G.R. No.

L-58509 December 7, 1982

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF RICARDO B.
BONILLA
deceased,
MARCELA
RODELAS, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
AMPARO
ARANZA,
ET
AL., oppositors-appellees, ATTY.
LORENZO
SUMULONG, intervenor.
Luciano A. Joson for petitioner-appellant.
Cesar Paralejo for oppositor-appellee.

RELOVA, J.:
This case was certified to this Tribunal by the Court of Appeals for final
determination pursuant to Section 3, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court.
As found by the Court of Appeals:
... On January 11, 1977, appellant filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of
Rizal for the probate of the holographic will of Ricardo B. Bonilla and the issuance
of letters testamentary in her favor. The petition, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 8432,
was opposed by the appellees Amparo Aranza Bonilla, Wilferine Bonilla Treyes
Expedita Bonilla Frias and Ephraim Bonilla on the following grounds:
(1) Appellant was estopped from claiming that the deceased left a will by failing to
produce the will within twenty days of the death of the testator as required by
Rule 75, section 2 of the Rules of Court;
(2) The alleged copy of the alleged holographic will did not contain a disposition of
property after death and was not intended to take effect after death, and
therefore it was not a will
(3) The alleged hollographic will itself,and not an alleged copy thereof, must be
produced, otherwise it would produce no effect, as held in Gam v. Yap, 104 Phil.
509; and
(4 ) The deceased did not leave any will, holographic or otherwise, executed and
attested as required by law.
The appellees likewise moved for the consolidation of the case with another case
Sp. Proc. No, 8275). Their motion was granted by the court in an order dated April
4, 1977.

On November 13, 1978, following the consolidation of the cases, the appellees
moved again to dismiss the petition for the probate of the will. They argued that:
(1) The alleged holographic was not a last will but merely an instruction as to the
management and improvement of the schools and colleges founded by decedent
Ricardo B. Bonilla; and
(2) Lost or destroyed holographic wills cannot be proved by secondary evidence
unlike ordinary wills.
Upon opposition of the appellant, the motion to dismiss was denied by the court in
its order of February 23, 1979.
The appellees then filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that the order
was contrary to law and settled pronouncements and rulings of the Supreme
Court, to which the appellant in turn filed an opposition. On July 23, 1979, the
court set aside its order of February 23, 1979 and dismissed the petition for the
probate of the will of Ricardo B. Bonilla. The court said:
... It is our considered opinion that once the original copy of the holographic will is
lost, a copy thereof cannot stand in lieu of the original.
In the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 Phil. 509, 522, the Supreme Court held that 'in the
matter of holographic wills the law, it is reasonable to suppose, regards the
document itself as the material proof of authenticity of said wills.
MOREOVER, this Court notes that the alleged holographic will was executed on
January 25, 1962 while Ricardo B. Bonilla died on May 13, 1976. In view of the
lapse of more than 14 years from the time of the execution of the will to the death
of the decedent, the fact that the original of the will could not be located shows to
our mind that the decedent had discarded before his death his allegedly missing
Holographic Will.
Appellant's motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, an appeal to the Court
of Appeals in which it is contended that the dismissal of appellant's petition is
contrary to law and well-settled jurisprudence.
On July 7, 1980, appellees moved to forward the case to this Court on the ground
that the appeal does not involve question of fact and alleged that the trial court
committed the following assigned errors:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT A LOST HOLOGRAPHIC WILL MAY
NOT BE PROVED BY A COPY THEREOF;
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DECEDENT HAS DISCARDED
BEFORE HIS DEATH THE MISSING HOLOGRAPHIC WILL;

III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING APPELLANT'S WILL.

The only question here is whether a holographic will which was lost or cannot be
found can be proved by means of a photostatic copy. Pursuant to Article 811 of
the Civil Code, probate of holographic wills is the allowance of the will by the court
after its due execution has been proved. The probate may be uncontested or not.
If uncontested, at least one Identifying witness is required and, if no witness is
available, experts may be resorted to. If contested, at least three Identifying
witnesses are required. However, if the holographic will has been lost or destroyed
and no other copy is available, the will can not be probated because the best and
only evidence is the handwriting of the testator in said will. It is necessary that
there be a comparison between sample handwritten statements of the testator
and the handwritten will. But, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic
will may be allowed because comparison can be made with the standard writings
of the testator. In the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 PHIL. 509, the Court ruled that "the
execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be
proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will.
The will itself must be presented; otherwise, it shall produce no effect. The law
regards the document itself as material proof of authenticity." But, in Footnote 8 of
said decision, it says that "Perhaps it may be proved by a photographic or
photostatic copy. Even a mimeographed or carbon copy; or by other similar
means, if any, whereby the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased may
be exhibited and tested before the probate court," Evidently, the photostatic or
xerox copy of the lost or destroyed holographic will may be admitted because
then the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be determined by
the probate court.
WHEREFORE, the order of the lower court dated October 3, 1979, denying
appellant's motion for reconsideration dated August 9, 1979, of the Order dated
July 23, 1979, dismissing her petition to approve the will of the late Ricardo B.
Bonilla, is hereby SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

