IV.

Executive Department
*In Pormento vs. Estrada, G.R. No. 191988, August 31, 2010, the petition asks
whether private respondent Joseph Ejercito Estrada, who was elected President of the
Republic of the Philippines in the general elections held on May 11, 1998 and sought the
presidency again in the general elections held on May 10, 2010, is covered by the ban on
the President from any re-election. Estrada was not elected President the second time
he ran. Since the issue on the proper interpretation of the phrase any reelection will
premised on a persons second (whether immediate or not) election as President, there
is no case or controversy to be resolved in this case. No live conflict of legal rights exists.
Assuming an actual case or controversy existed prior to the proclamation of a president
who has been duly elected in the May 10, 2010 elections; the same is no longer true
today. Following the results of that election, private respondent was not elected
President for the second time. Thus, any discussion of his re-election will simply be
hypothetical and speculative. It will serve no useful or practical purpose.
A. Privileges, inhibitions and disqualifications (Sections 6 and 13
Prohibitions/Inhibitions)
1. No increase in salaries during their tenure;
2. Shall not receive any other emoluments from the government or any other
source;
3. Shall not hold any other office or employment, unless otherwise provided in the
Constitution.
- This must not, however, be construed as applying to posts occupied by the Executive
officials without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity, as provided by law
and as required by the primary functions of the said official's office. - National Amnesty
Commission vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 156982, September 2, 2004.
1. Presidential Immunity - Immunity from suits during incumbency.
*After his tenure, the Chief Executive cannot invoke immunity from suit
for civil damages arising out of acts done by him while he was President which
were not performed in the exercise of official duties. - Estrada vs. Desierto, G.R.
No. 146710-15, March 2, 2001.
*A department secretary, even if treated as an alter ego of the President,
cannot invoke Presidential immunity in a case filed against him because the
questioned acts are not the acts of the President. - Ricardo Gloria vs. CA, G.R.
No. 119903, August 15, 2000.
*The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State
and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same
footing as any other trespasser. The intent of the framers of the Constitution is
clear that the immunity of the President from suit is concurrent only with his
tenure and not his term. Applying the foregoing rationale to this case, it is clear
that former President Arroyo cannot use the presidential immunity from suit to
shield herself from judicial scrutiny that would assess whether, within the context
of amparo proceedings, she was responsible or accountable for the abduction of
Rodriguez. - In the Matter of the Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Habeas
Data in favor of Noriel H. Rodriguez; Noriel H. Rodriguez vs. Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, et al., G.R. No. 191805 & G.R. No. 193160, November 15,
2011.
2. Presidential Privilege - Right of the President and high-level executive
branch officials to withhold information from Congress, the Courts, and
ultimately, the public.

