Persons Midterm

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001]

SUSAN NICDAO CARIO, petitioner, vs. SUSAN YEE CARIO, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The issue for resolution in the case at bar hinges on the validity of the two marriages contracted by the deceased
SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, whose death benefits is now the subject of the controversy between the two Susans whom
he married.
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the decision [1] of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 51263, which affirmed in toto the decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, in
Civil Case No. Q-93-18632.
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, he contracted two marriages, the first was on June 20,
1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cario (hereafter referred to as Susan Nicdao), with whom he had two offsprings,
namely, Sahlee and Sandee Cario; and the second was on November 10, 1992, with respondent Susan Yee Cario
(hereafter referred to as Susan Yee), with whom he had no children in their almost ten year cohabitation starting way
back in 1982.
In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S. Cario became ill and bedridden due to diabetes complicated by pulmonary
tuberculosis. He passed away on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee, who spent for his medical and
burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to
the deceased from various government agencies. Petitioner Susan Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000.00
from MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig, [3] while respondent Susan Yee received a total
of P21,000.00 from GSIS Life, Burial (GSIS) and burial (SSS). [4]
On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed the instant case for collection of sum of money against
petitioner Susan Nicdao praying, inter alia, that petitioner be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the one hundred
forty-six thousand pesos (P146,000.00) collectively denominated as death benefits which she (petitioner) received from
MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig. Despite service of summons, petitioner failed to file her
answer, prompting the trial court to declare her in default.
Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the subsistence of, and
without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage between petitioner and the deceased. She,
however, claimed that she had no knowledge of the previous marriage and that she became aware of it only at the
funeral of the deceased, where she met petitioner who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. To bolster her
action for collection of sum of money, respondent contended that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is void ab
initio because the same was solemnized without the required marriage license. In support thereof, respondent
presented: 1) the marriage certificate of the deceased and the petitioner which bears no marriage license number; [5] and
2) a certification dated March 9, 1994, from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, which reads
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P E R S O N S A N D H U M A N R E L AT I O N S
This is to certify that this Office has no record of marriage license of the spouses SANTIAGO CARINO (sic) and SUSAN
NICDAO, who are married in this municipality on June 20, 1969. Hence, we cannot issue as requested a true copy or
transcription of Marriage License number from the records of this archives.
This certification is issued upon the request of Mrs. Susan Yee Cario for whatever legal purpose it may serve. [6]
On August 28, 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent, Susan Yee, holding as follows:
WHEREFORE, the defendant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum of P73,000.00, half of the amount which was
paid to her in the form of death benefits arising from the death of SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, plus attorneys fees in the
amount of P5,000.00, and costs of suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[7]
On appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. Hence, the
instant petition, contending that:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER
COURT THAT VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS. GSIS IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING EQUITY IN THE INSTANT CASE
INSTEAD OF THE CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL MANDATE OF THE FAMILY CODE.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE CASE OF VDA. DE
CONSUEGRA VS GSIS TO HAVE BEEN MODIFIED, AMENDED AND EVEN ABANDONED BY THE ENACTMENT
OF THE FAMILY CODE.[8]
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis
acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous
marriage void.[9] However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an
absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of
a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon
the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the
validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. [10] In such instances, evidence must be
adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute
nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void. [11]
It is clear therefore that the Court is clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon the validity of the two marriages in
this case, as the same is essential to the determination of who is rightfully entitled to the subject death benefits of the
deceased.
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Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased
was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage,[12] and the absence thereof, subject to
certain exceptions,[13] renders the marriage void ab initio.[14]
In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased does not fall within the
marriages exempt from the license requirement. A marriage license, therefore, was indispensable to the validity of their
marriage. This notwithstanding, the records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no
marriage license number and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no
record of such marriage license. In Republic v. Court of Appeals,[15] the Court held that such a certification is adequate to
prove the non-issuance of a marriage license. Absent any circumstance of suspicion, as in the present case, the
certification issued by the local civil registrar enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a
record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the deceased has been sufficiently
overcome. It then became the burden of petitioner to prove that their marriage is valid and that they secured the required
marriage license. Although she was declared in default before the trial court, petitioner could have squarely met the
issue and explained the absence of a marriage license in her pleadings before the Court of Appeals and this Court. But
petitioner conveniently avoided the issue and chose to refrain from pursuing an argument that will put her case in
jeopardy. Hence, the presumed validity of their marriage cannot stand.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, having been
solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage
license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.
It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however, that since the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is
declared void ab initio, the death benefits under scrutiny would now be awarded to respondent Susan Yee. To reiterate,
under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial declaration of the
nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the second
marriage would also be void.
Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the deceased and petitioner
Susan Nicdao does not validate the second marriage of the deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that
their marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao
and the deceased void. Hence, the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio.
One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the property of the spouses according
to the applicable property regime.[16] Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property regime
would not be absolute community or conjugal partnership of property, but rather, be governed by the provisions of Articles
147 and 148 of the Family Code on Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage.
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the property regime of bigamous marriages, adulterous
relationships, relationships in a state of concubine, relationships where both man and woman are married to other
persons, multiple alliances of the same married man,[17] ... [O]nly the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or
industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions ...
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In this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution shall belong to the
co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned by each party belong to him or her exclusively. Then too, contributions in the
form of care of the home, children and household, or spiritual or moral inspiration, are excluded in this regime. [18]
Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is a bigamous marriage, having been
solemnized during the subsistence of a previous marriage then presumed to be valid (between petitioner and the
deceased), the application of Article 148 is therefore in order.
The disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc.], NAPOLCOM, Commutation, Pag-ibig,
and PCCUI, are clearly renumerations, incentives and benefits from governmental agencies earned by the deceased as
a police officer. Unless respondent Susan Yee presents proof to the contrary, it could not be said that she contributed
money, property or industry in the acquisition of these monetary benefits. Hence, they are not owned in common by
respondent and the deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and respondent has no right whatsoever to claim the
same. By intestate succession, the said death benefits of the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs. And, respondent,
not being the legal wife of the deceased is not one of them.
As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, Article 147 of the Family Code
governs. This article applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to
contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like the absence of a marriage
license. Article 147 of the Family Code reads Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by
them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the
rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been
obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article,
a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed
jointly in the acquisition thereof if the formers efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the
household.
xxx
xxx
xxx
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership
shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children
or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of
descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination
of the cohabitation.
In contrast to Article 148, under the foregoing article, wages and salaries earned by either party during the
cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal shares and will be divided equally between them, even if only one
party earned the wages and the other did not contribute thereto. [19] Conformably, even if the disputed death benefits
were earned by the deceased alone as a government employee, Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect thereto,
entitling the petitioner to share one-half thereof. As there is no allegation of bad faith in the present case, both parties of
the first marriage are presumed to be in good faith. Thus, one-half of the subject death benefits under scrutiny shall go
to the petitioner as her share in the property regime, and the other half pertaining to the deceased shall pass by, intestate
succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his children with Susan Nicdao.
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In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals relied on the case of Vda. de Consuegra v.
Government Service Insurance System, [20] where the Court awarded one-half of the retirement benefits of the deceased
to the first wife and the other half, to the second wife, holding that:
... [S]ince the defendants first marriage has not been dissolved or declared void the conjugal partnership established by
that marriage has not ceased. Nor has the first wife lost or relinquished her status as putative heir of her husband under
the new Civil Code, entitled to share in his estate upon his death should she survive him. Consequently, whether as
conjugal partner in a still subsisting marriage or as such putative heir she has an interest in the husbands share in the
property here in dispute.... And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observed that although the second
marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there
is need for judicial declaration of such nullity. And inasmuch as the conjugal partnership formed by the second marriage
was dissolved before judicial declaration of its nullity, [t]he only just and equitable solution in this case would be to
recognize the right of the second wife to her share of one-half in the property acquired by her and her husband, and
consider the other half as pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage. [21]
It should be stressed, however, that the aforecited decision is premised on the rule which requires a prior and
separate judicial declaration of nullity of marriage. This is the reason why in the said case, the Court determined the
rights of the parties in accordance with their existing property regime.
In Domingo v. Court of Appeals,[22] however, the Court, construing Article 40 of the Family Code, clarified that a prior
and separate declaration of nullity of a marriage is an all important condition precedent only for purposes of
remarriage. That is, if a party who is previously married wishes to contract a second marriage, he or she has to obtain
first a judicial decree declaring the first marriage void, before he or she could contract said second marriage, otherwise
the second marriage would be void. The same rule applies even if the first marriage is patently void because the parties
are not free to determine for themselves the validity or invalidity or their marriage. However, for purposes other than to
remarry, like for filing a case for collection of sum of money anchored on a marriage claimed to be valid, no prior and
separate judicial declaration of nullity is necessary. All that a party has to do is to present evidence, testimonial or
documentary, that would prove that the marriage from which his or her rights flow is in fact valid. Thereupon, the court, if
material to the determination of the issues before it, will rule on the status of the marriage involved and proceed to
determine the rights of the parties in accordance with the applicable laws and jurisprudence. Thus, in Nial v. Bayadog,
[23]
the Court explained:
[T]he court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it
is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When
such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The
clause on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void in Article 40 of the Family Code connoted
that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263 which
affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City ordering petitioner to pay respondent the sum of
P73,000.00 plus attorneys fees in the amount of P5,000.00, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint in Civil
Case No. Q-93-18632, is hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
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G.R. No. 103047 September 2, 1994

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND ANGELINA M. CASTRO, respondents.
Parungao, Abesamis, Eleazar & Pulgar Law Offices for private respondent.
PUNO, J.:
The case at bench originated from a petition filed by private respondent Angelina M. Castro in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage to Edwin F. Cardenas. 1 As ground therefor, Castro
claims that no marriage license was ever issued to them prior to the solemnization of their marriage.
Despite notice, defendant Edwin F. Cardenas failed to file his answer. Consequently, he was declared in default. Trial
proceeded in his absence.
The controlling facts are undisputed:
On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony performed by Judge
Pablo M. Malvar, City Court Judge of Pasay City. The marriage was celebrated without the knowledge of Castro's
parents. Defendant Cardenas personally attended to the processing of the documents required for the celebration of the
marriage, including the procurement of the marriage, license. In fact, the marriage contract itself states that marriage
license no. 3196182 was issued in the name of the contracting parties on June 24, 1970 in Pasig, Metro Manila.
The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife since the marriage was unknown to Castro's parents.
Thus, it was only in March 1971, when Castro discovered she was pregnant, that the couple decided to live together.
However, their cohabitation lasted only for four (4) months. Thereafter, the couple parted ways. On October 19, 1971,
Castro gave birth. The baby was adopted by Castro's brother, with the consent of Cardenas.
The baby is now in the United States. Desiring to follow her daughter, Castro wanted to put in order her marital status
before leaving for the States. She thus consulted a lawyer, Atty. Frumencio E. Pulgar, regarding the possible annulment
of her marriage. Through her lawyer's efforts, they discovered that there was no marriage license issued to Cardenas
prior to the celebration of their marriage.
As proof, Angelina Castro offered in evidence a certification from the Civil Register of Pasig, Metro Manila. It reads:
February 20, 1987
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that the names EDWIN F. CARDENAS and ANGELINA M. CASTRO who were allegedly
married in the Pasay City Court on June 21, 1970 under an alleged (s)upportive marriage license
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no. 3196182 allegedly issued in the municipality on June 20, 1970 cannot be located as said license
no. 3196182 does not appear from our records.
Issued upon request of Mr. Ed Atanacio.
(Sgd)
CENO
NA D.
QUINT
OS
Senior
Civil
Regist
ry
Officer
Castro testified that she did not go to the civil registrar of Pasig on or before June 24, 1970 in order to apply for a license.
Neither did she sign any application therefor. She affixed her signature only on the marriage contract on June 24, 1970 in
Pasay City.
The trial court denied the petition. 2 It held that the above certification was inadequate to establish the alleged nonissuance of a marriage license prior to the celebration of the marriage between the parties. It ruled that the "inability of
the certifying official to locate the marriage license is not conclusive to show that there was no marriage license issued."
Unsatisfied with the decision, Castro appealed to respondent appellate court. She insisted that the certification from the
local civil registrar sufficiently established the absence of a marriage license.
As stated earlier, respondent appellate court reversed the Decision of the trial court. 3 It declared the marriage between
the contracting parties null and void and directed the Civil Registrar of Pasig to cancel the subject marriage contract.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines urges that respondent appellate court erred when it ruled that the certification
issued by the civil registrar that marriage license no. 3196182 was not in their record adequately proved that no such
license was ever issued. Petitioner also faults the respondent court for relying on the self-serving and uncorroborated
testimony of private respondent Castro that she had no part in the procurement of the subject marriage license.
Petitioner thus insists that the certification and the uncorroborated testimony of private respondent are insufficient to
overthrow the legal presumption regarding the validity of a marriage.
Petitioner also points that in declaring the marriage between the parties as null and void, respondent appellate court
disregarded the presumption that the solemnizing officer, Judge Pablo M. Malvar, regularly performed his duties when he
attested in the marriage contract that marriage license no. 3196182 was duly presented to him before the solemnization
of the subject marriage.
The issues, being interrelated, shall be discussed jointly.
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The core issue presented by the case at bench is whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by
private respondent are sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig prior to
the celebration of the marriage of private respondent to Edwin F. Cardenas.
We affirm the impugned Decision.
At the time the subject marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law governing marital relations was the New Civil
Code. The law 4 provides that no marriage shall be solemnized without a marriage license first issued by a local civil
registrar. Being one of the essential requisites of a valid marriage, absence of a license would render the marriage
void ab initio. 5
Petitioner posits that the certification of the local civil registrar of due search and inability to find a record or entry to the
effect that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued to the parties is not adequate to prove its non-issuance.
We hold otherwise. The presentation of such certification in court is sanctioned by Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court, viz.:
Sec. 29. Proof of lack of record. A written statement signed by an officer having custody of an official
record or by his deputy, that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist
in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence
that the records of his office contain no such record or entry.
The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that despite diligent search, a particular document does
not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a register. As custodians of
public documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where
they are required to enter all applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the
marriage license was issued and such other relevant data. 6
The certification of "due search and inability to find" issued by the civil registrar of Pasig enjoys probative value, he being
the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a
certificate of "due search and inability to find" sufficiently proved that his office did not issue marriage license no.
3196182 to the contracting parties.
The fact that private respondent Castro offered only her testimony in support of her petition is, in itself, not a ground to
deny her petition. The failure to offer any other witness to corroborate her testimony is mainly due to the peculiar
circumstances of the case. It will be remembered that the subject marriage was a civil ceremony performed by a judge of
a city court. The subject marriage is one of those commonly known as a "secret marriage" a legally non-existent
phrase but ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage celebrated without the knowledge of the relatives and/or friends of
either or both of the contracting parties. The records show that the marriage between Castro and Cardenas was initially
unknown to the parents of the former.
Surely, the fact that only private respondent Castro testified during the trial cannot be held against her. Her husband,
Edwin F. Cardenas, was duly served with notice of the proceedings and a copy of the petition. Despite receipt thereof, he
chose to ignore the same. For failure to answer, he was properly declared in default. Private respondent cannot be
faulted for her husband's lack of interest to participate in the proceedings. There was absolutely no evidence on record to
show that there was collusion between private respondent and her husband Cardenas.
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It is noteworthy to mention that the finding of the appellate court that the marriage between the contracting parties is null
and void for lack of a marriage license does not discount the fact that indeed, a spurious marriage license, purporting to
be issued by the civil registrar of Pasig, may have been presented by Cardenas to the solemnizing officer.
In fine, we hold that, under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by
private respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of the subject marriage license.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED there being no showing of any reversible error committed by respondent
appellate court.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 133778
March 14, 2000
ENGRACE NIAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIAL, INGRID NIAL, ARCHIE
NIAL & PEPITO NIAL, JR., petitioners,
vs.
NORMA BAYADOG, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death?
Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born herein
petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on
December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof,
Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and
wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in
a car accident. After their father's death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to
Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption
that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner's successional rights. Norma filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the persons who could file an
action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissed the petition after
finding that the Family Code is "rather silent, obscure, insufficient" to resolve the following issues:
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for the declaration of the nullity of
marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Nial, with her specially so when at the time of the filing of this
instant suit, their father Pepito G. Nial is already dead;
(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs' deceased father with defendant is null and void ab initio;
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(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the second marriage after it was dissolved
due to their father's death. 1
Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null and void their father's marriage to
respondent before his death, applying by analogy Article 47 of the Family Code which enumerates the time and the
persons who could initiate an action for annulment of marriage. 2 Hence, this petition for review with this Court grounded
on a pure question of law.
This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
and because "the verification failed to state the basis of petitioner's averment that the allegations in the petition are "true
and correct"." It was thus treated as an unsigned pleading which produces no legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7, of the
1997 Rules. 3 However, upon motion of petitioners, this Court reconsidered the dismissal and reinstated the petition for
review. 4
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the applicable
law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration. 5 A valid
marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, 6 the absence of which renders the
marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) 7 in relation to Article 58. 8 The requirement and issuance of marriage
license is the State's demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which
the general public is interested. 9 This interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the
sanctity of family life and of affording protection to the family as a basic "autonomous social institution." 10 Specifically, the
Constitution considers marriage as an "inviolable social institution," and is the foundation of family life which shall be
protected by the State. 11 This is why the Family Code considers marriage as "a special contract of permanent
union" 12 and case law considers it "not just an adventure but a lifetime commitment." 13
However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, one of
which is that provided in Article 76, 14 referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and
exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the
marriage. The rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame
and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the
publication of every applicant's name for a marriage license. The publicity attending the marriage license may discourage
such persons from legitimizing their status. 15 To preserve peace in the family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of
public exposure and contain the source of gossip arising from the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to
preserve their privacy and exempt them from that requirement.
There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners' father to respondent Norma was celebrated without any marriage
license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that "they have attained the age of majority, and, being
unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, and that we now desire to marry each
other." 16 The only issue that needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article
76 of the Civil Code to warrant the counting of the five year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a
marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to marry each other during the entire
five-year continuous period or should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties have lived together and exclusively with
each other as husband and wife during the entire five-year continuous period regardless of whether there is a legal
impediment to their being lawfully married, which impediment may have either disappeared or intervened sometime
during the cohabitation period?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for five years without the
benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where
10 | j o h a n
the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-year common-law
cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had
it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the
marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at
anytime within the 5 years and continuity that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is
computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five
years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and
placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship
must be respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties
should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use the same missing element
as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a marriage
license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is required
in order to notify the public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has
knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar. 17 The Civil Code
provides:
Art. 63: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advice
the local civil registrar thereof. . . .
Art. 64: Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the marriage, the local civil registrar shall forthwith
make an investigation, examining persons under oath. . . .
This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:
Art. 17 provides in part: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the
marriage to advise the local civil registrar thereof. . . .
Art. 18 reads in part: . . . In case of any impediment known to the local civil registrar or brought to his attention,
he shall note down the particulars thereof and his findings thereon in the application for a marriage license. . . .
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited the concurrence of multiple marriages
by the same person during the same period. Thus, any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first
spouse shall be illegal and void, 18 subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was
dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal Code complements the civil law in that the contracting of two or more
marriages and the having of extramarital affairs are considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and
adultery. 19 The law sanctions monogamy.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each other as
husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to
the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first
wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has already
lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by
law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of
the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is
immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The
subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses
cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and wife".
11 | j o h a n
Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a
marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element.
The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a petition to declare their father's marriage
void after his death?
Contrary to respondent judge's ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code 20 cannot be applied even by analogy to petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriage. The second ground for annulment of marriage relied upon by the trial court, which
allows "the sane spouse" to file an annulment suit "at anytime before the death of either party" is inapplicable. Article 47
pertains to the grounds, periods and persons who can file an annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of
marriage. The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void marriages
are not identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is
void ab initio is considered as having never to have taken place 21 and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be
generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be ratified. A voidable
marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void marriage can be attacked collaterally.
Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be
assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring
will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. 22 That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible,
unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any
proper interested party may attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects except those declared by law
concerning the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual joint
contribution, 23 and its effect on the children born to such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43
and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the property regime governing voidable
marriages is generally conjugal partnership and the children conceived before its annulment are legitimate.
Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the death of petitioner's father extinguished the alleged marital bond between him and
respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a wrong premise that there was a marriage bond that was
dissolved between the two. It should be noted that their marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never existed at all
and the death of either extinguished nothing.
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a
marriage. 24 "A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their original rights or to make the
marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of
society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained
and declared by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction." 25 "Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void
marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken
place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact
of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time, whether before
or after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage
void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be
collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either,
the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio.26 But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides
that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a
second marriage 27 and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that effect. 28 For the same reason,
the law makes either the action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible. 29 Corollarily,
if the death of either party would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be
considered imprescriptible.
12 | j o h a n
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute
nullity.1wphi1 For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a
child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the
validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination
of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of
declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need
not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59,
dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said case is ordered REINSTATED.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Pardo, J., on official business abroad.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985
ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the National Capital
Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:\
In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn seeks to set aside the Orders, dated
September 15, 1983 and August 3, 1984, in Civil Case No. 1075-P, issued by respondent Judge, which denied her
Motion to Dismiss said case, and her Motion for Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order, respectively.
The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of the
United States; that they were married in Hongkong in 1972; that, after the marriage, they established their residence in
the Philippines; that they begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975, respectively; that the parties
were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982; and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore
Van Dorn.
Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal
property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that private
respondent be declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground
13 | j o h a n
that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein
respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community property" as of June 11, 1982. The Court below
denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines
so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is now the subject of this certiorari proceeding.
Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is interlocutory and is not subject to appeal. certiorari and
Prohibition are neither the remedies to question the propriety of an interlocutory order of the trial Court. However, when a
grave abuse of discretion was patently committed, or the lower Court acted capriciously and whimsically, then it devolves
upon this Court in a certiorari proceeding to exercise its supervisory authority and to correct the error committed which, in
such a case, is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 1 Prohibition would then lie since it would be useless and a waste of time
to go ahead with the proceedings. 2 Weconsider the petition filed in this case within the exception, and we have given it
due course.
For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal property in the Philippines.
Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal property because of the
representation he made in the divorce proceedings before the American Court that they had no community of property;
that the Galleon Shop was not established through conjugal funds, and that respondent's claim is barred by prior
judgment.
For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail over the prohibitive
laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially
if the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction.
For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether the property relations between petitioner and
private respondent, after their marriage, were upon absolute or relative community property, upon complete separation of
property, or upon any other regime. The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada divorce of the parties.
The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over petitioner who appeared in person
before the Court during the trial of the case. It also obtained jurisdiction over private respondent who, giving his address
as No. 381 Bush Street, San Francisco, California, authorized his attorneys in the divorce case, Karp & Gradt Ltd., to
agree to the divorce on the ground of incompatibility in the understanding that there were neither community property nor
community obligations. 3 As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney he executed in favor of the law firm of KARP &
GRAD LTD., 336 W. Liberty, Reno, Nevada, to represent him in the divorce proceedings:
xxx xxx xxx
You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an Answer, appear on my behalf and do
an things necessary and proper to represent me, without further contesting, subject to the following:
1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.
2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the Court.
3. 'I'hat there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the court.
xxx xxx xxx 4
14 | j o h a n
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The decree is
binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her
husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this
jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, 5 only Philippine nationals are
covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public police and
morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are
valid according to their national law. 6 In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage
from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme
Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court of competent
jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them
both from the bond. The marriage tie when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A
husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in
the nature of a penalty. that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still
absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing
to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the
Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not
repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private
respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner
should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The
latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated
against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the Complaint filed in Civil
Case No. 1075-P of his Court.
Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente and Patajo, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
15 | j o h a n
G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989

IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner,
vs.
HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD
GEILING, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner which ended in a foreign absolute divorce, only to be followed by a
criminal infidelity suit of the latter against the former, provides Us the opportunity to lay down a decisional rule on what
hitherto appears to be an unresolved jurisdictional question.
On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Ekkehard
Geiling, a German national, were married before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler in the
Federal Republic of Germany. The marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for some time in
Malate, Manila where their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980. 1
Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the spouses, followed by a separation de facto
between them.
After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in private respondent initiating a
divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January, 1983. He claimed that
there was failure of their marriage and that they had been living apart since April, 1982. 2
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, on January 23, 1983 where the same is still pending as Civil Case No. 83-15866. 3
On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree of
divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to petitioner. The
records show that under German law said court was locally and internationally competent for the divorce proceeding and
that the dissolution of said marriage was legally founded on and authorized by the applicable law of that foreign
jurisdiction. 4
On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed two
complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said respondent, petitioner "had
an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983".
Assistant Fiscal Jacinto A. de los Reyes, Jr., after the corresponding investigation, recommended the dismissal of the
cases on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. 5 However, upon review, the respondent city fiscal approved a
resolution, dated January 8, 1986, directing the filing of two complaints for adultery against the petitioner. 6 The
complaints were accordingly filed and were eventually raffled to two branches of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The
case entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and William Chia", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52435,
was assigned to Branch XXVI presided by the respondent judge; while the other case, "People of the Philippines vs.
Imelda Pilapil and James Chua", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52434 went to the sala of Judge Leonardo Cruz,
Branch XXV, of the same court. 7
16 | j o h a n
On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice asking that the aforesaid resolution of
respondent fiscal be set aside and the cases against her be dismissed. 8 A similar petition was filed by James Chua, her
co-accused in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. The Secretary of Justice, through the Chief State Prosecutor, gave due
course to both petitions and directed the respondent city fiscal to inform the Department of Justice "if the accused have
already been arraigned and if not yet arraigned, to move to defer further proceedings" and to elevate the entire records of
both cases to his office for review. 9
Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to suspend further proceedings
thereon. 10 As a consequence, Judge Leonardo Cruz suspended proceedings in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. On the
other hand, respondent judge merely reset the date of the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 to April 6, 1987.
Before such scheduled date, petitioner moved for the cancellation of the arraignment and for the suspension of
proceedings in said Criminal Case No. 87-52435 until after the resolution of the petition for review then pending before
the Secretary of Justice. 11 A motion to quash was also filed in the same case on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, 12 which motion was denied by the respondent judge in an order dated September 8, 1987. The same order
also directed the arraignment of both accused therein, that is, petitioner and William Chia. The latter entered a plea of not
guilty while the petitioner refused to be arraigned. Such refusal of the petitioner being considered by respondent judge as
direct contempt, she and her counsel were fined and the former was ordered detained until she submitted herself for
arraignment. 13 Later, private respondent entered a plea of not guilty. 14
On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a temporary
restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash. The petition is
anchored on the main ground that the court is without jurisdiction "to try and decide the charge of adultery, which is a
private offense that cannot be prosecuted de officio (sic), since the purported complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify
as an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing the criminal
complaint." 15
On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from implementing the
aforesaid order of September 8, 1987 and from further proceeding with Criminal Case No. 87-52435. Subsequently, on
March 23, 1988 Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoez acted on the aforesaid petitions for review and, upholding
petitioner's ratiocinations, issued a resolution directing the respondent city fiscal to move for the dismissal of the
complaints against the petitioner. 16
We find this petition meritorious. The writs prayed for shall accordingly issue.
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, 17 the crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes against chastity,
cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has long since been
established, with unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal,
requirement. 18 While in point of strict law the jurisdiction of the court over the offense is vested in it by the Judiciary Law,
the requirement for a sworn written complaint is just as jurisdictional a mandate since it is that complaint which starts the
prosecutory proceeding 19 and without which the court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to try the case.
Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person who can legally file the
complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of
lasciviousness, no provision is made for the prosecution of the crimes of adultery and concubinage by the parents,
grandparents or guardian of the offended party. The so-called exclusive and successive rule in the prosecution of the first
four offenses above mentioned do not apply to adultery and concubinage. It is significant that while the State, as parens
patriae, was added and vested by the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure with the power to initiate the criminal action for a
deceased or incapacitated victim in the aforesaid offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, in
17 | j o h a n
default of her parents, grandparents or guardian, such amendment did not include the crimes of adultery and
concubinage. In other words, only the offended spouse, and no other, is authorized by law to initiate the action therefor.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that such
initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This
is a familiar and express rule in civil actions; in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a motion to dismiss in
civil cases, is determined as of the filing of the complaint or petition.
The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of criminal cases does not mean that the same requirement
and rationale would not apply. Understandably, it may not have been found necessary since criminal actions are
generally and fundamentally commenced by the State, through the People of the Philippines, the offended party being
merely the complaining witness therein. However, in the so-called "private crimes" or those which cannot be
prosecuted de oficio, and the present prosecution for adultery is of such genre, the offended spouse assumes a more
predominant role since the right to commence the action, or to refrain therefrom, is a matter exclusively within his power
and option.
This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence
rather than go through the scandal of a public trial. 20 Hence, as cogently argued by petitioner, Article 344 of the Revised
Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal
action for, adultery. This is a logical consequence since the raison d'etre of said provision of law would be absent where
the supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the filing of the criminal
case. 21
In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant to commence the action be
definitely established and, as already demonstrated, such status or capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he
initiates the action. It would be absurd if his capacity to bring the action would be determined by his
status beforeor subsequent to the commencement thereof, where such capacity or status existed prior to but ceased
before, or was acquired subsequent to but did not exist at the time of, the institution of the case. We would thereby have
the anomalous spectacle of a party bringing suit at the very time when he is without the legal capacity to do so.
To repeat, there does not appear to be any local precedential jurisprudence on the specific issue as to when precisely the
status of a complainant as an offended spouse must exist where a criminal prosecution can be commenced only by one
who in law can be categorized as possessed of such status. Stated differently and with reference to the present case, the
inquiry ;would be whether it is necessary in the commencement of a criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds
between the complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at the time of the institution of the action by the
former against the latter.
American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction which are in pari materia with ours, yields the rule
that after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the right to institute proceedings against the
offenders where the statute provides that the innocent spouse shall have the exclusive right to institute a prosecution for
adultery. Where, however, proceedings have been properly commenced, a divorce subsequently granted can have no
legal effect on the prosecution of the criminal proceedings to a conclusion. 22
In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that
'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except on the complaint of the husband or wife.' Section
4932, Code. Though Loftus was husband of defendant when the offense is said to have been
committed, he had ceased to be such when the prosecution was begun; and appellant insists that his
18 | j o h a n
status was not such as to entitle him to make the complaint. We have repeatedly said that the offense is
against the unoffending spouse, as well as the state, in explaining the reason for this provision in the
statute; and we are of the opinion that the unoffending spouse must be such when the prosecution is
commenced. (Emphasis supplied.)
We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this case and in our jurisdiction, considering our
statutory law and jural policy on the matter. We are convinced that in cases of such nature, the status of the complainant
vis-a-vis the accused must be determined as of the time the complaint was filed. Thus, the person who initiates the
adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by this is meant that he is still married to the accused spouse, at the time
of the filing of the complaint.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of
Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private
respondent is concerned 23 in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons.
Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al., 24 after a divorce was granted by a United States court
between Alice Van Dornja Filipina, and her American husband, the latter filed a civil case in a trial court here alleging that
her business concern was conjugal property and praying that she be ordered to render an accounting and that the
plaintiff be granted the right to manage the business. Rejecting his pretensions, this Court perspicuously demonstrated
the error of such stance, thus:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United
States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private
respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. ...
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. ...
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would
have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over
conjugal assets. ... 25
Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal
standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this case before the decree of divorce for lack of
knowledge, even if true, is of no legal significance or consequence in this case. When said respondent initiated the
divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that there would no longer be a family nor marriage vows to protect once a
dissolution of the marriage is decreed. Neither would there be a danger of introducing spurious heirs into the family,
which is said to be one of the reasons for the particular formulation of our law on adultery, 26 since there would
thenceforth be no spousal relationship to speak of. The severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the
former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other.
The aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot be successfully relied upon by private respondent. In applying
Article 433 of the old Penal Code, substantially the same as Article 333 of the Revised Penal Code, which punished
adultery "although the marriage be afterwards declared void", the Court merely stated that "the lawmakers intended to
19 | j o h a n
declare adulterous the infidelity of a married woman to her marital vows, even though it should be made to appear that
she is entitled to have her marriage contract declared null and void, until and unless she actually secures a formal judicial
declaration to that effect". Definitely, it cannot be logically inferred therefrom that the complaint can still be filed after the
declaration of nullity because such declaration that the marriage is void ab initio is equivalent to stating that it never
existed. There being no marriage from the beginning, any complaint for adultery filed after said declaration of nullity
would no longer have a leg to stand on. Moreover, what was consequently contemplated and within the purview of the
decision in said case is the situation where the criminal action for adultery was filed beforethe termination of the marriage
by a judicial declaration of its nullity ab initio. The same rule and requisite would necessarily apply where the termination
of the marriage was effected, as in this case, by a valid foreign divorce.
Private respondent's invocation of Donio-Teves, et al. vs. Vamenta, hereinbefore cited, 27 must suffer the same fate of
inapplicability. A cursory reading of said case reveals that the offended spouse therein had duly and seasonably filed a
complaint for adultery, although an issue was raised as to its sufficiency but which was resolved in favor of the
complainant. Said case did not involve a factual situation akin to the one at bar or any issue determinative of the
controversy herein.
WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's motion to quash is SET ASIDE and another one
enteredDISMISSING the complaint in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 for lack of jurisdiction. The temporary restraining
order issued in this case on October 21, 1987 is hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner,
G.R. No. 154380

Present:
Davide, Jr., C.J.,
(Chairman),
Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago,
Carpio, and
Azcuna, JJ.
- versus -
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III,

Respondent.
Promulgated:
October 5, 2005
x --------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
20 | j o h a n
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a foreign citizen and
obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under
Philippine law?
Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a definite ruling on this apparently novel
question, presented as a pure question of law.
In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision[1] dated May 15, 2002, of the Regional Trial
Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and itsResolution[2] dated July 4, 2002 denying the motion for
reconsideration. The court a quo had declared that herein respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry.
The fallo of the impugned Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code
and by reason of the divorce decree obtained against him by his American wife, the petitioner is given
the capacity to remarry under the Philippine Law.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[3]
The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the
Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V.
Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.
In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano
discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a
certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel,
California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of
the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein
petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE[4]
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the instant case
because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien.
The proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for legal separation. [5] Furthermore, the
OSG argues there is no law that governs respondents situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and
not of judicial determination.[6]
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but insists that when his
naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by operation
of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. [7]
At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court actually constituted a
petition for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides:
RULE 63
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES
21 | j o h a n
Section 1. Who may file petitionAny person interested under a deed, will, contract or other
written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or
other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate
Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of
his rights or duties, thereunder.
...
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy
must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the
controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination. [8]
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between two Filipino citizens
where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of
the parties are also adverse, as petitioner representing the State asserts its duty to protect the institution of marriage
while respondent, a private citizen, insists on a declaration of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief, has
legal interest in the controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as when respondent
remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of his second marriage.
Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code apply to the case of
respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how this provision had come about in the first place, and what was the intent
of the legislators in its enactment?
Brief Historical Background

