CHAPTER VI.

JURISDICTION

1.

Jurisdiction, generally
a. Definition refs to the exercise of governmental power and authority in all forms, whether legislative, excutive or
judicial.

CASE: Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon

Brief Fact Summary. Two Americans (P) laid claims of ownership and entitlements to the schooner Exchange.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. National ships of war are viewed as been exempted by consent of the power of the friendly jurisdiction
whose port the ship enters.
Facts. The Schooner Exchange, owned by John M'Faddon and William Greetham, sailed from Baltimore, Maryland, on October
27, 1809, for San Sebastin, Spain. On December 30, 1810, the Exchange was seized by order of Napoleon Bonaparte. The
Exchange was then armed and commissioned as a French warship under the name of Balaou. When the vessel later docked in
Philadelphia due to storm damage, M'Faddon and Greetham filed an action in the district court to seize the vessel, claiming that it
had been taken illegally. The district court found that it did not have jurisdiction over the dispute. On appeal, the circuit court
reversed the decision of the district court, and ordered the district court to proceed to the merits of the case.[1] The Supreme
Court reversed the circuit court's decision, and affirmed the district court's dismissal of the action.
Issue. Are National ships of war viewed as been exempted by the consent of the power of the friendly jurisdiction whose port the
ship enters?
Held. (Marshall, C.J.) Yes. National ships of war are viewed as been exempted by consent of the power of the friendly
jurisdiction whose port the ship enters.
Chief Justice Marshall noted that a by the definition of sovereignty, a state has absolute and exclusive jurisdiction
within its own territory, but that it could also by implied or express consent waive jurisdiction.[2] Moreover, Marshall also noted
that under international custom jurisdiction was presumed to be waived in a number of situations. For instance, a foreign
sovereign and his diplomatic representatives were generally free from the jurisdiction of domestic courts when visiting.[3]
Similarly, if a state granted permission for a foreign army free passage across its territory, it generally implied a waiver of
jurisdiction over that army.[4] This custom was firmly enough established and necessary for international relations that it would
be wrongful for a country to violate it without prior notice.
Marshall further noted that while the right of free passage by an army need usually be explicitly granted (likely because
such passage inevitably involves physical damage of some sort), by maritime custom a nation's ports were presumptively open to
all friendly ships. While a nation could close its ports to the warships of another country, it would have to issue some form of
declaration to do so. Without such a declaration, a friendly foreign warship could enter a nation's port with its implied consent.[6]
Marshall further distinguished the difference between private merchant ships and citizens (who are subject to a nation's
jurisdiction when they enter its ports with the nation's implied consent), and military ships. Namely, private ships do not carry
with them the sovereign status of military ships, with the privileges that accompany it.[7] From this, Marshall arrived at the
conclusion that, by customary international law, a friendly warship that enters a nation's open port are exempted from that
nation's jurisdiction.
Applying this analysis to the facts at hand, Marshall found that the courts did not have jurisdiction over the case.

National ships of war entering the port of a friendly power open for their reception are to be considered as exempted
by the consent of that power from its jurisdiction

ENGLISH RULE The coastal state shall have jurisdiction over all offenses committed on board such vessels, except only
where they do not compromise the peace of the port.
FRENCH RULE Flag state shall have jurisdiction over all offenses committed on board such vessels, except only where the
compromise the peace of the port.
2.

Principles of jurisdiction
a. Bases: The 6 Principles of jurisdiction
1. Territorial principle based on acts committed within the territory of the state.
2. Active Nationality principle- based on the national of the defendants.
3. Passive National principle- based on the nationality of the injured persons
4. Protective principle- based on harm to a states own national interest

5. Universality principle- based on the international character of the crime, permitting a court in a state to try a person
for a crime committed in another state not linked to the forum state by nationality of the suspect or victim by harm to
its own national interests.
6. Jurisdiction based on international agreements or treaties.
b.

Pre-requisite for acquisition of judicial jurisdiction

The acquisition of judicial jurisdiction and its exercise by the forum state, in any types of jurisdiction, that courts
have acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused in criminal cases or the plaintiff and defendant in civil
suits before the forum court can hear the action and validly render judgement.

Such personal jurisdiction may be acquired by the arrest or surrender of the accused or by the service of summons
or voluntary appearance of the litigants, as it case maybe.

3.

Territorial jurisdiction
a. General concepts- based on the place of their commission in the territory of a state,

4.

Philippine territorial jurisdiction

a. Definition of national territory in the Constitution
b. Characteristic of jurisdiction in national territory

5.

Waiver of criminal jurisdiction

a. GR: jurisdiction is absolute and exclusive; EXC: waiver in favor of another state thru treaty
i. RP-US Military Bases Agreement
CASES:
People v. Acierto

GODOFREDO DIZON, petitioner, vs. THE COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE RYUKUS COMMAND,
UNITED STATES ARMY, respondent. G.R. No. L-2110
July 22, 1948
Facts: On March 14, 1947, an Agreement was concluded between the Philippines and the United States of America whereby the
latter is authorized to occupy and use certain portions of the Philippine territory as military bases and to exercise jurisdiction over
certain offenses committed within and outside said bases. For an offense allegedly committed at the main storage area, Philrycom
Engineer Depot, United States Army, APO 900, located at Quezon City, Philippines, the petitioner was prosecuted in and
convicted by a General Court Martial appointed by the Commanding General of the Philippine-Ryukus Command of the United
States Army and accordingly sentenced, on March 4, 1948, to confinement at hard labor for five years.
In his petition for habeas corpus filed with this Court on March 24, 1948, lastly amended by motion dated April 9,
1948, the petitioners contends that the General Court Martial had no jurisdiction over the alleged offense which was committed in
a place not a base of the United States Army within the meaning of the Agreement concerning military bases of March 14, 1947,
and that even assuming that the offense was committed in a base, said Agreement is unconstitutional because it deprives the
Philippine courts of the jurisdiction over all offenses exclusively vested in them by Article VIII, section 1, of the Constitution,
and violates section 1 of Article III of the Constitution guaranteeing to every person in the Philippines due process and equal
protection of the law.
There is no dispute that the main storage area in which the offense in question is alleged to have been committed is
located within a site in Quezon City which has been used as headquarters by the Philippine-Ryukus Command of the United
States Army since before March 14, 1947, when the Agreement between the Philippines and United States regarding military
bases was concluded. The bases granted to the United States under the Agreement are specified and enumerated in Annex "A"
and annex "B" of said Agreement which, however, in its Article XXI provides that "the United States shall retain the right to
occupy temporary quarters and installations now existing outside the bases mentioned in Annex A and Annex B" (paragraph 1)
and that "the terms of this Agreement pertaining to bases shall be applicable to temporary quarters and installations referred to in
paragraph 1 of this article while they are so occupied by the armed forces of the United States; provided, that offenses committed
within the temporary quarters and installations located within the present limits of the City of Manila shall no be considered as
offenses within the bases" (paragraph 3).
It is not pretended on the part of the respondent that the site in question is included within any of the bases specific in
Annex "A" and Annex "B". Hence the same undoubtedly falls under the classification of temporary installations provided for in
Article XXI of the Agreement. Even so, as said temporary installation is not located within the limits of the City of Manila, the
terms of the Agreement pertaining to bases are applicable thereto by virtue of the provision of paragraph 3 of Article XXI already
above quoted. Accordingly, the offense in question falls under the jurisdiction of the United States as a consequence of Article
XIII of the Agreement which stipulates that "the Philippines consents that the United States shall have the right to exercise
jurisdiction over . . . any offense committed by any person within any base except where the offender and offended parties are
both Philippine citizens (not members of the armed forces of the United States on active duty) or the offense is against the