MCC
INDUSTRIAL
SALES
CORPORATION,
petitioner,
vs.
SSANGYONG
CORPORATION, respondents.
Facts: On April 13, 2000, the petitioner MCC Industrial Steel Corp., a domestic
corporation engaged in the importation and wholesale of stainless steel in the
country, contracted with the herein private respondent, Ssangyon Corporation, a
manufacturer of stainless steel with a head office in Seoul South Korea. MCC
ordered 220 metric ton of stainless steel for $1,860 metric ton. It was arranged
that the respondent will issue the sales invoices through fax, and once the
petitioner conforme to such then MCC through its general manager and president
George Chan, the latter has to fax the same with his signature. On the time the
petitioner had a hard time to open the latters of credit, Ssangyong decided to
negotiate with its mother company in korea to grant MCC a discount and to
extend for a while the opening of letters of credit. Such request was accede by
respondent. The first $70,000 letter of credit was issued by MCC but the
remaining $170,000 was not. On this note, the respondent was compelled to filed
a complaint for breach of contract and prayer for damages. The lower court
acceded with the prayer of the respondent, that indeed petitioner failed comply
with their contract despite discounts given as well as extension for opening of
letter of credit, under the strong protest of the petitioner that the fax copies
presented as document cannot be relied upon as the best evidence.
Issue: Whether the print-out and/or photocopies of facsimile transmissions are
electronic evidence and admissible as such?
Held: Electronic Commerce Act of 2000 (R.A. No. 8792) vis--vis the Rules on
Electronic Evidence.
Although the parties did not raise the question whether the original facsimile
transmissions are "electronic data messages" or "electronic documents" within the
context of the Electronic Commerce Act (the petitioner merely assails as
inadmissible evidence the photocopies of the said facsimile transmissions), we
deem it appropriate to determine first whether the said fax transmissions are
indeed within the coverage of R.A. No. 8792 before ruling on whether the
photocopies thereof are covered by the law. In any case, this Court has ample
authority to go beyond the pleadings when, in the interest of justice or for the
promotion of public policy, there is a need to make its own findings in order to
support its conclusions.
Admissibility of Pro Forma
Invoices; Breach of Contract
by Appellants
Turning first to the appellants' argument against the admissibility of the Pro Forma
Invoices with Reference Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2 (Exhibits
"E", "E-1" and "F", pp. 215-218, Records), appellants argue that the said
documents are inadmissible (sic) being violative of the best evidence rule.

under the New Rules on Electronic Evidence, which came into effect on August 1,
2001. (Rule 2, Section 1 [h], A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC).
"(h) 'Electronic document' refers to information or the representation of
information, data, figures, symbols or other modes of written expression,
described or however represented, by which a right is established or an obligation
extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is received,
recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically. It
includes digitally signed documents and any printout or output, readable by sight
or other means, which accurately reflects the electronic data message or
electronic document. For purposes of these Rules, the term 'electronic document'
may be used interchangeably with 'electronic data message'.
An electronic document shall be regarded as the equivalent of an original
document under the Best Evidence Rule, as long as it is a printout or output
readable by sight or other means, showing to reflect the data accurately. (Rule 4,
Section 1, A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC)
The ruling of the Appellate Court is incorrect. R.A. No. 8792, otherwise known as
the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, considers an electronic data message or an
electronic document as the functional equivalent of a written document for
evidentiary purposes. The Rules on Electronic Evidence regards an electronic
document as admissible in evidence if it complies with the rules on admissibility
prescribed by the Rules of Court and related laws, and is authenticated in the
manner prescribed by the said Rules. An electronic document is also the
equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule, if it is a printout
or output readable by sight or other means, shown to reflect the data accurately.
Thus, to be admissible in evidence as an electronic data message or to be
considered as the functional equivalent of an original document under the Best
Evidence Rule, the writing must foremost be an "electronic data message" or an
"electronic document."
The Electronic Commerce Act of 2000 defines electronic data message and
electronic document as follows:
Sec. 5. Definition of Terms. For the purposes of this Act, the following terms are
defined, as follows:
xxx
c. "Electronic Data Message" refers to information generated, sent, received or
stored by electronic, optical or similar means.
xxx
f. "Electronic Document" refers to information or the representation of information,
data, figures, symbols or other modes of written expression, described or however
represented, by which a right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by
which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded,
transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically.

The argument is untenable.

The copies of the said pro-forma invoices submitted by the appellee are
admissible in evidence, although they are mere electronic facsimile printouts of
appellant's orders. Such facsimile printouts are considered Electronic Documents

The definitions under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, its IRR and the Rules
on Electronic Evidence, at first glance, convey the impression that facsimile
transmissions are electronic data messages or electronic documents because they
are sent by electronic means. The expanded definition of an "electronic data

message" under the IRR, consistent with the UNCITRAL Model Law, further
supports this theory considering that the enumeration "xxx [is] not limited to,
electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy."
And to telecopy isto send a document from one place to another via a fax
machine.
Indeed the court proved that it was within the intention of the framers of the law
to consider that original printout or the electronic data store in computer or
electronic gadget reduced in a readable form, will be considered as written
instrument provided that proper authentication be made and proved, to which the
respondent managed to do so.
The high court ruled in favor of the respondent.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

Versus MA. IMELDA IMEE R. MARCOS-MANOTOC, FERDINAND BONGBONG R.
MARCOS, JR., GREGORIO MA. ARANETA III, IRENE R. MARCOS-ARANETA, YEUNG
CHUN FAN, YEUNG CHUN HO, YEUNG CHUN KAM, and PANTRANCO EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION (PEA)-PTGWO, Respondents.
G. R. No. 171701
February 8, 2012
FACTS:
After the People Power Revolution in 1986, President Corazon C. Aquino created
the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) that was primarily
tasked to investigate and recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth amassed by the
then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives and
associates.
On 16 July 1987, the PCGG, acting on behalf of the Republic with the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Complaint for Reversion, Reconveyance,
Restitution, Accounting and Damages against Ferdinand E. Marcos, who was later
substituted by his estate upon his death; Imelda R. Marcos; and herein
respondents Imee Marcos-Manotoc, Irene Marcos-Araneta, Bongbong Marcos,
Tomas Manotoc, and Gregorio Araneta III.
Four amended Complaints were thereafter filed imputingactive participation and
collaboration of another persons, viz. Nemesio G. Co and Yeungs (Kam, Ho and
Fan) of Glorious Sun Fashion Manufacturing Corporation Phils.; and, Imelda
Cojuangco for the estate of Ramon Cojuangco and Prime Holdings, in the alleged
illegal activities and undertakings of the Marcoses in relation to the 200 Billion
Pesos ill-gotten wealth allegation.
Petitioner presented and formally offered its evidence against herein respondents.
However, the latter objected on the ground that the documents were
unauthenticated and mere photocopies.
On 2002, the Sandiganbayan issued a RESOLUTION ADMITTING all the
documentary exhibits formally offered by the prosecution; however, their
evidentiary value was left to the determination of the Court.
Subsequently, Imelda R. Marcos, Imee Marcos-Manotoc and Bongbong Marcos, Jr.;
Irene Marcos-Araneta and Gregorio Ma. Araneta III;Yeung Chun Kam, Yeung Chun
Ho and Yeung Chun Fan; and the PEA-PTGWO filed their respective Demurrers to
Evidence.
On 2005, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution, granting all the demurrers to
evidence except the one filed by Imelda R. Marcos. The sequestration orders on
the properties in the name of Gregorio Maria AranetaIII are accordingly lifted.
With regard to Imee Marcos-Manotoc and Bongbong Marcos, Jr., Irene Marcos and
Gregorio Araneta III, the court noted that their involvement in the alleged illegal

