Delivery Receipt for the Director
of Prisons showing receipt on November 7,
2003.
ANNEX D - Record of Resolutions in 3 other
cases (SP-80241, SP-65404 and SP-77957)
received for service by Salud on November 10,
2003. The resolutions/processes in these 3
cases
were
delivered/served
to
the
parties/counsel on November 10, 2003 together
with
undelivered
resolutions
left
unserved/undelivered on November 7, 2003.
ANNEX E
- Certification signed by Salud
showing service to parties/counsel in SP-65404
(received by Salud on November 10, 2003) on
November 10, 2003 (same date)
ANNEX F, F-1 & F-2
- Delivery Receipts
for parties/counsel in SP-65404, showing
service/delivery on November 10, 2003 in
contrast to his minimal delivery/services on

November 7, 2003 only in Muntinlupa.
4.2
That I delivered a copy of the Writ of

Habeas Corpus to [the National] Bureau
of Investigation (NBI);
4.3
That while I was at the NBI, I

received a text message from my boss,
requesting me to return to the office
immediately because there is another
notice of resolution coming from Atty.
Ledesma which I have to serve to Quezon
City and Las Pias;
[12]
4.4
In compliance with the request, I

returned to the Office and arrived at
around 3:15 p.m.;
In his counter-affidavit,[13] the respondent vehemently
4.5
That when I received the resolution,

I read the same and found out that the
hearing is still scheduled on December
10, 2003 at 10:30 a.m.;
4.6
That when I was about to leave to

deliver the Writ of Habeas Corpus and the
Notice of Hearing to the PAO, Quezon
City, my officemate Jun Vicencio told me
to wait because Irma, the staff of Atty.
Madarang requested me to standby
because I need to deliver the Order of
Release to the New Bilibid Prison,
Muntinlupa;
4.7
That because of the request I waited

until 4:00 p.m.;
4.8
That because its already late, I

decided to go to Atty. Madarangs office to
inquire about the Order of Release which I
need to deliver to the New Bilibid Prison,
Muntinlupa;
ANNEX G
- Copy of the resolution dated
November 6, 2003 of the 6th Division approving
the appellants bond and directing the issuance
of an order of release.
ANNEX H
- Copy of the Order of Release
upon Bond, which Salud was supposed to
deliver, among others on November 7, 2003 to
the defense counsel, the appellant and the OSG.
denied the charges. He never demanded money from

Laguas relative; his name had been used by someone and
was, thus, a mere victim of the circumstances. Moreover, the
fact that he immediately released the CA order in question
was clear proof that he had no financial interest in the
transaction. His version of the events that occurred that day
is as follows:
4.1
That on November 6, 2003 at

around 1:38 p.m. the Acting Chief of the
Mailing Section gave me an assignment
to deliver the Writ of Habeas Corpus
(hearing on November 26, 2003 at RTC,
Zamboanga) for CA-G.R. SP No. 80238 for
delivery to NBI, PAO, Quezon City,
Muntinlupa;
4.9
That Atty. Madarang told me to wait

a little while because the order is about to
be finished. So I waited.
4.10
That Atty. Madarang gave to me the

Order of Release at 4:15 p.m.
4.11
That because I am aware that I may

not reach [the] New Bilibid Prison on time,
I told Atty. Madarang that I can deliver it
on November 7, 2003, early in the
morning. She agreed and told me THANK
YOU Ikaw na ang bahala;
4.12
That I informed my boss about the

Order of Release that was assigned to me
and she had it listed in our logbook. I
asked my boss [Cecil Secarro] if I can
deliver the Notice of Hearing for SP 67586
and the others on Monday if I cannot
finish delivering them on November 7,
2003. She agreed but told me to be sure
that the Order of Release will be served
first and the others be served not later
than Monday, November 10, 2003.
Thereafter, I went home.
4.13
4.14
That on November 7, 2003, I went

straight to [the] New Bilibid Prison and
arrived
there
before
8:00
[a.m.]
Unfortunately, all the staff wearing white
uniforms and the security guards were
falling in line in front of the building of the
New Bilibid Prison. So I could not enter
the administration office.
That while I was standing in front of
the building where the administrative
office
is
located,
a
certain
ART
approached me and asked me if I am the
personnel of the Court of Appeals who will
deliver the Order of Release.
4.15
That I said yes, and he told me his

name and said that he is a relative of
MELCHOR LAGUA (prisoner) and is
connected with the office of Atty.
[Quimpo].
4.16
That at around 9:30 [a.m.] I was able

to enter the administrative offices but
because there was no staff inside I went
to the documentation office. The staff in
the documentation office told me to
submit the Order of Release to the
administrative office. He said that they
will prepare the documents of MELCHOR
LAGUA (prisoner) but also told me that
the prisoner might be released on
Monday yet because the signatories are
busy
attending
the
ongoing
98
anniversary celebration;
4.17
That I returned to the administrative

