181.

The present action relates to the possession and ownership of a certain piece
or parcel of land
The plaintiff alleged that he was the owner of said parcel of land; that the defendant
was illegally interfering with his possession of the same; that prior to the
commencement of the present action the defendant had presented a petition in the
Court of Land Registration (Cause No. 8350) for the registration of said parcel of
land in his name as administrator of the estate of Antonio Bueno, deceased; that
the present plaintiff opposed the registration of said parcel of land, alleging that he
was the owner of the same; that said cause was brought on for hearing in the Court
of land Registration and was finally decided; that the Court of Land Registration,
after hearing the evidence, reached the conclusion that the petitioner (the
defendant herein) was not entitled to have said parcel of land registered; that said
parcel of land belonged to the oppositor (the petitioner herein); that
notwithstanding said decision of the Court of Land Registration the defendant herein
continued molesting the plaintiff and interfering with his possession of said parcel of
land. The defendant answered said petition by a general denial.
he alleges that the lower court erred in admitting Exhibits E and F of the plaintiff. In
support of said assignment of error the appellant alleges that said documents had
not been properly identified and that their due execution and delivery had not been
proved.
EVIDENCE; PUBLIC AND PRIVATE DOCUMENT; POWERS AND DUTIES OF NOTARIES
PUBLIC, DISCUSSED. The rule is well established that before private documents
may be admitted in evidence their due execution and delivery must be proved
(section 321, Act No 190). Their due execution and delivery may be proved (a) by
any one who saw the document executed, (b) by evidence of the handwriting of the
maker, or (c) by a subscribing witness (section 324, act No. 190). There are certain
statutory exceptions to the foregoing rule (section 326, Act No. 190). A public
document duly acknowledged before a notary public, under his hand and seal with
his certificate thereto attached, is admissible in evidence without further proof of its
due execution and delivery until some question is raised as to the verity of said
acknowledgment and certificate. One of the very purposes of requiring documents
to be acknowledged before a notary public is to authorize such documents to be
given in evidence without further proof of their execution and delivery.

This action was begun in the Court of First Instance of Leyte,

pursuant to a complaint by means of which the plaintiffs Basilia
Bough and Gustavus Bough sought to have themselves put in
possession of the property covered by the deed of sale quoted in the
complaint, and to require the defendant Matilde Cantiveros to pay
182.

the plaintiffs the sum of five hundreds pesos by way of damages,

and to pay the costs. Matilde Cantiveros answered with a general
denial and a special defense, not sworn to, in which she asked that
judgment be rendered declaring the contract of sale theretofore
made between herself and Basilia Bough null.
"The lower Court erred in finding that the plaintiff Gustavus Bough, having prepared
a contract of separation between the defendant Matilde Cantiveros and her husband,
Jose Vasquez, sought to cause her to believe that she exposed herself to a suit by her
husband regarding her property, notwithstanding the contract of separation, and for
that reason and for the purpose of shielding herself from the consequences of the
apprehended suit, that she and her mother executed the document Exhibit A."
Counsel relies on the provisions of article 1218 of the Civil Code,
which provides that "Public instruments are evidence, even against
a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of
the date of the latter."
as the law well says "public instruments are evidence of the fact
which gave rise to their execution" and are to be considered as
containing all the terms of the agreement, yet, if the validity of the
agreement is the issue, parole evidence may be introduced to
establish illegality or fraud. Evidence to establish illegality or fraud,
is expressly permitted under section 285 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, and may be proved by circumstantial evidence, aided by
legitimate inferences from the direct facts.
We hold that parole evidence was properly admitted to show the illegality of the
contract of sale introduced as Exhibit A.
The defendants, Valeriano Pagkaliwagan and Victoriano
Pagkaliwagan, have appealed from a judgement of the Court of First
Instance of Batangas, finding them guilty of homicide
183.

prejudicial error was committed by the trial court; for the fact
remains that their guilt is duly established by the direct testimony of
two eyewitnesses, Leon Rayos and Delfin Garcia, who had no reason

