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T h i s d o c u m e n t is the p r o p e r t y of His B r i t a n n i c Majesty's G o v e r n m e n t

Printed for the War Cabinet, January,

1944

148

SECRET
COPY -

No.

W . P . (44) 35
18th January,

1944.

WAR
T H E

P R O T E C T I O N

O F

CABINET

M O N U M E N T S

A N D

*P*

W O R K S

MEMORANDUM BY T H E S E C R E T A R Y O F STATE F O R

O F

A R T

WAR

1. In connection with the paper circulated by the Deputy Prime Minister (W.P. (44) 14),
my colleagues will wish to have some account of what has been done and is being done for
the protection of monuments and works of art in territories entered by our forces.
2. The Army, in the face of the enemy, is concerned with his destruction to the exclusion
of all other considerations, ft will not exercise any nice discrimination in the selection of its
targets, since the enemy would be quick to take advantage of the sanctuary offered by any
such doctrine.
3. Immediately behind the advancing armies the situation is different. But here, too,
the prime object of the military staff proper and of the civil administration staff attached
to it is to facilitate military operations by attending to certain necessities, of which the
safeguarding of objects of historical interest is not one.
4. Nevertheless, the signatories of the memorandum attached to the Prime Ministers
paper are not alone in their anxiety that everything reasonably possible should be ,done to
secure the safety of objects having an international, rather than a local, significance in the
history of civilisation. The British forces in the held represent a fair cross-section of the
British public at large, and may be presumed to have at heart the same interests as the
distinguished representatives of fine arts, etc., who have written to the Deputy Prime
Minister and have been represented on the deputation to which he refers. -.'
5. Before the invasion of Sicily, viz., in April, 1943, the War Office initiated action for
conserving the art monuments of Italy. General routine orders were issued, both to the
fighting staffs and to the civil affairs officers, and, as part of the organization of the joint
Anglo-American civil administration of the Island, one of the responsibilities imposed upon
the Military Government was that of doing what might be practicable in this direction. I
must here observe that the invasion of Sicily, as in the case of all seaborne operations, was con
ditioned and limited in its extent by the availability of shipping, and this limitation covered
both the provision of personnel and of equipment, particularly vehicles. It followed,
therefore, that the preparations for military non-essentials had to be restricted by force of
circumstances to the barest minimum, and it was physically impossible to provide even
the more essential services with the necessary transport and personnel. Thus the
less essential services, of which art preservation was one, suffered in the opening stages.
This restriction was even more evident in the battles which culminated in the
clearance of the north coast of Africa. It is easy to appreciate that in the advance from
El Alamein the preservation of historical antiquities would not be foremost in the minds of
commanders, staff or troops.
6. On the American side the initiative was taken by various learned bodies, and in
August, 1943, a special Commission was appointed by the President of the United States
which sent out a body of officer experts (supplemented from British sources) and furnished
directives for their activities. These directives, which were approved jointly by the two
Governments, anticipated all the recommendations quoted by the Deputy Prime Minister as
made to him by the Parliamentary deputation on the 12th November.
7. Despite the powerful constitution of the American Commission and the orders
published by formation commanders, the steps taken were not fully effective, and on the
1st of November I appointed Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Leonard Woolley to be - Archaeological
Advisor to the Directorate of Civil Affairs and ordered him, at the earliest possible moment, to
visit Italy and Sicily and to carry out a personal investigation.
8. Sir Leonard Woolley found that while the staff of officer experts was admirably
equipped for its purpose, they were not distributed to the areas where they were most
needed ; in so far as they were distributed they had lost touch with the centre of their own
organization ; and they lacked the authority necessary for the effective performance of
their duties.
9. The organization, therefore, was not working as it should, and although it is an
exaggeration to speak of " much " avoidable damage and loss having occurred, there is no
doubt that there were abuses and that some opportunities of salving monuments were
let slip.

