Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Banogan v. Zerna
Ledesma v. Climaco
Cui v. Cui
Alawi v. Alauya
CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land
and promote respect for law and legal process.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
CANON 2 A lawyer shall make his legal services available in an efficient and
convenient manner compatible with the independence, integrity and
effectiveness of the profession.
CANON 3 A lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true,
honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts.
11.
12.
13.
14.
In re Tagorda
Atty. Ismael Khan v. Atty Rizalino Simbillo
Canoy v. Ortiz
Linsangan v. Tolentino
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In re Galang
In re Arthur M. Cuevas
Samaniego v. Ferrer
Arnobit v. Arnobit
St. Louis University etc v. Dela Cruz
Advincula v. Macabata
CANON 8 A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness, and candor
toward his professional colleagues and shall avoid harassing tactics against
opposing counsel.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
Reyes v. Chiong
Dallong-Galiciano v. Castro
Alcantara v. Pefianco
Camacho v. Pagulayan
Torres v. Javier
Linsangan v. Tolentino
CANON 10 A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
CANON 11 A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts
and judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
Fernandez v. De Ramos-Villalon
Rivera v. Corral
Johnny Ng v. Alar
Fudot v. Cattleya Land
Bondoc v. Judge Simbulan
CANON 12 - A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist
in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.
Berbano v. Barcelona
Sebastian v. Bajar
Hegna v. Paderanga
Plus Builders v. Revilla
Fil-Garcia, Inc. v. Hernandez
CANON 13 A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from
any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of
influencing the court.
68.
69.
70.
71.
Overgaard v. Valdez
Angalan v. Delante
Santon-Tan v. Robino
Somosot v. Lara
CANON 19 A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of
law.
72. Briones v. Jimenez
73. Pena v. Aparicio
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
Hilado v. David
Nakpil v. Valdes
Hornilla v. Salunat
Northwestern University v. Arquillo
Quiambao v. Bamba
Heirs of Falame v. Baguio
Pacana v. Pascual-Lopez
CANON 16 A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client
that may come into his possession.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
Licuanan v. Melo
Posidio v. Vitan
Lemoine v. Balon
Re: Atty. Maquera
Reddi v. Sersbio
De Chavez-Blanco v. Lumasag
Wilson Charm v. Patta-Moya
Jerry T. Wong v. Atty. Salvador N. Moya II
CANON 17 A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be
mindful of the trust and confidence in him.
CANON 18 A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
64.
65.
66.
67.
Hernandez v. Go
PANELCO v. Montemayor
Sps. Adecer v. Akut
Belleza v. Macasa
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77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
Sesbreno v. CA
Bautista v. Gonzales
Gamilla v. Marino
Pineda v. De Jesus
Roxas v. De Zuzuarregui
Law Firm of Tungol and Tibayan v. CA
CANON 21 A lawyer shall preserve the confidence and secrets of his client
even after the attorney-client relationship is terminated.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
Regala v. Sandiganbayan
Pfleider v. Palanca
Mercado v. Vitriolo
Genato v. Silapan
Hadjula v. Madianda
Rebecca J. Palm v. Atty. Felipe Iledan, Jr.
Canon 22 A lawyer may withdraw his services only for good cause and upon
notice appropriate in the circumstances.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
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commendable, to evade the operation of a decision final and executory, especially so,
where, as shown in this case, the clear and manifest absence of any right calling for
vindication, is quite obvious and indisputable.
One reason why there is a degree of public distrust for lawyers is the way
some of them misinterpret the law to the point of distortion in a cunning effort to
achieve their purposes. By doing so, they frustrate the ends of justice and at the
same time lessen popular faith in the legal profession as the sworn upholders of the
law. While this is not to say that every wrong interpretation of the law is to be
condemned, as indeed most of them are only honest errors, this Court must express
its disapproval of the adroit and intentional misreading designed precisely to
circumvent or violate it. As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist
in the proper administration of justice. They do not discharge this duty by filing
pointless petitions that only add to the workload of the judiciary, especially this Court,
which is burdened enough as it is. A judicious study of the facts and the law should
advise them when a case, such as this, should not be permitted to be filed to merely
clutter the already congested judicial dockets. They do not advance the cause of law
or their clients by commencing litigations that for sheer lack of merit do not deserve
the attention of the courts.
LEDESMA V. CLIMACO
Facts:
Atty. Ledesma was the counsel de parte for one of the cases pending before
the sala of Judge Climaco. He filed a motion to withdraw from the case but the judge
denied the motion and instead appointed him counsel de oficio for two more cases.
Atty. Ledesma filed another motion to withdraw because he was appointed as election
registrar, which was still denied.
Issue:
Should his motion to withdraw as counsel prosper?
Held:
No. The respondent judges denial was proper. It was observed that there is
no real conflict between his duties as election registrar and counsel de oficio. The
appointment of a lawyer as counsel de oficio is a privilege which veteran lawyers in
fact, readily welcome as an opportunity to render their services for free. In the same
way, all lawyers should treat it that way as an opportunity to prove to the community
that the proper performance of his profession is not contingent upon the payment of
his fees.
CUI V. CUI
Facts:
The Hospicio de San Jose de Barili, is a charitable institution established by
the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Dona Benigna Cui for the care and support, free of
charge, of indigent invalids, and incapacitated and helpless persons. It acquired
corporate existence by legislation (Act No. 3239). Sec. 2 of the Act gave the initial
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ALAWI V. ALAUYA
Facts:
Sophia Alawi was a sales representative of E.B. Villarosa & Partners Co.,
Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the
incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City,
They were classmates, and used to be friends.
Through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on
installments by Alauya of one of the housing units of Villarosa. In connection, a
housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC).
Not long afterwards, Alauya addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa &
Co. advising of the termination of his contract with the company. He claimed that his
consent was vitiated because Alawi had resorted to gross misrepresentation, deceit,
fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence. He laso wrote similar letters to the Vice
President of Villarosa and the Vice President of NHMFC.
On learning of Alauya's letters, Alawi filed an administrative complaint
against him. One of her grounds was Alauyas usurpation of the title of "attorney,"
which only regular members of the Philippine Bar may properly use.
Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is
"lexically synonymous" with "Counsellors-at-law." a title to which Shari'a lawyers have
a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the title of "attorney" because "counsellor" is
often mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal" or the Maranao term "consial," connoting a
local legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.
Issue:
Whether or not Alauya, a member of the Sharia bar, can use the title of
Attorney
Held:
He cant. The title is only reserved to those who pass the regular Philippine
bar.
As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had
occasion to declare that persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged
members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari'a courts.
While one who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted
to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered "counsellors," in the sense that they
give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The
title of "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in
the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing;
and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.
CANON 1
RE: FINANCIAL AUDIT OF ATTY. RAQUEL G. KHO
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Mesina was, for years, the Chua spouses legal counsel and adviser upon
whom they reposed trust and confidence. They were in fact lessees of a building
(Burgos Property) owned by Mesinas family, and another property (Melencio
Property), also owned by Mesinas family where the Chua spouses constructed their
house. These two properties were mortgaged by the registered owner, Mesinas
mother, Mrs. Mesina, in favor of the Planters Development Bank to secure a loan she
obtained. As Mrs. Mesina failed to meet her obligation to the bank, Atty. Mesina
convinced the Chua spouses to help Mrs. Mesina to settle her obligation in
consideration for which the Melencio property would be sold to them at P850.00/sq.
m.
The spouses Chua and their business partner, Marcelina Hsia, settled Mrs.
Mesinas bank obligation in the amount of P983,125.40. A Deed of Absolute Sale
dated January 19, 1985 conveying the Melencio property for P85,400.00 was
thereafter executed by Mrs. Mesina, whose name appears therein as Felicisima M.
Melencio, in favor of complainants. As complainants were later apprised of the
amount of capital gains tax they were to pay, they consulted respondent about it.
Respondent thus suggested to them that another Deed of Absolute Sale should be
executed, antedated to 1979 before the effectivity of the law mandating the payment
of capital gains tax. As suggested by respondent, another Deed of Absolute Sale
antedated February 9, 1979 was executed by Mrs. Mesina, whose name again
appears therein as Felicisima M. Melencio, in favor of complainants wherein the
purchase price was also indicated to be P85,400.00.
After liquidating the advances made by the Chua spouses in the redemption
of the MESINA properties, Mrs. Mesina was found to have an existing balance due
the spouses in the amount of P400,000.00, on account of which they advised
respondent about it. Respondent, by Affidavit acknowledged such obligation to be
his and undertook to settle it within two years.
Complainants were subsequently issued on a title over the Melencio
property.
Not long after the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale or in February
1986, one Tecson filed an Affidavit dated charging Mrs. Mesina, the spouses Chua,
Marcelina Hsia and the two witnesses to the said Deed of Absolute Sale, for
Falsification of Public Document and violation of the Internal Revenue Code. In his
complaint affidavit, Tecson alleged that he was also a lessee of the Melencio property
and was, along with the Chua spouses, supposed to purchase it but that contrary to
their agreement, the property was sold only to complainant and her co-complainant,
to his exclusion. Tecson went on to relate that the Deed of Absolute Sale did not
reflect the true value of the Melencio property and was antedated to evade payment
of capital gains tax. Tecson submitted documents showing that indeed the July 9,
1979 Deed of Absolute Sale was antedated.
Respondent thereupon hatched a plan to dodge the falsification charge
against Mrs. Mesina et al. He proposed to complainants that they would simulate a
deed of sale of the Melencio property wherein complainants would resell it to Mrs.
Mesina.
Heeding the proposal of respondent, complainants executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale dated April 1, 1986 conveying to Felicisima M. Melencio the Melencio
property for P85,400.00.A new title was accordingly issued in the name of Felicisima
A taxi driver (Soriano) filed an action for the disbarment of Atty. Dizon, on the
grounds that Dizon was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, and violated
Canon 1 of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Soriano allegedly fell victim to Dizon, who was found to have:
a. Driven his car under the influence of liquor;
b. Reacted violently and attempted assault for over a simple traffic incident;
c. Shot at Soriano, who was unarmed and not in the position to defend himself
(treachery);
d. Denied his acts despite positive evidence against him (dishonesty);
e. Guilty of dishonesty, claiming to be mauled by the victim (Kawawang driver,
binaril na nga, may lakas pa daw mag maul ng attorney na may baril. Hindi
din tanga mag rason si Dizon diba?);
f. Despite neing granted probation, he did not satisfy his civil liabilities to the
victim (Ano ba problema nito?!)
Issues:
(1) Is Dizons crime of Frustrated Homicide considered a crime involving
moral turpitude
(2) Does his guilt to such crime warrant disbarment?
ISSUE
Whether or not Mesina is guilty of Gross Misconduct?
HELD
Held:
(1) Yes.
Moral Turpitude is everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or
good morals
Dizon was obviously the aggressor for having pursued and shot Soriano, not
only because of his treachery, but also his intent to escape, betrayed by his attempt to
wipe off his prints from the gun. His inordinate reaction to a simple traffic incident
clearly indicates his non-fitness to be a lawyer.
(2) Yes.
His illegal possession of fire-arms, and his unjust refusal to satisfy his civil
liabilities all justify disbarment. The court reminds him that in oath and in the CPR, he
is bound to obey the laws of the land. The liabilities in question have been sitting for
4 years, unsatisfied, despite it being the condition for his probation (you ungrateful
person!)
Dizon displayed an utter lack of good moral character, which is an essential
qualification for the privilege to enter into the practice of law. Good moral character
includes at least common honesty.
Manuel Dizon, hereby disbarred.
SORIANO V. DIZON
Facts:
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Justice Hofilena
STEMMERIK V. MAS
FACTS:
Stemmerik, a Danish citizen, wanted to buy Philippine property due to its
beauty. He consulted Atty Mas about his intention, to which the latter advised him that
he could legally buy such properties. Atty Mas even suggested a big piece of property
that he can buy, assuring that it is alienable. Because of this, Stemmerik entrusted all
of the necessary requirements and made Atty Mas his attorney in fact as he went
Justice Hofilena
Issues:
(1) whether or not the petitioner was illegally dismissed; (2) whether or not
he is entitled to reinstatement, payment of back wages, thirteenth month pay and
other benefits; and (3) whether or not he is entitled to payment of moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees because of illegal dismissal.
HELD:
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Held:
The decision of NLRC is set aside. Private respondent is ORDERED to pay
petitioner back wages for a period not exceeding three (3) years, without qualification
or deduction, and, in lieu of reinstatement, separation pay equivalent to one (1) month
for every year of service, a fraction of six (6) months being considered as one (1)
whole year.
Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides that
"(a) lawyer shall encourage his client to avoid, end or settle the controversy if it will
admit of a fair settlement."
Counsels must be reminded that their ethical duty as lawyers to represent
their clients with zeal goes beyond merely presenting their clients' respective causes
in court. It is just as much their responsibility, if not more importantly, to exert all
reasonable efforts to smooth over legal conflicts, preferably out of court and
especially in consideration of the direct and immediate consanguineous ties between
their clients. The useful function of a lawyer is not only to conduct litigation but to
avoid it whenever possible by advising settlement or withholding suit. He should be a
mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise, rather than a virtuoso of
technicality in the conduct of litigation.
Both counsels herein fell short of what was expected of them, despite their
avowed duties as officers of the court. The records do not show that they took pains
to initiate steps geared toward effecting a rapprochement between their clients. On
the contrary, their acerbic and protracted exchanges could not but have exacerbated
the situation even as they may have found favor in the equally hostile eyes of their
respective clients.
In the same manner, we find that the labor arbiter who handled this
regrettable case has been less than faithful to the letter and spirit of the Labor Code
mandating that a labor arbiter "shall exert all efforts towards the amicable settlement
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Side Doctrine:
Good moral character is more than just the absence of bad character. Such
character expresses itself in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right and the
resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. This must be so because vast
interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and
confidence; he deals with his clients property, reputation, his life, his all.
CANONS 2 & 3
IN RE: TAGORDA
Facts:
Luis Tagorda was a member of the provincial board of Isabela. Previous to
the last election, he admits that he made use of a card written in Spanish containing
the fact that he was a candidate for third member of the Province of Isabela & offering
services as notary public (such as free consultation, execution of deed of sale, etc.).
He also admits that he wrote a letter addressed to a lieutenant of a barrio if his home
municipality saying that he will continue his practice of law and for the lieutenant to
make known to the people of his desire to serve as lawyer & notary public (including
his services to handle land registration cases for P3/every registration).
Issue:
W/N acts of Tagorda constituted advertising
Held:
Yes, Tagorda is in a way advertising his services and is contrary to the
Canons of Professional Ethics. Solicitation of business by circulars or advertisements,
or by personal communications or interviews not warranted by personal relations is
unprofessional. His acts warrant disbarment, but because of the mitigating
circumstance of his youth and inexperience, he is therefore suspended.
The law is a profession and not a business. The lawyer may not seek or
obtain employment by himself or through others for to do so would be unprofessional.
It is also unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring lawsuit. Lastly,
solicitation of cases result in the lowering of the confidence of the community and
integrity of the members of the bar (as it results in needless litigations and in incenting
to strife otherwise peaceful citizens).
ATTY. ISMAEL KHAN V. ATTY RIZALINO SIMBILLO
FACTS
A paid advertisement in the Philippine Daily Inquirer was published which reads:
Annulment of Marriage Specialist [contact number]. Espeleta, a staff of the Supreme
Court, called up the number but it was Mrs. Simbillo who answered. She claims that
her husband, Atty. Simbillo was an expert in handling annulment cases and can
guarantee a court decree within 4-6mos provided the case will not involve separation
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Justice Hofilena
Bacolod City, he was frankly preoccupied with both his functions as a local
government official and as a practicing lawyer.
Issue:
W/N Atty. Ortiz should be sanctioned?
Held:
Yes. Atty. Ortiz is to be sanctioned, suspension for 1 month.
Atty. Ortiz violated Canons 18 and 22. Under Canon 18.03, a lawyer owes
fidelity to his clients cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed to him. He owes his entire devotion to the interest of the client. His
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Under Canon 18.04, the
relationship of a lawyer-client being one of confidence, there is an ever present need
for the client to be adequately and fully informed of the developments of the case and
should not be left in the dark. A lawyer cannot shift the blame to complainant for
failing to inquire the status about the case as this is one of the lawyers duties.
The adoption of additional duties due to the election of Atty. Ortiz as
councilor does not exonerate him of his negligent behavior. The CPR allows a lawyer
to withdraw his legal service if the lawyer is elected or appointed to a public office
since councilors are not expressly prohibited to exercise their legal profession.
LINSANGAN V. TOLENTINO
Facts:
A complaint of disbarment was filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan,
Linsangan & Linsangan Law Office against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation
of clients & encroachment of professional services. Linsangan alleges that Tolentino
with the help of paralegal Labiano convinced his clients to transfer legal
representation by promising financial assistance and expeditious collection of their
claims. To induce them, Tolentino allegedly texted and called them persistently. To
support his allegation, Linsangan presented the sworn affidavit of James Gregorio
attesting that Labiano tried to prevail over him to sever his client-atty relationship with
Linsangan. Also, he attached respondents calling card:
Front
NICOMEDES TOLENTINO
LAW OFFFICE
CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES
W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
Fe Marie L. Labiano
Paralegal
1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr. Rm. M-01
Tel: 362-7820
6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar
CANONS 4, 5 & 6
SUAREZ V. PLATON
Back
Facts:
SERVICES OFFERED:
CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE
TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN
REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,
INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH
AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS
ABROAD.
In his defense, Tolentino denies knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and
circulating of said calling card.
Issue:
W/N Atty. Tolentino is guilty of advertising his services
Held:
Yes. Atty. Tolentino suspended for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and 16.04
and Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
With regard to Canon 3, the practice of law is a profession and not a
business. Thus, lawyers should not advertise their talents as merchants advertise
their wares. To allow lawyers to advertise their talents/skill is a commercialization of
the practice of law (degrading the profession in the publics estimation).
With regard to Rule 2.03, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for
purpose of gain, either personally or through an agent. In relation to Rule 1.03, which
proscribes ambulance chasing (involving solicitation personally or through an
agent/broker) as a measure to protect community from barratry and champertry.
As a final note regarding the calling card presented as evidence by
Linsangan, a lawyers best advertisement is a well-merited. reputation for
professional capacity and fidelity to trust based on his character and conduct. For this
reason, lawyers are only allowed to announce their services by publication in
reputable law lists or use of simple professional cards.
Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:
(a) lawyers name;
(b) name of the law firm with which he is connected;
(c) address;
(d) telephone number and
(e) special branch of law practiced.
Labianos calling card contained the phrase with financial assistance. The
phrase was clearly used to entice clients (who already had representation) to change
counsels with a promise of loans to finance their legal actions. Money was dangled to
lure clients away from their original lawyers, thereby taking advantage of their
financial distress and emotional vulnerability. This crass commercialism degraded the
integrity of the bar and deserves no place in the legal profession.
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Justice Hofilena
Not only did he fail to file a complaint against the Jovellanoses (which in the first place
he should not have done), respondent also led the complainant to believe that he
really filed an action against the Jovellanoses. He even made it appear that the
cases were being tried and asked the complainant to pay his appearance fees for
hearings that never took place. These acts constituted dishonesty, a violation of the
lawyer's oath not to do any falsehood.
Respondent's conduct in office fell short of the integrity and good moral
character required of all lawyers, specially one occupying a public office. Lawyers in
public office are expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which tend to
lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government but also uphold the
dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and
fair dealing. A government lawyer is a keeper of public faith and is burdened with a
high degree of social responsibility, higher than his brethren in private practice.
There is, however, insufficient basis to find respondent guilty of violating
Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondent did not hold the
money for the benefit of the complainant but accepted it as his attorney's fees. He
neither held the amount in trust for the complainant (such as an amount delivered by
the sheriff in satisfaction of a judgment obligation in favor of the client) nor was it
given to him for a specific purpose (such as amounts given for filing fees and bail
bond). Nevertheless, respondent should return the P5,000 as he, a government
lawyer, was not entitled to attorney's fees and not allowed to accept them.
CATU V. RELLOSA
FACTS
Catu co-owns a lot and building and contested the possession of one of the
units in the said building by Elizabeth (sister in law of Catu) and Pastor, who ignored
demands to vacate the place. The parties went to the Lupon Tagapamayapa to try to
settle the issue amicably. Respodent Rellosa as Punong Barangay presided over the
conciliation proceedings. The parties failed to settle their case, and the petitioner
brought the case to court.
Surprisingly, Rellosa appeared in court as counsel for Elizabeth and Pastor.
This prompted Catu to file an administrative complaint against Rellosa for his act of
impropriety.
IBP committee on bar discipline, after investigation, ruled that Rellosa
violated Rule 6.032 and RA 67133.
The committee recommended Rellosas
suspension from practice for 1 month.
ISSUE
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Justice Hofilena
GENBANK, which was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan, et al. and became
Allied Banking Corporation.
The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Rule 6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from accepting
'engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had
intervened while in said service.
ISSUE
W/N Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to
respondent Mendoza?
HELD
NO, IT DOES NOT APPLY. The matter or the act of respondent Mendoza as
Solicitor General involved in the case at bar is 'advising the Central Bank, on how to
proceed with the said bank's liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation
with the CFI of . In fine, the Court should resolve whether his act of advising the
Central Bank on the legal procedure to liquidate GENBANK is included within the
concept of 'matter under Rule 6.03.
The 'matter where he got himself involved was in informing Central Bank on
the procedure provided by law to liquidate GENBANK thru the courts and in filing the
necessary petition. The subject 'matter of Sp. Proc. No. 107812, therefore, is not the
same nor is related to but is different from the subject 'matter in Civil Case No. 0096
which is about the sequestration of the shares of respondents Tan, et al.
The jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include the dissolution and liquidation
of banks. It goes without saying that Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because his alleged intervention
while a Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is an intervention on a matter
different from the matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096.
Secondly, the supposed intervention of Mendoza in the liquidation case is
not significant and substantial. We note that the petition filed merely seeks the
assistance of the court in the liquidation of GENBANK. The principal role of the court
in this type of proceedings is to assist the Central Bank in determining claims of
creditors against the GENBANK.
Also, The disqualification of respondent Mendoza has long been a dead
issue. For a fact, the recycled motion for disqualification in the case at bar was filed
more than four years after the filing of the petitions for certiorari, prohibition and
injunction with the Supreme Court which were subsequently remanded to the
Sandiganbayan. At the very least, the circumstances under which the motion to
disqualify in the case at bar were refiled put petitioner's motive as highly suspect.
It is also submitted that the Court should apply Rule 6.03 in all its strictness
for it correctly disfavors lawyers who 'switch sides. It is claimed that 'switching sides'
carries the danger that former government employee may compromise confidential
official information in the process. But this concern does not cast a shadow in the
case at bar. As afore-discussed, the act of respondent Mendoza in informing the
Central Bank on the procedure how to liquidate GENBANK is a different matter from
the subject matter of Civil Case No. 0005 which is about the sequestration of the
Petitioner Arthur Cuevas Jr. recently passed the bar examinations, but was
precluded from taking the lawyers 1996 oath, pending approval from the
Supreme Court
This stems from petitioners participation in the initiation rites of the Lex
Talionis Fraternitas of Sand Beda where neophyte Raul Camaligan died as a
result of hazing.
He applied for and was granted probation, then was discharged on May
1995
May 1997, he applied to Court that he may take the lawyers oath and
attached to his petition certifications attesting to his righteous, peaceful and
law abiding character.
ISSUE
May Cuevas take the lawyers oath, taking in consideration the certifications
attesting to his righteous, peaceful and law abiding character?
HELD
Yes.
Though his deliberate participation in the initiation rites indicates absence of
that moral fitness required for admission into the bar, the court is willing to give the
petitioner a chance based on the various certifications: they sufficiently show that he
has a righteous, peaceful and civil oriented character; and he has proven that he has
taken steps to purge himself of his deficiency in moral character and atone for the
death of Raul Camaligan.
SAMANIEGO V. ATTY. FERRER
(Complaint for immorality, abandonment and willful refusal to give support to an
illegitimate child)
Facts:
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Held:
SC finds respondent guilty of immoral conduct, and suspended him from the
practice of law for 2 years, and another 2 years for notarizing documents.
HELD
Respondent was already a member of the Bar when he contracted the
bigamous marriage. However, after his failed first marriage, he remained celibate until
the 2nd marriage, showed his good intentions by marrying the 2nd wife, and he never
absconded in his family duties. The SC finds that penalty of disbarment is too harsh.
As to the charge of misconduct for having notarized documents without the
necessary commission, SC stresses notarization is not an empty, meaningless,
routinary act. For doing such constitutes not only malpractice but also the crime of
falsification of public documents. Respondent also violated the Notarial Law for so
doing, and this falls squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 and Canon 7.
The other cases against respondent are pending before the proper forums.
At such stages, the presumption of innocence still prevails in favor of the respondent.
ARNOBIT V. ARNOBIT
FACTS
Petitioner Rebecca Arnobit filed this complaint against her husband,
respondent Atty. Ponciano Arnobit, praying that the court exercise its disciplinary
power over him.
Rebecca alleged that she and respondent were married on 1942; that they
bore 12 children; that she saw respondent through law school, continuously
supporting him until he passed the bar; that several years after their marriage, or in
1968, respondent left the conjugal home and began cohabiting with Benita Buenafe
Navarro who later bore him four more children. Because of this, Rebecca was
impelled to file a complaint for legal separation and support, and a criminal case for
adultery.
Respondent admitted that Rebecca is his wedded wife but he denied having
cohabited with Benita. He also stated that Rebecca was the cause of their separation
alleging that she was always traveling for business purposes without his knowledge
and consent, thereby neglecting her obligations toward her family. Hearings were
conducted before the Office of the SolGen and subsequently, before the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline.
Aside from herself, Rebecca presented 2 other witnesses: her sister, who
identified a letter sent to her by respondent apologizing for the unhappiness he
caused the family; and the other was Melecio Navarro, the husband of Benita, who
testified about how respondent took his wife Benita as a mistress knowing fully well of
their marriage. During the hearings, respondent, despite due notice, repeatedly
absented himself when it was his turn to present evidence. He would also seek
postponement, pleading illness, on the hearing dates.
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The Court agreed with the IBP recommendation but ruled that gross immoral
conduct was sufficiently proven warranting disbarment of respondent.
CANON 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on
this fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Possession of good moral character is not only a condition precedent to the
practice of law, but a continuing qualification for all members of the bar.
Good moral character is more than just the absence of bad character. It
expresses itself in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right and the resolve not to
do the pleasant thing if it is wrong.
Immoral conduct has been described as conduct which is so willful, flagrant,
or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable
members of the community. To be the basis of disciplinary action, such conduct must
not only be immoral, but grossly immoral.
Grossly immoral meaning it must be so corrupt as to virtually constitute a
criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed
under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of
decency.
Lawyers must not only be of good moral character but must also be seen to
be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral
standards of the community.
The fact that respondents philandering ways are far removed from the
exercise of his profession would not save the day from him. A lawyer may be
suspended or disbarred for any misconduct which, albeit unrelated to the actual
practice of his profession, would show him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of
his license.
Respondent has the duty to show that he is morally fit to remain a member
of the bar. This, he failed to do. He never attended the hearings to rebut the charges
against him, irresistibly suggesting that they are true.
Undoubtedly, respondents act of leaving his wife and 12 children to cohabit
and have children with another woman constitutes gross immoral conduct. He should
therefore be disbarred.
ADVINCULA V. MACABATA
FACTS
Reyes then filed a disbarment case against Atty. Chiong for filing a groundless suit,
alleging that it was instituted to exact vengeance. Atty. Chiong alleges that Atty. Reyes
was impleaded for conniving with Xu in filing the estafa case. Salanga was impleaded
because of the supposed irregularities in conducting the investigation. The SC
referred the case to the IBP.
ISSUE
W/N the civil complaint was groundless
W/N is was proper to implead Atty. Reyes and Prosecutor Salanga in the
civil complaint
ISSUE
Is Atty. Macabata guilty of grossly immoral character to merit his
disbarment?
HELD
The Supreme Court ruled that Atty. Macabata was NOT guilty of grossly
immoral character.
Grossly immoral character must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act,
or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as to show the common sense of decency. To
merit a disbarment, the act must be grossly immoral.
Atty. Macabatas act of kissing Advincula was not grossly immoral. The kiss
was not motivated by malice. This was proven by Atty. Macabatas immediate apology
and the fact that it happened in a well-populated place. Advincula failed to prove that
Atty. Macabata lured her or took advantage of her.
While the disbarment complaint was dismissed, Atty. Macabata was
reprimanded and given a stern warning. The court described his kissing of Advincula
as distasteful.
(The Supreme Court also said that greetings like beso are ok.)
CANON 8
HELD
Yes, civil complaint was groundless and it was improper to implead Atty.
Reyes and Prosecutor Salanga in said civil complaint.
IBP: civil complaint was filed purposely to obtain leverage against the estafa
case. There was no need to implead Atty. Reyes and Prosecutor Salanga since they
were not parties in the business venture. Their inclusion in the complaint was
improper and highly questionable and the suit was filed to harass both of them. In
filing the civil suit, Atty. Chiong violated his oath of office and Canon 8 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. IBP recommended 2 years suspension
SC: affirmed IBPs recommendation. In addition, the Court mentioned some
alternative remedies Atty. Chiong could have taken if his allegations were indeed true.
Chiong could have filed a motion for reinvestigation or motion for reconsideration of
Salangas decision to file the information for estafa. Motion to Dismiss the estafa case
was also available if it was indeed filed without basis.
Relevant Provisions:
Canon 8 A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness, and candor towards
his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing
counsel.
Lawyers Oath not to wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or
unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same.
REYES V. CHIONG
ATTY. DALLONG- GALICINAO V. ATTY. CASTRO
FACTS
Two Chinese-Taiwanese businessmen (Xu and Pan) entered into a business
venture to set up a factory for seafood products. Xu invested P300,000. Eventually,
Xu discovered that Pan had not established the factory and asked for his money
back. Pan became hostile and ignored Xu. Xu engaged the services of Atty. Reyes,
who filed a complaint for estafa against Pan (represented by Atty. Chiong). The
complaint was assigned to Asst. Manila City Prosecutor Pedro Salanga, who issued a
subpoena for Pan to appear for preliminary investigation. For failure to appear and
submit a counter-affidavit, Salanga filed a criminal complaint for estafa against Pan in
the RTC of Manila. The RTC issued a warrant of arrest against Pan. In response, Atty.
Chiong filed a motion to quash the warrant of arrest. He also filed with the RTC of
Zamboanga a civil complaint for the collection of a sum of money, damages, and for
the dissolution of the business venture against Xu, Atty. Reyes and Salanga. Atty.
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Facts:
Atty. Dallong-Galicinao is the Clerk of Court of RTC and Atty. Castro was a
private practitioner and VP of IBP-Nueva Vizcaya. Respondent went to complainants
office to inquire whether the records of Civil Case No. 784 had already been
remanded to the MCTC. Respondent was not the counsel of either party in that
case.
Complainant replied that the record had not yet been transmitted since a
certified true copy of the CA decision should first be presented. To this respondent
retorted, You mean to say, I would have to go to Manila to get a copy? Complainant
replied that respondent may show instead the copy sent to the party he represents.
Respondent then replied that complainant shouldve notified him. Complainant
explained that it is not her duty to notify the respondent of such duty. Angered,
right to scold Salvani and insult and berate those who tried to calm him down.
Whatever moral righteousness he had was negated by the way he chose to express
his indignation.
CAMACHO V. PAGULAYAN
FACTS
Held:
Respondent is fined the amount of 10k with a warning.
Respondent was not the counsel of record of Civil Case No. 784. His
explanation that he will enter his appearance in the case when its records were
already transmitted to the MCTC is unacceptable. Not being the counsel of record
respondent had no right to impose his will on the clerk of court. He violated Rule 8.02,
because this was an act of encroachment. It matters not that he did so in good faith.
His act of raising his voice and uttering vulgar invectives to the clerk of court
was not only ill-mannered but also unbecoming considering that he did these in front
of the complainants subordinates. For these, he violated Rules 7.03 and 8.01 and
Canon 8.
The penalty was tempered because respondent apologized to the
complainant and the latter accepted it. This is not to say, however, that
respondent should be absolved from his actuations. People are accountable for the
consequences of the things they say and do even if they repent afterwards.
ALCANTARA V. PEFIANCO
AMA Computer College (AMACC) had a pending case in the RTC for
expelling some students due to having published objectionable features or articles in
the school paper. Thereafter, Atty. Camacho who is the counsel for the expelled
students filed a complaint against Atty. Pangulayan, counsel for AMACC, for violation
of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Ethics which provides that "A lawyer should
not in any way communicate upon the subject of controversy with a party represented
by counsel, much less should he undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter
with him, but should only deal with his counsel. It is incumbent upon the lawyer most
particularly to avoid everything that may tend to mislead a party not represented by
counsel and he should not undertake to advise him as to law." The complaint was
based on the fact that Atty. Pangulayan procured and effected from the expelled
students and their parents compromise agreements in which the students waived all
kinds of claims they may have against AMACC and to terminate all civil, criminal and
administrative proceedings filed against it. The compromise agreements were
procured by Atty. Pangulayan without the consent and knowledge of Atty. Camacho
given that he was already the counsel for the students at that time. It was averred that
the acts of Atty. Pangulayan was unbecoming of any member of the legal profession
warranting either disbarment or suspension from the practice of law.
Facts:
Atty. Alcantara (incumbent District Pubic Attorney of PAO in Anitque) filed a
complaint against Atty. Pefianco for conduct unbecoming of the bar for using improper
and offensive language and threatening and attempting to assault complainant. This
happened when Atty, Salvani was conferring with his client in the PAO office when the
wife of the murdered victim, in tears, came and askef for a settlement. Moved by the
plight of the woman, Pefianco, who was standing nearby, scolded and shouted at
Salvani to not settle the case and to have his client imprisoned so that he would
realize his mistake. As head of the office, Alcantara reproached Pefianco, but this
ended up with Pefianco saying that Alcantara was an idiot for sending him out of the
PAO. Also, Pefianco tried to attack Alcantara and even shouted at him, Gago ka!
The IBP Committee on Bar Discipline found that Pefianco violated Canon 8
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Issue:
W/N Pefianco is guilty of violating Canon 8
Held:
Yes. Canon 8 admonishes lawyers to conduct themselves with courtesy,
fairness and candor toward their fellow lawyers. Pefiancos meddling in a matter in
which he had no right to do so caused the incident. And although Pefianco was
moved by the womans plight, what he thought was righteous did not give him the
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ISSUE
Whether or not Atty. Pangulayan violated Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Ethics
HELD
YES! Atty. Pangulayan is suspended for 3 months from the practice of law
for having ciolated the Code of Professional Ethics.
In this case, when the compromise agreements were formalized and
effected by Atty. Pangulayan, Atty. Camacho was already the retained counsel for the
students in the pending case filed by the students against AMACC and Atty.
Pangulayan had full knowledge of such fact. However, Atty. Pangulayan still
proceeded to negotiate with the students and the parents without at least
communicating the matter with their lawyer even being aware that the students were
being represented by counsel.
Such failure of Atty. Pangulayan, whether by design or oversight, is an
inexcusable violation of the canons of professional ethics and in utter disregard of a
duty owing to a colleague. Atty. Pangulayan in this case fell short of the demands
required of him as a lawyer and as a member of the Bar.
*In relation to our topic (not stated in case), such act of Atty. Pangulayan is
also in violation of Canon 8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states
that "A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional
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advertisements
HELD/RATIO:
Yes, it constitutes practice of law. No, the ads should be enjoined.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To engage
in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristic of the
profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render any kind of service
that involves legal knowledge or skill.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes
legal advice and counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments and contract by
which legal rights are secured, although such matter may or may not be pending in a
court. When a person participates in a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in
the practice of law. One who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights
and then takes the business to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in
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litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience
with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex
situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an
intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so
far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of
the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which
involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the
welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by
persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and
acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all
attorneys.
The SC, in order to arrive at its decision, presented a brief history of
Monsods employment. After passing the bar exam, Atty. Monsod worked in the law
office of his father. From 1963 to 1970, he worked for the World Bank Group, where
he was assigned as operations officer in Costa Rica. His job involved getting
acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and coordinating
legal, economic and project work of the bank. In 1970, he returned to the Philippines
and worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief executive of an investment bank
and a business conglomerate. By 1986, he rendered his services to various
companies as a legal and economic consultant and he also worked as a Chief
Executive Officer. He was also the Secretary-General and National Chairman of
NAMFREL in 1986-1987. His position in NAMFREL required his knowledge in
election law. Also, he sat as a member of the Davide Commission in 1990.
