1

PETER PAUL DIMATULAC AND VERONICA

PETITIONERS VS. HON. SENSINANDO VILLON

DIMATULAC,

SP03 Virgilio Dimatulac was shot dead at his residence in

Pampanga. A complaint for murder was filed in the MTC and
after preliminary investigation, Judge Designate David issued
warrants of arrest against the accused. Only David, Mandap,
Magat, and Yambao were arrested and it was only Yambao who
submitted his counter-affidavit.

Roura. He also stated that he will no longer allow the private

prosecutor to participate. Judge Roura voluntarily inhibited
himself and was replaced by Judge Villon.
The Petitioners filed with the RTC a Manifestation submitting
documentary evidence to support their contention that the
offense committed was murder. Judge Villon ordered for the
resetting of the arraignment. The Yabuts entered a plea of not
guilty. The petitioners then filed a Urgent Motion to set aside
arraignment. Secretary Guingona of the DOJ resolved the appeal
in favor of the petitioners. He also ruled that treachery was
present.

Judge David then issued a resolution finding reasonable ground

that the crime of murder has been committed and that the
accused is probably guilty thereof. Though it was not clear
whether Pampanga Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor
Sylvia
Alfonso-Flores acted motu proprio, or upon motion of the private
respondents, she conducted a reinvestigation and resolved that
the Yabuts and Danny were in conspiracy, along with the other
accused, and committed homicide.

The Yabuts opposed the Manifestation because they have

already been arraigned and they would be put under double
jeopardy. The Secretary of Justice then set aside his order and
the appeal was held not and academic due to the previous
arraignment of the accused for homicide. Judge Villon denied the
Motion to set aside arraignment. The motion for reconsideration
was also denied. Hence, this petition for certiorari/prohibition
and mandamus.

Facts:

Before the information for homicide was filed, the Petitioner

appealed the resolution of Alfonso-Flores to the Secretary of
Justice. However, Provincial Proseutor Maranag ordered for the
release of David, Mandap, Magat, and Naguit. An information for
homicide was also filed before the Regional Trial Court. Judge
Raura approved the cash bonds of the Yabuts and recalled the
warrants of arrest against them.
Private Prosecutor Amado Valdez then filed a Motion to issue
hold departure order and Urgent Motion to defer proceedings.
Judge Roura deferred the resolution of the first Motion and
denied the second. He also set the arraignment of the accused.
The petitioners filed a Motion to inhibit Judge Roura for hastily
setting the date for arraignment pending the appeal in the DOJ
and for prejudging the matter.

Issues:
Whether the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor committed grave
abuse of discretion in reinvestigating the case without having
the respondents within the custody of the law and for filing the
information pending the appeal of the resolution with the DOJ.
Whether Hon. Villon acted with grave abuse of discretion in
proceeding with the arraignment and for denying the Motions to
set aside the arraignment.
Whether the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of
discretion in reconsidering his order.
Decision:

They also filed a Petition for prohibition with the Court of

Appeals. Public Prosecutor Datu filed a Manifestation and
Comment with the trial court and opposed the inhibition of

Petition is GRANTED.

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Alfonso-Reyes was guilty of having acted with grave abuse of
discretion for conducting a reinvestigation despite the fact that the
Yabuts were still at large. Though Sec. 5, Rule 112 states that the
prosecutor is not bound by the findings of the judge who conducted
the investigation, the resolution should be based on the review of
the record and evidence transmitted. Hence, she should have
sustained the recommendation since all the accused, except
Yambao, failed to file their counter-affidavits. It is impossible for
Alfonso-Reyes to not have known the appeal filed with the DOJ. The
filing of an appeal is provided in Sec. 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court. There is nothing in the law which prohibits the filing of an
appeal once an information is filed.
Judge Roura acted with grave abuse of discretion for
deferring the resolution to the motion for a hold departure order.
Since the accused were out on bail, the Motion should have been
granted since they could have easily fled. Though he is not bound
to the resolution of the DOJ, he should have perused the documents
submitted.
The DOJ was also in grave abuse of its discretion for setting
aside its order. In doing so, it has relinquished its power of control
and supervision of the Public Prosecutor. The state has been
deprived of due process. Hence, the dismissal of the case is null
and void and double jeopardy cannot be invoked by the accused.

DaniloNatividad, a member of the Integrated National Police (INP)

and assigned with the 2nd Narcotics Regional Unit, Narcotics
Command, who was then posing as a buyer of the said prohibited
drug for the consideration of TEN (P10.00) PESOS
Upon arraignment, the accused entered a plea of not guilty to the
crime charged. The trial court then found Enrique, Jr. guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
In this appeal, the accused-appellant vigorously insists in his
innocence. He asserts that the arresting officers did not confiscate
sticks of marijuana or any marked money from him and that
evidences obtained from him should have not been admitted by the
trial court since there was no confiscation receipt shown and were
erroneous because the same were taken during custodial
investigation, therefore, violative of the constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not accused is guilty despite his arguments
regarding the inadmissibility of evidences against him
HELD:
Yes.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANTONIO ENRIQUE, JR.

FACTS:
An Information was file against Antonio Enrique stating that not
being authorized by law to sell, deliver, give away to another or
distribute any prohibited drug, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver five (5) sticks of
marijuana cigarettes, as prohibited drug, to one Patrolman

Appellant completely misses the whole point of his prosecution and

ultimate conviction under RA 6425. He was caught in flagrante
delicto selling marijuana cigarettes to a poseur-buyer in exchange
for money. The commission of the offense of illegal sale of
marijuana requires merely the consummation of the selling
transaction. The serial number of the marked money need not even
be stated in the information. The non-presentation of the marked
money at the trial is not indispensable to the conviction of the
accused-appellant. What is important is the fact that the poseurbuyer received the marijuana from the appellant and that the said
cigarettes were presented in court as evidence. Having been caught

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in the act of selling a prohibited drug, appellant's arrest was lawful.
Hence, whatever is found in the accused-appellant's possession or
in his control may be seized and used in evidence against him.

private prosecutor on the ground that the latter has "absolutely no

standing in the instant proceedings before this Honorable Court
and, hence, without any personality to have any paper of his
entertained by this Tribunal.

We hold that the trial court did not err in convicting the accusedappellant. The evidence on record has fully established his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed
from is AFFIRMED subject to the modification as above-indicated.

The private prosecutors now contend that they are entitled to

appear before this Court, to take part in the proceedings, and to
adopt a position in contravention to that of the Solicitor General.

TAN JR. V. GALLARDO(RULE 110)

FACTS:
This is a Special Civil Action for certiorari with Prohibition;
petitioners seek the annulment of respondent Judge's Orders in 2
Criminal Cases.
By Resolution of this Court dated August 27, 1975, the respondent
Judge was required to file his answer within ten (10) days from
notice, and in connection therewith, a temporary restraining order
was issued to enjoin the respondent from further proceeding with
the afore-mentioned criminal cases.
The petition was subsequently amended to include the People of
the Philippines and thereafter, on January 14, 1976, the Solicitor
General, on behalf of the People of the Philippines, submitted his
Comment to the petition. The Solicitor General informed this Court,
thus: that they are "persuaded that there are bases for stating that
the rendition of respondent Judge's decision and his resolution on
the motion for new trial were not free from suspicion of bias and
prejudice and, therefore, the case should he remanded to the trial
court for the rendition of a new decision.
On January 30, 1976, private prosecutors submitted their Comment
in justification of the challenged Orders of the respondent Judge
BUT objected to the remand of said cases.
On February 12, 1976, the petitioners moved to strike out the
"Motion to Admit Attacked Comment" and the "Comment" of the

ISSUE:
Do the private prosecutors have the right to intervene
independently of the Solicitor General and to adopt a stand
inconsistent with that of the latter in the present proceedings?
HELD:
NO, To begin with, it will be noted that the participation of the
private prosecution in the instant case was delimited by the SC in
its Resolution of October 1, 1975, thus: "to collaborate with the
Solicitor General in the preparation of the Answer and pleadings
that may be required by this Court." To collaborate means to
cooperate with and to assist the Solicitor General. It was never
intended that the private prosecutors could adopt a stand
independent of or in contravention of the position taken by the
Solicitor General.
The prosecuting officer is the representative not of an ordinary
party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to
govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all;
and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it
shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.
The role of the private prosecutors, upon the other hand, is to
represent the offended parts, with respect to the civil action for the
recovery of the civil liability arising from the offense.
Therefore, although the private prosecutors may be permitted to
intervene, they are not in control of the case, and their interests are
subordinate to those of the People of the Philippines represented by
the fiscal.