io. The organization was accordingly re-modelled, and under the new arrangement some
of the officer experts are attached to the fighting commands, and in rear of the battle area
others are available for posting wherever required. Moreover, the officers now enjoy an
authority which formerly they did not possess.
I I . On the conclusion of his tour the Archaeological Adviser reported to A.F.H.Q.,
Algiers, and as a result of his specific recommendations General Eisenhower issued a general
order, which I give in the annexure to this paper.
12. Turning now to the details of the memorandum, I do not really follow what the
signatories mean when in paragraph i they say that they feel that such work should form
part of a larger scheme and not be confined to a supplementary part of one branch of the
Service. It is clear that this form of activity can only prosper if it is brought under the
direction of the Allied Military Government or of the Allied Commission of Control, as the
case may be. In either event the joint responsibility is, so far as the British Army is con
cerned, with the War Office, and the Department must be a branch of the War Office machine.
I regard the appointment of Sir Leonard Woolley as the Adviser to the Directorate of Civil
Affairs as being a wholly satisfactory arrangement. The experience we have gained in North
Africa and in Italy should stand us in good stead in the forthcoming operations on the
Continent; an organization based on that which I have sketched in the immediately preceding
paragraphs will function from the start of these operations.
13. I have referred briefly to the position of the Army as regards the restriction of
targets. This part of the memorandum, is, I think, mainly for the Secretary of State
for Air.
14. On the third point in the memorandum, I am wholly in agreement. The post-war
problem of restitution, or of compensation for works of art stolen or wantonly destroyed
by the enemy lies outside the scope of the fighting services. I heartily agree, therefore, that
a special Commission ought to be formed for this specific purpose. The need of it has been
foreseen and to some extent the way has been prepared for it. This is not to say that the
Army staff cannot do much valuable work in the way of collecting evidence of German theft
and destruction, evidence which would be a basis for the Restitution: Commission^
judgment. Some of these officers, no doubt, might well be chosen to serve on the Commission,
to which their experience would be of great value. And apart from the serving officers,
Sir Leonard Woolley is already enlisting in this country a panel of authorities on the fine
arts whose advice may be called for now in cases of special difficulty, and some of whom will
undoubtedly figure on any Commission which may be appointed.
15. I do not, however, think that a Commission, as such, could usefully deal with the
practical problems that confront the Army in the field, once the right machinery has been
evolved, and I believe that it has now been evolved. The rest is largely a matter of
military discipline. The mistakes which have occurred tend to show how impossible it is
for an external civilian bodyeven one as powerful as the United States Commissionto
control events within the province of the Commander-in-Chief. Such a body can, in my
opinion, act only in an advisory capacity. But of the need for the Restitution Committee I
am convinced, and I think it most desirable that it should be organized in advance.
P. J. G.
T H E W A R OFFICE,

x8th January,

1944.
A N N E X TO W.P.J44) 3 5 .
HISTORICAL MONUMENTS

1. Buildings.
(a) No building listed in the'sections " Works of ART " in the " Zone Hand-Books " of
ITALY issued by the Political Warfare Executive to all Allied Military Government officers
will be used for military purposes without the explicit permission of the Allied Commander
in-Chief or of the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, 15th Army Group in each individual
case.
(6) Commanders concerned are authorised, as a further measure of security, to close and
put out of bounds for troops any of the buildings listed in AMG " Zone Hand-Book " that
they deem necessary. Notices to that effect will be affixed to the buildings, and guards
provided to enforce them if necessary.
(c) Allied Military Government officers are prepared to furnish commanders with a list
of historical buildings other than those listed in the AMG "Zone Hand-Book." These
buildings are of secondary importance and may be used for military purposes when deemed
necessary. Commanders are reminded that buildings containing art collections, scientific
objects, or those which when used would offend the religious susceptibilities of the people,
should not be occupied when alternative accommodations are available.
2. Looting, Wanton Damage and Sacrilege.
The prevention of looting, wanton damage and sacrilege of buildings is a command
responsibility. The seriousness of such an offence will be explained to all Allied personnel.
By command of General EISENHOWER.
(B43/181)

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W.O.P.

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