office and was able to find Mr. JUANITO
TORRES, Administrative Officer III, who
received the copy for the Director but
refused to receive the copy of Mr. LAGUA.
He told me to wait for his staff to receive
the copy of Mr. LAGUA;
4.18
That because the staff were not

around, I went to the canteen to buy
softdrinks to quench my thirst;
4.19
That Mr.
canteen and
release of Mr.
no personnel
Release;
4.20
That since my boss told me to insure

the release of the prisoner, I waited for
ART followed me in the

told me to assist in the
LAGUA because there were
attending to the Order of
my staff to arrive who will attend to the

matter;
4.21
4.22
That I delivered the copy of Mr.

LAGUA to the staff. But ART told them he
can receive the copy of Mr. LAGUA
because he is his relative so, the staff told
me to give the copy to ART.
That I gave the copy of the Order of
Release for the accused to ART. ART also
told me that he is authorized to receive
the copy for Atty. Quimpo because he is
also the representative of the law office.
Hence, I also gave the copy for Atty.
Quimpo to ART;
4.23
That I was able to finish my duty at

the New Bilibid Prison at around 2:30
[p.m.] and I proceeded to Purok I, 6A
Bayanan, Muntinlupa to serve the Writ of
Habeas Corpus in CA-G.R. SP No. 80238;
4.24
That because of [sic] the address of

the addressee was incomplete, I found a
hard time locating the address of the
addressee and when I found Purok I, 6A,
the persons thereat do not know JOEL DE
LA PAZ. I asked for their help but nobody
in the place knew JOEL DE LA PAZ;
4.25
That I left Muntinlupa late in the

afternoon and due to the lack of time I
decided to deliver the other documents
on the next working day which is Monday,
November 10, 2003;
4.26
That I delivered the other documents

on Monday, November 10, 2003, without
any problem;
4.27
That I was surprised when Atty.

Madarang later on accused me that I used
her name and the name of Justice
Magtolis to demand money from Mr.
LAGUAS relative.[14]
Considering the gravity of the charges, then Acting

Presiding Justice Cancio C. Garcia [15] referred the matter to
Atty. Elisa B. Pilar-Longalong, Assistant Clerk of Court, for
investigation, report, and recommendation.
The Investigation
However,
the
entrapment
did
not
materialize.
The
respondent thereafter came to her office, where he was

The requisite hearings were held from December
12, 2003 to August 4, 2004.
asked why he was unable to serve all the other papers and
documents that day.[18] He also admitted that he served a
her
copy of the resolution to the wrong person (Baluran). Justice
Affidavit[16] dated December 8, 2003. She testified that the
Magtolis also stated that she threatened to transfer the
respondent later came to her office along with Ms. Secarro.
respondent,
Amidst his cries, he pleaded, Boss, patawad po, alang-alang
pleaded, and cried saying, Huwag naman pong pa-transfer.
sa aking mga anak. She replied, Wait, wala ka namang
When asked why, the respondent said that he has children in
kasalanan sa akin. Ikaw ang nagpasimuno ng lahat ng ito.
school and something like, Dyan po ako kumikita.[19]
Atty.
Madarang
affirmed
the
contents
of
The respondent repeated, Boss, patawad po alang alang sa

aking mga anak, and Atty. Madarang answered, Okey lang,
pinatawad na kita. Hindi naman ako galit sa iyo.[17]
and
that
the
latter
vehemently
objected,
Another witness was Cristy Flores, convicted of three

counts of estafa who served time at the Correctional Institute
for Women in Batangas City. She testified that the respondent
Justice Magtolis testified that Atty. Madarang reported
was introduced to her in December 1998 by a certain
having received a telephone call from the alleged relative of
Crisanta Gamil.[20] Gamil was also detained at the correctional
Lagua. She narrated that she gave the name Arlyn to the
facility; the respondent had worked on her appeal bond
caller, and, thereafter, exchanged text messages with the
papers and asked for P20,000.00 to facilitate the issuance of
respondent. Justice Magtolis instructed Atty. Madarang to
the appeal bond.[21] The payment was made right in front of
continue communicating with the respondent and, if possible,
her, and the respondent issued a receipt.[22] The witness also
to see it through a possible pay-off where a National Bureau
testified that Gamil told her, O, at least dyan mo ipalakad
of Investigation (NBI) agent would be asked to assist them.
ang papel mo. Okay yan, sigurado.[23]
The respondent
visited her in May 1999, as she had asked him to fix her
said accused. He stated that he gave an oral authorization to
appeal bond. During the visit, the respondent took the
Baluran to get the CA resolutions or orders; Baluran was the
pertinent documents from her. [24] The witness also stated that
one who furnished him a copy of the resolution. [28] He called
she gave the respondent a partial payment ofP7,000.00[25] on
Mr. Baluran to say that an order for Laguas release had
May 16, 1999 and he issued a receipt. [26] They then
already been issued by the appellate court. The witness
proceeded to the Documents Section where they secured
stated, however, that he had never seen the respondent
copies of the court decision, certificate of manifestation and
before.[29]
her picture. She made the last payment of P13,000.00 in June

