Agapay vs Palang

Agapay vs. Palang

GR No. 116668, July 28, 1997
FACTS:
Miguel Palang contracted marriage with Carlina in
Pangasinan on 1949. He left to work in Hawaii a few
months after the wedding. Thereafter, the 63 year old
Miguel contracted a subsequent marriage with 19 year
old Erlinda Agapay, herein petitioner. 2 months earlier,
they jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land
located at Binalonan Pangasinan. A house and lot in the
same place was likewise purchased. On the other hand,
Miguel and Carlina executed a Deed of Donation as a
form of compromise agreement and agreed to donate
their conjugal property consisting of 6 parcels of land to
their child Herminia.
Miguel and Erlindas cohabitation produced a son named
Kristopher.
In 1979, they were convicted of
concubinage upon Carlinas complaint. 2 years later,
Miguel died. Carlina and her daughter instituted this
case for recovery of ownership and possession with
damages against petitioner. They sought to get back the
land and the house and lot located at Binalonan allegedly
purchase by Miguel during his cohabitation with

petitioner. The lower court dismissed the complaint but

CA reversed the decision.
ISSUE: Whether the agricultural land and the house
and lot should be awarded in favor of Erlinda Agapay.
HELD:
The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973, was made in
favor of Miguel and Erlinda. However, their marriage is
void because of the subsisting marriage with Carlina.
Only the properties acquired by both parties through
their actual joint contribution shall be owned by them in
proportion to their respective contributions. It is
required that there be an actual contribution. If actual
contribution is not proved, there will be no co-ownership
and no presumption of equal shares.
When the land was acquired, she was only around 20
years old compared to Miguel who was already 64 years
old and a pensioner of the US Government. Considering
his youthfulness, its unrealistic how she could have
contributed the P3,750 as her share. Thus, the court
finds no basis to justify the co-ownership with Miguel
over the same. Hence, the Riceland should, as correctly
held by CA, revert to the conjugal partnership property
of the deceased and Carlina.

The transaction made by Miguel to Erlinda was properly

a donation and which was clearly void and inexistent by
express provision of the law because it was made
between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the
time of the donation. Moreover, Article 87 of the
Family Code, expressly provides that the prohibition
against donation between spouses now applies to
donations between persons living together as husband
and wife without a valid marriage, for otherwise, the
condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to
be better than those in legal union.

BA Finance Corp vs CA

due and demandable, Augusto failed to pay the

same.
The petitioner prayed for the issuance of a writ of
attachment alleging that said spouses were guilty of
fraud consisting of the execution of Deed of
Assignment assigning the rights, titles and interests
over a construction contract executed by and
between the spouses and A. Soriano Corporation.
The writ hereby prayed for was issued by the trial
court and not contented with the order, petitioner
filed a motion for the examination of attachment
debtor alleging that the properties attached by the
sheriff were not sufficient to secure the satisfaction
of any judgment which was likewise granted by the
court.

BA Finance Corp vs. CA

GR 61464, May 28 1988

ISSUE: WON A&L Industries can be held liable for

the obligations contracted by the husband.

FACTS:

HELD:

Augusto Yulo secured a loan from the petitioner in

the amount of P591,003.59 as evidenced by a
promissory note he signed in his own behalf and as
a representative of A&L Industries. Augusto
presented an alleged special power of attorney
executed by his wife, Lily Yulo, who managed the
business and under whose name the said business
was registered, purportedly authorized the husband
to procure the loan and sign the promissory note.
2months prior the procurement of the loan, Augusto
left Lily and their children which in turn abandoned
their conjugal home. When the obligation became

A&L Industries is a single proprietorship, whose

registered owner is Lily Yulo. The said proprietorship
was established during the marriage and assets
were also acquired during the same. Hence, it is
presumed that the property forms part of the
conjugal partnership of the spouses and be held
liable for the obligations contracted by the
husband. However, for the property to be liable, the
obligation contracted by the husband must have
redounded to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. The obligation was contracted by
Augusto for his own benefit because at the time he

incurred such obligation, he had already abandoned

his family and left their conjugal home. He likewise
made it appear that he was duly authorized by his
wife in behalf of the company to procure such loan
from the petitioner. Clearly, there must be the
requisite showing that some advantage accrued to
the welfare of the spouses. Thus, the Court ruled
that petitioner cannot enforce the obligation
contracted by Augusto against his conjugal
properties with Lily. Furthermore, the writ of
attachment cannot be issued against the said
properties and that the petitioner is ordered to pay
Lily actual damages amouting to P660,000.00.