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as
the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except
those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise
signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As
so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force
in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce
is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation presented by the case at hand. It
seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner. The instant case is one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens,
but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity
to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing in the U.S.A.
Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings [9] on the Family Code, the Catholic Bishops Conference of the
Philippines (CBCP) registered the following objections to Paragraph 2 of Article 26:
22 | j o h a n
1.
The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose spouses are Filipinos who
divorce them abroad. These spouses who are divorced will not be able to re-marry, while the
spouses of foreigners who validly divorce them abroad can.
2.
This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce even for Filipino citizens.
For those whose foreign spouses validly divorce them abroad will also be considered to be
validly divorced here and can re-marry. We propose that this be deleted and made into law only
after more widespread consultation. (Emphasis supplied.)
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26,
according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of theCivil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[10] The Van
Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree
validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to
remarry under Philippine law.
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties were
Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign citizenship by naturalization?
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals.[11] In Quita, the parties were,
as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and
obtained a divorce in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his
naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were
Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The
Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation
of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of
the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the
law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within
its spirit or intent.[12]
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant
case must be deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1.
2.
There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner; and
A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
23 | j o h a n
In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that
has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a
valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are
both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the divorced Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
We are also unable to sustain the OSGs theory that the proper remedy of the Filipino spouse is to file either a
petition for annulment or a petition for legal separation. Annulment would be a long and tedious process, and in this
particular case, not even feasible, considering that the marriage of the parties appears to have all the badges of validity.
On the other hand, legal separation would not be a sufficient remedy for it would not sever the marriage tie; hence, the
legally separated Filipino spouse would still remain married to the naturalized alien spouse.
However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by respondent concerning the
divorce decree and the naturalization of respondents wife. It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of
proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.[13]
Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that his wife was naturalized as an
American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it
must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. [14] Such foreign law must
also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged
and proved.[15] Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as
specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to
enter into another marriage.
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as
amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had
acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However, considering that in the present petition there is no
sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are unable to declare, based on respondents bare allegations that his
wife, who was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an American, that
respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly upon respondents submission
of the aforecited evidence in his favor.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated May
15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are
hereby SET ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 124371. November 23, 2000]
PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F. LLORENTE, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The Case
The case raises a conflict of laws issue.
24 | j o h a n
What is before us is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals [1] modifying that of the Regional Trial Court,
Camarines Sur, Branch 35, Iriga City [2] declaring respondent Alicia F. Llorente (herinafter referred to as Alicia), as coowners of whatever property she and the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente (hereinafter referred to as Lorenzo) may have
acquired during the twenty-five (25) years that they lived together as husband and wife.
The Facts
The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the United States Navy from March 10, 1927 to
September 30, 1957.[3]
On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente (hereinafter referred to as Paula) were married
before a parish priest, Roman Catholic Church, in Nabua, Camarines Sur.[4]
Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the United States and Paula stayed in the conjugal
home in barrio Antipolo, Nabua, Camarines Sur.[5]
On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship and Certificate of Naturalization No.
5579816 was issued in his favor by the United States District Court, Southern District of New York. [6]
Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the American Forces in 1945, Lorenzo was granted an accrued leave by
the U. S. Navy, to visit his wife and he visited the Philippines. [7] He discovered that his wife Paula was pregnant and was
living in and having an adulterous relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente. [8]
On December 4, 1945, Paula gave birth to a boy registered in the Office of the Registrar of Nabua as Crisologo
Llorente, with the certificate stating that the child was not legitimate and the line for the fathers name was left blank. [9]
Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. In fact, on February 2, 1946, the couple drew a written
agreement to the effect that (1) all the family allowances allotted by the United States Navy as part of Lorenzos salary
and all other obligations for Paulas daily maintenance and support would be suspended; (2) they would dissolve their
marital union in accordance with judicial proceedings; (3) they would make a separate agreement regarding their
conjugal property acquired during their marital life; and (4) Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula for her adulterous act
since she voluntarily admitted her fault and agreed to separate from Lorenzo peacefully. The agreement was signed by
both Lorenzo and Paula and was witnessed by Paulas father and stepmother. The agreement was notarized by Notary
Public Pedro Osabel.[10]
Lorenzo returned to the United States and on November 16, 1951 filed for divorce with the Superior Court of the
State of California in and for the County of San Diego. Paula was represented by counsel, John Riley, and actively
participated in the proceedings. On November 27, 1951, the Superior Court of the State of California, for the County of
San Diego found all factual allegations to be true and issued an interlocutory judgment of divorce. [11]
On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree became final. [12]
In the meantime, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines.
On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila. [13] Apparently, Alicia had no knowledge of the first
marriage even if they resided in the same town as Paula, who did not oppose the marriage or cohabitation. [14]
25 | j o h a n
From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband and wife. [15] Their twenty-five (25) year union
produced three children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surnamed Llorente. [16]
On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. The will was notarized by Notary Public Salvador
M. Occiano, duly signed by Lorenzo with attesting witnesses Francisco Hugo, Francisco Neibres and Tito Trajano. In the
will, Lorenzo bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their three children, to wit:
(1) I give and bequeath to my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO exclusively my residential house and lot, located at San
Francisco, Nabua, Camarines Sur, Philippines, including ALL the personal properties and other movables or belongings
that may be found or existing therein;
(2) I give and bequeath exclusively to my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and to my children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and
Beverly F. Llorente, in equal shares, all my real properties whatsoever and wheresoever located, specifically my real
properties located at Barangay Aro-Aldao, Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay Paloyon, Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay
Baras, Sitio Puga, Nabua, Camarines Sur; and Barangay Paloyon, Sitio Nalilidong, Nabua, Camarines Sur;
(3) I likewise give and bequeath exclusively unto my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and unto my children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F.
Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal shares, my real properties located in Quezon City Philippines, and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 188652; and my lands in Antipolo, Rizal, Philippines, covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title Nos. 124196 and 165188, both of the Registry of Deeds of the province of Rizal, Philippines;
(4) That their respective shares in the above-mentioned properties, whether real or personal properties, shall not be
disposed of, ceded, sold and conveyed to any other persons, but could only be sold, ceded, conveyed and disposed of
by and among themselves;
(5) I designate my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO to be the sole executor of this my Last Will and Testament, and in her
default or incapacity of the latter to act, any of my children in the order of age, if of age;
(6) I hereby direct that the executor named herein or her lawful substitute should served (sic) without bond;
(7) I hereby revoke any and all my other wills, codicils, or testamentary dispositions heretofore executed, signed, or
published, by me;
(8) It is my final wish and desire that if I die, no relatives of mine in any degree in the Llorentes Side should ever bother
and disturb in any manner whatsoever my wife Alicia R. Fortunato and my children with respect to any real or personal
properties I gave and bequeathed respectively to each one of them by virtue of this Last Will and Testament. [17]
On December 14, 1983, Lorenzo filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iriga, Camarines Sur, a petition for the probate
and allowance of his last will and testament wherein Lorenzo moved that Alicia be appointed Special Administratrix of his
estate.[18]
On January 18, 1984, the trial court denied the motion for the reason that the testator Lorenzo was still alive. [19]
On January 24, 1984, finding that the will was duly executed, the trial court admitted the will to probate. [20]
On June 11, 1985, before the proceedings could be terminated, Lorenzo died. [21]
26 | j o h a n
On September 4, 1985, Paula filed with the same court a petition [22] for letters of administration over Lorenzos
estate in her favor. Paula contended (1) that she was Lorenzos surviving spouse, (2) that the various property were
acquired during their marriage, (3) that Lorenzos will disposed of all his property in favor of Alicia and her children,
encroaching on her legitime and 1/2 share in the conjugal property.[23]
On December 13, 1985, Alicia filed in the testate proceeding (Sp. Proc. No. IR-755), a petition for the issuance of
letters testamentary.[24]
On October 14, 1985, without terminating the testate proceedings, the trial court gave due course to Paulas petition
in Sp. Proc. No. IR-888.[25]
On November 6, 13 and 20, 1985, the order was published in the newspaper Bicol Star. [26]
On May 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court issued a joint decision, thus:
Wherefore, considering that this court has so found that the divorce decree granted to the late Lorenzo Llorente is void
and inapplicable in the Philippines, therefore the marriage he contracted with Alicia Fortunato on January 16, 1958 at
Manila is likewise void. This being so the petition of Alicia F. Llorente for the issuance of letters testamentary is
denied. Likewise, she is not entitled to receive any share from the estate even if the will especially said so her
relationship with Lorenzo having gained the status of paramour which is under Art. 739 (1).
On the other hand, the court finds the petition of Paula Titular Llorente, meritorious, and so declares the intrinsic
disposition of the will of Lorenzo Llorente dated March 13, 1981 as void and declares her entitled as conjugal partner and
entitled to one-half of their conjugal properties, and as primary compulsory heir, Paula T. Llorente is also entitled to onethird of the estate and then one-third should go to the illegitimate children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surname (sic)
Llorente, for them to partition in equal shares and also entitled to the remaining free portion in equal shares.
Petitioner, Paula Llorente is appointed legal administrator of the estate of the deceased, Lorenzo Llorente. As such let
the corresponding letters of administration issue in her favor upon her filing a bond in the amount (sic) of P100,000.00
conditioned for her to make a return to the court within three (3) months a true and complete inventory of all goods,
chattels, rights, and credits, and estate which shall at any time come to her possession or to the possession of any other
person for her, and from the proceeds to pay and discharge all debts, legacies and charges on the same, or such
dividends thereon as shall be decreed or required by this court; to render a true and just account of her administration to
the court within one (1) year, and at any other time when required by the court and to perform all orders of this court by
her to be performed.
On the other matters prayed for in respective petitions for want of evidence could not be granted.
SO ORDERED.[27]
In time, Alicia filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration of the aforequoted decision. [28]
On September 14, 1987, the trial court denied Alicias motion for reconsideration but modified its earlier decision,
stating that Raul and Luz Llorente are not children legitimate or otherwise of Lorenzo since they were not legally
adopted by him.[29] Amending its decision of May 18, 1987, the trial court declared Beverly Llorente as the only
illegitimate child of Lorenzo, entitling her to one-third (1/3) of the estate and one-third (1/3) of the free portion of the
estate.[30]
27 | j o h a n
On September 28, 1987, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. [31]

On July 31, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, affirming with modification the decision of the trial
court in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that Alicia is declared as coowner of whatever properties she and the deceased may have acquired during the twenty-five (25) years of cohabitation.
SO ORDERED.[32]
On August 25, 1995, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration of the decision. [33]
On March 21, 1996, the Court of Appeals,[34] denied the motion for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.[35]
The Issue
Stripping the petition of its legalese and sorting through the various arguments raised, [36] the issue is simple. Who
are entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo N. Llorente?
We do not agree with the decision of the Court of Appeals. We remand the case to the trial court for ruling on the
intrinsic validity of the will of the deceased.
The Applicable Law
The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen long before and at the time of: (1) his divorce
from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and (4) death, is duly established, admitted and undisputed.
Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily governed by foreign law.
The Civil Code clearly provides:
Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding
upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the
person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the
country wherein said property may be found. (emphasis ours)
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial
notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. [37]
28 | j o h a n
While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded, the Court of Appeals did not admit the foreign law. The Court
of Appeals and the trial court called to the fore the renvoi doctrine, where the case was referred back to the law of the
decedents domicile, in this case, Philippine law.
We note that while the trial court stated that the law of New York was not sufficiently proven, in the same breath it
made the categorical, albeit equally unproven statement that American law follows the domiciliary theory hence,
Philippine law applies when determining the validity of Lorenzos will. [38]
First, there is no such thing as one American law. The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code cannot
possibly apply to general American law. There is no such law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the
United States. Each State of the union has its own law applicable to its citizens and in force only within the State. It can
therefore refer to no other than the law of the State of which the decedent was a resident. [39] Second, there is no showing
that the application of the renvoi doctrine is called for or required by New York State law.
The trial court held that the will was intrinsically invalid since it contained dispositions in favor of Alice, who in the
trial courts opinion was a mere paramour. The trial court threw the will out, leaving Alice, and her two children, Raul and
Luz, with nothing.
The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will. It declared Alice entitled to one half (1/2) of whatever property she
and Lorenzo acquired during their cohabitation, applying Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete disregard of the will, already probated as duly executed in
accordance with the formalities of Philippine law, is fatal, especially in light of the factual and legal circumstances
here obtaining.
Validity of the Foreign Divorce
In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[40] we held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code,
only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public policy and morality. In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided
they are valid according to their national law.
Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals,[41] that once proven that respondent was no
longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn would become applicable
and petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit from him.
In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,[42] we recognized the divorce obtained by the respondent in his country, the Federal
Republic of Germany. There, we stated that divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as
respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons.
For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be reversed. [43] We hold that the
divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter
of comity. Now, the effects of this divorce (as to the succession to the estate of the decedent) are matters best left to the
determination of the trial court.
Validity of the Will
The Civil Code provides:
29 | j o h a n
Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws
of the country in which they are executed.
When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a
foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution. (underscoring ours)
The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife and children by her is glaringly shown in the
will he executed. We do not wish to frustrate his wishes, since he was a foreigner, not covered by our laws on family
rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity.[44]
Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best proved by foreign law which
must be pleaded and proved. Whether the will was executed in accordance with the formalities required is answered by
referring to Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly probated.
As a guide however, the trial court should note that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our
system of legitimes, Congress did not intend to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. Congress
specifically left the amount of successional rights to the decedent's national law.[45]
Having thus ruled, we find it unnecessary to pass upon the other issues raised.
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 17446
promulgated on July 31, 1995 is SET ASIDE.
In lieu thereof, the Court REVERSES the decision of the Regional Trial Court and RECOGNIZES as VALID the
decree of divorce granted in favor of the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente by the Superior Court of the State of California in
and for the County of San Diego, made final on December 4, 1952.
Further, the Court REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo N.
Llorentes will and determination of the parties successional rights allowing proof of foreign law with instructions that the
trial court shall proceed with all deliberate dispatch to settle the estate of the deceased within the framework of the Rules
of Court.
No costs.
SECOND DIVISION

Petitioner,
G.R. No. 152577
Present:
PUNO,
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Chairman,
- versus-
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR.,
TINGA, and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
CRASUS L. IYOY,
Promulgated:
R e s p o n d e n t.
September 21, 2005
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Republic of the
Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, prays for the reversal of the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001, [1] affirming the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October 1998, [2] declaring the marriage between
respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void on the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines.
The proceedings before the RTC commenced with the filing of a Complaint [3] for declaration of nullity of marriage
by respondent Crasus on 25 March 1997. According to the said Complaint, respondent Crasus married Fely on 16
December 1961 at Bradford Memorial Church, Jones Avenue, Cebu City. As a result of their union, they had five children
Crasus, Jr., Daphne, Debbie, Calvert, and Carlos who are now all of legal ages. After the celebration of their
marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant. In 1984, Fely left the
Philippines for the United States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their five children, the youngest then being only six
years old, to the care of respondent Crasus. Barely a year after Fely left for the U.S.A., respondent Crasus received a
letter from her requesting that he sign the enclosed divorce papers; he disregarded the said request. Sometime in 1985,
respondent Crasus learned, through the letters sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got married to an American, with
whom she eventually had a child. In 1987, Fely came back to the Philippines with her American family, staying at Cebu
Plaza Hotel in Cebu City. Respondent Crasus did not bother to talk to Fely because he was afraid he might not be able
to bear the sorrow and the pain she had caused him. Fely returned to the Philippines several times more: in 1990, for
the wedding of their eldest child, Crasus, Jr.; in 1992, for the brain operation of their fourth child, Calvert; and in 1995, for
unknown reasons. Fely continued to live with her American family in New Jersey, U.S.A. She had been openly using the
surname of her American husband in the Philippines and in the U.S.A. For the wedding of Crasus, Jr., Fely herself had
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invitations made in which she was named as Mrs. Fely Ada Micklus. At the time the Complaint was filed, it had been 13
years since Fely left and abandoned respondent Crasus, and there was no more possibility of reconciliation between
them. Respondent Crasus finally alleged in his Complaint that Felys acts brought danger and dishonor to the family, and
clearly demonstrated her psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Such incapacity,
being incurable and continuing, constitutes a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36, in relation to
Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family Code of the Philippines.
Fely filed her Answer and Counterclaim [4] with the RTC on 05 June 1997. She asserted therein that she was
already an American citizen since 1988 and was now married to Stephen Micklus. While she admitted being
previously married to respondent Crasus and having five children with him, Fely refuted the other allegations made
by respondent Crasus in his Complaint. She explained that she was no more hot-tempered than any normal person,
and she may had been indignant at respondent Crasus on certain occasions but it was because of the latters
drunkenness, womanizing, and lack of sincere effort to find employment and to contribute to the maintenance of their
household. She could not have been extravagant since the family hardly had enough money for basic needs.
Indeed, Fely left for abroad for financial reasons as respondent Crasus had no job and what she was then earning as
the sole breadwinner in the Philippines was insufficient to support their family. Although she left all of her children
with respondent Crasus, she continued to provide financial support to them, as well as, to respondent Crasus.
Subsequently, Fely was able to bring her children to the U.S.A., except for one, Calvert, who had to stay behind for
medical reasons. While she did file for divorce from respondent Crasus, she denied having herself sent a letter to
respondent Crasus requesting him to sign the enclosed divorce papers. After securing a divorce from respondent
Crasus, Fely married her American husband and acquired American citizenship. She argued that her marriage to her
American husband was legal because now being an American citizen, her status shall be governed by the law of her
present nationality. Fely also pointed out that respondent Crasus himself was presently living with another woman
who bore him a child. She also accused respondent Crasus of misusing the amount of P90,000.00 which she
advanced to him to finance the brain operation of their son, Calvert. On the basis of the foregoing, Fely also prayed
that the RTC declare her marriage to respondent Crasus null and void; and that respondent Crasus be ordered to
pay to Fely the P90,000.00 she advanced to him, with interest, plus, moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees,
and litigation expenses.
After respondent Crasus and Fely had filed their respective Pre-Trial Briefs, [5] the RTC afforded both parties the
opportunity to present their evidence. Petitioner Republic participated in the trial through the Provincial Prosecutor of
Cebu.[6]
Respondent Crasus submitted the following pieces of evidence in support of his Complaint: (1) his own testimony
on 08 September 1997, in which he essentially reiterated the allegations in his Complaint; [7] (2) the Certification, dated 13
April 1989, by the Health Department of Cebu City, on the recording of the Marriage Contract between respondent
Crasus and Fely in the Register of Deeds, such marriage celebration taking place on 16 December 1961; [8] and (3) the
invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, wherein Fely openly used her American husbands surname,
Micklus.[9]
Felys counsel filed a Notice,[10] and, later on, a Motion,[11] to take the deposition of witnesses, namely, Fely and her
children, Crasus, Jr. and Daphne, upon written interrogatories, before the consular officers of the Philippines in New York
and California, U.S.A, where the said witnesses reside. Despite the Orders[12] and Commissions[13]issued by the RTC to
the Philippine Consuls of New York and California, U.S.A., to take the depositions of the witnesses upon written
interrogatories, not a single deposition was ever submitted to the RTC. Taking into account that it had been over a year
since respondent Crasus had presented his evidence and that Fely failed to exert effort to have the case progress, the
RTC issued an Order, dated 05 October 1998,[14] considering Fely to have waived her right to present her evidence. The
case was thus deemed submitted for decision.
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Not long after, on 30 October 1998, the RTC promulgated its Judgment declaring the marriage of respondent
Crasus and Fely null and void ab initio, on the basis of the following findings
The ground bearing defendants psychological incapacity deserves a reasonable consideration.