for making a false imputation. Thus, we deduce from the evidence

for the prosecution, whose side has also been well expounded in the
brief for the Government, that appellant Valeriano Pagkaliwagan,
after embracing Teodoro Ebora perhaps more as a strategic move
than as a gesture of conciliation abruptly took hold of his bolo and
struck Teodoro Ebora on the chest, thereby inflicting a gaping wound
that extended to the abdomen.
The rule against hearsay evidence had merely been given
application by the court in refusing to admit Exhibits 2 and 3 are
respectively an affidavit of Director of the Mindoro Provincial
Hospital to the effect that Valeriano Pagkaliwagan was confined and
treated for wounds on his face and head, and an affidavit of the
Provincial Fiscal of Mindoro to the effect that said appellant
voluntarily reported to his office for investigation with respect to the
incident in question. Indeed, in order to always preserve the right of
parties to cross-examine, Rule of court 123, section 77, provides
that "the testimony of witnesses shall be given orally in open court
and under oath or affirmation." Said affidavits are not, as contended
by counsel for appellants, in the nature of public documents
contemplated in Rule of Court 123, section 39.
184. Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of the Court of Appeals
accused-appellant was appointed on 17 January 1955 as a warehouseman-cashier in the National
Rice and Corn Corporation (NARIC for short) at Jaen Nueva Ecija agency; that he continued in said
position until 21 December 1956; that on or abou t 8 April 1957, the property and money
accountability of the accused, as agent-in-charge and cashier of the NARIC at Jaen Nueva Ecija,
was audited by NARIC Auditor Lucas Estrella; that at the time of the audit, the accused was found
short of P 253.18 in cash, 353 cavans and 50 kilos of rice valued at P 7,044.90, 5 cavans and 36
kilos of palay valued at P 51.62, and 6,161 empty sacks valued at P 3,760.10 (P0.61 each), or for a
total of P 11,109.70; that in computing the net stock of rice and palay under the charge and custody
of the accused, he was credited with a shrinkage allowance of 4% of the stock received; and that
Auditor Estrella demanded of the accused to produce the shortage but the latter failed to do so.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that Exhibit 2 was not signed and duly
authenticated; it is a mere carbon copy and no explanation was given why Flavio Vasquez was not
presented as a witness.
The only question to be resolved is whether or not the trial court and the Court of Appeals committed
reversible error in their appreciation of the evidence leading to the conviction of the accused

The record shows 7 a signed affidavit of Pedro Esquivel dated 20 February 1959. There appears to be no
reason why this same affidavit was not presented before the trial court, Obviously, the execution of the
document appended to the petition filed before this Court is an afterthought not really worth considering.
Affidavits are not considered the best evidence, if the affiants are available as witnesses. The use of
affidavits should be regulated by the hearsay rule 8 to safeguard every opportunity to cross examine the
affiants with regard to their contents and due execution. 9
A signed carbon copy or duplicate of a document executed at the same time as the original is known
as a duplicate original and maybe introduced in evidence without accounting for the non- production
of the original. 14But, an unsigned and uncertified document purporting to be a carbon copy is not
competent evidence. It is because there is no public officer acknowledging the accuracy of the copy.
The non-production by the accused of the original document, unless justified under the exceptions iN
Section 2, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, gives rise to the presumption of suppression of
evidence" 18adverse to him (the accused). Besides the charge order in question has a total price of P
8,171.68, while the misappropriated amount of 353 cavans and 50 kilos of rice is P 7,044.90, and the
amount of 5 cavans and 36 kilos of palay is 109.80 or a total of P 7,154.70. Counsel for the accused
appears to be confused, as he claims that the value of the rice in the charge order is P
7,044.90," 19 instead of P 8,171.68 which actually appears thereon.

185. Lopez publisher and owner of Manila Chronicle and Gatbonton (Editor) v.
Court of Appeals and Cruz (1970)
Ponente: Fernando, J.

Facts:
January 1956 Front-page story on the Manila Chronicle Fidel Cruz, sanitary inspector
assigned to the Babuyan Islands, sent distress signals to US Airforce planes which forwarded
such message to Manila
An American Army plane dropped emergency sustenance kits on the beach of the island
which contained, among other things, a two way radio set. Using the radio set Cruz reported
to the authorities in Manila that the locals were living in terror due to a series of killings
committed on the island since Christmas of 1955.
Philippine defense forces (scout rangers) were immediately deployed to the babuyan claro.
They were led by Major Wilfredo Encarnacion who discovered that Cruz only fabricated the
story about the killings to get attention. Cruz merely wanted transportation home to Manila.
Major Encarnacion branded the fiasco as a hoax the same word to be used by the
newspapers who covered the same
January 13, 1956 - This Week Magazine of the Manila Chronicle, edited by Gatbonton devoted
a pictorial article to it. It claimed that despite the story of Cruz being a hoax it brought to
light the misery of the people living in that place, with almost everybody sick, only 2
individuals able to read and write and food and clothing being scarce
January 29, 1956 - This Week Magazine in the "January News Quiz" made reference to Cruz
as a health inspector who suddenly felt "lonely" in his isolated post, cooked up a story
about a murderer running loose on the island of Calayan so that he could be ferried back to
civilization. Called it Hoax of the year
In both issues photos of a Fidel Cruz were published but both photos were of a different
person of the same name Fidel G. Cruz former mayor, business man, contractor from
Santa Maria, Bulacan
January 27, 1957 published statements correcting their misprint and explained that
confusion and error happened due to the rush to meet the Jan 13 th issues deadline
Cruz sued herein petitioners for libel in CFI Manila. Cruz won and was awarded P11,000 in
damages (5k actual, 5k moral, 1k attorneys fees)
CA affirmed CFI decision hence this case