STA. ROSA MINING V. ZABALA (RULE 110)

Thereafter, Fiscal Ilustre was appointed a judge in the Court of First

Instance of Albay and respondent Fiscal Zabala became officer-incharge of the Provincial Fiscal's Office of CamarinesNorte.

FACTS:
Petitioner filed a complaint for attempted theft of materials (scrap
iron) forming part of the installations on its mining property against
private respondents Romeo Garrido and Gil Alapan with the Office
of the Provincial Fiscal of CamarinesNorte, then headed by
Provincial Fiscal Joaquin Ilustre.

On April 19, 1976, respondent Fiscal filed a Second Motion to

Dismiss the case. This second motion to dismiss was denied by the
trial court in an order dated April 23, 1976. Whereupon, respondent
fiscal manifested that he would not prosecute the case and
disauthorized any private prosecutor to appear therein. Hence, this
petition for mandamus.

After conducting the preliminary investigation, a resolution

recommending that an information for Attempted Theft be filed
against private respondents on a finding of prima facie case which
resolution was approved by Provincial Fiscal Joaquin Ilustre.

ISSUE:
Should the Criminal Case be terminated on a motion filed by the
prosecutor upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who
reviewed the records of the investigation, after an information has
been filed to the court?

On October 29, 1974, Fiscal Ilustre filed with the Court of First
Instance of CamarinesNorte an Information dated October 17, 1987
docketed as Criminal Case No. 821, charging private respondents
with the crime of Attempted Theft.
In a letter dated October 22, 1974, the private respondents
requested the Secretary of Justice for a review of the Resolutions of
the Office of the Provincial Fiscal dated August 26, 1974 and
October 14, 1974.
On March 6, 1975, the Secretary of Justice, after reviewing the
records, reversed the findings of prima facie case of the Provincial
Fiscal and directed said prosecuting officer to immediately move for
the dismissal of the criminal case. Petitioner sought reconsideration
of the directive of the Secretary of Justice but the latter denied the
same in a letter dated June 11, 1975.
A motion to dismiss dated September 16, 1975 was then filed by
the Provincial Fiscal but the court denied the motion on the ground
that there was a prima facie evidence against private respondents
and set the case for trial on February 25, 1976.

HELD:
No, the rule in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or
information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its
dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the
sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the
direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while
the case is already in Court, he cannot impose his opinion on the
trial court.
The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case
before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive
jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by
the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to
grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or
after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed
after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of
Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.
In order therefore to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of
the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal may
be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice should, as
far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or
appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or

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information has already been filed in Court. The matter should be
left entirely for the determination of the Court.
JOHN LONEY V. PEOPLE (RULE 110)
FACTS:
Petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid, and Pedro B.
Hernandez are the President and Chief Executive Officer, Senior
Manager, and Resident Manager for Mining Operations,
respectively, of Marcopper Mining Corporation (Marcopper), a
corporation engaged in mining in the province of Marinduque.
Marcopper had been storing tailings from its operations in a pit in
Mt. Tapian, Marinduque. At the base of the pit ran a drainage tunnel
leading to the Boac and Makalupnit rivers. It appears that
Marcopper had placed a concrete plug at the tunnels end. On 24
March 1994, tailings gushed out of or near the tunnels end. In a
few days, the Mt. Tapian pit had discharged millions of tons of
tailings into the Boac and Makalupnit rivers.
In August 1996, the Department of Justice separately charged
petitioners in the Municipal Trial Court of Boac, Marinduque (MTC)
with violation of the ff.:
Water Code of the Philippines (PD 1067)
National Pollution Control Decree of 1976 (PD 984)
Philippine Mining Act of 1995 (RA 7942); and
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property.
Petitioners moved to quash the Informations among others that the
informations were duplicitous as the Department of Justice
charged more than one offense for a single act.
The MTC granted a partial reconsideration to its Joint Order and
quashing the Informations for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984. The
MTC maintained the Informations for violation of RA 7942 and
Article 365 of the RPC.

The RTC, set aside the Consolidated Order in so far as it quashed

the Informations for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984 and ordered
those charges reinstated by reason that there can be no absorption
by one offense of the three other offenses, as the acts penalized by
these laws are separate and distinct from each other.
The CA, affirmed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Should the charges filed against petitioners, except one, be
quashed for duplicity of charges and only the charge for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property should stand?
HELD:
No Duplicity of Charges in the Present Case. Duplicity of charges
simply means a single complaint or information charges more than
one offense, as Section 13 of Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure clearly states:
Duplicity of offense. A complaint or information must charge but
one offense, except only in those cases in which existing laws
prescribe a single punishment for various offenses.
In short, there is duplicity (or multiplicity) of charges when a single
Information charges more than one offense.
Under Section 3(e), Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure, duplicity of offenses in single information is a ground to
quash the Information.
The Rules prohibit the filing of such
Information to avoid confusing the accused in preparing his
defense. Here, however, the prosecution charged each petitioner
with four offenses, with each Information charging only one offense.
Thus, petitioners erroneously invoke duplicity of charges as a
ground to quash the Informations. On this score alone, the petition
deserves outright denial.
Petitioners further contend that they should be charged with one
offense only Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to
Property because (1) all the charges filed against them proceed
from and are based on a single act or incident of polluting the Boac

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and Makalupnit rivers thru dumping of mine tailings and (2) the
charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC absorbs the other
charges since the element of lack of necessary or adequate
protection, negligence, recklessness and imprudence is common
among them.
The contention has no merit. As early as the start of the last
century, this Court had ruled that a single act or incident might
offend against two or more entirely distinct and unrelated
provisions of law thus justifying the prosecution of the accused for
more than one offense. The only limit to this rule is the
Constitutional prohibition that no person shall be twice put in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.
Here, double jeopardy is not at issue because not all of its elements
are present. However, for the limited purpose of controverting
petitioners claim that they should be charged with one offense
only, we quote with approval Branch 94s comparative analysis of
PD 1067, PD 984, RA 7942, and Article 365 of the RPC showing that
in each of these laws on which petitioners were charged, there is
one essential element not required of the others.

PEOPLE V. TUMLOS(RULE 110)

FACTS:
On or about November 21, 1937, eight cows belonging to
MaximianoSobrevega and five belonging to his son-in-law,
AmbrosioPecasis, then grazing together in the barrio of Libongcogon, municipality of Sara, Province of Iloilo, were taken by the
herein defendant without the knowledge or consent of their
respective owners.
The deputy fiscal of Iloilo filed on July 11, 1938, an information
against the said defendant for the offense of theft of the eight cows
belonging to MaximianoSobrevega, which resulted in his being
sentenced on July 15, 1938, to an indeterminate penalty with the
accessories prescribed by law and costs.