security of the Philippines . . ." (paragraph 1). It is not insisted by the petitioner that his case comes under any of the exception
mentioned in this provision. This brings us to the constitutional point raised by the petitioner.
In at least two recent cases (Raquiza vs. Bradford,1 41 Off. Gaz., 626, decided on September 13, 1945, and Tubb vs.
Griess,2 44 Off. Gaz., 2712, decided on April 7, 1947), we applied the well-settled principles of International Law that a foreign
army allowed to march through a friendly country or to be stationed in it, by permission of its government or sovereign, is
exempt from the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the place. Counsel for the petitioner, admitting the correctness of our
pronouncement, does not contend that such exemption is an unconstitutional diminution or deprivation of the jurisdiction of the
Philippine courts, because by virtue of section 3 of Article II of the Constitution, the generally accepted principles of international
law have been adopted as part of the law of the Nation. In like manner, there would be not be an unconstitutional derogation of
the jurisdiction of the local courts if we are recognized the immunities of foreign sovereigns and ministers.
Although already superfluous, we do not hesitate to hold that even in the absence of an express declaration in the Constitution
that the generally accepted principles of international law are made a part of the law of the Nation, we are bound to uphold the
immunities above referred to. And this should be true as long as the civilized world or majority of the independent countries
composing it still abide by the rules of the international law, and as long as the Philippines continues, as it must continue, to have
an intercourse with such countries. We would be the last to suppose that the farmers of the Constitution would ever intend to
impugn or disregard any international practice. "A nation would justify be considered as violating its faith, although that faith
might not be expressly plighted, which should suddenly and without previous notice, exercise its territorial powers in a manner
not consonant to the usages and received obligations of the civilized world." (The Schooner Exchange vs. McFaddon and Others,
3 Law. ed., 287.)
Under the Agreement of March 14, 1947, the United States was given express permission to establish military bases on certain
portions of the Philippine territory and to exercise jurisdiction over certain offenses. The rights thus granted are no less than those
conceded by the rule of international law to "a foreign army allowed to march through a friendly country or to be stationed in it,
by permission of its government or sovereign." For this reason, if for no other, the constitutional point raised by the petitioner
becomes untenable. The jurisdiction granted to the United States under the Agreement may be wider than what is recognized by
international law, but the facts remains that the lesser right is fundamentally as much a diminution of the jurisdiction of the
Philippine courts as the greater right. If the latter right were to be invoked in the absence of the Agreement, there is every reason
to state that:
The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not
imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an external source, would imply a diminution of its sovereignty
to the extent of the restriction, and an investment of that sovereignty to the same extend in that power which could impose such
restriction. (The Schooner Exchange vs. McFaddon and Others, 3 Law. ed., 287, 293.)
Thus in the most recent case of Miquiabas vs. Commanding General, Philippine-Ryukus Command, United States Army,3 G.R.
No. L-1988, decided on February 24, 1948 (45 Off. Gaz., 3821), this Court enunciated the principle that as a rule "the
Philippines, being a sovereign nation, has jurisdiction over all offenses committed within its territory, but it may, by treaty or by
agreement, consent that the United States or any other foreign nation, shall exercise jurisdiction over certain offenses committed
within certain portions of said territory.
In further support of the Agreement in question, the argument may be advanced that the Philippine Independence Act, approved
by the United States Congress on March 24, 1934, reserves to the United States the right to have and acquire naval reservations
and fueling stations in the Philippines. (See section 10, in connection with section 5.) In the Joint Resolution approved by the
United States Congress on June 29, 1944, it was provided (section 2) that "after negotiation with the President of Commonwealth
of the Philippines, or the President of the Philippine Republic, the President of the United States is hereby authorized by such
means as he finds appropriate to withhold or to acquire and to retain such bases, necessary appurtenances to such bases, and the
rights incident thereto, in addition to any provided for by the Act of March 24, 1934, as he may deem necessary for the mutual
protection of the Philippine Islands and of the United States under the Philippine Independence Act was enlarged by the Joint
Resolution of June 29, 1944, so as to include not only naval reservations and fueling stations but other military bases in the
Philippines. Indeed, in the Proclamation of Philippine Independence, it was recited that "Whereas the Act of Congress approved
March 24, 1934, known as the Philippine Independence Act, directed that on the 4th day of July immediately following a ten-year
transitional period leading to the independence of the Philippines the President of the United States of America should by
proclamation withdraw and surrender all rights of possession, supervision, jurisdiction, control or sovereignty of the United
States of America in and over the territory and people of the Philippines except certain reservations therein and thereafter
authorized to be made and on behalf of the United States of America should recognize the independence of the Philippines, now
therefore, I, Harry S. Truman, President of the United States of America, acting under and by virtue of the authority vested in me
by the aforesaid Act of Congress, do proclaim that, in accord with and subject to the reservations provided for in the pertinent
provisions of the existing acts of Congress, the United States of America hereby withdraws and surrenders all rights of
possession, supervision, jurisdiction, control or sovereignty now existing and exercised by the United States of America in and
over the territory and people of the Philippines and on behalf of the United States of America I do hereby recognize the

independence of the Philippines as a separate and self-governing nation and acknowledge the authority and control over the same
of the Government instituted by the people thereof under the constitution now in force. . ." (Emphasis supplied.) The emphasized
portions of this declaration in the Proclamation of the Philippine Independence plainly lead to the conclusion that the withdrawal
of the sovereignty of the United States over the territory and people of the Philippines is subject to the right of the United States
to withhold and acquire such military bases as are authorized, not only by the Philippine Independence Act of March 24, 1934,
but also by the Joint Resolution of June 29, 1944. Hence the acquisition of bases by the United States under the Agreement of
March 14, 1944, cannot be constitutionally objectionable.
But the point we want to bring out is that, if bases may be validly granted to the United States under the Constitution, there is no
plausible reason while the lesser attribute of the jurisdiction cannot be waived. From another point of view, waiver of jurisdiction
may well be considered as included within the terms "necessary appurtenances to such bases, and the rights incident thereto,"
appearing in the Joint Resolution of June 29, 1944, herein-above already quoted.
Jurisdiction being validly waived in favor of the United States under the Agreement in question, it follows that petitioner's
contention regarding alleged denial of due process and equal protection of the law becomes unfounded.
The petition is therefore hereby denied, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.
Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla and Tuason, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PERFECTO, J., dissenting:
There is no way of measuring the magnitude of the constitutional question involved in this case. Whether we shall allow
ourselves to bear the stigma of judicial extraterritoriality is a matter of public policy upon which any one may take the position
that may take the position that may suit his taste, his mental and moral training, or simply his sense of national pride of dignity.
However low the concept of extraterritoriality is fallen into the abyss of ill-repute and however deep the conviction is as to the
affront and ignominy caused by the imposition of extraterritoriality in any country or nation, such consideration is only secondary
to the vital question regarding to the effectiveness of democratic constitutionalism.
The issue directly involved in this case poses before us the question whether or not he judicial extraterritoriality provided in the
Agreement of March 14, 1947, on American military bases in the Philippines is violative of the following provisions of section 1
and 2, Article VIII of the Constitution:
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be established by law.
SEC. 2. The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts, but may not
deprive the Supreme Court of its original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, nor
of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error, as the law or the rules of court
may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in
(1) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulations is in
question.
(2) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto.
(3) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any trial court is in issue.
(4) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment.
(5) All case in which an error or question of law is involved.
Article VIII of the Agreement grants the United States of America a general right to exercise jurisdiction over offenses committed
by any person within any military base, permanent or temporary, with two exceptions: First, where the offender and offended
party are both Filipinos; and second, where the offense is against the security of the Philippines.
The jurisdiction granted is judicial in nature. As such, it constitutes the essential function of one of the elemental powers and
attributes of sovereignty, the judicial power.

