Barredo V Garcia- 73 phil 607

Facts: On May 3, 1936, there was a head-on collision between a taxi of the
Malate taxicab driven by Fontanilla and a carretela guided by Dimapilis. The
carretela was over-turned, and a passenger, a 16-year old boy, Garcia, suffered
injuries from which he died. A criminal action was filed against Fontanilla, and
he was convicted. The court in the criminal case granted the petition to reserve
the civil action. Garcia and Almario, parents of the deceased, on March 7, 1939,
filed a civil action against Barredo, the proprietor of the Malate Taxicab and
employer of Fontanilla, making him primarily and directly responsible under
culpa acquiliana of Article 2180 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. It is
undisputed that Fontanillas negligence was the cause of the accident, as he was
driving on the wrong side of the road at high speed, and there was no showing
that Barredo exercised the diligence of a good father of a family, a defense to
Article 2180 of the said Code. Barredos theory of defense is that Fontanillas
negligence being punished by the Revised Penal Code, his liability as employer is
only subsidiary, but Fontanilla, was not sued for civil liability. Hence, Barredo
claims that he cannot be held liable.
Issue: Whether or not Barredo, as employer is civilly liable for the acts of
Fontanilla, his employee.
Held: Quasi-delict or culpa acquiliana is a separate legal institution under the
Civil Code of the Philippines is entirely distinct and independent from a delict or
crime under the Revised Penal Code. In this jurisdiction, the same negligent
act causing damage may produce civil liability (subsidiary) arising from a crime
under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines; or create an
action for quasi-delicto or culpa aquiliana under Articles 2179 and 2180 of the
Civil Code and the parties are free to choose which course to take. And in the
instant case, the negligent act of Fontanilla produces two (2) liabilities of
Barredo: First, a subsidiary one because of the civil liability of Fontanilla arising
from the latters criminal negligence under Article 103 of the Revised Penal
Code, and second, Barredos primary and direct responsibility arising from his
presumed negligence as an employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Since
the plaintiffs are free to choose what remedy to take, they preferred the second,
which is within their rights. This is the more expedious and effective method of
relief because Fontanilla was either in prison or just been released or had no
property. Barredo was held liable for damages.
Mendoza V Arrieta- 91 scra 113
Facts: On October 22, 1969, at around 4pm, a 3-way vehicular accident occurred
along Mac-Arthur Highway Bulacan, involving a Mercedez Benz owned and
driven by petitioner, a private jeep owned and driven by respondent Salazar and
a gravel and sand truck owned by respondent Timbol and driven by Montoya. As
aconsequence, separate informations were filed against Salazar and Montoya.
At the trial, petitioner testified that Salazar overtook the truck, swerved to the
left and hit his car. He further testified that before impact, Salazar jumped from
the jeep not knowing that Salazar was hit by the truck of Montoya. Montoya
affirmed this. On the other hand, Salazar tried to show that after overtaking the

truck, he flashed a signal showing his intention to turn left but was stopped at by
a policeman directing traffic at the intersection which he contends to be the time
he was hit by the truck causing his jeep to hit petitioners car.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the damages ensued to the vehicle of petitioner shall be the
liability of the driver of the jeep or of the truck.
(2) Whether or not the trucks owner may be held liable for damages caused by
him employee.
Held: Thus, the trial Court absolved jeep-owner-driver Salazar of any liability,
civil and criminal, in view of its findings that the collisionbetween Salazar's jeep
and petitioner's car was the result of the former having been bumped from
behind by the truck driven by Montoya. Neither was petitioner awarded damages
as he was not a complainant against truck-driver Montoya but only against jeepowner-driver Salazar.
That petitioner's cause of action against Timbol in the civil case is based on
quasi-delict is evident from the recitals in the complaint to wit: that while
petitioner was driving his car along MacArthur Highway at Marilao, Bulacan, a
jeep owned and driven by Salazar suddenly swerved to his (petitioner's) lane and
collided with his car That the sudden swerving of Salazar's jeep was caused
either by the negligence and lack of skill of Freddie Montoya, Timbol's employee,
who was then driving a gravel and sand truck iii the same direction as Salazar's
jeep; and that as a consequence of thecollision, petitioner's car suffered
extensive damages. Clearly, therefore, the two factors that a cause of action must
consist of, namely: (1) plaintiff's primary right, i.e., that he is the owner of a
Mercedes Benz, and (2) defendant's delict or wrongful act or omission which
violated plaintiff's primary right, i.e., the negligence or lack of skill either of jeepowner Salazar or of Timbol's employee, Montoya, in driving the
truck, causing Salazar's jeep to swerve andcollide with petitioner's car, were
alleged in the Complaint.
Consequently, petitioner's cause of action being based on quasi-delict,
respondent Judge committed reversible error when he dismissed the civil
suit against the truck-owner, as said case may proceed independently of the
criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
In view of what has been proven and established during the trial, accused
Freddie Montoya would be held able for having bumped and hit the rear portion
of the jeep driven by the accused Rodolfo Salazar. Considering that
the collision between the jeep driven by Rodolfo Salazar and the car owned and
driven by Edgardo Mendoza was the result of the hitting on the rear of the jeep
by the truck driven by Freddie Montoya, this Court behaves that accused Rodolfo
Salazar cannot be held able for the damages sustained by Edgardo Mendoza's
car.
PSBA V CA- 205 scra 729