activities was never established; neither did the documentary evidence pinpoint
their involvement therein. The court held that all presented evidence are hearsay,
for being merely photocopies and that the originals were not presented in court,
nor were they authenticated by the persons who executed them. Furthermore, the
court pointed out that petitioner failed to provide any valid reason why it did not
present the originals in court. These exhibits were supposed to show the interests
of Imee Marcos-Manotoc in the media networks IBC-13, BBC-2 and RPN-9, all three
of which she had allegedly acquired illegally, her alleged participation in dollar
salting through De Soleil Apparel and to prove how the Marcoses used the
Potencianos as dummies in acquiring and operating the bus company
PANTRANCO.
Meanwhile, as far as the YEUNGS were concerned, the court found the allegations
against them baseless. Petitioner failed to demonstrate howGlorious Sunwas used
as a vehicle for dollar salting; or to show that they were dummies of the Marcoses.
Again, the court held that the documentary evidence relevant to this allegation
was INADMISSIBLE for being mere photocopies, and that the affiants had not been
presented as witnesses.
ISSUE:
THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN GRANTING THE DEMURRERS TO EVIDENCE FILED
BY RESPONDENTS MA. IMELDA (IMEE) R. MARCOS AND FERDINAND (BONGBONG)
R. MARCOS, JR.; RESPONDENT-SPOUSES GREGORIO ARANETA III AND IRENE
MARCOS ARANETA AND RESPONDENTS YEUNG CHUN KAM, YEUNG CHUN FAN, AND
YEUNG CHUN HO
RULING:
It is petitioners burden to prove the allegations; the operative act on how and in
what manner must be clearly shown through preponderance of evidence.
The petitioner does not deny that what should be proved are the contents of the
documents themselves. It is imperative; therefore, to submit the original
documents that could prove petitioners allegations. Thus, the photocopied
documents are in violation of best evidence rule, which mandates that the
evidence must be the original document itself. Furthermore, petitioner did not
even attempt to provide a plausible reason why the originals were not presented,
or any compelling ground why the court such documents as secondary evidence
absent the affiants testimony.
The presentation of the originals of the aforesaid exhibits is not validly excepted
under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Under Section 3 (d), when the original
document is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a
public office, the original thereof need not be presented. However, all except one
of the exhibits are not necessarily public documents. The transcript of
stenographic notes (TSN) of the proceedings purportedly before the PCGG may be
a public document but what the plaintiff presented was a mere photocopy of the
purported TSN which was not a certified copy and was not even signed by the
stenographer who supposedly took down the proceedings. The Rules provide that
when the original document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a

public office; a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof may
prove its contents.
In order that secondary evidence may be admissible, there must be proof by
satisfactory evidence of (1) due execution of the original; (2) loss, destruction or
unavailability of all such originals and (3) reasonable diligence and good faith in
the search for or attempt to produce the original. None of the abovementioned
requirements were complied by the plaintiff.Exhibits P, Q, R, S, and T were
all photocopies. P, R, and T were affidavits of persons who did not testify
before the Court. Exhibit S is a letter, which is clearly a private document. It is
emphasized, even if originals of these affidavits were presented, they would still
be considered hearsay evidence if the affiants do not testify and identify them.
Petitioner having failed to observe the best evidence rule rendered the offered
documentary evidence futile and worthless in alleged accumulation of ill-gotten
wealth insofar as the specific allegations herein were concerned.Hence,
Sandiganbayan is correct in granting the respondents respective Demurers to
evidence.

September 29, 1962

G.R. No. L-18077
RODRIGO ENRIQUEZ, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
SOCORRO A. RAMOS, defendant-appellee.
Gelacio L. Dimaano for plaintiffs-appellants.
Vicente K. Aranda for defendant-appellee.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
This is an action for foreclosure of a real estate mortgage.
It is alleged that on November 24, 1958 defendant purchased from plaintiffs 20
parcels of land located in Quezon City and covered by transfer certificates of title
for the amount of P235,056.00 of which only the amount of P35,056.00 was paid
on the date of sale, the balance of P200,000.00 being payable within two years
from the date of sale, with 6% interest per annum during the first year, and the
remainder to draw 12% interest per annum if paid thereafter, provided that at
least P100,000.00 should be paid during the first year, otherwise the whole unpaid
balance would become immediately demandable; that to secure the payment of
the balance of P200,000.00 defendant executed a mortgage in favor of plaintiffs
upon the 20 parcels of land sold and on a half interest over a parcel of land in
Bulacan which was embodied in the same deed of sale; that said deed of sale with
mortgage was registered in the Offices of the Registers of Deeds of Quezon City
and Pampanga; and that as defendant broke certain stipulations contained in said
deed of sale with mortgage, plaintiffs instituted the present foreclosure
proceedings.
Defendant set up as affirmative defense that the contract mentioned in the
complaint does not express the true agreement of the parties because certain
important conditions agreed upon were not included therein by the counsel who
prepared the contract; that the stipulation that was omitted from the contract was
the promise assumed by plaintiffs that they would construct roads in the lands
which were to be subdivided for sale on or before January, 1959; that said
condition was not placed in the contract because, according to plaintiffs' counsel,
it was a superfluity, inasmuch as there is an ordinance in Quezon City which
requires the construction of roads in a subdivision before lots therein could be
sold; and that, upon the suggestion of plaintiff's counsel, their promise to
construct the roads was not included in the contract because the ordinance was
deemed part of the contract. Defendant further claims that the true purchase
price of the sale was not P235,056.00 but only P185,000.00, the difference of
P50,000.00 being the voluntary contribution of defendant to the cost of the
construction of the roads which plaintiffs assumed to do as abovementioned.
After the reception of the evidence, the trial court sustained the contention of
defendant and dismissed the complaint on the ground that the action of plaintiffs
was premature. It found that plaintiffs really assumed the construction of the
roads as a condition precedent to the fulfillment of the obligation stipulated in the