As observed, plaintiffs testimony is decidedly credible. The Court finds that defendant had indeed
exhibited unmistakable signs of psychological incapacity to comply with her marital duties such as
striving for family unity, observing fidelity, mutual love, respect, help and support. From the evidence
presented, plaintiff adequately established that the defendant practically abandoned him. She obtained
a divorce decree in the United States of America and married another man and has establish [ sic]
another family of her own. Plaintiff is in an anomalous situation, wherein he is married to a wife who is
already married to another man in another country.
Defendants intolerable traits may not have been apparent or manifest before the marriage, the
FAMILY CODE nonetheless allows the annulment of the marriage provided that these were eventually
manifested after the wedding. It appears to be the case in this instance.
Certainly defendants posture being an irresponsible wife erringly reveals her very low regard for
that sacred and inviolable institution of marriage which is the foundation of human society throughout the
civilized world. It is quite evident that the defendant is bereft of the mind, will and heart to comply with
her marital obligations, such incapacity was already there at the time of the marriage in question is
shown by defendants own attitude towards her marriage to plaintiff.
In sum, the ground invoked by plaintiff which is defendants psychological incapacity to comply
with the essential marital obligations which already existed at the time of the marriage in question has
been satisfactorily proven. The evidence in herein case establishes the irresponsibility of defendant Fely
Ada Rosal Iyoy, firmly.
Going over plaintiffs testimony which is decidedly credible, the Court finds that the defendant
had indeed exhibited unmistakable signs of such psychological incapacity to comply with her marital
obligations. These are her excessive disposition to material things over and above the marital stability.
That such incapacity was already there at the time of the marriage in question is shown by defendants
own attitude towards her marriage to plaintiff. And for these reasons there is a legal ground to declare
the marriage of plaintiff Crasus L. Iyoy and defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy null and void ab initio.[15]
Petitioner Republic, believing that the afore-quoted Judgment of the RTC was contrary to law and evidence, filed
an appeal with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, though, in its Decision, dated 30 July 2001, affirmed the
appealed Judgment of the RTC, finding no reversible error therein. It even offered additional ratiocination for declaring
the marriage between respondent Crasus and Fely null and void, to wit
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Defendant secured a divorce from plaintiff-appellee abroad, has remarried, and is now
permanently residing in the United States. Plaintiff-appellee categorically stated this as one of his
reasons for seeking the declaration of nullity of their marriage
Article 26 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with
the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5)
and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
WHERE A MARRIAGE BETWEEN A FILIPINO CITIZEN AND A FOREIGNER

IS VALIDLY CELEBRATED AND A DIVORCE IS THEREAFTER VALIDLY OBTAINED
ABROAD BY THE ALIEN SPOUSE CAPACITATING HIM OR HER TO REMARRY, THE
FILIPINO SPOUSE SHALL LIKEWISE HAVE CAPACITY TO REMARRY UNDER
PHILIPPINE LAW.
The rationale behind the second paragraph of the above-quoted provision is to avoid the absurd
and unjust situation of a Filipino citizen still being married to his or her alien spouse, although the latter is
no longer married to the Filipino spouse because he or she has obtained a divorce abroad. In the case
at bench, the defendant has undoubtedly acquired her American husbands citizenship and thus has
become an alien as well. This Court cannot see why the benefits of Art. 26 aforequoted can not be
extended to a Filipino citizen whose spouse eventually embraces another citizenship and thus becomes
herself an alien.
It would be the height of unfairness if, under these circumstances, plaintiff would still be
considered as married to defendant, given her total incapacity to honor her marital covenants to the
former. To condemn plaintiff to remain shackled in a marriage that in truth and in fact does not exist and
to remain married to a spouse who is incapacitated to discharge essential marital covenants, is verily to
condemn him to a perpetual disadvantage which this Court finds abhorrent and will not countenance.
Justice dictates that plaintiff be given relief by affirming the trial courts declaration of the nullity of the
marriage of the parties.[16]
After the Court of Appeals, in a Resolution, dated 08 March 2002, [17] denied its Motion for Reconsideration,
petitioner Republic filed the instant Petition before this Court, based on the following arguments/grounds
I.
Abandonment by and sexual infidelity of respondents wife do not per se constitute
psychological incapacity.
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II. The Court of Appeals has decided questions of substance not in accord with law and
jurisprudence considering that the Court of Appeals committed serious errors of law in ruling that Article
26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code is inapplicable to the case at bar.[18]
In his Comment[19] to the Petition, respondent Crasus maintained that Felys psychological incapacity was
clearly established after a full-blown trial, and that paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code of the Philippines was
indeed applicable to the marriage of respondent Crasus and Fely, because the latter had already become an
American citizen. He further questioned the personality of petitioner Republic, represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General, to institute the instant Petition, because Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines authorizes
the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to the trial court, not the Solicitor General, to intervene on behalf of the
State, in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages.
After having reviewed the records of this case and the applicable laws and jurisprudence, this Court finds the
instant Petition to be meritorious.
I
The totality of evidence presented during trial is insufficient to support the finding of psychological
incapacity of Fely.
Article 36, concededly one of the more controversial provisions of the Family Code of the Philippines, reads
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise
be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
Issues most commonly arise as to what constitutes psychological incapacity. In a series of cases, this Court laid down
guidelines for determining its existence.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[20] the term psychological incapacity was defined, thus
. . . [P]sychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity
that causes a party to be truly cognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine
the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This
psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated [21]
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The psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a)
Gravity It must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the
ordinary duties required in a marriage;
(b)
Juridical Antecedence It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although
the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and
(c)
Incurability It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means
of the party involved.[22]
More definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines
were handed down by this Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,[23] which, although quite lengthy, by its
significance, deserves to be reproduced below
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution
and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of
marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family,
recognizing it as the foundation of the nation. It decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
protected by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes
their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although
its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the
parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of
the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as
a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by
qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their I do's. The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
36 | j o h a n
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of
a profession or employment in a job
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal
or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure
that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or
opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.[24]
A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,[25] further clarified that there is no requirement that the defendant/respondent
spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of
nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Such psychological incapacity, however, must be established by
the totality of the evidence presented during the trial.
Using the guidelines established by the afore-mentioned jurisprudence, this Court finds that the totality of
evidence presented by respondent Crasus failed miserably to establish the alleged psychological incapacity of his
wife Fely; therefore, there is no basis for declaring their marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code of
the Philippines.
The only substantial evidence presented by respondent Crasus before the RTC was his testimony, which can
be easily put into question for being self-serving, in the absence of any other corroborating evidence. He submitted
only two other pieces of evidence: (1) the Certification on the recording with the Register of Deeds of the Marriage
Contract between respondent Crasus and Fely, such marriage being celebrated on 16 December 1961; and (2) the
invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, in which Fely used her American husbands surname. Even
considering the admissions made by Fely herself in her Answer to respondent Crasuss Complaint filed with the RTC,
the evidence is not enough to convince this Court that Fely had such a grave mental illness that prevented her from
assuming the essential obligations of marriage.
37 | j o h a n
It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines contemplates downright
incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect
or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. [26] Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities,
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and
abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the said Article. [27]
As has already been stressed by this Court in previous cases, Article 36 is not to be confused with a divorce
law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to
assume.[28]
The evidence may have proven that Fely committed acts that hurt and embarrassed respondent Crasus and
the rest of the family. Her hot-temper, nagging, and extravagance; her abandonment of respondent Crasus; her
marriage to an American; and even her flaunting of her American family and her American surname, may indeed be
manifestations of her alleged incapacity to comply with her marital obligations; nonetheless, the root cause for such
was not identified. If the root cause of the incapacity was not identified, then it cannot be satisfactorily established as
a psychological or mental defect that is serious or grave; neither could it be proven to be in existence at the time of
celebration of the marriage; nor that it is incurable. While the personal examination of Fely by a psychiatrist or
psychologist is no longer mandatory for the declaration of nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code
of the Philippines, by virtue of this Courts ruling in Marcos v. Marcos,[29] respondent Crasus must still have complied
with the requirement laid down in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina [30] that the root cause of the incapacity be
identified as a psychological illness and that its incapacitating nature be fully explained.
In any case, any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. [31] No less than the
Constitution of 1987 sets the policy to protect and strengthen the family as the basic social institution and marriage
as the foundation of the family.[32]
II
Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is not applicable to the case at bar.
According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the couple getting
married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was celebrated. By its plain and
literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely
because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not
established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent
Crasus sometime after she left for the United States in 1984, after which she married her American husband in
1985. In the same Answer, she alleged that she had been an American citizen since 1988. At the time she filed for
divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition, and
legal capacity, even when she was already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and
recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent
Crasus.
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III
The Solicitor General is authorized to intervene, on behalf of the Republic, in proceedings for annulment
and declaration of nullity of marriages.
Invoking Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines, respondent Crasus argued that only the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to the RTC may intervene on behalf of the State in proceedings for annulment
or declaration of nullity of marriages; hence, the Office of the Solicitor General had no personality to file the instant
Petition on behalf of the State. Article 48 provides
ART. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall
order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to
prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
That Article 48 does not expressly mention the Solicitor General does not bar him or his Office from intervening
in proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages. Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987, appoints the Solicitor General as the principal law officer and legal defender of the
Government.[33] His Office is tasked to represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the
services of lawyers. The Office of the Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the Government and, as
such, shall discharge duties requiring the services of lawyers. [34]
The intent of Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines is to ensure that the interest of the State is
represented and protected in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing
collusion between the parties, or the fabrication or suppression of evidence; and, bearing in mind that the Solicitor
General is the principal law officer and legal defender of the land, then his intervention in such proceedings could
only serve and contribute to the realization of such intent, rather than thwart it.
Furthermore, the general rule is that only the Solicitor General is authorized to bring or defend actions on
behalf of the People or the Republic of the Philippines once the case is brought before this Court or the Court of
Appeals.[35] While it is the prosecuting attorney or fiscal who actively participates, on behalf of the State, in a
proceeding for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General
takes over when the case is elevated to the Court of Appeals or this Court. Since it shall be eventually responsible
for taking the case to the appellate courts when circumstances demand, then it is only reasonable and practical that
even while the proceeding is still being held before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General can already exercise
supervision and control over the conduct of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal therein to better guarantee the
protection of the interests of the State.
In fact, this Court had already recognized and affirmed the role of the Solicitor General in several cases for
annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages that were appealed before it, summarized as follows in the case
of Ancheta v. Ancheta[36]
In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals [268 SCRA 198 (1997)], this Court laid down the
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 48 of the Family Code, one of which concerns the
role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State:
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless
39 | j o h a n
the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly
stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the
petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the
court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the
equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. [Id., at 213]
This Court in the case of Malcampo-Sin v. Sin [355 SCRA 285 (2001)] reiterated its
pronouncement in Republic v. Court of Appeals [Supra.] regarding the role of the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State [37]
Finally, the issuance of this Court of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages,[38] which became effective on 15 March 2003, should dispel any other doubts of
respondent Crasus as to the authority of the Solicitor General to file the instant Petition on behalf of the State. The
Rule recognizes the authority of the Solicitor General to intervene and take part in the proceedings for annulment
and declaration of nullity of marriages before the RTC and on appeal to higher courts. The pertinent provisions of
the said Rule are reproduced below
Sec. 5. Contents and form of petition.
(4) It shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall serve a copy of the petition on the Office of
the Solicitor General and the Office of the City or Provincial Prosecutor, within five days from the date of
its filing and submit to the court proof of such service within the same period.
Sec. 18. Memoranda. The court may require the parties and the public prosecutor, in
consultation with the Office of the Solicitor General, to file their respective memoranda in support of their
claims within fifteen days from the date the trial is terminated. It may require the Office of the Solicitor
General to file its own memorandum if the case is of significant interest to the State. No other pleadings
or papers may be submitted without leave of court. After the lapse of the period herein provided, the
case will be considered submitted for decision, with or without the memoranda.
Sec. 19. Decision.
(2) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the public prosecutor, shall be served with
copies of the decision personally or by registered mail. If the respondent summoned by publication
failed to appear in the action, the dispositive part of the decision shall be published once in a newspaper
of general circulation.
(3) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen days from notice to the parties.
Entry of judgment shall be made if no motion for reconsideration or new trial, or appeal is filed by any of
the parties, the public prosecutor, or the Solicitor General.
Sec. 20. Appeal.
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(2) Notice of Appeal. An aggrieved party or the Solicitor General may appeal from the decision
by filing a Notice of Appeal within fifteen days from notice of denial of the motion for reconsideration or
new trial. The appellant shall serve a copy of the notice of appeal on the adverse parties.
Given the foregoing, this Court arrives at a conclusion contrary to those of the RTC and the Court of Appeals, and
sustains the validity and existence of the marriage between respondent Crasus and Fely. At most, Felys abandonment,
sexual infidelity, and bigamy, give respondent Crasus grounds to file for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family
Code of the Philippines, but not for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the same Code. While this Court
commiserates with respondent Crasus for being continuously shackled to what is now a hopeless and loveless marriage,
this is one of those situations where neither law nor society can provide the specific answer to every individual problem.
[39]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
62539, dated 30 July 2001, affirming the Judgment of the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077,
dated 30 October 1998, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy remains valid and subsisting.