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law".
particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the
liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past
work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of
industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and
the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
There are several factors determinative of whether a particular activity constitutes
"practice of law."
1. Habituality
2. Compensation
3. Application of law, legal principle, practice or procedure which calls or legal
knowledge, training and experience is within the term "practice of law.
4. Attorney-client relationship.
CAMBALIZA V. CRISTOBAL-TENORIO
FACTS
Cabliza, a former employee of Cristal-Tenorio in her law office, filed a
disbarment complaint on the grounds of deceit, grossly immoral conduct and
malpractice or other gross misconduct in office.
NO. The court struck down the alleged oral agreement that the UNION
President should share in the Atty.s Fees. The UNION President is not the attorney
for the laborers. He may seek compensation only as such president. An agreement
whereby a UNION President is allowed to share in Atty.s Fees is immoral. Such a
contract we emphatically reject. It cannot be justified. Note Rule 9.02.
HELD
Respondent Edwin L. Rana was among those who passed the 2000 Bar
Examinations. On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of
successful bar examinees as members of the Philippine Bar, complainant Donna
Marie Aguirre filed against respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission to the Bar,
charging respondent with unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of
law, and grave misrepresentation.
The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar
during the scheduled oath-taking on 22 May 2001 but ruled that he cannot sign the
Roll of Attorneys pending the resolution of the charge against him.
Complainant charged respondent for unauthorized practice of law and grave
misconduct, alleging that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for
Vice Mayoralty candidate George Bunan in the May 2001 elections before the
Municipal Board of Election Canvassers (MBEC) of Mandaon, Masbate, and filed
with the MBEC a pleading as counsel entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the
Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor. Respondent also
signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in her petition to be declared the winning
mayoralty candidate.
On the charge of violation of law, respondent is not allowed by law to act as
counsel for a client in any court or administrative body, respondent being a municipal
government employee (Secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate).
The Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for
evaluation, report and recommendation.
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AGUIRRE V. RAMA
FACTS
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Issue:
Is Atty. Quintana guilty of violating Canon 9?
Held:
Yes. He was found to have assisted in the unauthorized practice of law by
negligently letting his wife notarize documents herself in his absence. His contention
that he rectified this error by slapping his wife is of no moment because he did not in
the first place take the necessary steps to prevent this. He was also charged with
violations of the notarial law.
CANONS 10 & 11
FERNANDEZ V. DE RAMOS-VILLALON
FACTS
This is an administrative case filed by petitioner Fernandez against Atty.
Villalon. It started from a case filed by a certain Carlos Palacios against Fernandez to
nullify a Deed of Donation. Atty. Villalon represented Palacios in the early part of the
case against Fernandez.
In 2004, Palacios, owner of a lot in Makati, sought the help of Fernandez to
help him in a case against a land-grabbing syndicate. Palacios won the case with the
help of Fernandez.
In Sept 2005, Palacios bumped into a Mrs. Lirio who expressed interest in
buying Palacios Makati property. It turns out that it was being sold by Fernandez who
allegedly had a Deed of Donation which Palacios executed in his favor. This Deed of
Donation was registered.
Palacios, with the help of Atty. Villalon, filed an action tto nullify the Deed
against Fernandez. However, Fernandez answered that the title transfer in his name
was proper, citing a Deed of Absolute Sale as basis. He furthered alled that it was
actually Palacios who forged the Deed of Donation to cheat in taxes.
In 2006, Fernandez filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Villalon for
violation of Rule 1.01, 7.03, 10.1, 10.2, 10.3. He claims that Atty. Villalon has
suppressed and excluded in the complaint filed by her knowledge about the existence
of the Deed of Absolute Sale, which was by the way, unregistered. He says that no
mention of it was made in the petition for the annulment of thee Deed of Donation.
Commissioner of IBP recommended the dismissal of the case. Sustaining
Atty. Villalons argument that she, as counsel for Palacios, was under no duty to
include the fact that the Deed of Sale existed because only the clients operative
facts, and not other evidentiary facts, need to be included in the complaint. The Deed
of Sale was a matter of a defense that Fernandez as defendant can freely point out
during the trial.
Fernandez appealed the case.
ISSUE
W/N there was grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint.
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Justice Hofilena
that the employees have been paid their service incentive leave pay. The employees
appealed to NLRC but the latter affirmed the labor arbiters decision.
In reaction to this, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Inhibit
(MRMI) where respondent used scandalous, offensive, and menacing languages to
support his complaint. He said that the labor arbiter was cross-eyed in making his
findings of fact and that Commissioner Dinopol acted in the same manner with malice
thrown in when he adopted the findings of the labor arbiter. That the retiring
commissioners of NLRC circumvent the law and jurisprudence when the money claim
involved in the case is substantial. According to respondent, such acts constitute
grave abuse of discretion.
Because of the MRMI, complainant filed a disbarment case with IBPs
Commission on Bar Discipline against respondent wherein it was alleged that the
latter violated certain codes and rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Specifically, respondent allegedly violated Canons 8 and 11 wherein a lawyer is
prohibited from using scandalous, oppressive, offensive, and malicious language
against an opposing counsel and before the courts.
In his defense, respondent argues that he did not violate any of the canons
found in the Code because 1) the NLRC is not among the courts referred to in the
rules; 2) the Commissioners therein are not judges; and 3) the complainants in labor
cases are entitled to some latitude of righteous anger. Attached to respondents
counter-complaint is an affidavit made by the union president Batan alleging that the
lawyers of the complainant are the ones who violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility when they filed multiple suits arising from the same cause of action
and when they deliberately lessened the number of complainants in the labor case.
The findings of the Commission on Bar discipline led the IBP to conclude
that respondent is guilty of violating Canons 8 and 11, while the lawyers of the
complainant did not violate any canons of the Code. It recommended that respondent
be reprimanded with a stern warning that severe penalties will be imposed in case a
similar conduct will be committed again.
ISSUE
W/N respondent violated Canons 8 and 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
HELD
YES. Respondent has clearly violated Canons 8 and 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. His actions erode the publics perception of the legal
profession. The MRMI contains insults and diatribes against the NLRC, attacking both
its moral and intellectual integrity, replete with implied accusations of partiality,
impropriety and lack of diligence. Respondent used improper and offensive language
in his pleadings that does not admit any justification.
Though a lawyer's language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always
be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of
unnecessary language is proscribed if we are to promote high esteem in the courts
and trust in judicial administration.
However, the penalty of reprimand with stern warning imposed by the IBP
Board of Governors is not proportionate to respondents violation of the Canons of the
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violated Rule 1.01 which provides that a lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
violated the Lawyers Oath, which mandates that he should support the
Constitution, obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities therein, and do no falsehood or not consent to the doing of
any in court. Further, he has also failed to live up to the standard set by law
that he should refrain from counseling or abetting activities aimed at
defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system. The
act of non-registration of the deeds of sale to avoid paying tax may not be
illegal per se; but, as a servant of the law, a lawyer should make himself an
exemplar for others to emulate.
PLUS BUILDERS V. REVILLA
FACTS
In the case of PLUS BUILDERS, INC., and EDGARDO C. GARCIA vs.
ATTY. ANASTACIO E. REVILLA, JR., , En Banc, A.C. No. 7056, February 11, 2009,
the respondent lawyer filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the
Philippine Supreme Court, finding respondent guilty of gross misconduct for
committing a willful and intentional falsehood before the court, misusing court
procedure and processes to delay the execution of a judgment and collaborating with
non-lawyers in the illegal practice of law.
On November 15, 1999, a decision was rendered by the Provincial
Adjudicator of Cavite (PARAD) in favor of complainant, Plus Builders, Inc. and against
the tenants/farmers Leopoldo de Guzman, et. al., who were the clients of respondent
Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. The PARAD found that respondents clients were mere
tenants and not rightful possessors/owners of the subject land. The case was
duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice, and is enjoined
from unduly delaying a case by impeding execution of a judgment or by misusing
court processes.
FIL-GARCIA, INC. V. HERNANDEZ
FACT
Filomeno Garcia, president of Fil-Garcia Inc., after losing his case in the CA
for a sum of money, secured the serviced of Atty. Fernando Hernandez, who received
the denied resolution for Garcia as counsel, and was given 15 days to appeal.
Instead of filing the appeal, Hernandez filed for a Motion for Extension the
day before the expiration of the period to file the appeal,, alleging that he was counsel
for a mayoralty candidate and a senatorial candidate, and he was also needed in the
canvassing of votes, so the urgency of the nature of his work will not allow him the
limited time to file the appeal, thus asked for 30 days extension.
30 days later, Hernandez again filed his 2 nd Motion for Extension, this time,
because he fell ill, and his physical state will not allow him to file the appeal on time,
thus asking for 20 days extension.
20 days later, the 3rd Motion for Extension was filed, with the grand excuse
that because he fell ill the last time, his work load piled up, thus requiring him more
time to conclude on the work load he missed when he was ill, plus the appeal, hence
the request for 10 days extension, to which 10 days later, he did actually file the
appeal. (Finally!)
Of course, afterwards, Hernandez learned that all three Motions for
Extensions were denied by the court, and to his dismay, received a copy of the
resolution denying the appeal all together. However, instead of informing his client,
Fil-Garcia, he decides to forward the resolution of denial of the appeal some 7 months
later, which greatly angered his client, pushing him to file for his disbarment.
ISSUE
HELD
It is the rule that when a lawyer accepts a case, he is expected to give his
full attention, diligence, skill and competence to the case, regardless of its importance
and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. A lawyers devotion to his clients cause
not only requires but also entitles him to deploy every honorable means to secure for
the client what is justly due him or to present every defense provided by law to enable
the latters cause to succeed. In this case, respondent may not be wanting in this
regard. On the contrary, it is apparent that the respondents acts complained of were
committed out of his over-zealousness and misguided desire to protect the interests
of his clients who were poor and uneducated. We are not unmindful of his dedication
and conviction in defending the less fortunate. Taking the cudgels from the former
lawyer in this case is rather commendable, but respondent should not forget his first
and foremost responsibility as an officer of the court. In support of the cause of their
clients, lawyers have the duty to present every remedy or defense within the authority
of the law. This obligation, however, is not to be performed at the expense of truth and
justice. This is the criterion that must be borne in mind in every exertion a lawyer
gives to his case. Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer has the
26 | Block C 2012
Justice Hofilena
cases against him, Mauricio continued to publish articles against Foodsphere and
discredit them in his tv shows. Because of this, the IBP ordered that Mauricio be
suspended for 2 years. Mauricio now challenges the validity of the suspension.
ISSUE/S
W/N Mauricios suspension was valid.
HELD
YES! Mauricio suspended for 3 years.
Continued Attacks Despite Pending Cases = Violation Of Rule 13.02
Despite the pendency of the case against Mauricio, and IBPs orders that he
discontinue with his actions, he still continued with his attacks against Foodsphere
and its products. This is a clear and conscious violation the Code of Professional
Responsibility which is an improper conduct of a member of the bar.
NOTE: The power of the media to form or influence public opinion cannot be
underestimated.
FACTS
Foodsphere, Inc. is the owner of CDO grocery products. One day, a Mr.
Cordero bought canned goods from a grocery store, one of them being a CDO liver
spread canned good. When Mr. Cordero and his family ate the liver spread, they
found that it tasted sour and subsequently discovered that the canned good was
infested with a colony of worms. A complaint was filed with the Bureau of Food and
Drug Administration (BFAD) and a subsequent investigation confirmed the presence
of the parasites. BFAD ordered a hearing between Foodsphere and the Corderos,
where the latter demanded P150k. Foodsphere refused, resulting to the Corderos
threatening to bring up the matter to the media.
Meanwhile, Atty Mauricio faxed Foodsphere a sample front page of a tabloid
he was involved with, which contained articles discrediting the latter, and threatened
to publish it if they didnt pay the amount the Corderos wanted. Foodsphere refused
as well. Atty Mauricio thus proposed a Kasunduan between the two, where
Foodsphere agreed to settle the matter for a lower amount, but added that
Foodsphere advertise in Mauricios tabloids and tv shows, in exchange for the
withdrawal of the complaint. The Corderos withdrew their complaint and BFAD
dismissed the complaint against Foodsphere.
Mauricio then sent Foodsphere an Advertising Contract asking the latter
advertisements of various media (which were a lotand expensive!) owned by
Mauricio. As a sign of goodwill, Foodsphere offered to patronize some advertisements
only. Mauricio was disappointed with this and threatened to proceed with the
publications. And a few weeks later, Mauricio, in his radio talk show (Batas ng Bayan)
held a guessing contest with questions that asked which company had worms in its
liver spread. He also wrote in his columns and aired in his tv shows about the same
topic.
Foodsphere filed criminal and civil complaints against Mauricio about the
discrediting remarks that he has been making against the company. Foodsphere also
filed the present administrative complaint against Mauricio to the IBP, where he was
ordered not to make any more statements on the matter. Notwithstanding the pending
27 | Block C 2012
Justice Hofilena
ISSUE
W/N Bagabuyo should be held in contempt and suspended for violating Rule
11.05, Canon 11 and Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility YES
HELD
Canon 11 mandates a lawyer to observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts and to judicial officers.
Bagabuyo violated Canon 11 when he indirectly stated that Judge Tan was
displaying judicial arrogance in the published article and when he stated that Judge
Tan was ignorant of the law and that as a mahjong aficionado, he was studying
mahjong instead of the law.
Rule 11.05 states that a lawyer shall submit grievances against a judge to
the proper authorities.
Bagabuyo violated Rule 11.05 when he caused the holding of a press
conference and submitted to a radio interview to air out his grievances against Judge
Tan.
Rule 13.02 states that a lawyer shall not make public statements in the
media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a
party.
Bagabuyo violated Rule 13.02 when he made statements in the article,
which were made while Criminal Case No. 5144 was still pending in court.
A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath, a
patent disregard of his duties, or an odious deportment unbecoming of an attorney.
CANON 15
HILADO V. DAVID
FACTS
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Justice Hofilena
Mrs. Hilado filed an action against Assad to annul the sale of several house
& lot between Assad and her now deceased husband, during the Japanese
occupation
Assads counsel is Atty. Francisco
Mrs. Hilados counsels are the following: Delgado, Dizon, Flores and
Rodrigo
Atty. Dizon wrote Atty. Francisco to discontinue representing Assad because
Mrs. Hilado consulted her about the case and even turned over some
documents to Atty. Francisco
Atty. Francisco even wrote a legal opinion/letter addressed to Mrs. Hilado
regarding the same case, which states that Atty. Francisco will not represent
Mrs. Hilado in the case and he thinks that the action against Assad will not
prosper
Mrs. Hilados counsel filed a motion to DISQUALIFY Atty. Francisco
Atty. Franciscos version of the story:
o Mrs. Hilado came to see Atty. Francisco about the case, but he
refused to become her counsel because he thinks that the action
will not prosper
o Days later, Atty. Franciscos assistant, Atty. Agrava, informed him
that Mrs. Hilado left some expediente in the firm. Atty. Francisco
instructed Atty. Agrava to return the expediente because they will
not handle the case of Mrs. Hilado
o Later, the firms stenographer showed Atty. Francisco a letter
allegedly dictated by Atty. Agrava which explains to Mrs. Hilado why
they refuse to take the case
o Atty. Francisco allegedly signed the letter without reading it
o Later on, Assad went to Atty. Franciscos office. Afterwards, Atty.
Francisco accepted the retainer fee
Lower Court Held: no other information was transmitted to Atty. Francisco
other than those in plaintiffs complaint and there was no attorney-client
relationship between Atty. Francisco and Mrs. Hilado. Hence, motion to
disqualify is denied.
ISSUE
W/N there was an attorney-client relationship between Atty. Francisco and
Mrs. Hilado
HELD
Yes, there was an attorney-client relationship because the purpose of Mrs. Hilado
was to obtain Atty. Franciscos personal service as a lawyer
Retainer and frequency of consultation is not needed , so long as the
purpose is to obtain professional advice or assistance and the attorney
permits, then an attorney-client relationship is established
Formality is not essential
Even is no secret communication was given, as long as there is an attorneyclient relationship which precludes accepting opposite partys retainer in the
same litigation regardless of what type of information was received
Only thus can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their
attorneys which is of paramount importance to administration of justice
Even if the information was only received by an assistant, it is still
considered as professional service, besides an information imparted to a
member of a firm is made available to the entire firm
Hence, Atty. Francisco is disqualified as Assads counsel
Ratio: Rule 15.02 a lawyer shall be bound by the rule on privileged communication
in respect of matters disclosed to him by a prospective client
was absent for quite some time but returned to work during the tenure of the litigation
of claims. Thus, he cannot claim ignorance of the case.
The test of impropriety of representation of conflicting interests is not the
certainty of such existence but mere probability for it to exist.
Even though he could have committed such misconduct not as a lawyer but
as an accountant, the court is not divested of jurisdiction to punish a lawyer for
misconduct committed outside the legal field, as the good moral character
requirement is not only a requisite for entrance to the bar but a continuing
requirement for the practice of law.
A lawyer should always act to promote public confidence to the legal
profession.
NAKPIL V. VALDES
HORNILLA V. SALUNAT
FACTS
Valdes obtained 2 loans (65k and 75k), then he bought the land and had the
title issued in his name.
When Jose Nakpil died, Imelda, his wife, became the administratrix of Joses
estate. And, Valdes law firm filed for the settlement of Joses estate.
Baguio property became an issue because the property was not included in
Joses inventory of estate, but the loans used to purchase the property were
charged under his name.
The title to the property was transferred from Valdes to Caval Realty, Valdes
family realty corp.
Valdes accounting firm handled the inventory of Joses estate but also,
handled the claims of Joses creditors- Angel Nakpil and ENORN, INC.
ISSUE
w/n Valdes is guilty of representing conflicting interests in violation of the
code of professional ethics
HELD
Yes.
The proscription applies no matter how slight the adverse interest is.
Representation of conflicting interests may be allowed only upon full
disclosure of the facts among all concerned parties, as to the extent of conflict and
probable adverse outcome.
The preparation of claims of the creditors against the estate is obviously
improper because he had to fight for one side, the claims he was defending against
for the other side.
The defense that he had already resigned from the law firm was not
supported by evidence. His resignation from the accounting firm only shows that he
29 | Block C 2012
Justice Hofilena
FACTS
Complainants in this case are members of the Philippine Public School
Teachers Association (PPSTA) who filed an intra-corporate case against its members
of the Board of Directors for unlawful spending and the undervalued sale of the real
properties of PPSTA corporation.
