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Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly

liable. (Article 100 RPC)


The reason is because a crime has a dual character: as an
offense against the State and against the private person
injured by it.
Dual character of crimes applies to cases governed by
special laws. Example: violation of the BP 22 results in
criminal and civil liability.
There is civil liability even if the offense is a public
offense, like in bigamy.
Persons liable are the principal, accomplice and
accessories.
It includes restitution, reparation of damages and
indemnification of consequential damages.
`applicable to cases involving civil liability arising from
delict. Art. 2202, NCC

Circumstances affecting Civil Liability


1.

2.

3.

Justifying circumstances
Defendant is free from civil liability if justifying
circumstances are properly establishes.
Exempting Circumstances
They do not erase the civil liability.
Mitigating and Aggravating Circumstances
Damages to be adjudicated may either be decreased or
increased depending on the presence of mitigating or
aggravating circumstances.

Effect of Death
A.

DEATH AFTER FINAL JUDGMENT: extinguishes criminal


liability of the person liable but will not extinguish the
civil liability.

B.

DEATH BEFORE FINAL JUDGMENT:


GENERAL RULE: The defendant is relieved from both
criminal and civil liability arising from criminal liability.
EXCEPTION: In case of libel and physical injuries
wherein the plaintiff initially opted to claim damages in
the criminal proceeding can file another case under
Article 33 of the Civil Code.

OZOA VS MADULA
L-62955
Facts:
Ozoa was the employer of Policarpio Balatayo, who
was convicted of homicide with serious physical
injuries thru reckless imprudence
Balatayo was convicted on the strength of his plea
of guilty, which he entered after withdrawing his
initial plea of not guilty.
Penalty: SIX (6) MONTHS of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to THREE (3) YEARS, SIX (6) MONTHS and
TWENTY- ONE (21) DAYS of prision correccional, as
maximum plus indemnification
writ of execution was returned unsatisfied because

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CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM DELICT

TORTS AND DAMAGES

of insolvency of the accused


Madula then moved for the issuance of a writ of
execution against the accused's employer, Ozoa.
Ozoa opposed the motion. the Court a quo directed
execution against Ozoa. In support of its ruling the
Court placed reliance on Article 103, in relation to
Article 102, of the Revised Penal Code, declaring the
employer subsidiarily responsible for the civil liability
of his employee when the latter is insolvent
Issue:
WON Ozoa can be held subsidiarily liable. /
affirmative
Ratio Decidendi:
The employer is subsidiarily answerable for the
adjudicated civil liability ex delito of his employee in
the event of the latter's insolvency; and the
judgment in the criminal action pronouncing the
employee to be also civilly liable is conclusive on the
employer not only as to the actuality of that liability
but also as to its amount.
before the employer's subsidiary liability is
exacted, there must be adequate evidence
establishing that (1) he is indeed the employer of
the convict; (2) that he is engaged in some kind of
industry; (3) the crime was committed by the
employee in the discharge of his duties; and (4)
execution against the employee is unsatisfied.
adjudication of the employer's subsidiary civil
liability need not be done by separate suit against
the employer but merely in the same criminal action
which resulted in the judgment declaring the
employee liable both criminally and civilly has not
been laid down by legislation, but by judicial
construction of related statutory provisions.
The proceeding in question was not after an a civil
action, but one considered a part or a continuation
of the criminal action. The more logical step then is
to apply the corresponding rules in criminal cases,
which provide that an appeal is taken simply by
filing a notice of appeal within fifteen (15) days from
notice or promulgation of the judgment.
There is no occasion to speak of enforcing the
employer's subsidiary civil liability until and unless it
appears that the employee's primary liability cannot
in the first instance be satisfied by reason of
insolvency. This fact cannot, in the very nature of
things, be known until some time after the verdict of
conviction shall have become final.
the appropriate remedy is either an appeal by writ
of error or by certiorari, depending on the nature of
the questions sought to be raised. Exceptionally, the
special civil action of certiorari may be resorted to as
a vehicle for review if the claim be of lack or excess
of jurisdiction, or the attendance of grave abuse of
discretion, in the issuance of the order of execution.
Parenthetically, even if the appeal were mistakenly
directed to the Court of Appeals despite raising only
questions of law, the mistake would not be fatal.
There is in fact no need for any further

JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES
TAN VS STANDARD VACUUM OIL CO.
L-4160
Facts:
Standard Vacuum Oil Co. ordered the delivery of
gasoline to the Rural Transit Company on May 13,
1949. Unfortunately, the gasoline tank-truck trailer
used in the delivery accidentally caught fire. Julito
Sto. Domingo, the driver, with Igmidio Rico, moved
the truck and abandoned it in the middle of the
street resulting to the destruction of buildings within
the area. Both Sto. Domingo and Rico were acquitted
of criminal charges because it cannot be proved that
it was their negligence that started the fire. Anita
Tan, the plaintiff, was one of the owners of the
houses destroyed during the accident. Tan filed a
case against the two companies as well as the two
employees involved for the damages she suffered.
However, the defendants filed separate motions for
the dismissal of the plaintiffs allegation.
Issue:
Whether or not the defendants are liable for the
damages incurred by the plaintiff.
Held:
The Court, based on Article 23 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, decided that Rural Transit Company
is with no doubt liable for damages. With Sto.
Domingo moving the truck to avoid a greater harm,
it was the Rural Transit Company which benefited
the most. The fire should have caused the explosion
of the companys gasoline deposit yet it was
avoided. And under Article 23 of the Civil Code, the
defendant is held liable as long as he gets benefited
even if the act or event that caused damage is not
his fault, thus it applies to the companys situation.
EFFECT OF ACQUITTAL
PADILLA VS CA
GR L-39999
FACTS
Petitioner Padilla was the Mayor of Panganiban,
Cam Norte, while the other petitioners were
policemen, who did a clearing operation of the public

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proceedings in this case. We have gone over the


record quite carefully and are convinced that Ozoa's
subsidiary civil responsibility has been duly
established by the evidence. That evidence was
presented at a hearing at which Ozoa was given
opportunity to submit, as he did submit proofs in his
behalf. We agree that the facts proven adequately
demonstrate the existence of the requisites for
holding Ozoa subsidiarily liable as an employer
under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code,
specified earlier in this opinion.

TORTS AND DAMAGES

market by virtue of the order of the Mayor.


In this operation, PR Antonio Vergara and his
familys stall (Pub Market Bldg 3) was forcibly
opened, cleared of its content and demolished by ax,
crowbar and hammers.
o Petitioners defense:
Vergara was given (prior notice) 72 hrs to vacate. o
Vergaras: Petitioners took they advantage of their
positions; must be charged with grave coercion;
there was evident premeditation.
RTC: Petitioners are guilty of grave coercion, to be
punished 5mos &1day imprisonment, and solidarily
fined 30K for moral damages, 10K actual and 10K
exemplary.
CA: acquitted, but solidarily liable for actual
damages of P9,600. MR denied. Petitioners now
appeal claiming that they are not liable for damages
by virtue of the acquittal.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
W/N Petitioners are liable still for civil damages
despite acquittal of the CA? Defense of Petitioner:
the civil liability which is included in the criminal
action is that arising from and as a consequence of
the criminal act, and the defendant was acquitted in
the criminal case, (no civil liability arising from the
criminal case), no civil liability arising from the
criminal charge could be imposed upon him.
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
PETITIONERS ARE LIABLE TO PAY DAMAGES.
First, they were acquitted due to REASONABLE
DOUBT. Grave coercion is committed if force upon
the person is applied, and not force upon things as
in this case. The CA held that they shouldve been
charged with threats or malicious mischief. Since,
these offenses were not alleged in the complaint,
Petitioners cannot be prosecuted for it.
HOWEVER, the clearing and demolition was not
denied. As a result, Vergara indeed suffered
damages pertaining to: cost of stall construction
(1300), value furniture and equipment (300), value
of goods seized (8K), amounting to P9600. Under the
law, petitioners are liable. o RPC 100: every person
criminally liable is civilly liable o 2176: damages due
under quasi-delict, limited though by 2177: from
recovering twice from the same act. o ROC Rule 111,
Sec 2 last paragraph:
Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it
extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds
from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact
from which the civil action might arise did not exist.
In other cases, the person entitled to the civil action
may institute it in the Jurisdiction and in the manner
provided by law against the person who may be
liable for restitution of the thing and reparation or
indemnity for the damage suffered.
Art 29, NCC: When the accused in a criminal
prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt
has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a
civil action for damages for the same act or omission
may be instituted. Such action requires only a

BUNAG JR VS CA
GR NO 101749
FACTS:
Background:
Zenaida and Bunag are lovers and two weeks before
the incident they had a fight. On the afternoon of
Sept. 8, 1973, the following incident occurred
Zenaida Cirilos version of the story:
Bunag, together with an unidentified male
companion, abducted her in the vicinity of the San
Juan de Dios Hospital in Pasay City o She was
brought in to a motel where due to her natural
weakness, being a woman and her small stature, she
was raped o After being deflowered against her will
and consent, she once again asked Bunag to let her
go home but the latter would not agree until they
get married o They proceeded to the house of Juana
de Leon, Bunags grandmother in Pamplona, Las
Pinas, Metro Manila, where the father of Bunag later
arrived and assured Zenaida that the following day,
they will go to Bacoor, to apply for a marriage
license, which they did
After filing their applications for a marriage license,
they both returned to Juanas house and lived there
as husband and wife until Sept. 29, 1973 (21 days) o
However, after some time, Bunag never returned
and Zenaida was forced to go back to her parents
home
Conrado Bunag Jr.s version of the story: o He
claims that they have had earlier plans to elope and
get married, and this fact was known to their friends,
among them, Architect Chito Rodriguez o The couple
made good their plans to elope on the afternoon of
Sept. 8, 1973, where together with their officemate
(Lydia), together with Guillermo Ramos, Jr., they had
some snacks in a foursome o When Lydia and
Guillermo took off, they took a taxi to the Golden

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preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the


defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file
a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint
should be found to be malicious. If in a criminal
case the judgment of acquittal is based upon
reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the
absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be
inferred from the text of the decision whether or not
the acquittal is due to that ground.
Facts support existence of damage; the extinction
of Petitioners criminal liability (acquittal) did not
carry with it the extinction of their civil liability.
Application of Art 29: action need not be filed in a
separate civil action all the time, (as in this case)
where fact of injury, its commission and result were
already established in the criminal proceeding. Since
by preponderance of evidence, civil liability was
proven to exist, indemnity is due in favor of Vergara.
A separate action will simply delay relief due to
Vergara.
Petition DENIED. CA AFFIRMED

TORTS AND DAMAGES

Gate and Flamingo Hotels to try to get a room but it


was full and they finally got a room at Holiday Hotel
o After checking out, they proceeded to the house of
Juana de Leon at Pamplona, Las Pinas where they
stayed until Sept. 29, 1973 o They had bitter
disagreements over money and the threats made to
his life prompted him to break off their plan to get
married
Zenaida filed a claim for damages for the breach of
promise to marry and the lower courts ruled in her
favor granting damages
Bunag filed a petition claiming the award of
damages was excessive and improper but was
denied, hence the present petition for review on
certiorari
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
W/N Bunags claim has merits
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
NO.
It is true that in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the
time-honored rule that an action for breach of
promise to marry has no standing in the civil law,
apart from the right to recover money or property
advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such
promise
Generally, therefore, a breach of promise to marry
per se is not actionable, except where the plaintiff
has actually incurred expenses for the wedding and
the necessary incidents thereof
However, the award of moral damages is allowed in
cases specified in or analogous to those provided in
Art. 2219 of the Civil Code o Correlatively, under Art.
21 of the said Code, in relation to Par. 10 of Art.
2219, any person who willfully causes loss or injury
to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs, or public policy shall compensate the
latter for moral damages
Generally, the basis of civil liability is the
fundamental postulate of our law that every person
criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable o In
other words, criminal liability will give rise to civil
liability ex delicto only if the same felonious act or
omission results in damage or injury to another and
is the direct and proximate cause thereof o Hence,
extinction of the penal action does not carry with it
the extinction of civil liability unless the extinction
proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that
the fact from which the civil liability might arise did
not exist
The dismissal of the complaint for forcible
abduction with rape was by mere resolution of the
fiscal at the preliminary investigation stage o There
is no declaration in a final judgment that the fact
from which the civil case might arise did not exist o
Consequently, the dismissal did not in any way
affect the right of herein private respondent to
institute a civil action arising from the offense
because such preliminary dismissal of the penal
action did not carry with it the extinction of the civil
action

PCGPINEDA RN,MAN 2015

EFFECT OF DEATH
PEOPLE VS BAYOTAS
GR 102007
FACTS:
Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with Rape
and eventually convicted thereof. Pending appeal of
his conviction, Bayotas died in the National Bilibid
Hospital
due
to
cardio
respiratory
arrest.
Consequently, the Supreme Court in its Resolution
dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal.
However, it required the Solicitor General to file its
comment with regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising
from his commission of the offense charged. In his
comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view
that the death of accused-appellant did not
extinguish his civil liability as a result of his
commission of the offense charged. The Solicitor
General, relying on the case of People v. Senday
diego insists that the appeal should still be resolved
for the purpose of reviewing his conviction by the
lower court on which the civil liability is based.
Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other
hand, opposed the view of the Solicitor General
arguing that the death of the accused while
judgment
of
conviction
is
pending
appeal
extinguishes both his criminal and civil penalties. In
support of his position, said counsel invoked the
ruling of the Court of Appeals in People v. Castillo
and Ocfemia which held that the civil obligation in a
criminal case takes root in the criminal liability and,
therefore, civil liability is extinguished if accused
should die before final judgment is rendered.
ISSUE & ARGUMENTS Whether the death of the
accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish
his civil liability.
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI Yes. Article 89 of the
Revised Penal Code is the controlling statute. It
reads, in part: Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally
extinguished. Criminal liability is totally
extinguished: (1.) By the death of the convict, as to
the personal penalties; and as to the pecuniary
penalties liability therefor is extinguished only when
the death of the offender occurs before final
judgment; The legal precept contained in this Article
is lifted from Article 132 of the Spanish El Codigo
Penal de 1870. Accordingly, SC rule: if the private
offended party, upon extinction of the civil liability
ex delicto desires to recover damages from the
same act or omission complained of, he must
subject to Section 1, Rule 111 (1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure as amended) file a separate civil
action, this time predicated not on the felony
previously charged but on other sources of
obligation. The source of obligation upon which the
separate civil action is premised determines against