Facts: Carlitos Bautista was stabbed while on the second floor premises of the
schools by assailants who were not members of the schools academic community.
This prompted the parents of thedeceased to file a suit in the RTC of Manila for
damages against PSBA and its corporate officers.
The defendant schools (now petitioner) sought to have the suit dismissed on the
ground of no cause of action and not within the scope of the provision of Art
2180 since it is an academic institution. The trial court overruled the petitioners
contention and its decision was later affirmed by the appellate court.
Issue: Whether the decision of the appellate court primarily anchored on the law
of quasi-delicts is valid.
Held: Although the Supreme Court agreed to the decision of the Court of
Appeals to deny the petition of motion to dismiss by the PSBA, they do not agree
to the premises of the appellate courts ruling.
Art 2180, in conjunction with Art 2176 of the civil code establishes the rule of in
loco parentis, they can not be held liable to the acts of Calitos assailants which
were not students of the PSBA and because of the contractual relationship.
The school and the students, upon registration established a contract between
them, resulting in bilateral obligations. The institution of learning must provide
their students with an atmosphere that promotes or assists its primary
undertaking of imparting knowledge, and maintain peace and order within its
premises.
The SC dismissed the petition and the case was remanded to the trail court to
determine if the school neglected its obligation to perform based on the
contractual relation of them and the students.
Amadora V CA 160 scra 315
Facts: A few days before graduation, Alfredo Amadora was shot and killed when
his classmate, Pablito Daffron fired a gun in theauditorium of their school. Daffon
was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence. Additionally, petitioners,
filed a civil action fordamages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code against
the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector the high school principal, the dean
ofboys, and the physics teacher, together with Daffon and two other students,
through their respective parents. The complaint against the students was later
dropped.
Issue: Whether or not the school may be held liable for the acts of its students.
Held: As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school premises in
pursuance of a legitimate student objective, in the exercise of a legitimate
student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student right, and even
in the enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege, the responsibility of the school
authorities over the student constitutes.
Teachers shall be liable for the acts of their students. As long as the defendant

can show that he had taken the necessary precautions to prevent the injury, he
can exonerate himself from liability.

Velarde et al V CA 361 s 56
FACTS:
The private respondent executed a Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage,
with a balance of P1.8 million, in favor of the petitioners. Pursuant to said
agreements, plaintiffs paid the bank (BPI) for three (3) months until they were
advised that the Application for Assumption of Mortgage was denied. This
prompted the plaintiffs not to make any further payment. Private respondent
wrote the petitioners informing the non-fulfillment of the obligations. Petitioners,
thru counsel responded that they are willing to pay in cash the balance subject to
several conditions. Private respondents sent a notarial notice of
cancellation/rescission of the Deed of Sale. Petitioners filed a complaint which
was consequently dismissed by an outgoing judge but was reversed by the
assuming judge in their Motion for Reconsideration. The Court of Appeals
reinstated the decision to dismiss.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a substantial breach of contract that would entitle its
rescission.
RULING:
YES. Article 1191 of the New Civil Code applies. The breach committed did not
merely consist of a slight delay in payment or an irregularity; such breach would
not normally defeat the intention of the parties to the contract. Here, petitioners
not only failed to pay the P1.8 million balance, but they also imposed upon
private respondents new obligations as preconditions to the performance of their
own obligation. In effect, the qualified offer to pay was a repudiation of an
existing obligation, which was legally due and demandable under the contract of
sale. Hence, private respondents were left with the legal option of seeking
rescission to protect their own interest.
Delta motors V Genuino
__________(See Compilation of oblicon Cases)_____________
Santos Ventura Hocorma Foundation V Santos 491
Art 1169 Demand and DelayG.R. No. 153004 November 5, 2004
SANTOS VENTURA HOCORMA FOUNDATION, INC.,
petitioner, vs.
ERNESTO V. SANTOS andRIVERLAND, INC.,
respondents.
QUISUMBING,
J
.Facts:
Ernesto V. Santos and Santos Ventura Hocorma Foundation, Inc. (SVHFI) were
plaintiff and defendant,respectively, in several civil cases. On October 26, 1990,
the parties executed a Compromise Agreement wherein Foundation shall pay
Santos P14.5 Million in the following manner:a. P1.5 Million immediately upon
the execution of this agreement; andb. The balance of P13 Million shall be paid,
whether in lump sum or in installments, at thediscretion of the Foundation,

