1. Edwin A. Acebedo vs. Eddie P.

Arquero (Article 1- Definition of

Marriage)
Nature: Administrative Case
Facts: Edwin Acebedo accused Eddie P. Arquero, Process Server of Brookes
Point Municipal Trial Court (MTC) for immorality alleging that the respondent
and his wife, Dedje Irader Acebedo, a former stenographer of the Brookes
Point MTC unlawfully and scandalously cohabited as husband and wife.
Arquero claimed that the illicit relationship between him and the petitioners
wife can be explained by the notarized written agreement of the petitioner
and his wife stating that they would sever their marriage ties and allow
themselves to live with other possible partner and that no one would go to
court to institute any action against the other.
Issue: Whether or not the Kasunduan is enough ground to sever the
marriage tie.
Ruling: SC ruled that respondents justification fails, being an employee of
the judiciary, respondent ought to have known that the Kasunduan had
absolutely no force and effect on the validity of the marriage between
complainant and his wife. Art 1 of the family code provides that marriage is
an inviolable social institution whose nature and consequences, and
incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation. It is an
institution of public order and policy, governed by rules established by law
which cannot be made inoperative by stipulation of the parties. Respondent
is suspended for 6 months.
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2. Filipina Sy vs. CA, RTC of San Fernando Pampanga and Fernando
Sy
Nature: Petition for Review on Decision of CA (affirmed RTC in denying for the
declaration of nullity of the marriage)
Facts: Petitioner Filipina Y. Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy contracted
marriage on November 15, 1973 at the Church of Our Lady of Lourdes in
Quezon City. Both were then 22 years old.
Their union was blessed with two children. On February 11, 1987, Filipina
filed a petition for legal separation, before the Regional Trial Court of San
Fernando, Pampanga. Later, upon motion of petitioner, the action was later
amended to a petition for separation of property on the grounds that her
husband abandoned her without just cause; that they have been living
separately for more than one year.
In May 1988, Filipina filed a criminal action for attempted parricide against
her husband, before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Filipina testified that
one afternoon, she went to the dental clinic at Tondo, Manila, owned by her
husband but operated by his mistress, to fetch her son and bring him to San
Fernando, Pampanga. While she was talking to her son, the boy ignored her
and continued playing with the family computer. Filipina got mad, took the
computer away from her son, and started spanking him.

At that instance, Fernando pulled Filipina away from their son, and punched
her in the different parts of her body. Filipina also claimed that her husband
started choking her when she fell on the floor, and released her only when he
thought she was dead. Filipina suffered from hematoma and contusions on
different parts of her body as a result of the blows inflicted by her husband
The Regional Trial Court of Manila, however, in its decision convicted
Fernando only of the lesser crime of slight physical injuries.
Petitioner later filed a new action for legal separation against private
respondent, docketed as on the following grounds: (1) repeated physical
violence; (2) sexual infidelity; (3) attempt by respondent against her life; and
(4) abandonment of her by her husband without justifiable cause for more
than one year. The Regional Trial Court granted the petition on the grounds
of repeated physical violence and sexual infidelity, and issued a decree of
legal separation.
On August 4, 1992, Filipina filed a petition for the declaration of absolute
nullity of her marriage to Fernando on the ground of psychological incapacity.
She points out that the final judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court in
her favor, in her petitions for separation of property and legal separation,
and Fernando's infliction of physical violence on her which led to the
conviction of her husband for slight physical injuries are symptoms of
psychological incapacity.
She also cites as manifestations of her husband's psychological incapacity
the following: (1) habitual alcoholism; (2) refusal to live with her without fault
on her part, choosing to live with his mistress instead; and (3) refusal to have
sex with her, performing the marital act only to satisfy himself. Moreover,
Filipina alleges that such psychological incapacity of her husband existed
from the time of the celebration of their marriage and became manifest
thereafter.
RTC and CA denied the declaration for nullity of the marriage of Filipina and
Fernando based on latters allegedly psychological incapacity. However, upon
this petition, Filipina Yap-Sy contended that the lower courts overlooked the
dates of their marriage ceremony and the issuance of a marriage license.
Issue: W/N marriage was valid due to absence of marriage license?
Ruling: Petitioner states that though she did not categorically state in her
petition for annulment of marriage before the trial court that the incongruity
in the dates of the marriage license and the celebration of the marriage itself
would lead to the conclusion that her marriage to Fernando was void from
the beginning, she points out that these critical dates were contained in the
documents she submitted before the court.
The date of issue of the marriage license and marriage certificate,
September 17, 1974, is contained in their marriage contract in her petition
for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court. The date
of celebration of their marriage at Our Lady of Lourdes, Sta. Teresita Parish,
on November 15, 1973, is admitted both by petitioner and private
respondent, as stated in paragraph three of petitioner's petition for the

declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court, and private
respondent's answer admitting it. This fact was also affirmed by petitioner, in
open court, on January 22, 1993, during her direct examination.
Carefully reviewing the documents and the pleadings on record, we find that
indeed petitioner did not expressly state in her petition before the trial court
that there was incongruity between the date of the actual celebration of their
marriage and the date of the issuance of their marriage license. From the
documents she presented, the marriage license was issued on September
17, 1974, almost one year after the ceremony took place on November 15,
1973. The ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage was indeed contracted
without a marriage license.
These pieces of evidence on record plainly and indubitably show that on the
day of the marriage ceremony, there was no marriage license. A marriage
license is a formal requirement; its absence renders the marriage void ab
initio. In addition, the marriage contract shows that the marriage license,
numbered 6237519, was issued in Carmona, Cavite, yet, neither petitioner
nor private respondent ever resided in Carmona.
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3. Alcantara vs Alcantara (August 28, 2007)
The case is a petition for review filed by the petitioner assailing the decision
of the Court of Appeals denying the petitioners appeal and affirming the
decision of the RTC Makati City dismissing his petition for annulment of
marriage.
Facts: On Decemer 8, 1982, Rosita Alcantara (respondent) and Restituto
Alcantara (petitioner) went to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking
for a person who could arrange a marriage for them. They met a person
fixer who arranged their wedding before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a
minister of the Gospel of the CDCC BR Chapel. The marriage was likewise
celebrated without the parties securing a marriage license. The wedding took
place at the staris in Manila City Hall and not in the CDCC BR chapel.
However, there was a marriage license obtained in Carmona, Cavite but
neither of the parties is a resident of Carmona, Cavite and they never went
to the said place to apply for a licence with its local civil registrar. Petitioner
and respondent went through another marriage ceremony at the San Jose de
Manuguit Church in Tondo, Manila on March 26, 1983 utilizing the same
marriage license. The marriage license number 7054133 is not identical
with the marriage license number appearing in the contract.
Issues: Whether or not the marriage is void when there was no marriage
license at the precise moment of solemnization of the marriage, when
marriage license was issued at a place where neither of the parties were
resident, when there was a discrepancy on the marriage license number in
the marriage contract.
Ruling: The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of
Family Code, would apply the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the

time of its celebration. A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage

under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence of which renders the marriage
void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to Article 53 of the same
Code. The law requires that absence of such marriage license must be
apparent on the marriage contract or at the very least, supported by a
certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was
issued to the parties. In the case at bar, the marriage contract reflects the
marriage license number. Moreover, the certification issued by the local civil
registrar specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage license was
issued further validating the fact that a license was issued to the parties
herein. Issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality, not the
residence of either of the contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage
license despite the absence of publication or prior to the completion of the
10-day period for publication are considered mere irregularities that do
not affect the validity of the marriage. The court still holds that there is
no sufficient basis to annul their marriage. An irregularity in any of the formal
requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the parties/ party
responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally, administratively liable.
The discrepancy between the marriage license number in the certification of
the Municipal civil registrar, which states that the marriage license number
issued to the parties is No. 7054133, while the contract states that the
marriage license is number 7054033. It is not impossible to assume that the
same is a mere typographical error. It therefore does not detract from our
conclusion regarding the existence and issuance of said marriage license to
the parties. The authority of the solemnizing officer shown to have performed
a marriage ceremony will be presumed in the absence of any showing to the
contrary. The solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to investigate whether or
not a marriage license has been duly and regularly issued by the local civil
registrar. All the said officer needs to know is that the license has been duly
and regularly issued by the competent official. Lastly, the church ceremony
was confirmatory of their civil marriage, thereby cleansing whatever
irregularities or defect attended the civil wedding. Instant petition denied of
lack of merit and the decision of the CA affirmed the decision of RTC Makati
City.
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4. ranes vs. Judge Salavador M. Occiano
Nature: Administrative Complaint
Facts: Petitioner Mercedita Mata Araes charges respondent judge,
presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur, with
Gross Ignorance of the Law for solemnizing her marriage to her late groom
Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage license and at
Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial jurisdiction.
The judge executed the solemnization of the marriage out of compassion,
according to the judge that he agreed to solemnize the marriage in his sala
at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. However, Arroyo
informed him that Orobia had a difficulty walking and could not
stand the rigors of travelling to Balatan which is located almost 25
kilometers from his residence in Nabua.