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TORTS AND DAMAGES

whom the same shall be enforced. If the same act or


omission complained of also arises from quasi-delict
or may, by provision of law, result in an injury to
person or property (real or personal), the separate
civil action must be filed against the executor or
administrator of the estate of the accused pursuant
to Sec. 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court: Sec. 1.
Actions which may and which may not be brought
against executor or administrator. No action upon
a claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest
thereon shall be commenced against the executor or
administrator; but actions to recover real or personal
property, or an interest therein, from the estate, or
to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover
damages for an injury to person or property, real or
personal, may be commenced against him. This is in
consonance with our ruling in Belamala where we
held that, in recovering damages for injury to
persons thru an independent civil action based on
Article 33 of the Civil Code, the same must be filed
against the executor or administrator of the estate
of deceased accused and not against the estate
under Sec. 5, Rule 86 because this rule explicitly
limits the claim to those for funeral expenses,
expenses for the last sickness of the decedent,
judgment for money and claims arising from
contract, express or implied. Contractual money
claims, we stressed, refers only to purely personal
obligations other than those which have their source
in delict or tort. Conversely, if the same act or
omission complained of also arises from contract,
the separate civil action must be filed against the
estate of the accused, pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 86 of
the Rules of Court.
Summary of Rules: 1. Death of the accused pending
appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability as well as the civil liability based solely
thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this
regard, "the death of the accused prior to final
judgment terminates his criminal liability and only
the civil liability directly arising from and based
solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex
delicto in senso strictiore." 2. Corollarily, the claim
for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death
of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a
source of obligation other than delict. 19 Article
1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other
sources of obligation from which the civil liability
may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
(a) Law (b) Contracts (c) Quasi-contracts (d) . . . (e)
Quasi-delicts 3. Where the civil liability survives, as
explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery
therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a
separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule
111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as
amended. This separate civil action may be enforced
either against the executor/administrator or the
estate of the accused, depending on the source of
obligation upon which the same is based as
explained above. 4. Finally, the private offended

TORTS AND DAMAGES

TORTS WITH INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION


1. Violation of civil and political rights (Article 32)

Although the same normally involves intentional acts, it


can also be committed through negligence.

Public officer who is a defendant cannot escape liability


under the doctrine of state immunity; the said doctrine
applies only if acts involved are done by officers in the
performance of their official duty within the ambit of
their powers; officers do not act within the ambit of
their powers if they violate the constitutional rights of
persons.
2.
A.

Defamation, Fraud, and Physical injuries (Article 33)


Defamation
Defamation is an invasion of the interest in reputation
and good name, by communication to others which tends
to diminish the esteem in which the plaintiff is held, or
to excite adverse feelings or opinion against him.
Includes the crime of libel and slander.
RPC considers the statement defamatory if it is an
imputation of circumstance tending to cause the
dishonor, discredit or contempt of natural or juridical
person or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.
Requisites for one to be liable for defamatory
imputations:
a. It must be defamatory
b. It must be malicious
c. It must be given publicity
d. The victim must be identifiable

NOTES:

Test in determining the defamatory character of the


imputation:
A charge is sufficient if the words are
calculated to induce the hearers to suppose and understand
that the person/s against whom they were uttered were
guilty of a certain offense, or are sufficient to impeach
their honesty, virtue, or reputation, or to hold the person/s
up to public ridicule.
Dissemination to a number of persons is not required,
communication to a single individual is sufficient publication.

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GENERAL RULE:
Every defamatory imputation is
presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good
intention or justifiable motive for making it is shown.

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party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this


separate civil action by prescription, in cases where
during the prosecution of the criminal action and
prior to its extinction, the private-offended party
instituted together therewith the civil action. In such
case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is
deemed interrupted during the pendency of the
criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article
1155 21 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid
any apprehension on a possible privation of right by
prescription. 22 Applying this set of rules to the case
at bench, SC held that the death of appellant
Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and the
civil liability based solely on the act complained of,
i.e., rape. Consequently, the appeal is hereby
dismissed without qualification.

EXCEPTIONS:
1.
A private communication made by any person to
another in the performance of any legal, moral or social duty;
and
2.
A fair and true report, made in good faith, without
any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other
official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or
of any statement, report, or speech delivered in said
proceedings or of any other act performed by public officers
in the exercise of their functions.

It is not sufficient that the offended party recognized


himself as the person attacked or defamed, it must be
shown that at least a third person could identify him as
the object of the libelous publication.
In order to escape liability, the defendant may claim that
the statements made are privileged.

Two kinds of privileged communication:


1)
2)

B.

C.

Absolutely privilege Those which are not actionable


even if the author acted in bad faith.
Qualifiedly privilege not actionable unless found to
have been made without good intention or
justifiable motive.

Fraud
Elements of deceit
1) The defendant must have made false representation
to the plaintiff
2) The representation must be one of fact
3) The defendant must know that the representation is
false or be reckless about whether it is false
4) The defendant must have acted on the false
representation
5) The defendant must have intended that the false
representation should be acted on
6) The plaintiff must have suffered damage as a result
of acting on the false representation
Half-truths are likewise included; it is actionable if the
withholding of that which is not stated makes that which
is stated absolutely false.
Misrepresentation upon a mere matter of opinion is not
an actionable deceit.
Physical injuries
Battery an intentional infliction of a harmful or
offensive bodily contact; bodily contact is offensive if it
offends a reasonable persons sense of dignity.
Assault intentional conduct by one person directed at
another which places the latter in apprehension of
immediate bodily harm or offensive act.
Includes bodily injuries causing death.

Physical injuries which resulted because of negligence or


imprudence is not included in Article 33; they are already
covered by Article 2176 of the Civil Code.

3.

Neglect of duty by police officers (Article 34)


Subsidiary liability of cities and municipalities, is
imposed so that they will exercise great care in selecting
conscientious and duly qualified policemen and exercise
supervision over them in the performance of their duties.

CASUPANAN VS LAROYA
GR 145391
FACTS:
Two vehicles, one driven by respondent Mario Laroya
and the other owned by petitioner Roberto Capitulo
and driven by petitioner Avelino Casupanan, figured
in an accident. Two cases were filed, with the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Capas , Tarlac. Laroya
filed a criminal case against Casupanan for reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property. On the
other hand, Casupanan and Capitulo filed a civil case
against Laroya for quasi-delict. When civil case was
filed, the criminal case was then at its preliminary
investigation stage. Laroya, defendant in the civil
case, filed a motion to dismiss the case on the
ground of forum-shopping considering the pendency
of the criminal case. The MCTC granted the motion
and dismiss the civil case. Casupanan and Capitulo,
filed a motion for reconsideration. They insisted that
the civil case is a separate civil action which can
proceed independently of the criminal case. The
MCTC denied the motion for econsideration.
Casupanan and Capitulo, filed a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 before the RTC and still it was denied
for lack of merit. They filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but RTC denied the same.
ISSUES:
Whether or not an accused in a pending criminal
case for reckless imprudence can validly file,
simultaneously and independently, a separate civil
action
for quasi-delict
against
the
private
complainant in the criminal case;
Whether or not there is forum-shopping.
HELD:
The MCTC dismissed the civil action for quasi-delict
on the ground of forum-shopping under Supreme
Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94. MCTC did
not state in its order of dismissal that the dismissal
was with prejudice. Thus, the MCTCs dismissal,
being silent on the matter, is a dismissal without
prejudice. Section 1 of Rule 41 provides that an
order dismissing an action without prejudice is not
appealable. Clearly, the Capas RTCs order
dismissing the petition for certiorari, on the ground
that the proper remedy is an ordinary appeal, is
erroneous. The essence of forum-shopping is the
filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for
the same cause of action, either simultaneously or

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TORTS AND DAMAGES

successively. It is present when in the two or more


cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights of
action and relief sought. There is no forum-shopping
in the instant case because the law and the rules
expressly allow the filing of separate civil action
which can proceed independently.
Under Section 1 of the Rule 111, what is deemed
instituted with the criminal action is only the action
to recover civil liability arising from the crime or exdelicto. All other civil actions under Articles 32, 33,
34, and 2176 of the Civil Code are no longer deemed
instituted and may be filed separately and
independently even without reservation. In no case,
however, may the offended party recover damages
twice for the same act or omission charged in the
criminal action. Clearly, Section 3 of Rule 111 refers
to the offended party in the criminal action, not the
accused.
ARTICLE 32 CIVIL CODE/ SEARCH AND SEIZURE
LIM VS DE LEON
GR L-22554
FACTS
Plaintiff-appellant Jikil Taha sold to a certain
Timbangcaya of Palawan a motor launch named M/L
"SAN RAFAEL". A year later Timbangcaya filed a
complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of
Palawan alleging that after the sale Jikil Taha forcibly
took away the motor launch from him.
After conducting a preliminary investigation, Fiscal
Ponce de Leon in his capacity as Acting Provincial
Fiscal of Palawan, filed with the CFI of Palawan the
corresponding information for Robbery with Force
and Intimidation upon Persons against Jikil Taha.
Fiscal Ponce de Leon, upon being informed that the
motor launch was in Balabac, Palawan, wrote the
Provincial Commander of Palawan requesting him to
direct the detachment commander-in Balabac to
impound and take custody of the motor launch.
Fiscal Ponce de Leon reiterated his request to the
Provincial Commander to impound the motor launch,
explaining that its subsequent sale to a third party,
plaintiff-appellant Lim, cannot prevent the court
from taking custody of the same. So, upon order of
the Provincial Commander, defendant-appellee
Maddela, seized the motor launch "SAN RAFAEL"
from plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim and impounded it.
Plaintiff-appellant Lim pleaded with Maddela to
return the motor launch but the latter refused.
Likewise, Jikil Taha through his counsel made
representations with Fiscal Ponce de Leon to return
the seized property to plaintiff-appellant Lim but
Fiscal Ponce de Leon refused, on the ground that the
same was the subject of a criminal offense.
All efforts to recover the motor launch going to
naught, plaintiffs-appellants Lim and Jikil Taha filed
with the CFI of Palawan a complaint for damages
against defendants-appellees Fiscal Francisco Ponce

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS


W/N defendants are civilly liable to plaintiffs for
damages allegedly suffered by them granting that
the seizure of the motor launch was unlawful.
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
PONCE DE LEON LIABLE UNDER ART. 32. DEFENDANT
MADELLA
CANNOT BE LIABLE SINCE
As to whether or not they are entitled to damages,
plaintiffs-appellants anchor their claim for damages
on Articles 32 and 2219 of the New Civil Code which
provide in part as follows: ART. 32. Any public officer
or employee, or any private individual, who directly
or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any
manner impedes or impairs any of the following
rights and liberties of another person shall be liable
to the latter for damages, (9) The rights to be secure
in one's person, house, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures
Pursuant to the foregoing provision, a person
whose constitutional rights have been violated or
impaired is entitled to actual and moral damages
from the public officer or employee responsible
therefor. In addition, exemplary damages may also
be awarded. In the instant case, plaintiff-appellant
Lim claimed that he purchased the motor launch
from Jikil Taha in consideration of P3,000.00, having
given P2,000.00 as advanced payment; that since its
seizure, the motor launch had been moored at
Balabac Bay and because of exposure to the
elements it has become worthless at the time of the
filing of the present action; that because of the
illegality of the seizure of the motor launch, he
suffered moral damages and that because of the
violation of their constitutional rights they were
constrained to engage the services of a lawyer
whom they have paid for attorney's fees.
Defendant-appellee Fiscal Ponce de Leon wanted
to wash his hands of the incident by claiming that
"he was in good faith, without malice and without
the slightest intention of inflicting injury to plaintiffappellant, Jikil Taha" when he ordered the seizure of
the motor launch. We are not prepared to sustain his
defense of good faith. To be liable under Article 32 of
the New Civil Code it is enough that there was a
violation of the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs
and it is not required that defendants should have
acted with malice or bad faith.
The very nature of Article 32 is that the wrong may
be civil or criminal. It is not necessary therefore that
there should be malice or bad faith. To make such a
requisite would defeat the main purpose of Article
32 which is the effective protection of individual

PCGPINEDA RN,MAN 2015


Page

de Leon and Maddela, alleging that on Maddela


entered the premises of Lim without a search
warrant and then and there took away the hull of the
motor launch without his consent; that he effected
the seizure upon order of Fiscal Ponce de Leon who
knew fully well that his office was not vested with
authority to order the seizure of a private property