Attorney Salunat is the counsel of the Philippine Public School Teachers
Association (PPSTA) and at the same time the counsel of the PPSTA Board of
Directors.
Hence, complainants now aver that Atty. Salunat is guilty of conflict of
interest.
ISSUE
Can a lawyer, engaged by a corporation, defend members of the board of
the same corporation in a derivative suit?
HELD
No, a lawyer cannot. Hence, Atty. Salunat is guilty of representing conflicting
interest and is admonished to observe a higher degree of fidelity in the practice of his
profession.
The Court in this case explained the nature of a derivative suit. Where
corporation directors have committed a breach, ultra vires acts, or negligence a
stockholder may sue on behalf of himself and other stockholders and for the benefit of
the corporation. In this suit therefore, the corporation is the real party in interest, while
the stockholder who files a suit for the corporations behalf is only the nominal party.
The test of inconsistency of interest is whether the acceptance of a new
relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity
and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the
performance thereof.
A situation wherein a lawyer represents both the corporation and its assailed
directors unavoidably gives rise to a conflict of interest.
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY V. ARQUILLO
At the time Atty. Bamba filed the replevin case on behalf of AIB, he was still
the counsel of record of Quiambao in the pending ejectment case. Under Rule 15.03,
a lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after full disclosure of the facts. This is founded on the principles of
public policy because it is the only way that litigants can be encouraged to entrust
their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration
of justice.
3 Tests of Conflict of Interests:
1. Whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim in behalf of one
client and, at the same time, to oppose that claim for the other client
2. Whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of
the lawyers duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite
suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty
3. Whether the lawyer would be called upon in the new relation to use against
a former client any confidential information acquired through their connection
or previous employment
HEIRS OF FALAME V. BAGUIO
FACTS
Plaintiffs, heirs of the late Lydio Falame, allege that their father engaged the
services of respondent Atty. Baguio to represent him in an action for forcible entry (in
which Lydio and his brother Raleigh were one of the defendants). As counsel, Atty.
Baguio used and submitted evidence of: 1.) A special power of attorney executed by
Lydio in favor of his brother, Raleigh Falame, appointing him as his attorney-in-fact;
and 2.) affidavit of Raleigh Falame, executed before the respondent, in which Raleigh
stated that Lydio owned the property subject of the case.
Plaintiffs further allege that even after a favorable ruling for the defendants in
the said case, Lydio still retained the services of Atty. Baguio as his legal adviser and
counsel of his businesses until his death in 1996.
However, in October of 2000 Atty. Baguio, in representation of spouses Raleigh and
Noemi Falame, filed a compliant against the plaintiffs involving the same property that
was the subject matter in the first case. Said complaint sought the declaration of
nullity of the deed of sale, its registration in the registry of deeds, TCT issued as a
consequence of the registration of the sale and the real estate mortgage.
Plaintiffs in turn, filed an administrative case against Atty. Baguio alleging
that by acting as counsel for the spouses Falame in the second case, wherein they
were impleaded a defendants, respondent violated his oath of office and duty as an
attorney. They contend that the spouses Falames interests are adverse to those of
his former client, Lydio.
The IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution adopting and approving
Investigating Commissioner Winston Abuyuans report and recommendation for the
dismissal of this case.
Held:
Yes, Atty. Bamba is guilty. Suspended for 1 year.
30 | Block C 2012
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ISSUE
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Justice Hofilena
Precedent and after being appointed as trustee of a fund amounting to Thirty Million
Pesos (P30,000,000.00) deposited at Real Bank. Multitel later changed its name to
Precedent.
Pacana sought the advice of Lopez who also happened to be a member of
the Couples for Christ, a religious organization where Pacana and his wife were also
active members. From then on, they constantly communicated, with the former
disclosing all his involvement and interests in Precedent and Precedents relation with
Multitel. Lopez gave legal advice to Pacana and even helped him prepare standard
quitclaims for creditors. In sum, Pacana avers that a lawyer-client relationship was
established between him and Lopez although no formal document was executed by
them at that time. There was an attempt to have a formal retainer agreement signed
but it didnt push through.
After a few weeks, Pacana was surprised to receive a demand letter from
Lopez asking for the return and immediate settlement of the funds invested by
Lopezs clients in Multitel. Lopez explained that she had to send it so that her clients
defrauded investors of Multitel would know that she was doing something for them
and assured Pacana that there was nothing to worry about.
Both parties continued to communicate and exchange information regarding
the persistent demands made by Multitel investors against Pacana. Pacana gave
Lopez several amounts, first 900,000; then 1,000,000 to be used in his case. Even
when Pacana went to the states, they continued communicating and he continued
sending her money for the case.
Wary that Lopez may not be able to handle his legal problems, Pacana was
advised by his family to hire another lawyer. When Lopez knew about this, she wrote
to complainant via e-mail, as follows:
Dear Butchie,
Hi! Ok ka lang? Hope you are fine. Sorry if I shocked you but I had to do it as your
friend and lawyer.
-----------I have been informed by Efie that your family is looking at hiring Coco Pimentel. I
know him very well as his sister Gwen is my best friend. I have no problem if you
hire him but I will be hands off. I work differently kasi. -------- Efren Santos will
sign as your lawyer although I will do all the work.
----------Please do not worry. Give me 3 months to make it all disappear. But if you hire
Coco, I will give him the free hand to work with your case. -------- I will stand by
you always. This is my expertise. TRUST me! ---Candy
When he got back to the country, Lopez told Pacana she had earned
P12,500,000.00 as attorneys fees and was willing to give P2,000,000.00 to him in
appreciation for his help. This never happened though. Lopez also ignored Pacanas
repeated requests for accounting. She continued to evade him.
Finally, Pacana filed a case with the IBP for Lopezs disbarment. The IBP disbarred
her.
Held:
Ratio:
HELD
Yes! Attorney Maricel Pascual-Lopez was DISBARRED for representing
conflicting interests and for engaging in unlawful, dishonest and deceitful conduct in
violation of her Lawyers Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Ratio: Rule 15.03 A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except
by written consent of all concerned given after full disclosure of the facts.
Lopez must have known that her act of constantly and actively
communicating with Pacana, who, at that time, was beleaguered with demands from
investors of Multitel, eventually led to the establishment of a lawyer-client relationship.
Lopez cannot shield herself from the inevitable consequences of her actions by
simply saying that the assistance she rendered to complainant was only in the form of
"friendly accommodations," precisely because at the time she was giving assistance
to complainant, she was already privy to the cause of the opposing parties who had
been referred to her by the SEC.
Given the situation, the most decent and ethical thing which Lopez should
have done was either to advise Pacana to engage the services of another lawyer
since she was already representing the opposing parties, or to desist from acting as
representative of Multitel investors and stand as counsel for complainant. She cannot
be permitted to do both because that would amount to double-dealing and violate our
ethical rules on conflict of interest.
Indubitably, Lopez took advantage of Pacanas hapless situation, initially, by
giving him legal advice and, later on, by soliciting money and properties from him.
Thereafter, Lopez impressed upon Pacana that she had acted with utmost sincerity in
helping him divest all the properties entrusted to him in order to absolve him from any
liability. But simultaneously, she was also doing the same thing to impress upon her
clients, the party claimants against Multitel, that she was doing everything to reclaim
the money they invested with Multitel.
CANON 16
LICUANAN V. MELO
Facts:
Licuanan filed a complaint against Atty. Melo for breach of professional
ethics. Atty. Melo was Licuanans counsel in an ejectment case filed against her
tenant. Atty. Melo failed to remit to her the rentals collected nor did the said lawyer
report to her the receipt of said amounts. It was only after a year from actual receipt
that Atty. Melo turned over his collections to Licuanan because a demand made by
the latter.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Melo should be penalized for failure to remit rentals
collected
32 | Block C 2012
Justice Hofilena
His friend, Jesus Garcia, arranged for the engagement of Atty. Balons
services as his counsel
Balon advised Lemoine that he was charging 25% of the actual amount to
being recovered payable upon successful recovery. Lemoine never gave his
consent as to the fee.
When Lemoine asked Balon as to the status of the case, Balon answered
that Metropolitan Insurance was offering P350,000 for settlement which
Lemoine suggested that Balon accept to avoid litigation
33 | Block C 2012
Justice Hofilena
ISSUE
W/N Atty. Balon violated the Code of Professional Responsibility
HELD
YES.
According to the SC, Atty. Balon violated Canons 1, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 21.
Specifically, Canon 16 which provides that a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and
properties of his client that may come into his possession.
Balon violated this and committed misconduct, when he failed to render an
account upon receipt of the money and further, when he failed to deliver such amount
to Lemoine.
It is also the duty of the lawyer to surrender such money collected when
demanded upon him. Balon violated this duty when he refuses to return the amount to
Lemoine contending that he has a lien on the fund.
The lawyers continuing exercise of his retaining lien, as provided for in Rule
16.03, presupposes that the client agrees with the amount of attorneys fees to be
charged. In case of disagreement, however, the lawyer must not arbitrarily apply the
funds in his possession to the payment of his fees, but rather he can file the
necessary action with the proper court to fix the fees. And in the present case,
Lemoine never gave his consent on the proposal of Balon.
It must be noted as well that before receiving the check, Balon proposes a
25% attorneys fees, after receiving the check, he was already asking for 50%.
SC found Balon guilty of malpractice, deceit, and gross misconduct, and
ordered disbarred.
IN RE: SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW IN THE TERRITORY OF
GUAM OF ATTY LEON G. MAQUERA
Facts:
Atty Maquera was counsel for a certain Castro who was indebted to Edward
Benavente who obtained judgment in a civil case. Castros propery was sold at public
auction to satisfy the obligation, but Castro retained the right to redemption over said
property.
In consideration for Maqueras legal fees, Castro and Atty Maquera entered
into an oral agreement that he would assign his right of redemption to Maquera.
Maquera purchased the property from Benavente for $525.00 then sold it for
$320,000.
He was suspended in the practice of law in Guam for two years for
Issue:
Is respondent guilty of violating Canon 16?
Held:
Yes. Said canon requires that a lawyer should properly account for all
amounts in his custody which pertain to the client and return the same upon demand.
This the respondent plainly failed to do even after repeated demands made by Reddi.
Issue:
May a member of the Philippine Bar who was disbarred or suspended from
the practice of law in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also be admitted as an
attorney be meted the same sanction as a member of the Philippine Bar for the same
infraction committed in the foreign jurisdiction?
Ruling:
It is not automatic suspension or disbarment, but is prima facie evidence
only.
The power of the Court to disbar/suspend a lawyer for acts an omission
committed in a foreign jurisdiction is found in Sec 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules
of Court:
[]The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a
competent court or other disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has
also been admitted as an attorney is a ground for his disbarment or suspension if the
basis of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated.
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be
prima facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension.
Also, he violated Article 1492 in relation to 1491 of the civil code which
prohibits a lawyer from acquiring by assignment the clients property which is the
subject of litigation. It extends to legal redemption.
Most particularly, Canon 17 which states that a lawyer owes fidelity to the
cause of his client and be mindful of the trust and confidence In him; and rule 1.01,
which prohibits a lawyer from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
HOWEVER, there is a need to ascertain Maquera has the right to explain
why he should and should not be suspended/disbarred on those grounds.
Suspension/disbarment is NOT automatic
NEVERTHELESS, the Court rules that Maquera should be suspended from
the practice of law for the non-payment of his IBP dues from 1977.
REDDI V. SERBIO, JR.
Facts:
Reddi, an Indian national, is a philanthropist. She decided to put up a
hospital in the Philippines and acquired, with the help of Atty. Serbio, some properties
to help speed up generation of funds. It was later found out that some of the
properties did not in fact belong to the owners she paid.
34 | Block C 2012
Justice Hofilena
35 | Block C 2012
Justice Hofilena
Yes!
Atty. Moya was charged for having failed to pay his debts and for issuing
worthless checks. He did not deny these allegations. Rule1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyers shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. It has been held that the issuance of
worthless checks as a violation of this rule and constitutes a gross misconduct.
3)
4)
5)
6)
The act of a lawyer in issuing a check without sufficient funds to cover the same
constitutes such willful dishonesty and immoral conduct as to undermine the
public confidence in the legal profession. He cannot justify his act of issuing
worthless checks by his dire financial conditions. He should not have contracted
debts which are beyond his financial capacity to pay. If he suffered financial
reverses he should have explained this with particularity and not though
generalized and unsubstantiated allegations.
Atty. Moya is accused of delay in the delivery of the sum of money due to his
client. His failure to explain such delay cannot be excused by his bare allegation
that the same had already been transmitted to the complainant.
His conduct in the course of the IBP proceedings in this case is also a matter of
serious concern. He submitted a motion to dismiss after requesting several
extensions of time to file his answer. His failure to attend the hearings and
belated plea to dismiss the case, despite orders to the contrary, show a callous
disregard of the lawful orders which caused undue delay in the IBP proceeding.
This conduct runs counter to the precepts of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and violates the lawyer's oath which imposes upon every member
of the bar the duty to delay no man for money or malice.
It is stressed that membership in the legal profession is a privilege burdened with
conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of
the highest degree of morality and faithful compliance with the Rules of the Legal
Profession are the conditions required for remaining a member of good standing
of the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law.
As to the penalty, failure to pay debts and issuance of worthless checks
constitutes gross misconduct for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with 1year
suspension. However, in this case, Atty. Moya is suspended for 2years because
aside from issuing worthless checks and failure to pay his debts, he also
seriously breached his client's trust and confidence to his personal advantage
and had shown a wanton disregard of the IBP's Orders in the course of its
proceedings.
CANONS 17 & 18
HERNANDEZ V. GO
FACTS
Atty. Go advised Hernandez to give him land titles covering three lots in
Zamboanga City belonging to her, so that he may sell them to enable her to
pay the creditors
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Justice Hofilena
Hernandez owns three more lots in Zamboanga City which were mortgaged
to creditors. When the mortgages fell due, Atty. Go redeemed the lots and
persuaded Hernandez to execute deeds of sale in his favor covering the said
lots
Atty. Go became the registered owner of all the lots belonging to Hernandez
In 1974, Hernandez came to know that Atty. Go did not sell her lots as
agreed upon, but instead he paid her creditors with his own funds and had
her land titles registered in his name, depriving her of real property worth
millions
Hernandez filed a complaint with the IBP
IBP: Atty. Go violated Canon 17 and should be suspended for 3 years
ISSUE
W/N Atty. GO SHOULD BE REPRIMANDED
HELD
YES, for violating Canons 16 and 17
Atty. Go violated Canon 16
His acts acquiring for himself Hernandezs lots entrusted to him are acts
constituting gross misconduct, a grievous wrong, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty,
willful in character and implies a wrongful intent and not a mere error in judgment
Such conduct on the part of Atty. Go not only degrades himself but also the
honor of the legal profession
Atty. Go violated Canon 17 which provides that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of
his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
Records show that Hernandez reposed high degree of trust and confidence
in Atty. Go and when she engaged his services, she entrusted to him her land titles
and allowed him to sell the same
Atty. Go, however, abused this trust and confidence when he did not sell her
properties to others but to himself without giving any monetary consideration to
Hernandez, thus depriving Hernandez the real worth of her properties
Atty. Go is duty bound to render a detailed report to Hernandez on how
much he sold the lots and the amounts paid to her creditors but failed to do so
In previous cases, the Court disbarred and expelled lawyers from the
practice of law in similar circumstances, thus, the penalty recommended by the IBP is
too light
Atty. Go was ordered disbarred.
PANELCO V. ATTY. JUAN AYAR MONTEMAYOR
FACTS:
This is an administrative complaint filed by Pangasinan Electric Cooperative
I (PANELCO I) charging Atty. Juan Ayar Montemayor with negligence.
Some of the omissions of Atty Montemayor were:
impression that they first had to pay off their civil liabilities prior to filing a petition for
probation and [2] unaware that they had only fifteen (15) days from their counsels
receipt of a copy of the decision to file their petition, proves that Atty. Akut failed to
give complainants timely legal advise.
Atty. Akut explained that he was out of his office most of the time because,
he and his wife were always out of town looking for faith healers to cure the malignant
brain tumor of his wife, who eventually succumbed to the cancer. Allegedly, after
attending the "important" hearings, he immediately went out of town seeking faith
healers.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent committed gross negligence or misconduct in
mishandling complainants cases on appeal, which eventually led to their dismissal, to
the prejudice of the complainant.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Akut is guilty of negligence.
HELD:
HELD:
Yes. WHEREFORE, Atty. Juan Ayar Montemayor is DISBARRED from the
practice of law. As counsel for complainant, respondent had the duty to present every
remedy or defense authorized by law to protect his client. When he undertook his
clients cause, he made a covenant that he will exert all efforts for its prosecution until
its final conclusion.He should undertake the task with dedication and care.
CANON 12 - A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EFFORT AND CONSIDER
IT HIS DUTY TO ASSIST IN THE SPEEDY AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE.
Rule 12.03 - A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file
pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or
offering an explanation for his failure to do so.
CANON 17 A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS
CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE
REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and
his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
CANON 19 - A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL
WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW.
ADECER V. AKUT
FACTS:
Originally, there was a Criminal Case in which complainants were charged
with committing a crime (Other deceits) punishable under the Revised Penal Code
(Other Deceits). Respondent, Atty. Akut was their legal counsel in the criminal case.
Complainant accuses Atty. Akut for being negligent.
First, despite Atty. Akuts receipt of a copy of the Decision and the
consequent running of the fifteen (15)-day period to file a petition for probation,
respondent went out of town without contacting complainants to give them proper
legal advice. Furthermore, Atty. Akuts admission that complainants were [1] under the
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prejudice the rights of a litigant, particularly his client. Thus, from the perspective of
the ethics of the legal profession, a lawyers lethargy in carrying out his duties to his
client is both unprofessional and unethical.
If his clients case is already pending in court, a lawyer must actively
represent his client by promptly filing the necessary pleading or motion and
assiduously attending the scheduled hearings. This is specially significant for a lawyer
who represents an accused in a criminal case.
The accused is guaranteed the right to counsel under the Constitution. However, this
right can only be meaningful if the accused is accorded ample legal assistance by his
lawyer:
The right to counsel proceeds from the fundamental principle of due process
which basically means that a person must be heard before being condemned. The
due process requirement is a part of a person's basic rights; it is not a mere formality
that may be dispensed with or performed perfunctorily.