Arroyo then requested if respondent judge could solemnize the marriage in

Nabua, to which request he acceded. Thereafter he carefully examined
the documents submitted to him by petitioner. When he discovered
that the parties did not possess the requisite marriage license, he
refused to solemnize the marriage and suggested its resetting to
another date. However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of
visitors, and the delivery of provisions for the occasion, he proceeded to
solemnize the marriage out of human compassion. He also feared that if he
reset the wedding, it might aggravate the physical condition of Orobia who
just suffered from a stroke. After the solemnization, he reiterated the
necessity for the marriage license and admonished the parties that their
failure to give it would render the marriage void. Petitioner and Orobia
assured respondent judge that they would give the license to him in
the afternoon of that same day. When they failed to comply, respondent
judge followed it up with Arroyo but the latter only gave him the same
reassurance that the marriage license would be delivered to his sala at the
Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur.
Issue: Whether or not the marriage is valid?
Ruling: The territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the
municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage
of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law
and subjects him to administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross
ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human
compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on
marriage.
Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without
the requisite marriage license. The court also said that a marriage which
preceded the issuance of the marriage license is void, and that the
subsequent issuance of such license cannot render valid or even add an iota
of validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage
license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a
marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he
solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this respect, respondent judge
acted in gross ignorance of the law.
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5. San Gabriel vs San Gabriel
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6. Herminia Borja-Manzano vs. Judge Roque Sanchez, MRC, Infanta,
Pangasinan
Nature: Administrative Complaint against Judge Sanchez for Gross
Ignorance of Law
Facts: Herminia Manzano avers that she was the lawful wife of the late
David Manzano, having been married to him on May 21, 1966 in Caloocan
City. Four children were born out of that marriage. On March 22, 1993, her
husband contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before
respondent Judge. When respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he

knew or ought to know that the same was void and bigamous, as the
marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were
"separated." Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment
that when he officiated the marriage between Manzano and Payao he did not
know that Manzano was legally married. What he knew was that the two had
been living together as husband and wife for seven years already without the
benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit. According to him,
had he known that the late Manzano was married, he would have advised the
latter not to marry again; otherwise, he (Manzano) could be charged with
bigamy. He then prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and
for being designed merely to harass him.
For his part, respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his plea for
the dismissal of the complaint and setting aside his earlier Comment. He
therein invites the attention of the Court to two separate affidavits of the late
Manzano and of Payao, which were allegedly unearthed by a member of his
staff upon his instruction. In those affidavits, both David Manzano and
Luzviminda Payao expressly stated that they were married to Herminia Borja
and Domingo Relos, respectively; and that since their respective marriages
had been marked by constant quarrels, they had both left their families and
had never cohabited or communicated with their spouses anymore.
Respondent Judge alleges that on the basis of those affidavits, he agreed to
solemnize the marriage in question in accordance with Article 34 of the
Family Code.
Issue: Whether the subsequent marriage of the deceased husband is valid?
Whether the Judge can be charged of Gross Ignorance of Law?
Ruling: No. The subsequent marriage of the late David Manzano
with Luzviminda Payao is null and void, because, even though the two
cohabited for seven years, still both of them had legal impediments to be
married again because of their previous valid marriages. Not all of the
requirements of Article 34 (Provision on Legal Ratification of Marital
Cohabitation) are present in the case at bar. It is significant to note that in
the affidavits of David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao before respondent
Judge himself, expressly stated the fact of their prior existing marriage.
Yes. Judge Sanchez is guilty of Gross Ignorance of Law. Respondent
Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a
diriment impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and
void
Note: Article 34 of the Family Code:
For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the
following requisites must concur:
1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife
for at least five years before the marriage;
2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;
3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be
present at the time of marriage;

4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together
for at least five years [and are without legal impediment to marry each
other]; and
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had
ascertained the qualifications of the parties and that he had found no legal
impediment to their marriage
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7. Case: Nial vs. Bayadog (328 SCRA 122)
Facts: Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26,
1974. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners. Pepito resulting to
her death on April 24, 1985 shot Teodulfa. One year and 8 months thereafter
or on December 24, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Bayadog got
married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma
executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived
together as husband and wife for at least 5 years and were thus exempt from
securing a marriage license. After Pepitos death on February 19, 1997,
petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito
and Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage
license.
Issue: What nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the
Civil Code (now Article 34 of the Family Code) to warrant the counting of the
5-year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a
marriage license.
Ruling: The 5-year common law cohabitation period, which is counted back
from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union
had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be
the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a
period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity-meaning no third party
was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity is unbroken. Any
marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall
be illegal and void, subject only to the exception in cases of absence or
where the prior marriage was dissolved or annulled.
In this case, at the time Pepito and respondents marriage, it cannot be said
that they have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least 5 years
prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepitos first marriage was
dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about 20 months
had elapsed. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started
cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each
other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse.
The subsistence of the marriage even where there is was actual severance of
the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation
by either spouse with any third party as being one as husband and wife.

Having determined that the second marriage involve in this case is not
covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void
ab initio because of the absence of such element.
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8. Republic vs. Dayot, GR No. 175581, March 28, 2008
Facts: Jose and Felisa Dayot were married at the Pasay City Hall on
November 24, 1986. In lieu of a marriage license, they executed a sworn
affidavit that they had lived together for at least 5years. On August 1990,
Jose contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual. They were both
employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating Board. Felisa then
filed on June 1993 an action for bigamy against Jose and an administrative
complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman. On the other hand, Jose filed a
complaint on July 1993 for annulment and/or declaration of nullity of
marriage where he contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham and
his consent was secured through fraud.
Issue: Whether or not Joses marriage with Felisa is valid considering that
they executed a sworn affidavit in lieu of the marriage license requirement.
Ruling: CA indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived
together for five years at the time they executed their sworn affidavit and
contracted marriage. Jose and Felisa started living together only in June
1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their marriage on
November 1986. Findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding in the
Supreme Court.
The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of
the law and invalidates a marriage. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation
in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisas cohabitation,
which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the
requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers
to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and
attested to by the parties under oath. Hence, Jose and Felisas marriage is
void ab initio. The court also ruled that an action for nullity of marriage is
imprescriptible. The right to impugn marriage does not prescribe and may
be raised any time.
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Facts: Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the
house of Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran City, for a period of four years. After
school year, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with each other. In
1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from
Singapore. The former replied and after an exchange of letters, they became
sweethearts. In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for
Canada to work there. While in Canada, they maintained constant
communication. In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to

petition appellant to join her in Canada. Both agreed to get married. Lucia
reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind.
On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court a petition for divorce
against appellant which was granted by the court. Appellant Lucio Morigo
married Maria Jececha Lumbago at Tagbilaran City. Lucio filed a complaint for
judicial declaration of nullity of marriage in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol.
The complaint seeks among others, the declaration of nullity of Lucios
marriage with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took
place. Appellant was charged with Bigamy in information filed by the City
Prosecutor of Tagbilaran City, with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol.

affair of the couple and was duly registered in the local civil registry. A
certain Pacita Noel came to be their match-maker and go-between who had
an amorous relationship with Tenchavez as written by a San Carlos college
student where she and Vicenta are studying. Vicenta and Pastor are
supposed to renew their vows/ marriage in a church as suggested by
Vicentas parents. However after translating the said letter to Vicentas dad ,
he disagreed for a new marriage. Vicenta continued leaving with her parents
in Cebu while Pastor went back to work in Manila.

Lucio Morigo moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that
the civil case for judicial nullification of his marriage with Lucia posed a
prejudicial question in the bigamy case. His motion was granted, but
subsequently denied upon motion for reconsideration by the prosecution.
When arraigned in the bigamy case, Lucio pleaded not guilty to the charge.

Vicenta applied for a passport indicating that she was single and when it was
approved she left for the United States and filed a complaint for divorce
against Pastor which was later on approved and issued by the Second Judicial
Court of the State of Nevada. She then sought for the annulment of her
marriage to the Archbishop of Cebu. Vicenta married Russell Leo Moran, an
American, in Nevada and has begotten children. She acquired citizenship on
August 8, 1958. Petitioner filed a complaint against Vicenta and her parents
whom he alleged to have dissuaded Vicenta from joining her husband.

Issue: Whether or not Lucio Morigo committed bigamy even with his defense
of good faith.

ISSUE: Whether the divorce sought by Vicenta Escano is valid and binding
upon courts of the Philippines.

Ruling: A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary

before a subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a
subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty
of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by
statutes as "void."