In the information filed in the present case the same defendant is

charged with the theft of five cows belonging to AmbrosioPecasis,
committed on November 21, 1937, the date of the commission of
the theft to the eight cows of MaximianoSobrevega charged to the
previous information.
In support of his appeal the appellant assigns as the only error
allegedly committed by the lower court in the aforesaid judgment
its failure to sustain the defense of "autrefois convict" or double
jeopardy, interposed by said defendant.
ISSUE:
Was there double jeopardy in the case at bar?
HELD:
Yes, the theft of the thirteen cows committed by the defendant took
place at the same time and in the same place; consequently, he
performed but one act. The fact that eight of said cows pertained to
one owner and five to another does not make him criminally liable
for two distinct offenses, for the reason that in such case the act
must be divided into two, which act is not susceptible of division.
The intention was likewise one, namely, to take for the purpose of
appropriating or selling the thirteen cows which he found grazing in
the same place. As neither the intention nor the criminal act is
susceptible of division, the offense arising from the concurrence of
its two constituent elements cannot be divided, it being immaterial
that the subject matter of the offense is singular or plural, because
whether said subject matter be one or several animate or inanimate
objects, it is but one.
Therefore, as the five cows alleged to be stolen by Irineo Tumlos
were integral parts of the thirteen cows which were the subject
matter of theft, and as he had already been tried for and convicted
of the theft of the other five.
JARANTILLA V. CA (RULE 111)

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FACTS:
The records show that private respondent Jose Kuan Sing was "sideswiped by a vehicle which was then driven by petitioner Edgar
Jarantilla and that private respondent sustained physical injuries as
a consequence.

civil action arising from the act or omission complained of, file a
separate action for civil liability arising from the same act or
omission where the herein petitioner was acquitted in the criminal
action on reasonable doubt and no civil liability was adjudicated or
awarded in the judgment of acquittal?

Petitioner was accordingly charged before the then City Court of

Iloilo for serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence. Private
respondent, as the complaining witness therein, did not reserve his
right to institute a separate civil action and he intervened in the
prosecution of said criminal case through a private prosecutor.
Petitioner was acquitted in said criminal case "on reasonable
doubt".

HELD:
Yes, although it was held that where the offended party elected to
claim damages arising from the offense charged in the criminal
case through her intervention as a private prosecutor, the final
judgment rendered therein constituted a bar to the subsequent civil
action based upon the same cause.

On October 30, 1974, private respondent filed a complaint against

the petitioner in the former Court of First Instance of Iloilo, and
which civil action involved the same subject matter and act
complained of in the criminal case.
In his answer filed therein, the petitioner alleged as special and
affirmative defense that the private respondent had no cause of
action and, additionally, that the latter's cause of action, if any, is
barred by the prior judgment in the criminal case inasmuch as when
said criminal case was instituted the civil liability was also deemed
instituted since therein plaintiff failed to reserve the civil aspect and
actively participated in the criminal case.
After trial, the CFI rendered judgment on May 23, 1977 in favor of
the herein private respondent and ordering herein petitioner to pay
the former for the hospitalization, medicines, for other actual
expenses, for moral damages, for attorney's fees, and costs.
The respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower
court and a motion for reconsideration was denied by respondent
court.
ISSUE:
Can the private respondent, who was the complainant in the
criminal action for physical injuries thru reckless imprudence and
who participated in the prosecution thereof without reserving the

In the case under consideration, private respondent participated

and intervened in the prosecution of the criminal suit against
petitioner. Under the present jurisprudential milieu, where the trial
court acquits the accused on reasonable doubt, it could very well
make a pronouncement on the civil liability of the accused and the
complainant could file a petition for mandamus to compel the trial
court to include such civil liability in the judgment of acquittal.
Private respondent, as already stated, filed a separate civil action
after such acquittal. This is allowed under Article 29 of the Civil
Code.
Thus, when the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on
the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable
doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may
be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of
evidence.
Another consideration in favor of private respondent is the doctrine
that the failure of the court to make any pronouncement, favorable
or unfavorable, as to the civil liability of the accused amounts to a
reservation of the right to have the civil liability litigated and
determined in a separate action. The rules nowhere provide that if
the court fails to determine the civil liability it becomes no longer
enforceable.

DAVID B. CAMPANANO, JR. vs. JOSE ANTONIO A. DATUIN

FACTS:

Seishin International Corporation, represented by its presidentherein petitioner David B. Campanano, Jr. filed against respondent.
An Information for violation ofB.P. Blg. 22. respondent was
convicted of Estafa by the Regional Trial Court, of Pasig City by
Decision of May 3, 1999. Meanwhile, sometime in July 15,
2003when he vacated his office, found the cash voucher
evidencing his cash payment of the two (2) road rollers, Sakai
brand, which he purchased from Mr. Yasonobu Hirota, representing
Seishin International Corporation, in the amount of Two Hundred
Thousand (P200,000.00) Pesos. The cash voucher was dated June
28, 1993, and it was signed by respondent and Mr. Hirota.

By Resolution of January 20, 2004, the Office of the City Prosecutor

of Quezon City dismissed respondent's complaint for incriminating
innocent person It appearing that the case of estafa was filed in
Pasig City , and the testimony given by respondent David Campano,
Jr. was also made in Pasig City , this office has no jurisdiction on the
above-entitled complainant.

ISSUE:

Whether the City prosecutor of Quezon City has jurisdiction over

the complaint filed by the respondent

HELD:
Claiming that the complaint of Seishin International Corporation
against him was false, unfounded and malicious respondent filed a
complaint for Incriminating Against Innocent Persons, before the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon city against petitioner and a
certain Yasunobu Hirota.

In filing the complaint for Estafa - fully knowing that it was baseless
and without factual or legal basis, according to respondent Mr.
Campanano, Jr. and Mr. Hirota should be criminally liable for the
crime of Incriminating Innocent Persons punishable under Article
363 of the Revised Penal Code.

It is doctrinal that in criminal cases, venue is an essential element

of jurisdiction; and that the jurisdiction of a court over a criminal
case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or
information.

The complaint-affidavit for incriminating innocent person filed by

respondent with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City on
August 28, 2003 does not allege that the crime charged or any of
its essential ingredients was committed in Quezon City . The only

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reference to Quezon City in the complaint-affidavit is that it is
where respondent resides. Respondent's complaint-affidavit was
thus properly dismissed by the City Prosecutor of Quezon City for
lack of jurisdiction

The Court of Appeals' conclusion-basis of its reversal of the DOJ

Resolutions that since petitioner's November 20, 2003 CounterAffidavit to respondent's complaint for incriminating innocent
person was executed in Quezon City, the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City had acquired jurisdiction to conduct
preliminary investigation of the case is thus erroneous.
In any event, the allegations in the complaint-affidavit do not make
out a clear probable cause of incriminating innocent person under
Article 363 of the Revised Penal Code.

The petition is Granted. The Court of Appeals Decision of

December 9, 2005 is Reversed and set aside. The complaint of
respondent for Incriminating Innocent Person filed against
petitioner David Campamano, Jr. is Dismissed

ERNESTO M. FULLERO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:
In 1977, petitioner was employed as a telegraph operator at the
Bureau of Telecommunications Office in Iriga City. In 1982, he
became the Acting Chief Operator of the same office until 1994. A
Personal Data Sheet (PDS) purportedly accomplished and signed by
petitioner, states that he passed the Civil Engineering Board

Examination. It appears that he submitted the PDS to the Bureau of

Telecommunications Regional Office, Legazpi City (BTO, Legazpi
City). A letter dated and signed by petitioner shows that he applied
for the position of either a Junior Telecommunications Engineer or
Telecommunications Traffic Supervisor with the Regional Director of
the Civil Service Commission (CSC), Region 5, Legazpi City. Upon
inquiry made by Florenda B. Magistrado, a subordinate of petitioner
in the BTO, Iriga City, with the PRC, it was verified that petitioner
never passed the board examination for civil engineering and that
petitioners name does not appear in the book of registration for
civil engineers.
Petitioner denied executing and submitting the subject PDS
containing the statement that he passed the board examination for
civil engineering. He likewise disowned the signature and thumb
mark appearing therein. He claimed that the stroke of the signature
appearing in the PDS differs from the stroke of his genuine
signature. He added that the letters contained in the PDS he
accomplished and submitted were typewritten in capital letters
since his typewriter does not have small letters. As such, the
subject PDS could not be his because it had both small and capital
typewritten letters. He further argued that the RTC had no
jurisdiction to try him there being no evidence that the alleged
falsification took place in Legazpi City.
After trial, the Legazpi City RTC rendered a Decision finding
petitioner guilty of the crime of falsification. Petitioner appealed to
the Court of Appeals. The appellate court promulgated its Decision
affirming in toto the assailed Legazpi City RTC Decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RTC of Legazpi City has jurisdiction over the case
HELD:
There are three important requisites which must be present before
a court can acquire jurisdiction over criminal cases. First, the court
must have jurisdiction over the offense or the subject
matter. Second, the court must have jurisdiction over the territory

10
where the offense was committed. And third, the court must have
jurisdiction over the person of the accused. There is no dispute that
the Legazpi City RTC has jurisdiction over the offense and over the
person of petitioner. It is the territorial jurisdiction of the Legazpi
City RTC which the petitioner impugns.
The territorial jurisdiction of a court is determined by the facts
alleged in the complaint or information as regards the place where
the offense charged was committed. It should also be emphasized
that where some acts material and essential to the crime and
requisite to its consummation occur in one province or city and
some in another, the court of either province or city has jurisdiction
to try the case, it being understood that the court first taking
cognizance of the case will exclude the others.
In the case at bar, the information specifically and positively alleges
that the falsification was committed in Legazpi City. Moreover, the
testimonies and documentary evidence for the prosecution have
sufficiently established that petitioner accomplished and thereafter
submitted the PDS to the BTO, Legazpi City. The foregoing
circumstances clearly placed the locus criminis in Legazpi City and
not in Iriga City.