Issue:
WON petitioners should be held liable for their error in printing the wrong Fidel
Cruzs photo in relation to the hoax of the year?
o WON such error is sufficient ground for an action for libel to prosper?
Held:
Yes they are liable but damages awarded to Cruz is reduced to P1,000.00
Ratio:
Mistake is no excuse to absolve publishers because libel is harmful on its face by the fact
that it exposes the injured party to more than trivial ridicule, whether it is fact or opinion is
irrelevant.
Citing Lu Chu Sing v. Lu Tiong Gui libel is "malicious defamation, expressed either in
writing, printing, or by signs or pictures, or the like, ..., tending to blacken the memory of
one who is dead or to impeach the honesty, virtue, or reputation, or publish the alleged or
1.

natural defects of one who is alive, and thereby "pose him to public hatred, contempt, or
ridicule,"
Citing standard treatise of Newell on Slander and Libel "Publication of a person's
photograph in connection with an article libelous of a third person, is a libel on the person
whose picture is published, where the acts set out in the article are imputed to such person."
o In this case 3rd person was Cruz his picture being published beside the article imputes
him as the purveyor of the hoax of the year
2.

Libel cannot be used to curtail press freedom however it also can not claim any talismanic
immunity form constitutional limitations
State interest in press freedom citing Justice Malcolm: Full discussion of public affairs is
necessary for the maintenance of good governance Public officials must not be too thinskinned with reference to comments on official actsof course criticism does not
authorize defamation. Nevertheless, as an individual is less than the state, so must expected
criticism be born for the common good.
So long as it was done in good faith, the press should have the legal right to have and
express their opinions on legal questions. To deny them that right would be to infringe upon
freedom of the press.
Last word on the subject Citing Quisumbing v. Lopez: Press should be given leeway and
tolerance as to enable them to courageously and effectively perform their important role in
our democracy
Freedom of the press ranks high in the hierarchy of legal values
TEST of LIABLITY must prove there was actual malice in publishing the story/photo! (Note:
but this was not done in this case)

186. For want of a one-peso documentary stamp in a special power of attorney for pre-trial
purposes, in lieu of the personal appearance of the plaintiff, the petitioner in this case, the
respondent Judge declared him non-suited and dismissed the complaint "for failure of the plaintiff to
appear for pre-trial conference.
We do not agree. The respondent Judge manifestly erred. He acted with indecent haste. He could have
easily required the counsel for the plaintiff to buy the required one-peso documentary stamp outside the
court room and affix the same to the special power of attorney and that respite would not have taken ten
minutes. Had he been less technical and more sensible, the present proceedings and the consequent
waste of time of this Court and of his own would have been avoided.

What the probate court should have done was to require the petitioner or proponent to affix the
requisite thirty-centavo documentary stamp to the notarial acknowledgment of the will which is the
taxable portion of that document.
That procedure may be implied from the provision of section 238 that the non-admissibility of the
document, which does not bear the requisite documentary stamp, subsists only "until the requisite
stamp or stamps shall have been affixed thereto and cancelled."
Thus, it was held that the documentary stamp may be affixed at the time the taxable document is
presented in evidence.

187. This is an action for partition and damages filed in the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental, The case is now before us on petition for review filed by defendants.
It appears that one Pedro Mahilum was the registered owner of a parcel of land, known as Lot No.
2195 of the Cadastral Survey of San Carlos, Negros Occidental as evidenced by Original Certificate
of Title No. RO-6024. Upon the death of Pedro Mahilum in 1934, he was succeeded by his six
children, executed a "deed of definite sale" in favor of Gorgonia Flora, married to Basilio Sotes,
whereby in consideration of P2,000.00, receipt of which was acknowledged by them.
The vendors had acknowledged the deed of sale before Notary Public Nicolas D. Destua. It further
appears that Gorgonia Flora, the herein plaintiff, had declared the contested portion for taxation
purposes and began paying the taxes therefor in 1936.
1wph1.t

The Mahilums, however, claimed that they never sold any portion of the aforesaid Lot No. 2195 of
the San Carlos Cadastre. As a matter of fact, according to them, Original Certificate of Title No. RO6024 (22893) is free from any encumbrance whatsoever.
errors are assigned by petitioners, (1) The Court of Appeals erred in not holding that the deed of sale
(Exh. "D") is inadmissible in evidence because it lacks the necessary documentary stamps.
The first assignment of error is without merit. Exhibit D is a duplicate copy of the original, signed
and/or thumbmarked by the parties and acknowledged before notary public Nicolas D. Destua. The
stamps referred to by petitioners (and required by Section 238 of the Internal Revenue Code so that
a public document may be admitted as evidence) are supposed to be, and as a matter of practice
actually are, affixed to the original or first copy of the document and not to any of the duplicates or
carbon copies thereof. There is no evidence whatsoever that such practice was not observed in
regard to the deed of sale involved in this case, and consequently the presumptions that official duty
has been regularly performed, that private transactions have been fair and regular, and that the
regular course of business has been followed, must be applied (Sec. 69[q], Rule 123; now Sec. 5,
Rule 131). The burden is upon those who seek to destroy this presumption to do so by convincing
proof.
With respect to the contention that Exhibit D should not have been admitted as evidence because it
is only a copy and the non-production of the original has not been explained, it should be pointed out
that said exhibit is itself a signed carbon copy or duplicate executed at the same time as the original.
This is what is known as duplicate original, and it may be introduced in evidence without accounting
for the non-production of the other copies.
188. Counsel

