1 SPOUSES RICARDO PASCUAL and CONSOLACION SIOSON

v. CA
G.R. No. 115925, August 15, 2003
FACTS: Petitioner Consolacion Sioson and respondent Remedios S.
Eugenio-Gino are the niece and granddaughter, respectively, of the
late Canuto Sioson. Canuto and
11 other individuals, including
his sister Catalina and his brother Victoriano, were co-owners of a
parcel of land.On November 20, 1951, Canuto had Lot 2 surveyed
and subdivided into eight lots. Lot 2-A and Lot 2-E were placed
under Canutos name. Three other individuals took the remaining
lots.
On September 26, 1956, Canuto and Consolacion executed a
Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan. Under the Kasulatan, Canuto sold
his 10/70 share in Lot 2 in favor of Consolacion for P2,
250.00. The Kasulatan was duly notarized. Consolacion
immediately took possession of Lots 2-A and 2-E. She later declared
the land for taxation purposes and paid the corresponding real
estate taxes.On October 23, 1968, the surviving children of Canuto
executed an affidavit affirming the Kasulatan in favor of
Consolacion. They also attested that the lots their father had sold
to Consolacion were Lots 2-A and 2-E.
The Register of Deeds issued a transfer of certificate to
Consolacion. On February 4, 1988, Remedios filed a complaint
against Consolacion and her spouse Ricardo Pascual for the
annulment or cancellation of TCT and damages. Remedios
claimed that she is the owner of the lots sold by Canuto to
Consolacion because Catalina devised these lots to her in
Catalinas last will and testament dated May 29, 1964.
Remedios added that Consolacion obtained title to these lots
through fraudulent means. On the other hand, the petitioners
sought to dismiss the complaint on the ground of prescription.
The trial court rendered judgment dismissing the case and ordering
Remedios to pay petitioners. The complaint filed by Remedios had
already prescribed. The trial court further ruled that Remedios has
no right of action against petitioners because Catalinas
last will from which Remedios claims to derive her title has
not been admitted to probate.
ISSUE: Whether or not the will of the deceased should be probated
first before the rights of the parties to the case can be ascertained

HELD: Yes. The probation of the will is essential in order for

Remedios to have a cause of action against petitioners.
Article 838 of the Civil Code states that [N]o will shall pass either
real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in
accordance with the Rules of Court. Thus, until admitted to
probate, a will has no effect whatever and no right can be
claimed thereunder. And since the probate court has not
admitted Catalinas last will, Remedios has not acquired any right
under the Last Will. Remedios is thus without any cause of
action either to seek reconveyance of Lots 2-A and 2-E or to
enforce an implied trust over these lots.
2 Union Bank v. Santibaez
Facts:

First Country Credit Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim M.

Santibanez entered into two loan agreements for the
payment of the purchase price of 2 units of tractors. In
view of this, Efraim and his son, Edmund executed a
promissory note in favor of FCCC.
Efraim died leaving a holographic will. Subsequently
testate proceedings were commenced before the RTC of
Iloilo with Edmund being appointed as the special
administrator of the estate of the testator.
During the pendency of the testate proceedings, Edmund
and his sister, Florence Santibanez Ariola, executed
a joint agreement wherein they agreed to divide
between themselves and take possession of the 3
tractors; 2 for Edmund and 1 for Florence, each of
them to assume indebtedness of their late father to
FCCC.
A deed of assignment with assumption of liabilities was
executed by and between FCCC and Union Savings and
Mortgage Bank, wherein FCCC as the assignor, assigned all
its assets and liabilities to Union Savings and Mortgage
Bank.
Demand letters for the settlement of the account were
sent by Union Bank to Edmund but the latter refused to
pay. Thus Union Bank filed a complaint for sum of money
against Edmund and Florence before the RTC of Makati.
However the case was dismissed. The lower court said
that the claim should have been filed with the

probate court were the testate estate of Efraim was

pending.
Issues:
WON the partition in the Agreement executed by the heirs is valid.
-

No, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until

after the will has been probated by the probate court.
This is especially because when the joint agreement
executed by Edmund and Florence partitioning the
tractors among themselves were executed, there was
already a pending proceeding for the probate of their late
fathers holographic will covering the said tractors. Thus
the probate court had already acquired jurisdiction over
the said tractors which they cant be divested of. Any
extrajudicial agreement needs court approval.

the assumption of the indebtedness of the decedent by Edmund

and Florence is not binding. Such assumption was conditioned
upon the agreement above. Hence, when the agreement of
partition between Edmund and Florence was invalidated, the
assumption of the indebtedness cannot be given force and effect.
WON the Union Bank can hold the heirs liable on the obligation of
the deceased.

No, Union Bank cannot hold the heirs liable on the obligation of
the deceased because it had not sufficiently shown that it is the
successor-in-interest of the Union Savings and Mortgage Bank to
which the FCCC assigned its assets and liabilities. Furthermore,
the documentary evidence clearly reflects that the parties in the
deed of assignment with assumption of liabilities were the FCCC,
and the Union Savings and Mortgage Bank, with the conformity of
Bancom Philippine Holdings, Inc. Nowhere can the participation
therein of Union Bank as a party can be found. As a result, Union
Bank has no personality to file the complaint and
therefore cannot hold the heirs liable for the obligation of
the deceased.
3 G.R. Nos. 140371-72 Preterition November 27, 2006
DY YIENG SEANGIO, BARBARA D. SEANGIO and VIRGINIA D.
SEANGIO,Petitioners,v. HON. AMOR A. REYES, in her capacity
as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, National Capital
Judicial Region, Branch 21, Manila, ALFREDO D. SEANGIO,

ALBERTO D.SEANGIO, ELISA D. SEANGIO-SANTOS, VICTOR D.