The respondent testified that he has been a CA
13, 1999, and also issued a receipt. The respondent was also
asking for an additional payment ofP15,000.00, which she
was unable to give.
Flores narrated that she introduced another detainee
to the respondent, Dalawangbayan, whom the latter was also
able to help. She stated that according to Dalawangbayan,
the respondent asked for P200,000.00. She further testified
that she knew the respondent as Joselito M. Salud, and not
Cielito Salud.[27] After the incident, she wrote a letter to
Associate Justice Conrado Vasquez, Jr. to ask for assistance
employee since 1991. He admitted that he knew Flores, and

met her in January 1999 when he brought Gamils order of
release in the Batangas City Jail. He claimed that he was
waiting for the relatives of Gamil as they were the ones who
would pay for his fare home, and while waiting, he talked to
the jailguard/warden. Flores then approached him and asked
him if he was from the CA. When the respondent answered in
the affirmative, Flores replied that Justice Vasquez was her
neighbor in Bian, Laguna.
regarding her appeal bond.

Atty. Salvador Quimpo, Laguas counsel, testified that
it was Engineer Art Baluran who hired him as counsel of the
The
respondent
admitted
that
he
was
in
the
Correctional Institute for Women in Mandaluyong City on May

16, 1999, as he was then visiting Vilma Dalawangbayan. He
also
saw
Flores.[30] When
asked
why
he
visited
Dalawangbayan, the respondent replied that Flores had
five other such visits to Dalawangbayan in the correctional
written a letter to him (which he dubbed as maintrigang
facility.
sulat)[31]addressed Lito Salud, Mailing Section, Court of

Appeals. In the said letter, Flores asked him to help
Dalawangbayan,
just
like
he
had
helped
Gamil.
The
respondent then showed the letter to then Chief of Office

Prudencio B. Aguilar, who told him, Puntahan mo yan, Lito
at maintriga yang sulat na yan, baka tayo mapahamak
dyan.[32] Thus, he went to the Correctional Institute in
Mandaluyong City to sort things out with Dalawangbayan
and Gamil. The respondent, however, stated that he could
not find the letter anywhere and had already been lost. [33]
During his May 16, 1999 visit to the correctional
facility, Flores approached him in the visiting hall, and said
suddenly, Sandali lang, Kuya, then left. He then talked to
Dalawangbayan about the controversial letter, explaining
that his job in the Court of Appeals was only to remand the
records and deliver the Orders for release, just like what he
did in Gamils case. [34] He again visited Dalawangbayan on
June 13, 1999[35] as evidenced by the entries in the visitors
logbook. He was no longer able to speak to Flores, but made
The Findings of the Investigating Officer
In her Report dated January 21, 2005, Atty. Longalong

found that the respondent was guilty as charged, and made
the following recommendation:
In view of all the foregoing, there is
substantial evidence to hold respondent liable
for the offenses charged. He is liable for
inefficiency
and
incompetence
in
the
performance of his official duties and for
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service when he admittedly served the copies of
the resolution and order of release in the Lagua
case intended for detained appellant and his
counsel on Mr. Baluran whom he admitted to
have met only on that day, against the rules and
normal office procedure on personal service. His
long stay in the Bureau of Prisons also caused
the delay in the service of other court processes
assigned to him for service on that day. He is
also liable for having financial or material
interest in an official transaction considering his
undue interest in the service of the order of
release and actual release of Lagua to the point
of staying almost the whole day in the Bureau of
Prisons and the aborted deal as can be
concluded from the phone call of Melissa
Melchor to Atty. Madarang and subsequent
exchange of text messages with Atty. Madarang
disguising as Laguas relative.
RECOMMENDATION:
1. Rule IV, Section 52 of Civil Service
Commission Memorandum Circular No. 19, S.
1999, issued pursuant to Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987, provides that the
penalty for the first offense of inefficiency and