for Telesforo Alo brought a complaint in the Court of First

Instance of Cebu on the 12th of July, 1904, against Clodoaldo
Rocamora, and asked that judgment be given in his favor,
condenming the defendant to return a parcel of land situated in the
barrio of Giloctog, municipality of Barili of that island (Cebu);

The defendant in his answer denies each and all of the allegations
contained in the different paragraphs of the complaint. After hearing
the evidence introduced by the parties, the court held that the
plaintiff was not entitled to a judgment against the defendant, and
directed that the case be dismissed,
To prove his title to the land he introduced in evidence the document which appears
on page 5 of the record.
Exhibit A is a document which was drawn up in the presence of
the gobernadorcillo of the town of Barili and the attesting witnesses on the 5th day
of November, 1888.
It is true that the title introduced in evidence by the plaintiff did not appear to have
been recorded in the Registry of Property, but the defendant has failed to establish his
ownership of the land by means of any document or title recorded or unrecorded in
the said registry.
As to the authenticity of Exhibit A, introduced by the plaintiff, it may
be said that it was fully established by the testimony of the plaintiff
himself and by that of the witness, Vicente Alquizola, who signed the
same together with thegobernadorcillo and who testified under oath
that he was present when the document was executed and signed
by those whose names are subscribed thereto.
Telesforo Alo and Vicente Alquizola witnessed the execution of the said instrument,
the latter having been one of the accompanying witnesses of the local authority before
whom it was executed. Consequently there is no doubt as to the authenticity of the
said document, nor as to the truth of the contents thereof, nor is there anything in the
record, or any legal reason, that would justify this court in holding that the said
document was false. In fact there is no claim that such document is false. Moreover,
there is no evidence in the case tending to show that the contents of the said document
are false.
189. Sofronio

de la Cruz was charged with having threatened Dolores Coronel in a

letter with death or the burning of her house unless she gave him P500, which she

must deposit in the place indicated to her in the letter. This letter was found by Rafaela
Coronel, who was living with Dolores, in the fence around her house, and as she was
then on her way to church she turned it over to the neighbor Agustin Coronel, who
read its content to Dolores Coronel, an old woman of 70 years, who became nervous
and uneasy upon seeing herself thus threatened. Tito Coronel reported the matter to
the municipal president of Guagua, Pampanga, who went to Dolores' house and
adopted some precautionary measures. Upon returning to town hall he found a man
held under arrest by the Constabulary.
One of the methods of proving the authenticity of a writing is collation, the
comparison the court can make with other writings proven to its satisfaction to be
authentic. The trial court held to be proven to its satisfaction as authentic the writing
by the defendant (Exhibit B) that was found inside the pocketbook. The defendant
tried to ascribe the writing to another to Tito Coronel and his counsel tested Tito
Coronel by having him write in the court room what he dictated to him. He directed
him to write the name of a person and of a place as the address of a letter, and it
plainly appears that neither the free handwriting of the letter nor the firmness of the
strokes of the writing is at all like somewhat rough and uncertain form, as a beginner,
of the writing and strokes in Exhibit B and the anonymous Exhibit A and C. These are
signed in the same way with a "Pulano Tal" so similar that it seems to be one signature
traced over the other.
190. It appears from the evidence that the defendants, Anastacio
Roberto and Eugenia de los Santos, were formerly the owners of the
parcel of land in question, which was then unregistered.
Anastacio Roberto conveyed the land to his sister, Juana Roberto,
the wife of the plaintiff Maximo Villaverde (Exhibit R). In the
cadastral proceedings of 1930 the land was registered in favor of
the conjugal partnership of Maximo Villaverde and Juana Roberto, as
evidenced by original certificate of title No. 15353 in the office of the
register of deeds for the Province of Bulacan (Exhibit I). Exhibit 2 is a
deed of conveyance executed on June 14, 1930, which purports to
evidence the sale of the aforesaid property by Juana Roberto, with
the consent of her husband, Maximo Villaverde, to the defendant
Eugenia de los Santos