The Filipino people, in the exercise of the sovereignty (section 1, Article II of the Constitution), decided to vest the judicial power
in one Supreme Court and such inferior courts as may be established by law. The popular constitutional mandate as couched in
section 1 of Article VIII excludes from the exercise of the power other entities and persons. Being an attribute of their
sovereignty, the people may exercise it directly or delegate it. When they delegated it to one Supreme Court and to such inferior
courts as may be established by law, the delegation cannot be enlarged or extended without contravening the will of the people.
To name one Supreme Court and inferior courts established by law is to exclude the United States of America, as a nation, and its
military personnel, establishments, and organization that may happened to occupy, use, or stay in the military bases covered by
the Agreement. Even the blind can see this clearly in their minds.
The negative provision of section 2 of Article VIII of the Constitution makes more emphatic and imperative the exclusiveness of
the delegation. Five cases are therein specified in which the Supreme Court cannot be deprived of original or appellate
jurisdiction. Many of such cases may present themselves in the trial of offenses jurisdiction over which is granted by the
Agreement to the United States of America. No one with some knowledge of law may gainsay the fact that in the trial of said
offenses the constitutionality or validity of a treaty, law, ordinance, or executive regulation may be raised; the jurisdiction of the
trial military court may be in issue; the accused may be sentenced to death or life imprisonment; or errors or question of law may
be involved. When said situation should arise in the exercise by the United States of America of the judicial extraterritoriality
granted to it in the Agreement, the Supreme Court may not exercise the appellant and revisory jurisdiction guaranteed to it by the
Constitution, because the Agreement has transferred it to the United States of America. The conflict between the Agreement and
the Constitution is too glaring to need more elaboration. The constitutional contravention is so evident that those who would save
the offending parts of the Agreement would not dare face squarely the conflict, but would rather seek refuge in judicial
pronouncements which have no bearing on the issue, have been made on different facts and issues, are the expressions of early
19th century mentality, or are the results of a wrong mental appraisal of truth and justice.
An obiter dictum made in a decision rendered one-and-a-half century ago, notwithstanding its immateriality may be the sheer
force of its old age is now elevated to the category of a principle of international law, so as to justify the unconstitutional
provisions of the Agreement in question. A foreign army it says allowed to march through a friendly country or to be
stationed in it, by permission of its government or sovereign, is exempt from the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the place. This
amazing pronouncement has been made in Exchange vs. M'faddon (7 Cranch 116; 3 Law. ed., 287, 294) rendered by the Supreme
Court of the United States of America in 1812, where a foreign army was not involved in any way. The whole litigation was
about the schooner Exchange. John M'faddon and William Greetham, American citizens, filed libel, claiming ownership of, and
restoration of possession to them, of the schooner, alleging that they were her sole owners, that on October 27, 1809, she sailed
from Baltimore bound to San Sebastian, Spain, and while lawfully, peacefully pursuing her voyage, she was, on December 30,
1810, forcefully taken by persons under decrees and order of Napoleon, Emperor of the French, out of the custody of the
libellants and of their captain and agents, and was disposed of by those persons. That the Supreme Court of the United States
should in the case of such a vessel make a solemn pronouncement about the grant of free passage to foreign troops is a thing that
would need a volume of explanations to be understood.
The impertinent pronouncement, thus officiously inserted in a litigation about a vessel, where it has no bearing at all, has been
invoked in support of the majority opinion in the Raquiza case (41 Off. Gaz., 626), to justify the trampling of the fundamental
right of personal freedom of three ladies, perpetrated by members of the army of the United States. It seemed that the aura with
which the army of liberation was surrounded was too dazzling to hide the acts of oppression committed by members thereof, and
to have blinded the majority to the extent of brushing aside a 20th century constitution for the sake of a casual immaterial
statement made in a decision rendered about the beginning of the 19th century. The error was again committed in the majority
opinion in the Tubbs case, L-1325,1 where the constitutional rights of two American cititzens were involved.
In both cases, Raquiza and Tubb, the constitutional question was overridden by transferring the controversies to an international
filed, to be decided under a pseudo-principle of international law applied by analogy, and the pseudo-principle is no other than
the impertinent statement made in an early 19th century decision. That impertinent pronouncement is again invoked in this case
to side-step the constitutional issue.
The much abused provision of the constitution to the effect that the generally accepted principles of international law are adopted
as part of the law of the nation (section 3 of Article II of the Constitution), is invoked to decide this case not upon the very text of
the Constitution, but upon the foreign army passage casual pronouncement. Of course, neither in this case nor in the Raquiza and
Tubb cases has any attempt been made to show that the pronouncement in question is among the generally accepted principles of
international law. The attempt would be futile now, because the pronouncement is neither a principle of international law nor one
generally accepted, it being only an obiter dictum made by a judge of the horse-and-buggy age.
It appears paradoxical that in a constitutional democracy like ours official pronouncements should be made recognizing
immunities of foreign sovereigns and ministers in violation of the Constitution. The Filipino people have never given recognition
to such immunities. On the contrary, they have embodied in the Constitution the purpose to establish a government under a
regime of justice, liberty and democracy, where any discrimination even in favor of the most powerful foreign power should not