Uy vs CA

Uy vs. CA
GR No. 109557, November 29, 2000
FACTS:
Dr. Ernesto Jardelaza suffered stroke that
rendered him comatose. Gilda, wife of the
latter, filed a petition in RTC Iloilo to be allowed
as sole administrator of their conjugal property
and be authorized to sell the same as her
husband is physically incapacitated to discharge
his functions. RTC ruled in favor of Gilda
contending that such decision is pursuant to
Article 124 of FC and that the proceedings
thereon are governed by the rules on summary
proceedings.

The son of the spouses, Teodoro, filed a motion

for reconsideration contending that the petition
made by her mother was essentially a petition
for guardianship of the person and properties of
his father. As such it cannot be prosecuted in
accordance with the provisions on summary
proceedings instead it should follows the ruled
governing special proceedings in the Revised
Rules of Court requiring procedural due process
particularly the need for notice and a hearing on
the merits. He further reiterated that Chapter 2
of the FC comes under the heading on
Separation in Fact between Husband and Wife
contemplating a situation where both spouses
are of disposing mind. Hence, he argued that
this should not be applied in their case.
During the pendency of the motion, Gilda sold
the property to her daughter and son in law.
Upon the appeal by Teodoro, CA reversed the
decision of the lower court.
ISSUE: WON Gilda as the wife of a husband who
suffered stroke may assume sole powers of
administration of the conjugal property and
dispose a parcel of land with improvements.
HELD:
SC ruled in favor of Teodoro. The rule on
summary proceedings does not apply to cases
where the non-consenting spouse is

incapacitated or incompetent to give consent.

In this case, trial court found that subject
spouse was incompetent who was in a comatose
condition and with a diagnosis of brain stem
infract. Hence, the proper remedy is a judicial
guardianship proceeding under the Revised
Rules of Court. The law provides that wife who
assumes sole powers of administration has the
same powers and duties as a guardian.
Consequently, a spouse who desires to sell real
property as administrator of the conjugal
property, must observe the procedure for the
sale of the wards estate required of judicial
guardians, and not the summary judicial
proceedings under FC. SC further held that
such incapacity of the trial court to provide for
an opportunity to be heard is null and void on
the ground of lack of due process.

Dela Cruz vs Dela Cruz

Dela Cruz vs. Dela Cruz
GR 19565, January 30, 1968
FACTS:

Estrella, the plaintiff, and Severino, the

defendant were married in Bacolod and
begotten 6 children. During their covertures,
they acquired several parcels of land and were
engage in various businesses. The plaintiff filed
an action against her husband for the
separation of their properties. She further

alleged that her husband aside from

abandoning her, also mismanaged their
conjugal properties. On the other hand,
Severino contended that he had always visited
the conjugal home and had provided support for
the family despite his frequent absences when
he was in Manila to supervise the expansion of
their business. The latter suspected that her
husband had a mistress named Nenita
Hernandez, hence, the urgency of the
separation of property for the fear that her
husband might squander and dispose the
conjugal assets in favor of the concubine.
ISSUE: WON there has been abandonment on
the part of the husband and WON there has
been an abused of his authority as administrator
of the conjugal partnership.
HELD:
The husband has never desisted in the
fulfilment of his marital obligations and support
of the family. To be legally declared as to have
abandoned the conjugal home, one must have
wilfully and with intention of not coming back
and perpetual separation. There must be real
abandonment and not mere separation. In fact,
the husband never failed to give monthly
financial support as admitted by the wife. This
negates the intention of coming home to the
conjugal abode. SC held that lower court erred

in holding that mere refusal or failure of the

husband as administrator of the conjugal
partnership to inform the wife of the progress of
the business constitutes abuse of
administration. In order for abuse to exist, there
must be a willful and utter disregard of the
interest of the partnership evidenced by a
repetition of deliberate acts or omissions
prejudicial to the latter.