The right to counsel must be more than just the presence of a lawyer in the
courtroom or the mere propounding of standard questions and objections. The right to
counsel means that the accused is amply accorded legal assistance extended by a
counsel who commits himself to the cause for the defense and acts accordingly. The
right assumes an active involvement by the lawyer in the proceedings, particularly at
the trial of the case, his bearing constantly in mind of the basic rights of the accused,
his being well-versed on the case, and his knowing the fundamental procedures,
essential laws and existing jurisprudence.
The right of an accused to counsel is beyond question a fundamental right.
Without counsel, the right to a fair trial itself would be of little consequence, for it is
through counsel that the accused secures his other rights. In other words, the right to
counsel is the right to effective assistance of counsel.
The right of an accused to counsel finds substance in the performance by
the lawyer of his sworn duty of fidelity to his client. Tersely put, it means an effective,
efficient and truly decisive legal assistance, not a simply perfunctory representation.
In this case, after accepting the criminal case against complainants son and receiving
his attorneys fees, respondent did nothing that could be considered as effective and
efficient legal assistance. For all intents and purposes, respondent abandoned the
cause of his client. Indeed, on account of respondents continued inaction,
complainant was compelled to seek the services of the Public Attorneys Office.
Respondents lackadaisical attitude towards the case of complainants son was
reprehensible. Not only did it prejudice complainants son, it also deprived him of his
constitutional right to counsel. Furthermore, in failing to use the amount entrusted to
him for posting a bond to secure the provisional liberty of his client, respondent
unduly impeded the latters constitutional right to bail.
OVERGAARD V. VALDEZ
FACTS
Overgaard is a Dutch national who engaged the services of Atty. Valdez.
They entered into a retainer agreement, providing that for 900K, Valdez would
represent Overgaard as counsel in 2 cases filed by him (Estafa and a mandamus
document which the Spouses Eustaquio prepared, and which complainants signed,
was a deed of absolute sale and not a real estate mortgage. They also learned that
Navarro R. Eustaquio (Navarro) had transferred the title over the property to his
name.
Complainants engaged the services of respondent for the purpose of
recovering their property.
Respondent lawyer filed a complaint for the reconveyance of the property.
Complainants and the Spouses Eustaquio entered into an amicable settlement. In the
amicable settlement, the complainants offered the spouses the sum of P30K as
repurchase price which the spouses accepted.
However, complainants did not have the P30,000 repurchase price for the
property. Respondent Delante advanced the P30,000 and, in return, complainants
allowed respondent to possess the property and gather its produce until he is paid.
When complainants tried to repay the P30,000 repurchase price and recover
the property from respondent, respondent refused. Complainants learned that
respondent transferred the title of the property to his name.
Complainants filed a complaint praying that (1) the deed of absolute sale
prepared by the Spouses Eustaquio and signed by the complainants be declared
void, (2) title issued in the name of Atty. Delante be declared void, and (3) respondent
be made to pay damages.
As defense, respondent alleges that:
1. The complainants only borrowed money from him without any intention
to pay him back or at least offer an explanation as to how they would be
able to repay him
2. That the couple did not really engage his services as counsel for an
annulment suit against Navarro Eustaquio
3. The sale between Eustaquio and the complainants was a valid sale and
not a mortgage
4. The actual buyer of the property was Atty. Delantes former client who is
now residing in New York. But after 11 years, the buyer did not return to
the Philippines anymore so he authorized Atty. Delante to have the
property in his name upon refund of the purchase price.
Complainants filed a complaint dated with the Court charging respondent
with gross violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In a Report dated 15 October 2007, Commissioner Hababag of the IBP
found that respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. IBP Board of
governors approved but increased the penalty from a 6-month suspension to 1-year.
FACTS
This is a complaint filed by the heirs of an illiterate couple belonging to the
Samal Tribe against Atty. Delante for gross violation of professional responsibility
particularly Canons 16 and 17.
The couple owned a property in Samal, Davao del Norte. On 15 April 1971,
Angalan and complainants borrowed P15,000 from Spouses Eustaquio. To secure the
loan, Angalan and complainants mortgaged their property and surrendered the title to
the Spouses Eustaquio.
When complainants tried to pay the loan and recover the title from the
Spouses Eustaquio, the Spouses Eustaquio refused. Complainants learned that the
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ISSUE
Whether or not respondent committed grave violation of [the] Code of
Professional Responsibility when he bought the property of his client[s] without their
knowledge, consent and against their will?
HELD
YES.
3.
Canon 17 states that lawyers shall be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in them. Respondent should have been mindful of the trust and confidence
complainants reposed in him. Complainants allege that they are illiterate and that the
Spouses Eustaquio took advantage of them. Complainants engaged the services of
respondent in the hope that he would help them recover their property. Instead of
protecting the interests of complainants, respondent took advantage of complainants
and transferred the title of the property to his name.
Considering the depravity of respondents offense, the Court finds the
recommended penalty too light. Violation of Canons 16 and 17 constitutes gross
misconduct. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states that a member of the
bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Court for gross
misconduct.
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A person who takes the 8.102-hectare property of his illiterate clients and
who is incapable of telling the truth is unfit to be a lawyer.
The Court finds Atty. Leonido C. Delante GUILTY of violating Canons 16 and
17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, the Court DISBARS him
from the practice of law and ORDERS that his name be stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys.
SANTOS-TAN V. ATTY. ROMEO R. ROBISO
FACTS
Complainant Santos-Tan charged respondent with malpractice for grossly
neglecting his duties and responsibilities as counsel for complainant and for issuing a
bouncing check.
Complainant found out that her case had not progressed and that the only
pleading that respondent had filed was his notice of appearance.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether respondent was negligent in handling complainants case (NO);
and
(2) Whether respondent should be disciplined for issuing a bouncing check
(YES).
RATIO:
On the issue of negligence on the part of respondent in handling
complainants case, the Court agrees that based on the facts presented there was
nothing that he could have done to expedite the resolution of the motion for
reconsideration then pending before the RTC. The RTC had already ordered that the
motion for reconsideration be submitted for resolution. Respondent could not be
faulted if the acting presiding judge did not want to act on the motion until the regular
presiding judge return.
Regarding the other issues, as a lawyer, respondent is deemed to know the
law, especially Bouncing Check Law. By issuing a check in violation of the provisions
of this law, respondent is guilty of serious misconduct. The act of a lawyer in issuing a
check which is drawn against insufficient funds constitutes deceitful conduct or
conduct unbecoming an officer of the court. The Court has held that the issuance of
checks which were later dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account
indicates a lawyers unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on him. It shows a
lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render him unworthy of
public confidence. As such, we have held that deliberate failure to pay just debts and
the issuance of worthless checks constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may
be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law. Respondent violated the
Attorneys Oath that he will, among others, obey the laws. The Code of Professional
Responsibility specifically provides:
CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY
THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR THE LAW AND LEGAL
PROCESSES.
SOMOSOT V. LARA
CANON 19
FACTS
Atty Lara objected, stating that such interrogatories and admission should be
sent directly to Mrs. Somosot
At this point, we should take note that Atty Lara is already sensitive about
the P27,000 in unpaid attys fees
Lara tried to locate Somosot about the fees in her office in Greenhills; office
was locked and according to the security guard, they had moved office
without leaving a forwarding address. Lara also attempted to call Mr and Mrs
Somosot, but they couldnt be reached
Dec. 2001, upon learning that Somosots new office was in Pasig, he called
her where he advised that she should find another Lawyer. She informed her
that she already did.
September, 2005. Lara receives a letter from Somosot giving him one last
chance to give her a reason not to instigate a disbarment suit against him.
ISSUE
W/N Atty Lara, from the facts stated, is deemed incompetent in his services
to Mrs. Ofelia Somosot.
HELD
Yes.
Atty Laras services were insufficient. His neglect (or refusal) to reply to the
Interrogatories and Request for Admissions himself eventually caused the court to
rule against Mrs. Somosot. Records do not show how exactly he tried to address the
Interrogatories issue or whether he appealed the case or not.
He did not mention how he tried to locate Mrs. Somosot to inform her about
the Interrogatories and Request for Admission. He only took the initiative when he
learned that he had been appointed into a government position.
Lara was very much sensitive about his unpaid billings, and this shouldnt be
a reason for him not to inform his client about the cases development
He had two valid reasons for withdrawing as her Atty. One, his appointment
in a government office; and two, Somosots refusal to pay his fees. He could have
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FACTS:
The complainant in this disbarment case is Atty. Briones. The respondent is
Atty. Jimenez. Complainant Briones is the Special Administrator of the Henson
Estate, while respondent Jimenez is the counsel for Heirs of Henson.
The root of herein administrative complaint for Disbarment is an RTC Order
(2002). The RTC Order directed complainant Briones to deliver the residue of the
estate to the Heirs in proportion to their shares. Complainant Briones did not reply to
the demand, so respondent Jimenez opted to file a criminal complaint in behalf of his
clients for refusal to obey the lawful order of the court.
Complainant Briones now claims that respondent Jimenez is guilty of
violation of Rule 19.01 of the Code of Professional responsibility by filing the
unfounded criminal complaint against complainant to obtain an improper advantage:
Rule 19.01 - A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the
lawful objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or
threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in
any case of proceeding.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Atty. Jimenez should be administratively liable.
HELD:
Yes. Atty. Jacinto D. Jimenez is found guilty of and REPRIMANDED [since
no evidence of malice or bad faith] for violation of Rule 19.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility Fair play demands that respondent should have filed the
proper motion with the RTC to attain his goal of having the residue of the estate
delivered to his clients and not subject complainant to a premature criminal
prosecution.
Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins a lawyer to
represent his client with zeal. However, the same Canon provides that a lawyers
performance of his duties towards his client must be within the bounds of the law.
Rule 19.01 of the same Canon requires, among others, that a lawyer shall employ
only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client. To permit
lawyers to resort to unscrupulous practices for the protection of the supposed rights of
their clients is to defeat one of the purposes of the state the administration of
justice. While lawyers owe their entire devotion to the interest of their clients and zeal
in the defense of their clients right, they should not forget that they are, first and
foremost, officers of the court, bound to exert every effort to assist in the speedy and
efficient administration of justice.
PENA V. APARICIO
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obligation to tell the truth of the offenses he imputed against Pea. He also stated that
the writing of demand letters is standard practice.
SC ruled that Atty. Aparicios assertions are misleading because the fact of
the matter is, he used such threats to gain leverage against Pea and force the latter
to accede to his clients claims. The letter even implied a promise to keep silent
about the said violations if the claim is met.
While it is true that writing demand letters is standard practice in the
profession of law, such letters must not contain threats such as those found in this
case.
Nevertheless, SC held that disbarment is too severe a penalty considering
that Atty. Aparicio wrote the letter out of his overzealousness to protect his clients
interests. Therefore, the SC reprimanded him with a stern warning.
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oppositor Pacita V. de los Santos as not being entitled to recognition as there was a
general order of default except as to the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Forestry,
not lifted as to her, and that she had no interest to oppose the application of the
registration of her land, although admittedly there was a claim on her part under a
pasture lease agreement in her favor. Hence the plea for the order of dismissal being
set aside and plaintiff being allowed to present evidence. What purpose, it may
pertinently be asked, would be served thereby if, after the time-consuming effort, it
would clearly appear that plaintiff could not in truth show that there was such an open,
uninterrupted, peaceful and adverse possession in the concept of owner? Nor is it to
be forgotten that in the motion to dismiss of oppositor de los Santos, it was stated:
"That the son of applicant Luis Santiago, namely Juanito S. Santiago, was one time
the Lessee of the aforesaid timber area sought to be registered by him under Pasture
Lease Agreement No. 182 on April 18, 1955, which Lease Agreement was cancelled
by the Government on August 18, 1958 for failure of Lessee Santiago to make the
improvements and comply otherwise with the terms and conditions of the Lease
Contract; ... ." There was no denial of such allegation.
An admission made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by the party
making such admission and are conclusive as to him, and that all proofs submitted by
him contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith, should be ignored, whether objection is
interposed by the party or not.
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SESBRENO V. CA
Facts:
Atty. Sesbreno is the counsel of 52 employees who sued the province of
Cebu for reinstatement and back wages. They signed 2 documents whereby the
employees agreed to pay Atty. Sesbreno 30% as attorneys fees and 20% expenses
to be taken from their back salaries. The trial court rendered a decision in favor the
employees and fixed Atty. Sesbrenos attorneys fees at 40% of back salaries,
terminal leave, gratuity pay and retirement benefits and 20% as expenses, or a total
of 60% of all monies paid to the employees. The court later on modified the attorneys
fees to 50%. Atty. Sesbreno appealed to the CA, which decided that the attorneys
fees should be reduced to 20% of the back salaries awarded to the employees. Atty.
Sesbreno appeals to the SC on the ground that attorneys fees amounting to 50% of
all monies awarded to his clients as contingent fees should be upheld for being
consistent with prevailing case law and the contract of professional services between
the parties.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals had the authority to reduce the amount
of attorneys fees awarded to Atty. Sesbreno, notwithstanding the contract for
professional services signed by the client
Held:
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them by UST and the attorneys fees amounting to 4.2M which he deducted from the
benefits allotted to faculty members.
Issue:
Whether or not the 4.2M attorneys fees is proportionate to the legal services
rendered by Atty. Marino
Held:
No. The record does not show any justification for such huge amount of
compensation nor any clear differentiation between his legal services and his tasks
union president comprising in all probity the same duties for which he has collected a
hefty compensation as attorney for the union. Furthermore, there was lack of notice
and transparency in Atty. Marinos dual role a lawyer and president of UST Faculty
Union when he obtained 4.2M as attorneys fees. A simple accounting of the money
that he and others concerned received from UST, as well as an explanation on the
details of the agreements, would have enlightened the faculty members about the
probability of conflict of interests on respondents part and guided them to look for
alternative actions to protect their own interests. The objective of a disciplinary case is
not so much to punish the individual attorney as to protect the dispensation of justice
by sheltering the judiciary and the public from the misconduct or inefficiency of
officers of the court. Restorative justice not retribution is our goal in this type of
proceedings. In view of this, instead of taking a more stern measure against
respondent, a reprimand and a warning would be sufficient disciplinary action. Hence,
Atty. Mario is admonished to refrain from all appearances and acts of impropriety
including circumstances indicating conflict of interests, and to behave at all times with
circumspection and dedication befitting a member of the Bar, especially observing
candor, fairness and loyalty in all transactions with his client.
VINSON PINEDA V. ATTY. DE JESUS, ATTY. AMBROSIO AND ATTY. MARIANO
Facts:
Aurora Pineda filed for declaration of nullity of marriage against Vinson
Pineda. Aurora proposed a settlement regarding visitation rights and the separation of
properties which was accepted by Vinson. Settlement was approved by the trial court
and their marriage was declared null and void.
Throughout the proceedings the respondent counsels were compensated
but they still billed petitioner additional legal fees in amounting to P16.5M. Vinson
refused to pay the additional fees but instead paid P1.2M.
Respondents filed a complaint with the same trial court.
Trial court ordered Vinson to pay a total of P9M. CA reduced the amount to a
total of P2M.
Issues:
W/N the RTC had jurisdiction over the claim for additional legal fees?
W/N respondents were entitled to additional legal fees?
Held:
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recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, which includes shares of stocks in the named
corps. in PCGG Case No. 33 (CC No. 0033) entitled "RP vs. Eduardo Cojuangco, et
al."
Among the defendants named in the case are herein petitioners and herein
private respondent Raul S. Roco, who all were then partners of the law firm Angara,
Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz (ACCRA) Law Offices. ACCRA Law Firm
performed legal services for its clients and in the performance of these services, the
members of the law firm delivered to its client documents which substantiate the
client's equity holdings.
In the course of their dealings with their clients, the members of the law firm
acquire information relative to the assets of clients as well as their personal and
business circumstances. As members of the ACCRA Law Firm, petitioners and private
respondent Raul Roco admit that they assisted in the organization and acquisition of
the companies included in CC No. 0033, and in keeping with the office practice,
ACCRA lawyers acted as nominees-stockholders of the said corporations involved in
sequestration proceedings.
PCGG filed a "Motion to Admit 3rd Amended Complaint" & "3rd Amended
Complaint" w/c excluded Roco from the complaint in PCGG Case No. 33 as
partydefendant, Roco having promised hell reveal the identity of the principal/s for
whom he acted as nominee/stockholder in the companies involved in PCGG Case #
33.
Petitioners were included in 3rd Amended Complaint for having plotted,
devised, schemed, conspired & confederated w/each other in setting up, through the
use of coconut levy funds, the financial & corporate framework & structures that led to
establishment of UCPB, UNICOM, COCOLIFE, COCOMARK, CIC, & more than 20
other coconut levy funded corps, including the acquisition of San Miguel Corp. shares
& its institutionalization through presidential directives of the coconut monopoly.
Through insidious means & machinations, ACCRA Investments Corp., became the
holder of roughly 3.3% of the total outstanding capital stock of UCPB.
In their answer to the Expanded Amended Complaint, petitioners alleged
that their participation in the acts w/ w/c their co-defendants are charged, was in
furtherance of legitimate lawyering
Petitioner Paraja Hayudini, who had separated from ACCRA law firm, filed a
separate answer denying the allegations in the complaint implicating him in the
alleged ill-gotten wealth.
Petitioners then filed their "Comment &/or Opposition" w/ Counter-Motion
that PCGG exclude them as parties-defendants like Roco. PCGG set the ff.
precedent for the exclusion of petitioners:
(a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients;
(b) submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and
(c) the submission of the deeds of assignments petitioners executed in favor of its
clients covering their respective shareholdings.
Consequently, PCGG presented supposed proof to substantiate compliance
by Roco of the same conditions precedent. However, during said proceedings, Roco
didnt refute petitioners' contention that he did actually not reveal the identity of the
client involved in PCGG Case No. 33, nor had he undertaken to reveal the identity of
the client for whom he acted as nominee-stockholder.
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Court has a right to know that the client whose privileged information is
sought to be protected is flesh and blood.
Privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-client relationship has been
established.
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something illegal and consults his attorney. Whether or not the act for which the client
sought advice turns out to be illegal, his name cannot be used or disclosed if the
disclosure leads to evidence, not yet in the hands of the prosecution, which might
lead to possible action against him.