ANTONIO MAGO and DANILO MACASINAG vs. COURT OF

APPEALS,
ROLANDO
ASIS
and
NATIONAL
HOUSING
AUTHORITY
NATURE:
This is an appeal by certiorari. Petitioners pray for reversal of the
Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the Orders of the RTC,
denying their Motion to Intervene and Petition for Relief from
Judgment in Civil Case Rolando Asis v. National Housing Authority.
FACTS:
Private respondent Rolando Asis filed with the RTC of Quezon City a
Petition against public respondent NHA to prevent it from acting
upon the recommendation for cancellation of the award in his favor

and the lot be subdivided into two, one to him and the other to
Antonio Mago and Danilo Macasinag as co-owners.
This case relates to an erroneous award by the NHA of a parcel of
land belonging to Francisco Mago, petitioner Antonio Magos
predecessor-in-interest, to Asis. Francisco Mago complained to the
NHA which acknowledged its mistake. As a result, the parties
agreed on a Kasunduan ng Paghahati ng Lote, whereby the lot will
be divided into two and split between petitioner Antonio Mago (to
whom Francisco Mago sold his interest over the land) and
respondent Asis. However, the NHA later, ironically executed a
Deed of Sale with Mortgage over the land in favor of Asis. Antonio
Mago again complained to the NHA and sued Asis in civil case for
recovery of possession and damages. NHA eventually came up with
the abovementioned Resolution.
The RTC dismissed Asiss petition in view of the NHAs admission
and recognition of Asiss title to the land. 69 days after they learned
of the above order, petitioners filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene
and a Petition for Relief from Judgment/Order. RTC denied the
motion and the petition. CA sustained the trial court and held that
while the Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote just,
speedy, and inexpensive resolution of cases, the rules on
reglementary periods must be strictly construed against the filer or
pleader to prevent needless delays.
Applicable Law
Under Sec. 2, Rule 12, of the Rules of Court, a person may, before
or during a trial, be permitted by the court, in its discretion, to
intervene in an action if he has legal interest in the matter in
litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest
against both, or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected
by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of
the court or of an officer thereof. 8 As for the Petilion for Relief from
Judgment/Order, the same was filed sixty-nine (69) days after
movants learned of the order, or beyond the reglementary period of
sixty (60) days from notice of judgment, under Sec. 3, Rule 38, of
the Rules of Court.

11
ISSUES:
1. Whether petitioners shall be allowed to intervene.
2. Whether petitioners Petition for Relief from Judgment should
be heard.
HELD:
1. YES. Under Sec 2, Rule 2, a person may, before or during
trial, be permitted to intervene if:
a. He has a legal interest in the matter under litigation;
or
b. He has a legal interest in the success of either parties
or an interest against both; or
c. When he is so situated as to be adversely affected by
a distribution or other disposition of property in
custody of the court or an officer thereof.
In this case, petitioners motion for intervention was, admittedly,
filed after the disputed order has become final. However, it must
be noted that petitioners were unaware of the proceedings in
the case between Asis and NHA. They were never impleaded
therein. Worse, they were led into believing that all was well, by
virtue of the Kasunduan. Asis acted in bad faith when he
accepted the award erroneously made to him by NHA knowing
full well that there was a previous perfected agreement between
him and petitioners. NHA itself even admitted its mistake in one
of its comments in the case between it and Asis.
The permissive tenor of the provision on intervention shows that
the intention of Rules was to give the court full discretion in
permitting or disallowing the same. However, this discretion
must be exercised judiciously and only after consideration of all
the circumstances obtaining in the case. In this case, the lower
courts only considered the technicalities, which worked injustice
on the part of the plaintiffs.
Therefore, petitioners Motion to Intervene should be granted.

2. YES. The time of filing said petition must satisfy both

periods as indicated in the Ruleswithin 60 days after
knowledge of order and not more than 6 months after
entry. A few days in excess of the 60-day requirement is
not fatal as long as it is filed within 6 months from
issuance of the order. In this case, the petition was 9 days
late of the 60-day deadline but still within the 6 month
period.
PRINCIPLE:
Section 2, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides "these rules shall be
liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist the
parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action and proceeding," but jurisprudence qualifies it by
enunciating the principle that rules on reglementary periods must
be strictly construed against the filer or pleader to prevent needless
delays.
But it is apparent that the courts a quo only considered the
technicalities of the rules on intervention and of the petition for
relief from judgment. The denial of their motion to intervene arising
from the strict application of the rule was an injustice to petitioners
whose substantial interest in the subject property-cannot be
disputed. We need not belabor the point that petitioners are indeed
indispensable parties with such an interest in the controversy or
subject matter that a final adjudication cannot be made in their
absence without affecting, any injuring, and such interest.

THE MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY vs.THE ATTORNEYGENERAL

NATURE:

12
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of
the Province of Tarlac dismissing the action before it on motion of
the plaintiff upon the ground that the court had no jurisdiction of
the subject matter of the controversy.
FACTS:
The plaintiff, a railroad company, began an action in the Court of
First Instance of the province of Tarlac for the condemnation of
certain real estate. After the filing of the complaint, the plaintiff
took possession of the lands described therein, building its line,
stations and terminals and put the same in operation.
Commissioners were appointed to appraise the value of the lands
so taken. They held several sessions, took a considerable amount of
evidence, and finally made their report. After the said report had
been made and fled with the court, the plaintiff gave notice to the
defendants that on a certain date it would make a motion to the
court to dismiss action, upon the ground that the court had no
jurisdiction of the subject matter, having been recently ascertained
by the plaintiff that the lands sought to be condemned were
situated in the Province of Nueva Ecija instead of the Province of
Tarlac as alleged in the complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of First Instance of one province has the
power and authority to take cognizance of an action by a railroad
company for the condemnation of real estate located in another
province.

Courts of First Instance over lands is applicable generally to the

sections of law just quoted. The provisions regarding the place and
method of trial are procedural. They touched not the authority of
the court over the land but, rather, the powers which it may
exercise over the parties. They relate not to the jurisdictional power
of the court over the subject matter but to the place where that
jurisdiction is to be exercised. In other words, the jurisdiction is
assured, whatever the place of its exercise. The jurisdiction is
the thing; the place of exercise its incident.
The principles which we have herein laid down we do not apply to
criminal cases. They seem to rest on a different footing. There the
people of the state are a party. The interests of the public require
that, to secure the best results and effects in the punishment of
crime, it is necessary to prosecute and punish the criminal in the
very place, as near as may be, where he committed his crime. As a
result it has been the uniform legislation, both in statutes and in
constitutions, that the venue of a criminal action must be laid in the
place where the crime was committed. While the laws here do not
specifically and in terms require it, we believe it is the established
custom and the uniform holding that criminal prosecutions must be
brought and conducted, except in cases especially provided by law,
in the province where the crime is committed.
For these reasons the judgment below must be reversed and the
cause remanded to the trial court with direction to proceed with the
action according to law.