take place. In tyrannical distatorships or under a god-emperor regime, even the most powerful chief of state is bound by laws or
even traditions. Such laws and traditions compelled a king of England to abdicate his throne.
It is admitted that the agreement in question effectuates a diminution of the jurisdiction of the Philippine courts, but it is justified
upon the following statement, recklessly made by the majority in the Miquiabas case, L-1198, that "the Philippines, being a
sovereign nation, has jurisdiction over all offenses committed within its territory, but it may, by treaty or by agreement, consent
that the United States or any foreign nation, shall exercise jurisdiction over said offenses committed within certain portions of
said territory.
To rely on such a statement is to lean on a slender bamboo branch. Both are misleading as support. Not much docimastic effort is
needed to show that the statement reveals an inadequate intellectual grasp of elemental concepts. Of course, the Philippines may
do anything it pleases with the attributes of its national sovereignty. On that score, practically the infinite is the limit. But, why
forget that "Philippines" is an abstract name of an entity whose acts are visible, tangible, and intelligible only through concrete
undertakings of living agents, moving on the solid earth of reality, not as fleeces of evaporating cloud vanishing in the sky of
intellectual conceptions and mirages? For the entity of have a footing in the realm of concrete facts, we have to reckon, in the
first place, with the human beings that constitute the people. That great mass of humanity does not, for practical reasons,
undertake directly any treaty-making, which, by the devices of representative democracy, is entrusted to specific agents and
agencies of government. Our people did not deem it wise to grant the treaty-making agencies absolute powers, but subject to the
limitations set forth in the Constitution. Now, to confuse, to indentify the treaty-making agents executive officers, diplomats,
the Senate, with the Filipino people or with that abstract creature called "Philippines," without exhibiting necessarily
manifestations of doddery, is to invite urgent therapeutic measures to achieve freedom from the spider web of error.
There is in the quoted assertion a lack of understanding of the elemental facts that treaties and international agreements are
concluded, not by the principals themselves, the people, but by their representatives, and that, while the powers of the principals
are unlimited, those of their representatives are limited by the Constitution. The people may amend, or remake the Constitution,
or maybe, dispense with it entirely. The representatives of the people can go no further than that allowed by the will of the people
as expressed in the Constitution.
To invoke the provisions of the Tydings-McDuffie Act of March 24, 1934 and the joint resolution of the United States Congress
on June 29, 1944, and the proclamation of Philippine Independence issued by President Truman on July 4, 1946, appears to us to
be out of place. They are authorities in support of reservations made by the United States to acquire naval reservations, fuelling
stations and military bases in the Philippines, through negotiations with our government and by mutual agreements of both
countries. The assertion that the acquisition of military bases by the United States under the agreement of March 14, 1947, cannot
constitutionally be objectionable, appears to be completely immaterial in the present controversy. Of course, our government may
allow the establishment in this country of military bases provided in the agreement, although not all will agree with the wisdom
of the number, extent and nature of the bases actually granted, and there are reasonable and patriotic citizens who would grant
much less on conditions not so onerous as those provided in the agreement. Such matter has nothing to do with the question
involving the constitutionality of the judicial extraterritoriality granted in the agreement. There is nothing in the congressional act
and resolution and in the independence proclamation exacting from our government the commitment of disregarding or violating
our own Constitution which, beside having been ratified by the Filipino people, carries the express approval of President Franklin
D. Roosevelt, as the highest representative of the people and government of the United States of America. At any rate, no such
commitment, if any, can be binding upon officials of our government who have all solemly sworn to uphold the Constitution.
We cannot keep the respect of the world or our own self-respect if we lack the moral fiber to resist the impositions of the
powerful, much less at the cost of our own fundamental law. When 1946 three senators and several representatives were wantonly
suspended so that their presence in Congress would not stand in the way of the approval of the so-called parity amendment, our
country had to pay very dearly in properties destroyed and lives snuffed. Just to accomodate a small minority of Americans, a
gruop of representatives of the people were denied the constitutional privileges of their office, thereby trampling down the
fundamental law. The shadow and memory of those who had been killed in the hills and plains of Central Luzon will forever
remorsely haunt our people. We hope that the unconstitutional judicial extraterritoriality here in issue will not cause our people to
spill so much sweat, tears, and blood, and to suffer the same calamities occasioned by the unconstitutional suspension of senators
and representatives in 1946.
This Supreme Court has the power to stop the rampage of constitutional breaches in which other agencies of our government are
indulging in a servile attitude of complaisance to former masters who are bent on keeping in thier hands the strings, the chains,
and the whip of unquestioned command. Our oath of office compels us to exercise that power. We do not entertain much respect
for the Soviet satellites in the Eastern and Central Europe. Shall we allow ourselves to go down in history as a mere American
satellite? The invading Japanese imperial army established in our country the puppet Philippine Republic. With only that one, we
are already sated with pupperty. Let us make the present Republic of the Philippines as truly sovereign as is the will of our
people, solemnly manifested in the Constitution.

Extraterritoriality impinges sharply upon our sovereignty and hurts our national dignity. On that matter we have yet much to learn
from the uncompromising attitude of Mabini, Quezon City and Abad Santos. There is striking contrast between the way our
heroes stood their ground to the last inch on matters of national dignity and our present proneness to allow the sphere of our
sovereignty to be pricked by abdications and surrenders to foreign impositions. Our pliability and meek submission to the
powerful compel us to mortgage and endanger the future of our people. We are in urgent need of reading Plutarch again, so that
we may mirror ourselves on the ancient examples of such public men as Lycurgus and Solon, Aristides and Cato the Censor, and
we need to cradle our hearts in the burning passion for liberty which placed Marcus Brutus among the immortals. The imposition
upon us of extraterritoriality is a thing of which the fellow citizens of Jefferson and Lincoln can never make legitimate boast and
they would rather have it forgotten as racism and lynching, and our submission to that imposition will be a thorn constantly
wounding the pride of our people.
Democratic constitutionalism is an essential factor in our present task of nation building. To ensure even a moderate success of
this Republic, we have to strick to the system. That system lies behind the wonderful achievements of the American Republic, the
greatest ever known in history, pioneer in many fields of human endeavor and leader in ushering the present Atomic era. That
system is indispensible for the attainment of an effective one-world political organization. No organization is possible without
law, and no law will command respect and obedience if it not the expression of the free of the people. Democratic
constitutionalism is in essence the just and orderly rule of the majority manifested in a basic documents: the constitution. Any
breach of the constitution is a dissolvent seed jeopardizing the survival of the organization wielded by the fundamental document.
While no unit of the organization is exempt from the duty of upholding it, the greatest responsibility lies on the shoulders of the
tribunals, by the very nature of their functions. The failure of this Supreme Court to enforce in this case the constitutional
mandates concerning the judicial power gives ground for serious alarm. We hope it will not cause too much havoc.
Our vote is to order the immediate release of petitoner.

ii.

Visiting Forces Agreement

CASE: Bayan v. Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000 constitutionality of VFA

BUENA, J.:
I.

THE FACTS

The Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America entered into an agreement
called the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The agreement was treated as a treaty by the Philippine
government and was ratified by then-President Joseph Estrada with the concurrence of 2/3 of the
total membership of the Philippine Senate.
The VFA defines the treatment of U.S. troops and personnel visiting the Philippines. It
provides for the guidelines to govern such visits, and further defines the rights of the U.S. and the
Philippine governments in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft,
importation and exportation of equipment, materials and supplies.
Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the VFA violates 25, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution,
which provides that foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines
except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate . . . and recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting State.
II.

THE ISSUE
Was the VFA unconstitutional?

III. THE RULING

[The Court DISMISSED the consolidated petitions, held that the petitioners did not commit
grave abuse of discretion, and sustained the constitutionality of the VFA.]

NO, the VFA is not unconstitutional.

Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country,
unless the following conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty
must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by congress, ratified by a majority
of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty by the
other contracting state.
There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the VFA. The
concurrence handed by the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with the provisions
of the Constitution . . . the provision in [in 25, Article XVIII] requiring ratification by a majority of the
votes cast in a national referendum being unnecessary since Congress has not required it.
xxx

xxx

xxx

This Court is of the firm view that the phrase recognized as a treaty means that the other
contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. To require the other
contracting state, the United States of America in this case, to submit the VFA to the United States
Senate for concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, is to accord strict meaning to the phrase.
Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in the Constitution are to be given their
ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus
attached to them prevails. Its language should be understood in the sense they have in common
use.
Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive
agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. To be
sure, as long as the VFA possesses the elements of an agreement under international law, the said
agreement is to be taken equally as a treaty.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The records reveal that the United States Government, through Ambassador Thomas C.
Hubbard, has stated that the United States government has fully committed to living up to the terms
of the VFA. For as long as the United States of America accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a
treaty, and binds itself further to comply with its obligations under the treaty, there is indeed marked
compliance with the mandate of the Constitution.
6.

Vessel is an extension of the state of its registry

a. Registry, as a rule, determines nationality of a vessel
CASES:
Assali v. Commissioner of Customs
Criminal Law Characteristics of Penal Laws Territoriality

In 1950, customs officers intercepted 5 ships owned by Illuh Asaali et al. Said ships were found to be
from Borneo and were on their way to a port in Tawi-tawi, Sulu. On board the ships were rattan
products and cigarettes. The customs confiscated said items on the ground that Asaali et al do not
have the required import permits for the said goods.
Asaali questioned the legality of the seizure as he contended that the customs officers did not
intercept them within Philippine waters but rather, they were intercepted in the high seas. Hence,
according to Asaali, Philippine import laws have no application to the case at bar.
ISSUE: Whether or not Asaalis contention is correct.

HELD: No. Asaalis contention is without merit. The Revised Penal Code leaves no doubt as to its
applicability and enforceability not only within the Philippines, its interior waters and maritime zone,
but also outside of its jurisdiction against those committing offense while on a Philippine ship. The
ships intercepted were of Philippine registry.
Further, it has been an establish principle that a state has the right to protect itself and its
revenues, a right not limited to its own territory but extending to the high seas. The authority of a
nation within its own territory is absolute and exclusive. The seizure of a vessel within the range of its
cannon by a foreign force is an invasion of that territory, and is a hostile act which it is its duty to
repel. But its power to secure itself from injury may certainly be exercised beyond the limits of its
territory.
It is thus most evident that the Court of Tax Appeals had not in any wise refused to adhere
faithfully to controlling legal principles when it sustained the action taken by respondent Commissioner
of Customs. It would be a reproach and a reflection on the law if on the facts as they had been shown
to exist, the seizure and forfeiture of the vessels and cargo in question were to be characterized as
outside the legal competence of our government and violative of the constitutional rights of
petitioners-appellants. Fortunately, as had been made clear above, that would be an undeserved
reflection and an unwarranted reproach. The vigor of the war against smuggling must not be
hampered by a misreading of international law concepts and a misplaced reliance on a constitutional
guaranty that has not in any wise been infringed.

Lauritzen v. Larsen
FACTS

-Danish seaman brought suit under Jones Act to recover for injuries on the Danish
ship,
the
Randa,
while
docked
in
Cuba.
-Larsen based assertion of federal jurisdiction on board reading of Jones Act, that
encompassed all sailors and on Lauritzen companys significant NY business
contracts.
Statute stated: Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his
employment may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law, with the
right of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United States modifying or
extending the common-law right or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway
employees
shall
apply...
ISSUE
Should
HOLDING
Danish

the

Danish

law
Law

apply

or

should
should

US

law

apply?
apply.

RULES
Law of the Flag- Each state under international law may determine for itself the
conditions on which it will grant its nationality to a merchant ship, thereby accepting
responsibility
for
it
and
acquiring
authority
over
it.
-Nationality is evidenced to the world by the ships papers and its flag.
-Law of the flag supersedes the territorial principle (even for criminal jurisdiction of
personnel of a merchant ship), because it is deemed to be a part of the territory of
that sovereignty (whose flag it flies), and not to lose that character when in navigable
waters
within
the
territorial
limits
of
another
sovereignty.
-All matters of discipline and all things done on board which affected only the vessel
or those belonging to it, and do not involve the peace or dignity of the country or the

ports tranquility, should be left by the local government to be dealt with by the
authorities of the nation to which the vessel belongs as the laws of that nation or the
interests of its commerce requires.
Internal discipline pertains to state of vessels registry
a. General Rule and Exception
b. Basis: Comity
CASES:
Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo
Mr. Justice CLARK delivered the opinion of the Court.
7.

While the petitioners in this diversity case present several questions, the sole one decided is whether the Labor Management
Relations Act of 1947 1 applies to a controversy involving damages resulting from the picketing of a foreign ship operated
entirely by foreign seamen under foreign articles while the vessel is temporarily in an American port. We decide that it does not,
and therefore do not reach other questions raised by the parties.
The S.S. Riviera on September 3, 1952, sailed into harbor at Portland, Oregon, for repairs, to load a cargo of wheat, and to
complete an insurance survey. It was owned by respondent, a Panamanian corporation, and sailed under a Liberian flag. The crew
was made up entirely of nationals of countries other than the United States, principally German and British. They had agreed to
serve on a voyage originating at Bremen, Germany, for a period of two years, or until the vessel returned to a European port. A
British form of articles of agreement was opened at Bremen. The conditions prescribed by the British Maritime Board were
incorporated into the agreement, including wages and hours of employment, all of which were specifically set out. The crew
further agreed to obey all lawful commands of the Master of the Riviera in regard to the ship, the stores, and the cargo, whether
on board, in boats, or on shore.
On or about September 9, 1952, the members of the crew went on strike on board the vessel and refused to obey the orders of the
Master. They demanded that their term of service be reduced, their wages be increased, and more favorable conditions of
employment be granted. 2 They refused to work, demanding their back pay and transportation or its cost to their ports of
engagement. The Master told the crew to continue their work or they would be discharged. When they declined to work he
discharged them and ordered them to leave the ship, which they refused to do. This situation continued until September 26, 1952,
when the striking crewmen left the vessel pursuant to an order of the United States District Court entered in a possessory libel
filed by the respondent. The crew had picketed the vessel from September 9, 1952, when the strike began, until September 26,
when they left the ship. On September 15, 1952, they had designated the Sailors' Union of the Pacific as their collective
bargaining representative. The striking crew or others acting for them continued the picketing from September 26, 1952, until
they withdrew the picket line on October 13, 1952. The Sailors' Union of the Pacific began picketing the Riviera on October 14
and continued to do so until restrained by an injunction issued in an action for injunctive relief and damages filed against it and
its principal representatives by the respondent. Two days later Local 90 of the National Organization of Masters, Mates and Pilots
of America set up a picket line at the Riviera which was maintained until December 8, 1952. This picketing was stopped by a writ
issued against that union and its representatives in the second action for injunction and damages filed by respondent and
consolidated here. On December 10, 1952, another picket line was established at the vessel. It was maintained this time by the
Atlantic and Gulf Coast District, S.I.U., 3 until it too was enjoined on December 12 in a third action filed by the respondent in
which the prayer likewise was for an injunction and damages. These three cases have been consolidated for consideration here.
All of the picketing was peaceful.
The ship sailed in December 1952. In June 1953, the injunction orders were vacated on appeal to the Court of Appeals and were
ordered dismissed as moot. The cases were returned to the District Court for trial on the damage claims. 9 Cir., 205 F.2d 944. The
ship had not returned to an American port at the time of trial in 1954. At the trial the court found that the purpose of the picketing
'was to compel the (respondent) to re-employ' the striking members of the crew for a shorter term and at more favorable wage
rates and conditions than those agreed upon in the articles. The court further found that as a result of the picketing the employees
of the firms repairing and loading the vessel refused to cross the picket line and the ship was forced to stand idly by without
repairs or cargo, all to the damage of respondent. The unions and their representatives contended that the trial court was without
jurisdiction because the Labor Management Relations Act had pre-empted the field. However, the trial court entered judgment for
damages against the three unions as well as their principal representatives. The judgments were based on a common-law theory
that the picketing was for an unlawful purpose under Oregon law. The court found that respondent had no remedy under the
Labor Management Relations Act because that Act 'is concerned solely with the labor relations of American workers between
American concerns and their employees in the United States, and it is not intended to, nor does it cover a dispute between a
foreign ship and its foreign crew.' The Court of Appeals thought that United Construction Workers, Affiliated with United Mine
Workers of America v. Laburnum Construction Corp., 1954, 347 U.S. 656, 74 S.Ct. 833, 98 L.Ed. 1025, governed, but that
Oregon law did not permit recovery against the unions since they were unincorporated associations. 9 Cir., 233 F.2d 62. 4 This, in