SEANGIO, ALFONSO D. SEANGIO,SHIRLEY D. SEANGIO-LIM,
BETTY D. SEANGIO-OBAS and JAMES D.
SEANGIO,Respondents.
Facts:
Private respondents, Alfredo Seangio et. al. filed for the
settlement of the intestate estate of the late Segundo
Seangio. Petitioners opposed said petition, contending that
Segundo left a holographic will disinheriting Alfredo for
cause. The reason for the disinheritance was due to Alfredos
maltreatment to his father Segundo. In view of the purported
holographic will, petitioners averred that in the event the decedent
is found to have a will, the intestate proceedings are to be
automatically suspended and replaced by the proceedings
of the will. Private respondents moved for the dismissal of the
probate proceedings contending that the alleged will of Segundo
does not contain any disposition of the estate of the deceased and
that all other compulsory heirs were not named nor instituted as
heir. Devisee or legatee hence there is preterition which
would result to intestacy. Petitioners countered that the rule on
preterition does not apply because Segundos will does not
constitute a universal heir or heirs to the exclusion of one or more
compulsory heirs. They argued that the testator intended all his
compulsory heirs, petitioners and private respondents alike, with
the sole exception of Alfredo, to inherit his estate.
Issue: Whether or not the compulsory heirs in the direct line were
preterited in the will.
Ruling:
No. The compulsory heirs in the direct line were not
preterited in the will. According to the Supreme Court, it was
Segundos last expression to bequeath his estate to all his
compulsory heirs with the sole exception of Alfredo. Also,
Segundo did not institute an heir to the exclusion of his other
compulsory heirs. The mere mention of the name of one of
the petitioners, Virginia, in the document did not operate to
institute her as the universal heir. Her name was included only
as a witness to the altercation between Segundo and his son,
Alfredo
4 TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ADRIANA MALOTO, ALDINA
MALOTO CASIANO, CONSTANCIO MALOTO, PURIFICACION
MIRAFLOR, ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH OF MOLO, AND ASILO
DE MOLO, vs. CA, PANFILO AND FELINO MALOTO
On October 20, 1963, Adriana Maloto died leaving as heirs her
niece and nephews. Believing that Adriana not leave behind a
will, these four heirs commenced on November 4, 1963 an

intestate proceeding for the settlement of their aunt's

estate.
On February 1, 1964, while the case was still in progress, the 4
heirs executed an agreement of extrajudicial settlement of
Adriana's estate dividing the estate into four equal parts. The
trial court approved on March 21, 1964.
March 1967, Atty. Palma discovered a Will dated January
3,1940. While Panfilo and Felino are still named as heirs in
the said will, Aldina and Constancio have much bigger and
more valuable shares than in the extrajudicial settlement.
The will also gives devises and legacies to Asilo de Molo, the Roman
Catholic Church of Molo, and Purificacion Miraflor.
On May 24, 1967, Aldina and Constancio, joined by the other
petitioners named in the will, filed motion for reconsideration and
annulment of the previous proceedings and for allowance of the
will. The trial court denied their motion, CA ruled that animus
revocandi in the destruction of the will had been sufficiently proven.
ISSUE: whether or not the will was revoked by Adriana.
HELD: Citing Art. 830. (3) -the physical act of destruction of a
will, like burning in this case, does not per se constitute an
effective revocation, unless the destruction is coupled with
animus revocandi on the part of the testator. It may be
performed by another person but under the express direction and
in the presence of the testator.
The document or papers burned by Adriana's maid, Guadalupe, was
not satisfactorily established to be a will at all. the burning was
not proven to have been done under the express direction
of Adriana, the burning was not in her presence. Both
witnesses, Guadalupe and Eladio (both illiterates- only hearsay
knowledge that it was a will), stated that they were the only ones
present as the papers were burned.
Respondents argue petitioners are barred by res adjudicata. For a
judgment to be a bar to a subsequent case, the following requisites
must concur: (1) the presence of a final former judgment; (2) the
former judgment was rendered by a court having jurisdiction over
the subject matter and the parties; (3) the former judgment is a
judgment on the merits; and (4) there is, between the first and the
second action, Identity of parties, of subject matter, and of cause of
action.
1)There is no final judgment rendered insofar as the probate
of Adriana Maloto's will is concerned. The decision of the trial
court in Special Proceeding No. 1736, involved only the intestate
settlement. As such, that judgment could not in any manner be
construed to be final with respect to the probate of the
subsequently discovered will of the decedent. 2)There was no
judgment on the merits of the action for probate. 3)This is