TORTS AND DAMAGES

rights. Public officials in the past have abused their


powers on the pretext of justifiable motives or good
faith in the performance of their duties.
But defendant-appellee Orlando Maddela cannot
be held accountable because he impounded the
motor launch upon the order of his superior officer.
While a subordinate officer may be held liable for
executing unlawful orders of his superior officer,
there are certain circumstances which would warrant
Maddela's exculpation from liability. The records
show that after Fiscal Ponce de Leon made his first
request to the Provincial Commander on June 15,
1962 Maddela was reluctant to impound the motor
launch despite repeated orders from his superior
officer.
Petition granted. Decision of Regional Trial Court
Revived and affirmed.
ABERCA VS VER
GR L-69866
FACTS:
Then President Marcos had already lifted Martial Law
but the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was
still suspended.
General Ver ordered Task Force Makabansa (TFM)
to conduct pre-emptive strikes against known
communist-terrorist (CT) underground houses in
view of increasing reports about CT plans to sow
disturbances in Metro Manila.
Plaintiffs filed a complaint which contained
allegations of searches made without search
warrants or based on irregularly issued or
substantially defective warrants; seizures and
confiscation, without proper receipts, of cash and
personal effects
belonging to plaintiffs and other items of property
which were not subversive and illegal nor covered by
the search warrants; arrest and detention of
plaintiffs without warrant or under irregular,
improper and illegal circumstances; detention of
plaintiffs
at
several
undisclosed
places
of
'safehouses" where they were kept incommunicado
and subjected to physical and psychological torture
and other inhuman, degrading and brutal treatment
for the purpose of extracting incriminatory
statements. The complaint contains a detailed
recital of abuses perpetrated upon the plaintiffs
violative of their constitutional rights.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
W/N the TFM may be held liable for their acts
under an official duty
Respondents: They have immunity from suit of a
state for they only followed the orders of the
President when he called them out. It was their
constitutional duty to exercise their functions.
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
YES, THEIR DUTY TO SUPPRESS LAWLESSNESS
IS NOT A BLANKET
LICENSE
WHICH
IGNORED
THE

MHP GARMENTS VS CA
GR NO 86720
FACTS:
MHP Garments, Inc., was awarded by the Boy Scouts
of the Philippines, the exclusive franchise to sell and
distribute official Boy Scouts uniforms, supplies,
badges, and insignias. In their Memorandum
Agreement, petitioner corporation was given the
authority to "undertake or cause to be undertaken
the prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scout
uniforms and other scouting supplies."
MHP received information that private respondents
Agnes Villa Cruz, Mirasol Lugatiman, and Gertrudes
Gonzales were selling Boy Scouts items and
paraphernalia without any authority. Petitioner de
Guzman, an employee of petitioner corporation, was
tasked to undertake the necessary surveillance and
to make a report to the Philippine Constabulary (PC).

PCGPINEDA RN,MAN 2015


Page

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE


PEOPLE.
Article 32 of the Civil Code provides:
1. Freedom from arbitrary arrest or illegal detention;
2. The right against deprivation of property without
due process of law;
3. The right to be secure in one's person, house,
papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures;
4.
The
privacy
of
communication
and
correspondence;
5. Freedom from being compelled to be a witness
against one's self, or from being forced to confess
guilt, or from being induced by a promise of
immunity or reward to make a confession, except
when the person confessing becomes a state
witness.
The complaint alleges facts showing with abundant
clarity and details, how plaintiffs' constitutional
rights and liberties mentioned in Article 32 of the
Civil Code were violated and impaired by
defendants.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus does not destroy petitioners' right
and cause of action for damages for illegal arrest
and detention and other violations of their
constitutional rights. The suspension does not render
valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is
suspended is merely the right of the individual to
seek release from detention through the writ of
habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his
liberty.
it does not and cannot suspend their rights and
causes of action for injuries suffered because of
respondents' confiscation of complainants private
belongings, the violation of their right to remain
silent and to counsel and their right to protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures and
against torture and other cruel and inhuman
treatment.

TORTS AND DAMAGES

de Guzman, Captain Renato M. Peafiel, and two


(2) other constabulary men of the Reaction Force
Battalion, Sikatuna Village, Diliman, Quezon City
went to the stores of respondents at the Marikina
Public Market. Without any warrant, they seized the
boy and girl scouts pants, dresses, and suits on
display at respondents' stalls. The seizure caused a
commotion and embarrassed private respondents.
Receipts were issued for the seized items. The items
were then turned over by Captain Peafiel to
petitioner corporation for safekeeping.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
W/N de Guzman, Captain Penafiel and the
constabulary men are liable for damages because of
their warrantless search and seizure.
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
THEY ARE LIABLE FOR DAMAGES
Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any
private individual, who directly or indirectly
obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner
impedes or impairs any of the following rights and
liberties of another person shall be liable to the
latter for damages.
(9) The rights to be secure in one's person, house,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures.
The indemnity shall include moral damages.
Exemplary damages may also be adjudged.
The very nature of Article 32 is that the wrong may
be civil or criminal. It is not necessary therefore that
there should be malice or bad faith. To make such a
requisite would defeat the main purpose of Article
32 which is the effective protection of individual
rights. Public officials in the past have abused their
powers on the pretext of justifiable motives or good
faith in the performance of their duties. Precisely,
the object of the Article is to put an end to official
abuse by plea of the good faith. In the United States
this remedy is in the nature of a tort.
ARTICLE 33 CIVIL CODE/ DEFAMATION
MANUEL VS CRUZ-PANO
GR L-46079
Libel suits based on official criticisms should be
dismissed outright unless made in bad faith
FACTS:
Petitioner wrote the Chairman of the Anti-Smuggling
Action
Center
denouncing
abuses
allegedly
committed by ASAC agents against petitioner's
clients. Petitioner said the agents subjected Ng
Woo Hay to indignities and took her necklace and
bracelet and her son's wristwatch plus HK$ 70. But
the agents were exonerated so petitioner filed
criminal charges of robbery. Petitioner found
prosecutors unsympathetic so he filed a civil action

HELD: From the viewpoint of procedural and


substantive law, the charge is defective. The
letter constitutes privileged communication. It was
sent by petitioner in his capacity as lawyer in the
discharge of his legal duty to his clients. He could
also invoke his civic duty as a private individual to
expose anomalies in the public service. The
complaint was addressed to the official who had
authority over them and could impose proper
disciplinary sanctions. As an index of good faith, the
letter was sent privately, directly to the addressee
without any fun fare nor publicity. As for the news
report, it is difficult to believe that the petitioner, an
ordinary citizen without known ties to newspaper,
could have by himself caused the publication. It
does not appear either that the report was paid for
like an advertisement. At any rate, the news item is
a true and fair report of a judicial proceeding, made
in good faith and without comments or remarks.
BORJAL VS CA
GR 126466
FACTS:
1. A civil action for damages based on libel was filed
beforethe court against Borjal and Soliven for writing
and publishing articles that are allegedly derogatory
and
offensive
against
Francisco
Wenceslao,
attacking
among
others
the
solicitation letters he send to support a conference
to be launch concerning resolving matters on
transportation crisis that is tainted with anomalous
activities.
2.
Wenceslao however was never named in
any
of the articles nor was the conference he was
organizing.
The
lower court
ordered
petitioners to indemnify the private respondent for
damages which was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. A petition for review was filed before the
contending that private respondent was not
sufficiently identified to be the subject of
the published articles.
Issue:
Whether or not there are sufficient grounds to
constitute guilt of petitioners for libel?
Ruling of the Case:
1. In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that
the victim be identifiable although it is not necessary
that he be named. It is also not sufficient that
the offended party recognized himself as the person
attacked or defamed, but it must be shown that at

PCGPINEDA RN,MAN 2015


Page

for damages against the agents. Later, the Bulletin


Today published a news item based on petitioner's
letter to ASAC. This became the basis of an action
for libel brought against petitioner and his clients.
Petitioner moved to quash the case but his motion
was denied.

TORTS AND DAMAGES

least a third person could identify him as the object


of the libelous publication.
These requisites have not been complied with in the
case at bar. The element of identifiability was not
met since it was Wenceslaso who revealed he was
the organizer of said conference and had he not
done so the public would not have known.
2. The concept of privileged communications is
implicit in the freedom of the press and
that privileged communications must be protective
of public opinion. Fair commentaries on matters of
public interest are privileged and constitute a valid
defense in an action for libel or slander.
The doctrine of fair comment means that while in
general every discreditable imputation publicly
made is deemed false, because every man is
presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved,
and every false imputation is deemed malicious,
nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is
directed against a public person in his public
capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order
that such discreditable imputation to a public official
may be actionable, it must either be a false
allegation of fact or a comment based on a false
supposition.
If
the
comment is an expression
of opinion, based on
established facts,
then
it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be
mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred
from the facts.
3. The questioned article dealt with matters of public
interest
as
thedeclared objective of the conference, the compos
ition of itsmembers and
participants, and
the manner by which it was intended to be funded
no doubt lend to its activities as being genuinely
imbued with public interest. Respondent is also
deemed to be a public figure and even otherwise is
involved in a public issue. The court held that
freedom of expression is constitutionally guaranteed
and protected with the reminder
among media
members
to practice
highest
ethical
standards in the exercise thereof.
A privileged communication may be either
:
1. Absolutely privileged communication those
which are not actionable even if the author has
acted in bad faith. An example is found in Sec. 11,
Art.VI, of the 1987 Constitution which exempts a
member of Congress from liability for any speech or
debate in the Congress or in any Committee thereof.
2. Qualifiedly privileged communications those
containing
defamatory
imputations
are
not
actionable unless found to have been made without
good intention justifiable motive. To this genre
belong "private communications" and " fair and true
report without any comments or remarks."
MVRS PUNLICATION VS ISLAMIC DAWAH COUNCIL

FACTS:
1. ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC.,
a
localfederation of more than seventy (70) Muslim reli
giousorganizations, and some individual Muslims
field in the RTC of Manila a complaint for damages in
their own behalf and as a class suit in behalf of the
Muslim
members
nationwide
against
MVRS
PUBLICATIONS, INC and some its staff arising from
an article published in the 1 August 1992 issue of
Bulgar, a daily tabloid.
2.
The
complaint:
a)
The statement
was insulting and damaging to the Muslims; b) that
these words alluding to the pig as the God of the
Muslims was not only published out of sheer
ignorance
but
with intent
to hurt the
feelings, cast insult and disparage the Muslims and
Islam, as a religion in this country, in violation of law,
public policy, good morals and human relations;
c) that on account of these libelous words Bulgar
insulted not only the Muslims in the Philippines but
the entire Muslim world, especially every Muslim
individual in non-Muslim countries.
3.MVRS PUBLICATIONS, INC. and BINEGAS, JR., in
their defense, contended that the article did not
mention respondents as the object of the article and
therefore were not entitled to damages; and, that
the article was merely an expression of belief or
opinion and was published without malice nor
intention to cause damage, prejudice or injury
to Muslims.
4. The RTC dismissed the complaint holding that
Islamic Dawah et al. failed to establish their cause
of action since the persons allegedly defamed by the
article were not specifically identified.
The alleged libelous article refers to the larger
collectivity of Muslims for which the readers of
the libel could not readily identify the personalities
of the persons defamed. Hence, it is difficult for an
individual Muslim member to prove that the
defamatory remarks apply to him.
5. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the
RTC. It opined that it was "clear from the disputed
article
that
the
defamation
wasdirected to all adherents of the Islamic faith. This
libelous imputation undeniably applied to the
plaintiff-appellants who are Muslims sharing the
same religious beliefs." It added that the suit for
damages was a "class suit" and that ISLAMIC
DA'WAHCOUNCIL
OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC.'s religious
status as a
Muslim
umbrella organization gave it the requisite
personality to sue and protect the interests of all
Muslims.
6. MVRS brought the issue to the SC.
RULING OF THE CASE:HELD
The article was not libelous. Petition GRANTED. The

PCGPINEDA RN,MAN 2015

Page

OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR NO 135306

10

TORTS AND DAMAGES

assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals was


REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the decision of the
RTC was reinstated.
1. There was no fairly identifiable person who was
allegedly injured by the Bulgar article. An individual
Muslim has a reputation that is personal, separate
and distinct in the community. Each has a varying
interest and a divergent political and religious view.
There
is no injury
to the
reputation
of the individual Muslims
who constitute
this
community that can give rise to an action for group
libel. Each reputation is personal in character to
every
person.
Together, the Muslims do not have a single common
reputation that will give them a common or general
interest in the subject matter of the controversy.
2. Defamation, which includes libel (in general,
written) and slander (in general, oral), means the
offense of injuring a person's character, fame or
reputation through false and malicious statements.
It is that which tends to injure
reputation
or
to
diminish
the
esteem,
respect,
good
will
or confidence in the plaintiff or to excite derogatory
feelings or opinions about the plaintiff.
3. Defamation is an invasion of a relational interest
since it involves the opinion which others in the
community may have, or tend to have, of the
plaintiff. Words which are merely insulting are not
actionable as libel or slander per se, and mere words
of general abuse however opprobrious, ill-natured,
or vexatious, whether written or spoken, do not
constitute a basis for an action for defamation in the
absence of an allegation for special damages.
4. Declarations made about a large class of people
cannot
beinterpreted to advert to an identified or identifiabl
eindividual. Absent circumstances specifically pointi
ng or alluding to a particular member of a class, no
member of such class has a right of action without
at all impairing the equally demanding right of free
speech and expression, as well as of the press,
under the
Bill of Rights
5. The SC used the reasoning in Newsweek v IAC:
where the defamation is alleged to have been
directed at a group or class, it is essential that the
statement must be so sweeping or all-embracing as
to apply to every individual in that group
or class, or sufficiently
specific so
that each
individual in the class or group can prove that the
defamatory statement specifically pointed to him, so
that he can bring the action separately.
6. The SC cited some US cases wherein the rule on
libel has been restrictive. It was held that there
could be no libel against an extensive community in
common law. With regard to the largest sectors in
society,
including
religious
groups, it may
be generally concluded that no criminal action at the
behest of the state, or civil action on behalf of the
individual, will lie.
7. "Emotional distress" tort action has no application