Maximo Villaverde executed a public document, Exhibit A, which

purports to evidence the sale of his one-half interest in the aforesaid
land to the plaintiff Teresa G. Enrile
Plaintiffs brought this action to have the deed of conveyance of June 14, 1930
declared null and void for fraud, and the transfer certificate of title in favor of Eugenia
de los Santos cancelled, to recover possession of the land in question, and to require
the defendants to account for the products which they had received therefrom.
the evidence is not sufficient to sustain the finding of the lower court
that the alleged sale of the land to Eugenia de los Santos and the
signature of Maximo Villaverde in the document in questions are
fictitious and forged.
The two instrumental witnesses and the notary public testified to the
due execution of the document and the payment of the
consideration in their presence. They testified that Juana Roberto
signed Exhibit 2 by placing her finger print thereon and Maximo
Villaverde by writing his name under that of his wife. It will be
observed that Exhibit R, the deed from Anastacio Roberto to Juana
Roberto on January 19, 1927, also bears the finger print of Juana
Roberto.
The fact that a witness has been convicted of felony is a circumstance to be taken into
consideration as affecting his character and credibility, but in the present case we see
no particular force in the fact that the defendant has been convicted of coercion,
because it is not the contention of Maximo Villaverde that he was forced to sign the
document in question, but that he never signed it at all.
191. Juan C. Ysmael, obtained a loan from Alfonso Abraham, Sr. in the amount of P12,500.00 in
Japanese currency notes, and executed a promissory note in favor of the latter promising to pay the
loan within 90 days with interest at the rate of 10% per annum. The note was executed in the
presence of Florencia Q. Abraham, the creditor's wife, who affixed her signature at the bottom
thereof as a witness thereto. Upon the maturity of the note, a demand was made for its payment, but
the debtor failed to pay.
On February 9, 1945, Alfonso Abraham, Sr. died. On the other hand, Juan C. Ysmael died intestate
on April 23, 1952 leaving the note still unpaid. in Special Proceedings for the settlement of the

intestate estate of Juan Ysmael, pending Florencia Q. Vda. de Abraham, together with her sons, filed
a pleading demanding payment of the amount represented by the note. Because no regular
administrator of the estate had yet been appointed by the court, the "Reclamation" was not acted
upon., the lower court issued in Order-Decree allowing the claim against the intestate estate of Juan
C. Ysmael,
whether or not petitioners have established a just and valid claim.
The record shows that petitioners have established the due execution and genuineness of the
promissory note and that respondents failed to present any evidence to destroy the same.
However, there was a waiver of the prohibition when the counsel for the administratrix extensively
cross-examined the witness on the very matters subject of the prohibition.
It was for this reason that the trial judge eventually overruled the counsel's previous general and
continuing objection and admitted the testimony of the witness. Furthermore, it is difficult to believe
that the counsel's lengthy cross-examination on the prohibited matter was merely for the purpose of
establishing the "motive, prejudices and predilection" of the witness.

193. the

spouses Isidro Sierra and Antonia Magtaas sold a parcel of

land to Marta B. Chivi, representing to her that the land was not
registered either under the Land Registration Act or under the
Spanish Mortgage Law and assuring her that although the land was
covered by a pre-war free patent application, the application had
not been approved and no patent had been issued. The Sierras
made that assurance because Chivi was not willing to buy the land if
it was covered by a patent, since it would then be subject to
repurchase. They agreed that the purchase price of P10,800.00 was
not to be fully paid until the vendors could have the land registered
under Act 496.
At the instance of the Sierras, Chivi filed an application for
registration of the land
While the application was pending Chivi,
sold her rights and interests in the land to the herein petitionersspouses Jaime Laico and Luz Los Banos for P25,647.00, with the
stipulation that should Chivi fail to secure and transfer title to the
Laicos she would return to them twice the amount of the aforesaid

purchase price. To induce the Laicos to buy Chivis rights and

interests, the Sierras showed them a petition withdrawing their free
patent application. The Laicos thereupon continued with the
registration proceeding in substitution of Chivi, who signed a deed
of transfer of her rights.
Chivis filed with the Court of Appeal a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction to annul: (1) the order of the
trial court authorizing the Laicos to adduce evidence ex parte on
their cross-claim against Marta B. Chivi
the Court of Appeals rendered decision declaring null and void all
the proceedings on the cross-claim of the spouses Laico against
Chivi, as well as the orders, decisions, writs and processes issued in
connection therewith, and restraining the therein respondent Judge
and sheriff
Could the cross-claim in this particular action stand after the
complaint in the same action was dismissed with prejudice?

chanroble s virtual law library

A cross-bill strictly speaking is one brought by a defendant in an

equity suit against ... other defendants in the same suit, touching
the matters in question in the original bill. It is considered as an
auxiliary suit dependent upon the original bill, and can be sustained
only on matters growing out of the original bill. There is a welldefined distinction between a cross-bill merely defensive in
character, and one seeking affirmative relief. The dismissal of the
original bill carries with it a purely defensive cross-bill but not one
seeking affirmative relief. 1
chanroble s virtual law library