understandably so because the trial court, in the intestate

proceeding, was without jurisdiction to rule on the probate
of the contested will. 4)There is no Identity between the cause of
action in intestate proceeding and that in an action for probate.
Judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING and SETTING ASIDE the
Decision of the CA and a new one ENTERED for the allowance of
Adriana Maloto's last will and testament.
5 GRIMM ROBERTS V. JUDGE LEONIDAS
*Rule 75 - Production and Allowance of Will
FACTS:
Edward Grimm an American resident of Manila died and was
survived by his second wife Maxine and their two children
(Pete and Linda) and by two other children from the first marriage
(Juanita and Ethel). Edward executed 2 wills. One will disposed of
his Philippine estate which was conjugal and the second will
disposed of his property outside the Philippines.
In both wills, the second family was favoured and the two
children from the previous marriage were given their legitimes from
the will for the Philippine estate only.
Maxine presented the two wills and a codicil for probate in
the Third Judicial District Court of Utah. In its order dated April 10,
1978, the Third Judicial District Court admitted to probate the two
wills and the codicil. But Maxine admits that she received a
notice of the intestate petition filed in Manila by Ethel.
Hence, Two weeks later, Maxine, as the first party, and Ethel as the
second party, with knowledge of the intestate proceeding in Manila,
entered into a compromise agreement in Utah regarding
the estate which designated Maxine, Pete and Ethel as
administrators of the Philippine estate.
However, at Intestate proceeding No. 113024.-At this juncture, it
should be stated that forty- three days after Grimm's death,
his daughter of the first marriage, Ethel, filed with the
Court of First Instance intestate proceeding No. 113024 for
the settlement of his estate. She was named special administratrix.
Maxine, filed an opposition and motion to dismiss the
intestate proceeding on the ground of the pendency of Utah
of a proceeding for the probate of Grimm's will. She also
moved that she be appointed special administratrix.
However, the intestate court in its orders noted that Maxine,
through a new lawyer, withdrew that opposition and motion to

dismiss and, at the behest of Maxine, Ethel and Pete, appointed

them joint administrators. Apparently, this was done pursuant to
the aforementioned Utah compromise agreement. The court
ignored the will already found in the record.
The three administrators submitted an inventory. With the
authority and approval of the court, they sold some of the
properties of the deceased and partitioned the remaining
properties as such, Maxine onehalf (4/8) of the decedent's
Philippine estate and one-eighth (1/8) each to his four children or
12-1/2%
Maxine and her two children moved to defer approval of the
project of partition. The court considered the motion moot
considering that it had already approved the declaration of heirs
and project of partition.
Ethel submitted to the court a certification of the Assistant
Commissioner of Internal Revenue dated October 2, 1979. It was
stated therein that Maxine interposed no objection to the transfer
of the estate to Grimm's heirs. The court noted the certification as
in conformity with its order.
For a period of more than five months, there was no
movement or activity in the intestate case. On April 18, 1980
Juanita Grimm Morris, through Ethel's lawyers, filed a motion for
accounting "so that the Estate properties can be partitioned among
the heirs and the present intestate estate be closed. Maxine's
lawyer was notified of that motion. Before that motion could be
heard, they filed a Petition to annul partition and testate
proceeding No. 134559 for the reason that Maxine and two
children alleged that they were defraud due to the
machinations of the Ethel, that the 1978 Utah compromise
agreement was illegal, that the intestate proceeding is void
because Grimm died testate and that the partition was contrary to
the decedent's wills.
Ethel filed a motion to dismiss the petition. Judge Leonidas denied it
for lack of merit. Ethel then filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition in this Court, praying that the testate proceeding be
dismissed, or alternatively that the two proceedings be
consolidated and heard in Branch 20 and that the matter of the
annulment of the Utah compromise agreement be heard prior to
the petition for probate
ISSUE: Whether the judge committed GADALEJ?

HELD:
No. A testate proceeding is proper in this case because
Grimm died with two wills and "no will shall pass either real
or personal property unless it is proved and allowed"
The probate of the will is mandatory. It is anomalous that the
estate of a person who died testate should be settled in an
intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should be
consolidated with the testate proceeding and the judge
assigned to the testate proceeding should continue hearing the two
cases.
Ethel may file within twenty days from notice of the finality
of this judgment an opposition and answer to the petition
unless she considers her motion to dismiss and other
pleadings sufficient for the purpose. Juanita G. Morris, who
appeared in the intestate case, should be served with copies of
orders, notices and other papers in the testate case.
6
RAFAEL
E.
MANINANG
and
SOLEDAD
L.
MANINANG, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. RICARDO L. PRONOVE, JR., as
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal and BERNARDO
S. ASENETA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-57848 June 19, 1982
FACTS:
Clemencia, left a holographic will which provides that all her
properties shall be inherited by Dra. Maninang with whose family
Clemencia has lived continuously for the last 30 years. The will
also provided that she does not consider Bernardo as his
adopted son. Bernardo, as the adopted son, claims to be the sole
heir of decedent Clemencia Aseneta, instituted intestate
proceedings.
ISSUE:
Was Bernardo preterited?
RULING:
In the instant case, a crucial issue that calls for resolution is
whether under the terms of the decedent's Will, private respondent
had been preterited or disinherited, and if the latter, whether it was

