The University of British Columbia

Faculty of Applied Science

Interdepartmental Memorandum

Engineering Student Services

CEME 2053, 2324 Main Mall, UBC Campus
Tel: (604) 822-6556
Fax: (604) 822-2021
email: students@apsc.ubc.ca

To:

Dr. Gopaluni, APSC 150 Coordinator

From:

Haddas Asfaw (student #: 25323149)

November 1, 2014

Subject: L1 F Failure of the Banqiao Reservoir Dam

1. Introduction
This memo is a failure analysis report on the Banqiao Reservoir Dam.
On August 8th, 1975, the dam ruptured in the aftermath of the third
typhoon to hit China that year, killing 9,600 people instantly and
destroying a total of approximately 5,960,000 structures (Qing, 1998).
The following sections of this report describe the events leading up to
and during the failure, the reasons behind the failure, and the lessons
to be learned from this failure.

2. Description
The Banqiao Reservoir Dam was built in response to the great deal of
destruction caused by the Huai River flooding in the summer of 1950
(Qing, 1998), among 87,000 reservoirs built from the 1950s to 1970s
(Fish, 2013) in a quest to Harness the Huai River. The dam was
designed to protect downstream areas from severe floods and its
spillway was designed to pass floods known as once-in-1,000-years
floods, 30 cm per day (Qing, 1998). Between 1957 and 1959, 100
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dams and reservoirs were built in the Zhumadian Prefecture mountains

alone. After the governmental plans to build more dams in the plains
were revealed, hydrologist Chen Xing argued against it, warning that
dam construction in the plains would have disastrous consequences,
but was ignored by authorities. He also recommended 12 sluice gates
be included on the Banqiao Dam, but was ignored and only 5 were
included (Fish, 2013).
On August 5, 1975, a typhoon collided with a cold front and crossed
over from Taiwan then the Yangtze River into Henan Province towards
the Banqiao and Shimantan dams. On that day alone, the typhoon
dumped 100 cm of water, more than 3 times the limit anticipated by
the engineers of the dam, with average yearly rainfall around 80 cm
(Liu, 2009). On August 6, a request was made to open the dam, but
due to another flood already downstream, it was rejected and the
sluice gates were only partially opened. Finally, on August 7,
permission was granted by telegram, but it did not reach the proper
authorities until late that night, and the sluice gates had been partly
blocked due to accumulated silt, impeding the ability to drain water.
At 12:30 am on August 8, the Shimantan reservoir reached its
maximum capacity and broke. Within 30 minutes, the water from the
Shimantan crested at the Banqiao dam, effectively breaking the
Banqiao dam and releasing over 700 cubic meters of water within 6
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hours. In a domino effect, the other 61 reservoirs located in the area

also gave way, unleashing another 6 billion cubic meters of floodwater,
killing 9,600 people instantly and as many as 230,000, if those who
died of resultant health epidemics and famine are included (Graham,
1999).

Figure 1. The 5 sluice gates on the Banqiao dam, as opposed to the 12

suggested.

3. Reasons for the Failure

On a structural level, the failure was a result of the lower capacity of
the dam, only being able to contain a once-in-1,000-years flood, and
giving primacy to water accumulation for irrigation raising the water
table beyond safe levels and causing serious environmental damage
(Qing, 1998). Also, the implementation of only 5 sluice gates instead of
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12 lead to considerably less drainage ability and even less when

blocked by the accumulated silt.
On a human level, the failure was the result of multiple engineering
concerns expressed by Chen Xing being suppressed by governments
desire for the dam to only fulfill certain requirements and the break in
communication when most vital on August 7.

4. Lessons to be Learned
The engineers in charge of designing the dam accommodated it only to
the desires of the government and broke hydrological safety standards
in doing so. As engineers, we must always look at all aspects of a
structure and make sure that they are up to building and safety
standards. Also, when multiple concerns were brought up, they were
ignored in favour of the end goal in mind. Regardless of goal, we must
address every concern seriously because it may just save many lives
from being lost. Finally, in any of our decisions, no desires, personal or
otherwise, should take precedence over safety.

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References
Fish, E. (2013). The Forgotten Legacy of the Banqiao Dam Collapse.
The Economic Observer. Retrieved 2 November 2014, from
http://www.eeo.com.cn/ens/2013/0208/240078
Graham, W. (1999). A procedure for estimating loss of life caused by
dam failure. Denver, Colorado: U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Bureau of
Reclamation.
Liu, D., Pang, L., & Xie, B. (2009). Typhoon disaster in China: prediction,
prevention, and mitigation. Natural hazards, 49(3), 421-436.
Qing, D., Thibodeau, J., & Williams, P. (1998). The river dragon has
come!. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe.

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