Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Payments Systems
By Pu Shen
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RTGS systems
The single most important feature of an RTGS
system is that it provides instant settlement with
finality as soon as a payment instruction arrives,
provided that sufficient funds are available in
the account of the sending bank. Settlement
refers to the actual transfer of funds from a sending
bank to a receiving bank. Finality means that the
settlement is unconditional and irrevocable. In
an RTGS system, real time means that payment
instructions are executed continuously, at the
instant they enter the system, while gross settlement means that for each payment instruction,
the total gross amount of funds is transferred.
In the United States, Fedwire is an RTGS
system with nearly 7,000 active member banks,
all of which hold reserve accounts at Federal
Netting systems
In contrast to RTGS systems, settlements in
netting systems do not occur immediately when
payment instructions are sent. Typically, when a
netting system receives a payment instruction,
the system immediately informs the receiver if
the instruction meets certain criteria. But the
actual settlements are not accomplished until the
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The most important implication of the difference between RTGS and netting systems is that
netting systems only have conditional finality.
In a well-organized netting system, payment
instructions sent to the systems are not allowed
to be revoked once they have been accepted by
the system and released to the receiving banks.
In this sense, netting systems have finality. But
this finality is only conditional, depending on
the absence of a settlement failure. A settlement
failure occurs if one or more members of the
netting system default on their settlement obligations and the system does not have sufficient
funds to cover the shortfalls. If a settlement
failure occurs, a netting system has to allow its
participants to revoke all or part of the payment
instructions sent during the day. Thus, the finality in a netting system is conditioned on the
success of settlement at the end of the day.
Another distinguishing feature of netting systems is that they need not be run by a settlement
agent. Functionally, a netting system can be
separated into two parts: a clearinghouse and a
settlement agent. The clearinghouse records all
payment instructions, checks whether the instructions satisfy certain specific rules and conditions, and if so, releases them to receiving
participants. At the end of the day, the clearinghouse calculates the net settlement obligations
for each member and informs them of their
obligations. The settlement agent then accomplishes the actual funds transfers. Consequently,
the function of the clearinghouse can be operated by any organization, bank or nonbank, private or public. On the other hand, a settlement
agent is a banks bank, which makes a countrys
central bank the natural choice for this role.5 In
contrast to a netting system, an RTGS system is
usually operated by its settlement agent because
the system requires continuous, or real time,
settling. Thus, in an RTGS system, it is not
practical to separate the operation of the system
from its settlement agent.
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Table 1
ASH
BIRCH
CEDAR
10
20
Total credit
Total debit
Net payment bank receives
(owes) at settlement
Receiving bank
BIRCH
CEDAR
15
10
30
25
15
10
10
20
(10)
Total debit
25
10
20
The main reason behind this strategy is the concern for settlement risk, especially for unwinding risk, in netting systems.
Credit risk
In general, credit risk is the risk that a payer
might lose all or part of its payment due to the
counterpartys failure to deliver its promised
payment. All business transactions involve two
sides. One side of the transaction generally
makes a monetary payment, such as dollars. The
other side pays goods or services in a business
transaction, stocks or bonds in a security transaction, or currencies in a foreign exchange trans-
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Unwinding risk
Unwinding risk arises because the payment
instructions released to receivers may ultimately
be revoked, or unwound. Unwinding occurs
when there is a settlement failure in a netting
system and the payment instructions accumulated during the day are allowed to be revoked.
Unwinding risk is only a concern in netting
systems, where it is a major risk for both individual users and regulators.
Unwinding can be costly to an affected institution in three ways. First, a user of a netting
system may have paid some of its obligations
with finality through other systems. If the users
counterparties payments are unwound, the user
becomes a first payer in such transactions and is
exposed to first payer risk at least overnight.
Second, many of the transactions unwound
might have to be renegotiated, which means the
institution could lose all gains from these transactions for that day. And third, there are likely
to be indirect costs to affected parties. For example, unwinding in one payments system may
make it difficult for an institution to fulfill its
obligations in other settlements systems, which
could require extensive resources to mitigate.
Suppose, for example, in a foreign exchange
transaction between Japanese yen and U.S. dollars, an unwinding in a yen payments system
causes nondelivery of the dollars. The nondelivery may cause the bank expecting the dollar
payment difficulty in fulfilling its dollar payment obligations.
In contrast to credit risk, unwinding risk is
hard to measure and even harder to manage
without collective arrangements. Managing
credit risk requires an individual user to know
the creditworthiness only of its counterparties.