incompetence in the performance of official
duties, for conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service and for directly or
indirectly having financial and material interest
in any official transaction is suspension for a
period of 6 months, 1 day to 1 year. Pursuant to
Section 55 of the same Memorandum Circular, if
the respondent is found guilty of 2 or more
charges, the penalty to be imposed should be
that corresponding to the most serious charge
and the rest shall be considered as aggravating
circumstances. Section 54-c of the same
Memorandum Circular provides that the
maximum of the penalty shall be imposed
where only aggravating and no mitigating
circumstances are present. Since in this case,
the penalty is the same for all 3 offenses, the
maximum of the penalty for the first offense
which is suspension for 1 year [may be]
imposed on the respondent.
2. Considering that the prescribed
penalty for the offense exceeds one month
suspension, the case may now be referred to
the Supreme Court for appropriate action,
pursuant to Circular No. 30-91 of the Office of
the Court Administrator.[36]
The Ruling of the Court
substantial evidence. If a court employee is to be disciplined

for a grave offense, the evidence against him must be
On the charge of inefficiency, the respondent is clearly

administratively liable. After serving Laguas copy of the
resolution and order of release to the prison Director, he
should have immediately returned to his station or served
the other resolutions and documents for personal service. As
an officer of the court, the respondent plays an essential part
in the administration of justice. He is required to live up to
the stringent standards of his office, and his conduct must, at
all times, be above reproach and suspicion. He must steer
clear of any act which would tend to undermine his integrity,
or erode somehow the peoples faith and trust in the courts.
[37]
As the respondent himself admitted, he stayed on until
2:30 p.m. without any valid reason, despite the fact that he
knew he still had to serve several orders and resolutions. As
competent and derived from direct knowledge; as such,

charges based on mere suspicion and speculation cannot be
given credence. Thus, if the complainant fails to substantiate
a
claim
of
corruption
and
bribery,
relying
on
mere
conjectures and suppositions, the administrative complaint

must
be
dismissed
for
lack
of
merit. [39] However,
in
administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof required to

establish malfeasance is not proof beyond reasonable doubt
but substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant
evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion, is required. [40]
The findings of
investigating magistrates on the credibility of witnesses are

given great weight by reason of their unmatched opportunity
to see the deportment of the witnesses as they testified. [41]
pointed out by the Investigating Officer, inefficiency and

incompetence in the performance of official duties is
classified
as
grave
offense,
and
is
punishable
by
suspension for six months and one day to one year. [38]
To determine the credibility and probative weight of

the testimony of a witness, such testimony must be
considered in its entirety and not in truncated parts. To
determine which contradicting statements of a witness is to
Indeed, the complainant in administrative proceedings

has the burden of proving the allegations in the complaint by
prevail as to the truth, the other evidence received must be
considered.[42] Thus, while it is true that there is no direct
JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:
Here, admitted. Basahin mo.
evidence that the respondent received any money to

facilitate the release of detained Lagua, the following
circumstances must be taken as contrary to the respondents
plea of innocence:
ATTY. ROSERO:
Yes, Justice,
cellphone number
ATTY. ROSERO:
Yes, admitted. That is his cellphone.
JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:
respondents testimony on the matter is as follows:

Q:
In the hearing of December 2, 2003, in

the TSN on page 32 onwards
This cellphone is yours.

Q:
ATTY. ROSERO:
Is that the testimony of Atty. Madarang,
November 7 is a Friday. Tumawag ka

daw several times kay Atty. Madarang,
November 7?
JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:
ATTY. ROSERO:
Do you also admit that you called Atty.

Madarang several times on November 7,
2003?
ATTY. ROSERO:
Justice?
Oo. I will just refer to your admission

through your counsel that Cellphone No.
6392044390[8]2 is yours. You admitted
that?
the
Sige, ulitin natin, 6392044390[9]2.
cellphone: bkit, C rhodora to; CNO KAMAGANAK AT ANONG

PANGALAN MO; and SINO K KC NAGHIWALAY N KAMI. The
but not
JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:
First. The respondent admitted that he was the sender

of the first three text messages in Atty. Madarangs
admitted
JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:
Texted, Im sorry I will correct that,
texted.
A:
I think we made an admission as to that

matter, Justice. Well just check the
affidavit of Atty. Madarang.
Q:
Nauna po siyang magtext sa akin,

Justice, hindi po ako nagtext sa kanya.
Nagtext po siya sa akin sumagot po ako
sa kanya.
There was an exchange several times?
A:
Nuong pong text niya sa akin hindi po

several times dahil kung makita nyo
po dyan.
JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:
sinagot yon. Pangalawa, yun din po ang

message nya. Ano ito? Sa akin pong kuan,
sa pag-iisip ko lang po, bakit dahil si Mr.
Art Baluran kamag-anak na, ano ito? Text
pa ulit pa sya ng pangatlo. Nang-iintriga
na to. Pang-apat, intriga to. Text ko nga
rin to, lokohan lang tayo. Bkit si Rhodora
to yun po ang sagot ko sa kanya.
Let me see the affidavit of Atty.