Ruling: Civil Code of the Philippines does not admit divorce. Philippine
courts cannot give recognition on foreign decrees of absolute divorce
between Filipino citizens because it would be a violation of the Civil Code.
Such grant would arise to discrimination in favor of rich citizens who can
afford divorce in foreign countries. The adulterous relationship of Escano
with her American husband is enough grounds for the legal separation
prayed by Tenchavez. In the eyes of Philippine laws, Tenchavez and Escano
are still married. A foreign divorce between Filipinos sought and decreed is
not entitled to recognition neither is the marriage of the divorcee entitled to
validity in the Philippines. Thus, the desertion and securing of an invalid
divorce decree by one spouse entitled the other for damages.

In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by

a duly authorized solemnizing officer. Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete merely
signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a
marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs
no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be
deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which Lucio might be
held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity
before he contracts a subsequent marriage.
The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a
penal statute in favor of an accused and weigh every circumstance in favor
of the presumption of innocence to ensure that justice is done. Under the
circumstances of the present case, Supreme Court held that petitioner has
not committed bigamy and that it need not tarry on the issue of the validity
of his defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent, which is now moot and
academic.
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10. Tenchavez vs. Escano,15 SCRA 355
FACTS: 27 years old Vicenta Escano who belong to a prominent Filipino
Family of Spanish ancestry got married on Feburary 24, 1948 with Pastor
Tenchavez, 32 years old engineer, and ex-army officer before Catholic
chaplain Lt. Moises Lavares. The marriage was a culmination of the love

WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;

(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of
legal separation from defendant Vicenta F. Escao;
(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escao to pay plaintiff-appellant
Tenchavez the amount of P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees;
(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto
Escao and the estate of his wife, the deceased Mena Escao, P5,000 by way
of damages and attorneys' fees.
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11. Republic vs. Orbecido, 472 SCRA 114
Facts: On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III and Lady Myros Villanueva
were married in Lam-an, Ozamis City and were blessed with a son and a
daughter. In 1986, Lady Myros left for the U. S. bringing along their son and
after a few years she was naturalized as an American citizen. Sometime in
2000, respondent Orbecido learned from his son who was living with his
wife in the States that his wife had remarried after obtaining her divorce

decree. Thereafter, he filed a petition for authority to remarry with the trial
court invoking par. 2 of Art. 26 of the Family Code. Having no opposition, on
May 15, 2002, the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Sur granted the
petition of the respondent and allowed him to remarry. The Solicitor
Generals motion for reconsideration was denied. In view of that, petitioner
filed this petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court. Herein petitioner raised the issue of the applicability of Art. 26 par. 2
to the instant case.
Issue: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26(2).
Ruling: Article 26 par. 2 of the Family Code only applies to case where at the
time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner. The instant case is one where at the time the marriage was
solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was
naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce
granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American
citizen while residing in the U. S. A. Therefore, the 2nd par. of Art. 26 does
not apply to the instant case.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American citizen,
there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and
Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently
obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin
requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in
this case. Thus Cipriano, the divorced Filipino spouse, should be allowed to
remarry.
However, since Cipriano was not able to prove as fact his wifes
naturalization he is still barred from remarrying.
Respondent Orbecido who has the burden of proof, failed to submit
competent evidence showing his allegations that his naturalized American
wife had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried
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12. San Luis vs San Luis

Facts: During his lifetime, Felicisimo (Rodolfos dad) contracted three

marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of
which were born six children. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased
Felicisimo.

Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with
whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an
American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce before the Family Court of the
First Circuit, State of Hawaii, which issued a Decree Granting Absolute
Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973. On June 20,
1974, Felicisimo married Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos. He
had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time
of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992. Upon death of his
dad Rodolfo sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and
the settlement of Felicisimos estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a
petition for letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City. Rodolfo claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the
petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the
time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee. Felicidad presented
the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit,
State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had
already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal
capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2 Article 26 of the Family Code.

Rodolfo asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be

given retroactive effect to validate respondents bigamous marriage with
Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in derogation of Article
256.

Issue: Whether or not Felicidads marriage to Felicisimo is bigamous.

Ruling: The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which

absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with
the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimos surviving
spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to
prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the
marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia
v. Recio, the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving
foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the
divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due
execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a
writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign

country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by

the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in
the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued
by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.
With regard to respondents marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in
California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and
the annotated text of the Family Law Act of California which purportedly
show that their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As stated
in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as
they must be alleged and proved.

The case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of
evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of
respondent and Felicisimo.
_____________________________________________________________________________

13. Ilusorio vs. Bildner

Facts: Potenciano Ilusorio a lawyer and a rich business man is married to
Erlinda Kalaw and had 6 children. Upon his arrival from the US the stayed in
Antipolo with Erlinda for 5 months. Their children alleged that their mother
overdosed him as a result of his deteriorating health. Erlinda filed a petition
for guardianship over the properties due to his health problems and
advanced age. After attending a meeting in Baguio city he did not return to
their house in Antipolo but instead lived in Makati. Erlinda filed a petition for
habeas corpus to have custody of her husband and visitation rights. CA
granted the petition for humanitarian reasons. SC reversed the CAs decision
Issue: w/n the CA erred in granting the petition for habeas corpus
Ruling: Writ of habeas corpus should not be issued

No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live

with his wife

Evidence show that there was no actual and effective detention or

deprivation of Ilusorio that would justify the issuance of the writ

Even though he is in medication- does not render him mentally

incapacitated

Ilusorio was in sound and alert mind and can still make his own choices

_____________________________________________________________________________

14. Corpuz vs Sto. Thomas, G.R. No. 186571

Facts: Gerbert Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian
citizenship through naturalization on Nov. 2000. On, Jan. 18 2005, he married
a Filipina named Daisylyn Sto. Tomas. Due to work and other professional
commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after their wedding. He returned
to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise her wife but was
shocked to discover that Daisylyn was having an affair with another man.
Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert went back to Canada and filed a petition for
divorce and was granted.
Two years after, Gerbert fell in love with another Filipina. In his desire to
marry his new Filipina fiance, Gerbert went to Pasig City Civil Registry Office
and registered the Canadian divorce decree on their marriage certificate.
Despite its registration, an NSO official informed Gerbert that their marriage
still exists under Philippine Law; and to be enforceable, the foreign divorce
decree must be judicially recognized by a Philippine court.
Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or
declaration of marriage as dissolved, with the RTC. Daisylyn offered no
opposition and requested for the same prayer.
RTC denied Gerberts petition contending that Art. 26 (2) applies only to
Filipinos and not to aliens. Gerbert appealed by certiorari to the Supreme
Court under Rule 45.
Issue: Whether the registration of the foreign divorce decree was properly
made.
Ruling: Supreme Court held in the negative. Article 412 of the Civil Code
declares that no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected,
without judicial order. The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the
Civil Code by specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by
which entries in the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural
requirements that must be complied with before a judgment, authorizing the
cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil registry.
_____________________________________________________________________________

15. Tongol vs. Tongol, 537 SCRA 135

Facts: On August 19, 1996, Orlando filed before the RTC of Makati City a
verified petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Filipinas on
the ground that the latter is psychologically incapacitated to comply with her
essential marital obligations. Orlando Tongol alleged that Filipinas was unable
to perform her duty as a wife because of Filipinas unbearable attitude that

will lead to their constant quarrel. In her Answer with Counter-Petition,

Filipinas admitted that efforts at reconciliation have been fruitless and that
their marriage is a failure. However, she claims that their marriage failed
because it is Orlandos insufficiency to fulfil his obligation as married man.
Both parties underwent a psychological examwhich proved that the
respondent Filipinas Tongol has a psychological insufficiency.
Issues: Does the psychological problem of Mrs. Filipina Tongolenough to
compel the court to nullify their marriage?
Ruling: No, as elucidated in Molina the psychological incapacity must exist
during the ceremony of the marriage, the psychological incapacity must be
apparent as to the extent that the other party is incapable the significance of
their marriage and lastly, the malady must be incurable. The definition or
manifestation of marriage must within the scope of article 36 of the Family
Code. As in the present case, the psychological insufficiency of Mrs tongol is
not severe that would render her incapable of recognize the sanctity of her
marital contract with her husband, second, Dr. vellegas failed to prove the
that the ailment is incurable. As to the facts of the psychological examination
report say: the emotional malady is accused merely by rejection of Mrs.
Tongol by her mother when she was young. Further, the facts of the case did
not show that Mrs. Tongol did not care about the welfare of their children.
And the financial issue as being cited in the facts, the court deemed that
such phenomena is natural in every marriage and can be settled easily.
Hence the court dismissed the petition of the nullity of marriage.
_____________________________________________________________________________

16. Carating-Siayngco vs Siayngco

Facts: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of
Appeals.
Juanita Carating Siayngco was married to Manuel Siayngco. Their
marriage did not produce children however, the adopted a boy. Manuel, after
being married for 24 years filed a petition to the court seeking the
nullification of their marriage by reason of psychological incapacity exhibited
through over domineering attitude and causing him embarrassment and
humiliation. The lower court denied his petition. The CA on the other hand
reversed the decision relying on the doctors findings that bith parties are
psychologically incapacitated.
Issue: Whether or not one or both of the parties were proven psychologically
incapacitated sufficient to warrant the nullification of their marriage.
Ruling: The court ruled in the negative. Manuels relationship with another
was caused merely by his sexual infidelity which does not fall within the
purview of psychological incapacity. This act is caused by his desire to have
children which he himself admitted. The testimonies of the doctor failed to

show that this infidelity is caused by a psychological illness or disorder. It is

necessary that it his by reason of a psychological disorder that he will be
completely unable to perform his marital obligations.
With regard to Juanita, Manuel failed to show that her actions
constitute psychological incapacity that would render her unable to perform
her marital obligations and that a doctor has in fact stated otherwise. The
evidence adduced failed to show sufficiently that the couple or either of the
spouse were psychologically incapacitated, rather it showed that they were
merely having the marital trouble of becoming strangers to each other and
wanting to get out of it. The marriage thus cannot be declared null and void.