a valid disinheritance. Preterition and disinheritance are two

diverse concepts.
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of
the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they are
not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are
neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited.
Disinheritance is a testamentary disposition depriving any
compulsory heirs of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized
by law.
By virtue of the dismissal of the testate case, the determination
of that controversial issue has not been thoroughly
considered. The conclusion of the trial court was that
Bernardo has been preterited. The SC is of opinion, however,
that from the face of the will, that conclusion is not indubitable.
Such preterition is still questionable. The Special Proceeding is
REMANDED to the lower court.
7 TESTATE ESTATE OF HILARION RAMAGOSA v. RAMAGOSA
Mariano Sumilang filed petition for the probate of document,
alleged to be Hilarion Ramagosas last will and testament,
institutes petitioner as sole heir of the testator. Aside from
opposing the petition for probate, the first set of oppositors
Saturnino and Santiago Ramagosa also claimed that they
were entitled to inherit the estate of the deceased. The
other oppositors representing themselves simply as next of
kin, appropriately prayed only for the disallowance of the
will. Oppositors alleged that ever it was really executed by him,
was revoked by implication of law six years before his death." After
making the will, Hilarion sold to petitioner Mariano and his
brother Mario the parcels of land, at the time of the
testator's death the titles to said lands were no longer in
his name. Petitioner moved to strike out the pleadings as
oppositors have no legal standing; and no valid claim and interest
in the distribution of (the) estate
Trial court: Motion to dismiss is denied for allegations goes into the
intrinsic value of the will and the grounds are without merit.
oppositors have no relationship whatsoever within the fifth degree
as provided by law and therefore the oppositors are totally
strangers to the deceased and motion is stricken out of record.

ISSUE: Whether oppositors have no legal standing; and no valid

claim and interest in the distribution of (the) estate
HELD: The order appealed from is AFFIRMED. The petition
below being for the probate of a will, the court's area of inquiry is
limited to the extrinsic validity thereof. The testator's
testamentary capacity and the compliance with the formal
requisites or solemnities prescribed by law are the only
questions presented for the resolution of the court. Any
inquiry into the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the
will or the legality of any devise or legacy is premature. (Nuguid vs.
Nuguid, G.R. No. L-23445, June 23, 1966).
Oppositors would want the court a quo to dismiss petition for
probate on the ground that the testator had impliedly revoked his
will by selling, prior to his death, the lands disposed of therein.True
or not, the alleged sale is no ground for the dismissal of the
petition for probate. Probate is one thing the validity of the
testamentary provisions is another.iThe first decides the execution
of the document and the testamentary capacity of the testator; the
second relates to descent and distribution.
In their brief, oppositors do not take issue with the court a quo's
finding that they "have no relationship whatsoever within the fifth
degree. They do not attempt to show that they have some interest
in the estate which must be protected. The uncontradicted
evidence, consisting of certified true copies of the parties' baptism
and marriage certificates, support the said court's finding in this
respect.
It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be
allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding he must have
an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be
affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the estate (Ngo
The Hua vs. Chung Kiat Hua, et al., L-17091, September 30, 1963);
and an interested party has been defined as one who would be
benefited by the estate such as an heir or one who has a claim
against the estate like a creditor. (Teotico vs. Del Val, etc., G.R. No.
L- 18753, March 26, 1965.)
The reason for the rule excluding strangers from contesting the will,
is not that thereby the court may be prevented from learning facts
which would justify or necessitate a denial of probate, but rather
that the courts and the litigants should not be molested by
the intervention in the proceedings of persons with no
interest in the estate which would entitle them to be heard
with relation thereto. (Paras vs. Narciso, 35 Phil. 244.)
Sometime after this case was elevated to the Court appellee moved
to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the order appealed from is
interlocutory. Deferred action on the motion until after the brief of
both parties had been filed. The motion, although now practically

academic in view of our resolution of the main issue involved, must

be denied, since the order of the lower court striking out appellants'
opposition to the probate of the will on the ground that they have
no personality to intervene in the case, was final and therefore
appealable order insofar as they were concerned.
8 Remedios (sister) NUGUID V. NUGUID (parents)
TOPIC: PRODUCTION AND ALLOWANCE OF WILL
SUMMARY: a case of preterition of compulsory heirs (parents) thus
the will is null and void. (only one institution was written in the
will)
Preterition consists in the omission in the testators will of the
forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they are not
mentioned therein, or, through mentioned, they are neither
instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited.
FACTS:
- Rosario Nuguid, a resident of Quezon City, died on
December 30, 1962, single, without descendants, legitimate
or illegitimate.
- Surviving her were her legitimate parents, Felix Nuguid
and Paz Salonga Nuguid, and six (6) brothers and
sisters,
namely:
Alfredo,
Federico,
Remedios,
Conrado, Lourdes and Alberto, all surnamed Nuguid.
- Petitioner Remedios Nuguid (SISTER) filed in the CFI
of Rizal a holographic will allegedly executed by
Rosario Nuguid. Petitioner prayed that said will be
admitted to probate and that letters of administration with
the will annexed be issued to her.
- Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid (PARENTS),
entered their opposition to the probate of her will.
Ground therefor, inter alia, is that by the institution of
petitioner Remedios Nuguid as universal heir of the
deceased, oppositors who are compulsory heirs of the
deceased in the direct ascending line were illegally
preterited and that in consequence the institution is
void. (oppositors moved to dismiss on the ground of
absolute preterition)
- The court's order held that "the will in question is a
complete nullity and will perforce create intestacy of the
estate of the deceased Rosario Nuguid" and dismissed the
petition without costs.
- Thus, this appeal

ISSUE: Whether or not the will should be allowed to probate?