The Baird exception, applicable to the instant case, is consonant with the
principal policy behind the privilege, i.e., that for the purpose of promoting freedom of
consultation of legal advisors by clients, apprehension of compelled disclosure from
attorneys must be eliminated. What is sought to be avoided then is the exploitation of
the general rule in what may amount to a fishing expedition by the prosecution.
In fine, the crux of petitioner's objections ultimately hinges on their
expectation that if the prosecution has a case against their clients, the latter's case
should be built upon evidence painstakingly gathered by them from their own sources
and not from compelled testimony requiring them to reveal the name of their clients,
information which unavoidably reveals much about the nature of the transaction which
may or may not be illegal.
The utmost zeal given by Courts to the protection of the lawyer-client
confidentiality privilege and lawyer's loyalty to his client is evident in the duration of
the protection, which exists not only during the relationship, but extends even after
the termination of the relationship.
We have no choice but to uphold petitioners' right not to reveal the identity of
their clients under pain of the breach of fiduciary duty owing to their clients, as the
facts of the instant case clearly fall w/in recognized exceptions to the rule that the
client's name is not privileged information. Otherwise, it would expose the lawyers
themselves to possible litigation by their clients in view of the strict fiduciary
responsibility imposed on them in exercise of their duties.
IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPLAINT FOR DISBARMENT OF
ATTORNEY PALANCA:
WILLIAM PFLEIDER VS. ATTORNEY PALANCA
Facts:
Palanca was the legal counsel of Pfleider. Pfleider leased an agricultural
land to Palanca known as Hacienda Asia. Pfleider filed a civil suit against Palanca for
rescission of the lease contract for defaulting in rental payments. He also filed this
administrative complaint of gross misconduct against Palanca. Pfleider alleged that in
a criminal case for estafa filed against him in which Palanca was his counsel, the
latter sought to negotiate the dismissal of the complaint. Pfleider alleged that Palanca
informed him through letters that he had successfully negotiated the dismissal of the
complaint and that he had deposited P5k with the court.
Issue:
W/N Palanca was guilty of gross misconduct?
W/N the filing of the civil suit for the rescission of the lease contract
terminated the attorney-client relationship?
Held:
imported cars, shark loans and other shady deals and that he was also involved in
bribery cases.
Genato claimed that Atty. Silapan was guilty of breaking their confidential
lawyer-client relationship.
Issue:
Was Atty. Silapan guilty of the breach?
Held:
No. While Canon 17 provides that a lawyer shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed on him, especially with privileged communication the protection
is only limited to communications which are legitimately and properly within the scope
of a lawful employment of a lawyer. It does not extend to those made in contemplation
of a crime or perpetration of a fraud. Thus, here, the attorney-client privilege does not
attach, there being no professional employment in the strictest sense.
However, the disclosures were not indispensable to protect Atty. Silapans
rights as they were not pertinent to the case. It was improper for him to disclose those
information as they were not the subject matter of litigation at hand. His professional
competence and legal advice were not being attacked in the said case. A lawyer must
conduct himself with integrity.
He is therefore suspended for 6 months.
Issue:
W/N Vitriolo violated the rule on privileged communication between attorney
and client when he filed a criminal case against his former client?
Facts:
Held:
SC provided the factors which are essential to establish the existence of the
communication privilege between an attorney and his client.
There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective attorney-client
relationship, and it is by reason of this relationship that the client made the
communication.
The client made the communication in confidence.
The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in his professional
capacity.
SC ruled that in applying all there rules, the evidence on record fails to
substantiate Mercados allegations. Mercado did not even specify the alleged
communication. all her claims were couched in general terms and lacked specificity.
GENATO V. ATTY SILAPAN
Facts:
Atty. Silapan was leasing office space in Genatos building. Atty. Silapan
handled some of Genatos cases. After a while, Atty. Silapan borrowed money from
Genato to buy a car. Atty. Silapan bought the car, and issued a postdated check to
Genato. The check was dishonored.
Genato filed a case against Atty. Silapan under BP 22. In his defense, he
alleged that Genato was in the business of buying an selling deficiency taxed
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Hadjula claimed that she asked legal advice from her friend, Atty. Madianda.
She disclosed confidential information during that period. However, after the
confidential information was given by Hadjula, Atty. Madianda referred her to another
lawyer.
Hadjula filed a complaint against Atty. Madianda because of this, claiming
the lawyer just wanted to hear her secrets. In answering the complaint, Atty.
Madianda filed a counter complaint against Hadjula for falsification of public
documents and immorality using the disclosures as basis for the charges.
Issue: What is to become of Atty. Madianda?
Held:
Reprimanded.
The moment complainant approached the then receptive respondent to seek
legal advice, a veritable lawyer-client relationship evolved between the two. Atty.
Madianda should have kept the information secret and confidential, under the
attorney-client privilege rule.
However, the seriousness of the respondents offense notwithstanding, the
Court feels that there is room for compassion, absent compelling evidence that she
(Atty. Madianda) acted with ill-will. It appears that she was actuated by the urge to
retaliate without perhaps realizing that in the process of giving bent to a negative
sentiment, she was violating the rule of confidentiality.
The intent of the law is to impose upon the lawyer the duty to protect the clients
interests only on matters that he previously handled for the former client and not for
matters that arose after the lawyer-client relationship has terminated
Facts:
Palm is the president of Comtech, which hired Atty. Iledan as its retained
counsel. She filed a case of disbarment against Atty. Iledan for breach of the attorneyclient privilege and conflict of interests.
The basis of the claim of breach occurred during a meeting. Atty. Iledan
claimed that the stockholders meeting cannot take place via teleconferencing
because they have yet to amend the by-laws of the corporation to allow such mode of
communications. Palm claims this was a breach of the attorney-client privilege of
confidentiality.
The basis of the conflict of interests stemmed from Atty. Iledan being the
counsel of Soledad who was filed with an estafa case by Comtech.
Issue:
Was Atty. Iledan guilty of breach? How about conflict of interests?
Held:
No. Although the information about the necessity to amend the corporate bylaws may have been given to respondent, it could not be considered a confidential
information. The amendment, repeal or adoption of new by-laws may be effected by
the board of directors or trustees, by a majority vote thereof, and the owners of at
least a majority of the outstanding capital stock, or at least a majority of members of a
non-stock corporation.It means the stockholders are aware of the proposed
amendments to the by-laws. Further, whenever any amendment or adoption of new
by-laws is made, copies of the amendments or the new by-laws are filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and attached to the original articles of
incorporation and by-laws.The documents are public records and could not be
considered confidential.
It is settled that the mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a
presumption of confidentiality. The client must intend the communication to be
confidential. Since the proposed amendments must be approved by at least a
majority of the stockholders, and copies of the amended by-laws must be filed with
the SEC, the information could not have been intended to be confidential. Thus, the
disclosure made by respondent during the stockholders meeting could not be
considered a violation of his clients secrets and confidence within the contemplation
of Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The Court also finds no conflict of interest when respondent represented
Soledad in a case filed by Comtech. The case where respondent represents Soledad
is an Estafa case filed by Comtech against its former officer. There was nothing in
the records that would show that respondent used against Comtech any
confidential information acquired while he was still Comtechs retained
counsel. Further, respondent made the representation after the termination of his
retainer agreement with Comtech. A lawyers immutable duty to a former client does
not cover transactions that occurred beyond the lawyers employment with the client.
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CANON 22
WACK WACK GOLF V. CA, PETRONILO ARCANGEL AND ANTONINO
BERNARDO
Facts:
Wack-wack was in a labor case against Arcangel. During the pendency of
the case, Wack-wack wanted to change their counsel from Balcoff, Poblador and
Cruz to the Law Office of Juan Chudian.
During the hearing, neither Wack-wack nor their original counsels showed
up, so Arcangel was allowed to present his evidence without Wack-wack. The court
awarded judgment to Arcangel. The law firm of Chuidian then filed a petition to set
aside the judgment on the ground of misunderstanding. This petition was denied by
the lower court. Wack-wack assails the denial of the petition.
It has to be taken note of that the court did not know of the change of
counsel because Chudian only entered his appearance after the judgment was
rendered against Wack-wack.
Issue:
Was the trial court correct in denying the petition to set aside the judgment?
Held:
Yes. As such counsel of record, Balcoff, Poblador and Cruz must have
known that, its impending relief as counself for the defendant notwithstanding, it is still
under obligation to protect the clients interest until its final release from the
professional relationship with such client. The court could recognize no other
representation on behalf of the client except such counsel of record until a formal
substitution of attorney is effected.
Any agreement or arrangement such counsel of record and its client may
reach regarding the presentation of the clients case in court is purely their private
concern. Proceedings in court cannot be made to depend on them.
VENTEREZ V. ATTY COSME
Facts:
Venterez and friends hired Atty. Cosme as counsel for a land title dispute.
The court rule against Venterez and friends. They wanted to file a motion for
reconsideration but Atty. Cosme failed or refused to do so. Because of this, Venterez
was constrained to contract another lawyer to prepare the MR.
Atty. Cosme claims that the son of one of the complainants informed him
that he was withdrawing the case from him because he (the son) already engaged
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and Petition for review of the judgment of conviction. But after the filing, Atty
disappeared and was nowhere to be found.
Later, the complainants found out that their petitions were denied for being
filed out of time and for failure to pay the docket fees. The decision became final and
warrants of arrest were issued.
Atty argues that he had decided to withdraw as counsel. He wrote a letter to
one of the complainants giving them instructinos to sign and file with the Court the
Notice to Withdraw. But the complainant didnt file it with the court because they were
aware that it would be difficult to find another counsel.
Issue:
Is Atty guilty of negligence in handling the case?
Held:
Yes! 3 month suspension. Atty should have filed the notice of withdrawal
himself if he truly wanted to withdraw. At the very least, he should have informed the
court. For failure to do so, Atty was negligent. Atty was also negligent in filing the
petition out of time. eventually he would have known that the petition was denied but
still he failed to informe the convicts and return their calls.
One of the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who
undertakes to conduct an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its conclusion. He is
not at liberty to abandon it without reasonable cause. A lawyers right to withdraw from
a case before its final adjudication arises only from the clients written consent or from
a good cause.
After agreeing to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to both
cause and client, even if the client never paid any fee for the attorney-client
relationship. Lawyering is not a business; it is a profession in which duty of public
service, not money, is the primary consideration.
METROPOLITAN BANK V. CA
Facts:
Atty. handled several cases from 1974 to 1983 concerning the declaration of
nullity of certain deeds of sale. Pending resolution in the RTC, Atty filed a motion to
enter his charging lien equal to 25% of the market value of the litigated properties as
atty fees. The court granted and the attys lien was annotated on the TCTs. The
cases were later dismissed with prejudice at the instance of the plaintiffs therein. Thus
the Bank now had the TCTs in its name and the attys lien was carried over.
Atty. filed a motion to fix his Atty Fees based on quantum meruit. RTC
granted the motion and fixed the fees at 936K. CA affirmed.
Issue:
Is Atty. entitled to a charging lien? Is a separate suit necessary for
enforcement of the lien?
Held:
No! CA affirmed. Atty rightly commenced the action against both his clients
and the judgment debtors. However, at the instance of the petitioner himself, the
complaint against his clients was withdrawn on the ground that he had settled his
differences with them. He maintained the case against employers because,
according to him, the computation of the employees money claims should have been
based on the national and not the provincial wage rate. Thus, petitioner insists that
the respondents should be made liable for the difference.
Attys act in withdrawing the case against the employees and agreeing to
settle their dispute may be considered a waiver of his right to the lien.
Even if there was such a breach of the contract, he had waived his right to
claim against the respondents by accepting payment and/or absolving from liability
those who were primarily liable to him.
DORONILLA V. CA
Facts:
Heirs of Doronilla had a dispute with their counsel over his Atty Lien. The
RTC declared that Counsel was entitled to 10% of the shares of the heirs.
Counsel filed a motion to annotate attorney's lien on the title of parcels of
land of the estate which the heirs had inherited. The RTC granted the motion.
Issue:
Is the order of annotation proper?
Held:
No! An attorney's lien does not extend to land which is the subject matter of
the litigation.
Facts:
Atty. convinced his clients to appeal a case from the POEA to the SC. Atty
asked from complainants $2.5K which he said were to be used for payment of docket
fees and that the court could take cognizance of the case. Later, complainant
corporation came to know that the fees to be paid to the SC consisted only of nominal
fees for such kind of appeal. Atty in order to cover up presented complainant a fake
xerox copy of an alleged Supreme Court receipt representing payment of $2.5K.
A criminal case was filed for estafa. Atty was acquitted but was held civilly liable for
$2.5K.
Issue:
SESBRENO V. CA
Facts:
Atty was hired as counsel by some workers. They agreed that Atty would
take 30% of whatever they may recover. The trial court ordered reinstatement and
payment of backwages. The employer appealed the decision.
Pending appeal, the workers entered into a compromise agreement that they
waived their right to be reinstated with the agreement of payment of full backwages at
once. The court adopted the compromise and ordered the withholding of the payment
of 55% for the lien of the Atty. But instead of withholding, the employer directly paid
the workers in full. Thus Atty filed a complaint for collection against the employer and
employees.
Atty. moved to dismiss the case against the employees.
Later the trial court ordered payment of 669K by the employee. The CA reversed.
Issue:
Is the employer liable for the Attys fees?
Held:
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Held:
Yes disbarred! No, complaint shouldnt be dismissed. Administrative cases
against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may
proceed independently of civil and criminal cases. The burden of proof is clearly
preponderant evidence.
A finding of guilt in a criminal case or liability in a civil case will not
necessarily result in a finding of liability in the administrative case and vice versa.
Neither will a favorable disposition in the civil action absolve the administrative liability
of the lawyer. The basic premise is that criminal and civil cases are altogether
different from administrative matters, such that the disposition in the first two will not
inevitably govern the third and vice versa. Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers
are sui generis
Respondent's acts are more despicable. Not only did he misappropriate the
money entrusted to him; he also faked a reason to cajole his client to part with his
money. Worse, he had the gall to falsify an official receipt of this Court to cover up his
misdeeds. Clearly, he does not deserve to continue being a member of the bar.
Issues:
W/N counsel is guilty of misrepresentation? YES
W/N he is exempt from paying his dues? YES
Held:
Rule 139-A provides:
Sec. 9. Membership dues. - Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay
such annual dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the
Supreme Court. A fixed sum equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the collections from
each Chapter shall be set aside as a Welfare Fund for disabled members of the
Chapter and the compulsory heirs of deceased members thereof.
Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. - Subject to the provisions of
Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall
warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment
for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member
from the Roll of Attorneys.
In accordance with these provisions, respondent can engage in the practice
of law only by paying his dues, and it does not matter that his practice is "limited."
While it is true that R.A. No. 7432, 4 grants senior citizens "exemption from the
payment of individual income taxes: provided, that their annual taxable income does
not exceed the poverty level as determined by the National Economic and
Development Authority (NEDA) for that year," the exemption does not include
payment of membership or association dues.
Second. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby
misrepresenting to the public and the courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the
Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility
which provides:
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Issue:
W/N Laput should be disbarred for gross misconduct
ISSUE:
W/N Daarol should be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct.
Held:
Yes. The acts are inherently improper and censurable, more so considering
that they were performed by a man dealing with a 72-year-old woman. The offense is
compounded by the circumstance that, being a member of the BAR, the offender
should have set an example of a man of peace and champion of the Rule of Law.
Worse still is the fact that the offended party is the very person whom the offender
had pledged to defend and protect his client. He was suspended from the practice
of law for 1 year.
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HELD/RATIO:
YES. The fact of his previous marriage was disclosed by respondent only
after the complainant became pregnant. Even then, respondent misrepresented
himself as being eligible to re-marry for having been estranged from his wife for 16
years and dangled a marriage proposal on the assurance that he would work for the
annulment of his first marriage. It was a deception after all as it turned out that
respondent never bothered to annul said marriage.
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Sespreno was not the counsel anymore after finality of judgment adopting
the compromise agreement. The camineros moved for execution however, only 45%
of the amount due them was released because the court retained the 55%, holding it
was payment of the lawyers fees pending determination of such amount. However,
instead of complying with the court order directing partial payment, the province of
Cebu directly paid the camineros the full amount of their adjudicated claims.
Sesbreno now sues for Damages and Attorneys Fees against respondents
and his former clients. RTC ruled in favor of Sesbreno. The court further upheld the
petitioners status as a quasi-party considering that he had a registered charging
lien. CA reversed.
ISSUE:
W/N Atty. Sesbreno is entitled to Damages for breach of contract.
HELD/RATIO:
NO. The compromise agreement had been validly entered into by the
respondents and the camineros and the same became the basis of the judgment
rendered by this Court.
Petitioners claim for attorneys fees was evidenced by an agreement for
attorneys fees voluntarily executed by the camineros where the latter agreed to pay
the former thirty (30%) percent of whatever back salaries, damages, etc. that they
might recover in the mandamus and other cases that they were filing or have filed.
Clearly, no fixed amount was specifically provided for in their contract nor was a
specified rate agreed upon on how the money claims were to be computed. The use
of the word whatever shows that the basis for the computation would be the amount
that the court would award in favor of the camineros. Considering that the parties
agreed to a compromise, the payment would have to be based on the amount agreed
upon by them in the compromise agreement approved by the court.
To insure payment of his professional fees and reimbursement of his lawful
disbursements in keeping with his dignity as an officer of the court, the law creates in
favor of a lawyer a lien, not only upon the funds, documents and papers of his client
which have lawfully come into his possession until what is due him has been paid, but
also a lien upon all judgments for the payment of money and executions issued
pursuant to such judgments rendered in the case wherein his services have been
retained by the client.
A charging lien is an equitable right to have the fees and costs due to the
lawyer for services in a suit secured to him out of the judgment or recovery in that
particular suit. It is based on the natural equity that the plaintiff should not be allowed
to appropriate the whole of a judgment in his favor without paying thereout for the
services of his attorney in obtaining such judgment.
Lawyering is not a moneymaking venture and lawyers are not merchants.
Law advocacy is not capital that yields profits. The returns it births are simple
rewards for a job done or service rendered. It is a calling that, unlike mercantile
pursuits which enjoy a greater deal of freedom from governmental interference, is
impressed with a public interest, for which it is subject to state regulation.