Madarang. After this question, may I ask for a
continuance?
ATTY. ROSERO:
No objection, Your Honor.
JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:
A:
Q:
A:
All these text messages were checked by

us with your counsel in the cellphone of
Atty. Madarang which were preserved
until we allowed her to erase these. There
are exchanges here: 6392044390[8]2,
November 7. When she texted she
answered, Bkit c Rhodora 2 and then
second was, Cnong kamaganak anong
pangalan mo? This is addressed to you,
this is your telephone?
Opo.
But the one who answered is Rhodora?
Ako po yun.
Q:
Ikaw ang sumasagot. Why did you say
that you are Rhodora?
A:
Justice, nung ma-receive ko po yong
text niya apat na beses ko pong nareceive ang text ni Arlene.
INVESTIGATOR:
Q:
So at that time you already knew about
Rhodora?
A:
Hindi po, dun, duon po sa text niya
nakalagay po dun eh, Si Rhodora
kasama ba? So ikinuan ko po na si
Rhodora to, dun po sa text nya.
Q:
A:
Nakipaglokohan ka?
Sa text niya nakalagay dun na Si
Rhodora ba kasama kaya po ako
nakipaglokohan dun.[43]
As pointed out by the Investigating Officer, the

respondents claim of joking around (nakipaglokohan)
with an unknown sender of a text message by replying
thereto is contrary to a normal persons reaction. This is
made even more apparent by the fact that the respondent
even admitted that he called Atty. Madarang twice, and when
asked why, gave a vague answer, and, when further
Who is Arlene?
A:
Atty. Madarang. Arlene, sa text po niya

sa akin, Sir Lito, kamaganak po ito ni Mr.
Lagua.
Magkano
pa
po
ba
ang
kakulangang pera para ibigay ko sa inyo.
Si Rhodora ba kasama? Hindi ko po
questioned, even broke down in tears. [44]

The respondents claim that the admission of the text
messages as evidence against him constitutes a violation of
his right to privacy is unavailing. Text messages have been

classified as ephemeral electronic communication under
Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence,
[45]
and shall be proven by the testimony of a person who
was a party to the same or has personal knowledge thereof.

Any question as to the admissibility of such messages is now
moot and academic, as the respondent himself, as well as his
counsel, already admitted that he was the sender of the first
three messages on Atty. Madarangs cell phone.
This was also the ruling of the Court in the recent case
of Zaldy Nuez v. Elvira Cruz-Apao.[46] In that case, the Court,
in finding the respondent therein guilty of dishonesty and
grave misconduct, considered text messages addressed to
the evidence of which is not recorded or

retained.
Under Section 2, Rule 11 of the [said
rules], Ephemeral electronic communications
shall be proven by the testimony of a person
who was a party to the same or who has
personal knowledge thereof . In this case,
complainant who was the recipient of the said
messages
and
therefore
had
personal
knowledge thereof testified on their contents
and import. Respondent herself admitted that
the cellphone number reflected in complainants
cellphone from which the messages originated
was hers. Moreover, any doubt respondent may
have had as to the admissibility of the text
messages had been laid to rest when she and
her counsel signed and attested to the veracity
of the text messages between her and
complainant. It is also well to remember that in
administrative
cases,
technical
rules
of
procedure and evidence are not strictly applied.
We have no doubt as to the probative value of
the text messages as evidence in determining
the guilt or lack thereof of respondent in this
case.
the complainant asking for a million pesos in exchange for a

favorable decision in a case pending before the CA. The Court
had the occasion to state:
The text messages were properly
admitted by the Committee since the same are
now covered by Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules
on Electronic Evidence, which provides:
Ephemeral
electronic
communication refers to telephone
conversations, text messages and
other electronic forms of communication
Second.
The
respondents
testimony
during
the
hearings held before Investigating Officer Atty. Longalong is

replete with inconsistencies and loopholes. He claimed that
he made inquiries from other CA staff and learned that there
was indeed a deal between someone in the criminal section
and a certain Rhodora of the RTC, Pasig. He further claimed
that the said parties wanted to get back at him for
immediately serving the release order which prevented

them from demanding the balance of the deal from Laguas
relative. However, this bare claim was not corroborated by
any witness. Moreover, the respondent alleged that two
anonymous callers claimed to know something about the
case against him; when asked about it, he stated that he no
longer exerted efforts to find out who they were as they did
not give out their names:
JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:
Q:
On page 5 of your affidavit, you said in

paragraph 8 That I made some inquiry
and some personnel of the Court of
Appeals told me that there is indeed a
deal between a staff in the Criminal
Section and Rhodora of RTC, Pasig. Can
you tell us who is this staff?
A:
Ah dito po Justice, hindi po siya
nagpakilala, sa telephono po.
INVESTIGATOR:
Sino siya?
A:
Hindi po siya yong tawag po niya sa