Supreme Court
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
MANUEL G. ALMELOR,
G.R. No. 179620
Petitioner,
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
- versus -
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
THE HON. REGIONAL TRIAL
REYES, JJ.
41 | j o h a n
COURT OF LAS PIAS CITY,

BRANCH 254, and
Promulgated:
LEONIDA T. ALMELOR,
Respondent.
August 26, 2008
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
MARRIAGE, in its totality, involves the spouses right to the community of their whole lives. It likewise involves a
true intertwining of personalities.[1]
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) denying the petition for
annulment of judgment and affirming in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Las Pias, Branch 254. The
CA dismissed outright the Rule 47 petition for being the wrong remedy.
The Facts
Petitioner Manuel G. Almelor (Manuel) and respondent Leonida Trinidad (Leonida) were married on January 29,
1989 at the Manila Cathedral.[3] Their union bore threechildren: (1) Maria Paulina Corinne, born on October 20, 1989; (2)
Napoleon Manuel, born on August 9, 1991; and (3) Manuel Homer, born on July 4, 1994.[4] Manuel and Leonida are
both medical practitioners, an anesthesiologist and a pediatrician, respectively.[5]
42 | j o h a n
After eleven (11) years of marriage, Leonida filed a petition with the RTC in Las Pias City to annul their
marriage on the ground that Manuel was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations. The case,
docketed as LP-00-0132 was raffled off to Branch 254.
During the trial, Leonida testified that she first met Manuel in 1981 at the San Lazaro Hospital where they worked
as medical student clerks. At that time, she regarded Manuel as a very thoughtful person who got along well with other
people. They soon became sweethearts. Three years after, they got married.[6]
Leonida averred that Manuels kind and gentle demeanor did not last long. In the public eye, Manuel was the
picture of a perfect husband and father. This was not the case in his private life. At home, Leonida described Manuel
as a harsh disciplinarian, unreasonably meticulous, easily angered. Manuels unreasonable way of imposing discipline
on their children was the cause of their frequent fights as a couple.[7] Leonida complained that this was in stark contrast
to the alleged lavish affection Manuel has for his mother. Manuels deep attachment to his mother and his dependence
on her decision-making were incomprehensible to Leonida.[8]
Further adding to her woes was his concealment to her of his homosexuality. Her suspicions were first
aroused when she noticed Manuels peculiar closeness to his male companions. For instance, she caught him in an
indiscreet telephone conversation manifesting his affection for a male caller.[9] She also found several pornographic
homosexual materials in his possession. [10] Her worse fears were confirmed when she saw Manuel kissed another man
on the lips. The man was a certain Dr. Nogales. [11] When she confronted Manuel, he denied everything. At this point,
Leonida took her children and left their conjugal abode. Since then, Manuel stopped giving support to their children. [12]
Dr. Valentina del Fonso Garcia, a clinical psychologist, was presented to prove Leonidas claim. Dr. del Fonso
Garcia testified that she conducted evaluative interviews and a battery of psychiatric tests on Leonida. She also had a
one-time interview with Manuel and face-to-face interviews with Ma. Paulina Corrinne (the eldest child). [13] Sheconcluded
that Manuel is psychologically incapacitated.[14] Such incapacity is marked by antecedence; it existed even before the
marriage and appeared to be incurable.
Manuel, for his part, admitted that he and Leonida had some petty arguments here and there. He, however,
maintained that their marital relationship was generally harmonious. The petition for annulment filed by Leonida came as
a surprise to him.
Manuel countered that the true cause of Leonidas hostility against him was their professional rivalry. It began
when he refused to heed the memorandum [15] released by Christ the King Hospital. The memorandum ordered him to
desist from converting his own lying-in clinic to a primary or secondary hospital. [16] Leonidas family owns Christ
the King Hospital which is situated in the same subdivision as Manuels clinic and residence. [17] In other words, he and
her family have competing or rival hospitals in the same vicinity.
Manuel belied her allegation that he was a cruel father to their children. He denied maltreating them. At most,
he only imposed the necessary discipline on the children.
43 | j o h a n
He also defended his show of affection for his mother. He said there was nothing wrong for him to return the
love and affection of the person who reared and looked after him and his siblings. This is especially apt now that his
mother is in her twilight years. [18] Manuel pointed out that Leonida found fault in this otherwise healthy relationship
because of her very jealous and possessive nature.[19]
This same overly jealous behavior of Leonida drove Manuel to avoid the company of female friends. He
wanted to avoid any further misunderstanding with his wife. But, Leonida instead conjured up stories about his sexual
preference. She also fabricated tales about pornographic materials found in his possession to cast doubt on his
masculinity.[20]
To corroborate his version, he presented his brother, Jesus G. Almelor. Jesus narrated that he usually stayed at
Manuels house during his weekly trips to Manila from IrigaCity. He was a witness to the generally harmonious
relationship between his brother Manuel and sister-in-law, Leonida. True, they had some quarrels typical of a husband
and wife relationship. But there was nothing similar to what Leonida described in her testimony.[21]
Jesus further testified that he was with his brother on the day Leonida allegedly saw Manuel kissed another
man. He denied that such an incident occurred. On that particular date,[22] he and Manuel went straight home from a trip
to Bicol. There was no other person with them at that time, except their driver.[23]
Manuel expressed his intention to refute Dr. del Fonso Garcias findings by presenting his own expert
witness. However, no psychiatrist was presented.
RTC Disposition
By decision dated November 25, 2005, the RTC granted the petition for annulment, with the following disposition:
WHEREFORE, premised on the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1.
Declaring the marriage contracted by herein parties on 29 January 1989 and all its
effects under the law null and void from the beginning;
44 | j o h a n
2.
Dissolving the regime of community property between the same parties with
forfeiture of defendants share thereon in favor of the same parties children
whose legal custody is awarded to plaintiff with visitorial right afforded to
defendant;
3.
Ordering the defendant to give monthly financial support to all the children; and
4.
Pursuant to the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC:
a.
Directing the Branch Clerk of this Court to enter this Judgment upon its
finality in the Book of Entry of Judgment and to issue an Entry of
Judgment in accordance thereto; and
b.
Directing the Local Civil Registrars of Las Pias City and Manila City to
cause the registration of the said Entry of Judgment in their respective
Books of Marriages.
Upon compliance, a decree of nullity of marriage shall be issued.
SO ORDERED.[24] (Emphasis supplied)
The trial court nullified the marriage, not on the ground of Article 36, but Article 45 of the Family
Code. It ratiocinated:
x x x a careful evaluation and in-depth analysis of the surrounding circumstances of the

allegations in the complaint and of the evidence presented in support thereof (sic) reveals that in this
case (sic) there is more than meets the eyes (sic).
Both legally and biologically, homosexuality x x x is, indeed, generally incompatible with hetero
sexual marriage. This is reason enough that in this jurisdiction (sic) the law recognizes marriage as a
special contract exclusively only between a man and a woman x x x and thus when homosexuality has
trespassed into marriage, the same law provides ample remedies to correct the situation [Article 45(3) in
relation to Article 46(4) or Article 55, par. 6, Family Code]. This is of course in recognition of the
biological fact that no matter how a man cheats himself that he is not a homosexual and forces himself to
live a normal heterosexual life, there will surely come a time when his true sexual preference as a
45 | j o h a n
homosexual shall prevail in haunting him and thus jeopardizing the solidity, honor, and welfare of his own
family.[25]
Manuel filed a notice of appeal which was, however, denied due course. Undaunted, he filed a petition for
annulment of judgment with the CA.[26]
Manuel contended that the assailed decision was issued in excess of the lower courts jurisdiction; that it had no
jurisdiction to dissolve the absolute community of property and forfeit his conjugal share in favor of his children.
CA Disposition
On July 31, 2007, the CA denied the petition, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the present Petition for Annulment of Judgment is hereby DENIED. The Court
AFFIRMS in toto the Decision (dated November 25, 2005) of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 254), in
Las Pias City, in Civil Case No. LP-00-0132. No costs.[27]
The CA stated that petitioner pursued the wrong remedy by filing the extraordinary remedy of petition
for annulment of judgment. Said the appellate court:
It is obvious that the petitioner is questioning the propriety of the decision rendered by the lower
Court. But the remedy assuming there was a mistake is not a Petition for Annulment of Judgment but an
ordinary appeal. An error of judgment may be reversed or corrected only by appeal.
What petitioner is ascribing is an error of judgment, not of jurisdiction, which is properly the
subject of an ordinary appeal.
In short, petitioner admits the jurisdiction of the lower court but he claims excess in the exercise
thereof. Excess assuming there was is not covered by Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. The Rule refers the lack of jurisdiction and not the exercise thereof. [28]
Issues
Petitioner Manuel takes the present recourse via Rule 45, assigning to the CA the following errors:
46 | j o h a n
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT TREATING THE PETITION FOR
ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT AS A PETITION FOR REVIEW IN VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE OF
THE ISSUES INVOLVED AND IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE;
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL
COURT AS REGARDS THE ORDER DECLARING THE MARRIAGE AS NULLAND VOID ON THE
GROUND OF PETITIONERS PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY;
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL
COURT AS REGARDS THE ORDER TO FORFEIT THE SHARE OF PETITIONER IN HIS SHARE OF
THE CONJUGAL ASSETS.[29]
Our Ruling
I.
The stringent rules of procedures may be relaxed to serve the demands of substantial justice and in
the Courts exercise of equity jurisdiction.
Generally, an appeal taken either to the Supreme Court or the CA by the wrong or inappropriate mode shall be
dismissed.[30] This is to prevent the party from benefiting from ones neglect and mistakes. However, like most rules, it
carries certain exceptions. After all, the ultimate purpose of all rules of procedures is to achieve substantial justice as
expeditiously as possible.[31]
Annulment of judgment under Rule 47 is a last remedy. It can not be resorted to if the ordinary remedies are
available or no longer available through no fault of petitioner. [32] However, in Buenaflor v. Court of Appeals,[33] this Court
clarified the proper appreciation for technical rules of procedure, in this wise:
Rules of procedures are intended to promote, not to defeat, substantial justice and,
therefore, they should not be applied in a very rigid and technical sense. The exception is that
while the Rules are liberally construed, the provisions with respect to the rules on the manner
and periods for perfecting appeals are strictly applied. As an exception to the exception, these
rules have sometimes been relaxed on equitable considerations. Also, in some cases the Supreme
Court has given due course to an appeal perfected out of time where a stringent application of the rules
would have denied it, but only when to do so would serve the demands of substantial justice and in the
exercise of equity jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.[34](Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
47 | j o h a n
[35]
For reasons of justice and equity, this Court has allowed exceptions to the stringent rules governing appeals.
It has, in the past, refused to sacrifice justice for technicality.[36]
After
discovering
the
palpable
error
of
his
petition,
Manuel seeks the
Court to consider his petition before the CA instead as a petition for certiorariunder Rule 65.
indulgence
of this
A perusal of the said petition reveals that Manuel imputed grave abuse of discretion to the lower court for
annulling his marriage on account of his alleged homosexuality. This is not the first time that this Court is faced with a
similar situation. In Nerves v. Civil Service Commission,[37] petitioner Delia R. Nerves elevated to the CA a Civil Service
Commission (CSC) decision suspending her for six (6) months. The CSC ruled Nerves, a public school teacher, is
deemed to have already served her six-month suspensionduring the pendency of the case. Nevertheless, she is ordered
reinstated without back wages. On appeal, Nerves stated in her petition, inter alia:
1.
This is a petition for certiorari filed pursuant to Article IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution of
the Philippines and under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
2.
But per Supreme Court Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 (Revised Circular No. 1-91)
petitioner is filing the instant petition with this Honorable Court instead of the Supreme Court.
[38]
(Underscoring supplied)
The CA dismissed Nerves petition for certiorari for being the wrong remedy or the inappropriate mode of appeal.
The CA opined that under the Supreme Court Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 x x x appeals from judgments
or final orders or resolutions of CSC is by a petition for review.[40]
[39]
This Court granted Nerves petition and held that she had substantially complied with the Administrative
Circular. The Court stated:
That it was erroneously labeled as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is
only a minor procedural lapse, not fatal to the appeal. x x x
More importantly, the appeal on its face appears to be impressed with merit. Hence, the Court of
Appeals should have overlooked the insubstantial defects of the petition x x x in order to do justice to the
parties concerned. There is, indeed, nothing sacrosanct about procedural rules, which should be
liberally construed in order to promote their object and assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding. As it has been said, where the rigid application
of the rules would frustrate substantial justice, or bar the vindication of a legitimate grievance, the courts
are justified in exempting a particular case from the operation of the rules.[41] (Underscoring supplied)
48 | j o h a n
Similarly, in the more recent case of Tan v. Dumarpa,[42] petitioner Joy G. Tan availed of a wrong remedy by filing a
petition for review on certiorari instead of a motion for new trial or an ordinary appeal. In the interest of justice, this Court
considered the petition, pro hac vice, as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
This Court found that based on Tans allegations, the trial court prima facie committed grave abuse of discretion
in rendering a judgment by default. If uncorrected, it will cause petitioner great injustice. The Court elucidated in this
wise:
Indeed, where as here, there is a strong showing that grave miscarriage of justice would result
from the strict application of the Rules, we will not hesitate to relax the same in the interest of substantial
justice.[43] (Underscoring supplied)
Measured by the foregoing yardstick, justice will be better served by giving due course to the present petition and
treating petitioners CA petition as one for certiorariunder Rule 65, considering that what is at stake is the validity or nonvalidity of a marriage.
In Salazar v. Court of Appeals,[44] citing Labad v. University of Southeastern Philippines, this Court reiterated:
x x x The dismissal of appeals on purely technical grounds is frowned upon. While the right to
appeal is a statutory, not a natural right, nonetheless it is an essential part of our judicial system and
courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal, but rather, ensure
that every party-litigant has the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, free
from the constraints of technicalities.[45]
Indeed, it is far better and more prudent for a court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of
the case on the merits to attain the ends of justice. [46]
Furthermore, it was the negligence and incompetence of Manuels counsel that prejudiced his right to
appeal. His counsel, Atty. Christine Dugenio, repeatedly availed of inappropriate remedies. After the denial of her notice
of appeal, she failed to move for reconsideration or new trial at the first instance. She also erroneously filed a petition for
annulment of judgment rather than pursue an ordinary appeal.
These manifest errors were clearly indicative of counsels incompetence. These gravely worked to the detriment
of Manuels appeal. True it is that the negligence of counsel binds the client. Still, this Court has recognized certain
exceptions: (1) where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law; (2) when its
application will result in outright deprivation of the clients liberty and property; or (3) where the interest of justice so
require.[47]
49 | j o h a n
The negligence of Manuels counsel falls under the exceptions. Ultimately, the reckless or gross negligence of
petitioners former counsel led to the loss of his right to appeal. He should not be made to suffer for his
counsels grave mistakes. Higher interests of justice and equity demand that he be allowed to ventilate his case in a
higher court.
In Apex Mining, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[48] this Court explained thus:
It is settled that the negligence of counsel binds the client. This is based on the rule that any act
performed by a counsel within the scope of his general or implied authority is regarded as an act of his
client. However, where counsel is guilty of gross ignorance, negligence and dereliction of duty, which
resulted in the clients being held liable for damages in a damage suit, the client is deprived of his day in
court and the judgment may be set aside on such ground. In the instant case, higher interests of justice
and equity demand that petitioners be allowed to present evidence on their defense. Petitioners may not
be made to suffer for the lawyers mistakes. This Court will always be disposed to grant relief to
parties aggrieved by perfidy, fraud, reckless inattention and downright incompetence of lawyers,
which has the consequence of depriving their clients, of their day in court.[49] (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, this Court has the power to except a particular case from the operation of the rule whenever the
demands of justice require it. With more conviction should itwield such power in a case involving the sacrosanct
institution of marriage. This Court is guided with the thrust of giving a party the fullest opportunity to establish the merits
of ones action.[50]
The client was likewise spared from counsels negligence in Government Service Insurance System v. Bengson
Commercial Buildings, Inc.[51] and Ancheta v. Guersey-Dalaygon.[52] Said the Court in Bengson:
But if under the circumstances of the case, the rule deserts its proper office as an aid to justice
and becomes a great hindrance and chief enemy, its rigors must be relaxed to admit exceptions thereto
and to prevent a miscarriage of justice. In other words, the court has the power to except a particular case
from the operation of the rule whenever the purposes of justice require it. [53]
II.
Concealment of homosexuality is the proper ground to annul a marriage, not homosexuality per se.
Manuel is a desperate man determined to salvage what remains of his marriage. Persistent in his quest, he fought
back all the heavy accusations of incapacity, cruelty, and doubted masculinity thrown at him.
The trial court declared that Leonidas petition for nullity had no basis at all because the supporting grounds relied
upon can not legally make a case under Article 36 of the Family Code. It went further by citing Republic v. Molina:[54]
50 | j o h a n
Indeed, mere allegations of conflicting personalities, irreconcilable differences, incessant quarrels