Considering that petitioners claim of higher attorneys fees is baseless and
considering further that he had settled his case as against his former clients, SC did
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accused of his right to preliminary investigation but that he must first sign a waiver of
the provision of Art.125 of the RPC. Accused refused to execute such waiver. The
prosecutor filed an information for murder with no recommended bail and a
certification that no preliminary investigation was conducted because accused did not
sign a waiver of the provisions of Art.125 of the RPC. Counsel of accused however
later filed a motion for release and proper preliminary investigation. After the case
was raffled to the RTC, Judge Pelayo initially allowed the release of accused on a
cash bond and issued an order granting the leave to conduct preliminary
investigation. Later on however, Pelayo motu proprio issued an order recalling the
granting of bail and proceeded to trial. Accused and his counsel continuously
opposed this.
Held:
(Note: What is related to ethics is actually found in the concurring opinion of
Justice Gutierrez)
I am at a loss for reasons why an experienced Judge should insist on
proceeding to trial in a sensational murder case without a preliminary investigation
despite vigorous and continued objection and reservation of rights of the accused and
notwithstanding the recommendation of the prosecutor that said rights be respected
I agree with Justice Isagani Cruz that the trial court has apparently been moved by a
desire to cater to public opinion to the detriment of the impartial administration of
justice. Mass media has its duty to fearlessly but faithfully inform the public about
events and persons. However, when a case has received wide and sensational
publicity, the trial court should be doubly careful not only to be fair and impartial but
also to give the appearance of complete objectivity in its handling of the case.
SABITSANA V. VILLAMOR
Facts:
It was discovered that there were 87 cases undecided by respondent judge
beyond the 90-day reglementary period. The dismal state of the Courthouse of the
respondent judge which was described as bereft of any dignity as a court of law has
been noted. Judge Villamor however shifts the blame on his clerk of court, Atty.
Jocobo who he claims was inefficient in the management of the court records.
Also, in the case of theft by Lipango, Villamor designated Judge Pitao as
acting judge of the MCTC. Villamor warned Pitao to acquit Lipango because the case
was being backed up by someone powerful. He did this by sending a letter to Pitao
through Lipangos wife. However, Pitao still convicted Lipango because the evidence
of guilt was strong. When Pitao was away for some conference, he found out that
Villamor revoked his designation and appointed another as judge of the MCTC. And
finally, when the case was elevated to the RTC where Villamor was assigned he
acquitted Lipango.
Held:
Villamor violated Canon3 and Canon2
A judge sits not only to Judge litigated cases with the least possible delay
but that his responsibilities include being an effective manager of the Court and its
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DIMATULAC V. VILLON
Note: Ill skip the facts because its exhaustingly long and complicated (recall: Kenjies
40page case. Haha. Note, there are actually a lot of respondents but only Villon is
related to us). Basically, there was denial of due process.
Judge Villon --- Acting with deliberate dispatch, set the date of arraignment without
even perusing the records (otherwise he wouldve known among others, that there
was a motion to defer proceedings because of an appeal pending in the DOG, there
was an order giving petitioners 10days to file a petition with the CA, the filing of such
petition, order of the CA directing respondent accused to comment on the petition to
show cause why the application for a write of preliminary injunction should not be
grantedetc.,).
All the foregoing demanded from any impartial mind a cautious attitude as
these were unmistakable indicia of the probability of a miscarriage of justice should
arraignment be precipitately held. While it may be true that he was not bound to await
the DOJ's resolution of the appeal his judicial instinct should have led him to peruse
the documents to initially determine if indeed murder was the offense committed; or,
he could have directed the private prosecutor to secure a resolution on the appeal
within a specified time. Given the totality of circumstances, judge Villon should not
have merely acquiesced to the findings of the public prosecutor.
IMPORTANT: The judge "should always be imbued with a high sense of duty
and responsibility in the discharge of his obligation to promptly and properly
administer justice." He must view himself as a priest, for the administration of justice
is akin to a religious crusade. Thus, exerting the same devotion as a priest "in the
performance of the most sacred ceremonies of religious liturgy," the judge must
render service with impartiality commensurate with the public trust and confidence
reposed in him. Although the determination of a criminal case before a judge lies
within his exclusive jurisdiction and competence, his discretion is not unfettered, but
rather must be exercised within reasonable confines. The judge's action must not
impair the substantial rights of the accused, nor the right of the State and offended
party to due process of law.
CANON 2
FERNANDEZ V. HAMOY
Facts:
Despite the lapse of more than 10years, respondent judge failed to render
judgment in the case were complainant was counsel to plaintiff. After Hamoy was
transferred, complainant learned he brought the records of the case to his new
station. Hamoys excuse was that his utility aid mixed the records up and because the
dockets were congested with so many family-cases his court being the only family
court in the area. He also failed to comply with the directives of the OCA. Also, he
was able to collect his salary when he claimed in his certification that he had no
pending cases.
In the present case, the Court found totally unacceptable the temerity of the
respondent judge in subjecting herein complainants, his subordinates all, to his
unwelcome sexual advances and acts of lasciviousness. Not only do the actions of
respondent judge fall short of the exacting standards for members of the judiciary;
they stand no chance of satisfying the standards of decency even of society at large.
His severely abusive and outrageous acts, which are an affront to women,
unmistakably constitute sexual harassment because they necessarily ". . . result in an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for the employees. Let it be
remembered that respondent has moral ascendancy and authority over complainants,
who are mere employees of the court of which he is an officer. The Court concludes
with moral certainty that he acted beyond the bounds of decency, morality and
propriety and violated the Code of Judicial Conduct. The bench is not a place for
persons like him. His gross misconduct warrants his removal from office.
IN RE JUDGE MARCOS
Facts:
Two complaints were filed by Romeo T. Zacarias and a concerned citizen of
Gerona, Tarlac. These Complaints identically charged Judge Martonino R. Marcos
(Formerly of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Tarlac City) and Clerk of
Court Shirley M. Visaya (of the 5th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Gerona, Tarlac) with
immoral conduct and illegal solicitation from litigants. Zacarias alleged that, on two
occasions, Judge Marcos and Visaya tried to extort money from him in exchange for
a favorable decision in a criminal case against Zacarias and for his provisional
release. He further alleged that upon some inquiries, he was informed that the
respondent Judge does not approve bailbonds without bribe money and that the
respondents are engaged in an illicit love affair which is common knowledge to
municipal and court personnel and as well as to the people of Gerona.
Issue:
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RTC. Complainant averred that there was an undue delay in the rendition of judgment
in the criminal case, the decision, that had acquitted the accused Romeo Tan, having
been rendered only on the tenth month after the case was submitted for decision.
Respondent judge was also cited for impropriety by complainant because he was
often seen with Attorney Vic Agravante, counsel for the accused, whose vehicle
respondent judge would even use at times.
Issue:
LACHICA V. FLORDELIZA
Facts:
Ruling:
Dr. Amparo A. Lachica, the Municipal Health Officer of Jose Abad Santos,
Davao del Sur, charged the respondent, Judge Rolando A. Flordeliza of the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Jose Abad Santos-Sarangani, Davao del Sur, with abuse of
judicial position and intimidation, for allegedly compelling her to sign a death
certificate even though she was not the attending physician. According to Lachica,
during a party, Judge Flordeliza, who was drunk at that time, threatened to file an
administrative case against her if she will refuse to sign the death certificate.
Yes.
The Investigating Justice has seen impropriety on the part of respondent
judge in his close association with a counsel for a litigant.
The Court shares the view and disquisition of the Honorable
Justice. Judges, indeed, should be extra prudent in associating with litigants and
counsel appearing before them so as to avoid even a mere perception of possible
bias or partiality. It is not expected, of course, that judges should live in retirement or
seclusion from any social intercourse. Indeed, it may be desirable, for instance, that
they continue, time and work commitments permitting, to relate to members of the bar
in worthwhile endeavors and in such fields of interest, in general, as are in keeping
with the noble aims and objectives of the legal profession. In pending or prospective
litigations before them, however, judges should be scrupulously careful to avoid
anything that may tend to awaken the suspicion that their personal, social or sundry
relations could influence their objectivity, for not only must judges possess proficiency
in law but that also they must act and behave in such manner that would assure, with
great comfort, litigants and their counsel of the judges' competence, integrity and
independence. The respondent was ADMONISHED to constantly be circumspect in
his conduct and dealings with lawyers who have pending cases before him.
Issue:
Whether respondent-judge is guilty as charged of abuse of judicial position
and intimidation amounting to violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct
Ruling:
Yes. A judges official conduct should be free from the appearance of
impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the
performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond
reproach.
From all the foregoing, as well as the evidence on record, this Court is
convinced that the charge of misconduct against the respondent judge has been
established by substantial evidence, which is the quantum of proof required in
administrative cases. His undue interest in having complainant sign the Death
Certificate is highly questionable, to say the least. Further, his inebriated demeanor
and incoherent behavior during the festivities, as attested to by a witness is
reprehensible in a judge and should be subjected to disciplinary action. Respondent
was FINED in the amount of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS, with a stern
warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with
more severely.
SIBAYAN-JOAQUIN V. JAVELLANA
Facts:
Eliezer A. Sibayan-Joaquin charged Judge Roberto S. Javellana, acting
presiding judge of the RTC of San Carlos City, Branch 57, with grave misconduct in
the performance of official duties, graft and gross ignorance of the law. The complaint
was an offshoot of a case for estafa filed by Sibayan-Joaquin for and in behalf of
Andersons Group, Inc., against Romeo Tan before the San Carlos City
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SAMSON V. CABALLERO
Facts:
This is an administrative complaint for dishonesty and falsification of a public
document against respondent Judge Virgilio G. Caballero. Complainant Olga M.
Samson alleged that respondent Judge Virgilio G. Caballero should not have been
appointed to the judiciary for lack of the constitutional qualifications of proven
competence, integrity, probity and independence, and for violating the Rules of the
Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) which disqualifies from nomination any applicant for
judgeship with a pending administrative case.
According to the complainant, respondent, during his JBC interviews,
deliberately concealed the fact that he had pending administrative charges against
him. She disclosed that, on behalf of Community Rural Bank of Guimba (Nueva
Ecija), Inc., she had filed criminal and administrative charges for grave abuse of
authority, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and violation of Article
208 of the Revised Penal Code against respondent in the Office of the Ombudsman
on July 23, 2003.
Issue:
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despite respondents demands, petitioners failed to deliver the title of the lot,
prompting him to file with the RTC a complaint for specific performance and
damages. The trial court issued an order dismissing the complaint for improper
venue. Respondent then filed a motion for reconsideration with motion for inhibition
alleging partiality on the part of the presiding judge Hon. Pedro T. Santiago. CA
denied the motion for inhibition.
Whether the CA erred in denying the motion for inhibition
Ruling:
No. Suffice it to state that whether judges should inhibit themselves from a
case rests on their own "sound discretion." Otherwise stated, inhibition partakes of
voluntariness on the part of the judges themselves. This Court has to be shown acts
or conduct of the judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter
can be branded the stigma of being biased or partial. In a catena of cases, we held
that "bias and prejudice, to be considered valid reasons for the voluntary inhibition of
judges, must be proved with clear and convincing evidence. Bare allegations of
partiality and prejudgment will not suffice. These cannot be presumed, especially if
weighed against the sacred obligation of judges whose oaths of office require them to
administer justice without respect to person and to do equal right to the poor and the
rich." Here, petitioners merely alleged the arbitrary issuance of a temporary
restraining order without however showing bias or prejudice on the part of the trial
judge. In fact, the Court of Appeals held that "such error of the respondent judge does
not necessarily warrant his inhibition in the case."
PIMENTEL V. SALANGA
Facts:
Challenged here in an original petition for certiorari and/or prohibition is the
right of respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur (Branch IV) to sit
in judgment in cases where petitioner, a practicing attorney, appears as counsel.
Petitioner's misgivings stem from the fact that he is complainant in an
administrative case he himself lodged in this Court on May 12, 1967, against
respondent judge upon averments of "serious misconduct, inefficiency in office,
partiality, ignorance of the law and incompetence."
Petitioner moved in the court below to have respondent judge disqualify
himself from sitting in Civil Case 21-C, Criminal Cases 4898 and C-5, and Election
Case 2470 aforesaid. He there prayed that the records of those cases be transferred
to another sala.
Respondent judge rejected the foregoing motion. He stood his ground with
the statement that the administrative complaint against him is no cause for
disqualification under the Rules of Court
Issue:
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and inefficiency, gross negligence, gross ignorance of the law, gross misconduct,
and/or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
Moreover, Judge Bermejo did not resolve the three Motions for Execution and two
Motions to Require Defendants Counsel to Inform the Court the Date He Received a
Copy of the Judgment.
Dr. Montemayor also avers that Judge Bermejo prevented the transmittal of
the records of the case to the appellate court within 15 days from the perfection of the
appeal in violation of Section 6, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court. According to him, it
was only after the respondent Judge received the defendants supersedeas bond that
the former issued the Order dated May 5, 2003 directing the Branch Clerk of Court to
transmit the records of the case to the appellate court.
The respondent Judge maintains that he is not liable for delay in the
rendition of judgment. In essence, he argues that since the Order deeming the case
submitted for resolution was issued on September 23, 2002, the rendition of judgment
on October 10, 2002 was made within the mandatory 30-day period.
Issue:
Is the respondent judge guilty of delaying rendition of judgment and violating
the Code of Judicial Ethics? YES.
Held:
The reckoning point from which the mandatory period for rendition of
judgment should be computed is the receipt of the last affidavits and position papers
of the parties, or the expiration of the period for filing the same, as provided by the
Rules, not from the issuance of the order by the judge deeming the case submitted
for resolution. The reckoning point is fixed by law, not by the judge. A judge cannot by
himself choose to prolong the period for deciding cases beyond that authorized by the
law.
The records do not reveal when the parties received Judge Bermejos Order
requiring them to submit their respective affidavits and position papers. Assuming,
however, that the court received the defendants Position Paper on August 14, 2002,
as respondent Judge claims, judgment should have been rendered on September 13,
2002. Instead, the decision was dated October 10, 2002, or nearly a month after the
lapse of the mandatory period for rendition of judgment and almost two months from
the receipt of the defendants Position Paper. Plainly, Judge Bermejo is guilty of delay
and, thus, administratively liable.
Rule 1.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires judges to administer
justice without delay. Rule 3.05 of the same Code admonishes all judges to dispose
of the courts business promptly and decide cases within the required periods. The
failure to decide a case within the required period is not excusable, constitutes gross
inefficiency and is a ground for the imposition of administrative sanctions against the
defaulting judge.
The respondent Judge, however, can only offer feeble excuses for his
inaction on the plaintiffs Motions for Execution. He claims that the first Motion for
Execution prayed that hearing be set on a date that was not a motion day. Judge
Bermejo forgets that while the Rules of Court requires all motions to be scheduled for
hearing on Friday afternoons, or if Friday is a non-working day, in the afternoon of the
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Specifically, under Rule 2.01 of the Code, a judge should so behave at all times as to
promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. The
appearance of bias or prejudice can be as damaging to public confidence and the
administration of justice as actual bias or prejudice.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds respondent Judge Juan O. Bermejo, Jr. of
delay in the rendition of judgment in violation of Rules 1.02 and 3.05 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct for which he is fined the amount of P5,000.00. Respondent Judge is
also declared guilty of impropriety in violation of Canon 2 of said Code and is fined
the amount of P10,000.00.
OKTUBRE V. VELASCO
FACTS:
Oktubre is the administrator of Paler Building, owned by Peggy DArcy.
DArcy is the aunt-in-law of Judge Velasco.
Shortly after Velascos appointment to the MTC of Maasin, he asked DArcy
if he could reside at the Paler Building. He was initially allowed by DArcy however
when he sought an extension to stay thereat he was denied by DArcy. Nevertheless,
Judge Velasco was able to stay in the building albeit in another room.
Judge Velasco then sent letters to the tenants of the building declaring that
he was the lawful owner of the building and all rentals should be deposited by them at
his office in the MTC. He also sent a strongly worded letter using the MTCs
letterhead to DArcy asserting possession over the building.
Judge Velasco caused the removal of the buildings service jeep from its
garage. DArcy then instructed Oktubre to replace the vehicle in the building and to
take measures to ensure that the removal would not be repeated. Oktubre
successfully replaced the vehicle and removed one of its wheels and put it inside the
computer room of the building.
Thereafter, Judge Velasco caused the destruction and replacement of the
padlock to Oktubres room and the access gate to the third floor of the building.
Oktubre then filed a complaint against the judge in the Punong Baranggay.
Conciliation proceedings failed.
After the hearing, Oktubre was asked by a police officer to come with him to
the station at the chiefs request. Upon arrival, he was confronted with an arrest
warrant signed under authority by Judge Velasco in connection with the alleged
robbery of the jeepneys wheel and he was put behind bars pursuant thereto.
After obtaining his release he was again filed suit for malicious mischief and
falsification of documents again by Judge Velasco. All the complaints were supported
by the sole affidavit of Judge Velasco which he prosecuted using his Office.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Velasco is guilty of grave misconduct, grave abuse of
authority and gross ignorance of the law.
RULING:
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favor of the original owner and nullified the deed of sale in favor of the buyer who
claims to be a purchaser in good faith. CA affirmed.
[]
Hence, this petition for review where Juan C. Sandoval prays for the reversal
of the Court of Appeals decision. Two issues are presented for resolution. First,
petitioner contends that he was denied due process when the ponente of the decision
in the Court of Appeals, Justice Luis Victor, did not inhibit himself from the case
inasmuch as he was, for a time, the presiding judge in the court a quo trying the
case. Second, petitioner maintains that he is an innocent purchaser for value who
should not be held accountable for the fraud committed against private respondent
Tan, Jr.
Issue:
Whether or not the Justice who penned the assailed decision in the Court of
Appeals should have inhibited himself from taking part in the case.
Held:
In every instance the judge shall indicate the legal reason for inhibition.
A judges conduct should be above reproach and in the discharge of his
judicial duties he should be conscientious, studious, thorough, courteous, patient,
punctual, just, impartial, fearless of public clamour, and regardless of private influence
should administer justice according to law and should deal with the patronage of the
position as a public trust; and he should not allow outside matters or his private
interests to interfere with the prompt and proper performance of his office.
From the foregoing legal principles, we find no basis for Justice Victor to
inhibit himself from deciding the case. To be sure, as trial court judge, he presided
partly over the case below, heard part of plaintiffs evidence and ruled on motions.
The decision itself, however, was penned by another judge, the Honorable Lucas
Bersamin, who took over as presiding judge when then Judge Luis Victor was
promoted. Upon elevation to the Court of Appeals, the case was assigned to Justice
Victor as ponente.