PHILIPPINE JOURNALIST INC VS THOENEN


GR NO 143372

PCGPINEDA RN,MAN 2015

Page

in this case because no particular individual was


identified
in
the
Bulgar article.
"Emotional distress" means any highly
unpleasant
mental reaction such as extreme grief, shame,
humiliation, embarrassment, anger, disappointment,
worry, nausea, mental suffering and anguish, shock,
fright, horror, and chagrin. This kind of tort action is
personal in nature, i.e., it is a civil action filed by an
individual to assuage the injuries to his emotional
tranquility
due
to
personal
attacks
on
his character. Under the
Second Restatement of the
Law, to recover for the
intentional
infliction of emotional
distress
the
plaintiff must show that:
(a)The conduct of the defendant was intentional or
in reckless disregard of the plaintiff;
(b)The conduct was extreme and outrageous;
(c)There was a causal connection between the
defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's mental
distress;
(d)The plaintiff's mental distress was extreme and
severe.
8."Extreme and outrageous conduct" means conduct
that is so outrageous in character, and so extreme in
degree,
as
to
go beyond all
possible bounds of decency. The actions must have
been so
terrifying as
naturally to
humiliate,
embarrass or frighten the plaintiff
9. Any party seeking recovery for mental anguish
must prove more than mere worry, anxiety,
vexation,
embarrassment,
or
anger. Liability
does not arise from mere insults, indignities, threats,
annoyances, petty expressions, or other trivialities.
Intentional tort causing emotional distress must
necessarily give way to the fundamental right to free
speech.
10. Respondents' lack of cause of action cannot
be cured by the filing of a class suit. An element of a
class suit is the adequacy of representation. In
determining the question of fair and adequate
representation of members of a class, the court
must consider:
(a) whether the interest of the named party is
coextensive with the interest of the other members
of the class;
(b) the proportion of those made parties as it so
bears to the total membership of the class; and,
(c) any other factor bearing on the ability of the
named party to speak for the rest of the class.
Islamic Dawah Council of the Philippines, Inc., seeks
in effect to assert the interests not only of
the Muslims in the Philippines but of the whole
Muslim world as well. Private respondents obviously
lack the sufficiency of numbers to represent such a
global group; neither have they been able to
demonstrate the identity.

11

TORTS AND DAMAGES

FACTS:
On 30 September 1990, a news item appeared in the
Peoples Journal claiming that a certain Francis
Thoenen, a Swiss national who allegedly shoots
wayward neighbors pets that he finds in his domain.
It also claimed that BF Homes residents, in a letter
through lawyer Atty. Efren Angara, requested for the
deportation of Thoenen to prevent the recurrence of
such incident in the future. Thoenen claimed that
the article destroyed the respect and admiration he
enjoyed in the community. He is seeking for
damages.
The petitioners admitted publication of the news
item, ostensibly out of a social and moral duty to
inform the public on matters of general interest,
promote the public good and protect the moral
public (sic) of the people, and that the story was
published in good faith and without malice.
Issue: Whether or not the news report fall under
privileged communication and therefore protected
by the constitutional provision on freedom of
speech.
Held: The right of free speech is not absolute. Libel
is not protected speech. In the instant case, even if
we assume that the letter written by Atty. Angara is
privileged communication, it lost its character when
the matter was published in the newspaper and
circulated among the general population, especially
since the individual alleged to be defamed is neither
a public official nor a public figure.
Moreover, the news item contained falsehoods on
two levels. First, the BF Homes residents did not ask
for the deportation of Thoenen, more so because the
letter of the Atty. Anagara was a mere request for
verification of Thoenens status as a foreign
resident. The article is also untrue because the
events she reported never happened. Worse, the
main source of information, Atty. Efren Angara,
apparently either does not exist, or is not a lawyer.
There is no constitutional value in false statements
of fact. Neither the intentional lie nor the careless
error materially advances societys interest in
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open debate.
Calculated falsehood falls into that class of
utterances which are no essential part of any
exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be
derived from them is clearly outweighed by the
social interest in order and morality The knowingly
false statement and the false statement made with
reckless disregard of the truth, do not enjoy
constitutional protection
ARTICLE 33 CIVIL CODE/FRAUD
LIM VS KOU CO PNG
GR 175256

PCGPINEDA RN,MAN 2015

Page

Principle: A single act or omission that cause


damage to an offended party may gave rise to two
separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender

(1) Civil liability ex delicto, that is, civil liability


arising from the criminal offense under Article 100
of the Revised PenalCode and (2) independent civil
liability; that is civil liability that may be pursued
independently of the criminal proceedings. The
independent civil liability may be based on an
obligation not arising from the act or omission
complained of as felony. It may also be based on an
act or omission that may constitute felony but,
nevertheless, treated independently from the
criminal action by specific provision of the Article 33
of the Civil Code.
FACTS:
FR Cement Corporation issued several withdrawal
authorities for the account of cement dealers and
traders, Fil-Cement and Tigerbilt. Each withdrawal
authority contained provision that it is valid for six
months from its date of issuance, unless revoked by
FRCC Marketing Department. Filcement and Tigerbilt
sold their withdrawal authorities to Co. On February
Co then sold these withdrawal authorities to Lim.
Using the withdrawal authorities Lim withdrew
cement bags from FRCC on a staggered basis.
Sometime in April 1999, FRCC did not allow Lim to
withdraw
the remaining
bags
covered
by
the withdrawal authorities. Lim clarified the matter
with Co and administrative manager of Fil-Cement,
who explained that the plant implemented a price
increase and would only release the goods once Lim
pays the price difference or agrees to receive lesser
quantity of cement. Lim filed case of Estafa through
Misappropriation or Conversion against Co. The
Regional Trial Court acquitted Co. After the trial
on the civil aspect of the criminal case the court
also found Co not civilly liable. Lim sought a
reconsideration which the regional trial Court
denied. On March 14, 2005 Lim filed her notice of
appeal on the civil aspect of the criminal case. On
April 19, 2005 Lim filed a complaint for specific
performance and damages before the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is no forum shopping for a
private complainant to pursue a civil complaint for
specific performance and damages while appealing
the judgment on the civil aspect of a criminal case
for estafa?
RULING: A single act or omission that cause
damage to an offended party may gave rise to two
separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender

(1) civil liability ex delicto, that is, civil liability


arising from the criminal offense under Article 100
of the Revised Penal Code and (2) independent civil
liability, that is civil liability that may be pursued
independently of the criminal proceedings. The
independent civil liability may be based on an
obligation not arising from the act or omission

12

TORTS AND DAMAGES

complained of as felony. It may also be based on an


act or omission that may constitute felony but,
nevertheless, treated independently from the
criminal action by specific provision of the Article 33
of the Civil Code. Because of the distinct and
independent nature of the two kinds of civil
liabilities, jurisprudence holds that the offended
party may pursue two types of civil liabilities
simultaneously or cummulatively, without offending
the rules on forum shopping, litis pendentia or res
judicata. The criminal cases of estafa are based on
culpa criminal while the civil action for collection is
anchored on culpa contractual. The first action is
clearly a civil action ex delicto, it having been
instituted together with criminal action. On the other
hand, the second action, judging by the allegations
contained in the complaint, is a civil action arising
from contractual obligation and for tortious conduct.
The Civil Case involves only the obligation arising
from contract and from tort, whereas the appeal in
the estafa case involves only the civil obligations of
Co arising from the offense charged.
DAMAGES
DAMAGE

The detriment, injury or loss which are


occasioned by reason of fault of another in
the property or person.

DAMAGES

The pecuniary compensation, recompense


or satisfaction for an injury sustained or as
otherwise
expressed,
the
pecuniary
consequences which the law imposes for
the breach of some duty or violation of
some rights.

DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA (Damage Without Injury)

A person may have suffered physical hurt or


injury, but for as long as no legal injury or
wrong has been done, there is no liability.

There is no liability even if there is damage


because there was no injury.

There can be damage without injury.

In order that a plaintiff may maintain an


action for the injuries of which he
complains, he must establish that such
injuries resulted from a breach of duty
which the defendant owed to the plaintiff.

Injury
Legal invasion
of a legal right

Damage
Loss, hurt or
harm
which
results from the
injury

Damages
The
recompense or
compensation
awarded for the

PCGPINEDA RN,MAN 2015

NOTES:

A complaint for damages is a personal action.


(Baritua vs. CA, 267 SCRA 331)
Proof of pecuniary loss is necessary to
successfully recover actual damages from the
defendant. No proof of pecuniary loss is
necessary in case of moral, nominal,
temperate, liquidated or exemplary damages.
The assessment of such damages, except
liquidated ones, is left to the discretion of the
court according to the circumstances of each
case.

Kinds of damages (MANTLE)


1.

Actual or Compensatory

2.

Moral

3.

Nominal

4.

Temperate or moderate

5.

Liquidated

6.

Exemplary or corrective

SPOUSES CUSTODIO VS. CA


G.R. NO. 116100, FEBRUARY 9, 1996
Doctrine: Every owner has an absolute right over his
property and his act of fencing and enclosing the
same was an act which he may lawfully perform in
the employment and exercise of said right.
Whatever injury or damage that may have been
sustained by others by reason of the rightful use of
the said land by the owner is damnum absque
injuria.
Facts: The respondent (Pacifico Mabasa) owns a
parcel of land with a two-door apartment erected
thereon situated at Interior P. Burgos St., Palingon,
Tipas, Tagig, Metro Manila. Said property may be
described to be surrounded by other immovables
pertaining to respondents herein.
As an access to P. Burgos Street from respondents
property, there are two possible passageways. The
first passageway is approximately one meter wide
and is about 20 meters distan(t) from Mabasas
residence to P. Burgos Street. Such path is passing in
between the previously mentioned row of houses of
the petitioners The second passageway is about 3
meters in width and length from Mabasas residence
to P. Burgos Street; it is about 26 meters. In passing
thru said passageway, a less than a meter wide path
through the septic tank and with 5-6 meters in

Page

damage
suffered

13

TORTS AND DAMAGES

length, has to be traversed.


When said property was purchased by Mabasa, there
were tenants occupying the remises and who were
acknowledged by Mabasa as tenants. However,
sometime in February, 1982, one of said tenants
vacated the apartment and when Mabasa went to
see the premises, he saw that there had been built
an adobe fence in the first passageway making it
narrower in width. Said adobe fence was first
constructed by Petitioners Santoses along their
property which is also along the first passageway.
Petitioner Morato constructed her adobe fence and
even extended said fence in such a way that the
entire passageway was enclosed. And it was then
that the remaining tenants of said apartment
vacated the area.
Petitioner Ma. Cristina Santos testified that she
constructed said fence because of some other
inconveniences of having (at) the front of her house
a pathway such as when some of the tenants were
drunk and would bang their doors and windows.
Trial court rendered a decision ordering the
Petitioners Custodios and Santoses to give
Respondent Mabasa permanent access ingress and
egress, to the public street and Mabasa to pay the
Custodios and Santoses the sum of Eight Thousand
Pesos (P8,000) as indemnity for the permanent use
of the passageway.
Respondent Mabasa went to the CA raising the sole
issue of whether or not the lower court erred in not
awarding damages in their favor. The CA rendered
its decision affirming the judgment of the trial court
with modification only insofar as the. grant of
damages to Mabasa The motion for reconsideration
filed by the petitioners was denied.
Issues:
Whether the grant of right of way to herein private
respondent Mabasa is proper. Whether the award of
damages is in order.
Held:
No. Herein petitioners are already barred from
raising the same. Petitioners did not appeal from the
decision of the court a quo granting private
respondents the right of way, hence they are
presumed to be satisfied with the adjudication
therein. With the finality of the judgment of the trial
court as to petitioners, the issue of propriety of the
grant of right of way has already been laid to rest.
No. A reading of the decision of the CA will show that
the award of damages was based solely on the fact
that the original plaintiff, Pacifico Mabasa, incurred
losses in the form of unrealized rentals when the
tenants vacated the leased premises by reason of

There is a material distinction between damages and


injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right;
damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from
the injury; and damages are the recompense or
compensation awarded for the damage suffered.
Thus, there can be damage without injury in those
instances in which the loss or harm was not the
result of a violation of a legal duty. (damnum absque
injuria). In order that a plaintiff may maintain an
action for the injuries of which he complains, he
must establish that such injuries resulted from a
breach of duty which the defendant owed to the
plaintiff a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and
legal responsibility by the person causing it
(damnum et injuria.)
In the case at bar, although there was damage,
there was no legal injury. The act of petitioners in
constructing a fence within their lot is a valid
exercise of their right as owners, hence not contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy. The law
recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and
dispose of a thing, without other limitations than
those established by law. It is within the right of
petitioners, as owners, to enclose and fence their
property. Article 430 of the Civil Code provides that
(e)very owner may enclose or fence his land or
tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or dead
hedges, or by any other means without detriment to
servitudes constituted thereon.
At the time of the construction of the fence, the lot
was not subject to any servitudes. There was no
easement of way existing in favor of private
respondents, either by law or by contract. The fact
that private respondents had no existing right over
the said passageway is confirmed by the very
decision of the trial court granting a compulsory
right of way in their favor after payment of just
compensation.
Hence, prior to said decision, petitioners had an
absolute right over their property and their act of
fencing and enclosing the same was an act which
they may lawfully perform in the employment and
exercise of said right. To repeat, whatever injury or
damage may have been sustained by private
respondents by reason of the rightful use of the said
land by petitioners is damnum absque injuria.