HELD:
The court holds that the terms of section 377 providing that actions
affecting real property shall be brought in the province where the
land involved in the suit, or some part thereof, is located, do not
affect the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance over the land itself
but relate simply to the personal rights of parties as to the place of
trial. They are of the opinion that what as they have said in the
discussion of the effect of section 377 relative to the jurisdiction of

PEOPLE v MONTENEGRO

NATURE

13
Petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction and/or restraining
order

ISSUE
WON the amended information should be admitted

FACTS
- The City Fiscal of Quezon City, thru Assistant Fiscal Virginia G.
Valdez, filed an Information for "Robbery" before the Court of First
Instance of Rizal against Antonio Cimarra, Ulpiano Villar, Bayani
Catindig and Avelino de Leon. Said accused (now private
respondents) were all members of the police force of Quezon City
and were charged as accessories-after-the-fact in the robbery
committed by the minor Ricardo Cabaloza, who had already
pleaded guilty and had been convicted in a crimial case before the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City. Ricardo
Cabaloza was convicted for the robbery of the same items, articles
and pieces of jewelry belonging to Ding Velayo, Inc. valued at
P75,591.40.

HELD
- Amendment of an information under Sec. 14, Rule 110 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure (formerly, Section 13, Rule 110 of the
old Rules on Criminal Procedure) may be made at any time before
the accused enters a plea to the charge. Thereafter and during the
trial, amendments to the information may also be allowed, as to
matters of form, provided that no prejudice is caused to the rights
of the accused.

- Upon arraignment, all of the accused (now private respondents)

entered a plea of "not guilty" to the charge filed against them.
- However, before the trial could proceed, the prosecuting fiscal
filed a Motion to Admit Amended Information seeking to amend the
original information by: (1) changing the offense charged from
"Robbery" to "Robbery in an Uninhabited Place," (2) alleging
conspiracy among all the accused, and (3) deleting all items,
articles and pieces of jewelry alleged to have been stolen in the
original Information and substituting them with a different set of
items valued at P71,336.80.
- Private respondents opposed the admission of the Amended
Information. The respondent court resolved to deny the proposed
amendments contained in the Amended Information. Petitioner
moved for reconsideration of the aforesaid order but the respondent
court denied said motion; hence, this petition.

- The test as to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the

amendment of a complaint or information is when a defense under
the complaint or information, as it originally stood, would no longer
be available after the amendment is made, and when any evidence
the accused might have, would be inapplicable to the complaint or
information as amended. On the other hand, an amendment which
merely states with additional precision something which is already
contained in the original information, and which, therefore, adds
nothing essential for conviction for the crime charged is an
amendment to form that can be made at anytime.
- The proposed amendments in the amended information, in the
instant case, are clearly substantial and have the effect of changing
the crime charged from "Robbery" punishable under Article 209 to
"Robbery in an Uninhabited Place" punishable under Art. 302 of the
Revised Penal Code, thereby exposing the private respondentsaccused to a higher penalty as compared to the penalty imposable
for the offense charged in the original information to which the
accused had already entered a plea of "not guilty" during their
arraignment.
- Moreover, the change in the items, articles and pieces of jewelry
allegedly stolen into entirely different articles from those originally

14
complained of, affects the essence of the imputed crime, and would
deprive the accused of the opportunity to meet all the allegations in
the amended information, in the preparation of their defenses to
the charge filed against them. It will be observed that private
respondents were accused as accessories-after-the-fact of the
minor Ricardo Cabaloza who had already been convicted of robbery
of the items listed in the original information. To charge them now
as accessories-after-the-fact for a crime different from that
committed by the principal, would be manifestly incongruous as to
be allowed by the Court.
- The allegation of conspiracy among all the private respondentsaccused, which was not previously included in the original
information, is likewise a substantial amendment saddling the
respondents with the need of a new defense in order to meet a
different situation in the trial court. To allow at this stage the
proposed amendment alleging conspiracy among all the accused,
will make all of the latter liable not only for their own individual
transgressions or acts but also for the acts of their co-conspirators.
Dispositive Petition is DISMISSED. Orders of the respondent court
AFFIRMED. TRO lifted.

ELCANO V HILL
FACTS:
Reginald Hill, a minor, caused the death of Agapito (son of Elcano).
Elcano filed a criminal case against Reginald but Reginald was
acquitted for lack of intent coupled with mistake. Elcano then filed
a civil action against Reginald and his dad (Marvin Hill) for damages
based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Hill argued that the civil
action is barred by his sons acquittal in the criminal case; and that
if ever, his civil liability as a parent has been extinguished by the

fact that his son is already an emancipated minor by reason of his

marriage.
ISSUE: Whether Marvin Hill may be held civilly liable under Article
2180.
HELD: Yes. The acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case does not
bar the filing of a separate civil action. A separate civil action lies
against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is
criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that
the offended party is not allowed, if accused is actually charged
also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be
entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two,
assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words,
the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule
111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act
considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not
extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the
criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed
by the accused. Briefly stated, culpa aquiliana includes voluntary
and negligent acts which may be punishable by law.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon
emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article
397, emancipation takes place by the marriage of the minor child,
it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation
by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus
Emancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall
terminate parental authority over the childs person. It shall enable
the minor to administer his property as though he were of age, but
he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property
without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue
and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother
or guardian. Therefore, Article 2180 is applicable to Marvin Hill
the SC however ruled since at the time of the decision, Reginald is

15
already of age, Marvins liability should be subsidiary only as a
matter of equity.

Despite this, the trial court convicted the accused with qualified
rape with death as punishment.
Issue: Whether the trial court could hold the accused guilty of
qualified rape.

PEOPLE VS NAZARENO
Facts:
Accused-appellants Narciso Nazareno and Ramil Regala were found
by the trial court guilty of murder. However, on appeal, Ramil
Regala contends that the failure of the prosecution to investigate
Rey Taling, his alleged companion and Mang Doming, Mang Romy,
and Nick Pealosa, as those who supplied the guns, raises doubt as
to accused-appellants guilt.
Issue: WON Regalas contention is meritorious
HELD:
The manner by which the prosecution of a case is handled is within
the sound discretion of the prosecutor and the non-inclusion of
other guilty parties is irrelevant to the case against an accused.

PEOPLE V RAMOS
Facts:
Accused was charged with rape in its simple form, that is, having
carnal knowledge of a woman by using force or intimidation, with
the additional allegation that the victim was only 14 years of age at
the time of the incident. However, the information failed to allege
that the victim was his daughter. The relationship between the
accused and the victim, was not laid down in the information.

Held: No. As this qualifying circumstance was not pleaded in the

information or in the complaint against appellant, he cannot be
convicted of qualified rape because he was not properly informed
that he is being accused of qualified rape. The Constitution
guarantees the right of every person accused in a criminal
prosecution to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation
against him. This right finds amplification and implementation in the
different provisions of the Rules of Court. Foremost among these
enabling provisions is the office of an information. The facts stated
in the body of the information determine the crime of which the
accused stands charged and for which he must be tried. This recital
of the essentials of a crime delineate the nature and cause of
accusation against an accused. It is fundamental that every
element of which the offense is composed must be alleged in the
complaint or information. The main purpose of requiring the
various elements of a crime to be set out in an information is to
enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense. He is
presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that
constitute the offense. An accused person cannot be convicted of an
offense higher than that with which he is charged in the complaint
or information on which he is tried. It matters not how conclusive
and convincing the evidence of guilt may be, but an accused cannot
be convicted of any offense, unless it is charged in the complaint or
information on which he is tried or is necessarily included
therein. He has a right to be informed of the nature of the offense
with which he is charged before he is put on trial. To convict an
accused of a higher offense than that charged in the complaint or
information on which he is tried would be an unauthorized denial of
that right.