_____________________________________________________________________________

17. Ferraris vs Ferraris, 495 SCRA 396

Facts: On February 20, 2001, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch
151 rendered a decision denying the petition for declaration of nullity of
petitioners marriage with Brix Ferraris. The trial court noted that suffering
from epilepsy does not amount to psychological incapacity under Article 36
of the Civil Code and the evidence on record was insufficient to prove
infidelity. On April 20, 2001, petitioners motion for reconsideration was
denied, the trial court reiterated that there was no evidence that respondent
is mentally or physically to such an extent that he could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed in toto the judgment of the trial court. On June 9, 2004, Court of
Appeals resolves the motion of reconsideration filed by petitioner Ma. Armida
Perez-Ferraris, denying the petition for review on certiorari of the Decision
and Resolution of the said court dated April 30, 2003 and February 24, 2004,
respectively for failure of the petitioner to sufficiently show that the Court of
Appeals committed any reversible error.
Issue: Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling
for annulment of marriage will render the judgment in favor to the
petitioner?
Ruling: The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the
marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is
about to assume. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law
has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter

insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. It

is for this reason that the Court relies heavily on psychological experts for its
understanding of the human personality.

the ground of psychological incapacity. Summons was effected by publication

in the Pilipino Star Ngayon, a newspaper of general circulation in the country
considering that Sharon did not reside and could not be found in the
Philippines.

The respondents alleged mixed personality disorder, the "leaving-the-house"

attitude whenever they quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic
attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and his
preference to spend more time with his band mates than his family, are not
rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or
unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage. While
petitioners marriage with the respondent failed and appears to be without
hope of reconciliation, the remedy however is not always to have it declared
void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity. An unsatisfactory
marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage. No less than the
Constitution recognizes the sanctity of marriage and the unity of the family;
it decrees marriage as legally "inviolable" and protects it from dissolution at
the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected"
by the state. Petition dismissed with finality.

Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad A. Dayan, who testified that she conducted
a psychological evaluation of petitioner and found him to be conscientious,
hardworking, diligent, a perfectionist who wants all tasks and projects
completed up to the final detail and who exerts his best in whatever he does.
On the other hand, Dr. Dayan declared that Sharon was suffering from AntiSocial Personality Disorder exhibited by her blatant display of infidelity; that
she committed several indiscretions and had no capacity for remorse, even
bringing with her the two children of Mustafa Ibrahim to live with petitioner.

_____________________________________________________________________________

18. David B. Dedel vs. CA and Sharon Corpuz-Dedel aka Jane Ibrahim
Facts: David and Sharon married on September 28, 1966. They had
four children. Petitioner avers that during the marriage, Sharon turned out
to be an irresponsible and immature wife and mother. She had extra-marital
affairs with several men: a dentist in the Armed Forces of the Philippines; a
Lieutenant in the Presidential Security Command and later a Jordanian
national.
Sharon was once confined in the Manila Medical City for treatment by Dr.
Lourdes Lapuz, a clinical psychiatrist. Petitioner alleged that despite the
treatment, Sharon did not stop her illicit relationship with the Jordanian
national named Mustafa Ibrahim, whom she married and with whom she had
two children.
However, when Mustafa Ibrahim left the country, Sharon returned to
petitioner bringing along her two children by Ibrahim. Petitioner accepted
her back and even considered the two illegitimate children as his own.
Thereafter, on December 9, 1995, Sharon abandoned petitioner to join
Ibrahim in Jordan with their two children. Since then, Sharon would only
return to the country on special occasions.
Finally, giving up all hope of a reconciliation with Sharon, petitioner filed on
April 1, 1997 a petition seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage on

Lower court declared their marriage void.

Republic appealed to set aside the judgment of the lower court
The Court of Appeals recalled and set aside the judgment of the trial court
and ordered dismissal of the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
Issue: Whether or not the totality of the evidence presented is enough to
sustain a finding that respondent is psychologically incapacitated. More
specifically, does the aberrant sexual behavior of respondent adverted to by
petitioner fall within the term psychological incapacity?
Ruling: No. In this case, respondents sexual infidelity can hardly qualify as
being mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that she could not have
known the obligations she was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given a valid assumption thereof. It appears that respondents promiscuity
did not exist prior to or at the inception of the marriage. What is, in fact,
disclosed by the records is a blissful marital union at its celebration, later
affirmed in church rites, and which produced four children. It must be shown
that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make
respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the
marital state, not merely due to her youth, immaturity or sexual promiscuity.
Petition is Denied.
_____________________________________________________________________________
19. Hernandez vs. CA & Hernandez, 320 SCRA 76
Facts: Lucita Estrella married Mario Hernandez on January 1, 1981 and they
begot three (3) children. On July 10, 1992, Lucita filed before the RTCmof
Tagaytay City, a petition for annulment of marriage under Article 36 alleging
that from the time of their marriage, Mario failed to perform hisnobligation to
support the family, devoting most of this time drinking, had affairs with many
women and cohabiting with another women with whomnhe had an
illegitimate child, and finally abandoning her and the family.
Issue: Whether there was psychological incapacity under Article. 36
Ruling: No. Habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and
abandonment do not by themselves constitute grounds for declaring a

marriage void based on psychological incapacity. It must be shown that these

facts are manifestations of a discolored personality which make private
respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the
marital state, and not merely due to private respondents youth and selfconscious feeling of being handsome, as the appellate court held.
Expert testimony should be presented to establish the precise cause of the
psychological incapacity to show that it existed at the time of
the marriage. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests
upon petitioner. The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to
protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution
and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.
_____________________________________________________________________________
20. Chi Ming Tsoi vs. CA, G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997
Facts: Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao were married on May 22, 1988. Until their
separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual contact between them.
Hence, Gina (wife) filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of their
marriage. Medical examinations showed that the wife was healthy, normal
and still a virgin, while the husband was found to be capable of having sexual
intercourse since he was not impotent.
The wife claimed that her husband was impotent, and was a closet
homosexual as he did not show his penis and since he was using his
mothers eyebrow pencil and cleansing cream. She also claimed that her
husband married her, a Filipino citizen, in order to acquire or maintain his
residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the appearance
of a normal man. On the other hand, the husband claimed that it was his wife
who was psychologically incapacitated to perform basic marital obligations.
He asserts that his wife avoided him whenever he wants to have sexual
intercourse with her. He further claimed that his wife filed the case because
she was afraid that she would be forced to return the pieces of jewelry of his
mother, and that he might consummate their marriage. He also insisted that
their marriage would remain valid because they are still very young and
there is still a chance to overcome their differences. The trial court declared
their marriage void on account of psychological incapacity of the husband.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Issue: Whether or not the prolonged refusal of the husband to have sexual
cooperation for the procreation of children with his wife is equivalent to
psychological incapacity.
Ruling: Yes. The prolonged refusal of the husband to have sexual
cooperation for the procreation of children with his wife is equivalent to
psychological incapacity.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or
her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant,
the Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological
incapacity than to stubborn refusal. The husbands senseless and protracted
refusal to fulfill his marital obligations is equivalent to psychological

incapacity. One of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is
to procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of
children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage. Constant
non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness
of the marriage. Decision affirmed and petition denied for lack of merit.
_____________________________________________________________________________