DIAZ VS DAVAO LIGHT AND POWER CO


GR 160959
FACTS:
Plaintiff asks for damages for defendants alleged

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Page

the closure of the passageway. However, the mere


fact that the plaintiff suffered losses does not give
rise to a right to recover damages.

14

TORTS AND DAMAGES

malicious prosecution of a criminal case of theft of


electricity against him, for plaintiffs filing of a
charge of violation of P.D. 401 as amended after
dismissal of the theft case, the filing of a damage
suit against him before the RTC of Cebu City which
was dismissed and the filing of another damage suit
before the same Cebu RTC which is still pending.
Damages are also being sought for defendants
removal of Electric Meter, but this is a subject
matter of a case pending before Branch 13 of this
Court and therefore said court retains jurisdiction
over the said cause of action. The RTC held that
while the City Prosecutor, and later the Secretary of
Justice, concluded that there was no probable cause
for the crime of theft, this did not change the fact
that plaintiff made an illegal connection for
electricity. A persons right to litigate should not be
penalized by holding him liable for damages. On
October 1, 2003, the CA affirmed the decision of the
RTC. It concluded that the evidence on hand showed
good faith on the part of DLPC in filing the subject
complaints. It pointed out that Diaz had been using
the electrical services of DLPC without its consent.
As to the effect of the compromise agreement, the
CA ruled that it did not bar the filing of the criminal
action. Thus, under the principle of damnum absque
injuria, the legitimate exercise of a persons right,
even if it causes loss to another, does not
automatically result in an actionable injury. Diaz,
now petitioner, comes before this Court in this
petition for review on certiorari
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the compromise agreement
entered into between DLPC and Diaz barred the
former from instituting further actions; and2.
Whether or not DLPC acted in bad faith in
instituting the criminal cases against Diaz
RULING:
The petition is without merit. Petitioner insists that
the compromise agreement as well as the decision
of the CA already settled the controversies between
them; yet, DLPC instituted the theft case against
Diaz, and worse, instituted another action for
violation of P.D. 401, as amended by B.P. Blg. 876.
Thus, the only conclusion that can be inferred from
the acts of DLPC is that they were designed to
harass, embarrass, prejudice, and ruin him. He
further avers that the compromise agreement
completely erased litigious matters that could
necessarily arise Moreover, Diaz asserts that the
evidence he presented is sufficient to prove the
damages he suffered by reason of the malicious
institution of the criminal cases. The court does not
agree. Article 2028 of the Civil Code defines a
compromise as a contract whereby the parties, by
making reciprocal concessions, avoid litigation or put
an end to one already commenced. The purpose
of compromise is to settle the claims of the parties
and bar all future disputes and controversies.

ACTUAL DAMAGES

PCGPINEDA RN,MAN 2015


In crimes and quasi-delict, the defendant shall be
liable for all damages which are the natural and
probable consequences of the act and omission
complained of.
It is not necessary that such
damages have been foreseen or could have
reasonably foreseen by the defendant. (Article
2202 Civil Code)
The amount should be that which would put
plaintiff in the same position as he would have
been if he had not sustained the wrong for which
he is now getting his compensation or reparation.
To recover damages, the amount of loss must not
only be capable of proof but must actually be
proven.
Uncertainty as to the precise amount is not
necessarily fatal.

Page

However, criminal liability is not affected by


compromise for it is a public offense which must be
prosecuted and punished by the Government on its
own motion, though complete reparation should
have been made of the damages suffered by the
offended party. A criminal case is committed against
the People, and the offended party may not waive or
extinguish the criminal liability that the law imposes
for the commission of the offense. Moreover, a
compromise is not one of the grounds prescribed by
the Revised Penal Code for the extinction of criminal
liability. On the other hand, malicious prosecution
has been defined as an action for damages brought
by or against whom a criminal prosecution, civil suit
or other legal proceeding has been instituted
maliciously and without probable cause, after the
termination of such prosecution, suit, or other
proceeding in favor of the defendant therein. It is an
established rule that in order for malicious
prosecution to prosper, the following requisites must
be proven by petitioner: (1) the fact of prosecution
and the further fact that the defendant (respondent)
was himself the prosecutor, and that the action
finally terminated with an acquittal; (2) that in
bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without
probable cause; and (3) that the prosecutor was
actuated or impelled by legal malice, that is, by
improper or sinister motive. The foregoing are
necessary to preserve a persons right to litigate
which may be emasculated by the undue filing of
malicious prosecution cases. From the foregoing
requirements, it can be inferred that malice and
want of probable cause must both be clearly
established to justify an award of damages based on
malicious prosecution. DLPC was not motivated by
malicious intent or by a sinister design to unduly
harass petitioner, but only by a well-founded anxiety
to protect its rights. Respondent DLPC cannot
therefore be faulted in availing of the remedies
provided for by law.

15

TORTS AND DAMAGES

LOSS OF EARNING CAPACITY:


Variables considered are:
1. life expectancy
2. net income/earnings

Formula:
{2/3 x (80age of death)} x mo. Earnings x 12
2
NOTE:

Life expectancy is computed as follows:


{ 2/3 x (80-age at death) }

Net earnings is the total of the earnings less


expenses necessary for the creation of such
earnings and less living or other incidental
expenses.

Loss of profits

May be determined by considering the average


profit for the preceding years multiplied by the
number of years during which the business was
affected by the wrongful act or breach.

Personal injury and loss earning capacity

Comprehends not only the value of the loss


suffered but also that of the profits which the
obligee failed to obtain.
Classification:
1. Dano emergente loss of what a person
already possesses
2. Lucro cessante failure to receive as a benefit
that would have pertained to him
NOTE: The latter type includes:
1.
2.

Loss or impairment of earning capacity in


cases of temporary or permanent personal
injury.
Injury to the plaintiffs business standing or
commercial credit.

Attorneys fees

They are actual damages. It is due to the plaintiff


and not to the counsel.
Plaintiff must allege the basis of his claim for
attorneys fees in the complaint; the basis should
be one of the 11 cases specified in Article 2208 of
the Civil Code.
Interests

Award of interest in the concept of actual and


compensatory damages actual damages.

Doctrine of Avoidable Consequences

A party cannot recover damages flowing from


consequences which the party could reasonably
have avoided.
It has a reasonable corollary:
a person who
reasonably attempts to minimize his damages can
recover the expenses that he incurred.
MARIKINA
AUTO
LINE
TRANSPORTCORPORATION vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 152040 March 31, 2006
FACTS:
1. Erlinda V. Valdellon is the owner of a two-door
commercial apartment located at No. 31 Kamias
Road, Quezon City. The Marikina Auto Line Transport
Corporation (MALTC) is the owner-operator of a
passenger bus, its employee, was assigned as the
regular driver of the bus.
2. At around 2:00 p.m. on October 3, 1992, Suelto
was driving the passenger bus along Kamias Road,
Kamuning, Quezon City, going towards EDSA. The
bus suddenly swerved to the right and struck the
terrace of the commercial apartment owned by

PCGPINEDA RN,MAN 2015

Page

The rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof


is imposed as follows:
1. When the obligation is breached and it consist
of payment of sum of money, i.e., a loan or
forbearance of money:
a. The interest due should be that which may
have
been
stipulated
in
writing;
furthermore, the interest due shall itself
earn legal interest from the time it is
judicially demanded.
b. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of
interest shall be 12% per annum to be
computed from default, i.e., from judicial or
extra-judicial demand under and subject to
the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil
Code.
2. When the obligation, not constituting a loan or
forbearance or money, is breached:

An interest on the amount of damages to


be awarded may be imposed at the
discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per
annum.

No interest shall be adjudged on


unliquidated claims or damages, except
when or until demand can be established
with reasonable certainty.

Where the demand is established with


reasonable certainty, the interest shall
begin to run from the time the claim is
made judicially or extrajudicially.
3. When the judgment of the court awarding the
sum of money becomes final and executory,
the rate of legal interest shall be 12% per
annum from such finality until its satisfaction.

16

TORTS AND DAMAGES

Valdellon. Upon Valdellons request, the court


ordered Sergio Pontiveros, the Senior Building
Inspection Officer of the City
Engineers Office, to inspect the damaged terrace.
3. He recommended that since the structural
members made of concrete had been displaced, the
terrace would have to be demolished "to keep its
monolithicness, and to insure the safety and stability
of the building."
4. In a letter addressed to the bus company and
Suelto,
Valdellon
demanded
payment
of
P148,440.00, within 10 days from receipt thereof, to
cover the cost of the damage to the terrace. he bus
company and Suelto offered a P30,000.00
settlement which Valdellon refused.
5. Valdellon filed a criminal complaint for reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property against
Suelto. After the requisite preliminary investigation,
an Information was filed with the RTC of Quezon City.
6. Valdellon also filed a separate civil complaint
against Suelto and the bus company for damages.
She prayed that after due proceedings, judgment be
rendered in her favor.
ISSUE(S):
1.W/N Suelto is guilty of reckless imprudence which
resulted in the damage of Valdellons property
HELD:
1. Yes. Respondent People of the Philippines was
able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that
petitioner Suelto swerved the bus to the right with
recklessness, thereby causing damage to the terrace
of private respondents apartment.
RATIO:
Although she did not testify to seeing the incident as
it happened, petitioner Suelto himself admitted this
in his answer to the complaint and when he testified
in the trial court. Suelto narrated that he suddenly
swerved the bus to the right of the road causing it to
hit the column of the terrace of private respondent.
Petitioners were burdened to prove that the damage
to the terrace of private respondent was not the
fault of petitioner Suelto. We have reviewed the
evidence on record and find that petitioners failed to
prove that petitioner acted on an emergency
caused by the sudden intrusion of a passenger
jeepney into the lane of the bus he was driving.
It was the burden of petitioners herein to prove
petitioner Sueltos defense that he acted on an
emergency, that is, he had to swerve the bus to the
right to avoid colliding with a passenger jeep coming
from EDSA that had overtaken another vehicle and
intruded into the lane of the bus. It is clear from the
photographs submitted by the prosecution that the

VILLA REY VS CA
L-25499
FACTS
An Izuzu First Class passenger bus owned and
operated by the defendant, driven by Laureano
Casim, left Lingayen, Pangasinan, for Manila. Among
its paying passengers was the deceased, Policronio
Quintos, Jr. who sat on the first seat, second row,
right side of the bus.
At about 4:55 o'clock a.m. when the vehicle was
nearing the northern approach of the Sadsaran
Bridge, it frontally hit the rear side of a bullcart filled
with hay. As a result the end of a bamboo pole
placed on top of the hayload and tied to the cart to
hold it in place, hit the right side of the windshield of
the bus. The protruding end of the bamboo pole,
about 8 feet long from the rear of the bullcart,
penetrated through the glass windshield and landed
on the face of Policronio Quintos, Jr. who, because of
the impact, fell from his seat and was sprawled on
the floor. The pole landed on his left eye and the
bone of the left side of his face was fractured.
Notwithstanding medical assistance, Policronio
Quintos, Jr. died due to traumatic shock due to
cerebral injuries.
The private respondents are the sisters and only
surviving heirs of Quintos Jr., who died single,
leaving no descendants nor ascendants. Said
respondents herein brought this action against
petitioner, for breach of the contract of carriage
between said petitioner and the deceased Quintos,
to recover the aggregate sum of P63,750.00 as
damages, including attorney's fees.
Petitioner contended that the mishap was due to a
fortuitous event, but this pretense was rejected by
the trial court and the Court of Appeals, both of

PCGPINEDA RN,MAN 2015

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commercial apartment of Dr. Valdellon sustained


heavy damage caused by the bus being driven by
Suelto. "It seems highly improbable that the said
damages were not caused by a strong impact. And,
it is quite reasonable to conclude that, at the time of
the impact, the bus was traveling at a high speed
when
Suelto
tried
to
avoid
the passenger
jeepney."The damages could not have been caused
except by a speeding bus. Had the accused not been
speeding, he could have easily reduced his speed
and come to a full stop when he noticed the jeep.
Were he more prudent in driving, he could have
avoided the incident or even if he could not avoid
the incident, the damages would have been less
severe. The severe damages sustained could not
have resulted had the accused acted as a
reasonable and prudent man would. The accused
was not diligent as he claims to be. What is more
probable is that the accused had to swerve to the
right and hit the commercial apartment of the
plaintiff because he could not make a full stop as he
was driving too fast in a usually crowded street.