16

SANTIAGO VS GARCHITORENA
Nature:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court to set aside: (a) the Resolution dated March 3, 1993 in
Criminal Case No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan (First division) and
to declare Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena of the
Sandiganbayan, disqualified from acting in said criminal case; and
(b) the Resolution of said court promulgated onMarch 14, 1993,
which deemed as "filed" the 32 Amended Informations against
petitioner.
Facts:
Santiago was charged by the Sandiganbayan with violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, allegedly committed by her
favoring "unqualified" aliens with the benefits of the Alien
Legalization Program. Santiago later on filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with
Criminal Case No. 16698 on the ground that said case was intended
solely to harass her as she was then a presidential candidate. She
alleged that this was in violation of Section 10, Article IX-C of the
Constitution which provides that "(b)ona fide candidates for any
public office shall be free from any form of harassment and
discrimination." The petition was dismissed.
Petitioner filed a motion for inhibition of Presiding Justice
Garchitorena. The Sandiganbayan (First Division), of which Presiding
Justice Garchitorena is a member, set the criminal case for
arraignment on November 13, 1992. Subsequently she filed for a
motion for a bill of particulars. The motion stated that while the
information alleged that petitioner had approved the application or
legalization of "aliens" and gave them indirect benefits and

advantages it lacked a list of the favored aliens. According to

petitioner, unless she was furnished with the names and identities
of the aliens, she could not properly plead and prepare for trial.
Consequently, although at the hearing where the prosecution
stated categorically that they would file only one amended
information, the prosecution filed a motion to admit the 32
Amended Information.

Issue:
Whether or not there should only be one information to be filed
against petitioner.
Held: Yes, because it was a continued crime. Sc found that there is
only one crime, hence there should only be one information.
According to CuelloCalon, for delitocontinuado to exist there
should be a plurality of acts performed during a period of time;
unity of penal provision violated; and unity of criminal intent or
purpose, which means that two or more violations of the same
penal provisions are united in one and same instant or resolution
leading to the perpetration of the same criminal purpose.
According to Guevarra, in appearance, a delitocontinuado
consists of several crimes but in reality there is only one crime in
the mind of the perpetrator (Commentaries on the Revised Penal
Code, 1957 ed., p. 102; Penal Science and Philippine Criminal Law,
p. 152). Padilla views such offense as consisting of a series of acts
arising from one criminal intent or resolution (Criminal Law, 1988
ed. pp. 53-54).
Applying the concept of delitocontinuado, we
constituting only one offense the following cases:

treated

as

(1) The theft of 13 cows belonging to two different owners

committed by the accused at the same time and at the same period
of time (People v. Tumlos, 67 Phil. 320 [1939] ).

17
(2) The theft of six roosters belonging to two different owners from
the same coop and at the same period of time (People v. Jaranillo,
55 SCRA 563 [1974] ).
(3) The theft of two roosters in the same place and on the same
occasion (People v. De Leon, 49 Phil. 437 [1926] ).
(4) The illegal charging of fees for services rendered by a lawyer
every time he collects veteran's benefits on behalf of a client, who
agreed that the attorney's fees shall be paid out of said benefits
(People v. Sabbun, 10 SCRA 156 [1964] ). The collection of the legal
fees were impelled by the same motive, that of collecting fees for
services rendered, and all acts of collection were made under the
same criminal impulse (People v. Lawas, 97 Phil. 975 [1955] ).
On the other hand, we declined to apply the concept to the
following cases:
(1) Two estafa cases, one of which was committed during the period
from January 19 to December 1955 and the other from January
1956 to July 1956 (People v. Dichupa, 113 Phil. 306 [1961] ). The
said acts were committed on two different occasions.
(2) Several malversations committed in May, June and July, 1936,
and falsifications to conceal said offenses committed in August and
October 1936. The malversations and falsifications "were not the
result of only one purpose or of only one resolution to embezzle and
falsify . . ." (People v. Cid, 66 Phil. 354 [1938] ).
(3) Two estafa cases, one committed in December 1963 involving
the failure of the collector to turn over the installments for a radio
and the other in June 1964 involving the pocketing of the
installments for a sewing machine (People v. Ledesma, 73 SCRA 77
[1976] ).
(4) 75 estafa cases committed by the conversion by the agent of
collections from customers of the employer made on different dates
(Gamboa v. Court of Appeals, 68 SCRA 308 [1975]).

The 32 Amended Informations reproduced verbatim the allegation

of the original information, except that instead of the word "aliens"
in the original information each amended information states the
name of the individual whose stay was legalized. The 32 Amended
Informations aver that the offenses were committed on the same
period of time, i.e., on or about October 17, 1988. The strong
probability even exists that the approval of the application or the
legalization of the stay of the 32 aliens was done by a single stroke
of the pen, as when the approval was embodied in the same
document.
PEOPLE VS. HONORABLE MIDPANTAO L. ADIL

FACTS:
A criminal complaint (Case No. 3335) was first filed against
respondent Margarito Fama alleged to have willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, assault, attack and use personal violence upon one
Miguel Viajar by then hurling the latter with a stone, hitting him in
the right cheek, thereby inflicting physical injuries which would
have required and will require medical attendance for a period from
5 to 9 days. Arraigned on July 7, 1975, the accused entered a plea
of not guilty.
Meanwhile, complainant Viajar filed a letter-complaint (Case No.
5241) with the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo charging against same
respondent arising from the same incident alleged in above
Criminal Case No. 3335. Same accusations were made except for an
allegation of hitting Viajar on the lower right eye which would heal
from five (5) to nine (9) days barring complications but leaving a
permanent scar and deforming on the right face.
Respondent Fama filed an urgent motion to defer proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 5241, claiming that since he was already charged

18
and pleaded not guilty in Criminal Case No. 3335, he would be in
double jeopardy, if Case No. 5241 were to be prosecuted. This
motion was opposed by the Fiscal and the Court required both
parties to file their respective memorandum on the issue of double
jeopardy. In the meantime, the Fiscal after filing Case No. 5241,
sought the dismissal of Case No. 3335, but the Municipal Court did
not act on said motion. Instead, the case was set for hearing and
was thereafter dismissed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the additional allegation of deformity in the
information in Case No. 5241 constitutes a supervening element
which should take this case out as one not of double jeopardy

FACTS:
The Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan filed an
Information against herein Private respondent Hermogenes Mariano
accusing him of estafa for allegedly to have wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with grave abuse of confidence and with deceit,
misappropriate, misapply and convert to his own personal use and
benefits the items he received valued at $717.50 or P4,797.35,
belonging to the USAID/NEC. Mariano has the duty of making
delivery of said items to the said Municipal Mayor, but, in spite of
repeated demands he failed to comply with his obligation.
Respondent was appointed as Liaison Officer by the then incumbent
Municipal Mayor, Constantino Nolasco, acting for and in behalf of
the municipality of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan.

HELD:
The Court said No finding was made in the first examination that
the injuries had caused deformity and the loss of the use of the
right hand. As nothing was mentioned in the first medical certificate
about the deformity and the loss of the use of the right hand, we
presumed that such fact was not apparent or could have been
discernible at the time the first examination was made. The course
(not the length) of the healing of an injury may not be determined
before hand; it can only be definitely known after the period of
healing has ended. That is the reason why the court considered that
there was a supervening fact occurring since the filing of the
original information.

Mariano filed a motion to quash the Information on the ground,

among others, that the court trying the case has no jurisdiction of
the offense charged or of the person of the defendant. In his
motion, he claimed that the items which were the subject matter of
the Information were the same items for which Mayor Nolasco was
indicted before a Military Commission under a charge of
malversation of public property, and for which he had been found
guilty. Inasmuch as the case against Mayor Nolasco had already
been decided by the Military Tribunal, the CFI of Bulacan had lost
jurisdiction over the case against him. The respondent Judge
Geraldez granted the motion.

In other words, in the peculiar circumstances of this case, the plea

of double jeopardy of private respondent Fama Jr., cannot hold. It
was, therefore, a grave error correctible by certiorari for respondent
court to have dismissed Criminal Case No. 5241.

Whether or not civil courts and military commissions exercise

concurrent jurisdiction over the offense of estafa of goods valued at
not more than six thousand pesos and allegedly committed by a
civilian.