and/or beatings, unpredictable mood swings, infidelities, vices, abandonment, and difficulty, neglect, or
failure in the performance of some marital obligations do not suffice to establish psychological incapacity.
[55]
If so, the lower court should have dismissed outright the petition for not meeting the guidelines set
in Molina. What Leonida attempted to demonstrate were Manuelshomosexual tendencies by citing overt acts generally
predominant
among
homosexual individuals.[56] She wanted
to
prove
that
the
perceived
homosexuality rendered Manuelincapable of fulfilling the essential marital obligations.
But instead of dismissing the petition, the trial court nullified the marriage between Manuel and Leonida on the
ground of vitiated consent by virtue of fraud. In support of its conclusion, the lower court reasoned out:
As insinuated by the State (p. 75, TSN, 15 December 2003), when there is smoke surely there is
fire. Although vehemently denied by defendant, there is preponderant evidence enough to establish with
certainty that defendant is really a homosexual. This is the fact that can be deduced from the totality of
the marriage life scenario of herein parties.
Before his marriage, defendant knew very well that people around him even including his own
close friends doubted his true sexual preference (TSN, pp. 35-36, 13 December 2000; pp.73-75, 15
December 2003). After receiving many forewarnings, plaintiff told defendant about the rumor she heard
but defendant did not do anything to prove to the whole world once and for all the truth of all his
denials. Defendant threatened to sue those people but nothing happened after that. There may have
been more important matters to attend to than to waste time and effort filing cases against and be
effected by these people and so, putting more premiums on defendants denials, plaintiff just the same
married him. Reasons upon reasons may be advanced to either exculpate or nail to the cross defendant
for his act of initially concealing his homosexuality to plaintiff, but in the end, only one thing is
certain even during his marriage with plaintiff, the smoke of doubt about his real preference continued
and even got thicker, reason why obviously defendant failed to establish a happy and solid family; and in
so failing, plaintiff and their children became his innocent and unwilling victims.
Yes, there is nothing untoward of a man if, like herein defendant, he is meticulous over even
small details in the house (sic) like wrongly folded bed sheets, etc. or if a man is more authoritative in
knowing what clothes or jewelry shall fit his wife (pp. 77-81, TSN, 15 December 2003); but these
admissions of defendant taken in the light of evidence presented apparently showing that he had extra
fondness of his male friends (sic) to the extent that twice on separate occasions (pp. 4-7, TSN, 14
February 2001) he was allegedly seen by plaintiff kissing another man lips-to-lips plus the homosexual
magazines and tapes likewise allegedly discovered underneath his bed (Exhibits L and M), the doubt
as to his real sex identity becomes stronger. The accusation of plaintiff versus thereof of defendant may
be the name of the game in this case; but the simple reason of professional rivalry advanced by the
51 | j o h a n
defendant is certainly not enough to justify and obscure the question why plaintiff should accuse him of
such a very untoward infidelity at the expense and humiliation of their children and family as a whole. [57]
Evidently, no sufficient proof was presented to substantiate the allegations that Manuel is a homosexual and that
he concealed this to Leonida at the time of their marriage. The lower court considered the public perception of Manuels
sexual preference without the corroboration of witnesses. Also, it took cognizance of Manuels peculiarities and
interpreted it against his sexuality.
Even assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that Manuel is a homosexual, the lower court cannot appreciate it as a
ground to annul his marriage with Leonida. The law is clear amarriage may be annulled when the consent of either
party was obtained by fraud,[58] such as concealment of homosexuality.[59] Nowhere in the said decision was it proven by
preponderance of evidence that Manuel was a homosexual at the onset of his marriage and that he deliberately hid such
fact to his wife.[60] It is the concealment of homosexuality, and not homosexuality per se, that vitiates the consent of the
innocent party. Such concealment presupposes bad faith and intent to defraud the other party in giving consent to the
marriage.
Consent is an essential requisite of a valid marriage. To be valid, it must be freely given by both parties. An
allegation of vitiated consent must be proven by preponderance of evidence. The Family Code has enumerated an
exclusive list of circumstances[61] constituting fraud. Homosexuality per se is not among those cited, but its concealment.
This distinction becomes more apparent when we go over the deliberations [62] of the Committees on the Civil Code
and Family Law, to wit:
Justice Caguioa remarked that this ground should be eliminated in the provision on the grounds for
legal separation. Dean Gupit, however, pointed out that in Article 46, they are talking only of
concealment, while in the article on legal separation, there is actuality. Judge Diy added that in legal
separation, the ground existed after the marriage, while in Article 46, the ground existed at the time of the
marriage. Justice Reyes suggested that, for clarity, they add the phrase existing at the time of the
marriage at the end of subparagraph (4). The Committee approved the suggestion.[63]
To reiterate, homosexuality per se is only a ground for legal separation. It is its concealment that serves as a
valid ground to annul a marriage. [64] Concealment in this case is not simply a blanket denial, but one that is constitutive
of fraud. It is this fundamental element that respondent failed to prove.
In the United States, homosexuality has been considered as a basis for divorce. It indicates that questions of
sexual identity strike so deeply at one of the basic elements of marriage, which is the exclusive sexual bond between the
spouses.[65] In Crutcher v. Crutcher,[66] the Court held:
52 | j o h a n
Unnatural practices of the kind charged here are an infamous indignity to the wife, and which
would make the marriage relation so revolting to her that it would become impossible for her to discharge
the duties of a wife, and would defeat the whole purpose of the relation. In the natural course of things,
they would cause mental suffering to the extent of affecting her health. [67]
However, although there may be similar sentiments here in the Philippines, the legal overtones are significantly
different. Divorce is not recognized in the country. Homosexuality and its alleged incompatibility to a healthy
heterosexual life are not sanctioned as grounds to sever the marriage bond in our jurisdiction. At most, it is only a
ground to separate from bed and board.
What was proven in the hearings a quo was a relatively blissful marital union for more than eleven (11) years,
which produced three (3) children. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests on Leonida. Sadly, she
failed to discharge this onus.
The same failure to prove fraud which purportedly resulted to a vitiated marital consent was found in Villanueva v.
Court of Appeals.[68] In Villanueva, instead of proving vitiation of consent, appellant resorted to baseless portrayals of his
wife as a perpetrator of fraudulent schemes. Said the Court:
Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, especially if they coincide with those of the trial court,
as in the instant case, are generally binding on this Court. We affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals
that petitioner freely and voluntarily married private respondent and that no threats or intimidation,
duress or violence compelled him to do so, thus
Appellant anchored his prayer for the annulment of his marriage on the ground that he did not
freely consent to be married to the appellee. He cited several incidents that created on his mind a
reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave danger to his life and safety. x x x
The Court is not convinced that appellants apprehension of danger to his person is so
overwhelming as to deprive him of the will to enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It is not disputed
that at the time he was allegedly being harassed, appellant worked as a security guard in a bank. Given
the rudiments of self-defense, or, at the very least, the proper way to keep himself out of harms way. x x
x
Appellant also invoked fraud to annul his marriage, as he was made to believe by appellee that
the latter was pregnant with his child when they were married. Appellants excuse that he could not have
impregnated the appellee because he did not have an erection during their tryst is flimsy at best, and an
outright lie at worst. The complaint is bereft of any reference to his inability to copulate with the appellee.
xxx
xxxx
53 | j o h a n
x x x The failure to cohabit becomes relevant only if it arises as a result of the perpetration of
any of the grounds for annulling the marriage, such as lack of parental consent, insanity, fraud,
intimidation, or undue influence x x x. Since the appellant failed to justify his failure to cohabit with the
appellee on any of these grounds, the validity of his marriage must be upheld. [69]
Verily, the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion, not only by solely taking into account petitioners
homosexuality per se and not its concealment, but by declaring the marriage void from its existence.
This Court is mindful of the constitutional policy to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous
social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.[70] The State and the public have vital interest in the
maintenance and preservation of these social institutions against desecration by fabricated evidence. [71] Thus, any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the validity of marriage.
III. In a valid marriage, the husband and wife jointly administer and enjoy their community or conjugal
property.
Article 96 of the Family Code, on regimes of absolute community property, provides:
Art. 96. The administration and enjoyment of the community property shall belong to both
spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husbands decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the
court by the wife for a proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the
contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the common properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance without the
authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or
consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a
continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a
binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer
is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
A similar provision, Article 124[72] prescribes joint administration and enjoyment in a regime of conjugal
partnership. In a valid marriage, both spouses exerciseadministration and enjoyment of the property regime, jointly.
In the case under review, the RTC decreed a dissolution of the community property of Manuel and Leonida. In
the same breath, the trial court forfeited Manuels share in favor of the children. Considering that the marriage is upheld
54 | j o h a n
valid and subsisting, the dissolution and forfeiture of Manuels share in the property regime is unwarranted. They remain
the joint administrators of the community property.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The appealed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the
petition in the trial court to annul the marriage isDISMISSED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-53703 August 19, 1986
LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY (as presiding judge of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Caloocan City) and KARL HEINZ WIEGEL, respondents.
Dapucanta, Dulay & Associates for petitioner.
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo and Ongsiako Law Office for private respondent.
PARAS, J.:
In an action (Family Case No. 483) filed before the erstwhile Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan City,
herein respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel (plaintiff therein) asked for the declaration of Nullity of his marriage (celebrated on
July, 1978 at the Holy Catholic Apostolic Christian Church Branch in Makati, Metro Manila) with herein petitioner Lilia
Oliva Wiegel (Lilia, for short, and defendant therein) on the ground of Lilia's previous existing marriage to one Eduardo A.
Maxion, the ceremony having been performed on June 25, 1972 at our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon City. Lilia,
while admitting the existence of said prior subsisting marriage claimed that said marriage was null and void, she and the
first husband Eduardo A. Maxion having been allegedly forced to enter said marital union. In the pre-trial that ensued, the
issue agreed upon by both parties was the status of the first marriage (assuming the presence of force exerted against
both parties): was said prior marriage void or was it merely voidable? Contesting the validity of the pre-trial order, Lilia
asked the respondent court for an opportunity to present evidence(1) that the first marriage was vitiated by force exercised upon both her and the first husband; and
(2) that the first husband was at the time of the marriage in 1972 already married to someone else.
Respondent judge ruled against the presentation of evidence because the existence of force exerted on both parties of
the first marriage had already been agreed upon. Hence, the present petition for certiorari assailing the following Orders
of therespondent Judge-
55 | j o h a n
(1) the Order dated March 17, 1980 in which the parties were compelled to submit the case for resolution based on
"agreed facts;" and
(2) the Order dated April 14, 1980, denying petitioner's motion to allow her to present evidence in her favor.
We find the petition devoid of merit.
There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force committed against both parties
because assuming this to be so, the marriage will not be void but merely viodable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and therefore
valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married respondent she was still
validly married to her first husband, consequently, her marriage to respondent is VOID (Art. 80, Civil Code).
There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time they
married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration 1 of
such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she
contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel); accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and respondent
would be regarded VOID under the law.
WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, for lack of merit, and the Orders complained of are hereby
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 58 June 2, 1977
PEDRO ODAYAT, complainant,
vs.
DEMETRIO AMANTE, respondent.
ANTONIO, J.:
In a verified amended letter-complaint dated March 10, 1973, 1 Pedro Odayat charged Atty. Demetrio Z. Amante, Clerk of
Court, Court of First Instance, Branch IX, Basey, Samar, with oppression, immorality and falsification of a public
document.2
Briefly stated, complainant's basic allegations are: (1) that respondent grabbed a portion of complainant's land, and,
when this latter resented, the former arrogantly challenged the complainant to bring the matter to court; (2) that
respondent is cohabiting with one Beatriz Jornada, with whom he begot many children, even while his spouse Filomena
Abella is still alive; and (3) that respondent, although married, falsely represented his status as single in the information
sheet be submitted in connection with his appointment to his present position as Clerk of Court.
56 | j o h a n
After respondent Demetrio Amante had submitted his letter-comment dated April 24, 1973, 3 which was considered as his
answer to the amended complaint, this Court, in its minute resolution of July 16, 1974, 4 referred this Administrative
Matter No. P-58 to the Executive Judge of the Court of First Instance, Branch I, Catbalogan, Samar, for investigation,
report and recommendation, and the matter was docketed therein as Administrative Case No. 264. The charges were
investigated by District Judge Segundo M. Zosa of said Court. After appropriate proceedings, Judge Zosa submitted to
this Court his Report and Recommendation dated December 3,1974. 5
1. Oppression. In the course of formal investigation on August 26, 1974 before Judge Zosa, complainant acquiesced
to the dropping of this charge of oppression against respondent, inasmuch as the issue involved therein refers to a
boundary dispute between the complainant and the respondent and admittedly being more properly a cause for a civil
action. 6 Hence, the scope of the investigation by Judge Zosa is limited to the other two charges.
2. Immorality. To prove this charge of immorality against respondent, complainant Pedro Odayat testified and
presented Exhibits "A" to "E", to the effect that respondent and Filomena Abella were married in Tacloban City on
October 16, 1948 before Judge Eugenio Brillo (then Justice of the Peace of Tacloban, Leyte; 7 ) that they had one son,
who was born on August 23, 1949 and baptized on October 1, 1949 by the name of Romeo Amante, in the Sto. Nino
Church, Tacloban City, by Rev. Fr. Magdaleno Agnes;8 that he came to know Filomena Abella, who is a native of Sta.
Rita, Samar, only after her marriage to the respondent when they took up their residence for five years in Basey, Samar;
that he did not know if Filomena Abella was still single when she married the respondent; that long before he filed his
complaint against respondent on March 10, 1973, he came to know that the respondent and one Beatriz Jornado were
living as husband and wife in Basey, Samar; that they had several children, two of whom are Maria Felisa J. Amante,
who was born on April 12, 1967, as per certified true copy of the Certificate of Birth of said child, 9 duly signed and issued
on May 7, 1973 by Perfecto Cabuquit, the Local Civil Registrar, 10 and Alma Amante y Jornada, who was born on April 8,
1965 and baptized on July 5, 1965, as per Certificate of Baptism, duly signed and issued on March 6, 1973 by the Parish
Priest, Rev. Fr. Jose M. Lentejas; 11 and that one of the reasons why he filed his complaint against the respondent was
because of their land dispute.
On the other hand, respondent Demetrio Amante testified, in his behalf, and presented Atty. Demosthenes Duquilla, as
well as Exhibits "1" and "2". Respondent admits his marriage with Filomena Abella on October 16, 1948. 12 He also admits
that he has been living with Beatriz Jornada, whom he married on April 4, 1964 during a religious revival in Almagro,
Samar, before Rev. Fr. John Belly, a Franciscan Missionary, 13 and with whom he begot six (6) children.14Respondent,
however, claims he was coerced into marrying Filomena Abella, unaware that she was already married to another man,
and they separated in 1949 after Filomena Abella told him of her previous marriage; that from 1949 to 1964, the
respondent did not hear or received any communication from Filomena Abella, much less knew of her whereabouts.
To rebut the charge of immorality, respondent presented in evidence the certification dated September 12, 1974 of David
C. Jacobe, the Local Civil Registrar of Pateros, Rizal 15 attesting that, in accordance with the Register of Marriages in his
office, Filomena Abella was married to one Eliseo Portales on February 16, 1948. Respondent's contention is that his
marriage with Filomena Abella was void ab initio, because of her previous marriage with said Eliseo Portales.
The Investigator finds for the respondent and recommends his exoneration from this charge. Indeed, there is no question
that Filomena Abella's marriage with the respondent was void ab initio under Article 80 [4] of the New Civil code, and no
judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of void marriages. 16
3. Falsification of a This document. The Investigator found that the complainant failed to prove this charge. Contrary to
the allegation of the complainant, the document in question, 17 shows that the respondent actually placed in "Item 6. Civil
Status" therein the word "Married". 18
57 | j o h a n
In view of the foregoing, We find that the recommendation of the Investigator is in accordance with law and the evidence
on record.
WHEREFORE, respondent Demetrio Amante is hereby exonerated from the charges filed against him by complainant.
Let a copy of this decision be attached to his personal record,
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 122749. July 31, 1996]
ANTONIO A. S. VALDES, petitioner, vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 102, QUEZON CITY, and CONSUELO
M. GOMEZ-VALDES, respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
The petition for review bewails, purely on a question of law, an alleged error committed by the Regional Trial Court
in Civil Case No. Q-92-12539. Petitioner avers that the court a quohas failed to apply the correct law that should govern
the disposition of a family dwelling in a situation where a marriage is declared void ab initio because of psychological
incapacity on the part of either or both of the parties to the contract.
The pertinent facts giving rise to this incident are, by and large, not in dispute.
Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez were married on 05 January 1971. Begotten during the marriage were five
children. In a petition, dated 22 June 1992, Valdes sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage pursuant to Article 36
of the Family Code (docketed Civil Case No. Q-92-12539, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 102). After
hearing the parties following the joinder of issues, the trial court, [1] in its decision of 29 July 1994, granted the petition; viz:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
"(1) The marriage of petitioner Antonio Valdes and respondent Consuelo Gomez-Valdes is hereby declared null and
void under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of their mutual psychological incapacity to comply with their
essential marital obligations;
"(2) The three older children, Carlos Enrique III, Antonio Quintin and Angela Rosario shall choose which parent they
would want to stay with.
"Stella Eloisa and Joaquin Pedro shall be placed in the custody of their mother, herein respondent Consuelo GomezValdes.
"The petitioner and respondent shall have visitation rights over the children who are in the custody of the other.
"(3) The petitioner and respondent are directed to start proceedings on the liquidation of their common properties as
defined by Article 147 of the Family Code, and to comply with the provisions ofArticles 50, 51 and 52 of the same code,
within thirty (30) days from notice of this decision.
58 | j o h a n
"Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, for proper recording in
the registry of marriages."[2] (Italics ours)
Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of that portion of the decision directing compliance with Articles 50, 51 and
52 of the Family Code. She asserted that the Family Code contained no provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of
common property in "unions without marriage." Parenthetically, during the hearing on the motion, the children filed a joint
affidavit expressing their desire to remain with their father, Antonio Valdes, herein petitioner.
In an Order, dated 05 May 1995, the trial court made the following clarification:
"Consequently, considering that Article 147 of the Family Code explicitly provides that the property acquired by both
parties during their union, in the absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained through the joint
efforts of the parties and will be owned by them in equal shares, plaintiff and defendant will own their 'family home' and
all their other properties for that matter in equal shares.
"In the liquidation and partition of the properties owned in common by the plaintiff and defendant, the provisions on coownership found in the Civil Code shall apply."[3] (Italics supplied)
In addressing specifically the issue regarding the disposition of the family dwelling, the trial court said:
"Considering that this Court has already declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent as null and void ab
initio, pursuant to Art. 147, the property regime of petitioner and respondent shall be governed by the rules on coownership.
"The provisions of Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code finds no application since Article 102 refers to the procedure
for the liquidation of the conjugal partnership property and Article 129 refers to the procedure for the liquidation of
the absolute community of property."[4]
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the order. The motion was denied on 30 October 1995.
In his recourse to this Court, petitioner submits that Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code should be held
controlling; he argues that:
"I
"Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where the parties are psychological incapacitated.
"II
"Articles 50, 51 and 52 in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code govern the disposition of the family dwelling
in cases where a marriage is declared void ab initio, including a marriage declared void by reason of the psychological
incapacity of the spouses.
"III
"Assuming arguendo that Article 147 applies to marriages declared void ab initio on the ground of the psychological
incapacity of a spouse, the same may be read consistently with Article 129.
59 | j o h a n
"IV
"It is necessary to determine the parent with whom majority of the children wish to stay." [5]
The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of
the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case
may be, of the Family Code. Article 147 is a remake of Article 144 of the Civil Code as interpreted and so applied in
previous cases;[6] it provides:
"ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by
them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the
rules on co-ownership.
"In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been
obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article,
a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed
jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the
household.
"Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during
cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.
"When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership
shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or
their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of
descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination
of the cohabitation."
This peculiar kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no legal impediment to marry each
other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. The term
"capacitated" in the provision (in the first paragraph of the law) refers to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage,
i.e., any "male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles
37 and 38"[7] of the Code.
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by
the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained
through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall still be considered as
having contributed thereto jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family
household."[8] Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's separate property are not included in the
co-ownership.
Article 147 of the Family Code, in substance and to the above extent, has clarified Article 144 of the Civil Code; in
addition, the law now expressly provides that
(a)
Neither party can dispose or encumber by act inter vivos his or her share in co-ownership property,
without the consent of the other, during the period of cohabitation; and
60 | j o h a n
(b)
In the case of a void marriage, any party in bad faith shall forfeit his or her share in the co-ownership in
favor of their common children; in default thereof or waiver by any or all of the common children, each vacant share shall
belong to the respective surviving descendants, or still in default thereof, to the innocent party. The forfeiture shall take
place upon the termination of the cohabitation[9] or declaration of nullity of the marriage.[10]
When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or when they do not live exclusively with
each other (as husband and wife ),only the property acquired by both of them through their actual joint contribution of
money, property or industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to their respective contributions. Such
contributions and corresponding shares, however, are prima facie presumed to be equal. The share of any party who is
married to another shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership, as the case may be, if so existing
under a valid marriage. If the party who has acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be
forfeited in the manner already heretofore expressed. [11]
In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of the parties' common property, the trial court
acted neither imprudently nor precipitately; a court which has jurisdiction to declare the marriage a nullity must be
deemed likewise clothed with authority to resolve incidental and consequential matters. Nor did it commit a reversible
error in ruling that petitioner and private respondent own the "family home" and all their common property in equal
shares, as well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the property owned in common by them, the
provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles 102 and 129, [12] of the
Family Code, should aptly prevail. The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or the
conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case until
the contract is annulled ),are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between common-law spouses.
The first paragraph of Article 50 of the Family Code, applying paragraphs (2 ),(3 ),(4) and (5) of Article 43, [13] relates only,
by its explicit terms, to voidable marriages and, exceptionally, to void marriages under Article 40[14] of the Code, i.e., the
declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage before the latter is
judicially declared void. The latter is a special rule that somehow recognizes the philosophy and an old doctrine that void
marriages are inexistent from the very beginning and no judicial decree is necessary to establish their nullity. In now
requiring forpurposes of remarriage, the declaration of nullity by final judgment of the previously contracted void
marriage, the present law aims to do away with any continuing uncertainty on the status of the second marriage. It is not
then illogical for the provisions of Article 43, in relation to Articles 41 [15] and 42,[16] of the Family Code, on the effects of the
termination of a subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of a previous marriage to be made
applicable pro hac vice. In all other cases, it is not to be assumed that the law has also meant to have coincident
property relations, on the one hand, between spouses in valid and voidable marriages (before annulment) and, on the
other, between common-law spouses or spouses of void marriages, leaving to ordain, in the latter case, the ordinary
rules on co-ownership subject to the provision of Article 147 and Article 148 of the Family Code. It must be stressed,
nevertheless, even as it may merely state the obvious, that the provisions of the Family Code on the "family home," i.e.,
the provisions found in Title V, Chapter 2, of the Family Code, remain in force and effect regardless of the property
regime of the spouses.
WHEREFORE, the questioned orders, dated 05 May 1995 and 30 October 1995, of the trial court are AFFIRMED.
No costs.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
61 | j o h a n
G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995

LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS, respondents.
VITUG, J.:
Concededly a highly, if not indeed the most likely, controversial provision introduced by the Family Code is Article 36 (as
amended by E.O. No. 227 dated 17 July 1987), which declares:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
The present petition for review on certiorari, at the instance of Leouel Santos ("Leouel"), brings into fore the
above provision which is now invoked by him. Undaunted by the decisions of the court a quo 1 and the Court of
Appeal, 2 Leouel persists in beseeching its application in his attempt to have his marriage with herein private
respondent, Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos ("Julia"), declared a nullity.
It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held the rank of First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, first met Julia. The
meeting later proved to be an eventful day for Leouel and Julia. On 20 September 1986, the two exchanged vows before
Municipal Trial Court Judge Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed, shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. Leouel
and Julia lived with the latter's parents at the J. Bedia Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July 1987, Julia gave birth to
a baby boy, and he was christened Leouel Santos, Jr. The ecstasy, however, did not last long. It was bound to happen,
Leouel averred, because of the frequent interference by Julia's parents into the young spouses family affairs.
Occasionally, the couple would also start a "quarrel" over a number of other things, like when and where the couple
should start living independently from Julia's parents or whenever Julia would express resentment on Leouel's spending
a few days with his own parents.
On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to work as a nurse despite Leouel's pleas to so
dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, or on 01 January 1989, Julia called up Leouel for the first time by long
distance telephone. She promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989. She never did. When
Leouel got a chance to visit the United States, where he underwent a training program under the auspices of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines from 01 April up to 25 August 1990, he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in touch
with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.
Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed with the regional trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch
30, a complaint for "Voiding of marriage Under Article 36 of the Family Code" (docketed, Civil Case No. 9814). Summons
was served by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in Negros Oriental.
On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer (through counsel), opposed the complaint and denied its allegations,
claiming, in main, that it was the petitioner who had, in fact, been irresponsible and incompetent.
62 | j o h a n
A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of nullity of their marriage was ruled out by the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor (in its report to the court).
On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences had repeatedly been set, albeit unsuccessfully, by the court, Julia
ultimately filed a manifestation, stating that she would neither appear nor submit evidence.
On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. 3
Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeal. The latter affirmed the decision of the trial court. 4
The petition should be denied not only because of its non-compliance with Circular 28-91, which requires a certification
of non-shopping, but also for its lack of merit.
Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to communicate with him, for more than five
years are circumstances that clearly show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life. In his own
words, Leouel asserts:
. . . (T)here is no leave, there is no affection for (him) because respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos
failed all these years to communicate with the petitioner. A wife who does not care to inform her husband
about her whereabouts for a period of five years, more or less, is psychologically incapacitated.
The family Code did not define the term "psychological incapacity." The deliberations during the sessions of the Family
Code Revision Committee, which has drafted the Code, can, however, provide an insight on the import of the provision.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 36. . . .
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the
sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack
of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.
On subparagraph (7), which as lifted from the Canon Law, Justice (Jose B.L.) Reyes suggested that they
say "wanting in sufficient use," but Justice (Eduardo) Caguioa preferred to say "wanting in the sufficient
use." On the other hand, Justice Reyes proposed that they say "wanting in sufficient reason." Justice
Caguioa, however, pointed out that the idea is that one is not lacking in judgment but that he is lacking in
the exercise of judgment. He added that lack of judgment would make the marriage voidable. Judge
(Alicia Sempio-) Diy remarked that lack of judgment is more serious than insufficient use of judgment
and yet the latter would make the marriage null and void and the former only voidable. Justice Caguioa
suggested that subparagraph (7) be modified to read:
"That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack of
incapacity is made manifest after the celebration."
63 | j o h a n
Justice Caguioa explained that the phrase "was wanting in sufficient use of reason of judgment to
understand the essential nature of marriage" refers to defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent,
which is not the idea in subparagraph (7), but lack of appreciation of one's marital obligations.
Judge Diy raised the question: Since "insanity" is also a psychological or mental incapacity, why is
"insanity" only a ground for annulment and not for declaration or nullity? In reply, Justice Caguioa
explained that in insanity, there is the appearance of consent, which is the reason why it is a ground for
voidable marriages, while subparagraph (7) does not refer to consent but to the very essence of marital
obligations.
Prof. (Araceli) Baviera suggested that, in subparagraph (7), the word "mentally" be deleted, with which
Justice Caguioa concurred. Judge Diy, however, prefers to retain the word "mentally."
Justice Caguioa remarked that subparagraph (7) refers to psychological impotence. Justice (Ricardo)
Puno stated that sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent with one but not with another.
Justice (Leonor Ines-) Luciano said that it is called selective impotency.
Dean (Fortunato) Gupit stated that the confusion lies in the fact that in inserting the Canon Law
annulment in the Family Code, the Committee used a language which describes a ground for voidable
marriages under the Civil Code. Justice Caguioa added that in Canon Law, there are voidable marriages
under the Canon Law, there are no voidable marriages Dean Gupit said that this is precisely the reason
why they should make a distinction.
Justice Puno remarked that in Canon Law, the defects in marriage cannot be cured.
Justice Reyes pointed out that the problem is: Why is "insanity" a ground for void ab initio marriages? In
reply, Justice Caguioa explained that insanity is curable and there are lucid intervals, while psychological
incapacity is not.
On another point, Justice Puno suggested that the phrase "even if such lack or incapacity is made
manifest" be modified to read "even if such lack or incapacity becomes manifest."
Justice Reyes remarked that in insanity, at the time of the marriage, it is not apparent.
Justice Caguioa stated that there are two interpretations of the phrase "psychological or mentally
incapacitated" in the first one, there is vitiation of consent because one does not know all the
consequences of the marriages, and if he had known these completely, he might not have consented to
the marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
Prof. Bautista stated that he is in favor of making psychological incapacity a ground for voidable
marriages since otherwise it will encourage one who really understood the consequences of marriage to
claim that he did not and to make excuses for invalidating the marriage by acting as if he did not
understand the obligations of marriage. Dean Gupit added that it is a loose way of providing for divorce.
xxx xxx xxx
64 | j o h a n
Justice Caguioa explained that his point is that in the case of incapacity by reason of defects in the
mental faculties, which is less than insanity, there is a defect in consent and, therefore, it is clear that it
should be a ground for voidable marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it is capable
of convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid intervals and there are cases when the insanity
is curable. He emphasized that psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has
nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
On psychological incapacity, Prof. (Flerida Ruth P.) Romero inquired if they do not consider it as going to
the very essence of consent. She asked if they are really removing it from consent. In reply, Justice
Caguioa explained that, ultimately, consent in general is effected but he stressed that his point is that it is
not principally a vitiation of consent since there is a valid consent. He objected to the lumping together of
the validity of the marriage celebration and the obligations attendant to marriage, which are completely
different from each other, because they require a different capacity, which is eighteen years of age, for
marriage but in contract, it is different. Justice Puno, however, felt that psychological incapacity is still a
kind of vice of consent and that it should not be classified as a voidable marriage which is incapable of
convalidation; it should be convalidated but there should be no prescription. In other words, as long as
the defect has not been cured, there is always a right to annul the marriage and if the defect has been
really cured, it should be a defense in the action for annulment so that when the action for annulment is
instituted, the issue can be raised that actually, although one might have been psychologically
incapacitated, at the time the action is brought, it is no longer true that he has no concept of the
consequence of marriage.
Prof. (Esteban) Bautista raised the question: Will not cohabitation be a defense? In response, Justice
Puno stated that even the bearing of children and cohabitation should not be a sign that psychological
incapacity has been cured.
Prof. Romero opined that psychological incapacity is still insanity of a lesser degree. Justice Luciano
suggested that they invite a psychiatrist, who is the expert on this matter. Justice Caguioa, however,
reiterated that psychological incapacity is not a defect in the mind but in the understanding of the
consequences of marriage, and therefore, a psychiatrist will not be a help.
Prof. Bautista stated that, in the same manner that there is a lucid interval in insanity, there are also
momentary periods when there is an understanding of the consequences of marriage. Justice Reyes and
Dean Gupit remarked that the ground of psychological incapacity will not apply if the marriage was
contracted at the time when there is understanding of the consequences of marriage. 5
xxx xxx xxx
Judge Diy proposed that they include physical incapacity to copulate among the grounds for void
marriages. Justice Reyes commented that in some instances the impotence that in some instances the
impotence is only temporary and only with respect to a particular person. Judge Diy stated that they can
specify that it is incurable. Justice Caguioa remarked that the term "incurable" has a different meaning in
law and in medicine. Judge Diy stated that "psychological incapacity" can also be cured. Justice
Caguioa, however, pointed out that "psychological incapacity" is incurable.
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Justice Puno observed that under the present draft provision, it is enough to show that at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, one was psychologically incapacitated so that later on if already he can
comply with the essential marital obligations, the marriage is still void ab initio. Justice Caguioa
explained that since in divorce, the psychological incapacity may occur after the marriage, in void
marriages, it has to be at the time of the celebration of marriage. He, however, stressed that the idea in
the provision is that at the time of the celebration of the marriage, one is psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations, which incapacity continues and later becomes manifest.
Justice Puno and Judge Diy, however, pointed out that it is possible that after the marriage, one's
psychological incapacity become manifest but later on he is cured. Justice Reyes and Justice Caguioa
opined that the remedy in this case is to allow him to remarry. 6
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Puno formulated the next Article as follows:
Art. 37. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated, to comply with the essential obligations of marriage shall
likewise be void from the beginning even if such incapacity becomes manifest after its
solemnization.
Justice Caguioa suggested that "even if" be substituted with "although." On the other hand, Prof.
Bautista proposed that the clause "although such incapacity becomes manifest after its solemnization"
be deleted since it may encourage one to create the manifestation of psychological incapacity. Justice
Caguioa pointed out that, as in other provisions, they cannot argue on the basis of abuse.
Judge Diy suggested that they also include mental and physical incapacities, which are lesser in degree
than psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa explained that mental and physical incapacities are vices
of consent while psychological incapacity is not a species of vice or consent.
Dean Gupit read what Bishop Cruz said on the matter in the minutes of their February 9, 1984 meeting:
"On the third ground, Bishop Cruz indicated that the phrase "psychological or mental
impotence" is an invention of some churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that
is why it is considered a weak phrase. He said that the Code of Canon Law would rather
express it as "psychological or mental incapacity to discharge . . ."
Justice Caguioa remarked that they deleted the word "mental" precisely to distinguish it from vice of
consent. He explained that "psychological incapacity" refers to lack of understanding of the essential
obligations of marriage.
Justice Puno reminded the members that, at the last meeting, they have decided not to go into the
classification of "psychological incapacity" because there was a lot of debate on it and that this is
precisely the reason why they classified it as a special case.
At this point, Justice Puno, remarked that, since there having been annulments of marriages arising from
psychological incapacity, Civil Law should not reconcile with Canon Law because it is a new ground
even under Canon Law.
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Prof. Romero raised the question: With this common provision in Civil Law and in Canon Law, are they
going to have a provision in the Family Code to the effect that marriages annulled or declared void by the
church on the ground of psychological incapacity is automatically annulled in Civil Law? The other
members replied negatively.
Justice Puno and Prof. Romero inquired if Article 37 should be retroactive or prospective in application.
Justice Diy opined that she was for its retroactivity because it is their answer to the problem of church
annulments of marriages, which are still valid under the Civil Law. On the other hand, Justice Reyes and
Justice Puno were concerned about the avalanche of cases.
Dean Gupit suggested that they put the issue to a vote, which the Committee approved.
The members voted as follows:
(1) Justice Reyes, Justice Puno and Prof. Romero were for prospectivity.
(2) Justice Caguioa, Judge Diy, Dean Gupit, Prof. Bautista and Director Eufemio were for retroactivity.
(3) Prof. Baviera abstained.
Justice Caguioa suggested that they put in the prescriptive period of ten years within which the action for
declaration of nullity of the marriage should be filed in court. The Committee approved the suggestion. 7
It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision Committee in ultimately deciding to adopt the provision with less
specificity than expected, has in fact, so designed the law as to allow some resiliency in its application. Mme. Justice
Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a member of the Code Committee, has been quoted by Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo in Salita
vs. Hon. Magtolis (G.R. No. 106429, 13 June 1994); thus: 8
The Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that the giving of
examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the
Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience,
the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals
which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was
taken from Canon Law.
A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, 9 which reads:
Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning essentila matrimonial rights and
duties, to be given and accepted mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
(Emphasis supplied.)
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Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all that persuasive for having no juridical or secular effect, the
jurisprudence under Canon Law prevailing at the time of the code's enactment, nevertheless, cannot be dismissed as
impertinent for its value as an aid, at least, to the interpretation or construction of the codal provision.
One author, Ladislas Orsy, S.J., in his treaties,
framed, states:
10
giving an account on how the third paragraph of Canon 1095 has been
The history of the drafting of this canon does not leave any doubt that the legislator intended, indeed, to
broaden the rule. A strict and narrow norm was proposed first:
Those who cannot assume the essential obligations of marriage because of a grave
psycho-sexual anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam psychosexualem) are unable to contract
marriage (cf. SCH/1975, canon 297, a new canon, novus);
then a broader one followed:
. . . because of a grave psychological anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam psychicam) . . . (cf. SCH/1980,
canon 1049);
then the same wording was retained in the text submitted to the pope (cf. SCH/1982, canon 1095, 3);
finally, a new version was promulgated:
because of causes of a psychological nature (ob causas naturae psychiae).
So the progress was from psycho-sexual to psychological anomaly, then the term anomaly was
altogether eliminated. it would be, however, incorrect to draw the conclusion that the cause of the
incapacity need not be some kind of psychological disorder; after all, normal and healthy person should
be able to assume the ordinary obligations of marriage.
Fr. Orsy concedes that the term "psychological incapacity" defies any precise definition since psychological causes can
be of an infinite variety.
In a book, entitled "Canons and Commentaries on Marriage," written by Ignatius Gramunt, Javier Hervada and LeRoy
Wauck, the following explanation appears:
This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of
marriage. Some psychosexual disorders and other disorders of personality can be the psychic cause of
this defect, which is here described in legal terms. This particular type of incapacity consists of a
realinability to render what is due by the contract. This could be compared to the incapacity of a farmer
to enter a binding contract to deliver the crops which he cannot possibly reap; (b) this inability to commit
oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and
love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring; (c) the inability must be
tantamount to a psychological abnormality. The mere difficulty of assuming these obligations, which
could be overcome by normal effort, obviously does not constitute incapacity. The canon contemplates a
true psychological disorder which incapacitates a person from giving what is due (cf. John Paul II,
Address to R. Rota, Feb. 5, 1987). However, if the marriage is to be declared invalid under this
incapacity, it must be proved not only that the person is afflicted by a psychological defect, but that the
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defect did in fact deprive the person, at the moment of giving consent, of the ability to assume the
essential duties of marriage and consequently of the possibility of being bound by these duties.
Justice Sempio-Diy 11 cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan
Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch 1), who opines that psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such
that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history
of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must
be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the deliberations of the
Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code
has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical
authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's "Void and
Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law," quoting from the Diagnostic Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's "Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases").
Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction with,
existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of
the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological
incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage. This pschologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations
with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to
the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind or
concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage
contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcholism, lesbianism or homosexuality
should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family
Code. These provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances
being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance that may have some bearing
on the degree, extent, and other conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and evaluated
so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists,
psychologists, and persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable.
Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We should continue to be reminded that innate in our society,
then enshrined in our Civil Code, and even now still indelible in Article 1 of the Family Code, is that
Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family
and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and
not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the
marriage within the limits provided by this Code. (Emphasis supplied.)
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Our Constitution is no less emphatic:

Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall
strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected
by the State. (Article XV, 1987 Constitution).
The above provisions express so well and so distinctly the basic nucleus of our laws on marriage and the family, and they
are doubt the tenets we still hold on to.
The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close to the standards required to decree a
nullity of marriage. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation.
Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the specific answers to every individual problem.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997

CHI MING TSOI, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents.
TORRES, JR., J.:

Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a marriage in its journey over troubled waters. Laws are
seemingly inadequate. Over time, much reliance has been placed in the works of the unseen hand of Him who created
all things.
Who is to blame when a marriage fails?
This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife against her uncaring husband in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City (Branch 89) which decreed the annulment of the marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner appealed the decision of the trial court to respondent Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 42758) which affirmed
the Trial Court's decision November 29, 1994 and correspondingly denied the motion for reconsideration in a resolution
dated February 14, 1995.
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The statement of the case and of the facts made by the trial court and reproduced by the Court of Appeals 1 its decision
are as follows:
From the evidence adduced, the following acts were preponderantly established:
Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at the Manila Cathedral, . . . Intramuros Manila,
as evidenced by their Marriage Contract. (Exh. "A")
After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at the South Villa, Makati, they went and proceeded
to the house of defendant's mother.
There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first night of their married life.
It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her expectations, that as newlyweds they were supposed to enjoy
making love, or having sexual intercourse, with each other, the defendant just went to bed, slept on one side
thereof, then turned his back and went to sleep . There was no sexual intercourse between them during the first
night. The same thing happened on the second, third and fourth nights.
In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can enjoy together during their first week as
husband and wife, they went to Baguio City. But, they did so together with her mother, an uncle, his mother and
his nephew. They were all invited by the defendant to join them. [T]hey stayed in Baguio City for four (4) days.
But, during this period, there was no sexual intercourse between them, since the defendant avoided her by
taking a long walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair located at the living room. They slept
together in the same room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989. But during this period,
there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. [S]he claims, that she did not: even see her husband's
private parts nor did he see hers.
Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag, a urologist at
the Chinese General Hospital, on January 20, 1989.
The results of their physical examinations were that she is healthy, normal and still a virgin, while that of her
husband's examination was kept confidential up to this time. While no medicine was prescribed for her, the
doctor prescribed medications for her husband which was also kept confidential. No treatment was given to her.
For her husband, he was asked by the doctor to return but he never did.
The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show his penis. She said,
that she had observed the defendant using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother.
And that, according to her, the defendant married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or maintain his residency
status here in the country and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man.
The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.
On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their marriage shall be annulled by reason of
psychological incapacity, the fault lies with his wife.
But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife annulled for several reasons, viz: (1) that he loves
her very much; (2) that he has no defect on his part and he is physically and psychologically capable; and, (3)
since the relationship is still very young and if there is any differences between the two of them, it can still be
71 | j o h a n
reconciled and that, according to him, if either one of them has some incapabilities, there is no certainty that this
will not be cured. He further claims, that if there is any defect, it can be cured by the intervention of medical
technology or science.
The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989,
there was no sexual contact between them. But, the reason for this, according to the defendant, was that
everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him and whenever he caresses
her private parts, she always removed his hands. The defendant claims, that he forced his wife to have sex with
him only once but he did not continue because she was shaking and she did not like it. So he stopped.
There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant , why the plaintiff filed this case against him, and these
are: (1) that she is afraid that she will be forced to return the pieces of jewelry of his mother, and, (2) that her
husband, the defendant, will consummate their marriage.
The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid because they are still very young and there is still a
chance to overcome their differences.
The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His penis was examined by Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr., for
the purpose of finding out whether he is impotent . As a result thereof, Dr. Alteza submitted his Doctor's Medical
Report. (Exh. "2"). It is stated there, that there is no evidence of impotency (Exh. "2-B"), and he is capable of
erection. (Exh. "2-C")
The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to find out whether or not he has an erection and he
found out that from the original size of two (2) inches, or five (5) centimeters, the penis of the defendant
lengthened by one (1) inch and one centimeter. Dr. Alteza said, that the defendant had only a soft erection which
is why his penis is not in its full length. But, still is capable of further erection, in that with his soft erection, the
defendant is capable of having sexual intercourse with a woman.
In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no collusion between the parties and that the
evidence is not fabricated." 2
After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as VOID the marriage entered into by the plaintiff with
the defendant on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Basilica of the Immaculate Conception, Intramuros,
Manila, before the Rt. Rev. Msgr. Melencio de Vera. Without costs. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the
Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City. Let another copy be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Manila.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred:
I
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in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there was no sexual intercourse between the parties without
making any findings of fact.
II
in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion with petitioner is a psychological
incapacity inasmuch as proof thereof is totally absent.
III
in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private respondent to have sex with each other
constitutes psychological incapacity of both.
IV
in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the parties decreed by the lower court without fully satisfying
itself that there was no collusion between them.
We find the petition to be bereft of merit.
Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-89-3141, private respondent has the burden of proving the
allegations in her complaint; that since there was no independent evidence to prove the alleged non-coitus between the
parties, there remains no other basis for the court's conclusion except the admission of petitioner; that public policy
should aid acts intended to validate marriage and should retard acts intended to invalidate them; that the conclusion
drawn by the trial court on the admissions and confessions of the parties in their pleadings and in the course of the trial is
misplaced since it could have been a product of collusion; and that in actions for annulment of marriage, the material
facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved. 3
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:
Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the
material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on
such pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation the material facts alleged in the
complaint shall always be proved.
The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the pleadings. What said provision seeks to prevent is annulment of
marriage without trial. The assailed decision was not based on such a judgment on the pleadings. When private
respondent testified under oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by oath before the trial court and was
cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in form of a testimony. After such evidence was
presented, it be came incumbent upon petitioner to present his side. He admitted that since their marriage on May 22,
1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual intercourse between them.
To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why, as stated by the petitioner, the Civil Code provides that no
judgment annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment (Arts. 88
and 101[par. 2]) and the Rules of Court prohibit such annulment without trial (Sec. 1, Rule 19).
The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not want their marriage to be annulled. This only shows that
there is no collusion between the parties. When petitioner admitted that he and his wife (private respondent) have never
73 | j o h a n
had sexual contact with each other, he must have been only telling the truth. We are reproducing the relevant portion of
the challenged resolution denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, penned with magisterial lucidity by Associate
Justice Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes, viz:
The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this Court is not based on a stipulation of facts. The issue
of whether or not the appellant is psychologically incapacitated to discharge a basic marital obligation was
resolved upon a review of both the documentary and testimonial evidence on record. Appellant admitted that he
did not have sexual relations with his wife after almost ten months of cohabitation, and it appears that he is not
suffering from any physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is
strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder which to the mind of this Court clearly demonstrates an 'utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage' within the meaning of Article 36 of the
Family Code (See Santos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995). 4
Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the
private respondent to have sex with each other constitutes psychological incapacity of both. He points out as error the
failure of the trial court to make "a categorical finding about the alleged psychological incapacity and an in-depth analysis
of the reasons for such refusal which may not be necessarily due to physchological disorders" because there might have
been other reasons, i.e., physical disorders, such as aches, pains or other discomforts, why private respondent
would not want to have sexual intercourse from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989, in a short span of 10 months.
First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent court made a finding on who between petitioner and
private respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the other. The fact remains, however, that there has never been
coitus between them. At any rate, since the action to declare the marriage void may be filed by either party, i.e., even the
psychologically incapacitated, the question of who refuses to have sex with the other becomes immaterial.
Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on record to show that any of the parties is suffering from
phychological incapacity. Petitioner also claims that he wanted to have sex with private respondent; that the reason for
private respondent's refusal may not be psychological but physical disorder as stated above.
We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could have discussed with private respondent or asked her what is
ailing her, and why she balks and avoids him everytime he wanted to have sexual intercourse with her. He never did. At
least, there is nothing in the record to show that he had tried to find out or discover what the problem with his wife could
be. What he presented in evidence is his doctor's Medical Report that there is no evidence of his impotency and he is
capable of erection. 5 Since it is petitioner's claim that the reason is not psychological but perhaps physical disorder on
the part of private respondent, it became incumbent upon him to prove such a claim.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage obligations,
and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological
incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of
psychological incapacity. 6
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate children based on the universal
principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage." Constant non- fulfillment of
this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and
protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
As aptly stated by the respondent court,
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An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the husband's plea that the wife did not want carnal
intercourse with him does not inspire belief. Since he was not physically impotent, but he refrained from sexual
intercourse during the entire time (from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989) that he occupied the same bed with his
wife, purely out of symphaty for her feelings, he deserves to be doubted for not having asserted his right seven
though she balked (Tompkins vs. Tompkins, 111 Atl. 599, cited in I Paras, Civil Code, at p. 330). Besides, if it
were true that it is the wife was suffering from incapacity, the fact that defendant did not go to court and seek the
declaration of nullity weakens his claim. This case was instituted by the wife whose normal expectations of her
marriage were frustrated by her husband's inadequacy. Considering the innate modesty of the Filipino woman, it
is hard to believe that she would expose her private life to public scrutiny and fabricate testimony against her
husband if it were not necessary to put her life in order and put to rest her marital status.
We are not impressed by defendant's claim that what the evidence proved is the unwillingness or lack of
intention to perform the sexual act, which is not phychological incapacity, and which can be achieved "through
proper motivation." After almost ten months of cohabitation, the admission that the husband is reluctant or
unwilling to perform the sexual act with his wife whom he professes to love very dearly, and who has not posed
any insurmountable resistance to his alleged approaches, is indicative of a hopeless situation, and of a serious
personality disorder that constitutes psychological incapacity to discharge the basic marital covenants within the
contemplation of the Family Code. 7
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the "spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and
wife and not any legal mandate or court order" (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is
shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say "I could not have
cared less." This is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural
order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in
the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family
relations.
It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private respondent. That is a shared feeling which
between husband and wife must be experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of
spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process. An expressive interest in each other's feelings at a time it is
needed by the other can go a long way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but for
two consenting adults who view the relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice and a continuing
commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves trapped in its mire of
unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the studied judgment of respondent
appellate court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES , the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 29, 1994 is
hereby AFFIRMED in all respects and the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
75 | j o h a n
G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in addition to those enumerated in the Civil
Code) to assail the validity of a marriage, namely, "psychological incapacity." Since the Code's effectivity, our
courts have been swamped with various petitions to declare marriages void based on this ground. Although this
Court had interpreted the meaning of psychological incapacity in the recent case ofSantos vs. Court of Appeals,
still many judges and lawyers find difficulty in applying said novel provision in specific cases. In the present
case and in the context of the herein assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, the Solicitor General has
labelled exaggerated to be sure but nonetheless expressive of his frustration Article 36 as the "most liberal
divorce procedure in the world." Hence, this Court in addition to resolving the present case, finds the need to
lay down specific guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the January 25, 1993 Decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals 2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the May 14, 1991 decision of the Regional Trial
Court of La Trinidad, 3 Benguet, which declared the marriage of respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo
Molina void ab initio, on the ground of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The Facts
This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent Roridel O. Molina of a verified
petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the petition alleged that Roridel
and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church 4 in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina
was born; that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a
husband and a father since he preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered
his money; that he depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard
to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them; that sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was
relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family; that in October
1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which their relationship was estranged; that in March
1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks
later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus shown
that he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital obligations and was a highly
immature and habitually quarrel some individual who thought of himself as a king to be served; and that it would
be to the couple's best interest to have their marriage declared null and void in order to free them from what
appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the start.
In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live together as
husband and wife, but contended that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's
strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of friends even after their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal
76 | j o h a n
to perform some of her marital duties such as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the household and
handle their finances.
During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:
1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at the Church of St. Augustine,
Manila;
2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina was born on July 29,
1986;
3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;
4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;
5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;
6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the petitioner wife.
Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that of her friends Rosemarie Ventura
and Maria Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a
psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. She also submitted documents marked as
Exhibits "A" to "E-1." Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial
conference.
On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The appeal of petitioner was
denied by the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence, the present recourse.
The Issue
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect
interpretation of the phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of the Family Code) and made
an incorrect application thereof to the facts of the case," adding that the appealed Decision tended "to establish
in effect the most liberal divorce procedure in the world which is anathema to our culture."
In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court relied 5 heavily on the trial court's findings "that
the marriage between the parties broke up because of their opposing and conflicting personalities." Then, it
added it sown opinion that "the Civil Code Revision Committee (hereinafter referred to as Committee) intended
to liberalize the application of our civil laws on personal and family rights. . . ." It concluded that:
As ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychologically incapacity as a broad range of
mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards the
marital union, his or her personal relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her
conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the principal objectives of marriage. If said
conduct, observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to self-destruct because
it defeats the very objectives of marriage, then there is enough reason to leave the spouses to
their individual fates.
77 | j o h a n
In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no indiscretion in analyzing and
deciding the instant case, as it did, hence, We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and
conclusions thus made.
Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court of Appeals.
The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to
psychological incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage
of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their psychological nature which renders them incapable of
performing such marital responsibilities and duties."
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals 6 this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that
"psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and that (t)here is
hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to
the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the
Catholic Archdiocese of Manila, 7 Justice Vitug wrote that "the psychological incapacity must be characterized
by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of
is an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the
performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting
personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to
meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to
be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor physical) illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could nor get along with each
other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its
incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility,
not psychological incapacity. Dr. Sison testified: 8
COURT
Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on your findings
that it is better for the Court to annul (sic) the marriage?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q There is no hope for the marriage?
A There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.
78 | j o h a n
Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are psychologically unfit
for each other but they are psychologically fit with other parties?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?
A Yes, Your Honor.
The Court has no more questions.
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were constitutive of
psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration. While some effort was made to prove that
there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on Reynaldo's part of
being "conservative, homely and intelligent" on the part of Roridel, such failure of expectation is nor indicative
of antecedent psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows love's temporary blindness to the faults and
blemishes of the beloved.
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the facts of this case vis-a-visexisting
law and jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code and the difficulty experienced by
many trial courts interpreting and applying it, the Court decided to invite two amici curiae, namely, the Most
Reverend Oscar V. Cruz, 9 Vicar Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C. Puno, 10 a member of the Family Code Revision
Committee. The Court takes this occasion to thank these friends of the Court for their informative and
interesting discussions during the oral argument on December 3, 1996, which they followed up with written
memoranda.
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved
in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted
in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus,
our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, 11 recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It
decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both
the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes the permanence,
inviolability and solidarity
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical. although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally
or physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be
given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle ofejusdem
79 | j o h a n
generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating
nature explained. Expert evidence may be given qualified psychiatrist and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence
must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the
illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability
may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone
of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not
necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a
pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may
not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation
of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability,
nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and
their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence
and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines,
while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken
by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became
effective in 1983 and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature. 14
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the
religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight
should be given to decision of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidence what is
decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision,
contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church
while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other shall walk together in synodal cadence
towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel
for the state. No decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be
80 | j o h a n
quoted in the decision, briefly staring therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be,
to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The
Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculicontemplated under Canon 1095.
In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to grant the petition. Such ruling
becomes even more cogent with the use of the foregoing guidelines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage of
Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Regalado, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concurs in the result.
81 | j o h a n

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FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001]

G.R. No. 103047 September 2, 1994

March 14, 2000

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989

G.R. No. 154380

CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III,

Brief Historical Background

On September 28, 1987, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. [31]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

G.R. No. 152577

The ground bearing defendants psychological incapacity deserves a reasonable consideration.

Article 26 of the Family Code provides:

WHERE A MARRIAGE BETWEEN A FILIPINO CITIZEN AND A FOREIGNER

The psychological incapacity must be characterized by

According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines

Sec. 20. Appeal.

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 179620

THE HON. REGIONAL TRIAL

COURT OF LAS PIAS CITY,

August 26, 2008

REYES, R.T., J.:

WHEREFORE, premised on the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:

Pursuant to the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC:

Upon compliance, a decree of nullity of marriage shall be issued.

SO ORDERED.[24] (Emphasis supplied)

x x x a careful evaluation and in-depth analysis of the surrounding circumstances of the

On July 31, 2007, the CA denied the petition, disposing as follows:

In Apex Mining, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[48] this Court explained thus:

Indeed, mere allegations of conflicting personalities, irreconcilable differences, incessant quarrels

Article 96 of the Family Code, on regimes of absolute community property, provides:

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995

Our Constitution is no less emphatic:

G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997

TORRES, JR., J.:

G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997

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