The cross-claim in this case was purely defensive in nature. It arose

entirely out of the complaint and could prosper only if the plaintiffs
succeeded. Hence, under the principle above enunciated, it could
not be the subject of independent adjudication once it lost the
nexus upon which its life depended.
chanroble svirtualawlibrarychanrobles vi

194. In connection with an election protest filed by Benjamin R. Abubakar against Hadji Arsad Sali
involving the office of Provincial Governor of Sulu, on motion of protestant Abubakar, and in the
course of the revision of the ballots contested therein an order authorizing him "to avail himself of
the services of handwriting and/or thumbmark experts" who "may at any time avail themselves of all
the questioned ballots" in said case "for examination and study subject to the supervision" of the
court. Purporting to act in conformity with this order, Abubakar availed of the services of handwriting
and fingerprint experts of the National Bureau of Investigation and other employees of said office,
who examined the ballots aforementioned under the supervision of the Clerk and the Deputy Clerk of
Court of Sulu. protestee Sali instituted, however, the present case
against Abubakar, the aforementioned officers of the NBI and the Clerk as well as the Deputy Clerk
of Court of Sulu, for the purpose of preventing them from further examining said ballots and securing
a declaration to the effect that the expert examination thereof conducted by NBI agents is null and
void. Upon the submission of Abubakar's answer to the amended petition filed by Sali, which
included the NBI Director as one of the respondents herein, the case was called for hearing and later
submitted for decision, without the presentation of any evidence. Soon thereafter, the lower court
issued an order,that the respondents NBI Agents as directed by respondent NBI Director were
without legal authority to conduct the expert examination of the petitioner's questioned ballots
Hence, this appeal by respondent Abubakar.
whether or not the NBI may extend technical aid to parties other than law enforcement officers
and/or entities of the Government, including courts.
The order appealed from is predicated upon the theory that the law creating the NBI 1 merely
authorizes the same "to give technical aid to all prosecuting and law enforcement officers and
entities of the Government, as well as to the courts that may request its services" 2; that said law
does not authorize the NBI to give aid to private party litigants; and that, since the aforementioned
order of the lower court, dated September 4, 1964, did not explicitly authorize Abubakar to engage
the services of NBI experts, it follows that the examination of the contested ballots by said experts is
illegal, as well as null and void.
Indeed, any person, expert or not, either in his private or in his official capacity, may testify in court
on matters, within his personal knowledge, which are relevant to a suit, subject to the judicial
authority to determine the credibility of said testimony and the weight thereof. Upon the other hand,
the question whether a public official may or shall be ordered or permitted by his superior to examine
documents and testify thereon in a given case, is one mainly administrative in character which is
within the competence of said superior officer, or the Bureau Director or Head of the Office, or the
corresponding department head to decide, and is independent of the validity of the examination thus
made or of the credence and weight to be given by the Court to the conclusions reached, in
consequence of said examination, by the official who made it.
195. The complaint, prayed for the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. C-14429 registered
in the names of David Lio and Victoria Ong Lio, covering Lot No. 3208 recovery of real property and
damages. The main ground of the said complaint was that the deed of real estate mortgage
executed with the Republic Bank, as mortgagee, covering nine (9) parcels of land previously
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title and co-owned pro indiviso by Rufino Co Ling and his brother

Bonifacio Co, was signed in blank by Rufino Co Ling and his wife Ngo Eng and on the assurance by
Bonifacio Co that only his (Bonifacio Co's) one half (1/2) share of, or interest in the nine (9) parcels
of land would be mortgaged. And yet, the mortgage covered the whole of said nine (9) parcels of
land. the complaint was dismissed by the trial court after finding that Co Ling and his wife Ngo Eng
did not sign the deed of real estate mortgage in blank but after it had been completely filled up.
whether or not Co Ling and his wife Ngo Eng signed the deed of real estate mortgage in blank, that
is, before the entries in said deed were typed therein.
Petitioners also urge that even the notary public, Atty. Remedios C. Balderama, positively testified
that the parties appeared before her and signed the real estate mortgage after she typed the dates
and numbers of their residence certificates. The foregoing testimony of the notary public was
propped by the testimony of petitioners' expert witness, Desiderio Pagui, for it was based on a
neutral and impartial report which remains unrebutted by petitioners.
Both parties agree that by examining the document in question "with the naked eye conflicting
impressions would result. As correctly observed by private respondents, the document itself is
ambivalent, neutral. Therefore, it needed an expert to examine the document. Between a report on
examination submitted by a private practitioner who was hired by an interested party and whose
professional integrity has been placed in doubt, and the objective examination of a government
agency "with accepted competence" and "cloaked with the mantle of impartiality and neutrality
whose services were required by no less than the trial court itself, we agree with respondent
appellate court that the latter's findings are entitled to full weight and credit. It follows that the Court
of Appeals' conclusion is not absurd or a mistake.
196. Assisted by her father, Federico Nalam, complainant , filed before the Butuan

complainant accuses DOMINGO

PAGPAGUITAN alias Pingkong and ROBERTO SALAZAR alias Opaw of
the crime of Rape. Pagpaguitan admitted having sex with complainant, but
City Prosecutor a complaint stating that

insisted that it was consensual. He claimed they had eloped and that truly they
were actually sweethearts. The trial court, however, disbelieved Pagpaguitans
version. Finding the prosecutions evidence convincing, the court convicted
Pagpaguitan and Salazar.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE TESTIMONIES OF THE