effect, left the judgments standing against the individual representatives of the unions, the petitioners here. We granted certiorari
in order to settle the important question of jurisdiction 352 U.S. 889, 77 S.Ct. 125, 1 L.Ed.2d 84.
It should be noted at the outset that the dispute from which these actions sprang arose on a foreign vessel. It was between a
foreign employer and a foreign crew operating under an agreement made abroad under the laws of another nation. The only
American connection was that the controversy erupted while the ship was transiently in a United States port and American labor
unions participated in its picketing.
It is beyond question that a ship voluntarily entering the territorial limits of another country subjects itself to the laws and
jurisdiction of that country. Wildenhus' Case, 1887, 120 U.S. 1, 7 S.Ct. 385, 30 L.Ed. 565. The exercise of that jurisdiction is not
mandatory but discretionary. Often, because of public policy or for other reasons, the local sovereign may exert only limited
jurisdiction and sometimes none at all. Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 1923, 262 U.S. 100, 43 S.Ct. 504, 67 L.Ed. 894. It follows that
if Congress had so chosen, it could have made the Act applicable to wage disputes arising on foreign vessels between nationals of
other countries when the vessel comes within our territorial waters. The question here therefore narrows to one of intent of the
Congress as to the coverage of the Act.
The parties point to nothing in the Act itself or its legislative history that indicates in any way that the Congress intended to bring
such disputes within the coverage of the Act. Indeed the District Court found to the contrary, specifically stating that the Act does
not 'cover a dispute between a foreign ship and its foreign crew.' The Court of Appeals, though not passing on the question, noted
that 'It may well be that American laws should not be construed to apply, without some more explicit Congressional indication
than we are able to find in the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, to situations with as many points of foreign contact as
the situation at bar.' 233 F.2d at page 65.
Our study of the Act leaves us convinced that Congress did not fashion it to resolve labor disputes between nationals of other
countries operating ships under foreign laws. 5 The whole background ground of the Act is concerned with industrial strife
between American employers and employees. In fact, no discussion in either House of Congress has been called to our attention
from the thousands of pages of legislative history that indicates in the least that Congress intended the coverage of the Act to
extend to circumstances such as those posed here. It appears not to have even occurred to those sponsoring the bill. The Report
made to the House by its Committee on Education and Labor and presented by the coauthor of the bill, Chairman Hartley, stated
that 'the bill herewith reported has been formulated as a bill of rights both for American workingmen and for their employers.'
The report declares further that because of the inadequacies of legislation 'the American workingman has been deprived of his
dignity as an individual,' and that it is the purpose of the bill to correct these inadequacies. (Emphasis added.) H.R.Rep. No. 245,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 4. What was said inescapably describes the boundaries of the Act as including only the workingmen of our
own country and its possessions.
The problem presented is not a new one to the Congress. In the Seamen's Act of March 4, 1915, 38 Stat. 1164, the Congress
declared it unlawful to pay a seaman wages in advance and specifically declared the prohibition applicable to foreign vessels
'while in waters of the United States.' Id., at 1169, as amended, 46 U.S.C. 599(e), 46 U.S.C.A. 599(e). In Sandberg v.
McDonald, 1918, 248 U.S. 185, 39 S.Ct. 84, 63 L.Ed. 200, this Court construed the Act as not covering advancements 'when the
contract and payment were made in a foreign country where the law sanctioned such contract and payment * * *. Had Congress
intended to make void such contracts and payments a few words would have stated that intention, not leaving such an important
regulation to be gathered from implication.' Id., 248 U.S. at page 195, 39 S.Ct. at page 86. The Court added that 'such sweeping
and important requirement is not found specifically made in the statute.' Ibid. See also Neilson v. Rhine Shipping Co., 1918, 248
U.S. 205, 39 S.Ct. 89, 63 L.Ed. 208. In 1920 Congress amended 4 of the Seamen's Act of 1915, and granted to every seaman on
a vessel of the United States the right to demand one-half of his then earned wages at every port the vessel entered during a
voyage. 41 Stat. 1006, 46 U.S.C. 597, 46 U.S.C.A. 597. The section was made applicable to 'seamen on foreign vessels while in
harbors of the United States, and the courts of the United States shall be open to such seamen for its enforcement.' This Court in
Strathearn Steamship Co. v. Dillon, 1920, 252 U.S. 348, 40 S.Ct. 350, 64 L.Ed. 607, upheld the applicability of the section to a
British seaman on a British vessel under British articles. The Court pointed out:
'taking the provisions of the act as the same are written, we think it plain that it manifests the purpose of Congress to place
American and foreign seamen on an equality of right in so far as the privileges of this section are concerned, with equal
opportunity to resort to the courts of the United States for the enforcement of the act. Before the amendment * * * the right to
recover one-half the wages could not be enforced in face of a contractual obligation to the contrary. Congress, for reasons which
it deemed sufficient, amended the act so as to permit the recovery upon the conditions named in the statute.' Id., 252 U.S. at page
355, 40 S.Ct. at page 352.
In 1928, Jackson v. S.S. Archimedes, 275 U.S. 463, 48 S.Ct. 164, 72 L.Ed. 374, was decided by this Court. It involved advance
payments made by a British vessel to foreign seamen before leaving Manchester on her voyage to New York and return. It was
contended that the advances made in Manchester were illegal and void. That there was 'no intention to extend the provisions of
the statute,' the Court said, 'to advance payments made by foreign vessels while in foreign ports, is plain. This Court had pointed
out in the Sandberg case, supra, that such a sweeping provision was not specifically made in the statute * * *.' Id., 275 U.S. at