21. Leonilo Antonio vs. Marie Ivonne Reyes

Facts: Leonilo and Ivonne got married barely a year after their meeting.
They begot three children. Leonilo filed a complaint for declaration of nullity
of their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity claiming that
Ivonne lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income,
educational attainment and other events or things, to wit:
1 She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate
son, and instead introduced the boy to petitioner as the adopted child of
her family. She only confessed the truth about the boys parentage when
petitioner learned about it from other sources after their marriage.
2 She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David, attempted to
rape and kill her when in fact, no such incident occurred.
3 She misrepresented herself as psychiatrist to her obstetrician, and told
some of her friends that she graduated with a degree in psychology,
when neither was true.
4 She claimed to be a singer voice talent affiliated in Blackgold Recording
Company (Blackgold); yet, not a single member of her family ever
witnessed her alleged singing activities with the group. In the same vein,
she postulated that a luncheon show was held at the Philippine Village
Hotel in her honor and even presented an invitation to that effect but he
discovered per certification by the Director of Sales of said hotel that no
such occasion has taken place.
5
She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and under
those names, sent lengthy letters to petitioner claiming to be from
Blackgold and touting her as the "number one moneymaker" in the
commercial industry worth P2 million. Petitioner later found out that
respondent herself was the one who wrote and sent the letters to him
when she admitted the truth in one of their quarrels. He likewise realized
that Babes Santos and Via Marquez were only figments of her
imagination when he discovered they were not known in or connected
with Blackgold.
6
She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, she altered
her payslip to make it appear that she earned a higher income. She
bought a sala set from a public market but told petitioner that she
acquired it from a famous furniture dealer. She spent lavishly on
unnecessary items and ended up borrowing money from other people on
false pretexts.
7 She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of calling
up his officemates to monitor his whereabouts. When he could no longer
take her unusual behavior, he separated from her in August 1991. He

10

tried to attempt a reconciliation but since her behavior did not change,
he finally left her for good in November 1991.
In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante Herrera Abcede
(Dr. Abcede), a psychiatrist, and Dr. Arnulfo V. Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical
psychologist, who stated, based on the tests they conducted, that
petitioner was essentially a normal, introspective, shy and conservative
type of person. On the other hand, they observed that respondents
persistent and constant lying to petitioner was abnormal or pathological.
It undermined the basic relationship that should be based on love, trust
and respect. They further asserted that respondents extreme jealousy
was also pathological. It reached the point of paranoia since there was no
actual basis for her to suspect that petitioner was having an affair with
another woman. They concluded based on the foregoing that respondent
was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital
obligations.
In opposing the petition, respondent claimed that she performed her
marital obligations by attending to all the needs of her husband. She
asserted that there was no truth to the allegation that she fabricated
stories, told lies and invented personalities. She presented her version,
thus:
(1) She concealed her child by another man from petitioner because she was
afraid of losing her husband.
(2) She told petitioner about Davids attempt to rape and kill her because
she surmised such intent from Davids act of touching her back and ogling
her from head to foot.
(3) She was actually a BS Banking and Finance graduate and had been
teaching psychology at the Pasig Catholic School for two (2) years.
(4) She was a free-lance voice talent of Aris de las Alas, an executive
producer of Channel 9 and she had done three (3) commercials with McCann
Erickson for the advertisement of Coca-cola, Johnson & Johnson, and Traders
Royal Bank. She told petitioner she was a Blackgold recording artist although
she was not under contract with the company, yet she reported to the
Blackgold office after office hours. She claimed that a luncheon show was
indeed held in her honor at the Philippine Village Hotel on 8 December 1979.
(5) She vowed that the letters sent to petitioner were not written by her and
the writers thereof were not fictitious. Bea Marquez Recto of the Recto
political clan was a resident of the United States while Babes Santos was
employed with Saniwares.
(6) She admitted that she called up an officemate of her husband but
averred that she merely asked the latter in a diplomatic matter if she was the
one asking for chocolates from petitioner, and not to monitor her husbands
whereabouts.
(7) She belied the allegation that she spent lavishly as she supported almost
ten people from her monthly budget of P7,000.00.

After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioners evidence and held
that respondents propensity to lying about almost anythingher occupation,
state of health, singing abilities and her income, among othershad been
duly established. According to the trial court, respondents fantastic ability to
invent and fabricate stories and personalities enabled her to live in a world of
make-believe. This made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her
incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage. The trial court
thus declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void.
Shortly before the trial court rendered its decision, the Metropolitan Tribunal
of the Archdiocese of Manila annulled the Catholic marriage of the parties, on
the ground of lack of due discretion on the part of the parties
Petitioner duly alerted the Court of Appeals of these rulings by the Catholic
tribunals. Still, the appellate court reversed the RTCs judgment. While
conceding that respondent may not have been completely honest with
petitioner, the Court of Appeals nevertheless held that the totality of the
evidence presented was insufficient to establish respondents psychological
incapacity. It declared that the requirements in the case of Republic v. Court
of Appeals governing the application and interpretation of psychological
incapacity had not been satisfied.
Issue: Whether the marriage can be declared void due to psychological
incapacity of the petitioners wife?
Ruling: Yes. The SC find that the present case sufficiently satisfies the
guidelines in Molina.
First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the
psychological incapacity of his spouse. Apart from his own testimony,
he presented witnesses who corroborated his allegations on his wifes
behavior, and certifications from Blackgold Records and the Philippine Village
Hotel Pavillon which disputed respondents claims pertinent to her alleged
singing career. He also presented two (2) expert witnesses from the field of
psychology who testified that the aberrant behavior of respondent was
tantamount to psychological incapacity. In any event, both courts below
considered petitioners evidence as credible enough. Even the appellate
court acknowledged that respondent was not totally honest with petitioner.
Second. The root cause of respondents psychological incapacity has
been medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint,
sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the trial
courts decision. The initiatory complaint alleged that respondent, from the
start, had exhibited unusual and abnormal behavior "of perennially telling
lies, fabricating ridiculous stories, and inventing personalities and situations,"
of writing letters to petitioner using fictitious names, and of lying about her
actual occupation, income, educational attainment, and family background,
among others.
These allegations, initially characterized in generalities, were further linked
to medical or clinical causes by expert witnesses from the field of
psychology. Petitioner presented two (2) such witnesses in particular. Dr.

11

Abcede, a psychiatrist who had headed the department of psychiatry of at

least two (2) major hospitals.
Third. Respondents psychological incapacity was established to
have clearly existed at the time of and even before the celebration
of marriage. She fabricated friends and made up letters from fictitious
characters well before she married petitioner. Likewise, she kept petitioner in
the dark about her natural childs real parentage as she only confessed when
the latter had found out the truth after their marriage.
Fourth. The gravity of respondents psychological incapacity is
sufficient to prove her disability to assume the essential obligations
of marriage. It is immediately discernible that the parties had shared only a
little over a year of cohabitation before the exasperated petitioner left his
wife. Whatever such circumstance speaks of the degree of tolerance of
petitioner, it likewise supports the belief that respondents psychological
incapacity, as borne by the record, was so grave in extent that any prolonged
marital life was dubitable.
Respondents ability to even comprehend what the essential marital
obligations are is impaired at best. Considering that the evidence
convincingly disputes respondents ability to adhere to the truth, her avowals
as to her commitment to the marriage cannot be accorded much credence.
Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential
marital obligations as embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family
Code. Article 68, in particular, enjoins the spouses to live together, observe
mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. As
noted by the trial court, it is difficult to see how an inveterate pathological
liar would be able to commit to the basic tenets of relationship between
spouses based on love, trust and respect.
Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into
consideration the fact that the marriage of the parties was annulled
by the Catholic Church. The appellate court apparently deemed this detail
totally inconsequential as no reference was made to it anywhere in the
assailed decision despite petitioners efforts to bring the matter to its
attention. Such deliberate ignorance is in contravention of Molina, which held
that interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts.
Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement in Molina
that such psychological incapacity be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Petitioner points out that one month
after he and his wife initially separated, he returned to her, desiring to make
their marriage work. However, respondents aberrant behavior remained
unchanged, as she continued to lie, fabricate stories, and maintained her
excessive jealousy. From this fact, he draws the conclusion that respondents
condition is incurable.
_____________________________________________________________________________