PUROK PRESIDENT AND THE BARANGAY CAPTAIN THAT THE SUBJECT
OF THE INSTANT COMPLAINT WAS INITIALLY ELOPEMENT.
during the proceedings before the purok president and the barangay captain,
elopement was indeed mentioned. However, Pagpaguitans tale of elopement rang
with far too many inconsistencies to be credible

In rape the prosecution must rule out the victims consent to the sexual act. [19] Here, the
testimony of private complainant was clear and convincing: she did not consent to penile
invasion.

Pagpaguitan claimed the above dialogue clearly showed their sweet relationship with each
other and revealed intimacy in their relationship even before the sexual act. [21]However, as
correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, the cited dialogue merely revealed familiarity
rather than intimacy.[22] Even assuming for arguments sake, that they were sweethearts,
nevertheless, rape was committed because by force, appellant had sex with the victim against her
will.[23] The claim that they were sweethearts could not prove complainants consent [24] nor
undermine her complaint.

197. the Philippine National Bank obtained a judgment against Joaquin M. Bondoc for P10,289.60
plus interest at the rate of 7% per annum computed from June 30, 1949. This judgment was never
executed.
After five years and upon the instance of the Philippine National Bank said judgment was revived in
Civil Case No. 30663 on February 20, 1957 where the Court of First Instance of Manila condemned
Joaquin M. Bondoc to pay the Philippines National Bank the sum of P16,841.64 plus 7% interest and
costs. Neither was this judgment enforced during the five years thereafter.
The lower court held that the right to revive the judgment has prescribed inasmuch as more than ten
years had elapsed since it was first rendered on June 29, 1949. It further ruled that the Code of Civil
Procedure (Act 190) or the New Civil Code does not provide for the revival of a revived judgment.
Plaintiff has appealed from the order of dismissal
whether or not a revived judgment may itself be revived.
Appellee's theory relates the period of prescription to the date the original judgment became final.
Such a stand is inconsistent with the accepted view that a judgment reviving a previous one is a new
and different judgment. The inconsistency becomes clearer when we consider that the causes of
action in the three cases are different. In the original case, the action was premised on the unpaid
promissory note signed by Joaquin Bondoc in favor of the Philippine National Bank; in the second
case, the Philippine National Bank's cause of action was the judgment rendered in Civil Case No.
8040; and in the present case, the basis is the judgment rendered in Civil Case No. 30663.
Parenthetically, even the amounts involved are different.
The source of Section 6 aforecited is Section 447 of the Code of Civil Procedure which in turn was
derived from the Code of Civil Procedure of California. The rule followed in California in this regard is
that a proceeding by separate ordinary action to revive a judgment is a new action rather than a
continuation of the old, and results in a new judgment constituting a new cause of action, upon which
a new period of limitations begins to run.
199. Petitioners are the heirs of Agapito Causapin who died in October 1954 leaving a 473-square
meter lot in Niugan, Cabuyao, Laguna. they partitioned the land between them and the
corresponding tax declarations were issued in their individual names. Erlinda resided in the land until
1963 when she went to work in Manila., the land was left to the care of her cousin, respondent
Lorenza Manalo.

Erlinda returned to Niugan and discovered that a building was being constructed on the land. Upon
inquiry from the Register of Deeds she learned that it was already titled in the name of respondentspouses Dominador de Guzman and Anastacia Batas under Original Certificate of Title No. P-1796.
Weighing the foregoing conflicting evidence, the trial court concluded there was no valid transfer of
the property of Erlinda to respondents.
However, the trial court declared as valid the sale of Alberto's share to respondent-spouses de
Guzman because he failed to persuade the court that no consideration was paid for the sale. it is
alleged that the Court of Appeals completely failed to give probative value to the attendant facts and
the testimony of petitioner Erlinda with respect to the purported source of all the conveyances While
that document and the alleged deed of sale between petitioner Erlinda and respondent Eusebio
Calugay stated that Erlinda was of age, she however testified under oath that she was only
seventeen (17) years old in 1963. Therefore, said documents transferred no rights whatsoever to
respondents due to Erlinda's incapacity by reason of minority.
The first of these is to determine how much and to what extent genuine writing will diverge from a
certain type
The trial court resolved the first ground in this wise: ". . . on close observation, the signature of
Erlinda appearing on the alleged Deed of Sale to Eusebio, which is of course denied, is very
different from her signature appearing in the verification of her complaint in the instant case, and
even in the Deed of Sale from Alberto Causapin to the de Guzmans which Erlinda signed as
Administratrix." 12 This is a loose end which the lower court failed to settle. An accurate examination to
determine forgery should dwell on both the differences and similarities in the questioned signatures
A comparison of Erlinda's signature in the "Bilihang Tuluyan" with her signatures on the other
documents reveals that the slight differences in strokes are overshadowed by the significant
similarities. These similarities suffice to convince us that the signature of petitioner Erlinda on the
deed of sale between her and respondent Eusebio is genuine; a fortiori, the deed of sale between
them is valid. Moreover, it is highly noticeable that the signatures of Erlinda that were analyzed by
the trial court are on documents executed several years apart, to wit, 29 July 1963, 17 August 1967
and 20 June 1986. The passage of time and a person's increase in age may have decisive
influences in his writing characteristics. 14 Thus, authorities are of the opinion that in order to bring about
an accurate comparison and analysis, the standards of comparison must be as close as possible in point
of time to the suspected signature.