(preterition)
HELD: NO, decision affirmed, will is null and void.
RATIO:
- The case is for the probate of a will. The court's area of
inquiry is limited to an examination of, and
resolution on, THE EXTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL.
The due execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary
capacity, and the compliance with the requisites or
solemnities by law prescribed, are the questions solely to be
presented, and to be acted upon, by the court.
- At this stage of the proceedings is NOT CALLED UPON
TO RULE ON THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OR EFFICACY OF
THE PROVISIONS OF THE WILL, the legality of any devise
or legacy therein
o The parties shunted aside the question of whether or
not the will should be allowed probate. For them, the
meat of the case is the intrinsic validity of the will.
o Normally, this comes only after the court has
declared that the will has been duly authenticated.
o But petitioner and oppositors, in the court below and
here on appeal, travelled on the issue of law, to wit:
Is the will intrinsically a nullity?
- If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will,
nothing will be gained.
- These are the practical considerations that induce us to a
belief that we might as well meet head-on the issue of the
validity of the provisions of the will in question.
IMPORTANT: PRETERITION
- The statute we are called upon to apply in Article 854 of the
Civil Code which, in part, provides: ART. 854. The
preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the
compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at
the time of the execution of the will or born after the
death of the testator, shall annul the institution of
heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid
insofar as they are not inofficious. ...
- In this case, deceased Rosario Nuguid left no descendants,
legitimate or illegitimate. But she left forced heirs in the
direct ascending line her parents, now oppositors Felix
Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid.
- AND, THE WILL COMPLETELY OMITS BOTH OF THEM:
They thus received nothing by the testament; tacitly,
they were deprived of their legitime; neither were
they expressly disinherited.

THIS IS A CLEAR CASE OF PRETERITION.

The one-sentence will here institutes petitioner as the sole,
universal heir nothing more. No specific legacies or
bequests are therein provided for. It is in this posture that
we say that the nullity is complete. Perforce, Rosario Nuguid
died intestate.
Because, the nullification of such institution of universal heir
without any other testamentary disposition in the will
amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written.
As aforesaid, there is no other provision in the will before us
except the institution of petitioner as universal heir. That
institution, by itself, is null and void. And, intestate
succession ensues.
The disputed order, we observe, declares the will in
question "a complete nullity". Article 854 of the Civil
Code in turn merely nullifies "the institution of heir".
Considering, however, that the will before us solely provides
for the institution of petitioner as universal heir, and nothing
more, the result is the same. The entire will is null.

9 Constantino C. ACAIN, petitioner vs.

Hon. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
G.R. No. 72706, October 27, 1987
FACTS:
Constantino Acain filed on the Regional Trial Court a
petition for the probate of the will of his late Uncle,
Nemesio Acain, on the premise that the latter died leaving a will
in which the former and his brothers and sisters were instituted as
heirs. After the petition was set for hearing in the lower court,
Virginia Fernandez and Rosa Diongson, a legally adopted
daughter and the widow of the deceased respectively, filed a
motion to dismiss on the grounds that: (1) Constantino Acain has no
legal capacity to institute the proceedings; (2) he is merely a
universal heir; and (3) the widow and the adopted daughter
have been pretirited. Said motion was denied as well as the
subsequent motion for reconsideration. Consequently, Fernandez
and Diongson filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari
and prohibition with preliminary injunction which was subsequently
referred to the Intermediate Appellate Court. IAC granted Fernandez
and Diongsons petition and ordered the trial court to dismiss the
petition for probate of the will. Due to the denial of Acains motion
for reconsideration, he then filed a petition for review on certiorari
before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Virginia Fernandez and Rosa Diongson have been
pretirited.
HELD:
Article 854 of the Civil Code:
The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory
heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution
of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the
institution of heir; but the devisees and legacies shall be valid
insofar as they are not inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the
institution shall be effectual, without prejudice to the right of
representation.
Preterition consists in the omission in the testators will of the
forced heirs or anyone of them either because they are not
mentioned therein, or though mentioned, they are neither
instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. Insofar as the
widow is concerned, Article 854 may not apply as she does
not ascend or descend from the testator, although she is a
compulsory heir. However, the same thing cannot be said of the
legally adopted daughter. Under Article 39 of P.D. No. 603, known
as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, adoption gives to the
adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a
legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted
person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that she
was totally omitted and preterited in the will and that both the
adopted child and the widow were deprived of at least their
legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly
disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of the
legally adopted child.
The universal institution of Acain together with his brothers and
sisters to the entire inheritance of the testator results in totally
abrogating the will because the nullification of such institution of
universal heirs without any other testamentary disposition in the
will amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written.
10 Garcia v. Vasquez

G.R. No. L-26808 March 28, 1969

Facts:
1. Gliceria del Rosario executed 2 wills, one in June 1956,
written in Spanish, a language she knew an spoke. The
other will was executed in December 1960 consisting of
only one page, and written in Tagalog. The witnesses to the

1960 will declared that the will was first read 'silently' by
the testatrix before signing it. The probate court admitted the
will.