*The necessity for withholding the information must be of such a high

degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a
particular case. - Senate vs. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006.
*In Neri vs. Senate Committees, G.R. No. 180843, March 25, 2008, the SC
upheld the refusal of Neri to answer the three (3) questions asked during the
Senate inquiry because the information sought by the 3 questions are properly
covered by the presidential communications privilege, and executive privilege
was validly claimed by the President through the Executive Secretary. First, the
communications relate to the power to enter into an executive agreement with
other countries which is a quintessential and non-delegable power of the
President. Second, the communications were received by a member of the
Cabinet which through proximity test is covered by the executive privilege. Third,
it was not shown that there is compelling need for the information as to justify
the limitation of the President, nor was there a showing of the unavailability of
the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
B. Powers
1. Executive and administrative powers in general
*Absence of motion of reconsideration; effect of: The omission of
the filing of a motion for reconsideration poses no obstacle for the Courts review
of its ruling on the whole case since a serious constitutional question has been
raised and is one of the underlying bases for the validity or invalidity of the
presidential action. If the President does not have any constitutional authority to
discipline a Deputy Ombudsman and/or a Special Prosecutor in the first place,
then any ruling on the legal correctness of the OPs decision on the merits will be
an empty one. In other words, since the validity of the OPs decision on the merits
of the dismissal is inextricably anchored on the final and correct ruling on the
constitutional issue, the whole case including the constitutional issue remains
alive for the Courts consideration on motion for reconsideration. - Emilio A.
Gonzales III v. Office of the President, etc., et al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit v. Atty.
Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 196231/G.R. No. 196232, January 28,
2014.
*Constitutional bodies; concept of independence: The
independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman and by the Constitutional
Commissions shares certain characteristics they do not owe their existence to
any act of Congress, but are created by the Constitution itself; additionally, they
all enjoy fiscal autonomy. In general terms, the framers of the Constitution
intended that these independent bodies be insulated from political pressure to
the extent that the absence of independence would result in the impairment of
their core functions. The deliberative considerations abundantly show that the
independent constitutional commissions have been consistently intended by the
framers to be independent from executive control or supervision or any form of
political influence. At least insofar as these bodies are concerned, jurisprudence is
not scarce on how the independence granted to these bodies prevents
presidential interference. Emilio A. Gonzales III v. Office of the President, etc., et
al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit v. Atty. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No.
196231/G.R. No. 196232, January 28, 2014.
*Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770; unconstitutional; vesting of
disciplinary authority in the President over the Deputy
Ombudsman; violation of the independence of the Ombudsman. In
more concrete terms, we rule that subjecting the Deputy Ombudsman to
discipline and removal by the President, whose own alter egos and officials in the

Executive department are subject to the Ombudsmans disciplinary authority,

cannot but seriously place at risk the independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman itself. Section 8(2) of R.A. No. 6770 intruded upon the
constitutionally-granted independence of the Office of the Ombudsman. By so
doing, the law directly collided not only with the independence that the
Constitution guarantees to the Office of the Ombudsman, but inevitably with the
principle of checks and balances that the creation of an Ombudsman office seeks
to revitalize. What is true for the Ombudsman must equally and necessarily be
true for her Deputies who act as agents of the Ombudsman in the performance of
their duties. The Ombudsman can hardly be expected to place her complete trust
in her subordinate officials who are not as independent as she is, if only because
they are subject to pressures and controls external to her Office. This need for
complete trust is true in an ideal setting and truer still in a young democracy like
the Philippines where graft and corruption is still a major problem for the
government. For these reasons, Section 8(2) of R.A. No. 6770, providing that the
President may remove a Deputy Ombudsman, should be declared void. Emilio A.
Gonzales III v. Office of the President, etc., et al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit v. Atty.
Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 196231/G.R. No. 196232, January 28,
2014.
2. Power of appointment
a) In general
b) Commission on Appointments confirmation
*The power of the succeeding President to revoke appointments
made by an Acting President evidently refers only to appointments in the
Executive Department. It has no application to appointments in the
judiciary, because temporary or acting appointments can only undermine
the independence of the judiciary due to their being revocable at will. - De
Castro vs. JBC, G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010.
*By-Passed Appointment one that has not been finally acted
upon on the merits by the Commission on Appointments at the close of the
session of Congress.
- An ad interim appointee disapproved by the Commission on
Appointments can no longer be extended a new appointment; An ad
interim appointment that has lapsed by inaction of the Commission on
Appointments does not constitute a term of office. - Matibag vs.
Benipayo, G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002.
c) Midnight appointments - appointment made by a President within
two (2) months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of
his term.
- The Court held in De Castro vs. JBC, G.R. No. 191002, April 20,
2010, that the prohibition does not extend to appointment of members of
the Supreme Court. Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition
contained in Section 15, Article VII to the Appointment of members of the
Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They would have easily
and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII
as being equally applicable to the appointment of members of the Supreme
Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4(1), Article VIII. That
such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against
the President or Acting President making appointments within two (2)