page 470, 48 S.Ct. at page 166. Soon thereafter several proposals were made in Congress designed to extend the coverage of the
Seamen's Act so as to prohibit advancements made by foreign vessels in foreign ports. A storm of diplomatic protest resulted.
Great Britain, Italy, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Germany, and Canada all joined in vigorously denouncing the
proposals. 6 In each instance the bills died in Congress.
And so here such a 'sweeping provision' as to foreign applicability was not specified in the Act. 7 The seamen agreed in Germany
to work on the foreign ship under British articles. We cannot read into the Labor Management Relations Act an intent to change
the contractual provisions made by these parties. For us to run interference in such a delicate field of international relations there
must be present the affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed. It alone has the facilities necessary to make fairly
such an important policy decision where the possibilities of international discord are so evident and retaliative action so certain.
We, therefore, conclude that any such appeal should be directed to the Congress rather than the courts.
Affirmed.

McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Mareneros de Honduras

Facts:
The National Maritime Union of America, filed a petition with the National Labor Relations Board seeking certification, as the
representative of the unlicensed seamen employed upon certain Honduran-flag vessels owned by Empresa Hondurena de
Vapores, a Honduran corporation.
The petition was filed against United Fruit Company, a New Jersey corporation which was alleged to be the owner of the
majority of Empresa's stock.
The crews on these vessels are recruited by Empresa in Honduras. Most are Honduran citizens and claim that country as their
residence and home port. The crew are required to sign Honduran shipping articles, and their wages, terms and condition of
employment, discipline, etc., are controlled by a bargaining agreement between Empresa and a Honduran union, Sociedad
Nacional de Marineros de Honduras.
Under the Honduran Labor Code only a union whose "juridic personality" is recognized by Honduras and which is composed of
at least 90% of Honduran citizens can represent the seamen on Honduran-registered ships. The N. M. U. fulfills neither
requirement.
The Board held that Empresa was engaged in "commerce" within the meaning of 2 (6) of the Act 3 and that the maritime
operations "affected commerce" within 2 (7), 4 meeting the jurisdictional requirement of 9 (c) (1). 5 It therefore ordered an
election to be held among the seamen signed on Empresa's vessels to determine whether they wished N. M. U., Sindicato
Maritimo Nacional de Honduras, 6 or no union to represent them.
Empresa and Sociedad brought suits in Federal District Courts to prevent the election. Empresa proceeding in New York against
the Regional Director and Sociedad in the District of Columbia against the members of the Board.
Issue:
W/n the juridical provisions of the Natl Labor Relations Act extend to the maritime operations of such foreign flag ships with
alien seamen.
Held:
The jurisdictional provisions of the National Labor Relations Act do not extend to the maritime operations of such foreign flag
ships employing alien seamen.
The theory of the Board on balancing of contacts that rely on weight of American contacts might require the Board inquire into
the internal discipline and order of all foreign vessels calling at American ports. Such activity would raise considerable
disturbance not only in the field of maritime law but in our international relations as well. In addition, enforcement of Board

orders would project the courts into application of the sanctions of the Act to foreign-flag ships on a purely ad hoc weighing of
contacts basis. This would inevitably lead to embarrassment in foreign affairs and be entirely infeasible in actual practice.
Petitioners say that the language of the Act may be read literally as including foreign-flag vessels within its coverage. If the
sponsors of the original Act or of its amendments conceived of the application now sought by the Board, they failed to translate
such thoughts into describing the boundaries of the Act as including foreign-flag vessels manned by alien crews.
Therefore, we find no basis for a construction which would exert United States jurisdiction over and apply its laws to the internal
management and affairs of the vessels here flying the Honduran flag, contrary to the recognition long afforded them not only by
our State Department but also by the Congress.
The well-established rule of international law that the law of the flag state ordinarily governs the internal affairs of a ship.
Sociedad, currently the exclusive bargaining agent of Empresa under Honduran law, would have a head-on collision with N. M.
U. should it become the exclusive bargaining agent under the Act. This would be aggravated by the fact that under Honduran law
N. M. U. is prohibited from representing the seamen on Honduran-flag ships even in the absence of a recognized bargaining
agent.
Jurisdiction over crimes committed on board vessel
a. Rule on territoriality and Exception
b. Rule on concurrent jurisdiction and Exception
c. Rule if the vessel of foreign registry is in the Philippines:
CASES:
US v. Flores
Brief Fact Summary. For the crime committed overseas, the court held that it lacked jurisdiction.
8.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. While within foreign waters, where the local sovereign has not asserted its jurisdiction, the United
States (P) may define and punish offenses committed by its own citizens on its vessels.
Facts. An American was murdered by Flores (D) a U.S. citizen while on an American vessel at anchor in the Belgian Congo. The
district court, to which Flores (D) was charged in Philadelphia, sustained a demurrer to the indictment and discharged Flores (D)
on the premise that the court lacked jurisdiction. This judgment was appealed by the United States (P).
Issue. While within foreign waters, where the local sovereign has not asserted its jurisdiction, can the United States (P) define and
punish offenses committed by its own citizens on its vessels?
Held. (Stone, J) Yes. While within foreign waters, where the local sovereign has not asserted its jurisdiction, the United States (P)
may define and punish offenses committed by its own citizens on its vessels. A merchant vessel is taken to be part of the territory
whose flag it flies and does not lose that character when it navigates water within the territorial limits of another sovereignty. The
onus now lies on the U.S. courts to apply its own statutes to the offenses committed by its citizens on vessels flying its own flag.
These statutes are however interpreted in the light of recognized principles of international law. Reversed and remanded.
Discussion. According to the Court, the indictment charged an offense within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the
United States. The local authorities would have jurisdiction in the case of a serious crime if the local authorities claimed
jurisdiction. The doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction is based on the principles of international comity
US v. Look Chow
Facts: Several persons (including the internal-revenue agent of Cebu) went aboard the steamship Erroll to inspect and search its
cargo. Note that steamship Erroll is of English nationality and it came from HongKong bound for Mexico via the call ports of
Manila and Cebu. These persons found sacks of opium (exhibits A, B, and C.)
The complaint filed against defendant stated that defendant carried, kept, possessed, and had in his possession and control 96 kg
of opium and that he he had been surprised in the act of selling P1,000 worth prepared opium. However, since there was more
than 1 crime charged, the fiscal just filed for unlawful possession of opium
Defense admitted that Exhibits A, B, and C, contained opium and were found on board Erroll and that it was true that the
defendant stated that these sacks of opium were his and that he had them in his possession. (There was an exhibit D but exhibit D
was the opium bought from the defendant.)