200. plaintiff is a depositor in good standing of defendant bank's branch at Sucat, Paraaque, under

current checking account no. 210-0053-60. Plaintiff claims that three (3) checks all payable to cash
and all drawn against plaintiffs aforementioned current account were presented for encashment
Plaintiff also claims that due to defendant bank's gross negligence and inexcusable negligence in
exercising ordinary diligence in verifying from plaintiff the encashment of plaintiff's checks and in
determining the forgery of drawer's signatures, the aforesaid three (3) checks were encashed by
unauthorized persons to the damage and prejudice of the plaintiff corporation.

The trial court was convinced that the petitioner bank had exercised due care and diligence in
determining the authenticity of the checks in question before they were encashed. It was rather the
private respondent that had been negligent in the care and custody of the corporate checks.
the trial court is missed the complaint for lack of merit. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the trial court
The Court of appeals held that it was not necessary for the private respondent to prove that the
signatures on the three checks in question were forged of the following admissions set forth in
petitioner's answer
, the petitioner alleges that the best evidence of the forgery were the original checks bearing the
alleged forged signatures of private respondent's officers.
In spite of the timely objection made by the petitioner, the private respondent introduced in evidence
mere photocopies of the questioned checks. The failure to produce the originals of the checks was a
fatal omission inasmuch as there would be no evidentiary basis for the court to declare that the
instruments were forgeries. Likewise such failure amounted to a willful suppression of evidence,
which created a presumption that its production would be unfavorable to respondent's case. 6 It could
also be presumed that "the checks in question [were] genuine checks regularly issued by the respondent
in the course of its business, bearing the genuine signatures of the officers whom it authorized to sign in
its behalf." Also, an unfavorable inference could be drawn from the unexplained failure of private
respondent to call as its witness Mr. Co Yok Teng, whose signature was among those allegedly forged.
201. Both the petitioner Sergio Bautista and private respondent Roberto Miguel were candidates for

the office above mentioned. After canvass, petitioner Bautista was proclaimed the winner by the
Barangay Board of Canvassers. Roberto Miguel filed a protest on the ground of fraud and illegal
acts or practices allegedly committed by Bautista. The latter filed an answer but filed no counter
protest.
The trial court rendered a decision. Roberto Miguel is hereby declared to have received the same
number of votes as the protestee Sergio Bautista for the position of Bgy. Captain of Bgy. Teachers
Village East, Quezon City.
From this decision of the city court, protestant Roberto Miguel filed an appeal to the Court of First
Instance of Rizal. petitioner Bautista questions the reliance by respondent court on the opinion of
oneDesiderio A. Pagui, who was never presented and qualified as an expert witness.
Whether or not the supposed opinion of a person, who was brought by private respondent but who
was never presented as a witness, is competent and admissible evidence to support the appellate
court's (CFI) conclusion that no less than eighteen (18) votes cast in favor of your petitioner were
written by one and the same person.
Desiderio A. Pagui, Examiner of Questioned Documents (Ret. Chief Document Examiner, NBI), who
was allowed by the lower court to assist it in the appreciation of ballots contested by either party as
having been written by a single hand and to take photographs of the questioned ballots, his report
and photographs having been submitted by protestant-appellant to this Court accompanying his
memorandum.

Notwithstanding this report, this Court has taken pains and meticulous effort to examine with its
naked eye the questioned ballots and handwritings, and compare the same with each other in order
to determine whether or not they were indeed written by a single hand, and this Court is convinced
beyond doubt that Exhs. B, C, D, E, F, G, H, K, L, M, N and O, were written by a single hand,
considering the remarkable similarity if not almost identity of the writings on these ballots. The lower
Court's ruling on these twelve (12) ballots is hereby reversed, and the twelve (12) votes for
protestee-appellee based thereon should be deducted from him.