months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the
President's or Acting President's term does not refer to the members of the
Supreme Court. - This ruling modified the former rule espoused in In re:
Appointment of Valenzuela, A.M. No. 98-0501, November 9, 1998, that
the provision on midnight appointments applies to the judiciary. Further,
said ruling granted authority to then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
to appoint Chief Justice Renato Corona as successor of retired Chief
Justice Reynato Puno.
d) Power of removal
3. Power of control and supervision
*Executive power; civilian police force; authority of local
executives over police. Regarding the countrys police force, Section 6, Article
XVI of the Constitution states that: The State shall establish and maintain one
police force, which shall be national in scope and civilian in character, to be
administered and controlled by a national police commission. The authority of
local executives over the police units in their jurisdiction shall be provided by
law. A local chief executive, such as the provincial governor, exercises
operational supervision over the police, and may exercise control only in day-today operations In the discussions of the Constitutional Commission regarding
the above provision it is clear that the framers never intended for local chief
executives to exercise unbridled control over the police in emergency situations.
This is without prejudice to their authority over police units in their jurisdiction
as provided by law, and their prerogative to seek assistance from the police in day
to day situations, as contemplated by the Constitutional Commission. But as a
civilian agency of the government, the police, through the NAPOLCOM, properly
comes within, and is subject to, the exercise by the President of the power of
executive control. Jamar M. Kulayan, et al. vs. Gov. Abdusakur M. Tan etc., et
al., G.R. No. 187298, July 3, 2012.
a) Doctrine of qualified political agency
*Petitioners argue that the EVAT law is unconstitutional as it constitutes
abandonment by Congress of its exclusive authority to fix the rate of taxes under
the 1987 Philippine Constitution and also nullified the President's power of
control by mandating the fixing of the tax rate by the President upon the
recommendation of the Secretary of Finance. The SC ruled that the Secretary of
Finance can act as agent of the Legislative Department to determine and declare
the event upon which its expressed will is to take effect. His personality in such
instance is in reality but a projection of that of Congress. Thus, being the agent of
Congress and not of the President, the President cannot alter or modify or nullify,
or set aside the findings of the Secretary of Finance and to substitute the
judgment of the former for that of the latter. - Abakada Guro vs. Executive
Secretary, G.R. No. 168056, September 1, 2005.
*Applying the doctrine of qualified political agency, the power of the
President to reorganize the National Government may be validly delegated to his
Cabinet Members exercising control over a particular executive department. DENR vs. DENR Region XII Employees, G.R. No. 149724, August 19, 2003.
b) Executive departments and offices
*Executive power; power of reorganization.
Section 31 of
Executive Order No. 292 (E.O. 292), otherwise known as the Administrative Code

of 1987, vests in the President the continuing authority to reorganize the offices
under him in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency
In the case of Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora [G.R. Nos. 142801-802,
July 10, 2001], the Court affirmed that the Presidents authority to carry out a
reorganization in any branch or agency of the executive department is an express
grant by the legislature by virtue of E.O. 292, thus: But of course, the list of legal
basis authorizing the President to reorganize any department or agency in the
executive branch does not have to end here. We must not lose sight of the very
source of the power that which constitutes an express grant of power. Under
Section 31, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987), the President, subject to the policy of the
Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall
have the continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the
Office of the President. For this purpose, he may transfer the functions of other
Departments or Agencies to the Office of the President. Pichay, Jr. v. Office of
the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs-Investigative and
Adjudicatory Division, et al., G.R. No. 196425, July 24, 2012.
*The President has the continuing authority to reorganize the national
government, which includes the power to group, consolidate bureaus and
agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify functions,
services and activities and to standardize salaries and materials; it is effected in
good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more
efficient. - MEWAP vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 160093, July 31, 2007.
c) Local government units
*Executive power; emergency or calling-out powers of local
executives. Respondents cannot rely on paragraph 1, subparagraph (vii) of
Article 465 [of the Local Government Code], as the said provision expressly refers
to calamities and disasters, whether man-made or natural. The governor, as local
chief executive of the province, is certainly empowered to enact and implement
emergency measures during these occurrences. But the kidnapping incident in
the case at bar cannot be considered as a calamity or a disaster. Respondents
cannot find any legal mooring under this provision to justify their actions.
Paragraph 2, subparagraph (vi) of the same provision is equally inapplicable for
two reasons. First, the Armed Forces of the Philippines does not fall under the
category of a national law enforcement agency, to which the National Police
Commission (NAPOLCOM) and its departments belong. Its mandate is to
uphold the sovereignty of the Philippines, support the Constitution, and defend
the Republic against all enemies, foreign and domestic. Its aim is also to secure
the integrity of the national territory. Second, there was no evidence or even an
allegation on record that the local police forces were inadequate to cope with the
situation or apprehend the violators. If they were inadequate, the recourse of the
provincial governor was to ask the assistance of the Secretary of Interior and
Local Government, or such other authorized officials, for the assistance of
national law enforcement agencies. Jamar M. Kulayan, et al. vs. Gov.
Abdusakur M. Tan etc., et al., G.R. No. 187298, July 3, 2012.
4. Military powers
*Commander-in-chief clause to call out the Armed Forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
*The conditions of actual invasion or rebellion AND public safety
requires it need not concur before the President may exercise its calling out
power. The only criterion is that whenever it becomes necessary, the President