The principle that approximates the situation obtaining herein is the
disqualification of a judge from deciding a case where his ruling in a lower court is
the subject of review or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling
or decision is the subject of review. Granted that Justice Victor presided partly over
the case in the court a quo, his was not the pen that finally rendered the decision
therein. Hence, he cannot be said to have been placed in a position where he had to
review his own decision as judge in the trial court. Accordingly, he was not legally
bound to inhibit himself from the case.
Nevertheless, Justice Victor should have been more prudent and
circumspect and declined to take on the case, owing to his earlier involvement in the
case. The Court has held that a judge should not handle a case in which he might be
perceived, rightly or wrongly, to be susceptible to bias and partiality, which axiom is
intended to preserve and promote public confidence in the integrity and respect for
the judiciary. While he is not legally required to decline from taking part in the case, it
is our considered view that his active participation in the case below constitutes a
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Complainant alleges that it is the plaintiff in a case pending before the RTC
presided over by respondent. Respondent issued an Order granting the application
for writ of preliminary attachment. An urgent motion to discharge and lift writ of
preliminary attachment was filed by defendants before the respondent and on the
same day, respondent issued an Order lifting the writ of preliminary attachment. Said
Order was issued sans proper notice and hearing as required by the Rules of Civil
Procedure. Respondent approved defendants counter-bond despite knowledge that
the bonding companys Supreme Court Clearance was not valid and the maximum
net retention of the bonding company had a deficiency. At a meeting in his house,
respondent asked Rafael King to match defendants offer to pay P250,000.00 so that
the Order of July 5, 2002 will be reconsidered formally if a motion for reconsideration
is filed by complainant. Respondents favorite hang-out is the karaoke music lounge
of Metropolis Hotel owned by herein complainant, and he uses said facilities "gratis et
amore."
Held:
We agree with the Investigating Justices finding that respondent is guilty of
gross ignorance of the law for not holding a full-blown hearing on the motion to lift
attachment and for violating the three-day notice rule.
Respondent acted with indecent haste in immediately holding a hearing on
the motion to lift attachment filed only a few minutes before said hearing, in
considering the same submitted for resolution, and in issuing the order lifting the writ
of preliminary attachment and approving the counter-bond, all on the same day
without giving complainant the opportunity to be heard on the matter.
It is has been oft repeated that judges cannot be held to account or answer
criminally, civilly or administratively for an erroneous judgment of decision rendered
by him in good faith, or in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption. However, it
has also been held that when the law violated is elementary, a judge is subject to
disciplinary action. The principles of due notice and hearing are so basic that
respondents inability to accord a litigant their right thereto cannot be excused. In this
case, we believe that respondents actuations reek of malice and bad faith. Thus, we
find respondent guilty of gross ignorance of the law for violating the three-day notice
rule and failing to give herein complainant due notice and the opportunity to be heard
on the matter
As to the matter of the approval of the counter-bond, respondent utterly
failed to exercise due care in examining the supporting papers. The respondent
should know the basic requirements before approving a surety bond or a judicial bond
such as counter-bond.
It is indeed grossly improper for respondent to meet with a litigant at his
home and to frequent the karaoke bar owned by such litigant, enjoying the use
thereof for free. Respondent thereby received benefits from a litigant appearing in his
court. Respondents defense that his wife offered to pay but the management of the
karaoke bar did not allow her to do so, is feeble. The testimonies of the waiters at
said bar are quite clear that respondents wife would sign the order slips, but no
payment was ever given by respondent or his wife. Respondent should have insisted
on paying, especially considering that complainant has a total of three cases pending
before his court. By entertaining a litigant in his home and receiving benefits given by
nearly a month, leading Centrum to fear that respondent judge would welsh on her
undertaking to increase the awards in its favour.
On rendering an unjust interlocutory order and gross ignorance of the law,
the court finds the judges errors in this case to be grossly inexcusable. The judge
violated certain provisions in the rules of court applicable to ejectment proceedings.
Facts:
Petitioner Centrum filed a complaint with the MTCC for ejectment of several
stores leasing its building (JVLS Building). Centrum bought this property from JVLS
Co. Inc., but the tenants refused to pay rent to Centrum (These tenants on the other
hand sued JVLS to enforce their right of first option). MTCC ruled for Centrum,
ordered the tenants to pay rent covering 53 months + interests.
The tenants appealed this decision to RTC where respondent is the
presiding judge. In that appeal, Centrum moved for the execution of the MTCC
decision, but respondent refused. The tenants moved for 30 days within which to file
their supplemental memorandum, which the judge granted, but limited the period to
10 days. Centrum urged for the early resolution of the case, but the judge said that
Centrums motion was already moot and academic, but she wanted to give the
tenants a chance to file their memorandum (meaning a ruling was already made).
The judge on July 13 released the decision in favour of Centrum, but with
different rental rates (higher, in favour of Centrum). This decision was dated June 15.
In the present administrative case against respondent judge, Centrum
charged her with 1. Corrupt acts and practices, gross dishonesty, serious misconduct;
2. Knowingly rendering an unjust interlocutory order; 3. Gross ignorance of the law.
Centrum states that not only were the amounts in the decision substantially
increased, it also disclosed that it had received a duplicate copy of the decision even
before it was promulgated, signed by the respondent. Judge claimed she was
innocent and had no idea how Centrum got a copy. Centrum also alleges that the
judge unjustly denied its motion for execution.
Held:
Judge Rizalina Capco-Umali (petitioner) charged Judge Paulita AcostaVillarante (respondent) with violation of Canon 4.
The petitioner and other judges made a courtesy call to the Mayor of
Mandaluyong and they talked about local allowance of judges. The Mayor noticed the
disparity in the amounts received (respondent was receiving more, compared to
petitioner and other judges). So the Mayor ordered that the allowance received by
respondent be reverted to the previous rates.
During the first ever monthly meetingof RTC judges, what happened in the
courtesy call was reported. Angered, respondent yelled accusations of paninira at the
Executive judge (she was there during the courtesy call and was presiding over the
meeting). Petitioner, also present at the meeting, felt that she had to rescue the
executive judge and explained what happened. This time, respondent yelled at
petitioner, called her sinungaling and told petitioner to stop talking because
nakakahiwa boses mo. Petitioner yelled back, matanda ka na, malapit ka na sa
kamatayan gumagawa ka pa ng ganyan, madadamay pa kami, to which the
respondent answered that she was ready to die any moment because she did no
wrong. Basically, they had a screaming match until they were pacified.
Judge Villarante then wrote a Memorandum addressed to Executive Judge
of the Mandaluyong RTC, copies of which were furnished to the Justices of the SC,
JBC, other judges of Mandaluyong, its Congressman, and prosecutor. The memo
suggested that the holding of monthly meeting of judges be suspended, considering
what transpired. Petitioner filed a complaint for libel based on the memorandum. In
causing the circulation of the memorandum, respondent claimed that it was her
obligation to bring to the attention of concerned officials the personal demeanor of
petitioner that would put the judiciary in public scrutiny and disrespect.
Held:
Both judges are fined (11,000 for petitioner, 16,000 for respondent) and
given a stern warning for having violated Sec 1, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct
Courts are looked upon by the people with high respect. Misbehavior by
judges and employees necessarily diminishes their dignity. Any fighting or
misunderstanding is a disgraceful occurrence reflecting adversely on the image of the
Judiciary. By fighting, respondent judges failed to observe the proper decorum
expected of members of the Judiciary. More detestable is the fact that their squabble
arose out of a mere allowance coming from the local government.
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secure an authorization to engage in the practice of law only shows that he is aware
of the prohibition.
Moreover, he should not permit the law firm to still carry his name. By
allowing the firm to do so, he held himself in public as a lawyer, in violation of the
rules and norms of judicial ethics.
CONCERNED LAWYERS OF BULACAN V. PRESIDING JUDGE PORNILLOS
(Judge dismissed for borrowing money from lawyers with pending cases before her)
Facts:
Complainants charged Judge Pornillos for, among others, the violation of the
Canons of Judicial Conduct for borrowing money from her staff and lawyers in
amounts ranging from P500-P5k. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) made
an investigation and found that such attaches no administrative liability (since they
were already paid or waived by the creditors and were obtained 19 years ago).
Issue:
W/N Judge Pornillos should be held administratively liable.
Facts:
Complainant Atty. Binalay filed this administrative case against Judge Lelina,
Jr. for violating Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and Canon 4 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct (both are with regard to prohibition on judges in the private practice
of law).
Respondent judge is preventively suspended for being charged with rape,
abduction with rape and slight illegal detention. While still under suspension, the
judge filed a manifestation for the court to grant him the permission to practice law
during the remainder of his preventive suspension, or if such cannot be granted, to
consider him resigned from the judiciary.
It turned out, however, that even before he filed this manifestation, he had
already engaged in the private practice of law representing 2 persons in a criminal
case, and one in a civil case, all of which are still pending. All pleadings in those
cases were signed by him, as a partner of the Bartolome Lelina Calimag Densing &
Associates Law Offices.
In the meantime, the office of court administrator directed respondent to
desist from engaging in the practice of law pending the courts resolution of his
manifestation.
In his comment, the judge argues that the prohibition to engage in practice of
law applies only to judges who are in the active service and should not cover those
under suspension. He also said he was forced to practice law due to his
impoverished life and because of the continuing sufferings of his wife and children.
Held:
Judge is suspended and sternly warned.
By being merely suspended, judge remains to bound by the prohibition to
practice law. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos ditinguire debemos. Law does not make a
distinction between a suspended judge and an active judge. The fact that he tried to
Held:
Yes. Judge Pornillos was dismissed from the service for gross misconduct
(aggravated by undue delay in rendering decisions and violation of SC rules). Under
the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil service, borrowing money by
superior officers from subordinates is a violation punishable by reprimand,
suspension, and dismissal from service. At the very least, she should be admonished
for dealing with her subordinates in an improper manner.
More severely prohibited is borrowing money or property from lawyers and
litigants in case pending before the court (a serious charge under Sec. 8, Rule 140 of
ROC). Under Canon 5 of the Code of Judicial Conduct (the old one), a judge shall
refrain from financial and business dealings that tend to reflect adversely on the
courts impartiality, interfere with the proper performance of judicial activities, or
increase involvement with lawyers or persons likely to come before the court.
LIHAYLIHAY V. JUDGE ALEJANDRO CANDA
Facts:
Petitioner filed a complaint against Judge Canda for the ff. acts:
Threatening her through text message that she would be in trouble (because he
thought she was supporting an applicant for sheriff which he opposed)
Filing admin. complaints and criminal cases to harass her
Describing her as a GRO, undignified, a whore, disgusting, repulsive,
pakialamera, offensive, etc. (in a letter he wrote to the Executive Judge after he found
out she ad him blotted with the police because of the text threat)
Publishing such remarks in a newspaper
Issue:
W/N Judge Canda is guilty of gross misconduct
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Justice Hofilena
FACTS
Held:
YES. He is suspended from the practice of law indefinitely. The New Code
of Judicial Conduct provides that confidential information* acquired by justices and
judges in their official capacity shall not be used or disclosed for any other purposes
not related to their judicial duties.
*Information not yet made public concerning the work of any justice or judge
relating to pending cases.
CANONS 5 & 6
REPUBLIC V. CAGUIOA
Consolidation of 3 cases against respondent
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Justice Hofilena
HELD:
YES! Adopt findings of the CA. Caguioa Dismissed from service + forfeiture
of retirement benefits except leave credits.
RATIO:
Gross Ignorance of the Law
Judge Caguioa issued the Writs of Preliminary Injunction that did not satisfy
the legal requisites for its issuance, and which was enforced outside of his territorial
jurisdiction. In the former, the applicants of the Writ showed no clear and
5 RA 9334
The Constitution mandates that all cases or matters filed before all lower
courts shall be decided or resolved within 90 days from the time the case is submitted
for decision. Peralta ignored this mandate. Failure to comply within the mandated
period constitutes a serious violation of the constitutional right of the parties to a
speedy disposition of their cases.
For more than a year, Peralta failed to resolve several motions the motion
to dismiss appeal and for issuance of writ of execution as well as the three motions to
resolve, and didnt offer any reason or justification on why it took him more than a
year to resolve the motions. He thus violated the New Code of Judicial Conduct which
requires judges to dispose of the courts business promptly and decide cases within
the required periods. A judges failure to resolve motions and incidents within the
prescribed period of three months as gross inefficiency for it undermines the peoples
faith and confidence in the judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it to disrepute.
BACULI V. BELEN
Baculi, a Provincial Prosecutor, filed an Information against a personaccused for frustrated homicide. Belen, a RTC Judge, directed Baculi to submit
evidence that the notice of preliminary investigation was duly served and received by
such person. After a series of pleadings filed by Baculi, Belen directed the former why
he should not be cited for tempt of court for making unfounded statements in his
pleadings. No such reason was given, thus Belen found Baculi guilty of direct
contempt for making scurrilous (vulgar) and contumacious (rebellious) statements in
one of the latter's Motions, and subsequently for indirect contempt. Baculi moved that
such order be set aside, but was denied by Belen, stating that such Decisions are
final and executory. Therefore, Baculi filed a complaint against Belen, denying the
claims against him, and added that Belen was induced by revenge because it was
Baculi who indicted him in a previous libel case against him, and that Belen had a
'power complex'.
ISSUE:
W/N Belen is guilty of gross ignorance of the law for citing Baculi in indirect
contempt.
HELD:
YES! Suspended for 6 months + Stern warning.
ISSUE/S:
W/N Peralta is liable for inefficiency and undue delay in rendering a decision
or order.
HELD:
YES! FINED + Sternly Warned.
RATIO:
Delivery of Decisions with Reasonable Promptness
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Justice Hofilena
RATIO:
Gross Ignorance of the Law
Indirect contempt is any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to
impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice. The scurrilous and
contumacious statements constitute direct contempt because it is equivalent to
misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt
the administration of justice. But such is not the reason for indirect contempt. And
even if such statements were considered as indirect contempt, Belen did not follow
deciding cases beyond that authorized by law. If a judge needs more time to decide a
case, he should formally request the SC for an extension of the deadline.
Failure to apply elementary rules of procedure constitutes gross ignorance of
the law and procedure. Lack of malice or good faith will not exonerate Nacional
because the rules violated were basic procedural law. All he had to do was apply
them, but he chose not to. It is settled that one who accepts the position of judge
owes the public and the court the ability o be proficient in the law and the duty to
maintain the professional competence at all times. Competence and diligence are
prerequisites to the due performance of judicial office. (Note: length of service does
not mitigate administrative penalty)
Facts:
CANEDA V. MENCHAVEZ
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Justice Hofilena
Facts:
Complainant Atty. Caneda is counsel for defendant Virginia Guzman, in Civil
Case Roberto Borromeo v. Heirs of Juan Borromeo, for judicial partition pending with
Judge Mechanvezs sala.
During the Dec. 14, 2005 hearing of said partition case, the motion to
segregate the inheritance shares of one of the plaintiffs, Roberto Borromeo was due
to be taken up. During the hearing, the defendants agreed to a partition subject to
plaintiffs withdrawal of a motion for reconsideration it filed before the SC to clear one
of the areas (subject to partition) of squatters. Because the plaintiff could not withdraw
the MR before the SC, Atty. Caneda suggested mediation. Judge Menchavez blurted
out never mind mediation, walay hinundan na.
When Judge Menchavez checked on the progress of the case, Atty. Caneda
remarked it was being delayed because no proper summons had been served on the
defendants who were residing outside the country. Menchavez reacted angrily and
banged his gavel & shouted I said no publication period. Afterwards, Menchavez
slammed the table with his hand and went inside his chambers. Afterwards, Judge
Menchavez came back with a holstered handgun and smashed it on the table, as he
angrily shouted at Atty. Caneda Unsay gusto nimo? Yawa! Gahig ulo!
Atty. Caneda filed a complaint against Judge Menchavez alleging that the
Judges act of challenging him inside the courtroom in the presence of many people
was improper
Issue:
W/N Judge Menchavez should be held liable
Held:
Yes, Judge Menchavez overstepped the norms of propriety demanded of a
member of the bench by losing his cool and uttering intemperate language during the
hearing.
In the courtroom, a lawyer makes submissions before a judge whose role is
to hear and consider the submissions, and subsequently rule on the matter. It is not a
situation where two equals, such as the opposing counsels, argue against each other.
Menchavez should have coolly ruled and allowed counsel to respond to his ruling
instead of proceeding in a manner that invited further arguments. Atty. Caneda also
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Justice Hofilena
Yes, Judge Dilag is dismissed from service, with forfeiture of all retirement
benefits, excluding accrued leave benefits and disqualification from reinstatement or
appointment to any public office.
A judge is the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence to uphold and
maintain public confidence in the legal system. Thus, while he is expected to keep
abreast of developments in law and jurisprudence, he is presumed to have more than
a cursory knowledge of the rules of procedure (Eg. taking cognizance of a second
petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity when Dilag
had already dismissed with prejudice the first petition involving the same parties,
issues, and causes of action with that of the first petition). Not every error is indicative
of ignorance, for if committed in good faith, no administrative sanction is imposed.
Good faith, however, inheres only within the parameters of tolerable judgment. It does
not apply where the issues are so simple and the applicable legal procedures evident
and basic as to be beyond possible margins of error. In the case at bench, Dilag failed
to follow basic legal procedures which are not excusable but renders him
administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law and procedure (During
questioning, Dilag said that re-filing is allowed in a dismissal with or without prejudice.
Also, he deiced a case even before the submission of the City Prosecutor relative to
the investigation to determine collusion between the parties as required under Sec. 9
of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages)
Dilag was charged with gross ignorance of the law. However, to warrant a
finding of gross ignorance of the law, the error must be so gross and patent as to
produce an inference of bad faith. The acts complained of must not only be contrary
to existing law and jurisprudence, but were also motivated by bad faith, fraud,
dishonesty, and corruption. For to hold a judge administratively accountable for ever
erroneous order or decision he renders would be intolerable. In the case at bar, there
was no allegation whatsoever that Dilag was motivated by bad faith, malice or
corruption when he issued the premature warrant of arrest. Be that as it may, the
Court holds him administratively liable for his unfamiliarity with the rules on the
conduct of prelim investigations. Judges should be conversant with basic legal norms
and precepts as well as with the statutes and procedural rules. They are expected to
follow developments in the law and to apply them. Having accepted the exalted
position of a judge, whereby he judges his fellowmen, the judge owes it to the public
who depend on him, and to the dignity of the court he sits in, to be proficient in the
law. Thus, the Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judge to be faithful to the law and
be the embodiment of professional competence.