22. Azcueta vs. Republic of the Philippines, G. R. No. 180668

Facts: On July 24, 1993, petitioner Marieta Azcueta married Rodolfo Azcueta
at Antipolo City. They ceased to live together as husband and wife in 1997.
On March 2, 2002, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo
City a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage under Article 36
of the Family Code of the Philippines. On July 19, 2005, the regional Trial
Court, Branch 72 declared the marriage null and void ab initio pursuant to
Article 36 of the Family Code.
The solicitor-general appealed the Regional Trial Court's decision objecting
that the psychiatric report of the psychologist was based solely on the
information given by the petitioner and not based on personal examination
of Rodolfo. On August 31, 2007, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of
the Regional Trial Court, thus making the marriage between the petitioner
and Rodolfo VALID.
The petitioner filed to the Supreme Court a petition for review on certiorari
assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals. On May 26, 2009, the Supreme
Court granted the petition and reinstated the decision of the Regional Trial
Court declaring the marriage annulled.
Issue: Whether or not the totality of the evidence presented is adequate to
sustain a finding that Rodolfo is psychologically incapacitated to comply with
his essential marital obligations.
Ruling: Yes, because the petitioner successfully discharged her burdens to
prove the psychological incapacity of his husband. Furthermore, the root
cause of Rodolfo's psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically
identified, sufficiently proven by expert's testimony, and clearly explained in
the trial court's decision. Moreover, Rodolfo's psychological incapacity was
established to have clearly existed at the time and even before the
celebration of their marriage, it has also been shown to be sufficiently grave,
so as to render him unable ta assume the essential obligations of marriage.
_____________________________________________________________________________
23. Camacho-Reyes vs. Reyes, 628 SCRA 461
Facts: Petitioner and respondent were campus sweetheart. The formers
love to the latter did not change even when she discovered that respondent
was cutting classes and taking up marijuana. He did not even finish college.
By the time they married each other, all living expenses were shouldered by
respondents parents, and they were living with the respondents parents,
when their first child was born, financial difficulties started to come in. To
prod respondent into assuming more responsibility, petitioner suggested that
they live separately from her in-laws. However, the new living arrangement
engendered further financial difficulty. Petition was a single-income earner,
and the business vetures of the respondent all floundered, the couple
became so estranged from each other that the respondent remained
unconcerned and inattentive, not only to the petitioner but also to their
children. To make things worse, petitioner was able to confirm that

12

respondent was having an extra-marital affair.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent is psychologically incapacitated to
fulfill essential marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Ruling: Yes, there existed psychological incapacity. The marriage between
the petitioner and the respondent was nullified. Psychological incapacity was
shown by:1) Respondents sporadic financial support;2) Extra-marital affairs;
3) Substance abuse; and 4) Failed business attempts. The high court found
that the marriage between the parties from its inception had this congenital
infirmity which pertains to the inability of the parties to effectively function
emotionally, intellectually and socially towards each other in relation to their
essential duties to mutually observe love, fidelity and respect as well as to
mutually render help and support as mandated by Article 68 of the Family
Code. Such finding was anchored by the unanimous finding of three
psychology experts: petitioner manifested inadequacies along her affective
sphere that made her less responsive to the emotional needs of her
husband, while the respondent manifested strong sense of inadequacy
along masculine strivings and narcissistic features that renders him
psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of
marriage. The SC further ruled that such psychological incapacity, as stated
by psychology experts, is permanent, incurable, and stable and stable over
time, and mere recommendation of one psychology expert that the
incapacity that the incapacity is curable does not automatically imply
curability. Therefore, the case has the gravity, juridical antecedence, and
incurability- the three requirements of nullifying marriage based on
psychological incapacity.
_____________________________________________________________________________

Ruling: There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and private

respondent celebrated while the former's previous marriage with one
Emerlina de la Paz was still subsisting is bigamous. As such, it is from the
beginning. Petitioner himself does not dispute the absolute nullity of their
marriage. The Court had ruled that no judicial decree is necessary to
establish the invalidity of a void, bigamous marriage.
The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity
of marriage, one of which is the separation of property according to the
regime of property relations governing them. It stands to reason that the
lower court before whom the issue of nullity of a first marriage is brought is
likewise clothed with jurisdiction to decide the incidental questions regarding
the couple's properties.
_____________________________________________________________________________
25. Mercado vs. Tan
Facts: This is a petition for review on the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Dr. Vincent Mercado was married to Ma. Consuelo Tan in 1991 and
produced a child. However Tan discovered that Mercado was already married
to one Maria Thelma Oliva in 1976 with whom he also had children. Tan
eventually filed a complaint for bigamy against Mercado. Mercado on the
other hand, filed a petition for the nullification of his marriage with Oliva
which was granted by the court. The bigamy case proceeded and Mercado
admits that the two marriages were consummated but contests that since
the first marriage has already been declared null and void, bigamy could no
longer be charged against him. The lower court as well as the Court of
Appeals found him guilty, hence this petition.

24. Domingo vs. CA, 226 SCRA 572

Facts: Delia Domingo, private respondent, filed a petition before RTC of
Pasig for the declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of property
against Roberto Domingo, petitioner. She alleged that they were married at
Carmona, Cavite with evidences of marriage certificate and marriage license,
unknown to her, petitioner had a previous marriage with Emerlina dela Paz
which is still valid and existing. She came to know the prior marriage when
Emerlina sued them for bigamy. She prays that their marriage be declared
null and void and, as a consequence, to declare that she is the exclusive
owner of all properties she acquired during the marriage and to recover them
from him.
Roberto moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the marriage being
void ab initio, the petition of declaration of nullity is unnecessary. It added
that private respondent has no property which in his possession.
Issue: Whether or not respondent may claim for the declaration of nullity of
marriage and separation of property against petitioner on the ground of
bigamy.

Issue: Whether petitioner can still be proceeded against for bigamy after a
subsequent declaration of the nullity of marriage of the first one
consummated
Ruling: The Court ruled in the affirmative. The Family Code now provides
that for the absolute nullity of marriage to be considered, it is necessary that
a judicial declaration of nullity be obtained. This is most helpful before
contracting a subsequent marriage. Said provision is a safeguard so as to
lessen the risk of being charged of bigamy. Such circumstance is present in
this case. The subsequent acquisition of a judicial declaration of the nullity of
marriage cannot be a hindrance to a bigamy case. Besides, said nullification
was seeked only after a complaint for bigamy was filed against him. It is
necessary that before contracting a marriage one is already capacitated to
remarry by virtue of a declaration of marriage and not after.
_____________________________________________________________________________
26. Atienza vs Brillantes, 243 SCRA 32
Facts: An administrative case was filed by herein complainant against Judge
Brilliantes of MTC, Manila. Complainant alleges that he has two children with

13

De Castro who stays in Makati, Manila in the house he bought and stayed
while he is in Manila. Sometime in 1991 he saw Respondent Judge sleeping
on his bed, upon inquiry, he was told by the houseboy that respondent was
cohabiting with De Castro. Complainant further alleged that respondent was
married to a certain Zenaida Ongkiko and begot five children.
In reply respondent alleged that the complainant was not married to De
Castro, he also denied having been married to Zenaida ongkiko, however
admitted having five children with her. He stated that the marriage between
him and Ongkiko was not valid since there was no marriage license and
further claimed that when he married De Castro he believed in all good faith
of its intent and purpose.
Issue: Whether or not Article 40 of the Family Code that required nullity of
previous marriage for purpose of remarriage shall apply?
Ruling: As a general rule provided in Article 4 of the NCC: Laws shall have
no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.
Article 40 of the Family Code provides that a Judicial Declaration of Nullity is
required before a party can enter into second marriage however the said
Code took effect only on August 3, 1988 and the marriages that respondent
contracted was 1965 and 1991 however the provisions of this code shall
apply regardless of the date of the marriage, besides under Article 256 of the
Family Code, said Article is given retroactive effects in so far as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil
Code or other laws this is particularly true with Article 40 which is a rule of
Procedure, herein respondent has not shown any vested rights that was
impaired by the application of Article 40 ti his case.
_____________________________________________________________________________
27. Manuel vs People
Facts: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of
Appeals finding petitioner guilty of bigamy.
On July 28, 1975, Eduardo Manuel was married to Rubylus Gana in Makati.
Said wife was eventually convicted for estafa and Manuel has had no
communication with her for 20 years. Sometime in 1996, Manuel met Tina
Gandalera, a student, in Dagupan. She was then 21, and Eduardo was 39. He
then visited him and they even went to a motel where, despite Tinas
resistance, Eduardo was able to have his way with her. He offered her
marriage and even brought his parents to Baguio to meet Tinas parents and
assured them that their son was single. This is also what appears in the
marriage contract. They were married in April of 1996. After being able to
build a home together, eventually Eduardo rarely came home and did not
send money for support. Tina claims that everytime she asks him about
these matters he slaps her. Eventually, Eduardo got all his things and left.
Upon investigating, Tina discovered in the NSO that Eduardo was already
married and so she filed a case for bigamy. Eduardo contends however, that
Tina knew of his previous marriage and that he believed in good faith that his
marriage was already dissolved because of his wifes absence for 20 years.