Managing unwinding risk, however, requires an
individual user to know the creditworthiness of
all members of the same netting system because
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Liquidity risk
Liquidity risk is the risk that payment instructions cannot be executed (in an RTGS system)
or settled (in a netting system) due to the lack
of liquidity, even though the involved parties
are fundamentally sound. A bank could be in
solid financial shape, but it may not be able to
pay its settlement obligations, say, because of a
temporary breakdown in the communications
between its branch offices caused by a snow
storm. For example, a branch that was supposed
to sell a loan portfolio to obtain the settlement
funds might not be able to do so. In other lines
of business transactions, this temporary liquidity shortfall may not cause significant difficulties. But for a payments system and its
participants, immediate liquidity at settlement
time is crucial. For this reason, liquidity risk is
a special concern to payments systems.
While liquidity risk exists in all payments
systems, it is more acute in RTGS systems
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Table 2
ASH
BIRCH
CEDAR
10
20
Total credit
Total debit
Net payment bank receives
(owes) at settlement
Funds available for clearing
purposes
Receiving bank
BIRCH
CEDAR
15
10
30
25
15
10
10
20
(10)
Paying bank
ASH
Receiving bank
BIRCH
ASH
BIRCH
10
15
Total credit
Total debit
10
15
15
10
(5)
Total debit
25
10
20
Total debit
15
10
Liquidity risk can be reduced, or even eliminated, if all members of a payments system hold
ample amounts of liquidity, such as cash or
reserve balances that can be used for clearing
purposes. But liquidity is costly to its holders;
funds held as cash or reserve balances do not
earn interest income. Thus, there is a tradeoff
between minimizing liquidity risk and minimizing liquidity cost. As a result, from a banks
perspective, it is usually too costly to totally
eliminate liquidity risk.14
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ple, in Table 2, if Cedar Bank were fundamentally sound and had only a temporary liquidity
shortage, it should easily be able to obtain overnight loans from the other banks. In this case,
Cedar would be able to fulfill its settlement
obligations (which become zero), which would
eliminate the liquidity and unwinding risk.
The severity of unwinding risk and liquidity
risk varies with the type of payments system.
Unwinding risk is a major source of risk only in
netting systems. Although liquidity risk exists in
both RTGS and netting systems, it is a major
source of risk only in RTGS systems. The unique
feature of these two risks in settlement systems is
that they expose an institution not only to bilateral
risks with its counterparties, but also to risks with
every other user of the same payments system.
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Table 3
SUMMARY
Payment system
Settlement risk
Credit
First payer
Receiver
Unwinding
Liquidity
RTGS
Equal to full
payment
Equal to full
payment (for
indirect users only)
None
Major concern
Netting
Major concern
Negligible
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Collateral requirements. Collateral requirements, when properly combined with multilateral debit limits, can significantly reduce
unwinding risk. A netting system can require
each of its participants to post collateral in a
system account, which will be liquidated to pay
for settlement if the participant fails to fulfill its
settlement obligations. To protect the system
from an unwinding, the collateral requirements
for a member could be set to equal its multilateral debit limit. This way, settlement is guaranteed even if members of the system fail.
A potential problem with loss sharing agreements is that an individual member may extend
bilateral credit limits too aggressively because
it does not bear the full cost of a potential default.
One way to avoid such abuses of loss sharing
agreements would be to require that the shared
loss for each participant vary with the bilateral
credit limit it has set for the failed participants.
This way, it would be in a participants best
interest to set prudent bilateral credit limits. For
instance, assume Dates Bank fails with a total of
$75 million in settlement obligations. Then the
loss sharing agreements could require a bank
granting Dates a $20 million credit limit to pay
$1 million and a bank granting Dates a $10
million credit limit to pay $0.5 million.32
Loss sharing agreements. Loss sharing agreements spread the cost of default in a netting
system among all members. Loss sharing agreements specify the additional settlement obligations for each member when some participants
cannot fulfill their settlement obligations. With
loss sharing agreements, the impact of a participants failure to pay its obligations will not be
concentrated in a few institutions, thus reducing
the possibility of a chain reaction. Consequently,
the risks of settlement failure and unwinding are
reduced as well.
By combining loss sharing agreements with
multilateral debit limits and collateral requirements, a netting system can further reduce unwinding risk at little additional cost to its
members. For instance, instead of requiring
each member bank to provide collateral equal to
its multilateral debit limits, a netting system
could require a member to provide collateral
CHIPS has adopted all three of these measures, significantly reducing settlement risk,
especially unwinding risk, to its members.33
While a participant is free to set its bilateral
credit limit for another CHIPS participant, both
its collateral requirement and loss sharing obligations vary with this limit. Thus, it is in a
participants interest to assess a counterpartys
credit risk prudently and set the bilateral credit
limit accordingly. Further, with the loss sharing
agreement, the required amount of collateral in
CHIPS is relatively small, as are the costs of
posting collateral. With these measures implemented, CHIPS is confident that it can settle
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ENDNOTES
1 Large-value payments systems are also called wholesale
in the references.
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REFERENCES
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