Villanueva vs IAC
Villanueva vs. IAC
GR No. 67582, October 29, 1987
FACTS:
Modesto Aranas, husband of Victoria, inherited a
land from his father. Dorothea and Teodoro,
Modestos illegitimate children, borrowed money
from
private
respondent
Jesus
Bernas,
mortgaging as collateral their fathers property.
Bernas then consolidated his ownership over
the lot when the mortgagors failed to redeem it
withn the reglementary period, and had the title
in the name of Modesto cancelled and another
TCT issued in his name.
In 1978, petitioner Consolacion Villanueva and
Raymundo Aranas filed a complaint against
respondents spouses Jesus and Remedios

Bernas, for the cancellation of the TCT under the

name of the Bernases, and they be declared coowners of the land. Petitioner alleged that
spouses Modesto and Victoria in 1987 and 1958
executed 2 separate wills: first bequeathing to
Consolacion and Raymundo and to Dorothea
and Teodoro, in equal shares pro diviso, all of
said Victorias shares from the conjugal
partnership property; and second Modestos
interests in his conjugal partnership with
Victoria as well as his separate properties
bequeathed to Dorothea and Teodoro. Trial
court dismissed the complaint, declaring herein
respondents as the legal owners of the disputed
property. IAC likewise affirmed the lower courts
decision.
ISSUE: WON Villanueva had a right over the
land and the improvements thereon made by
Victoria who rendered the lot as conjugal
property.
HELD:
The land was not a conjugal partnership
property of Victoria and Modesto. It was
Modestos exclusive property since he inherited
it from his parents. Moreover, since Victoria
died ahead of Modesto, Victoria did not inherit
said lot from him and therefore had nothing of
the land to bequeath by will of otherwise to
Consolacion. Article 158 of the Civil Code says
that improvements, whether for utility or

adornment made on the separate property of

the spouses through advancements from the
partnership or through the industry of either
spouse belong to the conjugal partnership, and
buildings constructed at the expense of the
partnership during the marriage on land
belonging to one of the spouses also pertain to
the partnership, but the value of the land shall
be reimbursed to the spouse who owns the
same.
Furthermore, Bernas mode of acquisition of
ownership over the property appears in all
respect to be regular, untainted by any defect
whatsoever. Bernas must therefore be deemed
to have acquired indefeasible and clear title to
the lot which cannot be defeated or negated by
claims subsequently arising and of which he had
no knowledge or means of knowing prior to their
assertion and ventilation.

1927. The latter while in Germany, executed a

will in March 1926, pursuant with its law
wherein plaintiff was named his universal heir.
The deceased possessed not only real property
situated in the Philippines but also personal
property consisting of shares of stocks in 19
domestic corporations. Included in the personal
property is a life insurance policy issued at
Manila on January 1913 for the sum of $10,000
by the Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada,
Manila Branch. In the insurance policy, the
estate of the deceased was named the
beneficiary without any qualification. Rosario is
the sole and only heir of the deceased. BPI, as
administrator of the decedents estate and
attorney in fact of the plaintiff, having been
demanded by Posadas to pay the inheritance
tax, paid under protest. Notwithstanding
various demands made by plaintiff, Posadas
refused to refund such amount.

BPI vs Posadas

ISSUE: WON the plaintiff is entitled to the

proceeds of the insurance.

BPI vs. Posadas

GR No. 34583, October 22, 1931

HELD:

FACTS:
Rosario and Adolphe were married in January
1914. The wife was actually residing and living
in Germany when Adolphe died in December

SC ruled that(1)the proceeds of a life-insurance

policy payable to the insured's estate, on which
the premiums were paid by the conjugal
partnership, constitute community property,
and belong one-half to the husband and the
other half to the wife, exclusively; (2)if the

premiums were paid partly with paraphernal

and partly conjugal funds, the proceeds are
likewise in like proportion paraphernal in part
and conjugal in part; and (3)the proceeds of a
life-insurance policy payable to the insured's
estate as the beneficiary, if delivered to the
testamentary administrator of the former as
part of the assets of said estate under probate
administration, are subject to the inheritance
tax according to the law on the matter, if they
belong to the assured exclusively, and it is

immaterial that the insured was domiciled in

these Islands or outside.
Hence, the defendant was ordered to return to
the plaintiff one-half of the tax collected upon
the amount of P20,150, being the proceeds of
the insurance policy on the life of the late
Adolphe Oscar Schuetze, after deducting the
proportional part corresponding to the first
premium.