within a period of not more than two (2) years from the execution of
thisagreement.In compliance, Santos moved for the dismissal of the cases, while
SVHFI paid the initial P1.5 million. Afterseveral demands, SVHFI failed to pay
the balance of P13 million, prompting Santos to apply for the issuance of a writ
of execution of the compromise judgment of the RTC dated September 30, 1991.
Twice, SVHFIs properties were auctioned and sold to Riverland, Inc.
On June 2, 1995, Santos and RiverlandInc. filed a Complaint for Declaratory
Relief and Damages alleging delay on the part of SVHFI in paying thebalance.
They further alleged that under the Compromise Agreement, the obligation
became due on October26, 1992, but payment of the remaining balance was
effected only on November 22, 1994. Thus, respondentsprayed that petitioner be
ordered to pay legal interest on the obligation, penalty, attorney's fees and costs
of litigation.SVHFI alleged that the legal interest on account of fault or delay was
not due and payable, considering thatthe obligation had been superseded by the
compromise agreement. Moreover, SVHFI argued that absent astipulation,
Santos must ask for judicial intervention for purposes of fixing the period.
Issue:
Whether or not SVHFI incurred in delay based on the compromise agreement
and thereby liable for legal interest
Ruling:
SVHFI is liable for legal interest as penalty on account of delay. The Compromise
Agreement was entered into on October 26, 1990.
It was judicially approved on September30, 1991. Applying existing
jurisprudence, the compromise agreement as a consensual contract
becamebinding between the parties upon its execution and not upon its court
approval. Hence, the two-year periodshould have begun on October 26, 1990.In
this case, there was non-fulfillment of the obligation with respect to time.
The requisites of mora were all
met:(1) that the obligation be demandable and already liquidated

the two-year period already lapsed and the amount of payment was already
determined;(2)
that the debtor delays performance

SVHFI paid the balance beyond the two-year period; andfinally,(3)

that the creditor requires the performance judicially or extra-judicially

a demand letter was sent inaccordance with the extra-judicial demand as

contemplated by law.When the debtor knows the amount and period when he is
to pay, interest as damages is generally allowed asa matter of right. The legal
interest for loan as forbearance of money is 12% per annum to be computed
fromthe time the demand was made under the provisions of Article 1169 of the
Civil Code.
Fallo:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated
January 30, 2002 of theCourt of Appeals and its April 12, 2002 Resolution in CAG.R. CV No. 55122 are AFFIRMED. Costs againstpetitioner.SO ORDERED
Abella V Francisco 55 p 447
Villaroel V Manila Motors 104 P 926

Chaves v Gonzales 32 SCRA 547

Khe Hong Cheng v Court of Appeals 355 SCRA 701
Siguan v Lim 318 SCRA 725
Juan Nakpil & Sons v Court of Appeals 144 SCRA 597
Gaite v Fonacier 2 SCRA 830 Gonzales v Heirs of Tomas and Paula Cruz 314 SCRA 585
Coronel v Court of Appeals and Alcaraz 263 SCRA 15
Central Philippine University v Court of Appeals 245 SCRA 511
Quijada V Court of Appeals 299 SCRA 695
Lao Lim v Court of Appeals 191 SCRA 150
Heirs of Timoteo Moreno v Mactan Cebu Internationa Airport Authority 413 SCRA
502
Herrera v Leviste 135 SCRA 129
Taylor v Uy Tieng Piao 43 PHIL 873
Ynchausti vs Yulo 34 PHIL 978
Inciong vs. CA 257 SCRA 578
RCBC vs CA 178 SCRA 739
Lafarge Cement Phil. vs Continental Cement 443 SCRA 522
Jaucian vs Querol 38 PHIL 718
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation v CA (Official gazette No. p. 2467)
Quiombing vs CA 257 SCRA 578
Alipio v. CA 341 SCRA 441