In Defense of the a Priori by Laurence BonJour

Laurence is concerned with a priori justification for believing something to be true,

not with a prori knowledge as such.
His assumptions:
1. Justification is one of the requirements for knowledgethe only one to which
the issue of a priori status is relevant.
2. Justification in the relevant sense consists in having a good reason for
thinking that the belief in question is true.
The two basic elements of the concept of an a priori reason are:
1. Negativenegatively, an a priori reason for thinking that a claim is true is
one whose rational force or cogency does not derive from experience, either
directly (as in perception) or indirectly (as by inference of any sort
deductive, inductive, or explanatory whose premises derive their
acceptability from experience).
2. Positivepositively, in the most cases a priori reasons result from similar
insights into the truth, indeed the necessary truth, of the relevant claim. Lets
call them a priori insights.
A priori reason negatively understood, does not mean that:
1. Someone who has undergone no experience of any sort could be in
possession of it, since the possession of an a priori reason requires
understanding the claim for which it is a reason, and experience, even
experience of some fairly specific sort, might be required for that.
2. That experience of some sort could not also count for or against the claim in
question.
3. That such experiences could not override, perhaps even more or less
conclusively, the a priori reason in question.
4. That an a priori reason renders the claim certain or infallible.
Difference between a priori insights and hunches or fears:
A priori insights at least reveal not just that the claim is or must be true but also
why this is and indeed must be so. Also, it is often a mistake to think of a priori
insights as propositional in form. In the most fundamental cases (modus ponens),
the application of a propositional insight concerning the cogency of such an
inference would require either a further inference of the very sort in question or one
equally fundamental, thereby leading to vicious regress. Instead the relevant logical
insight must be construed as non-propositional, as a direct grasping of the way in
which the conclusion is related to the premises and validly flows from them.
The argument for a priori reasons from examples:

1. 1 + 1 = 2
2. All squares have four edges.
3. For any propositions P and Q, if it is true that P or Q and it is false that P, then
it is true that Q.
4. If A > B and B > C, then A > C.
5. No surface can be uniformly read and uniformly blue at the same time.
Dialectical Arguments for a priori reasons
First argument: It is concerned with the relation between experience and certain of
the beliefs which it intuitively seems to justify. On any account of the justificatory
force of experience, there will be some beliefs whose justification derives from a
direct relation to experience and others whose relation to experience is less direct.
The most straightforward version of this picture would be a broadly foundationalist
view in which the more directly justified beliefs are justified by the content of
experience alone, without the need for any reasoning or any further premises.
The class of beliefs that are broadly empirical but clearly not justified by a direct
relation to experience is extremely large and important, something that is so for any
conception of the scope of direct experiential justification that has ever been
seriously advocated. This indirectly justified class of beliefs will include at least:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

beliefs about the unobserved past

beliefs about unobserved situations in the present
beliefs about the future
beliefs in laws of nature and similar sorts of generalizations
beliefs about unobservable entities and processes such as those described by
theoretical science

How can experience non-directly justify beliefs of these kinds? If experience can
provide a good reason for thinking that a belief in this category is true, then we
have a logically prior good reason for believing some conditional proposition having
a conjunction of beliefs for which there are direct experiential reasons as
antecedent and the further belief we are focusing on as consequent

b (Jeb -> Jl(b1&b2&bn) -> b), where Jeb = a belief justified by experience and Jlb is belief
justified by logically prior reason
P1: Experience (e) can indirectly-justify (IJ) a belief (B).
P2: If P1, then (b1&b2&bn) -> B).
P3: (b1&b2&bn) -> B.
C: IJeB
Here, b1, b2,bn are propositions that are directly justified by experience.

The argument depends on the truth of the conditional (P3). Why should we assume its truth? If B can be
reduced completely to the conjunction of beliefs that are directly justified by experience, then the
conditional is directly justified by experience. However, if B is irreducible to the conjunction and is over
and above the conjunction, then B cannot be directly justified by experience. Given this, it follows that
the conditional is justified a priori. Otherwise, we have no reason for thinking that any empirical claim
that is not directly justified by experience is true. (This seems an extreme outcome to BonJour).
2nd argument for a priori reasons
P1: If {(p->q)&p}->q (P), then there is a good reason for thinking that a conditional claim is true (Q).
P2. Q cannot be established by experience.
P3: Q can be established by another argument (conditional in form, involving transition from premisses to
conclusion), but this doesnt answer the issuewhat establishes the truth of the conditional claim? Only
leads to further regress.
C: Q can only be established a priori.