akin sa telepono nang malaman po dito
sa CA na ako ay kinasuhan ninyo
tumawag po siya sa Personnel.
Q:
Who was the first caller, the lady or the
gentleman?
A:
Babae po.
Q:
Were you the one who answered the
phone?
A:
Hindi po.
INVESTIGATOR:
JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:
Hinahanap daw siya.
Q:
A:
Who is siya?
Ay hindi po siya nagpakilala.
INVESTIGATOR:
Lalaki o babae?
A:
Una po babae tapos yong pangalawa po
lalaki.
INVESTIGATOR:
Sinong kinakausap?
A:
Ako po.
INVESTIGATOR:
Hinahanap ka?
A:
Hinahanap po nila ako.
JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:
Q:
A:
What did he tell you? He, lalaki, ano?

Sa babae muna po?
Q:
A:
Oo, babaet lalake ba?

Opo.
JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:
Q:
A:
Hinahanap ka, okay, when you answered

the phone, what did you say?
Ang sabi ko po sa kanya, pupuwede mo
ba akong matulungan sa paggawa ng
affidavit dahil kinasuhan nga ako ni
Justice Magtolis.
Q:
But you do not know who you were
talking to?
A:
Tinanong ko nga po kung sino siya eh
tumutulong lang daw siya sa akin dahil
ang naririnig niyang tsismis din dyan eh
baka po si Rhodora ang may ka-kuan sa
Criminal.
A:
Kaya po sinabi din sa akin na tsismis eh
hindi pa po pwedeng
Q:
What did you answer her?
INVESTIGATOR:
Anong sagot mo raw?
Q:
A:
Saan yong ka-kuan?

Ang may kausap sa Criminal.
Q:
Who said na baka si Rhodora ang may
kausap sa Criminal?
A:
Yon pong kausap ko sa kabilang linya.
JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:
Q:
Anong sagot niya sa tulungan kasi
nakakarinig siyang tsismis?
INVESTIGATOR:
Q:
A:
The name you do not know?

Eh tinanong ko naman po kung sino siya
ayaw naman po niyang magpakilala.
Matutulungan mo ba ako, ibinaba na po
ang telepono.
INVESTIGATOR:
Anonymous caller.
JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:
You are very fond of answering calls. You
dont even know the name.
Q:
That anonymous caller told you that

there must be some deals between
Rhodora and someone from the Criminal
Section?
A:
Yun din daw po ang naririnig niyang
tsismis dyan sa labas.
Q:
A:
Tsismis, that was that the caller told you?

Opo.
Q:
And she wanted to help you?
Q
A:
Ano ang sagot mo?

Eh iyon nga ang gusto kong malaman,
ang katotohanan. Baka naman pupuwede
mo akong matulungan. Sino ba to?
JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:
Q:
Di ba she was the one who offered to
help?
A:
Ay ayaw daw po naman niyang masabit
po ang pangalan niya.
Q:
But she was the one who called you?
A:
Opo.
Q:
Okay. How did your talk end with this girl
or lady?
A:
Nung pagsalita ko nga pong baka
pupuwede akong tulungan, wala na.
Q:
How about the man, the gentleman or
the boy who called?
A:
Same kuan din po ang kanilang kuan e.
JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:
Dont use kuan.
din ang itinawag sa akin kahapon. Eh

dalawa na kayo eh baka naman
pupuwede nyo akong matulungan. Puede
ko bang malaman ang pangalan mo?
Ganun din po, ayaw na pong magsalita
ibinaba na [ang] telepono.
ATTY. ROSERO:
Sige, Lito, ipaliwanag mo.
A:
Same kuento rin po, sinabi niya na

ganuon din po na narinig din po niya sa
labas.
Q:
A:
Do you know Rhodora?

Hindi po.
Q:
A:
You never met her?

Hindi po.
JUSTICE MAGTOLIS:
Q:
Alright, you were not the one who
answered the call?
A:
Hindi po.
Q:
A:
Q:
Somebody called you that theres a
phone call?
A:
Opo.
You never talked to her?

Nung pong ipinakiusap nyo sa akin sa
telepono po nung tayo poy
Q:
Q:
When you answered, what was your first
word?
A:
Hello!
A:
After the conversation with the lady and

that gentleman who called you to offer
some help and afterwards did not help at
all, what happened?
Wala na po.
Q:
What was the answer at the other end of
the line?
A:
Hello rin po.
Q:
What next?
A:
Alam mo, ang sabi po niya sa akin
ganito po
Q:
A:
Q:
Q:
Who was the first
something other than hello?
A:
Siya po ang nauna.
Q:
A:
one
who
said
What did she say, the exact words?