contract on the part of defendant, and since the same has not been undertaken,
plaintiffs have no cause of action. In due time, plaintiffs have appealed.
The evidence of record discloses the following facts: On November 6, 1966,
plaintiffs entered into a contract of conditional sale with one Pedro del Rosario
covering a parcel of land in Quezon City described in Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 1148 which has a total area of 77,772 square meters in consideration of a
purchase price of P10.00 per square meter. To guarantee the performance of the
conditions stipulated therein a performance bond in the amount of P100,000.00
was executed by Pedro del Rosario. Del Rosario was given possession of the land
for development as a subdivision at his expense. He undertook to pay for the
subdivision survey, the construction of roads, the installation of light and water,
and the income tax plaintiffs may be required to pay arising from the transaction,
in consideration of which Del Rosario was allowed to buy the property for
P600,000.00 within a period of two years from November 6, 1956 with the
condition that, upon his failure to pay said price when due, all the improvements
introduced by him would automatically become part of the property without any
right on his part to reimbursement and the conditional sale would be rescinded.
Unable to pay the consideration of P600,000.00 as agreed upon, and in order to
avoid court litigation, plaintiffs and Del Rosario, together with defendant Socorro
A. Ramos, who turned out to be a partner of the latter, entered into a contract of
rescission on November 24, 1958. To release the performance bond and to enable
defendant to pay some of the lots for her own purposes, plaintiffs allowed
defendant to buy 20 of the lots herein involved at the rate of P16.00 per square
meter on condition that she will assume the payment of P50,000.00 as her share
in the construction of roads and other improvements required in the subdivision.
This situation led to the execution of the contract of sale Exhibit A subject of the
present foreclosure proceedings.
The main issues closed in this appeal are: (1) Is the purchase price of the 20 lots
bought by defendant from plaintiffs the sum of P185,000.00, as claimed by
defendant, or P235.056.00, as claimed by plaintiffs?; and (2) Was an oral
agreement, coetaneous to the execution of the contract of sale, entered into
between the parties to the effect that plaintiffs would undertake the construction
of the roads on the lots sold before defendant could be required to comply with
her financial obligation?
Defendant contends that the contract of sale Exhibit A does not express the true
agreement of the parties because certain important conditions agreed upon were
not included therein by plaintiffs' counsel among which is the promise assumed by
plaintiffs that they would undertake to construct the roads that may be required in
the subdivision subject sale of the sale on or before January, 1959; that said
condition was not placed in the contract because plaintiffs' counsel said that it
was a superfluity inasmuch as there was then in Quezon City an ordinance which
requires the construction of road in a subdivision before the lots therein could be
sold; and that, upon the suggestion of plaintiffs' counsel, such commitment was
not included in the contract because the ordinance aforesaid was already deemed
to be part of the contract.

Plaintiffs, on the other hand, dispute the above contention arguing that there was
no such oral agreement or understanding because all that was agreed upon
between the parties was already expressed and included in the contract of sale
Exhibit A executed between the parties, and since defendant failed to pay the
balance of her obligation within the period stipulated the whole obligation became
due and demandable thus giving plaintiffs the right to foreclose the mortgage in
accordance with law.
After considering and evaluating the evidence submitted by both parties, the court
a quo found defendant's contention well-taken, thereby concluding that the action
of plaintiffs was premature. In reaching this conclusion; the court a quo made the
following comment:
. . . The Court is of the opinion that the construction of the roads was a condition
precedent to the enforcement of the terms of Exhibit A, particularly the
foreclosure of mortgage, for the reason that the subdivision regulations of Quezon
City requires, as a matter of law, that the sellers of lands therein to be converted
into subdivision lots must construct the roads in said subdivision before the lots
could be sold. This requirement must have been uppermost in the mind of the
parties in this case which led to the execution of the so-called 'Explanation'
(Exhibit 3) wherein it is stated that the sum of P50,000.00 was a contribution of
the herein defendant for the construction of the roads which the plaintiffs would
undertake 'in accordance with the provisions of the City Ordinance of Quezon City'
(Exhibit 3). It is to be noted that Exhibit 3 was executed on November 24, 1958,
the very day when Exhibit A was also executed. Exhibit 3 also proves that the
purchase price is not, as appearing in the deed of sale with mortgage Exhibit A,
actually P235,000.00 but only P185,000.00 which would approximately be the
price of the entire area of the land sold at the rate of P16.00 per square meter.
We find no error in the conclusion reached by the court a quo for indeed that is the
condition to be expected by a person who desires to purchase a big parcel of land
for purposes of subdivision. In a subdivision the main improvement to be
undertaken before it could be sold to the public is feeder roads as otherwise it
would be inaccessible and valueless and would offer no attraction to the buying
public. And so it is correct to presume was the court a quo did, that when the sale
in question was being negotiated the construction of roads in the prospective
subdivision must have been uppermost in the mind of defendant for her purpose
in purchasing the property was to develop it into a subdivision. That such
requirement was uppermost in the mind of defendant is proven by the execution
by the plaintiffs of the so-called "Explanation" (Exhibit 3) on the very day the deed
of sale was executed wherein it was stated that the sum of P50,000.00 was
advanced by defendant as her contribution to the construction of the roads which
plaintiffs assumed to undertake "in accordance with the provisions of the City
Ordinance of Quezon City." It is to be noted that said document specifically states
that the amount of P50,000.00 should be deducted from the purchase price of
P235,056.00 appearing in the deed of sale, and this is a clear indication that the
real purchase price is only P185,000.00 as claimed by defendant, which would
approximately be the price of the entire area of the land at the rate of P16.00 per
square meter.