The lower court as well as the appellate court ruled in favor of Tina
Gandalera.
Issue: Whether or not Eduardo should be held liable for bigamy and that
moral damages should be awarded to Ganadalera.
Ruling: The court affirmed the decision of the appellate court. In the issue of
bigamy, the court justified their decision by the fact that ignorance of the law
does not excuse Eduardo from complying with the necessary requirements
before a person can contract a second marriage. In his case, what was
important was the judicial declaration of presumption of death of his first
wife. This is because of provisions in the Civil Code as well as the Revised
Penal Code which requires said judicial declaration to avoid being charged of
bigamy. This was also found necessary in order to prevent problems in the
future with respect to the second marriage.
When it comes to the moral damages, the respondent claimed that
said damages cannot be granted because bigamy is not included in the
specific cases where moral damages is to be granted according to Article
2219 of the Civil Code. The court ruled that although bigamy was not
included in the list of cases provided for by Article 219, moral damages may
nevertheless be granted in light of Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code.
Article 19 provides for the principle of Abuse of Rights which has three
requisites in order to be invoked. They are 1) that there is a legal right or
duty 2) exercised in bad faith and 3) the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring
another. The court finds the elements present in said case because he
assured Gandalera that he was single and even indicated this in the marriage
contract. Also, according to Article 20, if the standards setforth in the
previous provision is not met, the person who willfully violates this is to
responsible and in Article 21, said person must compensate the person
damages or injured by his act. From these provisions, a grant of moral
damages is justified because Gandalera was willfully made to believe that
she was marrying a single man and she dutifully served him as a wife only to
be deceived by him.
_____________________________________________________________________________
28. Republic Of The Philippines vs Nolasco
Facts: Gregorio Nolasco met Janet Monica Parker in a bar in England during
a port call, Nolasco being a seaman. Parker then lived with him in the ship for
6 months and married her after his semans contract expired. After said
marriage, he was able to be employed as seaman again and left the country
while Janet stayed with his parents in Antique. The parents eventually wrote
to him saying that Janet has left Antique and that she has already given
birth. He claimed that he has looked for her in England and even wrote
letters to the bar where he met her but the same was returned to him. He
also asked friends for information but to no avail. Nolasco eventually filed for
a petition of declaration of presumptive death of Janet. Basing from the
above fact, the trial court granted the petition. The Republic of the
Philippines appealed this case saying that the presumptive death Nolasco

14

claims is not based on a well-founded belief and thus cannot be granted by

the Court. The CA affirmed the lower courts decision.
Issue: Whether or not Nolasco was able to comply with the requisites of
Article 41 of the Family Code specifically the need for a well-founded belief
that the spouse is dead, which would warrant the declaration of presumptive
death
Ruling: The Court ruled in the negative and reversed and set aside the
decision of the lower and appellate courts.
One of the requirements for the declaration of presumptive death is that it is
based on a well founded belief. The others are the year of absence and the
wish to remarry. In the present case, Nolasco claims that he searched for
Janet in England, asked friends and wrote to a bar. It can be seen that his
search was not a diligent one. He merely depended on chance when he
looked for her in a big city abroad and asked acquaintances. He did not, as
he should have, acquired the help and assistance of authorities both local
and that of the British Embassy so as to perform a better search. The court
thus cannot declare Janet presumptively dead by reason of lack of well
founded belief.
_____________________________________________________________________________
29. Republic of the Philippines VS. Bermudez Lorino, G.R. No.
160258.
January
19,
2005
Facts: Gloria Bermudez and Francisco Lorino were married in June 1987. The
wife was unaware that her husband was a habitual drinker with violent
attitude and character and had the propensity to go out with his friends to
the point of being unable to work. In 1991 she left him and returned to her
parents together with her three children. She went abroad to work for her
support her children. From the time she left him, she had no communication
with him or his relatives.
In 2000, nine years after leaving her husband, Gloria filed a verified petition
with the RTC under the rules on Summary Judicial Proceedings in the Family
Law. The lower court issued an order for the publication of the petition in a
newspaper
of
general
circulation.
In November 7, 2001, the RTC granted the summary petition. Although the
judgment was final and executors under the provisions of Act. 247 of the
Family Code, the OSG for the Republic of the Philippines filed a notice of
appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the factual and legal bases for a judicial declaration of
presumptive death under Art 41 of the Family Code were duly established.
Ruling: Art. 238 of the Family Code under Title XI Summary Judicial
Proceeding in the Family Law, sets the tenor for cases scoured by these
rules, to wit: Art238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural
rules in this Title shall apply in all cases provided for in this Code requiring
summary court proceeding. Such cases shall be decided in an expeditions

manner with out regards technical rules. The judge of the RTC fully complied
with the above-cited provision by expeditiously rending judgment within
ninety (90) days after the formal offer of evidence by the petitioner.
_____________________________________________________________________________
30. Villanueva vs Court of Appeals
Facts: This is a petition for review assailing the decision of the Court of
Appeals.
Orland Villanueva was married to Lilia Canalita-Villanueva in 1988. Orland
eventually filed for annulment of their marriage by reason of force and
duress employed on him in order to marry Lilia who was then pregnant. He
claims to have received harassing phone calls and visits from three men. He
also claims that the never cohabited and that he couldnt have impregnated
her before marriage and that the child died upon delivery. Lilia however
contests that he freely entered into the marriage and that they lived together
for one month and he wrote her letters while he was in Manila. He visited her
and knew of her pregnancy and the child dying because of premature birth.
The case was dismissed and Orland was ordered to pay Lilia damages.
Issue: Whether or not the marriage may be annulled
Ruling: The court ruled in the negative. The court said that it took Orland
four years to claim that he was coerced into the marriage which then justifies
the possibility that he is asking for the annulment of said marriage by reason
of a bigamy case he is facing. Also, his being a security guard must have
given him proper knowledge when it comes to defending himself making the
claims of force due to facts stated above untenable. Also, his claim that they
did not cohabit is not a ground for the annulment of marriage especially
since he failed to prove that this was due to fraud, intimidation, lack of
consent and the other grounds for annulment.
_____________________________________________________________________________
31. Alcazar vs Alcazar, 603 SCRA 604
_____________________________________________________________________________
32. Manuel G. Almelor vs. Regional Trial Court off Las Pinas City,
G.R. No. 179620
Facts: On January 29, 1989, Manuel Almelor and Leonida Almelor got
married at the Manila Cathedral. They had three children. Manuel and
Leonida are both medical practitioners, an anesthesiologist and a
pediatrician, respectively. Prior to their union, they met each other in 1981 at
San Lazaro Hospital where they worked as medical students. At that time,
she regarded Manuel as a very thoughtful person who got along well with
other people. They soon became sweethearts. Three years after, they got
married. After eleven (11) years of marriage, Leonida filed a petition with the
RTC in Las Pinas City to annul their marriage on the ground that Manuel was
psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations. Leonida
averred that Manuel's kind and gentle demeanor did not last long. Frequent

15

quarrels of the couple rooted from the harsh disciplinary measure of Manuel
to their children. She also contended that Manuel was up to this time, he was
still attached to his mother and dependent on her especially on decisionmaking.
On November 25, 2005, RTC rendered judgment granting the petition for
annulment, stating that the marriage between Manuel and Leonida was void
from the beginning on the ground of psychological incapacity. On July 31,
2007, CA affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.
Issue: Whether or not the decision of the lower court was correct in
upholding the marriage between Leonida and Manuel null and void on the
ground of psychological incapacity.
Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the decision of the lower court is not
correct.
The trial court declared that Leonida's petition for nullity had "no basis at all
because the supporting grounds relied upon cannot legally make a case
under Article 36 of the Family Code."
Even assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that Manuel is a homosexual, the lower
court cannot appreciate it as a ground to annul his marriage with Leonida.
The law is clear - a marriage may be annulled when the consent of either
party was obtained by fraud, such as concealment of homosexuality.
Nowhere in the said decision was it proven by preponderance of evidence
that Manuel was a homosexual at the onset of his marriage and that he
deliberately hid such fact to his wife. It is the concealment of homosexuality,
and not homosexuality per se, that vitiates the consent of the innocent party.
Such concealment presupposes bad faith and intent to defraud the other
party in giving consent to the marriage.
Consent is an essential requisite of a valid marriage. To be valid, it must be
freely given by both parties. An allegation of vitiated consent must be proven
by preponderance of evidence. The Family Code has enumerated an
exclusive list of circumstances constituting fraud. Homosexuality per se is
not among those cited, but its concealment.
This Court is mindful of the constitutional policy to protect and strengthen
the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the
foundation of the family. The State and the public have vital interest in the
maintenance and preservation of these social institutions against desecration
by fabricated evidence. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
validity of marriage
_____________________________________________________________________________
33. Aquino vs Delizo
Facts: This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Conchita Delizo married Fernando Aquino in 1954 while she was pregnant.
Aquino now claims that her pregnancy was concealed from him because it