Exact words, sa naalala kong sinabi niya
Alam mo, Mr. Salud, Salud po ang kuan
niya sa akin, narinig ko sa labas,
istoryahan dyan sa labas na baka si
Rhodora ang may ka-kuan dito sa
Criminal. Ang sabi ko po sa kanya Iyan
A:
Did you not check with Rhodora, What

is this they are talking about that it might
be between you and someone in the
Criminal Section? You never asked her
that?
Hindi ko na rin po
You did not. But I thought you wanted
help from those people who can help
you?
Eh hindi na nga po sila nagbanggit po ng
pangalan dahil po sabi ng unang babae
ayaw nga rin po niyang sumabit sa kaso.
[47]
This respondents actuation on this matter, if at all
of the credibility of witnesses by trial judges in civil and
true, is again contrary to the normal reaction of one who has
criminal cases where preponderance of evidence and proof
been administratively charged, and wants to clear his name
beyond
of any wrongdoing.
applies a fortioriin administrative cases where the quantum

of
The respondent also admitted visiting an inmate

(Vilma Dalawangbayan) at the correctional facility eight
times for no apparent reason. This admission lends some
credence to the testimony of Flores, that she was the one
who introduced him to Dalawangbayan, the person he was
visiting. When asked why he frequently visited, he stated
that he found her beautiful (Maganda po siya, Justice), and
was on the verge of courting her (Para na nga po akong
nanliligaw). The Court believes that this allegation was
concocted by the respondent as a mere afterthought, to
cover up for his misdeeds.
The
Investigating
Officer
also
found
that
the
respondent was high-strung during his testimony, and this

finding must be accorded respect. Indeed, when the issue is
the credibility of witnesses, the function of evaluating it is
primarily lodged in the investigating judge. The rule which
concedes due respect, and even finality, to the assessment
proof
reasonable
required
doubt,
is
only
respectively,
substantial
are
required,
evidence.
The
investigating judge is in a better position to pass judgment

on the credibility of witnesses, having personally heard them
when they testified, and observed their deportment and
manner of testifying.[48] Thus, the following findings of Atty.
Longalong are well taken:
However,
respondent
denied
receiving P20,000 from Gamil and P15,000 from
Flores and signing LM Salud on Flores
notebooks (Exhibits E-1 and F-1) but admitted
visiting Vilma at the Correctional Institute for
Women 8 times from May to August 1999.
Respondents denial here appears self-serving
and incredible considering his admission of
going to the Correctional Institute for Women
several times for no valid official reason.
Moreover, although Flores is a convict for estafa,
her
testimony on the matter was more consistent
and credible. Likewise, respondent admitted
seeing Flores at the Correctional Institute for
Women and that Flores mailed her letter to him
on May 16, 1999 which he called maintriga.
He also admitted that he told Flores to seek the
help of Justice Vasquez on her case. The
foregoing, plus the fact that Flores eventually
wrote Justice Vasquez, confirms the truth of
Flores testimony on the matter.
With the aforecited admissions by

respondent, the substantial evidence presented
by the complainant and her witnesses with their
positive and forthright testimonies deserve
more credence than respondents self-serving
denial and inconsistent and vague testimony.
Even the demeanor of complainant and her
witnesses give credence to their testimonies
than the nervous and [high-strung] demeanor of
respondent during his testimony. Moreover,
complainant and her witnesses, including the
superiors of respondent, have no reason or
motive whatsoever to testify falsely against him.
Respondents defense of denial is inherently a
weak defense. It is well settled that denial, to be
believed, must be buttressed by strong
evidence of non-culpability, otherwise the denial
is purely self-serving and with nil evidentiary
value (People of the Philippines v. Arlee, 323
SCRA 201). Like the defense of alibi, denial
crumbles in the light of positive declarations
(People of the Philippines vs. Ricafranca, 323
SCRA 652).
things, propriety and decorum so as to earn and keep the

publics respect and confidence in the judicial service.
[49]
Public service requires the utmost integrity and strictest
discipline. Thus, a public servant must exhibit at all times the