A circumstance which lends cogency to defendant's claim that the commitment of

plaintiffs to construct roads was not inserted in the contract because of the
insurance made by their counsel that it would be a superfluity is the fact that in
Quezon City there was really an ordinance which requires the construction of
roads it subdivision before lots therein could be sold, and considering that this
assurance came from the very counsel who prepared the document who even
intimated that ordinance was deemed part of the contract, defendant must have
agreed to the omission relying on the good faith plaintiffs and their counsel. At
any rate, the execute of the document Exhibit 3 clarifies whatever doubt may
have existed with regard to the true terms of the agreement on the matter.
It is argued that the court a quo erred in allowing presentation of parole evidence
to prove that a conteporaneous oral agreement was also reached between parties
relative to the construction of the roads for same is in violation of our rule which
provides that when the terms of an agreement had been reduced to writing it is to
be considered as containing all that has been agreed upon and that no evidence
other than the terms there can be admitted between the parties (Section 22, Rule
123). This rule, however, only holds true if there is allegation that the agreement
does not express the intent of the parties. If there is and this claim is in issue in
the pleadings, the same may be the subject parole evidence (Idem.). The fact that
such failure has been put in issue in this case is patent in the answer wherein
defendant has specifically pleaded that the contract of sale in question does not
express the true intent of the parties with regard to the construction of the roads.
It appearing that plaintiffs have failed to comply with the condition precedent
relative to the construction of the roads in the subdivision in question, it follows
that their action is premature as found by the court a quo. The failure of defendant
to pay the realty and income taxes as agreed upon, as well as to register the
mortgage with respect to the Bulacan property, aside from being minor matters,
appear sufficiently explained in the brief of defendant-appellee.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against
appellants.

[G.R. No. 162109. January 21, 2005]

LAPANDAY AGRICULTURAL & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (L.S. VENTURES, INC.,
ALREADY MERGED WITH LAPANDAY AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT CORP.),
petitioner, vs. MAXIMO ESTITA, JUANITO ABASOLO, PEDRO ALQUIZA, ISMAEL
ALFAR, MANUEL ALFAR, ERLINDA S. ARIS, PAULO ABLAA, RUFO ALIPUYO, MARY
ANION, ROSALIO ALFAR, AQUILINO ABILIS, HERSON ALFANTA, GETRODEZ
BALANAY, ELENA BATO-BATO, ALBERTO BOHOLST, PRISCILA CABATUAN,
VICTORINO CABATUAN, RUPERTO CABATUAN, CRISTINO CONANG, PANFILO,
CABIGAS, APOLINARIO CABIGAS, EUSTAQUIO CELEN, ANTONIA COMENDADOR,
POLICARPIO CLARIDO, JOSE CABONITA, CANDELARIO COSEP, GUILLERMO
CASINILLO, SEBASTIAN CASINILLO, JOSE CAMUS, MARGARITO CLARIDO, JUAN
CABAOG, MARIAS CABAOG, MARIAS CABAOG, TEOFISTA CASAS, ISMAEL
CLARIDO, TOMASA BUDIANG, SOZIMA CASAS, LEONARDO CEJAS, JOSUE DANDAN,
EFREN DEL RIO, LEONARDO DELLO, PABLO DINALO, BERNARDITO EUSALINA,
EGMEDIO EUSALINA, PELAGIO ESTITA, MAMERTA ENERO, MARCELINA ENERO,
REMEGIO ENERO, MATEO ENERO, PLACIDO ESPINOSA, ANA FRANCO, MELVIN
FRANCO, ELESIO GEONSON, CIRIACO GEONSON, URBANO GEONSON, CIRIACO
GEONSON, MARINA GEONSON, TEOFILO GEONSON, GAUDIOSO GEONSON,
ANACLITO GEONSON, LAREANA GEONSON, URBANO GEONSON, ANDRICA GIOCA,
MARCILA GEALON, RODRIGO GEALON, PATERNO GUMBA, AGAPITO GUMBA,
FRANCISCO HERSAMIO, ROMEO INONG, ABDON INONG, ANDRES YBAEZ, ALBINA
JIMENEZ, SERGIO JIMENEZ, SIMPLICIO LABRADO, ENCARNACION LASCUA,
IGNACIA LASCUA, MELCHOR LACANG, MAURITO LOQUIO, GAUDIOSO LASCUA,
PRIMO MONTAEZ, JOSE MONTAEZ, BEINVINIDO MONTAEZ, PABLO MENDOZA,
JUANITA MENDOZA, VICENTE MACION, JR., CIPRIANA MACION, EDUARDO
MONTOYA, CESAR MADRAGA, JUSTO NORO, ALEXANDER NORO, DOMINGO NORO,
FERMIN NORO, QUINTIN NORO, MAURO NORO, ULPIANO NORO, GERTRODEZ
NORO, ENRIQUE OBENZA, DANILO OBENZA, LEONARDO PEPITO, EULALIO
PANLAAN, EDILITO PAMULAWAN, LEONILA PACIONES, REMEDIOS PACIONES,
REGALADO PACIONES, JAIME RECEBAS, RODRIGO REBUYAS, AMANCIO RESGONIA,
EPETACIO ROLUNA, LEONARDO ROTAQUIOU, ISIDRA RAMOS, HERMINIGILDO
SELGAS, LILIA TAPIC, ISIDRO TALAOGON, IGMEDIO VILLARIN, EUGENIA BRIGOLE,
FLAVIANO BATOBATO, MANUELA PIALA, CLAUDIA ENERO, GEORGE COSEP,
ANTONIO COSEP, ALFREDO MENDOZA, ALBERTO MENDOZA, QUINTIN JABELLO,
DOLORES JABILLO, ROLUNA DIONESIO, LOLITA ALFOJA, TOCAO RODOLFO,
AVELINO, CABONIA, GAUDENCIO VILLARAMIA, MARIA PESIAO AND SOFIO
ANTIPUESTO, VICTORIANO CASAS, CELEDONIO CARILLO, CONCHITA CARILLO,
CORNELIO BAYARCAL, AURELIO GALLARDO, FRANCISCA CARTAGENA, AVELINO
CABONITA, BALBINO HERSAMIO, TEOFISTO ABALAA, NORMA GANTUANCO and
PATERNO GUMBA and/or MEMBERS OF THE DAVAO DEL SUR FARMERS
ASSOCIATION (DASURFA), respondents.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
In this verified petition for review on certiorari, petitioner Lapanday Agricultural &
Development Corporation assails and seeks the annulment of the following
issuances of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 71230, to wit:

1. Decision dated September 3, 2003,[1] declaring as valid an earlier decision

dated January 17, 2001 of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB) in DARAB Case No. 8117, which, in turn, affirmed with modification the
resolution dated October 20, 1997 of the DAR Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator of Digos, Davao del Sur in a land dispute involving the vast
agricultural land of the late Orval Hughes at Malalag, Davao del Sur; and
2. Resolution dated January 19, 2004,[2] denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
We lift from the decision under review and reproduce hereunder the factual
backdrop of the case, thus:
The instant petition involves a vast tract of an agricultural land with an area of
716 hectares located at Malalag, Davao del Sur. On July 28, 1924, this land was
leased by the Government to Orval Hughes for a period of twenty-five (25) years
under Lease Application No. 815 (E-172). The lease actually expired on May 25,
1952, it having been extended for three (3) years. Orval Hughes died and was
survived by his five (5) heirs who then filed their Sales Application Nos. V-11538,
V-12992, V-13837, V-14586 and V- 15003 with the Bureau of Lands. Teodulo
Tocao, et al., filed a protest against the sales application.
On August 20, 1957, the Office of the President gave due course to the
applications to cover only 317 hectares at 63 hectares per heir as per OCT No. P4712 but awarded 399 hectares to 133 protesters [led by Teodulo Tocao] at three
(3) hectares each.
On September 17, 1981, the Ministry of Natural Resources issued an Order
implementing said decision (Annex N, Rollo, pp. 160-164). However, the 133
petitioners listed in the said Order were not in possession of the land allotted to
them. So, they formed the Malalag Land Petitioners Association, Inc. (The
Association) headed by one Cecilio R. Mangubat Sr.
On the other hand, those in possession of the land sought the assistance of the
Malalag Ventures Plantation Inc., in its development into a viable banana
production project to which the corporation acceded.
Meanwhile, on November 12, 1987, the Supreme Court in Minister of Natural
Resources vs. Heirs of Orval Hughes, 155 SCRA 566, sustained the OP decision
and it became final and executory.
On December 12, 1991, the association, through its president Mr. Mangubat, sent
a letter to the management of Lapanday Group of Companies, Inc. manifesting
that they were no longer interested in the government grant under the Order of
the Ministry of Natural Resources and offered to transfer and waive whatever
interest they have over the subject land for a monetary consideration (Annex O,
Rollo, p. 165).
Mr. Mangubat was the first to relinquish his right for P54,000.00 (Annex P, Rollo,
p. 166). The individual respondents allegedly followed suit. He facilitated the

relinquishment in the Office of the Commission on the Settlement of Land

Problems (COSLAP) (Annex Q, Rollo, pp. 167-169).
It therefore came as a surprise when, on January 17, 1995, the individual
respondents filed [against Lapanday and/or L.S. Ventures, Inc., the Heirs of Orval
Hughes, the DENR/COSLAP and Cecilio Mangubat, Sr.] the following cases: forcible
entry, reinstatement, nullification of affidavits of quitclaims, relinquishment,
waiver and any other documents on disposition of lands before the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (PARAD) of Digos, Davao, del Sur. They
alleged that since 1947, they had been the share tenants-tillers, openly and
continuously, of the late Orval Hughes and his heirs and they remained as such on
the 317 hectares land (Annexes A & B, Rollo, pp. 40-72).
They further averred that on February 11, 1991, petitioner-corporation, Hughes
heirs and Cecilio Mangubat Sr., conspiring together, misled them to receive
P54,000.00 each as rentals on their respective landholdings and deceived to sign
receipts in English which turned out to be affidavits of quitclaims in favor of the
petitioner (Annex E, PARAD Decision dated July 9, 1997, p. 3; Rollo, p. 111).
Petitioner [Lapanday Agricultural & Development Corporation] opposed said
actions for being factually and legally baseless, there being no entity by the name
of Lapanday and L.S. Ventures Inc. which has agricultural operation in Davao del
Sur. The fact is that said company had already merged with Lapanday Agricultural
and Development Corporation (Annexes C & M, Rollo, pp. 73-79 & 159,
respectively).
In a decision dated July 9, 1997,[3] the DAR Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
of Digos, Davao del Sur, Mardonio L. Edica, rendered judgment in favor of the
Malalag Ventures Plantation, Inc. and declared the entire 716-hectare property as
covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program or CARP.
More
specifically, the decision dispositively reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, a decision is hereby rendered declaring that
the entire 716 hectares shall be covered by CARP. The portion planted to bananas
by the Malalag Plantation Ventures shall be governed by Sections 13 and 32 of
Republic Act No. 6657 in favor of Malalag Land Petitioner Association. The
Operation Division of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office shall implement this
decision in accordance with existing guidelines, rules and regulations.
The heirs of Orval Hughes are hereby ordered to reinstate the Malalag Land
Petitioners Association. Leasehold tenancy shall be observed collectively, pending
recommendation by the PARO Operations Division, without prejudice to the
outcome of the cases still pending with the administrative agencies and the
regular courts.
SO ORDERED.
Upon motion for reconsideration, Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator Mardonio
L. Edica, in a Resolution dated October 20, 1997,[4] modified his aforequoted
decision of July 9, 1997 by specifically directing Lapanday and/or L.S. Ventures,