ISSUE:

HELD:
PEOPLE VS MARIANO

19
"Jurisdiction" is the basic foundation of judicial proceedings. The
word "jurisdiction" is derived from two Latin words "juris" and "dico"
"I speak by the law" which means fundamentally the power or
capacity given by the law to a court or tribunal to entertain, hear,
and determine certain controversies. "Criminal Jurisdiction" is
necessarily the authority to hear and try a particular offense and
impose the punishment for it.

SEC. 44. Original jurisdiction. Courts of First Instance shall

have original jurisdiction: xxx xxx xxx (f) In all criminal cases
in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for
more than six months, or a fine of more than two hundred
pesos, (emphasis supplied)

The offense of estafa charged against respondent Mariano is

penalized with arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period, or imprisonment from four (4)
months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months. By
reason of the penalty imposed which exceeds six (6) months
imprisonment, the offense alleged to have been committed by the
accused, now respondent, Mariano, falls under the original
jurisdiction of courts of first instance.
Estafa and malversation are two separate and distinct offenses and
in the case, the accused in one is different from the accused in the
other. But more fundamental is the fact that the court does not
have here a situation involving two tribunals vested with concurrent
jurisdiction over a particular crime so as to apply the rule that the
court or tribunal which first takes cognizance of the case acquires
jurisdiction thereof exclusive of the other. The Military Commission
as stated earlier is without power or authority to hear and
determine the particular offense charged against respondent
Mariano, hence, there is no concurrent jurisdiction between it and
respondent court to speak of.

PEOPLE VS OLARTE
FACTS:
Defendant Olarte was charged with libel. It is alleged in the
information that it was committed on or about the 24th day of
February, 1954 against Ms. Meris. A complaint was filed on Feb 22,
1956 where dependant Olarte waived her right to Preliminary
Investigation. The information was filed on July 3, 1956. Defendant
moved to quash the information on the ground of that the offense
charge prescribed which was dismissed by the CFI on the ground
that the filing of the complaint interrupt the running of prescription.
Defendant, citing the case of People vs. Coquia, argued that it is the
date of the filing of the information that should be taken in
determining prescription and not the filing of the complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not filing of the complaint interrupt the running of
prescription.
HELD:
This Court has reexamined the question and, after mature
consideration, has arrived at the conclusion that the true doctrine
is, and should be, the one established by the decisions holding that
the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be
merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation,
should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal
responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information
is filed can not try the case on its merits. Several reasons buttress
this conclusion: first, the text of Article 91 of the Revised Penal
Code, in declaring that the period of prescription "shall be
interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information" without
distinguishing whether the complaint is filed in the court for
preliminary examination or investigation merely, or for action on

20
the merits. Second, even if the court where the complaint or
information is filed may only proceed to investigate the case, its
actuations already represent the initial step of the proceedings
against the offender. Third, it is unjust to deprive the injured party
of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not
under his control. All that the victim of the offense may do on his
part to initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite complaint.
Considering the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby overrules the
doctrine of the cases of People vs. Del RosarioL-15140, December
29, 1960; and People vs. Coquia, L-15456, promulgated June 29,
1963.
Having been finally decided in the previous appeal that the criminal
action here was not barred, the issue of prescription is utterly
foreclosed, and all that remains is to try and decide the case on the
merits. It is expected that it will be done with the utmost dispatch,
this case having been already pending for many years.

ISABELITA REODICA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
On the evening of 17 October 1987, Petitioner Isabelita Reodica was
driving a van along Doa Soledad Avenue, Better Living
Subdivision, Paraaque, Metro Manila. Allegedly because of her
recklessness, her van hit the car of complainant Norberto Bonsol. As
a result, complainant sustained physical injuries, while the damage
to his car amounted to P8,542.00. Thus, on 20 October 1987,
complainant filed an Affidavit of Complaint against petitioner with
the Fiscal's Office. Later, on 13 January 1988, an information was
filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati charging petitioner

with "Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with

Slight Physical Injury." Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not
guilty to the charge. Trial then ensued.
RULING OF RTC:
The RTC of Makati, Branch 145, rendered a decision convicting
petitioner of the "quasi offense of reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property with slight physical injuries," and sentencing
her to suffer imprisonment of six (6) months of arresto mayor, and
to pay the complainant, Norberto Bonsol y Atienza, the sum of
Thirteen P13,542, representing the cost of the car repairs
(P8,542.00) and medical expenses (P5,000.00) without subsidiary
impairment in case of insolvency; and to pay the costs.
Petitioner appealed from the decision to the Court of Appeals
RULING OF COURT OF APPEALS:
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court.
Petitioner subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration, where:
Now that an acquittal seems impossible, may we revisit the
penalty and move that it be reviewed and set aside since it is
respectfully submitted to be error to complex damage to
property and slight physical injuries, as both are light
offenses, over which the respondent court had no jurisdiction
and even assuming such jurisdiction, it cannot impose a
penalty in excess of what is authorized by law.
CA denied. Hence, this petitions before the Supreme Court for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the respondent court of appeals gravely
abused its discretion when it complexed the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property and slight
physical injuries imposing a single excessive penalty

21
2. Whether or not the respondent court of appeals gravely erred
when it affirmed the trial court's decision notwithstanding the
defense of prescription and lack of jurisdiction.
3. Whether or not the duplicity of the information may be
questioned for the first time on appeal.
HELD:
1. In the instant case, following the ruling in the Turla case, the
offense of lesiones leves through reckless imprudence should
have been charged in a separate information.
Reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries is
punishable by public censure only. Article 9, paragraph 3, of
the Revised Penal Code defines light felonies as infractions of
law carrying the penalty of arresto menor or a fine not
exceeding P200.00, or both. Since public censure is classified
under Article 25 of the Code as a light penalty, and is
considered under the graduated scale provided in Article 71
of the same Code as a penalty lower than arresto menor, it
follows that the offense of reckless imprudence resulting in
slight physical injuries is a light felony.
On the other hand, reckless imprudence also resulting in
damage to property is, as earlier discussed, penalized
with arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods.
Since arresto mayor is a correctional penalty under Article 25
of the Revised Penal Code, the quasi offense in question is a
less grave felony not a light felony as claimed by
petitioner.
Hence, the trial court erred in considering the
following felonies as a complex crime: the less grave
felony of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property in the amount of P8,542.00 and the light

felony of reckless imprudence resulting in physical

injuries.
2. Which Court Has Jurisdiction Over the Quasi Offenses
in Question.
The jurisdiction to try a criminal action is to be determined by
the law in force at the time of the institution of the action,
unless the statute expressly provides, or is construed to the
effect that it is intended to operate as to actions pending
before its enactment. The criminal jurisdiction of the lower
courts was then determined by the duration of the
imprisonment and the amount of fine prescribed by law for
the offense charged.
Since offenses punishable by imprisonment of not exceeding
4 years and 2 months were within the jurisdictional ambit of
the MeTCs, MTCs and MCTCs, it follows that those penalized
with censure, which is a penalty lower than arresto
menor under the graduated scale in Article 71 of the Revised
Penal Code and with a duration of 1 to 30 days, should also
fall within the jurisdiction of said courts. Thus, reckless
imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries was
cognizable by said courts.
As to the reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property in the amount of P8,542.00, the same was also
under the jurisdiction of MeTCs, MTCs or MCTCs because the
imposable penalty therefor was arresto mayor in its minimum
and medium periods the duration of which was from 1
month and 1 day to 4 months.
Therefore, be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on the
part of the RTC of Makati.
Prescription of the Quasi Offenses in Question.

22
Pursuant to Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, reckless
imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries, being a light
felony, prescribes in two months. On the other hand, reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of
P8,542.00, being a less grave felony whose penalty is arresto
mayor in its minimum and medium periods, prescribes in five
years.
Art. 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. The
period of prescription shall commence to run from the
day on which the crime is discovered by the offended
party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be
interrupted by the filing of the complaint of
information, and shall commence to run again when
such proceedings terminate without the accused being
convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped by
any reason not imputable to him.