2. The oppositors alleged that the as of December 1960, the

eyesight of the deceased was so poor and defective that she
could not have read the provisions contrary to the testimony of the
witnesses.
Issue: Whether or not the will is valid?
RULING: The will is not valid. If the testator is blind, Art. 808 of
the New Civil Code (NCC) should apply.If the testator is blind or
incapable of reading, he must be apprised of the contents
of the will for him to be able to have the opportunityto
object if the provisions therein are not in accordance with
his wishes.
The testimony of her opthalmologist established that
notwithstanding an operation to remove her cataract and being
fitted with the lenses, this did not improve her vision. Her vision
remained mainly for viewing distant objects and not for
reading. There was no evidence that her vision improved at
the time of the execution of the 2nd will. Hence, she was
incapable of reading her own will. The admission of the will
to probate is therefor erroneous.
11 Apolonia Banayad Frianela v. Servillano Banayad, Jr.,
G.R.No. 169700, July 30, 2009

13 Heirs of Jesus Fran v. Hon. Bernardo LL. SalasG.R. No. L53546; June 25, 1992
Facts:
Remedios Tiosejo died with neither descendants nor ascendants;
she left real and personalproperties located in Cebu City,
Ormoc City and Puerto Bello, Merida, Leyte. She left a last
will and testament wherein she bequeathed to her

collateral relatives(b,s,n,n) all herproperties. She designated

Rosario Tan or, upon the latter's death, Jesus Fran, as
executor.Jesus Fran filed a pet for the probate of Remedios' will.
The pet alleged that Rosario wasnot physically well. Tan signed a
waiver in favor of Fran on hte third page of the pet.The PRs
(sisters of the deceased) filed a manifestation, alleging that they
needed time tostudy the petition bec. some heirs have been
intentionally omitted. PRs did not file anyopposition. The pet
thus became uncontested. The probate court rendered a
decisionadmitting the will to probate. Pet filed an Inventory of the
Estate, copies thereof werefurnished to the PRs. A Project of
Partition was submitted by hte exec to the court. The PRsstill did
not make any objections. TC issued its Order approving the
partition. Thereafter,the aforesaid branch(which issued the order)
was converted to a Juvenile and DomesticRelations Court.PRs filed
with the new branch a MR of the probate judgment and the order of
partition.Pets challenged the juris of the court. Respondent Judge
issued an order declaring thetestamentary dispos as void.
Issue: WON respondent Judge committed grave abuse of
discretion?
Ruling:
1. Yes. Respondent Judge committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when he
granted the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and
thereafter set aside the probate judgment of 13 November
1972 in Sp. Proc. No. 3309-R, declared thesubject will of the
testatrix a forgery, nullified the testamentary dispositions therein
andordered the conversion of the testate proceedings into one of
intestacy.After the probate court rendered its decision on 13
November 1972, and there having been no claim presented
despite publication of notice to creditors, petitioner Fran
submitted aProject of Partition which private respondent
Maria M. Vda. de Gandiongco voluntarilysigned and to
which private respondent Espina expressed her conformity
through acertification filed with the probate court. Assuming
for the sake of argument that privaterespondents did not receive a
formal notice of the decision as they claim in their OmnibusMotion
for Reconsideration, these acts nevertheless constitute indubitable

proof of theirprior actual knowledge of the same. A formal notice

would have been an idle ceremony. Intestate proceedings, a
decision logically precedes the project of partition, which
isnormally an implementation of the will and is among the
last operative acts to terminatethe proceedings. If private
respondents did not have actual knowledge of the decision,
theyshould have desisted from performing the above acts and
instead demanded frompetitioner Fran the fulfillment of his alleged
promise to show them the will. The sameconclusion refutes and
defeats the plea that they were not notified of the order
authorizingthe Clerk of Court to receive the evidence and that the
Clerk of Court did not notify them of the date of the reception of
evidence. Besides, such plea must fail because privaterespondents
were present when the court dictated the said order.
14 CYNTHIA C. ALABAN v. COURT OF APPEALS
FRANCISCO H. PROVIDO,
G.R. No. 156021, September 23, 2005 SUPRA

and

FACTS:
1. Respondent Francisco Provido filed a petition for the
probate of the Last Will and Testament of the late
Soledad Provido Elevencionado
a. ALLEGATION: he was the heir of the decedent and the
executor of her will.
b. RTCs RULING: allowed the probate of the will and directed
the issuance of letters testamentary to respondent
2. Petitioners after 4 months filed a motion for the
reopening of the probate proceedings
a. CLAIMS:
1)
They are the intestate heirs of the decedent.
2)
RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition due
to non-payment of the correct docket fees, defective
publication, and lack of notice to the other heirs.
3)
The will could not have been probated because:
a) the signature of the decedent was forged;
b) the will was not executed in accordance with
law, that is, the witnesses failed to sign below the
attestation clause;
c) the decedent lacked testamentary capacity to
execute and publish a will;
d) the will was executed by force and under duress and
improper pressure;

e) the decedent had no intention to make a will at the

time of affixing of her signature; and
f) she did not know the properties to be disposed of,
having included in the will properties which no longer
belonged to her.
b. RTCs Ruling: denied motion
1)
petitioners were deemed notified of the hearing by
publication and that the deficiency in the payment of
docket fees is not a ground for the outright dismissal of
the petition.
2)
RTCs Decision was already final and executory even
before petitioners filing of the motion to reopen
3. Petitioners filed a petition to annule RTCs decision
a. CLAIM: there was a compromise agreement between
petitioners and respondents and they learnt the
probate proceeding only in July 2001
b. CAs RULING: petition dismissed
1)
no showing that petitioners failed to avail of or resort
to the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for
relief from judgment, or other appropriate remedies
through no fault of their own
ISSUE: W/N the allowance of the will to probate should be annulled
for failure to mention the petitioners as parties
HELD: No
1. Probate of a will is considered action in rem
a. Under the Rules of Court, any executor, devisee, or
legatee named in a will, or any other person interested
in the estate may, at any time after the death of the
testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have
the will allowed. Notice of the time and place for
proving the will must be published for three (3)
consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province as well as furnished to
the designated or other known heirs, legatees,
and devisees of the testator
b. Petitioners became parties due to the publication of the
notice of hearing
2. The filing of motion to reopen is similar to a motion for new
trial
a. The ruling became final and executor because the
motion was filed out of time
b. Given that they knew of the decision 4 months after they
could have filed a petition for relief from judgment after
the denial of their motion to reopen.