Inc. to turn over the area involved for CARP coverage, and ordering the Hughes
heirs to reinstate the members of the Davao del Sur Farmers Association
(DASUFRA) as leasehold tenants of the subject land. We quote the dispositive
portion of the same Resolution:
WHEREFORE, the decision of 9 July 1997 is hereby modified to read:
Declaring that the entire 716 hectares shall be covered by CARP. The portion
planted to bananas by the Malalag Plantation Ventures, Inc. shall be governed by
Sections 13 and 32 of Republic Act No. 6657 in favor of qualified members of the
Malalag Land Petitioners Association (MLPA), and the remaining portion shall be
allotted to all deserving and listed members of the Davao del Sur Farmers
Association (DASUFRA). The LAPANDAY, L.S. Ventures and/or the Malalag
Plantation Ventures, Inc. is hereby mandated to turn over the area involved for
CARP coverage. The Operations division of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office of
Davao del Sur is likewise mandated to implement this resolution in accordance
with existing guidelines, rules and regulations.
The heirs of Orval Hughes are hereby ordered to reinstate the members of the
DASUFRA. Leasehold tenancy shall be observed collectively pending
documentation of the area by the PARO Operations Division regardless of the
outcome of the cases still pending with the administrative agencies and the
regular courts.
The local National Police, Armed Forces of the Philippines or any of the component
units are hereby directed to assist the DAR in the enforcement and/or
implementation of this resolution xxx.
This resolution is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
From the aforequoted resolution of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator,
Lapanday and/or L.S. Ventures, Inc., went on appeal to the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), at Quezon City where the appeal
was docketed as DARAB Case No. 8117.
In a decision dated January 17, 2001,[5] the DARAB, ruling that the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator had no jurisdiction to declare the entire 716-hectare
landholding as covered by the CARP and that the only issue within his competence
is to find out whether sufficient grounds exist to warrant respondents
dispossession from the 317-hectare portion thereof which was earlier awarded to
the heirs of Orval Hughes, modified the appealed resolution of Provincial
Adjudicator Edica, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Resolution of October 20, 1997,
is hereby MODIFIED to read as follows:
1. Ordering respondents heirs of Orval Hughes to vacate the premises of the 133
(sic, should be 399) hectares which were long ago awarded to 133 awardees who

were identified in the Order of Natural Resources Minister dated September 17,
1981, and turn over the peaceful possession thereof to the said 133 awardees or
their heirs;

erred (1) in assuming jurisdiction over an issue covering a public land; and (2) in
rendering judgment against it even as it is not a real party-in-interest in the case.
The petition is bereft of merit.

2. Ordering respondents Lapanday and/or L.S. Ventures and Hughes heirs to

restore petitioners Maximo Estita, et al., to their respective farmlots within the 317
hectares owned by the Hughes Heirs; and
3. Declaring the nullity of the quitclaims allegedly executed by petitioners.
The matter of placing the 317 hectares under CARP shall be pursued in the proper
forum which is the Office of the Honorable DAR Secretary.
This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
With their motion for reconsideration of the same decision having been denied by
DARAB in its Resolution of March 15, 2002, Lapanday and/or L.S. Ventures, Inc.,
this time under the name Lapanday Agricultural & Development Corporation (the
herein petitioner), elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via a petition for
review, thereat docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 71230.
As stated at the threshold hereof, the Court of Appeals, in a Decision dated
September 3, 2003,[6] denied petitioners recourse thereto for being merely
dilatory and accordingly upheld the validity of the aforementioned DARAB decision
of 17 January 2001 and resolution of 15 March 2002, as follows:
WHEREFORE, in consonance with the Supreme Courts directive not to further
delay the implementation of the August 20, 1957 Decision, the instant petition is
hereby DENIED for being dilatory. The assailed Decision of the DARAB dated 17
January 2001 and Resolution dated 15 March 2002 are declared VALID.
Petitioner and its counsel are warned not to further resort to measures of this
nature, otherwise, they shall be dealt with severely for having abused the
processes of the courts.
The individual respondents who received the amount of P54,000.00 are ordered to
return the same to the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
In time, petitioner moved for a reconsideration, which motion was denied by the
same court in the herein equally assailed Resolution dated January 19, 2004[7] for
being merely pro forma.
Hence, this recourse by petitioner Lapanday Agricultural & Development
Corporation on its basic submission that the Department of Agrarian Reform thru
its Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator, the DARAB and the Court of Appeals all

Before going any further, however, we shall first address respondents concern as
to what remedy petitioner has resorted to in coming to this Court: whether by
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, wherein only
questions of law may be raised, albeit jurisprudence extends this remedy even
to questions of fact in exceptional cases,[8] or by the special civil action of
certiorari under Rule 65, whereunder the main inquiry is whether there is grave
abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdiction.
While the petition raises jurisdictional issue, it is apparent from our reading
thereof that the same is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. For one,
the very recourse itself is captioned as a petition for review on certiorari. For
another, even as petitioner came to this Court from a final decision of the Court of
Appeals, the latter is not impleaded as a nominal party-respondent in the petition
thus filed, as in fact the ones impleaded as respondents in the caption thereof are
only the very same original parties to the case while still in the offices a quo.
We shall then deal with the petition as one filed under Rule 45 and treat the
alleged lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR), the DARAB and the Court of Appeals as allegation of reversible error.
Petitioner first contends that the subject landholding is still part of the public
domain, hence, still under the jurisdiction of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) and, therefore, beyond the coverage of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).
There can be no debate at all that under the Public Land Act, the management
and disposition of public lands is under the primary control of the Director of
Lands (now the Director of the Lands Management Bureau or LMB) subject to
review by the DENR Secretary[9]
The hard reality in this case, however, is that the land in question has ceased to
be public, as in fact it is already titled. As found by both the DARAB and the Court
of Appeals, the 317-hectare land awarded to the Hughes Heirs is covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. P-4712, the existence of which was never refuted
by the petitioner. Specifically, the DARAB decision of January 17, 2001,[10] partly
states:
On August 20, 1957 the Office of the President gave due course to applications to
cover only 317 hectares at 63 hectares each heir as per OCT No. P-4712 but
awarding 399 hectares to 133 awardees at three (3) hectares each (Emphasis
supplied),
a finding reechoed on page 3 of the CA decision of September 3, 2003.[11]