17

TORTS AND DAMAGES

which found that the accident and the death of


Policronio had been due to the negligence of the bus
driver, for whom petitioner was liable under its
contract of carriage with the deceased.
The Trial Court based the number of years by
which the damages shall be computed on the life
expectancy of Quintos, which was placed at 33-1/3
years he being over 29 years of age (or around 30
years for purposes of computation) at the time of his
demise by applying the formula (2/3 x [80-301 =
life
expectancy)
adopted
in
the
American
Expectancy Table of Mortality or the actuarial of
Combined Experience Table of Mortality.
Petitioner maintains that the lower courts had
erred in adopting said formula and in not acting in
accordance with Alcantara v. Surro in which the
damages were computed on a four year basis,
despite the fact that the victim therein was 39 years
old, at the time of his death, and had a life
expectancy of 28.90 years.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
W/N the amount of damages awarded is proper?
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
YES, it is proper.
In the case of Alcantara v. Surro, none of the parties
had questioned the propriety of the four-year basis
adopted by the trial court in making its award of
damages. Both parties appealed, but only as regards
the amount thereof. The plaintiffs assailed the noninclusion, in its computation, In fact in that case the
Court held that: The determination of the indemnity
to be awarded to the heirs of a deceased person has
therefore no fixed basis
Much is left to the
discretion of the court considering the moral and
material damages involved, and so it has been said
that "(t)here can be no exact or uniform rule for
measuring the value of a human life and the
measure of damages cannot be arrived at by precise
mathematical
calculation,
but
the
amount
recoverable depends on the particular facts and
circumstances of each case. The life expectancy of
the deceased or of the beneficiary, whichever is
shorter, is an important factor. Other factors that are
usually considered are: (1) pecuniary loss to plaintiff
or beneficiary; (2) loss of support ; (3) loss of
service; (4) loss of society; (5) mental suffering of
beneficiaries ; and (6) medical and funeral expenses.
Life expectancy is, not only relevant, but, also, an
important element in fixing the amount recoverable
by private respondents herein. The Court of Appeals
has not erred in basing the computation of
petitioner's liability upon the life expectancy of
Policronio Quintos, Jr.
It has been consistently held that earning capacity,
as an element of damages to one's estate for his
death by wrongful act is necessarily his net earning
capacity or his capacity to acquire money, "less the
necessary expense for his own living. Stated
otherwise, the amount recoverable is not loss of the
entire earning, but rather the loss of that portion of
the earnings which the beneficiary would have

MERCURY DRUG VS HUANG


GR 172122
FACTS:
Petitioner Mercury Drug is the registered owner of a
Mitsubishi truck, with petitioner del Rosario as driver.
Respondents Richard and Carmen Huang are parents
of respondent Stephen Huang, who owned a Sedan.
The two vehicles got into an accident as they were
traversing a highway. The Sedan was on the left
innermost lane while the truck was on the next lane
to its right, when the latter swerved to its left and
slammed in the front right side of the car. As a
consequence, the car was wrecked and Stephen
Huang incurred massive injuries and became
paralyzed.
The parents of Stephen faulted Del Rosario for
committing
gross
negligence
and
reckless
imprudence, and Mercury Drug for failing to exercise
the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of its driver.
The RTC found the petitioners jointly and severally
liable for damages. The CA affirmed, hence this
appeal.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
W/N Mercury Drug is liable as employer of
Del Rosario.
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
Mercury Drug is liable.
Mercury Drug is jointly and solidarily liable with Del
Rosario, as the employer of the latter. In order to be
relieved of such liability, Mercury should show that it
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family,
both in the selection and supervision of the
employee in the performance of his duties. Mercury
failed in both respects.
In selecting employees, the employer is required to
examine them as to their qualifications, experience
and service records. With respect to supervision, the
employer should formulate standard operating
procedures, monitor their implementation and
impose disciplinary measures for their breach. To
establish such, concrete proof, such as documentary
evidence must be submitted by him.
In the case at bar, it was shown that Del Rosario
didn't take driving tests and psychological exams
when he applied for the position of a Truck Man. In
addition, Mercury didn't present Del Rosario's NBI
and police clearances. Next, the last seminar
attended by the driver occurred a long 12 years
before the accident occurred. Lastly, Mercury didn't
have a backup driver for long trips. When the
accident happened Del Rosario has been out on the
road for more than 13 hours.

PCGPINEDA RN,MAN 2015

Page

received. In other words, only net earnings, not


gross earning, are to be considered that is, the total
of the earnings less expenses necessary in the
creation of such earnings or income and less living
and other incidental expenses.

18

TORTS AND DAMAGES

As to negligence with regard to supervision over its


employees, Mercury didn't impose any sanction on
Del Rosario when the latter reported to the former
about the incident. Hence, Mercury didn't exercise
due diligence.
In the end, the SC found that Mercury and Del
Rosario are jointly and solidarily liable to the
Huangs.
EASTERN SHIPPING VS CA
GR 97412
FACTS:
This is an action against defendants shipping
company, arrastre operator and broker-forwarder
for damages sustained by a shipment while in
defendants custody, filed by the insurer-subrogee
who paid the consignee the value of such
losses/damages.
Two fiber drums of riboflavin were shipped from
Yokohama, Japan for delivery vessel SS EASTERN
COMET owned by defendant Eastern Shipping
Lines, Inc. under Bill of Lading. The shipment was
insured under plaintiffs Marine Insurance
Policy. Upon arrival of the shipment in Manila, it
was discharged unto the custody of defendant
Metro Port Service. The latter excepted to one
drum, said to be in bad order, which damage was
unknown to plaintiff.
Allied Brokerage Corporation received the
shipment from defendant Metro Port Service,
Inc., one drum opened and without seal. Allied
Brokerage Corporation made deliveries of the
shipment to the consignees warehouse. The
latter excepted to one drum which contained
spillages, while the rest of the contents was
adulterated/fake
Plaintiff contended that due to the losses/damage
sustained by said drum, the consignee suffered
losses totaling P19,032.95, due to the fault and
negligence of defendants. Claims were presented
against defendants who failed and refused to pay.
Plaintiff was compelled to pay the consignee
P19,032.95 under the aforestated marine insurance
policy, so that it became subrogated to all the rights
of action of said consignee against defendants
Eastern Shipping alleged that the shipment was
discharged in good order from the vessel unto the
custody of Metro Port Service so that any
damage/losses incurred after the shipment was
incurred after the shipment was turned over to the
latter, is no longer its liability. Metroport averred
that
although
subject
shipment
was
discharged unto its custody, portion of the
same was already in bad order. Allied Brokerage
alleged that plaintiff has no cause of action against
it, not having negligent or at fault for the shipment
was already in damage and bad order condition
when received by it.
Lower court :
A.Ordering defendants to pay plaintiff, jointly and

TORTS AND DAMAGES

PCGPINEDA RN,MAN 2015

19

PEOPLE VS AMINOLA
GR 178062

Page

severally: 1. The amount of P19,032.95, with the


present legal interest of 12% per annum from
October 1, 1982, the date of filing of this
complaints, until fully paid (the liability of
defendant Eastern Shipping, Inc. shall not exceed
US$500 per case or the CIF value of the loss,
whichever is lesser, while the liability of defendant
Metro Port Service, Inc. shall be to the extent of the
actual invoice value of each package, crate box or
container in no case to exceed P5,000.00 each,
pursuant to Section 6.01 of the Management
Contract);
2. P3,000.00 as attorneys fees, and 3. Costs.
There is sufficient evidence that the shipment
sustained damage while in the successive
possession of appellants, and therefore they are
liable
Court of Appeals thus affirmed in toto.

FACTS:
Abdul Aminola was convicted of the RTC robbery
with homicide. After the killing of Nestor Gabuya, on
the night of the same day, an informant told police
officers of Aminola's whereabouts and during the
search, officers found guns.
Accused now questioned the legality of their
warrantless arrest, arguing that there was no hot
pursuit nor was in compliance of Rule 113, Sec. 5,
par. b of the Rules of Court. Also, that there was
considerable period of time had elapsed between
their arrest and the commission of the crime.
ISSUE: Whether the warrantless arrest was valid.

Issue:
Whether or not a claim for damage sustained on a
shipment of goods can be a solidary, or joint and
several, liability of the common carrier, the arrastre
operator and the customs broker;
Held:
The common carriers duty to observe the requisite
diligence in the shipment of goods lasts from the
time
the
articles
are
surrendered
to
or
unconditionally placed in the possession of, and
received by, the carrier for transportation until
delivered to, or until the lapse of a reasonable time
for their acceptance by, the person entitled to
receive them. When the goods shipped either are
lost or arrive in damaged condition, a presumption
arises against the carrier of its failure to observe
that diligence, and there need not be an express
finding of negligence to hold it liable. In Firemans
Fund Insurance, Co. vs. Metro Port Service, Inc., we
held that the relationship between the consignee
and the common carrier is similar to that of the
consignee and the arrastre operator. Since it is the
the goods that are in its custody and to deliver them
in good condition to the consignee, such
responsibility also devolves upon the CARRIER. Both
the ARRASTRE and the CARRIER are therefore
charged with the obligation to deliver the goods in
good condition to the consignee.
We do not, of course, imply by the above
pronouncement that the arrastre operator and the
customs broker are themselves always and
necessarily liable solidarily with the carrier, or viceversa. Eastern Shipping Lines which, being the
carrier and not having been able to rebut the
presumption of fault, is, in any event, to be held
liable in this particular case. The factual finding
of both the court a quo and the appellate court is
that there is sufficient evidence that the
shipment sustained damage while in the
successive possession of appellants

RULING: The SC ruled that the arrest was valid.


Aminola submitted his arraignment without any
objection when it should have been raised before it
to be quashed. Aminola was questioning their arrest
for the first time on appeal and are, therefore,
deemed to have waived their right to the
constitutional protection against illegal arrests and
searches.
Robbery with Homicide; elements. The following
elements must be established for a conviction in the
special complex crime of robbery with homicide: 1.
The taking of personal property is committed with
violence or intimidation against persons; 2. The
property taken belongs to another; 3. The taking is
with animo lucrandi; and 4. By reason of the robbery
or on the occasion thereof, homicide is committed.
Essential for conviction of robbery with homicide is
proof of a direct relation, an intimate connection
between the robbery and the killing, whether the
latter be prior or subsequent to the former or
whether both crimes are committed at the same
time. The prosecution was able to establish that
accused-appellants
committed
robbery
with
homicide through the totality of their evidence. The
first three elements were established when Oliva
testified that he saw, and positively identified,
accused-appellants taking Gabuyas property by
force and both shooting Gabuya. Gabuyas death
resulting from their attack proves the last element of
the complex crime as duly confirmed by the postmortem report.
MORAL DAMAGES
Includes physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and
similar injury.

No proof of pecuniary loss is necessary.


GENERAL RULE: The plaintiff must allege and prove:

1.

The factual basis for moral damages; and

Requisites for award of moral damages:


1.
2.
3.
4.

There must be an injury whether physical, mental


or psychological, clearly sustained by the claimant;
There must be a culpable act or omission.;
Such act or omission is the proximate cause of the
injury;
The damages is predicated on the cases cited in
Art.2219.

NOTE:
The award of moral damages cannot be
granted in favor of a corporation because, being an
artificial person, it has no feelings, no emotions, no
senses. It cannot therefore experience physical
suffering and mental anguish which can be
experienced only by one having a nervous system.
HERBOSA VS CA AND PVE
GR 119086
FACTS:
Petitioner spouses contracted the services of PVE for
the betamax coverage of their then wedding
celebration. .On the day of the wedding, the PVE
crew arrived at the residence of the bride. They
recorded the pre-departure activities of the bride
before leaving for the church and the Manila Hotel
where the wedding reception followed. 2days after
the wedding however, studio manager of PVE,
informed the petitioners that the videotape
coverage of their wedding celebration was damaged
due to mechanical defect in their equipment.
Petitioners alleged that said failure on the part of
PVE to perform its obligation caused deep
disappointment, anxiety and an irreparable break in
the continuity of an established family tradition of
recording by film or slide historical and momentous
family events especially wedding celebrations and
for which they were entitled to be paid actual, moral
and exemplary damages including attorneys fees.
RTC rendered a decision ordering defendant to pay
the plaintiffs actual, moral and exemplary damages
in the amount of P100,000.00, P 10,000.00 for
attorneys fees and to pay the costs of these
proceedings.
Issues: Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to
award of damages arising from breach of contract of
service.
Held: PVE liable for damages.
Ratio: PVE disclaimed any liability for the damaged
videotape by invoking force majeure or fortuitous
event and asserted that a defective transistor
caused the breakdown in its video tape recorder, but

PCGPINEDA RN,MAN 2015

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2. Its causal relation to the defendants act


EXCEPTION: Moral damages may be awarded to the
victim in criminal proceedings without the need for
pleading of proof of the basis thereof.

20

TORTS AND DAMAGES

failed to substantiate its bare allegation by


presenting in evidence the alleged defective
transistor before the trial court. At any rate,
in order that fortuitous event may exempt
PVE from liability, it is necessary that it be free from
negligence. The PVE crew miserably failed to detect
the defect in the video tape recorder and this could
have been avoided by a timely exercise of minimum
prudence by the crew of PVE. The failure to record
on videotape the wedding celebration of the
petitioners constitutes malicious breach of contract
as well as gross negligence on the part of
respondent Solid Distributors, Inc. However, the
award of damages to the petitioners cannot be
lumped together as was done by the trial court. It is
basic that the claim for actual, moral and exemplary
damages as well as attorneys fees must each be
independently identified and justified. Article 1170
of the New Civil Code provides that those who in
the performance of their obligations are guilty of
fraud, negligence or delay, and those who in any
manner contravene the tenor there of, are liable for
damages.
For failure of PVE, to comply with its obligation under
the video tape coverage contract, petitioners are
entitled to actual damages at least in the amount of
(P1,423.00) representing their down payment in that
contract. Ordinarily, moral damages cannot be
recovered in an action for breach of contract
because such an action is not among those
expressly mentioned in Article2219. However, moral
damages are recoverable for breach of contract
where the breach was wanton, reckless, malicious or
in bad faith, oppressive or abusive. The wanton and
reckless failure and neglect to timely check and
remedy the video tape recorder by the PVE crew
indicates a malicious breach of contract and gross
negligence on the part of said respondent in the
discharge
of
its
contractual
obligations.
Consequently, the petitioners who suffered mental
anguish and tortured feelings thereby, are entitled to
an award of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00) as moral damages. In the case of Go
v. Court of Appeals it was emphasized that (i)n our
society, the importance of a wedding ceremony
cannot be underestimated as it is the matrix of the
family and, therefore, an occasion worth reliving in
the succeeding years. Considering the sentimental
value of the tapes and the fact that the event
therein recordeda wedding which in our culture is
a significant milestone to be cherished and
remembered could no longer be reenacted and
was lost forever. The award of exemplary damages
which is hereby fixed to (P40,000.00) is justified,
under the premises, to serve as a warning to all
entities engaged in the same business to observe
good faith and due diligence in the fulfillment of
their contractual obligations. Additionally, the award
of attorneys fees in the amount of Ten Thousand
Pesos (P10,000.00) is also proper in accordance with
Article 2208 of the Civil Code.