3. Petition for annulment of judgment must still fail for

failure to comply with the substantive requisites,
a. An action for annulment of judgment is a remedy in law
independent of the case where the judgment sought to
be annulled was rendered
b. PURPOSE: to have the final and executory judgment set
aside so that there will be a renewal of litigation.
c. 2 Grounds: extrinsic fraud, and lack of jurisdiction or
denial of due process
d. An action to annul a final judgment on the ground
of fraud lies only if the fraud is extrinsic or
collateral in character
i. Extrinsic if it prevents a party from having a trial or
from presenting his entire case to the court, or where
it operates upon matters pertaining not to the
judgment itself but to the manner in which it is
procured.
4. Notice is required to be personally given to known heirs,
legatees, and devisees of the testator
a. the will states that the respondent was instituted
as the sole heir of the decedent thus he has no
legal obligation to mention petitioners in the
petition for probate or personally notify them

17 DE GUZMAN V. ANGELES JUNE 2, 1988

TOPIC: JURISDICTION IS ACQUIRED
(1) OVER THE PROCEEDING
(2) OVER THE ESTATE
(3) OVER THE INTERESTED PARTIES

DOCTRINE: The requirement of a hearing and the notification to all

the known heirs and other interested parties as to the date thereof
is essential to the validity of the proceeding for the appointment of
an administrator "in order that no person may be deprived of his
right or property without due process of law" (Eusebio v. Valmores,
97 Phil. 163).

FACTS:
- Respondent Elaine G. de Guzman (surviving spouse of the
decedent) filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate
estate of Manolito de Guzman, before the RTC of Makati.
- Also, ELAINE G. DE GUZMAN filed a motion for writ of
possession over five (5) vehicles registered under the
name of Manolito de Guzman, alleged to be conjugal
properties of the de Guzman's but which are at present in

the possession of the private respondent's father-in- law,

herein petitioner Pedro de Guzman.
Elaine D.G. filed her "Ex-Parte Motion to Appoint Petitioner
as Special Administratrix of the Estate of Manolito de
Guzman."
The motion was set for hearing but not notice of such order
was given to Pedro D.G.
The lower court granted the Elaine D.G.s motion to be
appointed as special administratrix. Also an Ex-Parte Motion
for Assistance was granted in favor of Elaine to assist in the
preserving the estate (writ of possession)
Pedro D.G. resisted when Deputy Sheriffs Jose B. Flora and
Honorio Santos tried to take the subject vehicles on the
ground that they were his personal properties.
o this resulted in a "near shoot-out between members
of the Makati Police, who were to maintain peace and
order, and the CAPCOM soldiers who were ostensibly
aiding respondent sheriffs and Elaine G. de Guzman"
o "the timely arrival of Mayor Jejomar Binay of Makati
defused the very volatile situation which resulted in
an agreement between the parties that the bulldozer,
sought to be taken, be temporarily placed in the
custody of Mayor Binay, while the parties seek
clarification of the order from respondent Judge
Zosimo Angeles the next day, June 9, 1981 at 10:30
a.m."
In the conference held before the respondent court attended
by the counsels for both parties, the order was clarified to
the effect that the order "must be merely to take and
preserve assets admittedly belonging to the estate,
but not properties, the ownership of which is claimed
by third persons."
Pedro D.G. then filed a manifestation listing properties which
he claimed to be his own.
The instant petition was filed to annul the lower court's
orders, 2 previous decisions (administratix and ex-parte
motion for assistance), and a TRO was issued enjoining such
decisions

PEDRO D.G.s arguments

- He contends that the order is a patent nullity, the
respondent court not having acquired jurisdiction to appoint
a special administratrix because the petition for the
settlement of the estate of Manolito de Guzman was not yet
set for hearing and published for three consecutive weeks,
as mandated by the Rules of Court.

the appointment of a special administratrix constitutes an

abuse of discretion for having been made without giving
petitioner and other parties an opportunity to oppose said
appointment.
the petitioner alleges that the immediate grant of the
motion praying for the court's assistance in the preservation
of the estate of the deceased, "without notice to the
petitioner Pedro de Guzman, and its immediate
implementation on the very same day by respondent Elaine
G. de Guzman with the assistance of respondents deputy
sheriffs, at no other place but at the home of the petitioner
Pedro de Guzman, are eloquent proofs that all the
antecedent events were intended solely to deprive
petitioner de Guzman of his property without due process of
law."