According to the testimony of the internal-revenue, the opium seized in the vessel had been bought by the defendant in
HongKong, at P3.00 for each round can and P5.00 for each of the others, for the purpose of selling it, as contraband, in Mexico
and Puerto de Vera Cruz; that the vessel arrived at Cebu and on the same day he sold opium.
Issue: Whether or not the Philippine courts have jurisdiction
Held: Yes, the Philippine courts have jurisdiction.
Mere possession of a thing of prohibited use in the Philippine Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in transit, in any of their ports, does
not, as a general rule, constitute a crime triable by the courts of the Philippines. However, in the case at bar, a can of opium is
landed from the vessel upon Philippine soil, thus committing an open violation of the Philippine laws.
People v. Wong Cheng
Facts:
Appelle (Wong Cheng) is accused of having illegally smoked opium, aboard the merchant vessel Changsa of English nationality
while said vessel was anchored in Manila Bay two and a half miles from the shores of the city.
Lower court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Attorney General urges the revocation of the order of Lower Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction over crime committed aboard merchant vessels of foreign registry
anchored in our jurisdiction waters.
Held:
There are two fundamental rules on this particular matter in connection with International Law; to wit:
1.) the French rule, according to which crimes committed aboard a foreign merchant vessels should not be prosecuted in the
courts of the country within whose territorial jurisdiction they were committed, unless their commission affects the peace and
security of the territory; and
2.) the English rule, based on the territorial principle and followed in the United States, according to which, crimes perpetrated
under such circumstances are in general triable in the courts of the country within territory they were committed. Of this two
rules, it is the last one that obtains in this jurisdiction, because at present the theories and jurisprudence prevailing in the United
States on this matter are authority in the Philippines which is now a territory of the United States.
We have seen that the mere possession of opium aboard a foreign vessel in transit was held by this court not triable by or courts,
because it being the primary object of our Opium Law to protect the inhabitants of the Philippines against the disastrous effects
entailed by the use of this drug, its mere possession in such a ship, without being used in our territory, does not being about in the
said territory those effects that our statute contemplates avoiding. Hence such a mere possession is not considered a disturbance
of the public order.
But to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though aboard a foreign merchant ship, is certainly a breach of the public
order here established, because it causes such drug to produce its pernicious effects within our territory. It seriously contravenes
the purpose that our Legislature has in mind in enacting the aforesaid repressive statute.
Moreover, as the Attorney-General aptly observes:
. . . The idea of a person smoking opium securely on board a foreign vessel at anchor in the port of Manila in open defiance of the
local authorities, who are impotent to lay hands on him, is simply subversive of public order.
The order appealed from is revoked and the cause ordered remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings in accordance
with law.
Wildenhuss Case (Belgian consul (P) v. American authorities (D)
Brief Fact Summary. After Widenhus, a Belgian national, was arrested in New Jersey for killing another Belgian crew while
onboard a Belgian vessel moored in Jersey City, the Belgian consul (P) sought to have him released to the Belgian authorities.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The sovereignty of the home of the ship deals with disorders that disturbs only the peace of the ship or
those on board but the proper authorities of the local jurisdiction punishes those that disturb public peace.
Facts. A Belgian national by the name Widenhus, allegedly killed another Belgian crew member while their ship was in port in
New Jersey. The Belgian consul (P) applied for a writ of habeas corpus after Wildenhus was arrested on the ground that a treaty
granting exclusive charge to consuls for the internal order of the merchant vessels of their nation. The consul (P) appealed the
judgment after the circuit court refusal to release Wildenhus.
Issue. Does the sovereignty of the home of the ship deal with disorders which disturbs only the peace of the ship or those on
board and does the proper authorities of the local jurisdiction punish those who disturb public peace?
Held. (Waite, C.J.) Yes. The sovereignty of the home of the ship deals with disorders that disturbs only the peace of the ship or
those on board but the proper authorities of the local jurisdiction punishes those that disturb public peace. Felonious homicide is a
subject for the local jurisdiction. Hence, the consul has no right to interfere if the authorities are proceeding with the case in a
regular way. Affirmed.
Discussion. Many treaties governing consuls authority were discussed by the court and most of these treaties affirm the fact that
a ship is subject to local jurisdiction. The local authorities and the local police usual decide whether a particular incident disturbs
the peace of the port.
9.

Jurisdiction over collusion in high seas

CASE: The Case of SS Lotus, France v. Turkey
Brief Fact Summary. Turkeys (D) assertion of jurisdiction over a French citizen who had been the first officer of a ship that
collided with a Turkish ship on the high seas was challenged by France (P) as a violation of international law.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. A rule of international law, which prohibits a state from exercising criminal jurisdiction over a
foreign national who commits acts outside of the states national jurisdiction, does not exist.
Facts. A collision occurred shortly before midnight on the 2nd of August 1926 between the French (P) mail steamer Lotus
and the Turkish (D) collier Boz-Kourt. The French mail steamer was captained by a French citizen by the name Demons
while the Turkish collier Boz-Kourt was captained by Hassan Bey. The Turks lost eight men after their ship cut into two and
sank as a result of the collision.
Although the Lotus did all it could do within its power to help the ship wrecked persons, it continued on its course to
Constantinople, where it arrived on August 3. On the 5th of August, Lieutenant Demons was asked by the Turkish (D)
authority to go ashore to give evidence. After Demons was examined, he was placed under arrest without informing the
French (P) Consul-General and Hassan Bey. Demons were convicted by the Turkish (D) courts for negligence conduct in
allowing the accident to occur.
This basis was contended by Demons on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction over him. With this, both countries
agreed to submit to the Permanent Court of International Justice, the question of whether the exercise of Turkish (D)
criminal jurisdiction over Demons for an incident that occurred on the high seas contravened international law.
Issue. Issue: Does a rule of international law which prohibits a state from exercising criminal jurisdiction over a foreign
national who commits acts outside of the states national jurisdiction exist?
Held. (Per curiam) No. A rule of international law, which prohibits a state from exercising criminal jurisdiction over a
foreign national who commits acts outside of the states national jurisdiction, does not exist. Failing the existence of a
permissive rule to the contrary is the first and foremost restriction imposed by international law on a state and it may not
exercise its power in any form in the territory of another state.
This does not imply that international law prohibits a state from exercising jurisdiction in its own territory, in respect of any
case that relates to acts that have taken place abroad which it cannot rely on some permissive rule of international law. In
this situation, it is impossible to hold that there is a rule of international law that prohibits Turkey (D) from prosecuting
Demons because he was aboard a French ship. This stems from the fact that the effects of the alleged offense occurred on a
Turkish vessel.
Hence, both states here may exercise concurrent jurisdiction over this matter because there is no rule of international law in
regards to collision cases to the effect that criminal proceedings are exclusively within the jurisdiction of the state whose
flag is flown.
Discussion. In 1975, France enacted a law regarding its criminal jurisdiction over aliens because of this the situation
surrounding this case. The law stipulates that aliens who commit a crime outside the territory of the Republic may be

prosecuted and judged pursuant to French law, when the victim is of French nationality. This is contained in 102 Journal Du
Droit International 962 (Clunet 1975). Several eminent scholars have criticized the holding in this case for seeming to imply
that international law permits all that it does not forbid.
10.

Jurisdiction over crimes on board aircraft or airship

11.

Active, passive personality, and protective jurisdiction

12.

Universal jurisdiction
CASES:
The Eichmann case
The Filartiga case

13.

Jurisdiction by treaty