Issue: Whether or not co-ownership is applicable to


valid
marriage.
Held: Since the present case does not involve the
annulment of a bigamous marriage, the provisions of
article 50 in relation to articles 41, 42 and 43 of the
Family Code, providing for the dissolution of the
absolute community or conjugal partnership of
gains, as the case maybe, do not apply. Rather the
general rule applies, which is in case a marriage is
declared void ab initio, the property regime
applicable to be liquidated, partitioned and
distributed is that of equal co-ownership. Since the
properties ordered to be distributed by the court a
quo were found, both by the RTC and the CA, to have
been acquired during the union of the parties, the
same would be covered by the co-ownership. No
fruits of a separate property of one of the parties
appear to have been included or involved in said
distribution.
IMMACULATE CONCEPTION ACADEMY VS AMA
COMPUTER COLLEGE INC.
GR 173575

ABS CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATON VS CA


GR 128690
FACTS:
In 1992, ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, through
its vice president Charo Santos-Concio, requested
Viva Production, Inc. to allow ABS-CBN to air at least
14 films produced by Viva. Pursuant to this request,
a meeting was held between Vivas representative
(Vicente Del Rosario) and ABS-CBNs Eugenio Lopez

Page

BUENAVENTURA VS CA
GR 127358
FACTS:
Noel Buenaventura filed a position for the
declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground that
both he and his wife were psychologically
incapacitated. The RTC in its decision, declared the
marriage entered into between petitioner and
respondent null and violation ordered the liquidation
of the assets of the conjugal partnership property;
ordered petitioner a regular support in favor of his
son in the amount of 15,000 monthly, subject to
modification as the necessity arises, and awarded
the care and custody of the minor to his mother.
Petitioner appealed before the CA. While the appeal
was pending, the CA, upon respondents motion
issued a resolution increasing the support pendants
like to P20, 000. The CA dismissal petitioner appeal
for lack of merit and affirmed in to the RTC decision.
Petitioner motion for reconsideration was denied,
hence this petition.

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21

TORTS AND DAMAGES

(General Manager) and Santos-Concio was held on


April 2, 1992. During the meeting Del Rosario
proposed a film package which will allow ABS-CBN to
air 104 Viva films for P60 million. Later, SantosConcio, in a letter to Del Rosario, proposed a
counterproposal of 53 films (including the 14 films
initially requested) for P35 million. Del Rosario
presented the counter offer to Vivas Board of
Directors but the Board rejected the counter offer.
Several negotiations were subsequently made but
on April 29, 1992, Viva made an agreement with
Republic Broadcasting Corporation (referred to as
RBS or GMA 7) which gave exclusive rights to RBS
to air 104 Viva films including the 14 films initially
requested by ABS-CBN.
ABS-CBN now filed a complaint for specific
performance against Viva as it alleged that there is
already a perfected contract between Viva and ABSCBN in the April 2, 1992 meeting. Lopez testified
that Del Rosario agreed to the counterproposal and
he (Lopez) even put the agreement in a napkin
which was signed and given to Del Rosario. ABS-CBN
also filed an injunction against RBS to enjoin the
latter from airing the films. The injunction was
granted. RBS now filed a countersuit with a prayer
for moral damages as it claimed that its reputation
was debased when they failed to air the shows that
they promised to their viewers. RBS relied on the
ruling in People vs Manero and Mambulao Lumber vs
PNB which states that a corporation may recover
moral damages if it has a good reputation that is
debased, resulting in social humiliation. The trial
court ruled in favor of Viva and RBS. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court.
ISSUE:
1.
Whether or not a contract was perfected in
the
April
2,
1992
meeting
between
the
representatives
of
the
two
corporations.
2.
Whether or not a corporation, like RBS, is
entitled to an award of moral damages upon
grounds of debased reputation.
HELD:
1. No. There is no proof that a contract was
perfected in the said meeting. Lopez testimony
about the contract being written in a napkin is not
corroborated because the napkin was never
produced in court. Further, there is no meeting of
the minds because Del Rosarios offer was of 104
films for P60 million was not accepted. And that the
alleged counter-offer made by Lopez on the same
day was not also accepted because theres no proof
of such. The counter offer can only be deemed to
have been made days after the April 2 meeting
when Santos-Concio sent a letter to Del Rosario
containing the counter-offer. Regardless, there was
no showing that Del Rosario accepted. But even if he
did accept, such acceptance will not bloom into a
perfected contract because Del Rosario has no
authority to do so.
As a rule, corporate powers, such as the power; to
enter into contracts; are exercised by the Board of

FILIPINAS BROADCASTING NETWORK VS AGO


MEDICAL AND EDUCATIONAL CENTER-BICOL
CHRISTIAN COLLEGE OF MEDICINE
GR 141994
FACTS:
Expos is a radio documentary program hosted by
Carmelo Mel Rima (Rima) and Hermogenes Jun
Alegre (Alegre). Expos is aired every morning
over DZRC-AM which is owned by Filipinas
Broadcasting Network, Inc. (FBNI). Expos is
heard over Legazpi City, the Albay municipalities
and other Bicol areas.
In the morning of 14 and 15 December 1989, Rima
and Alegre exposed various alleged complaints from
students, teachers and parents against Ago Medical
and Educational Center-Bicol Christian College of
Medicine (AMEC) and its administrators. Claiming
that the broadcasts were defamatory, AMEC and
Angelita Ago (Ago), as Dean of AMECs College of
Medicine, filed a complaint for damages against
FBNI, Rima and Alegre on 27 February 1990. The
complaint further alleged that AMEC is a reputable
learning institution.
With the supposed exposs, FBNI, Rima and Alegre
transmitted malicious imputations, and as such,
destroyed plaintiffs (AMEC and Ago) reputation.
AMEC and Ago included FBNI as defendant for
allegedly failing to exercise due diligence in the
selection and supervision of its employees,
particularly Rima and Alegre.
On 18 June 1990, FBNI, Rima and Alegre, through
Atty. Rozil Lozares, filed an Answer alleging that the
broadcasts against AMEC were fair and true. FBNI,
Rima and Alegre claimed that they were plainly
impelled by a sense of public duty to report the
goings-on in AMEC, [which is] an institution imbued

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Directors. But this power may be delegated to a


corporate committee, a corporate officer or
corporate manager. Such a delegation must be clear
and specific. In the case at bar, there was no such
delegation to Del Rosario. The fact that he has to
present the counteroffer to the Board of Directors of
Viva is proof that the contract must be accepted first
by the Vivas Board. Hence, even if Del Rosario
accepted the counter-offer, it did not result to a
contract because it will not bind Viva sans
authorization.
2. No. The award of moral damages cannot be
granted in favor of a corporation because, being an
artificial person and having existence only in legal
contemplation, it has no feelings, no emotions, no
senses, It cannot, therefore, experience physical
suffering and mental anguish, which call be
experienced only by one having a nervous
system. No moral damages can be awarded to a
juridical person. The statement in the case of People
vs Manero and Mambulao Lumber vs PNB is a mere
obiter dictum hence it is not binding as a
jurisprudence.

22

TORTS AND DAMAGES

with public interest. Thereafter, trial ensued.


During the presentation of the evidence for the
defense, Atty. Edmundo Cea, collaborating counsel
of Atty. Lozares, filed a Motion to Dismiss on FBNIs
behalf. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss.
Consequently, FBNI filed a separate Answer claiming
that it exercised due diligence in the selection and
supervision of Rima and Alegre. FBNI claimed that
before hiring a broadcaster, the broadcaster should
(1) file an application; (2) be interviewed; and (3)
undergo an apprenticeship and training program
after passing the interview.
FBNI likewise claimed that it always reminds its
broadcasters to observe truth, fairness and
objectivity in their broadcasts and to refrain from
using libelous and indecent language. Moreover,
FBNI requires all broadcasters to pass the Kapisanan
ng mga Brodkaster sa Pilipinas (KBP) accreditation
test and to secure a KBP permit.
On 14 December 1992, the trial court rendered a
Decision finding FBNI and Alegre liable for libel
except Rima. The trial court held that the broadcasts
are libelous per se. The trial court rejected the
broadcasters claim that their utterances were the
result of straight reporting because it had no factual
basis. The broadcasters did not even verify their
reports before airing them to show good faith. In
holding FBNI liable for libel, the trial court found that
FBNI failed to exercise diligence in the selection and
supervision of its employees. In absolving Rima from
the charge, the trial court ruled that Rimas only
participation was when he agreed with Alegres
expos. The trial court found Rimas statement
within the bounds of freedom of speech,
expression, and of the press.
Both parties, namely, FBNI, Rima and Alegre, on
one hand, and AMEC and Ago, on the other,
appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts judgment
with modification. The appellate court made Rima
solidarily liable with FBNI and Alegre. The appellate
court denied Agos claim for damages and attorneys
fees because the broadcasts were directed against
AMEC, and not against her. FBNI, Rima and Alegre
filed a motion for reconsideration which the Court of
Appeals denied in its 26 January 2000 Resolution.
Hence, FBNI filed the petition for review.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
Whether FBNI is solidarily liable with Rima
and Alegre
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
YES, UNDER ART 2219 of NCC
As operator of DZRC-AM and employer of Rima and
Alegre, FBNI is solidarily liable to pay for damages
arising from the libelous broadcasts. As stated by
the CA, "recovery for defamatory statements
published by radio or television may be had from the
owner of the station, a licensee, the operator of
the station, or a person who procures, or
participates in, the making of the defamatory
statements. An employer and employee are

QUEZON CITY GOVERNMENT VS DACARA


GR 150304
FACTS:
At about 1:00 A.M., Fulgencio Dacara, Jr., son of
Fulgencio P. Dacara, Sr. and owner of 87 Toyota
Corolla 4-door Sedan. While driving the said vehicle,
JR rammed into a pile of earth/street diggings found
at Matahimik St., Quezon City, which was then being
repaired by the QC government. As a result, Dacarra
Jr. allegedly sustained bodily injuries and the vehicle
suffered extensive damage for it turned turtle when
it hit the pile of earth.
Dacara sued the city for damages on the ground of

PCGPINEDA RN,MAN 2015

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solidarily liable for a defamatory statement by the


employee within the course and scope of his or her
employment, at least when the employer authorizes
or ratifies the defamation. In this case, Rima and
Alegre were clearly performing their official duties as
hosts of FBNIs radio program Expos when they
aired the broadcasts. FBNI neither alleged nor
proved that Rima and Alegre went beyond the scope
of their work at that time. There was likewise no
showing that FBNI did not authorize and ratify the
defamatory broadcasts.
Moreover, there is insufficient evidence on record
that FBNI exercised due diligence in the selection
and supervision of its employees, particularly Rima
and Alegre. FBNI merely showed that it exercised
diligence in the selection of its broadcasters
without introducing any evidence to prove that it
observed the same diligence in the supervision of
Rima and Alegre. FBNI did not show how it exercised
diligence in supervising its broadcasters. FBNIs
alleged constant reminder to its broadcasters to
"observe truth, fairness and objectivity and to refrain
from using libelous and indecent language" is not
enough to prove due diligence in the supervision of
its broadcasters. Adequate training of the
broadcasters on the industrys code of conduct,
sufficient information on libel laws, and continuous
evaluation of the broadcasters performance are but
a few of the many ways of showing diligence in the
supervision of broadcasters.
FBNI claims that it "has taken all the precaution in
the selection of Rima and Alegre as broadcasters,
bearing in mind their qualifications." However, no
clear and convincing evidence shows that Rima and
Alegre underwent FBNIs "regimented process" of
application. Furthermore, FBNI admits that Rima and
Alegre had deficiencies in their KBP accreditation,
which is one of FBNIs requirements before it hires a
broadcaster. Significantly, membership in the KBP,
while voluntary, indicates the broadcasters strong
commitment to observe the broadcast industrys
rules and regulations.
Clearly, these circumstances show FBNIs lack of
diligence in selecting and supervising Rima and
Alegre. Hence, FBNI is solidarily liable to pay
damages together with Rima and Alegre.