With the above, and bearing in mind that the CARP covers, regardless of tenurial
arrangement and commodity produce, all public and private agricultural lands,
[12] with the DAR vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate,
through its adjudication boards, agrarian reform matters, and exclusive
jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of the agrarian reform
program,[13] we rule and so hold, contrary to petitioners assertion, that the DAR,
thru its Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator at Digos, Davao del Sur correctly
took cognizance of the case in the first instance.
Petitioner next argues that the DARAB decision, as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, ordering Lapanday and/or L.S. Ventures Inc. to restore [respondents]
Maximo Estita et al. to their respective farm lots within the 317 hectares owned by
the Hughes Heirs, has no valid force and effect against petitioner because it is
not a real party-in-interest, pointing out that Lapanday and/or L.S. Ventures, Inc.,
are separate and distinct from petitioners corporate personality. Petitioner
asserts that Lapanday has no juridical personality, while the corporate life of
L.S. Ventures Inc. has ceased when said entity merged with petitioner in 1996.
Moreover, petitioner points out that it has no business operations in Davao del Sur
where the land in question lies.
We are not persuaded.
To begin with, it is basic in the law of procedure that misjoinder of parties is not a
ground for the dismissal of an action, as parties may be dropped or added by
order of the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of
the proceedings and on such terms as are just[14]

Petitioners filing of an Answer has thereby cured whatever jurisdictional defect it

now raises. As we have said time and again, the active participation of a party in
a case pending against him before a court or a quasi judicial body, is tantamount
to a recognition of that courts or bodys jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by
the resolution of the case and will bar said party from later on impugning the
courts or bodys jurisdiction.[16]
But even assuming, in gratia argumenti, that Lapanday does not have a juridical
personality, it may nonetheless be sued under such a name considering that
respondents commonly know petitioner by the name Lapanday Group of
Companies, as shown in their alleged letter of intent to relinquish their rights
over the subject land.[17] This brings to mind Section 15, Rule 3, of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, which reads:
SEC. 15. Entity without juridical personality as defendant. - When two or more
persons not organized as an entity with juridical personality enter into a
transaction, they may be sued under the name by which they are generally or
commonly known (Emphasis added).
Aware of the hopelessness of its cause, petitioner invariably posits that the herein
respondents are not real parties-in-interest and are bereft of any legal personality
to file and initiate the complaint for forcible entry, etc. before the office of the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of Digos, Davao del Sur because they are
not tenant-tillers of the land in dispute. Consequently, so petitioner argues,
respondents are not entitled to be restored thereto.
Petitioners posture cannot hold water.

Then, too, there is the rule that objections to defects in parties should be made at
the earliest opportunity, that is, at the moment such defect becomes apparent, by
a motion to strike the names of the parties wrongly impleaded. For, objections to
misjoinder cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.[15]
Here, aside from unsubstantiated denials that it is not the party referred to in the
complaint for forcible entry, etc., commenced by the respondents before the office
of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of Digos, Davao del Sur, petitioner
did not even file a motion to strike its name in all the proceedings below. Quite the
contrary, and as correctly found by the Court of Appeals in the decision under
review, petitioner corporation x x x filed an Answer (Annex D, Rollo, pp.91-96) thereby submitting to the
jurisdiction of the Board. The same answer bears the name LAPANDAY AND/OR
L.S. VENTURES, INC., signed by its representative Caesar E. Barcenas and
assisted by its counsel Jose V. Yap (Ibid, Rollo, p. 96). This alone negates the
petitioners stance that there is no entity by the name of Lapanday and that L.S.
Ventures, Inc. is seperate and distinct from any company (see Annex M Rollo, p.
159 on Merger of Lapanday Agricultural & Development Corporation and L.S.
Ventures, Inc.). And such admission made by the petitioner in the course of the
proceedings in this case, does not require proof (Sec. 4, Rule 129 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence).

Both the DAR Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator and the DARAB affirmed and
confirmed the tenancy status of the respondents. We see no reason why the Court
of Appeals should not rely on such a finding in upholding the respondents right to
be restored to their respective farmlots as leasehold tenants thereof.
For sure, the evidence adduced by the respondents clearly indicate that they were
tenant-tillers of the 317-hectare land owned by the heirs of Orval Hughes. Indeed,
documents[18] showing that the Judicial Administrator of the Intestate Estate of
Orval Hughes had filed cases in court against the respondents for their failure to
deliver the Estates share in the harvests, are unmistakable proofs that a tenurial
arrangement exists regarding the agricultural produce of the land.
Besides, the heirs of Orval Hughes as former landlords of the respondents, never
denied the tenancy status of the latter, as in fact they did not even bother to
answer respondents complaint for forcible entry, etc., before the Office of the
Provincial Agrarian Adjudicator.
In any event, it need not be stressed that the question regarding the respondents
tenancy status is factual in nature, which is not proper in a petition for review.[19]
More so must this be where, as here, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator,
the DARAB and the Court of Appeals were one in upholding the tenancy status of
the respondents.

The submission is equally puerile.

Moreover, it is axiomatic that findings of administrative agencies, which have
acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are
accorded not only respect but even finality by the courts[20] In Corpuz vs. Sps.
Grospe,[21] we categorically held:
As a rule, if the factual findings of the CA coincide with those of the DARAB an
administrative body which has acquired expertise on the matter such findings
are accorded respect and will not be disturbed on appeal
As tenant-tillers of the 317-hectare land owned by the heirs of Orval Hughes,
respondents are undeniably parties-in-interest to this controversy. As such, they
have the legal personality to institute the action in the office a quo, namely, the
office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator at Digos, Davao del Sur.
But then, there is petitioners contention that respondents interests over the
subject land have already been waived when quitclaims to that effect were
allegedly executed and signed by them.

Waivers of rights and/or interests over landholdings awarded by the government

are invalid for being violative of the agrarian reform laws. To quote from our
decision in Torres vs. Ventura,[22] as reiterated in Corpuz vs. Sps. Grospe: [23]
x x x As such [the farmer-beneficiaries] gained the rights to possess, cultivate
and enjoy the landholding for himself. Those rights over that particular property
were granted by the government to him and no other. To insure his continued
possession and enjoyment of the property, he could not, under the law, make any
valid form of transfer except to the government or by hereditary succession, to his
successors
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.