highest sense of honesty and integrity not only in the
performance of his official duties but in his personal and
private dealings with other people.[50]
While there is no direct evidence to suggest that he
actually extorted money to facilitate the issuance of the
appeal bond and release order which he himself served, the
surrounding circumstances, as well as the inconsistencies in
his testimony, point towards administrative culpability. The
respondents actuations fall short of the standard required of
Indeed, the Court is looked upon by people with high
public
servant.
He
is
guilty
of
gross
or
grave
transgression
of
some
respect, a sacred place where litigants are heard, rights and
misconduct. Misconduct
conflicts
with.
established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a
Misbehavior within or around the vicinity diminishes its
dereliction from duty, unlawful behavior, willful in character,
sanctity and dignity. The conduct and behavior required of
improper or wrong behavior,[51] while gross, has been
every court personnel, from the presiding judge to the
defined as out of all measure; beyond allowance; flagrant;
lowliest
and
shameful; such conduct as is not to be excused. [52] Under
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Their
the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations, grave
settled
clerk,
and
must
justice
always
solemnly
be
dispensed
beyond
reproach
conduct must, at all times, be characterized by, among other
is
misconduct is punishable by dismissal from the service even
tends to diminish the image of the Judiciary cannot be
for the first offense, as it is classified as a grave offense.
countenanced.
However, considering that the respondent has not been

IN
previously charged nor administratively sanctioned, the Court

finds that a penalty of suspension for one year and six
months will serve the purpose of disciplining the respondent.
LIGHT
OF ALL THE
FOREGOING,
respondent
Cielito M. Salud is found GUILTY of inefficiency and gross

misconduct. He is SUSPENDED for a period of One (1) Year
and
Six
(6)
Months,
effective
immediately.
He
is
Court personnel, from the lowliest employee to the
further DIRECTED to inform the Court as to the date of his
clerk of court or any position lower than that of a judge or
receipt of this Decision to determine when his suspension
justice, are involved in the dispensation of justice, and
shall have taken effect.
parties seeking redress from the courts for grievances look

upon them as part of the Judiciary. They serve as sentinels of
justice,
and
any
act
of
impropriety
on
their
part
immeasurably affect the honor and dignity of the Judiciary

and the peoples confidence in it. [53] Thus, any conduct which
The
Office
of
the
Court
Administrator
is
also DIRECTED to conduct a discreet investigation on the

possible involvement of Rhodora Valdez (Utility Worker), and
other personnel of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 163.SO ORDERED.

Electronic Evidence Cases

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Electronic Evidence Cases

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE

October 17, 2007

MCC INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION, petitioner,

confirm MCC's and Sanyo Seiki's order of 220 metric

Ssangyong reiterated its request for the facilitation of the

2) Attorney's fees in the sum of P50,000.00

II. THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO PLAINLY ERRED IN

On August 31, 2005, the CA rendered its Decision affirming

the reglementary period. The appellate court resolved, on

because MCC's motion for reconsideration was filed beyond

should not be reckoned from September 29, 2005 (when

justice in a straight jacket for then the result

determination of his cause, free from the

messages" or "electronic documents" within the context of

The argument is untenable.

An electronic document shall be regarded as the

Turning first to the appellants' argument against the

The ruling of the Appellate Court is incorrect. R.A. No.

In resolving this issue, the appellate court ruled as follows:

prescribed by the Rules of Court and related laws, and is

Sec. 6. Definition of Terms. For the purposes of this

of the phrase "electronic data message" and the House of

Given these definitions, we go back to the original question:

However, Congress deleted the phrase, "but not limited to,

be defined. I would like to add a definition on what is

Senator Santiago. We are in Part 1, short title on the

Senator Santiago. Yes, Mr. President. I will furnish a

Senator Magsaysay. May I know how will this affect the

And then finally, before I leave the Floor, may I please

Senator Santiago. These are completely congruent

Senator Magsaysay. It is accepted, Mr. President.

recorded or preserved by or in a computer system are

Senator Santiago. Thank you, Mr. President.

Thus, when the Senate consequently voted to adopt the term

is "electronic" because it is recorded or stored in or by

4(2). In this case the reliability of the computer system

elemental area at a time, and representing the shade

telephone or non-interactive mail; (4) it considers payments

more convincing than that which is offered in opposition to

Pro forma Invoice dated 17 To show that def

Conforme signature of Mr. To show that def

Pro forma Invoice dated 17 To

The essential elements of a contract of sale are (1) consent

Pro forma Invoice dated 17 To

Letter to defendant SANYO To prove that def

Letter to defendants dated To prove that defendants were

Letter to defendants dated To prove that plaintiff repeatedly

Letter from defendants To prove that defendants admit of

faxed by defendants to opening of the Let

Letter to defendants dated

Letter to defendants dated To prove that plain

Letter to defendants dated

with back-up photocopy

the price of US$1,86

Name of sender MCC To prove that def

Pro forma Invoice dated 16 To prove that de

Notation "1/2", photocopy To prove that the

Ref. No. ST2-POSTS080- To prove that the

Significantly, among these documentary evidence presented

Given these norms, we find that respondent failed to prove

It is observed, however, that respondent Ssangyong did not

and which bears the signature of Gregory Chan,

these damages cannot be presumed and courts,

COMMODITY: Stainless Steel HR Sheet in Coil, Slit