23

TORTS AND DAMAGES

negligence. In its defense, QC insists that they


placed all the necessary precautionary signs to alert
the public of a roadside construction. They argue
that the driver was over-speeding, and that his own
negligence was therefore the sole cause of the
incident.
Issue: Whether or not the QC government was
negligent.
Held: YES. That the negligence of Dacara was the
proximate cause of the accident was aptly discussed
in the lower courts finding, which we quote: nary
a lighting device or a reflectorized barricade or
sign perhaps which could have served as an
adequate warning to motorist especially
during the thick of the night where darkness is
pervasive. Contrary to the testimony of the
witnesses for the defense that there were signs,
gasera which was buried so that its light could not
be blown off by the wind and barricade, none was
ever presented to stress the point that
sufficient and adequate precautionary signs
were placed at Matahimik Street. If indeed signs
were placed thereat, how then could it be explained
that according to the report even of the
policeman which for clarity is quoted again,
none was found at the scene of the accident.
Petitioners belatedly point out that Dacara. was
driving at the speed of 60 KPH when he met the
accident. This speed was allegedly well above the
maximum limit of 30 kph allowed on city streets with
light traffic, when not designated through streets, as
provided under the Land Transportation and Traffic
Code. Thus, petitioners assert that Dacara, having
violated a traffic regulation, should be presumed
negligent pursuant to Article 2185 of the Civil Code.
These matters were, however, not raised by
petitioners at any time during the trial. It is
evident from the records that they brought up for
the first time the violation in their MR of the CA
Decision. It is too late in the day for them to raise
this new issue.
DAMAGES
DOCTRINE: Article 2231 of the Civil Code
mandates that in cases of quasi-delicts,
exemplary damages may be recovered if the
defendant acted with gross negligence. Gross
negligence means such utter want of care as
to raise a presumption that the persons at
fault must have been conscious of the
probable consequences of their carelessness,
and that they must have nevertheless been
indifferent (or worse) to the danger of injury
to the person or property of others. The
negligence must amount to a reckless
disregard for the safety of persons or
property.
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES MAY BE AWARDED TO
LGUS
Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that
exemplary damages may be imposed by way of

free weekdays, 1 free Saturday and 1 free Sunday).


Sps. Tan again tried to reserve. This time, they were
confirmed. However, FLP called them, saying that
their reservation was cancelled.
The SEC hearing officer ruled in favor of Sps. Tan.
However, the Court of Appeals ruled that Fontana
should refund Sps. Tan upon returning their
certificates of shares for incurring delay (in the
construction of the facilities).
ISSUE:
WON the Tan Sps are entitled to nominal damages

FONTANA RESORT VS SPS TAN


GR 154670

HELD:
Respondents additionally alleged the unreasonable
cancellation of their confirmed reservation for the
free use of an FLP villa on April 1, 1999. According
to respondents, their reservation was confirmed by a
Mr. Murphy Magtoto, only to be cancelled later on by
a certain Shaye. Petitioners countered that April 1,
1999 was a Holy Thursday and FLP was already fullybooked. Petitioners, however, do not deny that
Murphy Magtoto and Shaye are FLP employees who
dealt with respondents. The absence of any
confirmation number issued to respondents does not
also discount the possibility that the latters
reservation was mistakenly confirmed by Murphy
Magtoto despite FLP being fully-booked. At most, we
perceive a mix-up in the reservation process of
petitioners. This demonstrates a mere negligence
on the part of petitioners, but not willful intention to
deprive
respondents
of
their
membership
benefits. It does not constitute default that would
call for rescission of the sale of FRCCI shares by
petitioners to respondents. For the negligence of
petitioners as regards respondents reservation for
April 1, 1999, respondents are at least entitled to
nominal damages in accordance with Articles 2221
and 2222 of the Civil Code.
In Almeda v. Cario, we have expounded on the
propriety of granting nominal damages as
follows:

FACTS:
Sps. Tan bought from RN Development Corporation
(RNDC) two class D shares of stock for Fontana
Resort
and
Country
Club
(FRCCI),
worth
P387,300.00, enticed by the promises of RNDCs
sales agents promises that FRCCI would construct a
park with first-class leisure facilities called Fontana
Leisure Park (FLP).
Two years later, Sps. Tan filed a case in SEC, seeking
refund since according to the Sps. Tan, they were
deceived into buying FRCCI shares because of
fraudulent misrepresentations. FLP turned out still
unfinished.
Sps. Tan narrated that they were able to book and
avail themselves of free accommodations. However,
whenever they reserved again for their daughters
18th birthday, they were told that they already
consumed their free stay (since they only have 5

[N]ominal damages may be awarded to a plaintiff


whose right has been violated or invaded by the
defendant, for the purpose of vindicating or
recognizing that right, and not for indemnifying the
plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. Its award is
thus not for the purpose of indemnification for a loss
but for the recognition and vindication of a
right. Indeed, nominal damages are damages in
name only and not in fact. When granted by the
courts, they are not treated as an equivalent of a
wrong inflicted but simply a recognition of the
existence of a technical injury. A violation of the
plaintiff's right, even if only technical, is sufficient to
support an award of nominal damages. Conversely,
so long as there is a showing of a violation of the
right of the plaintiff, an award of nominal damages is
proper.
It is also settled that the amount of such damages

NOMINAL DAMAGES--STAND ALONE

PCGPINEDA RN,MAN 2015

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example or correction for the public good. The


award of these damages is meant to be a
deterrent to socially deleterious actions.
Public policy requires such imposition to
suppress wanton acts of an offender. It must
be emphasized that local governments and
their employees should be responsible not
only for the maintenance of roads and streets,
but also for the safety of the public. Thus,
they must secure construction areas with
adequate precautionary measures. Not only is
the work of petitioners impressed with public
interest; their very existence is justified only
by public service.
Hence, local governments have the paramount
responsibility of keeping the interests of the
public foremost in their agenda. For these
reasons, it is most disturbing to note that the
present petitioners are the very parties
responsible
for
endangering
the
public
through such a rash and reckless act.

24

TORTS AND DAMAGES

Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a


right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or
invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or
recognized, and not for the purpose of
indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by
him. (Article2221 Civil Code)
Small sums fixed by the court without regard to the
extent of the harm done to the injured party.
Law presumes damage although actual or
compensatory damages are not proven.
They are damages in name only and are allowed
simply in recognition of a technical injury based on
a violation of a legal right.
Nominal damages cannot co-exist with actual or
compensatory damages.

TORTS AND DAMAGES

PCGPINEDA RN,MAN 2015

25

Carino granted the request and Almeda executed


an undertaking to pay the balancebut failed despite
repeated demands of Carino.
.Carino filed a case against Almeda. RTC ruled in
favor of Carino.
Almeda appealed, questioning the award of
nominal damages of the trial court.
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower
court. It held that the award of nominal damages
was justified by the unjust refusal of Almeda and
Almeda, Inc. to settle and pay the balance of the
purchase price in violation of the rights of Cario
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
W/N the award of NOMINAL damages was
proper?
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
YES. Almedas refusal to pay the purchase
price despite repeated demands and after
they sold the properties to third parties
constitutes a violation of Carinos right to the
amount in their agreement.
Nominal damages may be awarded to a plaintiff
whose right has been violated or invaded by the
defendant, for the purpose of vindicating or
recognizing that right, and not for indemnifying the
plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. Its award is
thus not for the purpose of indemnification for a loss
but for the recognition and vindication of a right.
Indeed, nominal damages are damages in name only
and not in fact. When granted by the courts, they
are not treated as an equivalent of a wrong inflicted
but simply a recognition of the existence of a
technical injury. A violation of the plaintiffs right,
even if only technical, is sufficient to support an
award of nominal damages. Conversely, so long as
there is a showing of a violation of the right of the
plaintiff, an award of nominal damages

Page

is addressed to the sound discretion of the court,


taking into account the relevant circumstances.
In this case, we deem that the respondents are
entitled to an award of P5,000.00 as nominal
damages in recognition of their confirmed
reservation for the free use of an FLP villa on April 1,
1999 which was inexcusably cancelled by petitioner
on March 3, 1999.
In sum, the respondents Complaint sufficiently
alleged a cause of action for the annulment or
rescission of the contract of sale of FRCCI class D
shares by petitioners to respondents; however,
respondents
were
unable
to
establish
by
preponderance of evidence that they are entitled to
said annulment or rescission.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition
is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated May 30,
2002 and Resolution dated August 12, 2002 of the
Court
Appeals
in
CA-G.R.
SP
No.
67816
are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Petitioners
are ORDERED to pay respondents the amount
of P5,000.00 as nominal damages for their
negligence as regards respondents cancelled
reservation for April 1, 1999, but respondents
Complaint, in so far as the annulment or rescission
of the contract of sale of the FRCCI class "D shares
of stock is concerned, is DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
ALMEDA VS CARINO
GR NO. 152143
FACTS:
April 30, 1980, Ponciano L. Almeda and Avelino G.
Cario, predecessors-in-interest of petitioners and
respondents, entered into 2 agreements to sell, one
covering 8 titled properties at P1,743,800.00, 20%
upon the signing and execution of the agreement,
balance four equal semi-annual installments,
beginning six months from the signing thereof, with
12% interest per annum.
Another 3 untitled properties, at P1,208,580.00,
15% upon the signing and execution of the
agreement, and the balance, bearing a 12% annual
interest from the signing thereof, to be paid as
follows: 15% of the purchase price plus interest to
be paid upon the issuance of titles to the lots, and
the balance plus interests to be paid in semi-annual
installments starting from the date of issuance of the
respective certificates of title to the lots involved,
which must be not later than March 30, 1982.
The parties amended their agreement by
extending the deadline of producing the titles to the
lands, P300K payment for the titled lands, Carino tor
ender acctg of the sugar cane crops and Carino to
pay 10K a month in case of failure to produce the
title of the documents.
Almeda asked Carino for the Deed of Absolute Sale
over the 8 titled properties despite non-payment of
the full price.

AGABON VS NLRC
GR 158694

TEMPERATE OR MODERATE DAMAGES

These are damages, which are more than nominal


but less than compensatory, and may be recovered
when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has
been suffered but its amount cannot be proved
with certainty. (Article 2224 Civil Code)
In cases where the resulting injury might be
continuing and possible future complications
directly arising from the injury, while certain to
occur are difficult to predict, temperate damages
can and should be awarded on top of actual or
compensatory damages; in such cases there is no
incompatibility between actual and temperate
damages.
ARANETA VS BANK OF AMERICA
L-25414

LIQUIDATED DAMAGES
Those agreed upon by the parties in a contract, to
be paid in case of breach thereof.
RADIOWEALTH FINANCE CO VS DEL ROSARIO
GR 138793
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES
Imposed by way of example or correction for the public
good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or
compensatory damages.

1.
2.
3.

Requisites for the award of exemplary damages:


They are imposed by way of example in addition to
compensatory damages and Imposed only after the
claimants right to them has been established;
They cannot be recovered as a matter of right, their
determination depending upon the amount of
compensatory damages that may be awarded;
The act must be accompanied by bad faith or done in
wanton, fraudulent, oppressive or malevolent manner.
CATHAY PACIFIC AIRWAYS VS VASQUEZ
GR 150853
FACTS:
The Spouses Vasquez went to HongKong via Cathay
Pacific Airlines. Included in the trip was their maid
who rode in the tourist class, and 2 friends who rode
with them in the business class cabin.
On the way back to Manila, the spouses presented
their boarding passes to the attendant. The
attendant informed them that their seats have been
upgraded to first class because they were Marco
Polo Club Members (frequent flyer club) and they
had such the privilege of a free upgrade in seating
accommodations when such is available.
The spouses did not want to change their seats
because they felt that they should be seated with
their friends with whom they had traveled and Dr.
Vasquez had business matters he wanted to discuss
with them.
The attendant, however, insisted that they take
the seats because the flight has been overbooked
and the only way for them to get in this flight was to
take the first class upgrade. They took in reluctantly
for want to be with their friends.
When they returned back to Manila, they
demanded from Cathay Pacific damages of up to
P1M, including Moral Damages.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
W/N Spouses Vasquez are entitled to MORAL
DAMAGES, if not should they be indemnified in
another manner.
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI

PCGPINEDA RN,MAN 2015

Page

DE GUZMAN VS TUMOLVA
GR 188072

26

TORTS AND DAMAGES

NO. SPOUSES ARE NOT ENTITLED TO MORAL


DAMAGES AS THERE WAS NO BAD FAITH ON
THE PART OF CATHAY PACIFIC OR ITS
ATTENDANTS.
The spouses knew that they were members of the
Marco Polo Club and that they had such privileged.
But privileges, as known to us, can be waived. The
flight attendant would have consulted the spouses if
they wanted to avail of that privilege before their
business class seats were given to someone else
and not surprise them, as like what happened in this
case.
The spouses clearly waived such privilege,
therefore Cathay Pacific breached the contract of
carriage.
It is essential, however, that there exists bad faith
or malice when in breach of the contract of carriage.
The attendants changed the seat accommodations
without such malice. Bad faith imports a dishonest
purpose or some moral obliquity which was not
present in this case.
SPOUSES MAY ENTITLED ONLY TO NOMINAL
DAMAGES
The court did not award them even nominal
damages, they just made mention that
Nominal Damages is the most the spouses may
claim:
According to article 2221:
o Article 2221. Nominal damages are
adjudicated in order that a right of the
plaintiff, which has been violated or
invaded by the defendant, may be
vindicated or recognized, and not for
the purpose of indemnifying the
plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.
BRIGHT MARITIME CORPORATION VS FANTONIAL
GR NO 165935
moral damages were awarded because the
employers act was tainted with bad
faith, considering that respondents Medical
Certificate stated that he was fit to work on the day
of his scheduled departure, yet he was not allowed
to leave allegedly for medical reasons. Further, in
the said case, exemplary damages was also imposed
on the employer by way of example or correction
for the public good in view of petitioners act of
preventing respondent from being deployed on the
ground that he was not yet declared fit to work on
the date of his departure, despite evidence to the
contrary. The Court added: x x x. Exemplary
damages are imposed not to enrich one party or
impoverish another, but to serve as a deterrent
against or as a negative incentive to curb socially
deleterious actions.
ATTORNEYS FEES

PCGPINEDA RN,MAN 2015

Page

KAISAHAN AT KAPATIRAN NG MGA


MANGGAGAWA AT KAWANI SA MWC-EAST
ZONE UNION VS MANILA WATER COMPANY INC

27

TORTS AND DAMAGES

GR 174179

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