was of another man while Delizo claims that it was their child out of wedlock.
Aquino filed a petition for nullification of marriage by reason of fraud. He
presented the marriage contractv while Delizo did not present any. The court
ruled in favor of Delizo and did not invalidate the marriage because the
concealment of the pregnancy does not constitute the fraud that would
invalidate a marriage. Aquino tried to reopen the case but it was denied and
the CA eventually affirmed the lower courts decision saying that it was
impossible for him not to have noticed that the girl was pregnant. A motion
for reconsideration was filed or chance to present further evidence to the
lower court which he id. These evidences were his brothers statement that
he himself fathered the child and hid this fact from petitioner and showed
pictures of Delizo saying she was naturally plump. The petition was denied.
Issue: Whether or not concealment of pregnancy constitutes fraud that
could annul the marriage
Ruling: The court ruled in the affirmative. In the Family Code, the law
includes fraud as grounds for nullification of a marriage. In the present case,
the pregnancy was concealed from petitioner at the time of the marriage and
said child was of another man. This constitutes fraud and can justify an
annulment. Petitioner was able to show that the girl was naturally plump or
fat which does not make it obvious that she is pregnant. It has been shown
that pregnancy is usually obvious on the 6 th month when the roundness
actually appears. The case was then remanded for a new trial.
_____________________________________________________________________________
34. Bugayong vs. Ginez, G.R. No. L-10033 December 28, 1956
Facts: Benjamin Bugayong, serviceman in the US Navy was married to
defendant Leonila Ginez in Pangasinan, while on furlough leave. After
marriage, the couples live with the sisters of the husband, before the latter
left to report back to duty, the couple came to an agreement that Leonila
would stay with Benjamins sisters.
Leonila left the dwelling of her sisters-in-law which she informed her husband
by letter that she had gone to reside with her mother in Pangasinan. Early in
July 1951, Benjamin receive letters from his sister Valeriana Polangco that
her wife informing him of alleged acts of infidelity. Benjamin went to
Pangasinan and sought for his wife whom he met in the house of Leonilas
godmother. They lived again as husband and wife and stayed in the house of
Pedro Bugayong, cousin of the plaintiff-husband. On the second day, he tried
to verify from his wife the truth of the information he received but instead of
answering, Leonila packed up and left him which Benjamin concluded as a
confirmation of the acts of infidelity. After he tried to locate her and upon
failing he went to Ilocos Norte. Benjamin filed in CIF of Pangasinan a
complaint for legal separation against Leonila, who timely filed an answer
vehemently denying the averments of the complaint.
Issue: Whether or not the acts charged in line with the truth of allegations of
the commission of acts of infidelity amounting to adultery have been
condoned by the plaintiff-husband.

16

Ruling: Granting that infidelities amounting to adultery were commited by

the wife, the act of the husband in persuading her to come along with him
and the fact that she went with him and together they slept as husband and
wife deprives him as the alleged offended spouse of any action for legal
separation against the offending wife because his said conduct comes within
the restriction of Article 100 of Civil Code.
_____________________________________________________________________________
35. De Ocampo vs. Florenciano
JOSE DE OCAMPO, petitioner, SERAFINA FLORENCIANO, respondent
Facts: They were married and had children which is said to be living with the
plaintiff.Sometime March 1951, plaintiff dicovered that his wife was betraying
his trust by maintaining illicit relations with one Jose Arcalas. Plaintiff sent
her to Manila in June 1951 to study beauty culture, where she stayed for one
year. Again, plaintiff discovered that while in the said city defendant was
going out with several other men, aside from Jose Arcalas. When defendant
had finished studying, she left plaintiff and since then they had lived
separately. June 1955 plantiff surprised his wife by having an illicit affair with
Nelson Orzame. Plaintiff signified his intention of filing a petition for legal
separation, to which defendant manifested her conformity provided she is
not charged with adultery in a criminal action. Plaintiff filed a case of legal
separation on the ground of adultery. Defendant while interrogated by the
fiscal admitted having sexual relationship with Orzame. During prosecution,
the defendant kept silent and did not attend any hearing. Court ordered the
fiscal if there was collusion and the result was none. The Court of First
Instance of dismissed the case and Court of Appeals confirmed that there
was confession of judgment, condonation or consent to the adultery and
prescription.
Issue: W/N there was confession of judgment, condonation or consent to
adultery and prescription
Ruling: Theres confession of judgment, condonation, collusion and
prescription. SC reversed the appealed decision and decree a legal
separation between these spouse, all the consequent effects. Costs of all
instances against Serafina Florenciano.
Rationale:

Plaintiff's failure actively to search for defendant and take her home
does not constitute condonation or consent to her adulterous
relationship.

It was the wife who "left" him after having sinned with Arcalas and
after he had discovered her dates with other men. Consequently, it
was not his duty to search for her to bring her home. Hers was the
obligation to return
Notes:

Confession of judgment usually happens when the defendant

appears in court and confesses the right of plaintiff to judgment or
files a pleading expressly agreeing to the plaintiff's demand.

Collusion in divorce or legal separation means the agreement.

. . . between husband and wife for one of them to commit, or to
appear to commit, or to be represented in court as having
committed, a matrimonial offense, or to suppress evidence of a valid
defense, for the purpose of enabling the other to obtain a divorce.
This agreement, if not express, may be implied from the acts of the
parties. It is a ground for denying the divorce.
_____________________________________________________________________________
36. Lapuz-Sy vs. Eufemio, 43 SCRA 177
Facts: Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio,
married civilly on September 21, 1934 and canonically on September 30,
1943. In 1943, her husband abandoned her. Carmen discovered Eufemio
cohabiting with a Chinese woman, Go Hiok. Carmen prayed for the issuance
of the decree of legal separation. Eufemio amended answer to the petition
and alleged affirmative.
Before the trial could be completed, petitioner died in a vehicular accident.
With these respondent moved to dismiss the petition for legal separation on
two grounds; the petition was filed beyond 1-year period and the death of
petitioner abated the acted for legal separation.
Issue: Whether or not the death of plaintiff in action for legal separation
before final decree abated the action.
Ruling: An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the
bed-and-board separation of the spouses is purely personal. The Civil Code of
the Philippines recognizes this in its Article 100, by allowing only the
innocent spouse and no one else to claim legal separation; and in its Article
108, by providing that the spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop or abate
the proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal separation already
rendered. Being personal in character, it follows that the death of one party
to the action causes the death of the action itself actio personalis moritur
cum persona.
_____________________________________________________________________________
37. Atilano vs Chua
Facts: Chua Ching Beng and Pilar Atilano were married on May 1951
in Zamboanga City. After their marriage, they went to Manila and live with
Chua's parents. In October 1951, the couple went to Zamboanga to visit
Pilars parents. Chua returned toManila with the understanding that Pilar
would follow him, but she did not.
In 1953, Pilar filed a complaint for support against Chua alleging that they
have been living separately for two years due to constant fights and Chua's
inability to provide a home for themselves apart from his parents.

17

Chua stated that he was willing to support his wife but only if she lives in
Manilawith him. He was also willing to establish a conjugal
dwelling separate from his parents.
Meanwhile, Pilar filed a petition for alimony pendente lite. Based on a
stipulation of facts agreed upon by the parties, the court rendered judgment
granting the Pilars allowance after finding that the latter's refusal to
return was caused by her aversion to stay with the parents of Chua after she
had experienced some previous in-law troubles.
Chua filed a petition electing to fulfill his obligation as thus fixed by the court
by receiving and maintaining Pilar at his residence in Pasay, which was,
apart, from that of his parents and that if the Pilar refuses, he will not be
compelled to remitallowance to her in Zamboanga.
His petition was denied, thus this case.
Issue: Whether or not Pilar is entitled to support when she refused to live
with Chua
Ruling: The court found that while the wife strongly wanted to be separated
from the husband, the husband was open to fix the problem, acknowledging
his obligation to support her and even expressing his willingness to abide by
her wishes to have a conjugal dwelling apart from his parents, although this
might be financially taxing for him to sustain. The defendant acknowledges

that the Art. 111, CC imposes on the husband the responsibility of

maintaining and supporting his wide and family but he insists that under Art.
209, CC he is given the option to fulfill said duty either by paying
the allowance as fixed by the Court or by receiving and maintaining the
person entitled thereto in his house. He has thus elected to perform his
obligation by the second means allowed by the law. The law affords moral
and
legal
obstacle
as
aground
to
compel
husband
to
provide separatemaintenance for the wife. However, misunderstanding with
in-laws is not a validmoral and legal obstacle. Art. 110 does not preclude the
husband from fixing the conjugal residence at the patriarchal home, nor is it
against any recognized norm of morality.
Although the husband and the wife are, obliged to live together, observe
mutual respect and fidelity and render mutual help and assistance (Art. 109),
and that the wife is entitled to be supported, our laws contain no provision
compelling the wife to live with her husband where even without legal
justification she establishes her residence apart from that provided for by the
former, yet and in such event We would see no plausible reason why she
should be allowed any support from the husband.
Judgment was modified. Chua was given the option of supporting his wife at
their conjugal dwelling apart from the home of his parents, and should
Pilar refuse to abide by the terms, then Chua would be relieved from the
obligation of giving any support. (G.R. No. L-11086, March 29, 1958)

18