It must be stressed that prescription in criminal cases is a

matter of substantive law. Pursuant to Section 5(5), Article
VIII of the Constitution, this Court, in the exercise of its rulemaking power, is not allowed to diminish, increase or modify
substantive rights. Hence, in case of conflict between the
Rule on Summary Procedure promulgated by this Court and
the Revised Penal Code, the latter prevails.
In the instant case, as the offenses involved are covered by
the Revised Penal Code, Article 91 thereof shall apply. Thus,
the prescriptive period for the quasi offenses in question was
interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's
office three days after the vehicular mishap and remained
tolled pending the termination of this case. We cannot,

therefore, uphold petitioner's defense of prescription of the

offenses charged in the information in this case.
3. Following Lontok, the conclusion is inescapable here, that
the quasi offense of reckless imprudence resulting in slight
physical injuries should have been charged in a separate
information because it is not covered by Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code. However, petitioner may no longer
question, at this stage, the duplicitous character of the
information, i.e., charging two separate offenses in one
information, to wit: (1) reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property; and (2) reckless imprudence resulting in
slight physical injuries. This defect was deemed waived
by her failure to raise it in a motion to quash before
she pleaded to the information.
Under Section 3, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, when
two or more offenses are charged in a single
complaint or information and the accused fails to
object to it before trial, the court may convict the
accused of as many offenses as are charged and
proved and impose on him the penalty for each of
them.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED.

MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO VS OMBUDSMAN

FACTS:
An information was filed against petitioner with the Sandiganbayan
for violation of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The order of
arrest was issued with bail for release fixed at Php. 15,000 so she
filed a motion for acceptance of cash bail bond. On the same day
the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution authorizing the petitioner to

23
post cash bond which the later filed in the amount of Php.15, 000.
Her arraignment was set, but petitioner asked for the cancellation
of her bail bond and that she be allowed provisional release on
recognizance. The Sandiganbayan deferred it. The Sandiganbayan
issued a hold departure order against petitioner, by reason of the
announcement she made that she would be leaving for the U.S. to
accept a fellowship a Harvard.
In the instant motion submitted for our resolution, petitioner argues
among others that the Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the hold
departure order considering that it had not acquired jurisdiction
over the person of the petitioner. He initially postulates that
respondent court never acquired jurisdiction over her person
considering that she has neither been arrested nor has she
voluntarily surrendered, aside from the fact that she has not validly
posted bail since she never personally appeared before said court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the person of
the petitioner
HELD:
It has been held that where after the filing of the complaint or
information a warrant for the arrest of the accused is issued by the
trial court and the accused either voluntarily submitted himself to
the court or was duly arrested, the court thereby acquires
jurisdiction over the person of the accused. The voluntary
appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction
over his person, is accomplished either by his pleading to the
merits (such as by filing a motion to quash or other pleadings
requiring the exercise of the court's jurisdiction there over,
appearing for arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail. On the
matter of bail, since the same is intended to obtain the provisional
liberty of the accused, as a rule the same cannot be posted before
custody of the accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities

either by his arrest or voluntary surrender. In the case at bar, it

becomes essential, therefore, to determine whether respondent
court acquired jurisdiction over the person of herein petitioner and,
correlatively, whether there was a valid posting of bail bond.
We find and so hold that petitioner is deemed to have voluntarily
submitted herself to the jurisdiction of respondent court upon the
filing of her aforequoted "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of
Cash Bail Bond for and in behalf of Dr. Miriam Defensor-Santiago"
wherein she expressly sought leave "that she be considered as
having placed herself under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
for purposes of the required trial and other proceedings," and
categorically prayed "that the bail bond she is posting in the
amount of P15,000.00 be duly accepted" and that by said motion
"she be considered as having placed herself under the custody" of
said court. Petitioner cannot now be heard to claim otherwise for,
by her own representations, she is effectively estopped from
asserting the contrary after she had earlier recognized the
jurisdiction of the court and caused it to exercise that jurisdiction
over the aforestated pleadings she filed therein.

CLAUDIO J. TEEHANKEE, JR VS. HON. JOB B. MADAYAG

FACTS:
Petitioner was originally charged in an information for the crime of
frustrated murder allegedly committed while armed with a
handgun, with intent to kill, treachery and evident premeditation,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack,
assault and shoot one Maureen Navarro Hultman on the head,
thereby inflicting gunshot wounds, which ordinarily would have
caused her death. But it did not produce it by reason of cause or

24
causes independent of her will, that is, due to the timely and able
medical assistance rendered which prevented her death.
After the prosecution had rested its case, petitioner was allowed to
file a motion for leave to file a demurrer to evidence. However,
before the said motion could be filed, Maureen Navarro Hultman
died. Consequently, private prosecutor filed an omnibus motion for
leave of court to file amended information to change the same from
frustrated murder to consummated murder. At the scheduled
arraignment, petitioner refused to be arraigned on the amended
information for lack of a preliminary investigation thereon. When
petitioner's counsel manifested that he would not take part in the
proceedings because of the legal issue raised, the trial court
appointed a counsel de oficio to represent herein petitioner.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not an amended information involving a
substantial amendment, without preliminary investigation,
after the prosecution has rested on the original information,
may legally and validly be admitted
2. Whether or not a counsel de oficio may legally and validly be
appointed to represent an accused who is represented by
counsel of choice who refuses to participate in the
proceedings because of a perceived denial of due process
and after a plea for appellate remedies within a short period
is denied by the trial court
HELD:
1. To answer:
Q: Was there an amendment of the information or
substitution when the information was changed from
frustrated murder to consummated murder?

A: There is an amendment. There is an identity of offenses

charged in both the original and the amended information.
What is involved here is not a variance of the nature of
different offenses charge, but only a change in the stage of
execution of the same offense from frustrated to
consummated murder. This being the case, we hold that an
amendment of the original information will suffice and,
consequent thereto, the filing of the amended information for
murder is proper.
Q: What kind of amendment? Is it formal or substantial?
A: Formal. An objective appraisal of the amended information
for murder filed against herein petitioner will readily show
that the nature of the offense originally charged was not
actually changed. Instead, an additional allegation, that is,
the supervening fact of the death of the victim was merely
supplied to aid the trial court in determining the proper
penalty for the crime. That the accused committed a
felonious act with intent to kill the victim continues to be the
prosecution's theory. There is no question that whatever
defense herein petitioner may adduce under the original
information for frustrated murder equally applies to the
amended information for murder.
Q: Is there a need of a preliminary investigation on the new
charge?
A: No need because you have not changed the crime. If you
change the crime or when there is substitution, there is a
need of preliminary investigation. Since it is only a formal
amendment, preliminary investigation is not necessary. The
amended information could not conceivably have come as a
surprise to petitioner for the simple and obvious reason that
it charges essentially the same offense as that charged under
the original information. Furthermore, as we have heretofore
held, if the crime originally charged is related to the
amended charge such that an inquiry into one would elicit
substantially the same facts that an inquiry into the other

25
would
reveal,
not necessary.

new

preliminary

investigation

is

A substantial amendment consists of the recital of

facts
constituting
the
offense
charged
and
determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other
matters are merely of form. Thus, the following have
been held to be merely formal amendments, viz:
(1) new allegations which relate only to the range of
the penalty that the court might impose in the event
of conviction;
(2) an amendment which does not charge another
offense different or distinct from that charged in the
original one;
(3) additional allegations which do not alter the
prosecutions theory of the case so as to cause
surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense
he has or will assume; and

(4) an amendment which does not adversely affect

any substantial right of the accused, such as his right
to invoke prescription.
2. The Court said We find nothing irregular in the appointment
by the trial court of a counsel de oficio for herein petitioner
whose counsel of record refused to participate in the
proceedings because of an alleged legal issue. Such issue
having been demonstrated herein as baseless, we apprehend
his refusal to participate in the trial as causative of or
contributive to the delay in the disposition of the case. And,
finally, for as long as the substantial rights of herein
petitioner and other persons charged in court are not
prejudiced, the scheduling of cases should be left to the
sound discretion of the trial court.