may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. - SANLAKAS vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 159085, February 3,
2004.
*The President has discretionary authority to declare a state of rebellion.
The court may only look into the sufficiency of the factual basis for the exercise of
the power. - Lacson vs. Perez, G.R. No. 147780, May 10, 2001.
*Executive power; emergency or calling-out powers of
President. [I]t has already been established that there is one repository of
executive powers, and that is the President of the Republic. This means that
when Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution speaks of executive power, it is
granted to the President and no one else. As emphasized by Justice Jose P.
Laurel, in his ponencia in [Villena v. Secretary of the Interior, 67 Phil. 541
(1939)]: With reference to the Executive Department of the government, there
is one purpose which is crystal-clear and is readily visible without the projection
of judicial searchlight, and that is the establishment of a single, not plural,
Executive. The first section of Article VII of the Constitution, dealing with the
Executive Department, begins with the enunciation of the principle that The
executive power shall be vested in a President of the Philippines. This means
that the President of the Philippines is the Executive of the Government of the
Philippines, and no other. Corollarily, it is only the President, as Executive, who
is authorized to exercise emergency powers as provided under Section 23, Article
VI, of the Constitution, as well as what became known as the calling-out powers
under Section 7, Article VII thereof. Jamar M. Kulayan, et al. vs. Gov.
Abdusakur M. Tan etc., et al., G.R. No. 187298, July 3, 2012.
*The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence is a power that the Constitution directly vests in the President. She did
not need a congressional authority to exercise the same. If there is a need to
pacify the people's fears and stabilize the situation, the President has to take
preventive action. - Datu Zaldy Uy Ampatuan, et al. vs. Hon. Ronaldo Puno, et
al., G.R. No. 190259, June 7, 2011.
*The President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the
armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and
Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on the
President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the delegated legislative
powers contemplated by Section 23(2), Article VI. - SANLAKAS vs. Executive
Secretary, G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004.
*A distinction must be drawn between the President's authority to declare
a state of national emergency and to exercise emergency powers. The exercise
of emergency powers, such as the taking of privately-owned public utility or
business affected with public interest under Article XII Section 17, requires a
delegation from Congress. - David vs. Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006.
5. Pardoning power
a) Nature and limitations
b) Forms of executive clemency
6. Diplomatic power

*The power to ratify is vested in the President, subject to the concurrence

of the Senate. The role of the Senate, however, is limited only to giving or
withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it is within the
authority of the President to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate or, having
secured its consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify it. Although the refusal of a
state to ratify a treaty which has been signed in its behalf is a serious step that
should not be taken lightly, such decision is within the competence of the
President alone, which cannot be encroached by the Court via a writ of
mandamus. - Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., et al. vs. Office of the Executive Secretary,
et al., G.R. No. 158088, July 6, 2005.
*The President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and
its sole representative with foreign nations. - Neri vs. Senate, G.R. No. 180643,
September 4, 2008.
7. Powers relative to appropriation measures
8. Delegated powers
9. Veto powers
10. Residual powers
11. Executive privilege
C. Rules of Succession