ISSUE: whether or not a probate court may appoint a special

administratrix and issue a writ of possession of alleged
properties of a decedent for the preservation of the estate in a
petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of the said
deceased person even before the probate court causes notice to
be served upon all interested parties pursuant to section 3, Rule
79 of the Revised Rules of Court.
HELD: PETITION GRANTED. The questioned orders are set aside.
The case is remanded to the lower court. The court cant
appoint a special administratix and issue a writ of possession if
no notice was served to all interested parties.
RATIO:
- In the case of Santos v. Castillo (64 Phil. 211) we ruled that
before a court may acquire jurisdiction over the case for the
probate of a will and the administration of the properties left
by a deceased person, the application must allege the
residence of the deceased and other indispensable facts or
circumstances and that the applicant is the executor named
in the will or is the person who had custody of the will to be
probated.
o the respondent court acquired jurisdiction over the
proceedings upon the filing of a petition for the
settlement of an intestate estate by the private
respondent since the petition had alleged all the
jurisdictional facts, the residence of the deceased
person, the possible heirs and creditors and the
probable value of the estate of the deceased

Manolito de Guzman pursuant to Section 2, Rule 79

of the Revised Rules of Court.
However, there is a difference between the jurisdiction of
the probate court over the proceedings for the
administration of an estate and its jurisdiction over the
persons who are interested in the settlement of the estate of
the deceased person.
The court may also have jurisdiction over the "estate" of the
deceased person but the determination of the properties
comprising that estate must follow established rules.
o Section 3, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides: Court to set time for hearing. Notice
thereof. When a petition for letters of
administration is filed in the court having jurisdiction,
such court shall fix a time and place for hearing the
petition, and shall cause notice thereof to be given to
the known heirs and creditors of the decedent, and to
any other persons believed to have an interest in the
estate, in the manner provided in sections 3 and 4 of
Rule 76.
It is very clear from this provision that the probate court
must cause notice through publication of the petition after it
receives the same. The purpose of this notice is to bring all
the interested persons within the court's jurisdiction so that
the judgment therein becomes binding on all the world.
Where no notice as required by Section 3, Rule 79 of
the Rules of Court has been given to persons
believed to have an interest in the estate of the
deceased person; the proceeding for the settlement
of the estate is void and should be annulled. The
requirement as to notice is essential to the validity of
the proceeding in that no person may be deprived of
his right to property without due process of law.
(Eusebio v. Valmores, 96 Phil. 163).
notice through publication of the petition for the settlement
of the estate of a deceased person is jurisdictional, the
absence of which makes court orders affecting other
persons, subsequent to the petition void and subject to
annulment
IN THIS CASE, no notice as mandated by section 3,
Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court was caused to
be given by the probate court before it acted on the
motions of the private respondent to be appointed as
special administratrix, to issue a writ of possession of
alleged properties of the deceased person in the

widow's favor, and to grant her motion for assistance

to preserve the estate of Manolito de Guzman.
The "explanation" which we required of the respondent
Judge for his apparent haste in issuing the questioned
orders, states: 10. In issuing the subject Orders,
undersigned acted in the honest conviction that it would be
to the best interest of the estate without unduly prejudicing
any interested party or third person. x x x
o This explanation while seemingly plausible does not
sufficiently explain the disregard of the Rule. If
indeed, the respondent court had the welfare of both
the estate and the person who have interest in the
estate, then it could have caused notice to be given
immediately as mandated by the Revised Rules of
Court.
o All interested persons including herein petitioner who
is the biggest creditor of the estate listed in the
Petition (P850,240.80) could have participated in the
proceedings especially so, because the respondent
immediately filed a motion to have herself appointed
as administratrix.
A special administrator has been defined as the
"representative of decedent appointed by the
probate court to care for and preserve his estate
until an executor or general administrator is
appointed
The petitioner as creditor of the estate has a similar interest
in the preservation of the estate as the private respondent
who happens to be the widow of deceased Manolito de
Guzman. Hence, the necessity of notice as mandated by the
Rules of Court.

Teotico vs Del Val

GR No. L18753, March 26, 1965
FACTS:
Maria Mortera died on July 1955 leaving properties worth P600,000.
She executed a will written in Spanish, affixed her signature and
acknowledged before Notary Public by her and the witnesses.
Among the legacies made in the will was the P20,000 for Rene
Teotico who was married to the testatrixs niece, Josefina Mortera.

The usufruct of Marias interest in the Calvo Building were left to

the said spouses and the ownership thereof was left in equal parts
to her grandchildren, the legitimate children of said spouses.
Josefina was likewise instituted, as sole and universal heir to all the
remainder of her properties not otherwise disposed by will. Vicente
Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will but was opposed
by Ana del Val Chan, claiming that she was an adopted child of
Francisca (deceased sister of Maria) and an acknowledged natural
child of Jose (deceased brother of Maria), that said will was not
executed as required by law and that Maria as physically and
mentally incapable to execute the will at the time of its execution
and was executed under duress, threat, or influence of fear.

ISSUE: WON defendant has right to intervene in this proceeding.

HELD:
It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed
to intervene in a probate proceeding is that he must have an
interest in the estate, will or in the property to be affected by either
as executor or as a claimant of the estate and be benefited by such
as an heir or one who has a claim against it as creditor. Under the
terms of the will, defendant has no right to intervene because she
has no such interest in the estate either as heir, executor or
administrator because it did not appear therein any provision
designating her as heir/ legatee in any portion of the estate. She
could have acquired such right if she was a legal heir of the
deceased but she is not under the CIVIL CODE. Even if her
allegations were true, the law does not give her any right to
succeed the estate of the deceased sister of both Jose and
Francisca because being an illegitimate child she is prohibited by
law from succeeding to the legitimate relatives of her natural father
and that relationship established by adoption is limited solely to the
adopter and adopted and does not extend to the relatives of the
adopting parents except only as expressly provided by law. As a
consequence, she is an heir of the adopter but not of the relatives
of the adopter.

Hence, defendant has no right to intervene either as testamentary

or as legal heir in the probate proceeding.